Holding

The High Court was justified in reversing the trial court's acquittal because the prosecution's evidence, including credible injured eyewitness testimony, forensic findings, and a valid ballistic report, established guilt beyond reasonable doubt, satisfying the requirement of substantial and compelling reasons for interference.

Summary

The case involves the murder of five members of the Shukla family in Hamirpur, Uttar Pradesh, where seven accused were initially acquitted by the trial court. The State appealed, and the Allahabad High Court convicted all accused under Sections 148, 149, 302 and 307 IPC, rejecting the trial court's findings on motive, eyewitness credibility, FIR discrepancies, weapon recovery, and the admissibility of a ballistic report. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in overturning the acquittal, emphasizing that substantial and compelling reasons exist when injured eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence, and corroborative documentary material are reliable. It held that motive is secondary when direct eyewitness evidence is strong, that the FIR and tehreer discrepancies are minor and do not vitiate the prosecution case, and that the ballistic report complied with Section 293 CrPC. The Court also affirmed the existence of an unlawful assembly with a common object under Section 149 IPC and validated the weapon recovery. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the criminal appeals, confirming the High Court's convictions and sentences, and also dismissed the informant's SLP and writ petition.

Issues considered

The High Court's jurisdiction to reverse an order of acquittal and the standard of "substantial and compelling reasons" required.
Whether the lack of a proven motive defeats the prosecution when injured eyewitnesses provide direct evidence.
The credibility of injured eyewitnesses PW-1 and PW-2 in light of alleged inconsistencies in their statements, injuries, and timing of FIR filing.
The admissibility of the ballistic (FSL) report under Section 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The existence of an unlawful assembly and a common object under Section 149 of the IPC.
The validity of weapon and ammunition recovery, including the identification of the 8x60‑bore rifle as a .315‑bore rifle.
The relevance of the fax sent by the Superintendent of Police and its impact on the prosecution case.
The effect of procedural irregularities in the investigation on the overall guilt of the accused.

Legislation cited

Arms Act, 1959s. 25, s. 30
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 293, s. 378, s. 386
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 148, s. 149, s. 302, s. 307

Subjects

murderinjured eyewitnessappeal against acquittalunlawful assemblySection 149 IPCballistic reportSection 293 CrPCweapon recoveryforensic evidencemotiveFIR discrepancies

Judgment

[2022] 12 S.C.R. 1035 1035

ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL A
v.
STATE OF U.P.
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 946-947 of 2019)
NOVEMBER 04, 2022 B

[UDAY UMESH LALIT, CJI, S. RAVINDRA BHAT
AND PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 – s. 302 r/w s.149, s.307 r/w s.149 and
s.148 – Arms Act, 1959 – ss.25 and 30 – Code of Criminal C
Procedure, 1973 – s.293 – Murder of five persons – Seven accused
– The deceased belonged to or were associated with the same family;
two of them were brothers, the third was their minor son and the
other two were their close family friends – Trial Court acquitted all
the accused – Appeal against acquittal – High Court reversed the
findings of the trial court and convicted all the accused under ss.148, D
302 read with 149, 307 read with 149 of the IPC, and sentenced
them to life imprisonment – Propriety of – Held: High Court was
justified in exercising its appellate jurisdiction in reversing the order
of acquittal as there were certain glaring mistakes, and distorted
conclusions in the decision of the Trial Court – High Court was E
duty-bound to reverse the decision as there existed very substantial
and compelling reasons to do so, failing which it would have caused
a grave miscarriage of justice – Prosecution proved the presence
of PW-1 at the place of occurrence and of him being an injured
eye-witness to the incident – Facts narrated in the FIR were fully
F
corroborated by much of the documentary evidence and were fully
in consonance with the testimony of the prosecution witnesses –
The High Court was correct in rejecting the submission that the
prosecution failed to prove a common object and unlawful assembly
– The arrests of A6, A10, A7 and A8 were concurrently and
consistently spoken by all the witnesses, PW-10, PW-11 and PW-12 G
– Conclusion drawn by trial court that the arrest and recovery were
doubtful were glaring mistakes – Rejection of the FSL (ballistic)
report was another grave mistake of the Trial Court – Conclusion
of Trial Court that the ballistic report was inadmissible as it is not in
consonance with the requirement of s.293 Cr.P.C. was entirely wrong
H
1035
1036 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A – The ballistic report was in complete compliance of the statutory
provision – High Court had to necessarily step in to prevent a grave
miscarriage of justice.
Appeal – Appeal against acquittal by trial court – Jurisdiction
of the High Court – Discussed.
B Criminal Law – Motive – Sufficiency or insufficiency of motive
does not have a direct bearing on the actual evidence against the
accused, particularly when the prosecution relies on direct evidence
of injured eyewitnesses.
Criminal Law – Investigation – Defective investigation by
C investigating authorities by itself does vitiate the case of the
prosecution when there are credible eye-witness testimonies as well
as other compelling pieces of evidence.
Evidence – Witness – Testimony of injured eye-witness –
Appreciation – Held: When there are credible ocular witnesses whose
D statements are corroborated by other contemporaneous evidence,
certain minor variations, such as non-recovery of blood-stained
clothes, certain other weapons etc. will not be fatal to the case of
the prosecution.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.293 – Statutory
E requirement under – Compliance – FSL (ballistic) report – On facts,
the report came from the office of the Assistant Director of a Forensic
Lab bearing his seal – Conclusion of the Trial Court that the ballistic
report was inadmissible as it was not in consonance with the
requirement of Section 293 Cr.P.C., is entirely wrong – Ballistic report
F was in complete compliance of the statutory provision – Trial Court
erred in rejecting the ballistic report.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. In the instant case, the High Court was justified
in exercising its appellate jurisdiction in reversing the order of
G acquittal as there were certain glaring mistakes, and distorted
conclusions in the decision of the Trial Court. The High Court
was duty-bound to reverse the decision as there existed very
substantial and compelling reasons to do so, failing which it would
have caused a grave miscarriage of justice. [Para 174][1109-C]
H
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1037

2. Even though the prosecution placed material to establish A
the existence of a motive on the part of the accused party to
murder five members of the Shukla family and associates, the
motive part is treated secondary in view of the fact that this is a
case of direct evidence of injured eye-witnesses. [Para 174][1109-
D-E]
B
3. The place of the incident is not disputed. In fact, the Trial
Court itself returned findings about the first as well as the second
event of the incident. These findings were affirmed by the High
Court. Therefore, the only question related to the persons
involved and the manner of commission of the offence. [Para
174][1109-E-F] C

4. Having examined the contentions relating to (a)
discrepancies in the number of dead bodies brought to the hospital
(b) improbability of the time taken to prepare the tehreer (c)
alleged omissions in the FIR (d) and the discharge timing
mentioned in the Bed Head Ticket, casting doubt on the time of D
lodging the FIR, it is found that the prosecution has explained all
the discrepancies beyond a reasonable doubt. The conclusions
of the Trial Court were based on surmises and conjectures, and
therefore, the High Court is justified in reversing the judgment
of the Trial Court. [Para 174][1109-G-H; 1110-A] E
5. Having considered the four submissions in support of
the contention that PW-1 and PW-2 are not the eyewitnesses to
the incident, being (a) discrepancy on the bullets marks on the
jonga, (b) bullet injuries on the deceased and eyewitnesses on
the basis of PW-1 statement, (c) timing of the X-ray and Bed Head F
Ticket, and (d) evidence relating to the failure of electricity at
the time of the incident, it is found that these submissions are
contrary to evidence on record. The prosecution has proved the
presence of PW-1 at the place of occurrence and of him being an
injured eye-witness to the incident. The inferences drawn by the
Trial Court were based on a misreading of the evidence, and G
therefore, the High Court was obliged to reverse the finding to
prevent a grave miscarriage of justice. [Para 174][1110-B-C]
6. Having examined the alternative story of the defence
based on the fax, said to have been sent from the office of the SP
H
1038 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A and introduced through the defence witness DW-3, it is clear that
the facts mentioned in the fax are not supported by any evidence.
On the contrary, the facts narrated in the FIR are fully
corroborated by much of the documentary evidence and are fully
in consonance with the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
As there is no evidence to corroborate the events mentioned in
B
the fax and the evidence of DW-3 does not inspire confidence, to
say the least. The conclusion of the Trial Court that the
prosecution could not prove the case is totally erroneous. Such a
finding is a glaring mistake as held by this Court in Chandrappa
and Ors. v. State of Karnataka obligating the High Court to interfere
C with an order of acquittal. [Para 174][1110-D-F]
7. The High Court was correct in rejecting the submission
that the prosecution failed to prove a common object and the
unlawful assembly. The decision of the High Court on this issue
is unexceptionable on fact and law. [Para 174][1111-A-B]
D 8. The conclusion of the Trial Court about the recovery of
the weapon is based on a perverse finding as it misunderstood
the 8x60-bore rifle to be distinct from a 0.315 bore rifle. The
technical material prove beyond doubt that there is no difference
at all. The distinction is only in the measurement system, one
E being British and the other being the Continental system. In view
of such a perverse finding, the High Court had very substantial
and compelling reasons to reverse the findings of the Trial Court.
[Para 174][1111-B-D]
9. The arrests of Naseem (A6), Bhan Singh (A10), Shyam
F Singh (A7) and Sahab Singh (A8) were concurrently and
consistently spoken by all the witnesses, PW-10, PW-11 and PW-
12. The conclusion drawn by the Trial Court that the arrest and
recovery were doubtful were glaring mistakes. The High Court
was, therefore, completely justified in reversing the decision of
the Trial Court. [Para 174][1111-D-E]
G
10. The rejection of the FSL (ballistic) report is another
grave mistake of the Trial Court. The conclusion of the Trial Court
that the ballistic report is inadmissible as it is not in consonance

H
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1039

with the requirement of Section 293 Cr.P.C. is entirely wrong. A
The ballistic report is in complete compliance of the statutory
provision. The High Court had to necessarily step in to prevent
a grave miscarriage of justice. [Para 174][1111-F-G]
M.G.Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra [1963] 2 SCR
405 – followed. B
Chandrappa and Ors v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4
SCC 415 : [2007] 2 SCR 630; Ghurey Lal v. State of
UP (2008) 10 SCC 450 : [2008] 11 SCR 499; Amzad
Ali Alias Amzad Kha and Ors v. State of Assam (2003) 6
SCC 270; Bhargavan and Ors v. State of Kerala (2004) C
12 SCC 414 : [2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 535; Bhupendra
Singh and Ors v. State of U.P. (2009) 12 SCC 447 :
[2009] 6 SCR 262 and State of Himachal Pradesh v.
Mast Ram (2004) 8 SCC 660 : [2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 269
– relied on.
D
State of U.P. v. Gokaran and Ors (1984) Supp SCC
482; Masalti v. State of U.P. [1964] 8 SCR 133; Praveen
Kumar v. State of Karnataka (2003) 12 SCC 199;
Menoka Malik and Ors v. State of West Bengal and Ors
(2019) 18 SCC 721 : [2018] 10 SCR 707; N.
Vijaykumar v. State of Tamil Nadu (2021) 3 SCC 687; E
Nawab Ali v. The State of U.P. (1974) 4 SCC 600 :
[1974] 3 SCR 734; State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Charan
and Ors. (2013) 12 SCC 76 : [2013] 8 SCR 336; Shivaji
Genu Mohite v. The State of Maharashtra (1973) 3 SCC
219; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kishanpal and Others F
(2008) 16 SCC 73: [2008] 11 SCR 1048; Sheo Shankar
Singh v. State of Jharkhand and Anr. (2011) 3 SCC
654 : [ 2011] 4 SCR 312; Darbara Singh v. State of
Punjab (2012) 10 SCC476 : [2012] 7 SCR 541; Rammi
Alia Rameshwar v. State of M.P. (1999) 8 SCC 649 :
[1999] 3 Suppl. SCR 1; Abdul Sayeed v. State of G
Madhya Pradesh (2010) 10 SCC 259 : [2010]
13 SCR 311; Rajendra Alia Rajappa & Ors v. State of
Karnataka (2021) 6 SCC 178; Rana Pratap and Ors.
v. State of Haryana (1983) 3 SCC 327; Karnel Singh v.
H
1040 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A State of M.P.(1995) 5 SCC 518 : [1995] 2 Suppl.
SCR 629; C. Muniappan and Others v. State of Tamil
Nadu (2010) 9 SCC 567 : [2010] 10 SCR 262; Saddik
alias Lalo Gulam Hussein Shaikh and Ors v. State of
Gujarat (2016) 10 SCC 663 : [2016] 5 SCR 421;
Lakshman Singh v. State of Bihar (2021) 9 SCC 191
B
and M Nageswara Reddy v. State of AP 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 268 – referred to.
W.H.B. Smith, Mauser Rifles and Pistols (The
Stackpole Company, Pennsylvania, United States of
America, 4th edn, 1954, pg nos. 156,157) – referred
C to.
Case Law Reference
(1984) Supp SCC 482 referred to Para 44
[1964] 8 SCR 133 referred to Para 52
D
(2003) 12 SCC 199 referred to Para 52
[2018] 10 SCR 707 referred to Para 52
(2021) 3 SCC 687 referred to Para 56
[1974] 3 SCR 734 referred to Para 60.2
E
[2013] 8 SCR 336 referred to Para 60.2
[2007] 2 SCR 630 relied on Para 74
[1963] 2 SCR 405 followed Para 75

F [2008] 11 SCR 499 relied on Para 76
(1973) 3 SCC 219 referred to Para 82
[2008] 11 SCR 1048 referred to Para 83
[2011] 4 SCR 312 referred to Para 84
G [2012] 7 SCR 541 referred to Para 84
[1999] 3 Suppl. SCR 173 referred to Para 100
[2010] 13 SCR 311 referred to Para 115
(2021) 6 SCC 178 referred to Para 116
H (1983) 3 SCC 327 referred to Para 134
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1041

[1995] 2 Suppl. SCR 629 referred to Para 140 A
[2010] 10 SCR 262 referred to Para 141
(2003) 6 SCC 270 relied on Para 143
[2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 535 relied on Para 144
[2009] 6 SCR 262 relied on Para 145 B
[2016] 5 SCR 421 referred to Para 146
(2021) 9 SCC 191 referred to Para 164
[2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 269 relied on Para 170
C
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
Nos. 946-947 of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.04.2019 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Government Appeal No.5123 of 2002 and
Criminal Revision No.1548 of 2002.
D
With
Criminal Appeal Nos. 1030-1031, 1046-1047, 1269-1270, 1804-
1805, 1980-1981, 1279-1280 of 2019, slp (crl) no.10742 of 2019, w.p.
(crl) no. 57 of 2022.
Harin P. Raval, Siddhartha Dave, Ms. Sonia Mathur, Ms. E
Aishwarya Bhati, Vishvajit Singh, Jayant Muthuraj, Ratnakar Dash, Sr.
Advs., Shiv Kumar Pandey, Abhay Raj Singh Chandel, Chandrashekhar
A. Chakalabbi, Awanish Kumar, Abhinav Garg, D. Girish Kumar, Kumar
Vinayakam Gupta, Kartikey Kanojiya, M/s. Dharmaprabhas Law
Associates, Sandeep Jha, Arjun D. Singh, Ashish Singh, Dharmendra F
Kumar Sinha, Uday Prakash Yadav, Simarjeet Singh Saluja, Ms. Prerna
Dhall, Noor Rampal, Ms. Aastha Mehta, Ms. Ishita Sinha, Rohit Pandey,
Murari Tiwari, Ramjee Pandey, Ms. Manisha Chava, Rustam Singh
Chauhan, Ms. B.L.N. Shivani, Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Ms. Harshita
Raghuvanshi, Ms. Shreyase Aggrwal, Ashiwan Mishra, Kamlendra
Mishra, Shashank Singh, Anupam Chaudhary, Manoj Kumar Dwivedi, G
Mrinal Kumar Sharma, Ms. Bansuri Swaraj, Ms. Ana Upadhyay, Akash
Singh, Ms. Manya Hasija, Prem Sunder Jha, Pankj Bist, Krishnanand
Pandeya, Manish Kumar, Anshuman Srivastava, Naresh Kumar, Advs.
for the appearing parties.
H
1042 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.
1. These Criminal Appeals are by seven accused convicted and
sentenced to life by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad for the
murder of five persons. The deceased belonged to or were associated
B
with the same family; two of them were brothers, the third was their
minor son and the other two were their close family friends. Apart from
these criminal appeals, there is also a Special Leave Petition filed by the
informant (PW-1), who is the sole surviving brother in the family, praying
for enhancement of the sentence from life to death and also a Writ
C Petition seeking transfer of accused no. 5 to a jail outside Uttar Pradesh
for serving out the sentence in lieu of his influence in the State.
2.1 The judgment of the High Court was rendered in an appeal
against acquittal of all the accused by the Trial Court1. The High Court
by its judgment2 impugned herein reversed the findings of the Trial Court
D and convicted all the accused for the offences under Sections 148, 302
read with 149, 307 read with 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 3 and
sentenced them to life imprisonment. The details of the conviction and
sentences are as under.
2.2 All these accused were sentenced to undergo life imprisonment
E for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and to pay
a fine of Rs. 20,000/- each, in default to undergo six months additional
simple imprisonment. The accused were sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for three years for the offence under Section 148 IPC and
to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- each and in default to undergo simple
F imprisonment of six months. All the accused were sentenced to undergo
ten years rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 307 read
with149 IPC and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each, in default to undergo
six months simple imprisonment.
2.3 The acquittal of Ashok Kumar Singh Chandel(A5) under
G Sections 379 and 404 IPC by the Trial Court was upheld. Further, the

1
Court of the Upper Sessions Judge, Hamirpur; ST No. 145/2000, 146/2000 and 147/
2000 dated 15.07.2002.
2
In Government Appeal No. 5123/2002 and Criminal Revision No. 1548/2002 dated
19.04.2019.
3
H hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’.
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1043
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

acquittal of accused Sahab Singh (A8) for an offence under Section 25 A
of the Arms Act, 19594 and the acquittal of accused Ashok Singh
Chandel(A5) for an offence under Section 30 of the Arms Act was also
confirmed by the High Court without any variation. With these findings,
the Criminal Appeal of the State and the Criminal Revision of the
informant (PW-1) were substantially allowed.
B
3. Challenging the judgment of the High Court, the present criminal
appeals are filed by the accused Raghuvir Singh (A1) in Crl. A Nos.
1046- 1047/2019, Ashutosh Singh @ Dabbu (A2) in Crl. A. Nos. 1030-
1031/2019, Uttam Singh (A3) and Pradeep Singh (A4) in Crl. A Nos.
1269-1270/2019, Ashok Kumar Singh Chandel (A5) in Crl. A Nos. 946-
947/2019, Naseem (A6) in Crl. A Nos. 1279-1280/2019, Sahab Singh C
(A8) in Crl. A No. 1980- 1981/2019, and Bhan Singh (A10) in Crl. A
Nos. 1804-1805/2019.
The Incident:
4. The prosecution case as it unfolds in the First Information D
Report5 is that there has been a long-standing factional dispute between
two groups in Hamirpur, U.P. The group represented by Ashok Chandel
(A5) and the group represented by Shukla family were inimically disposed
against each other for a long time. The FIR is about the incident that has
occurred at 09.10 P.M. on 26.01.1997 at Mohalla Subhash Bazar, Kasba,
Hamirpur as two events occurring one after another in quick succession. E
The first incident is in front of the gun shop owned by accused no. 6,
referred to as ‘Naseem’s gun shop’ and the second incident is near the
residence of Parma Pandit which is about 50-75 meters from Naseem’s
gun shop. The two incidents are as follows.
5.1 First part of the incident: On 26.01.1997, Rajiv Shukla (PW- F
1) along with his servant Lallan went to the market Mohalla Subhash
Bazaar, Kasba, Hamirpur in the evening of 26.01.1997 at around 07.30
PM to buy some articles. As they were returning from the market, they
saw PW-1’s elder brother, Rakesh Kumar Shukla, his two sons, Gudda
and Chandan, Sri Kant Pandey, Vipul (PW-1’s son) and Ved Prakash, G
returning home in a vehicle, all through referred to as a ‘jonga’.
5.2 On seeing the jonga, PW-1 and Lallan stopped to speak to
Rakesh Kumar Shukla and others in the jonga. As the jonga was parked
4
hereinafter referred to as the ‘Arms Act’.
5
hereinafter referred to as ‘FIR’. H
1044 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A in the middle of the road, facing east direction in front of Naseem’s (A6)
gun shop, six accused, namely Ashok Kumar Chandel (A5), Naseem
(A6), Shyam Singh (A7), Sahab Singh (A8), Jhandu (A9) and Rukku
(driver of A5) came out of Naseem’s gun shop, all armed with rifles and
guns and suddenly started firing indiscriminately at the jonga.
B 5.3 It is stated in the FIR that immediately after hearing the sound
of fire from the side of the market, Raghuvir Singh, liquor contractor
(A1), his son Ashutosh alias Dabbu Singh (A2), Pradeep Singh (A4),
Uttam Singh (A3) and Bhan Singh (A10) arrived at the spot in another
vehicle and started firing at the jonga. Due to the firing, Sri Kant (since
deceased) and Ved Prakash (since deceased), who were sitting on the
C rear side of the jonga, received bullet injuries. Rakesh Kumar Shukla
(since deceased), Gudda (since deceased), Chandan and Vipul also
received bullet injuries. Because of the firing, panic gripped, and the
market was shut down.
6.1 Second part of the incident: Immediately on getting
D information about the occurrence, Rajesh Kumar Shukla, elder brother
of PW-1, Ravi Kant Pandey (PW-2), Bhagwati Sharan Nayak, Sri
Prakash Nayak, Anil and many others reached the place of the incident.
As the children Chandan and Vipul sustained minor injuries, they were
immediately taken out of the jonga and sent home with the help of some
people in the area.
E
6.2 Rajesh Shukla reversed the jonga from in front of Naseem’s
gun shop and started driving it towards the hospital, which is on the west
side of the Subhash Bazar Road. However, as they reached Parma
Pandit’s house, which is just 50-75 meters from Naseem’s gun shop, the
accused, having already reached the spot. At that moment, Ashok Chandel
F (A5) exhorted that “no one from the Shukla Family should escape
alive”, and on hearing that, all the accused again started firing
indiscriminately. At this point, Rajesh Shukla got out of the jonga with his
rifle to take aim and fire back at the accused persons. However, during
the cross-fire, Rajesh Shukla sustained fatal injuries and fell down on
the spot. PW-1, who was standing on the driver’s side (right side) of the
G jonga, also received bullet injuries on his leg. Similar is the position of
PW- 2, who also received bullet injuries on his leg. As PW-1 and his
companions took cover to conceal themselves, PW-1 saw the assailants
snatch the rifle from Rajesh Kumar Shukla (since deceased), who had
fallen due to bullet injuries and escaped from the scene of offence, towards
H ‘chowraha’ in their vehicles.
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1045
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

6.3 Having seen Rajesh Kumar Shukla also succumb to bullet A
injuries like Gudda and Rakesh Kumar Shukla, hoping to save Srikant
Pandey and Ved Prakash, PW-1 put them in the jonga and drove to the
hospital.
At the hospital:
7.1 PW-1 reached the hospital at around 07.50 P.M, and he was B
immediately examined by Dr. N.K. Gupta, PW-8 who gave the injury
report- Exb. Ka-13 which records injuries on his left thigh (back portion)
caused by firearms. Dr. S.R. Gupta, PW-7, who was the Radiologist on
duty that day, got his X-Ray-Exbs. Ka-44-46 done.
7.2 While PW-1 was being treated, Dr. P.N Paya, PW-5, examined C
the bodies of deceased Rakesh Kumar Shukla, Rajesh Kumar Shukla
and Sri Kant Pandey and declared them dead. Dr. R.S. Gupta, PW-6,
examined Gudda and Ved Prakash and declared them dead. One Mr.
Hardayal was also injured in the firing was examined by PW-8 Dr. N.K.
Gupta. His injury report, Exb. Ka-14 was prepared at 8.45 P.M. PW-8 D
also examined PW-2 at 10 P.M. and gave the injury report, marked as
Exb. Ka-15. Vipul and Chandan were also examined at 10.30 P.M., and
their injury reports were marked and exhibited as Exbs. Ka- 16 and Ka-
17, respectively.
Filing of the FIR: E
8.1 After obtaining immediate medical attention, PW-1’s statement
(‘tehreer’) was recorded at the hospital by Saraswati Sharan, the scribe
who was examined as PW-3. Upon completion of the tehreer, at around
09.10 PM, PW-1 went to the police station to report the incident and to
lodge the FIR. At the Police Station, Constable Mahesh Singh, examined F
as PW-9 prepared the FIR6, Exb. Ka-20, in his own handwriting, by
copying the contents from the tehreer under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307,
302, 34 & 395 IPC.
8.2 In the FIR, PW-1 mentioned about the two incidents, first in
front of Naseem’s gun shop and second near Parma Pandit’s house and
G
named ten accused and two unknown persons. The motive behind the
attack was stated to be a political rivalry between Ashok Kumar Chandel
and the Shukla family. In this context, the informant mentioned about a
criminal case involving Shyam Singh (A7). In that case, Rakesh Kumar

6
FIR no. 33/1997. H
1046 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A Shukla and Rama Kant Pandey (brother of Sri Kant Pandey) assisted
the prosecution against Shyam Singh (A7). He also mentioned about the
Assembly Elections, where the Shukla family opposed Shyam Singh (A7)
and Ashok Kumar Chandel (A5), leading to a political rivalry.
8.3 The FIR was thereafter copied into the General Diary by the
B Investigating Officer, Lalman Verma, PW-12. After copying the FIR,
PW-12 proceeded to the place of occurrence in furtherance of the
investigation.
9. It is important to mention at this stage that on the next day, i.e.
on 27.01.1997, at 7.50 P.M. two more FIRs 7, were registered against
C Sahab Singh and Ashok Kumar Chandel under Sections 25 and 30 of the
Arms Act, 1959 respectively.
Investigation:
10. After lodging the FIR, PW-1 returned to the hospital where
D the panchayatnama8 of the deceased was being conducted. Thereafter,
PW-1 went to the place of occurrence in the jonga, which was driven by
Lallan, where he met the Investigating Officer, PW-12. The Investigating
Officer, recorded the statement of PW-1 in the presence of an
independent witness and also prepared a site map-Exb. Ka-25. Having
noticed a pool of blood on the road near Naseem’s gun shop, PW-12
E collected samples of bloodstained soil and grass- Exb. Ka-26. The
Investigating Officer also collected 12 blank cartridges (6 bore and 6
brass)- Exb. Ka-27 in front of Parma Pandit’s house. An expired Manarth
Card (Railway travel card), issued by the Indian Railways Board, New
Delhi-Exb. Ka-28 was also recovered by him in front of Naseem’s gun
F shop, the card bore the name of Ashok Kumar Chandel. The jonga by
which PW-1 went to the place of occurrence was also seized along with
a piece of the footrest which had blood on it, a sample of the broken
piece of the front glass of the jonga and some pieces of glass lying at the
spot, all of them later marked as -Exb. Ka- 29.

G 11. After the investigation at the place of occurrence, PW-12 went
to the hospital where Sub-Inspector R.N. Singh Pal and ASI

7
FIR no. 34/1997 and FIR no. 35/1997.
8
Panchnama has been referred to as ‘Panchayatanama’ in the High Court as well as the
Trial Court Judgment. For the purposes of the present appeals, we will use the word
H ‘Panchnama’.
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1047
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

Harishchandra Singh were present and preparing the panchnamas9 of A
the dead bodies. All the dead bodies were sealed separately and sent for
post-mortem. The post-mortems of the bodies of Rakesh Shukla, Rajesh
Shukla and Sri Kant Pandey were conducted on 27.01.1997 the following
day between 10 AM to 12.30 PM by PW-510. Similarly, the post-mortems
of Gudda and Ved Prakash were also done on 27.01.1997 between 2
B
PM and 2.30 PM by PW-611.
Arrests:
12. The next day, that is on 27.01.1997, the Investigating Officer
proceeded to Laxmibai Tiraha after finding out that some of the accused
were at Naseem’s house. Upon reaching the place, the police party C
found Naseem (A6), Shyam Singh (A7), Sahab Singh (A8) and Bhan
Singh (A10) trying to flee through the backdoor of Naseem’s house
leading to River Betwa. They were arrested and a rifle along with 10
brass bullets tied in a green belt was recovered from the possession of
Sahab Singh(A8). On being questioned about the rifle, Sahab Singh stated
that the rifle belonged to Ashok Kumar Chandel. The seized rifle and D
the bullets were marked as Exb. Ka-24 and they were sent for FSL
Report. A copy of the seizure memo was provided to Sahab Singh. On
the basis of the seizure memo, cases under Sections 25 and 30 of the
Arms Act were registered against accused Sahab Singh (A8) and Ashok
Kumar Chandel (A5). E
13. A search for the rest of the other accused was made, however,
as they could not be found a report under Sections 82 and 83 (proclamation
of person absconding) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 197312 was
presented to the court on 28.01.1997. On the very same day, on receiving
information regarding the looted rifle of Rajesh Kumar Shukla at the F
residence of Ashok Kumar Chandel, at Mohalla Vivek Nagar, his house
was raided and a country-made pistol and one licensed Double Barrel
Breach Loading (DBBL) gun were recovered.
14. There was another lead regarding the looted rifles at the
residence of one Mr. Anand Purwar. However, nothing in relation to the G

9
Rakesh Shukla (Exb. Ka-30); Rajesh Shukla (Exb. Ka-37); Sri Kant Pandey (Exb. Ka
43); Guddu (Exb. Ka-48); Ved Prakash (Exb Ka-53).
10
Rakesh Shukla (Exb. Ka-3); Rajesh Shukla (Exb. Ka-4); Sri Kant Pandey (Exb. Ka-5).
11
Gudda (Exb. Ka-6); Ved Prakash (Exb. Ka-7).
12
hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C’ H
1048 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A murders was recovered in the raid, except one licensed DBBL gun of
12 bore, four cartridges and a licensed Mauser gun with 8 cartridges.
These were seized in the presence of independent witnesses and a copy
of the same was provided to Anand Purwar. These weapons were not
sent for forensic examination.
B 15. On 29.01.1997, statements of witnesses to the panchnama
were recorded. Section 161, Cr.P.C statement of Bhagwati Saran Nayak
who was present on the day of the incident was recorded, however
statement of victims Vipul and Chandan could not be recorded as they
were very young. The Investigating Officer (PW-12) also recorded the
statement of Hardayal on 16.02.1997.
C
16. Upon obtaining information about the presence of accused
Raghuvir Singh (A1), Dabbu (A2), Pradeep (A4) and Uttam (A3), in a
Maruti car near city forest, they were perused and arrested on 01.02.1997.
17. Another raid was conducted at Ashok Kumar Chandel’s
D Kanpur residence however no weapons were recovered. Upon receipt
of information about the weapons used by Raghuvir (A1) and Dabbu
(A2), their Moradabad residence was raided but nothing could be
recovered. Later, even a Court witness was again sent to Moradabad
for recovery of the weapons, but nothing was recovered.

E 18. On 21.02.1997, accused Jhandu (A9) was arrested and his
Section 313 Cr.P.C statement was recorded. As accused Rukku was
absconding, his trial was separated from the present case. Ultimately,
he was convicted by the Trial Court13 on 12.04.2007 and sentenced to
life imprisonment. His conviction and sentence was confirmed by the
High Court14 by judgment dated 24.05.2019. He has not filed a Special
F Leave Petition before us.
19. On completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet, Exb. Ka-
58, was filed against 10 accused on 22.02.1997 and the case was set for
trial.
The Trial:
G
20. The Trial Court framed charges against the accused persons
on 25.01.2002 under sections 147, 148 and 302 read with section 149,

13
Sessions Trial number 127/2003.
14
H Criminal Appeal No. 2617/2017.
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1049
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

IPC against all the 10 accused and under Sections 25 and 30, Arms Act A
against Sahab Singh and Ashok Kumar Chandel respectively. The Trial
Court also framed charges against Ashok Kumar Chandel under Sections
379 and 404 IPC. While prosecution examined fourteen witnesses being
PW-1 to PW-14, the defence examined three witnesses being DW-1 to
DW-3. There was also one Court witness being CW-1.
B
21. The following are the prosecution witnesses with an indication
about the purpose for which they were examined.

C

D

E

F
22. The following are the defence witnesses.

G

23.1 Of all the witnesses, the prosecution strongly relied on the
evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 who are examined as injured eye-witnesses.
H
1050 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A 23.2 PW-1 in his testimony gave a detailed description of the events
at the place of incident. He deposed about the first as well as the second
incident including the position at which the deceased as well as the eye-
witnesses were situated at the time of the incident. He also deposed
about the weapons used by the accused persons, injuries sustained by
the deceased persons and the bullet marks on the jonga. PW-1 also
B
recounted the events that followed the incidents including the lodging of
the FIR, medical treatment at the hospital and recording of his statement
by the IO at the place of occurrence.
23.3 The other ocular witness presented by the prosecution is
Ravi Kant Pandey, PW-2. He testified about his presence during the
C second incident and his involvement in rescuing the children from the
jonga. He gave a detailed description about his position during the incident
and the injury sustained by him. He also detailed the deceased persons
in the jonga, including his brother Sri Kant Pandey while naming all the
accused and the firing. He further mentioned about his treatment in the
D hospital and also that of the children who he accompanied.
24. Other witnesses are the police officers and the doctors who
treated the deceased persons as well as the injured witnesses as
mentioned in the table above. The defence witnesses were examined
only to contradict the statements of PW-1 and PW-2.
E Judgment of the Trial Court:
25. By its judgment dated 15.07.2002, the Trial Court acquitted all
the accused. As this is a case of reversal in an appeal against acquittal,
it is extremely important to examine the reasoning and the findings of
the Trial Court in minute detail. This is for the reason that in an appeal
F against acquittal, the appellate court must exercise its jurisdiction only
for very substantial and compelling reasons. For determining whether
substantial, compelling and sufficient reasons existed for the High Court
to reverse a finding of acquittal, we will first scrutinize the judgment of
the Trial Court in detail. The decision of the Trial Court is based on its
G conclusions on the (a) motive, (b) place of occurrence, (c) contradictions
in the statement of PW-1 and PW-2, (d) recovery of weapons (e) and
the illegality with respect to the FSL report.
26.1 Motive: The Trial Court found that the prosecution failed to
establish any motive for the accused to commit the offence. The
conclusions were based on three grounds:
H
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1051
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

26.2 Firstly, the Trial Court held that the motive based on the A
alleged involvement of Shyam Singh (A7) in a past murder case in which
the deceased and his associates assisted the prosecution is ‘insufficient’
and ‘far-fetched’.
26.3 Secondly, the Trial Court dismissed the alleged opposition of
the deceased party to the election of Ashok Kumar Chandel in the B
Assembly Elections of 1996 as not convincing enough. Trial Court also
held that PW-1 could not clearly articulate the political animosity.
26.4 Thirdly, the alleged animosity between the Chandel group
and the Shukla group based on the competing interests of the educational
institutions run by Naseem –Islamia Inter College, Hamirpur and those C
supported by Shukla group – Vidya Mandir is not based on any evidence.
27. Place of occurrence: The Trial Court recorded that the incident
occurred in two parts. As far as the first part is concerned, it returned a
finding that “this place of occurrence has not been challenged by
the defence and from the questions by Naseem himself during the D
cross-examination of the witness it is clear that the incident had
taken place.” With respect to the second incident, the Trial Court again
returned a finding to the effect that “the investigation officer during
inspection of the place of occurrence found blood but he did not
collect blood stained soil from here. This is his mistake but this does
not draw any adverse inference on the prosecution case.” E

28. The prosecution’s contention that the entire incident was pre-
planned did not impress the Trial Court because there were three
different routes by which the deceased party could reach their residence
from their sister’s house. In view of this, the Trial Court held that there
was no certainty about PW-1 and Lallan on the one hand and Rakesh F
Shukla and others in the jonga meeting in front of Naseem’s gun shop,
i.e. the place of occurrence on the other. The Trial Court held that this
meeting could not have been expected by the accused party to lay an
ambush.
29. Differences in the contents FIR copied from the Tehreer: G
The Trial Court examined the tehreer and compared it with the FIR.
The discrepancies were highlighted to come to a conclusion of
improbability of scribing the tehreer within ‘10-15 minutes’ and for
coming to a conclusion that the FIR is ante-dated and fragmented. In
this context;
H
1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A i. The Trial Court doubted the FIR for the reason that certain
words and phrases in the tehreer did not appear in the FIR.
For the reason that words such as ‘tatha’ in the tehreer
was replaced with ‘aur’ and the sentence ‘tatha mere per
me goliya lagi’ was omitted in the FIR, the Trial Court
concluded that the FIR was ante-dated and fragmented. It
B
was also noted that while the tehreer ends with a prayer
for police protection, the FIR is silent on the same.
ii. Taking into account the time at which PW-1 was medically
examined (8.30 PM), followed by his narration of the incident
to PW-3 for scribing the tehreer, the Trial Court held that
C the tehreer could not have been prepared within 10-15
minutes. This conclusion was based on a calculation made
by the Trial Court on the statement of PW-1 with respect
to his medical examination and the lodging of the FIR.
Further, the Trial Court considered that the tehreer is
D meticulously written without any mistake, which is not
possible to be done in less than 30 minutes. For this reason,
the Trial Court concluded that the tehreer itself is doubtful
and, therefore, even the FIR is doubtful.
30. Contradictions in the timings of lodging the FIR: The Trial
E Court came to the conclusion that there are inconsistencies in the
statements of PW-1 about the lodging of the FIR. This finding led to the
conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the fact beyond a
reasonable doubt. The conclusion was based on the following grounds:
i. While the FIR states that the incident took place at 7:30
F PM, the fax sent by the Superintendent of Police mentions
the incident as 7.45 PM. This contradiction cast a doubt on
the story of the prosecution, particularly the veracity of the
statement of PW-1.
ii. Based on the statement of PW-1 that he left the place of
G occurrence 10- 15 minutes after the incident and reached
the hospital within 3-4 minutes after which he was examined
by PW-8 at 8.30 PM, the Trial Court concluded that the
incident could have taken place only at 8.00 PM and not
7.30 PM. Yet another reason for the Trial Court to disbelieve
the statement of PW-1.
H
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1053
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

31. Fax sent by Superintendent of Police, Hamirpur: The Trial A
Court heavily relied on the fax message sent from the office of the
Superintendent of Police, Hamirpur to the higher authorities informing
them of the occurrence of the incident. This fax message, though not
part of the investigation was introduced by the defence through DW-3.
The description of the events in the FIR are in stark contradiction with
B
the events narrated in the fax. Relying on the fax and accepting the
evidence of DW-3, the Trial Court came to the conclusion that the
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt, the occurrence of
the event at the time mentioned in the FIR, the motive, presence of the
accused persons etc. As the fax contradicts the statement of PW-1 his
entire evidence must be rejected. C
32. Trial Court on the testimony of injured eye-witness PW-1:
The Trial Court’s reason for rejecting the evidence of PW-1 as an
eyewitness is based on its conclusions about the following inconsistencies
in his statement:
i. The veracity of statement of PW-1 based on the bullet D
marks on the jonga: Taking note of the bullet marks on
the jonga, the Trial Court came to the conclusion that the
version of PW-1 that there was indiscriminate firing is
unbelievable. The Trial Court held that there was only one
bullet hole on the back side of the jonga while the other E
parts of the jonga were intact, except a partially broken
mirror on driver’s side. On this basis, the Trial Court
disbelieved that there was indiscriminate firing towards the
jonga by the accused persons.
ii. The veracity of statement of PW-1 as it contradicts the F
injuries sustained by him: Based on the statement of PW-
1 that he was on the non-driver side of the jonga, the Trial
Court came to the conclusion that this version cannot be
believed as the injuries sustained by him do not match his
own description as if that were true, he would have been in
the direct line of firing and could not have escaped with just G
one bullet injury on his leg.
iii. The veracity of the statement of PW-1 based on injuries
sustained by the deceased persons: The Trial Court came
to the conclusion that the gun shot injuries on the body of
Rakesh Kumar Shukla do not match the description of PW- H
1054 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A 1. Similarly, the gunshot wounds received by Sri Kant, Ved
Prakash and Gudda were contrasted with the narration of
events by PW-1 to disbelieve his version. Further, in view
of the fact that there were no independent witnesses to
vouchsafe for the incident, the Trial Court concluded that
the prosecution failed to establish PW-1’s presence and in
B
turn the event.
iv. The veracity of PW-1’s statement based on the
documentary evidence relating to the treatment at the
hospital: The Trial Court concluded that the entries made
in the medical register were back-dated as there was no
C record with respect to any payment made in furtherance of
the treatment. The injury report prepared by PW- 8 indicated
that the injuries on PW-1 were on the left knee, whereas
the G.D. entry noted that the bandage was on his left calf.
This led the Trial Court to disbelieve the injury on PW-1.
D Further, with respect to the medical examination of PW-1,
it was observed that the Bed Head Ticket, as well as the
medical examination report, had certain discrepancies with
regard to the timing, date, parental name as well as the
place of injury which had over-writing and cuttings. Due to
these factors, PW-1’s injuries as well as the medical
E evidence were disbelieved.
v. Unnatural behaviour by PW-1 during the second
incidence: PW-1’s presence at the second incident was also
disbelieved by the Trial Court on the ground that his behaviour
is unnatural. The reason for such a conclusion is this. The
F Trial Court felt that PW-1 should have in the natural course
narrated the incident to Rajesh Shukla and Ravi Kant Pandey
as they reached the place of occurrence. Further, the Trial
Court held that if the firing was indiscriminate, he could not
have narrated the incident with minor details as to who used
G which gun. In this context, the Trial Court also noted that
PW-1 could not remember the persons who took the children
Vipul and Chandan home at the time of the incident.
vi. The veracity of PW-1’s statement with respect to
electricity connection at the time of the incident: The
H Trial Court believed the evidence of DW-1, Executive
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1055
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

Engineer at the Electricity Distribution Division, Hamirpur A
that there was no electricity between 7.50 PM to 8.45 PM.
In view of this, the Trial Court concluded that PW-1 could
not be an eye- witness of the incident as he could neither
have identified the accused nor clearly seen the incident.
33. Trial Court on the testimony eyewitness, PW-2: The Trial B
Court disbelieved the presence of PW-2 at the second place of the incident
based on its conclusion that the injury on his body was not that of a
firearm. The Trial Court held that this witness cannot be believed as
there is a contradiction in his statement about who had actually taken
the children, Vipul and Chandan home. Further, the Trial Court concluded
that the conduct and behaviour of PW-2 is unnatural as he did not C
immediately go to the hospital after receiving bullet injuries and also did
not accompany his brother who died during the incident.
34. Recovery of weapons:
i. The Trial Court disbelieved the story of the prosecution D
about the recovery of an 8x60 bore rifle from Sahab Singh
during his arrest, as it contradicted the fax message sent
by the Superintendent of Police which mentioned the
recovery of a 0.315 bore rifle from Sahab Singh. Based on
this contradiction, the Trial Court concluded that the recovery
from Sahab Singh is false as there are two different rifles E
mentioned in two different documents.
ii. Trial Court found it strange that PW-12 searched only Ashok
Kumar Chandel and Raghuvir’s Moradabad house for the
murder weapons, and none of the houses of the other
accused persons were searched. F
iii. In view of the fact that the Court Witness (CW-1) could
not recover any weapon from the Moradabad house, the
Trial Court concluded that the whole investigation was mala-
fide and was intended to implicate Ashok Kumar Chandel.
G
iv. The Trial Court discredited the seizure of the weapon and
the bullet cartridges from Sahab Singh as the statement of
PW-14Dy. Superintendent of Police, CBCID that PW-11
and 12 mentioned to him that they recovered 18 bullets,
contradicts with evidence PW-11 and 12 who stated that
they recovered 10 bullets. H
1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A 35. Ballistic Report: The Trial Court held that the ballistic report
is not admissible in evidence as the requirements of Section 293, Cr.P.C
were not followed.
36. Recovery of Railway Manarth Card belonging to Ashok
Chandel from the place of occurrence: The Trial Court came to the
B conclusion that the Manarth Card recovered from the place of
occurrence had expired way back on 12.01.1994 which is more than
three years prior to the incident. The Trial Court also found that the said
Manarth Card was not sealed and stamped like other pieces of evidence.
While the Trial Court did not dispute that the Railway Manarth Card
belonged to Ashok Kumar Chandel it doubted the recovery from the
C
place of occurrence.
37. In view of the above findings and conclusions, the Trial Court
acquitted all the accused of all the charges.
38. Challenging the judgment of the Trial Court, the State preferred
D a criminal appeal and the informant (PW-1) filed a criminal revision
before the High Court.
Judgment of the High Court:
39. We have undertaken a detailed description of the reasons and
conclusions adopted by the Trial Court only to see if the High Court
E while reversing an order of acquittal has sufficient and cogent reasons
to interfere with the reasoning of the Trial Court. A strict scrutiny of the
judgment of the High Court is necessary as an order of acquittal can be
interfered with only for substantial and compelling reasons. Following
the same structure adopted by the Trial Court, we will consider and
F examine the reasons adopted by the High Court with respect to each
and every finding of the Trial Court.
40. As stated earlier, the High Court in appeal convicted all the
accused under Sections 148, 302 read with 149, 307 read with 149 IPC
and acquitted the accused Ashok Kumar Chandel under Sections 379
G and 404 IPC and Section 30 Arms Act. Sahab Singh was also acquitted
of 25 of the Arms Act. The High Court’s findings are as under:
41. Motive: The High Court held that there is sufficient evidence
to conclude that there existed a motive for the Chandel group for
committing the offences against the deceased and their men. The High
H Court concluded on the basis of evidence on record that Rakesh Kumar
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1057
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

Shukla along with Rama Kant Pandey (brother of deceased Sri Kant A
Pandey) lobbied against Shyam Singh (A7), who was involved in a criminal
case. Further, it also came on record that the deceased party opposed
Ashok Kumar Chandel in the Assembly Elections. All this, according to
the High Court establishes that Shyam Singh and Ashok Kumar Chandel
were on hostile terms with the Shukla family. As regards Sahab Singh, it
B
was held that he was Ashok Kumar Chandel’s private gunner and
therefore, he also had the same motive. In so far as Naseem (A6) is
concerned, he was supported by the Chandel group because Naseem’s
Educational Institution – Islamia Inter College was in competition with
Vidya Mandir, supported by the Shukla Family. In view of all these factors,
as indicated above, the High Court concluded that there is sufficient C
motive. At the same time, the plea of Ashok Kumar Chandel that he
was falsely implicated and that one Alok Purwar alias Titu who is the
owner of a petrol pump was responsible for the murders was discarded
by the High Court as there was no evidence.
42. High Court’s analysis of the approach adopted by the Trial D
Court in drawing its conclusions on the evidence of witnesses and
the documentary evidence: Apart from reversing the findings given by
the Trial Court on specified issues such as motive, the contradiction in
the timing of lodging the FIR, its inconsistencies with the tehreer, reliability
on the fax message, recoveries of firearms etc., which are being
E
recounted hereinbelow, the High Court noted a fundamental problem.
The problem related to the approach adopted by the Trial Court, the
High Court was of the opinion that much of the conclusions drawn by
the Trial Court were based on a very technical and pedantic approach in
analysing the evidence of witnesses or drawing inferences from the
documentary evidence. The technical approach adopted by the Trial F
Court has according to the High Court caused grave miscarriage of
justice. This is explained by the High Court while dealing with each
issue in the following manner.
43. FIR and Tehreer discrepancies: The High Court was of
the opinion that the approach adopted by the Trial Court in construing G
the tehreer and the FIR were super technical. The High Court found
that the explanation proffered by the prosecution for omissions in the
FIR to be genuine as the investigating officer was pressurizing PW-9
who prepared the FIR to provide a copy of the report and therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that such omissions could have taken place.
H
1058 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A Moreover, the possibility of a few words being left out while writing a
long report cannot be ignored and hence the mistakes were considered
bonafide. Rejecting the allegation that FIR is ante-timed, the High Court
observed that after PW-1 was treated in the hospital at 8.30 PM he
could go to the police station to lodge an FIR and that there is nothing
unnatural about it, considering the nature of his injuries. The High Court
B
examined the spot map as per which the hospital and the police station
were in close proximity. The documentary evidence supported the
statement of PW-1 that he returned to the hospital for proper treatment
and was discharged the next day at 09.00 AM.
44. Testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2: The High Court was of
C
the opinion that the approach adopted by the Trial Court in discarding
the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 was hyper-technical. At the outset,
the place of occurrence and also the occurrence of the event were not
doubted by the Trial Court. The evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 being
injured witnesses cannot be discarded based on minor inconsistencies.
D The High Court examined each of the contradictions and inconsistencies
found by the Trial Court and concluded that the same was drawn on a
speculative premise. The High Court held that, “a perusal of above
analysis made by the Trial Court appears to have been done over
meticulously with lot of guess work made on this part”. In this
context, the High Court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in
E
the case of State of U.P. v. Gokaran and ors15. In this case, Supreme
Court had interfered with the order of acquittal by the High Court
stating that – “it becomes the duty of the Court to interfere with the
acquittal in order to redeem the course of justice. the High Court
has adopted a hyper-technical approach to the entire prosecution
F case. “
45. Reversing the finding of the Trial Court based on the evidence
of DW-1, Executive Engineer, Electricity Distribution Division, Hamirpur
suggesting that there was no power during the time of occurrence of the
incident, the High Court held that even according to DW-1, he was not
G sure as to which phase the electricity connection to the Subhash Market
was connected. Yet again, the High Court felt that the Trial Court judgment
is based on surmises and conjectures, particularly when there were direct
injured eye-witnesses.

15
H (1984) Supp SCC 482.
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1059
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

46. On the question of contradictions in the statements of PW-1 A
and PW-2 with regard to their position and injuries sustained, it was held
that the Trial Court was incorrect in discarding their testimonies as in a
situation of indiscriminate firings, it becomes very difficult for any witness
to recollect as to who exactly was shooting at whom and from which
exact direction. It was also observed that it is too much to expect an
B
injured witness to depose distinctly about each and every injury received
by the deceased and other injured persons. The High Court went on to
observe that the Trial Court paid more attention to ascertain as to which
particular injury was caused in what sitting position to the injured and the
deceased rather than looking at the incident as a whole. The findings of
the Trial Court doubting the presence of the witness on technical grounds C
was not accepted by the High Court.
47. While considering the conduct of PW-2 right after the incident,
the High Court did not find anything unnatural. PW-2 was asked to look
after the injured children Vipul and Chandan and hence he went home,
and this is completely natural. D
48. Recovery of Weapons: The High Court rejected the findings
of the Trial Court with respect to (a) the fax message sent by the
Superintendent of Police mentioning the arrest of Sahab Singh with a
0.315 bore rifle as opposed to the recovery memo which mentioned
8x60 bore rifle recovered from Sahab Singh (b) non-examination of a E
public witness during the arrest and recoveries (c) the search made
during the arrest of the accused for the following reasons.
49. The High Court came to the conclusion that the Trial Court
erred in arriving at the decision that there was no recovery made from
Sahab Singh on the basis of the fax message. The High Court found that F
the conclusions of the Trial Court were perverse as the 0.315 bore rifle
in the continental system having measurements are in millimeters (mm)
is nothing but an 8x60 bore rifle which is the British system of annotation.
However, on the legality of recovery, the High Court held that the seizure
was not corroborated by an independent witness and therefore it
proceeded to acquit Sahab Singh (A8) as well as Ashok Kumar Chandel G
(A5) under Sections 25 and 30 of the Arms Act.
50. Manarth Card Recovery: As regards the recovery of
Manarth Card (railway travel card) belonging to Ashok Kumar Chandel
is concerned, the Trial Court’s decision to discard the same as the card
had expired long before the incident was rejected by the High Court for H
1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A the reason that it is not uncommon that people carry passes or ID cards
even after the date of expiry. According to the High Court, the recovery
of the card cannot be rejected just because the validity of the card expired
before the incident. The High Court also observed that the Investigating
Officer has nothing against Ashok Kumar Chandel to falsely implicate
him.
B
51. Ballistic Report: Accepting the ballistic report, the High Court
observed that the report was forwarded by one of the Director/ Deputy
Director/ Assistant Director of the said lab under the seal. This is in
compliance with the statutory requirement under Section 239 Cr.P.C
and hence the report was not discarded and was considered admissible.
C
52. In support of its conclusions, the High Court relied on the
decisions of this Court in Masalti v. State of U.P.16; Praveen Kumar v.
State of Karnataka 17; State of U.P v. Gokaran and ors 18; Menoka
Malik and ors v. State of West Bengal and ors19.
D Submissions on Behalf of the Appellants:
53. In this batch of appeals, we heard Mr. Harin P Raval, Mr.
Siddharth Dave, Mr. Jayant Muthuraj, Mr. Ratnakar Dash, Mr. Basava
Prabhu Patil, Mr. Vishvajit Singh, Senior Advocates, followed by Ms.
Bansuri Swaraj, Advocate for the Appellants. We have also heard, Ms.
E Aishwarya Bhati, Learned Additional Solicitor General and Mr. A.K.
Mishra, Additional Advocate General for the State of U.P. and Ms. Sonia
Mathur, Senior Advocate for the Informant.
54. The senior counsels were assisted by S/Shri Shiv Kumar
Pandey, Abhay Raj Singh Chandel, Chandrashekhar A. Chakalabbi,
F Awanish Kumar, Abhinav Garg, D.Girish Kumar, Kumar Vinayakam
Gupta, Kartikey Kanojia, M/s Dharmaprabhas Law Associates, AOR,
S/Shri Sandeep Jha, Arjun D. Singh, Ashish Singh, Advocates,
Dharmendra Kumar Sinha, AOR, Uday Prakash Yadav, Simarjeet Singh
Saluja, Ms. Prerna Dhall, Ms. Noor Rampal, Ms. Aastha Mehta, Ms.
Ishita Sinha, S/Shri Rohit Pandey, Murari Tiwari, Advocates, Ramjee
G Pandey, AOR, Ms. Manisha Chava, Shri Rustam Singh Chauhan, Ms.
B.L.N. Shivani, Shri Rajeev Kumar Dubey, Ms. Harshita Raghuvanshi,

16
(1964) 8 SCR 133.
17
(2003) 12 SCC 199.
18
Supra no. 15.
19
H (2019) 18 SCC 721.
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1061
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

Ms. Shreyase Aggrwal, Shri Ashiwan Mishra, Advocates, S/Shri A
Kamlendra Mishra, Shashank Singh, AOR, Anupam Chaudhary, Manoj
Kumar Dwivedi, Mrinal Kumar Sharma, Ms. Ana Upadhyay, Shri Akash
Singh, Ms. Manya Hasija, Advocates, S/Shri Prem Sunder Jha, AOR,
Pankaj Bist, Advocate, Krishnanand Pandeya, AOR, Manish Kumar,
Advocate, Anshuman Srivastava and Shri Naresh Kumar, AOR.
B
55. We will encapsulate the submission of the learned counsels
for the Appellants as well as the State before we proceed to analyze and
answer the same.
56. Leading the arguments on behalf of the Appellants, Mr. Harin
Raval for A5 submitted that in case of an appeal against acquittal, there C
is a double presumption in favour of the accused. As having secured an
acquittal from one of the courts, the presumption of his innocence is
reinforced and reaffirmed. Therefore, if two conclusions are possible on
the basis of the evidence on record, then the appellate court should not
disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. He relied on
the decision of this Court of N. Vijaykumar v. State of Tamil Nadu20. D
He also submitted that the High Court has reversed the findings of the
Trial Court without providing any reasons and has simply supported its
findings by stating that the Trial Court decision was based on assumptions
and speculations.
57. As the substantial part of the case of the prosecution is E
dependent on the evidence of PW-1, he rightly focused on the credibility
and veracity of the evidence of this witness. He argued that the following
features of the case would make it clear that PW-1 was not present at
the scene of offence and he cannot be accepted as an eyewitness at all.
i. According to PW-1, he was on the right side of the jonga F
(non-driver side) when he was speaking to deceased
Rakesh Shukla at which point the alleged ‘indiscriminate’
firing began from Naseem’s gun shop. If this were true, in
this positioning PW-1 would have been in the direct line of
firing and could not have escaped with one bullet injury on G
his leg. Further, as per the evidence of PW-8, the bullet
injury on PW-1 was on the upper portion of his left leg,
which would only be possible if his back was facing the
assailants.
20
(2021) 3 SCC 687. H
1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A ii. Since, PW-1 had stated that he was on the non-driver side
and so was deceased Gudda in the jonga who received
fatal injuries, it is highly improbable that PW-1 did not receive
any injuries in the first incident while being present on the
non-driver side.
B iii. As per PW-1’s evidence, he was standing in front of the
jonga during the first incident when there were bystanders.
However, none of them were made witnesses and examined
by the prosecution.
iv. During the second incident, when deceased Rajesh Kumar
C Shukla was injured by 16 bullets as per the post-mortem
report, it is highly improbable that PW-1 would receive minor
injuries on the lower part of the body while standing adjacent
to Rajesh.
v. As per the evidence of PW-5 (Dr. PN Paya), Rakesh
D Shukla received injuries on his left side which contradicts
his position in the jonga on the right side.
vi. PW-9 had stated that when PW-1 reached the police station
to lodge the FIR, the bandage was on his calf, however, as
per PW-1’s injury report, his injuries were on his thigh. If
E he had received immediate medical treatment from PW-8
then his bandage would have been on the thighs.
vii. PW-2 sustained a 2x2 CM wound which cannot be caused
by a rifle, DBBL or an SBBL gun. Therefore, the
description of the firearms as deposed by PW-1 cannot be
F believed. Moreover, no firearms were recovered expect
for the one recovered from Sahab Singh which is also not
proved to be used in the incident.
58.1 Referring to the contradictions arising out of the treatment
of PW-1 in the hospital the learned counsel tried to establish that the
presence of PW-1 is doubtful for the following reasons:
G
i. The Bed Head Ticket of PW-1 does not mention an X-Ray
recommendation.
ii. There is no entry in the cash register of any money being
deposited regarding any X-Ray or treatment being done.
H
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1063
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

iii. It was deposed by PW-1 that the X-Ray took place at 10 A
PM however, the X-Ray department closes at 2 PM.
Therefore, the timings of the same cannot be believed.
iv. There is no mention of date on the X-Ray plates of PW-1.
v. As per the evidence of PW-12, one Srideen took PW-1,
B
Ravi Kant, Hardayal and Vipul to the hospital for X-Ray on
28.01.1997 and he also brought them back home. Thus, the
statement of PW-1 regarding the X- Ray is doubtful.
Moreover, a material witness, Srideen was never examined
by the prosecution.
C
58.2 It was argued that if PW-1 was admitted to the hospital on
26.01.1997 and was discharged only on 27.01.1997 at 9 AM, his
statement that he went to the police station at 09.10 PM to register the
FIR and then returned to the hospital and then to the place of occurrence
at 10 PM cannot be believed. PW- 1 stated that he took all the dead
bodies to the hospital, however, the police memo initially recorded four D
bodies and the fifth dead body was received after 9 PM. If PW-1 left
to lodge the FIR at 9 PM and at the same time if the hospital records
received the fifth body at 9 PM then how was PW-1 aware of this fact
to mention it in the tehreer which was written at 8.30 PM. In light of
this, it was contended that the FIR is ante-timed. The learned Senior
E
Counsel submitted that there is only one hole on the left side of the
windscreen of the jonga and the remaining parts were intact. If this is
true, then the version of PW-1 that the incident was of indiscriminate
firing cannot be believed. Further, as per the evidence of PW-4, there
was no diesel in the jonga and this is directly in line with the defence
theory put up that, the incident was a result of a quarrel with one Titu F
regarding moving the jonga which according to Rakesh Shukla had no
diesel. In this context, the fax message sent by S.P. Mathur was relied
on. It is submitted that Hardayal was treated in the hospital at 8.30
P.M and therefore, the statement of PW-1 that he did not see Hardayal
cannot be believed.
G
58.3 Mr. Raval submits that the fax sent by S.P. Mathur to the
higher authorities mentions arrest of Sahab Singh on 26.01.1997 with
315 bore rifle and what is shown in the recovery memo is an 8x60 bore
rifle. The High Court’s findings that rifle of 8x60 bore and 315 bore are
the same is fallacious as the conversion comes to 480 bore.
H
1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A 59.1 Questioning the presence of PW-2 at the scene of the offence
Mr. Raval submitted that:
i. The conduct of PW-2 was very unnatural as he reached
the hospital only at 10 PM even though he had allegedly
received a bullet injury. Moreover, his brother Sri Kant
B Pandey has also died.
ii. PW-2 stated that Chandan and Vipul were sent home with
someone from the Mohalla but they were neither produced
nor examined by the prosecution. There is also a material
contradiction as to whether PW-2 took Vipul and Chandan
C home or not.
59.2 Mr. Raval also relied on the evidence of the defence witness
DW-1, to discredit prosecution witnesses, PW-1 and PW-2 on the ground
that there was no electricity at the place of occurrence when the incident
happened.
D 60.1 Mr. Siddharth Dave, learned Senior Advocate appearing for
Ashutosh Singh alias Dabbu (A2), argued that no evidence was led by
the prosecution to prove how two groups of accused gathered at one
place by forming an unlawful assembly in pursuance of a common object
to fire indiscriminately at the persons sitting in the jonga. It is the case of
E the prosecution that at around 7.30 PM on 26.01.1997, PW-1 along with
his servant Lallan who had gone to purchase some articles from the
market met Rakesh Shukla in the jonga. If the said meeting was a chance
meeting, then the formation of an unlawful assembly with a common
object would stand disproved. Moreover, there were no allegations as to
at what prior point in time the accused form an unlawful assembly.
F
60.2 It was urged that the incident took place in two parts and
therefore, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to lead evidence as to
when the unlawful assembly in the first part dispersed and when it gathers
again during the second incident. In light of this, it was argued that offence
under Section 149 was not made out by the Appellants as there was no
G evidence to prove the formation of an unlawful assembly with a common
object. The Counsel placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in
Nawab Ali v. The State of U.P.21, Masalti v. State of U.P.22 and State

21
(1974) 4 SCC 600.
22
H (1964) 8 SCR 133.
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1065
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

of Rajasthan v. Shiv Charan and ors23 to say that it is incumbent upon A
the prosecution to show that the person concerned was a member of the
unlawful assembly at the time of the commission of the offence.
Moreover, mere presence or association with other members alone is
not per se sufficient to hold that each member is criminally liable for the
offence committed by the others, unless, there is sufficient evidence on
B
record to show that each member intended to or knew the likelihood of
commission of such an offending act, being a member of the unlawful
assembly as provided for under Section 149, IPC.
61. Mr. Jayanth Muthuraj, learned Senior Advocate, appearing
for Pradeep Singh (A4), submitted on the improbabilities of the first as
C
well as the second incident. With respect to the first incident, he would
say that PW-1 sustained no injury and it has remained unexplained
how the new vehicle comprising of five people comes all of a sudden
and starts firing, and even after that PW-1 was not injured. So far as
the second incident is concerned, he took us to the inquest report and
argued that the prosecution is not able to explain interpolation and cutting D
in many places. He argued in similar lines as that of Mr. Raval about
the non-examination of certain witnesses, he also submitted that there
were contradictions about sending Vipul and Chandan to the house.
Who took them to the residence is a mystery. He also touched upon
the issue relating to the delay in FIR, the fax message sent by the
E
Superintendent of Police and the recovery of Manarth card bearing
the name of Ashok Kumar Chandel near Naseem’s shop and the
evidence of DW-1 establishing that there was no electricity at the time
of the incident.
62. Mr. Ratnakar Dash, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
F
Uttam Singh (A3) and Bhan Singh (A10) commenced with U.P. Police
Regulation 97 about the recording of the FIR. He, however, did not
pursue this submission. He adopted the same line of submission as that
of Mr. Raval about the credibility of the PW-1 in view of the uncertainty
about the injuries. Mr. Dash argued that there was no motive attributable
to his clients Uttam Singh and Bhan Singh. He adopted the same G
argument as that of Mr. Siddharth Dave with respect to the second
incident and concluded by stating that there are no recoveries from Uttam
Singh as well as Bhan Singh.

23
(2013) 12 SCC 76. H
1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A 63. Mr. Basava Prabhu Patil, learned Senior Advocate, appeared
on behalf of Sahab Singh (A8) submits that his client’s name appears in
the FIR along with the gunner of Chandel who was also cited. However,
after the filing of the charge sheet, the gunner’s name is deleted and his
client is prosecuted as accused no. 8. He submits that his client is a
farmer and he is falsely implicated. Mr. Patil also questioned the veracity
B
of the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2. He argued that the prosecution has
taken the Government gunner out and substituted him instead. He has
nothing to do with Chandel and the recovery of the rifle, for this he relied
on his Section 313, Cr.P.C statement. It is interesting to note that Mr.
Patil has questioned the authenticity of the fax alleged to have been sent
C by Mr. S.K. Mathur, SP to his superior officers. In the fax, it is alleged
that Ashok Singh Chandel’s private gunner Sahab Singh was arrested
while carrying a 0.315 bore rifle before the alleged arrest on 27.01.1997.
Mr. Patil submitted that though his client was acquitted of the charge
under Section 25 of the Arms Act, in view of the fact that the recovery
was not based on any independent witness he was convicted under
D
Section 302, IPC along with all others only on the basis of evidence
given by PW-1.
64. Ms. Bansuri Swaraj, learned Advocate made submissions on
behalf of Naseem (A6) who is referred to as the Bandukwala. She
submitted that Naseem is 70 years old and has no motive to indulge in
E the crime at all. She joined the other counsels in making the common
argument about the contradictions in statement of PW-1 and PW-2.
Questioning the arrest memo, she argued that if the fax mentions Sahab
Singh’s arrest before 27.01.1997, then Naseem’s arrest along with Sahab
Singh as evidenced by the arrest memo dated 27.01.1997 is a forged
F document. Finally, she concluded by stating that no recovery of weapons
was made from his client.
Submissions by the State:
65. The State was represented by the Learned Additional Solicitor
General, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati. The learned ASG commenced her
G submission with the occurrence of the incident on 26.01.1997 which is
not disputed. The death of 5 persons was also not disputed. With the aid
of a pictographic depiction of the site map and injuries on the body, she
explained the incident in the context of place, time, and persons involved.
Recounting the relationship between the parties, from the very beginning
H she states that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that there is a
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1067
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

longstanding rivalry between the group of Chandel, Raghuvir Singh, A
Naseem, and other members as against the group comprising of the
Shukla family.
66. Learned ASG identified the injuries of the witnesses and the
deceased and compared them with the documentary evidence and the
statements of doctors to emphasize the veracity of the eyewitnesses. B
She has also referred to the post-mortem report of Rakesh Shukla, Rajesh
Shukla, Srikant Pandey, Gudda, and Ved Prakash and again co-related it
to the evidence of the doctors who were examined with the corresponding
exhibits. This is another factor, according to the learned ASG to add
credence to the statement of the eyewitnesses.
C
67. Learned ASG referred to the evidence of PW-1 in detail and
sought to correct the statements made by the witness with the evidence
on record. She would further submit that there is no reason to disbelieve
the evidence of the eyewitnesses and if their version is accepted then
the various possibilities and contradictions that the Appellants have
suggested have to be discarded. The learned ASG laid emphasis on the D
approach adopted by this Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal
and submitted that there is no inviolable rule that an Appellate Court
would refrain from interfering with the judgment of acquittal even if
there is grave miscarriage of justice.
68. Referring to the submission of the Appellants that non- E
examination of witnesses would be fatal for the prosecution, she has
referred to certain decisions of this Court indicating the correct approach
that needs to be adopted. The reasoning adopted by the High Court in
reversing the decision of the Trial Court was brought to our notice. The
learned ASG emphasized that the Trial Court had adopted a super
technical approach in analyzing the statement of the eyewitnesses and F
rejected them without appreciating the principles on the basis of which
an injured eyewitness evidence is to be considered. It is her submission
that the Trial Court has committed a serious error in acquitting all the
accused in the teeth of clear evidence of the eyewitnesses. The learned
ASG concludes by saying that the High Court has not committed any G
error, in fact or in law while reversing the decision of the Trial Court. For
this reason, she had prayed dismissal of these appeals.
Submissions by the Informant:
69. Ms. Sonia Mathur learned Senior Counsel supporting the learned
ASG has submitted that there is sufficient proof of the presence of PW- H
1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A 1 in the first as well as the second incident. She referred to the 1995
murder involving Shyam Singh, where Rakesh Kumar Shukla and Rama
Kant Pandey assisted the prosecution. These incidents coupled with the
Shukla family and associates opposing Ashok Chandel in the Assembly
Election are a strong motive for killing five members of the Shukla family.
In the alternative, she has submitted that in view of the presence of
B
injured eyewitnesses the need to prove motive becomes irrelevant. Ms.
Sonia Mathur took us through the compilation comprising important pieces
of evidence and explained the position in which the witnesses and the
deceased got bullet injuries and corroborated them with the medical
evidence. She has also supported the prosecution on all the points that
C were taken up by the ASG.
Analysis and Findings:
70. Preliminary: We will commence with dealing with three
preliminary submissions, commonly urged by all the learned counsels for
the Appellants. First of this submission relates to the error committed by
D the High Court in interfering with the judgment of the Trial Court while
exercising jurisdiction of a criminal appellate court against an order of
acquittal. The second common submission relates to the alleged failure
on the part of the prosecution to establish a clear motive for the accused
to commit the offences. The third submission advanced by some of the
E counsels relates to the lack of evidence regarding the occurrence of the
event and that too at two places.
71. After the preliminary submissions, we will deal with the
arguments advanced by the defence to impeach the veracity of the
testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 as the injured eye-witnesses. These
arguments relate to the discrepancies in the timing of lodging of the FIR
F and contradictions about the presence of PW-1 at the place of incidence
because of the evidence relating to (a) the bullet marks on the jonga (b)
the physical position of PW-1 and the injuries sustained by him and the
deceased at the time of the incident (c) the contradictions arising out of
the timing of X-Ray reports and issuance of the Bed Head Ticket (d)
G and the absence of electricity at the time of the incident. With respect to
PW-2, we will examine the submissions (a) regarding his presence at
the place of the incident (b) injuries sustained by him (c) his unnatural
behaviour at the time of the incident.
72. We will then deal with the submission questioning the conviction
H under Section 149 IPC. Thereafter, we will deal with the contradictions
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1069
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

in the FIR on the basis of the fax message. Then, dealing with the A
submission on recoveries, we will consider the submissions relating to
(a) recovery of the Railway Manarth Card from the scene of the offence
(b) and recovery of the weapon and bullets during the arrests. We will
finally deal with the submission about the admissibility of the ballistic
report.
B
I. Jurisdiction of the High Court in Appeals Against Acquittals
73. This is the first preliminary submission and it is based on a
principle laid down by this Court that in an appeal against acquittal, the
criminal appellate court will not interfere with the acquittal unless there
are substantial and compelling reasons. The common submission of C
all the counsels appearing for the Appellants is, therefore, that the High
Court was not justified in reversing the order of acquittal.
74. The position of law with respect to the jurisdiction of the High
Court in cases of appeals against acquittals is well established. After
reviewing the judgments on this subject, this Court clarified in D
Chandrappa and Ors v. State of Karnataka24 that:
“3. Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling
reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong
circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”,
etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an E
appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of
language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court
to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the
court to review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.” F
75. It is sufficient to note the principle laid down in the Constitution
Bench of this Court in M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra25:
“16. …But the true legal position is that however circumspect
and cautious the approach of the High Court may be in
G
dealing with appeals against acquittals, it is undoubtedly
entitled to reach its own conclusions upon the evidence
adduced by the prosecution in respect of the guilt or innocence

24
(2007) 4 SCC 415.
25
(1963) 2 SCR 405. H
1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A of the accused. This position has been clarified by the Privy
Council in Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor and NurMohammad
v. Emperor [AIR 1945 PC 151] ...
17. …Similarly in Ajmer Singh v. State of Punjab [(1953) SCR
418] it was observed that the interference of the High Court
B in an appeal against the order of acquittal would be justified
only if there are “very substantial and compelling reasons to
do so”. In some other decisions, it has been stated that an
order of acquittal can be reversed only for “good and
sufficiently cogent reasons” or for “strong reasons”. In
appreciating the effect of these observations, it must be
C remembered that these observations were not intended to lay
down a rigid or inflexible rule which should govern the
decision of the High Court in appeals against acquittals. They
were not intended, and should not be read to have intended
to introduce an additional condition in clause (a) of Section
D 423(1) of the Code. All that the said observations are intended
to emphasise is that the approach of the High Court in dealing
with an appeal against acquittal ought to be cautious because
as Lord Russell observed in the case of Sheo Swarup, the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused “is not
certainly weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at
E his trial”. Therefore, the test suggested by the expression
“substantial and compelling reasons” should not be construed
as a formula which has to be rigidly applied in every case.
That is the effect of the recent decisions of this Court, for
instance, in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1961
F SC 715] and Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1962 SC
439] and so, it is not necessary that before reversing a
judgment of acquittal, the High Court must necessarily
characterise the findings recorded therein as perverse…”
76. Following the Constitution Bench, this Court in Ghurey Lal v.
G State of UP26 has formulated the following principles:
“69. The following principles emerge from cases
1. The Appellate Court may review the evidence in appeals
against acquittal under sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal

H 26
(2008) 10 SCC 450.
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1071
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is A
wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire
evidence on record. It can review the trial court’s conclusion
with respect to both facts and law.
2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The
accused possessed this presumption when he was before the B
trial court. The trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption
that he is innocent.
3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to
the trial court’s decision. This is especially true when a witness’
credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to C
take a different view of the evidence. There must also be
substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial
court was wrong.
70. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate
courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized D
by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise
disturb the trial court’s acquittal:
1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb
the trial court’s acquittal if it has “very substantial and
compelling reasons” for doing so. E
A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would
have “very substantial and compelling reasons” to discard
the trial court’s decision. “Very substantial and compelling
reasons” exist when:
i. The trial court’s conclusion with regard to the facts is F
palpably wrong;
ii. The trial court’s decision was based on an erroneous
view of law;
iii. The trial court’s judgment is likely to result in “grave
miscarriage of justice”; G

iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with
the evidence was patently illegal;
v. The trial court’s judgment was manifestly unjust and
unreasonable; H
1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A vi. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the
material evidence or has ignored material documents
like dying declarations/ report of the ballistic expert,
etc.
vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.
B 2. The Appellate Court must always give proper weight and
consideration to the findings of the trial court.
3. If two reasonable views can be reached - one that leads to
acquittal, the other to conviction - the High Courts/Appellate
Courts must rule in favor of the accused.”
C
77. Keeping in mind the above-referred principles we will now
proceed to examine the impugned judgment and see if the High Court
has properly applied the principles while exercising the criminal appellate
jurisdiction against the order of acquittal.

D II. Motive
78. The second common ground raised by many Appellants relates
to the motive behind the commission of the offence. The Trial Court
held that the disputes between Chandel and other accused with the Shukla
group are ‘insufficient’ for committing murder. Counsels for the
Appellants have repeatedly argued that the prosecution failed to establish
E
any motive for the accused to commit the crime. We will deal with this
submission in fact as well as in law.
79. On facts, three instances are referred to by the prosecution to
indicate the existence of a prior rivalry between the two groups. Firstly,
in the year 1995, one Sanjay Kumar Shukla of Sumerpur and Shiv Narain
F
Mishra, President of Degree College were murdered by accused Shyam
Singh (A7) and others. In that murder case, deceased Rakesh Kumar
Shukla along with Rama Kant Pandey (brother of deceased Sri Kant
Pandey) lobbied against Shyam Singh. Ashok Kumar Chandel and
Raghuvir Singh were in close alliance with Shyam Singh. Secondly, the
G Shukla family and associates opposed Ashok Kumar Chandel in the
Assembly Elections that year. As a result, accused Shyam Singh, Ashok
Kumar Chandel and Raghuvir were on hostile terms with the Shukla
family. Sahab Singh is stated to be the private gunner of Ashok Kumar
Chandel and therefore he would have the same disposition against the
Shukla family. Thirdly, accused Naseem was the Manager of Islamia
H
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1073
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

Inter College and the other competing educational institution in the town, A
Vidya Mandir was run by the members associated with Shukla family.
Naseem was close to Ashok Kumar Chandel and they were acting
together since they were inimical towards Shukla’s individually and also
as a group.
80. PW-1 has in his deposition spoke about the existence of long B
political enmity with Ashok Chandel in the following terms.
“13. I had long political enmity with Ashok Chandel. My
family used to oppose him in the election. Ashok Chandel
used to contest election for MLA. He lost the 1996 election
for MLA with a huge margin because of our opposition. Ashok C
Chandel had lost the election before this in the year 1995.
Shiv Narayan Mishra and Abhay Shukla, Chairman, of
degree college were killed at Sumerpur publicly in which
accused Shyam Singh and others were prime accused against
which chargesheet had been filed. In the said incident, my
D
brother Rakesh Shukla and Sh. Ramakant Pandey, Advocate,
i.e. brother of deceased Shrikant Pandey, had favoured the
deceased. Ashok Chandel and Raghuvir Singh and other had
favoured Shyam Singh. This is the reason for their animosity/
grudge.
E
14. Naseem was the manager of Islamiya Inter College,
Hamirpur. Whereas, the Chairman of the Vidya Mandir,
Hamirpur (Inter College). are Brahmins. There exists
competition between both the institutions. Ashok Chandel,
Raghvir Singh, Naseem etc. used to sit together often.”
F
81. At the outset, we hold that the finding of the Trial Court that
the motive suggested by the prosecution is ‘insufficient’ for the
commission of the murder of five persons is an inappropriate measure.
82. Sufficiency or insufficiency of motive does not have a direct
bearing on the actual evidence against the accused, particularly when G
the prosecution relies on direct evidence of injured eyewitnesses.
This position of law is clear from the following decisions of this Court.
In Shivaji Genu Mohite v. The State of Maharashtra27, this Court
held:
27
(1973) 3 SCC 219. H
1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A “11. Assuming that the prosecution evidence was not sufficient
or cogent enough for a motive to be spelt out of it, the fact
that the prosecution was not able to discover such an impelling
motive would not reflect upon the credibility of a witness,
proved to be a reliable eyewitness…..
B 12. As stated earlier, the fact that the prosecution in a given
case has been able to discover a sufficient motive or not cannot
weigh against the testimony of an eyewitness. Evidence as to
motive would, no doubt, go a long way in cases wholly
dependent on circumstantial evidence. Such evidence would
form one of the links in the chain of circumstantial evidence
C in such a case. But that would not be so in cases where there
are eye- witnesses of credibility, though even in such cases if
a motive is properly proved, such proof would strengthen the
prosecution case and fortify the court in its ultimate
conclusion. But that does not mean that if a motive is not
D established the evidence of an eye-witness is rendered
untrustworthy.”
83. In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kishanpal and
Others28 it was held that:
“39. The motive may be considered as a circumstance which
E is relevant for assessing the evidence but if the evidence is
clear and unambiguous and the circumstances prove the guilt
of the accused, the same is not weakened even if the motive is
not a very strong one. It is also settled law that the motive
loses all its importance in a case where direct evidence of
F eyewitnesses is available, because even if there may be a very
strong motive for the accused persons to commit a particular
crime, they cannot be convicted if the evidence of eyewitnesses
is not convincing. In the same way, even if there may not be
an apparent motive but if the evidence of the eyewitnesses is
clear and reliable, the absence of in adequacy of motive
G cannot stand in the way of conviction.”
84. In another case of Sheo Shankar Singh v. State of
Jharkhand and Anr29, this Court observed:

28
(2008) 16 SCC 73.
H 29
(2011) 3 SCC 654.
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1075
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

“15. ….. These decisions have made a clear distinction A
between cases where the prosecution relies upon
circumstantial evidence on the one hand and those where it
relies upon the testimony of eyewitnesses on the other……….
Proof of motive, recedes into the background in cases where
the prosecution relies upon an eye witness account of the
B
occurrence. This is because if the court upon a proper
appraisal of the deposition of the eyewitnesses comes to the
conclusion that the version given by them is credible, absence
of evidence to the motive is rendered inconsequential…
16. The case at hand rests upon the deposition of the
eyewitnesses to the occurrence. Absence of motive would not, C
therefore, by itself make any material difference……”
85. Also, in the case of Darbara Singh v. State of Punjab30:
“15. ……In a case where there is direct evidence of witnesses
which can be relied upon, the absence of motive cannot be a D
ground to reject the case. Under no circumstance, can motive
take the place of direct evidence available as proof……...
16. Motive in criminal cases based solely on the positive, clear,
cogent and reliable ocular testimony of witnesses is not at all
relevant. In such a fact situation, the mere absence of a strong E
motive to commit the crime, cannot be of any assistance to the
accused… “
86. In view of the evidence on the aspect relating to motive, coupled
with the clear position of law with respect to the relevance and weightage
of motive in cases of evidence of direct injured eyewitness to the incident, F
the conclusion of the Trial Court that the case of the prosecution fumbles
as it failed to prove the motive is incorrect. The decision of the High
Court, based on the principles laid down by this Court is unexceptionable.
III. Place of occurrence
87. Some of the counsels for the Appellants submitted that the G
prosecution has failed to adduce any evidence about the occurrence of
the event at the place alleged. This submission need not detain us for
long as this was also raised before the Trial Court and it was not accepted
even by the Trial Court. It is, therefore, sufficient for us to refer to the
30
(2012) 10 SCC 476. H
1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A finding of the Trial Court on this submission. While rejecting this
argument, the Trial Court recorded that the incident occurred as two
events in quick succession. With respect to the first event the Trial Court
held:
“This place of occurrence has not been challenged by the
B defence and by the questions by Naseem himself during the
cross examination of witnesses it is clear that the incidence
had taken place.”
88. Similarly, the Trial Court recorded the following with respect
to the second event of the incident in the following manner:
C “The second place of incident has been said to be occurred
in front of the house of Parmanand Pandit and as per site
map [Exh. A-25], house of Anirudh Kumar Sahu is located
west side of house of Naseem….
xxx
D
The investigation officer during inspection of the place of
occurrence found blood but did not collect blood-stained soil
from there. This is his mistake but this does not draw any
adverse inference on the prosecution case.B. B. words have
been shown by the investigation officer in the site map [Exh-
E A-25] after inspection of the place of occurrence, on which
places it is said that bullet cartridges total 12 have been
found, out of which 6 are to said of 12 bore and 6 of brass.
He has not indicated as to which bullet cartridges was found
from which place separately. These B. B. marks are shown in
F the map as the road below the platform at Nasim’s house an
in front of house of Parma Pandit. Therefore the place of
incident is not doubtful.”
89. In view of the clear and categorical finding of the Trial Court
itself about the place of occurrence, we need not entertain any doubt
about the place of occurrence. This issue is answered accordingly.
G
IV. Timings of lodging of the FIR and Discrepancies therein
90. Faced with the direct evidence of eyewitnesses cited by the
prosecution, the defence mounted a challenge to the veracity and the
truthfulness of the eyewitnesses. At the outset, they would submit that
H the prosecution could not answer the severe improbabilities depending
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1077
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

upon the time taken by PW-1 to move from the scene of the offence to A
the hospital and then to the police station. We will presently deal with
this issue.
91. The prosecution case is that the incident took place at around
07.30 PM and lasted for about 8-10 minutes. Thereafter, PW-1 reached
the hospital with all the deceased in the jonga by 07.50 PM. After reaching B
the hospital, he got the dead bodies examined first and then himself. He
was eventually examined at 8.30 PM. After his preliminary examination,
Saraswati Sharan, PW-3, scribed the tehreer as narrated by PW-1 in
the hospital itself. It is after this that PW-1 left for the police station at
around 09:00 PM to lodge the FIR which came to be registered at 09.10
PM. C

92. Challenging the prosecution story, the learned counsel for the
Appellants made four submissions (i) it was contended that the statement
in the tehreer that PW-1 brought five dead bodies with him to the hospital,
and thereafter he left for the police station at 9PM is in contradiction to
the police memo (Exb. Ka-18) sent by the hospital to the police station D
at 9PM, which in turn mentions only four dead bodies and two injured
persons (ii) it could not have been possible for PW-3 to write such a
long tehreer and that too without any mistake in a span of 15-20 minutes
before PW-1 proceeded to the police station (iii) it was also urged that,
there were certain omissions made in the FIR which was copied from E
the tehreer and hence, there were material discrepancies in both the
documents (iv) finally, according to PW-1’s Bed Head Ticket received
from the hospital, the discharge timing is mentioned to be 9 AM on
27.01.1997 on the next day and therefore he could not have lodged the
FIR at 09.10 PM on 26.01.1997. We will now deal with each of these
submissions. F

93. Firstly, it can be observed from the evidence of the doctor,
PW-8 that he examined the dead bodies and the two injured namely,
PW-1 and Hardayal and prepared a police memo to that effect. The
same was sent to the police station by 9 PM. The evidence of PW-8 is
extracted below: G
“All these injuries have possible to come at 7 .30 PM of
26.1.97. On that day I had sent a Police Memo to the Inspector
in-charge of P.S. Kotwali for information. I had sent this memo
at 9 PM. I had prepared this in my handwriting and signature
and it was mentioned that dead bodies of five persons have H
1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A been brought in this hospital and two injured have also come,
whose names are Rajiv Shukla S/o Sh. Bhishm Prasad Shukla
and name of other is Hardyal Verma S/ o Sh. Mahadev Prasad.
Original of it was sent to the Police, which is Ex. 7 6A / 7 on
the case file, exhibited as Ex.A-18"
B 94. The above-referred evidence, when contrasted with Exb. Ka-
18 (which is in Hindi) does not give rise to any contradiction for the
following reason. In the first paragraph of Exb. Ka-18 there is a mention
of four dead bodies and two injured. The second paragraph mentions
one more dead body brought at 9 PM.
C 95. Further, as per the evidence of PW-1, he has taken all the
deceased to the hospital together. He has also stated that from the hospital
he did not take the jonga to the police station to lodge the FIR, instead,
he went by autorickshaw. This was because one dead body was still in
the jonga and was surrounded by female members of the family. It was
brought inside the hospital around the time he was about to leave for the
D police station. The relevant portion of PW-1’s testimony is extracted
herein below:
“250. I had gone to the Kotwali by rickshaw, reason being
that a few ladies had come from home. A dead body was inside
the Jonga.
E
251. The ladies had surrounded the car and the kotwali was
at a short distance only. The ladies of my own family also had
come (illegible) ladies from colony and Pandey jee’s family
also had come when. I had gone to lodge a report.”

F 96. It is thus clear that there were five bodies and PW-1 brought
them to the hospital in the jonga after the incident. The conclusion of the
Trial Court is therefore erroneous and is not based on the evidence on
record. The High Court is fully justified in reversing this finding as it is
not merely an alternative view but a correction of an error which is
substantial and compelling.
G
97. Secondly, we have seen the tehreer, it is a short document.
The conclusion of the Trial Court that the tehreer could not have been
written in less than 30 minutes and therefore the FIR could not have
been filed at 9.10 PM is speculative and based on an imaginative arithmetic
calculation. There was no basis for the Trial Court to assume that this
H document could not have been written in 15-20 minutes, particularly in
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1079
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

view of the evidence of PW-3 who is stated to be an experienced scribe. A
In this very context, the further conclusion of the Trial Court that the
document could not have been written without any mistakes or cuttings
is yet again speculative and without any basis.
98. Thirdly, it was argued that Constable Mahesh Singh, PW-9
who prepared the FIR by copying the contents of the tehreer made B
certain omissions like the word ‘tatha’ were replaced by ‘aur’ and the
word ‘anya’ was written out of alignment. Also, the sentence ‘tatha
mere per me goliya lagi’ was omitted. During the examination-in-chief
of this witness, he mentioned that he was under pressure to complete
the FIR formalities and the investigating officer was hurrying him to
hand over the report. This explanation was accepted by the High Court C
as such omissions cannot be held to be fatal to the case of the prosecution.
The Trial Court committed a serious error in discrediting the version
of PW-1 about the occurrence of the event on the basis of such minor
and inconsequential omissions. It was therefore necessary for the High
Court to interfere with the glaring mistakes committed by the Trial Court. D
This is a good and sufficient ground to interfere.
99. Finally, we are in agreement with the observation made by
the High Court with regard to the discharge timing mentioned on the
Bed Head Ticket, as this is a natural conclusion to be drawn based on
the evidence available on record. It is, therefore, logical to conclude that E
PW-1 would have gone to the police station to lodge the FIR and returned
to the hospital for further treatment.
100. The variations indicated in the tehreer and the FIR, as well
as the argument of improbability based on a minute-by-minute construct
by the learned counsels for the Appellants, can under no circumstance F
become fatal to the acceptance of the tehreer and the FIR. This Court,
while noting the defects and variations in the investigation observed in
Rammi Alia Rameshwar v. State of M.P.31:
“24. When an eyewitness is examined at length it is quite
possible for him to make some discrepancies. No true witness G
can possibly escape from making some discrepant details.
Perhaps an untrue witness who is well tutored can
successfully make his testimony totally non- discrepant. But
courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies
31
(1999) 8 SCC 649. H
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the
credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning
his evidence. But too serious a view to be adopted on mere
variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as
between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two
statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for
B
judicial scrutiny.
25. It is a common practice in trial courts to make out
contradictions from the previous statement of a witness for
confronting him during cross-examination. Merely because
there is inconsistency in evidence it is not sufficient to impair
C the credit of the witness. No doubt Section 155 of the Evidence
Act provides scope for impeaching the credit of a witness by
proof of an inconsistent former statement. But a reading of
the section would indicate that all inconsistent statements are
not sufficient to impeach the credit of the witness….
D 26. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with
the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to
contradiction. Only such of the inconsistent statement which
is liable to be “contradicted” would affect the credit of the
witness…..”
E 101. The Trial Court has taken a super technical approach in
doubting the timing of lodging of the FIR for arriving at an erroneous
conclusion the FIR and the tehreer are ante-timed. In these
circumstances, there are compelling and substantial reasons for the High
Court to interfere with the findings and conclusions of the Trial Court.
F V. Presence of PW-1 at the place of incidence
102. Yet another substantive argument advanced on behalf of the
Appellants is that the presence of PW-1 at the scene of the offence is
doubtful. Therefore, his testimony must be rejected on the ground that
he is not an eye-witness at all. To make this point good, the learned
counsels advanced four-fold submission, which is also the reasoning of
G
the Trial Court. We will refer to each of the submissions and deal with
them.
A. Bullet marks on the jonga
103. Based on the statement of PW-1 in the FIR that the accused
H party fired at them ‘indiscriminately’, it is argued that this statement
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1081
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

cannot be believed as there were no multiple bullet holes on the jonga. A
In fact, the jonga only has one bullet hole on the left side of the
windscreen.
104. A proper reading of the evidence demonstrates the following.
The Head Constable, M.T., Malkhan Singh, PW-4, conducted the technical
examination of the vehicle and prepared a report exhibited as Ex-A2. B
Though Exb. A-2 is in Hindi, and the content of it is available in the
testimony of PW-4, which we can consider and understand the correct
fact situation. PW-4 states in the report that the jonga had a hole in the
windscreen window and multiple holes in the back side of the driver’s
seat. He also stated that there were holes in the upper body of the back
tyre of the left side of the jonga and on both sides of the window. The C
driver-side mirror was also broken.
105. This description matches the seizure memo of the jonga
exhibited as Ka-29, which was prepared when the jonga was seized.
The relevant part of PW- 4’s testimony is as under:
D
“….There was a hole in the body towards back in left side.
Condition of steering was ok. Condition of break was ok.
Condition of Back Pedal, Electric (Light) was fine.
Transmission was fine. Suspension was fine. Tyres were in
running condition. There was a hole in the front mirror (wind
screen) window and right side and there were holes in the E
back seat of right side (driver seat). Driver mirror was also
broken…..
xxxx
9. Holes were found in the side doors of both side windows. F
Holes were not found in the back curtain. Holes of curtains,
except one or two, remaining holes ‘ are inside the fold of
curtain. That which is one or half hole has not gone while
folding the curtains from many places.”
106. We have carefully perused the seizure memo of the jonga
G
which clearly describes “kai jagah par goliyon ke nishan hai”,
meaning thereby that there are many bullet marks found on the jonga.
Further, the inspection report prepared by PW-4 on 25.02.2002 also
mentions about the existence of multiple bullet marks on the jonga. This
is also the version of PW-1.
H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A 107. Even the investigating officer, PW-12 who prepared the
seizure memo of the jonga, found 12 blank cartridges on the spot along
with samples of the broken front glass of the jonga.
108. It is in the context of the above-referred evidence that we
need to look at the testimony of PW-1 about which the Appellants have
B argued as if he supports their case. The following extraction from his
testimony makes it clear that this submission has no ground to stand.
“…I don’t remember the number of hole, I had seen at that
time. I had seen only one hole in the glass (wind shield). I did
not notice the hole on other parts of the body of the vehicle.
C It is incorrect to suggest that there might not been any other
gun shot hole in the vehicle except one on the glass (wind
shield).”
109. On an overall examination of the testimonies and the
documentary evidence on record, it is evident that the jonga had multiple
D bullet holes on different parts. The contention that only one bullet hole
was found on the windscreen is to be rejected, and we have no hesitation
in holding that the conclusion drawn by the Trial Court that there was
no ‘indiscriminate’ firing is based on the misreading of the evidence.
We are also of the opinion that this is a substantial and compelling
reason for the High Court to interfere with the judgment of the Trial
E
Court.
B. Position of PW-1 and the injuries sustained by him and the
deceased at the time of the incident
110. The Appellants argued that the injuries on PW-1 and the
F deceased persons do not match the position they were in when the firing
occurred. We will answer this with reference to the first as well as the
second incident.
111. At the first incident, from the testimony of PW-1 as well as
the site plan drawn by PW-12, PW-1 was initially standing in front of the
G jonga when he stopped to speak to the deceased Rakesh Shukla. While
explaining that the site plan does not accurately describe Lallan’s and
his position, he categorically states that he moved to the right side (non-
driver side) of the jonga when it was facing east to speak to the deceased
Rakesh as there were people on the driver’s side. We will quote this in
his own words as this is of some importance:
H
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1083
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

“….The Jonga had been stopped/parked in the mid of the A
road. I was in front of the Jonga only, when it was stopped
there. I do not recall exactly if I was on the right side (Patari)
of the road. At that time, the Jonga was facing east. The east
falls in the direction of my home. I moved to the Jonga at
non-driver side to speak to him. I had gone to my right side.
B
There were a few people standing in the side of driver. My
servant· (domestic help) Lallan had come to me
xxx
I had told the I.O. the fact that the Jonga was standing exactly
in the mid of the road but not that we were standing on the C
right side of the road. I do not know the reason why the LO.
has shown (demarcated) our location in the right side of the
road but not in front of the Jonga…”
112. It is at this point of time that the firing started, that is when
PW-1 was on the non-driver side. If this is considered true, then PW-1’s D
testimony that he shielded himself behind the jonga falls into place and
he is certainly not in the direct line of firing. We have no hesitation in
rejecting the contention of the Appellants that PW-1 is in the direct line
of firing. It is not in dispute that PW- 1 is on the non-driver side of the
vehicle and when the firing began from Naseem’s gun shop which is in E
the south side of the jonga. In fact, this submission is speculative as the
complainant has not even indicated in the FIR that he was on the driver-
side of the jonga during the first instance. PW-1’s testimony is clearly in
consonance with the statement in the FIR. It is surprising that Trial Court
has rejected the very presence of PW-1 on the scene of the offence on
the basis of a hypothetical argument, and the High Court was justified in F
interfering with such a finding.
113. In so far as the second incident is concerned, Appellants
contend that, when deceased Rajesh stepped out of the jonga after turning
the same towards the hospital to fire back at the Appellants, he was hit
G
by several bullets, PW-1 could not have escaped with just one bullet
shot. This, according to the Appellants, is so improbable that his presence
is falsified. In fact, the Trial Court accepted this submission. We have
examined this submission in detail and have found it to be incorrect for
the following reasons.
H
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A 114. After the first incident, the jonga was turned to proceed
towards the hospital. On reaching the second spot near Parma Pandit’s
house, when the assailants again attacked, Rajesh got down from the
jonga with his rifle in an attempt to retaliate. At that point, he suffered
multiple bullet injuries. Consistent with his stand, PW-1 was behind the
jonga on the right side, which is the driver’s side, and that is how he
B
could take cover of the jonga, but he could not escape a bullet injury on
his leg. So far as deceased Rajesh Shukla is concerned, he proactively
got out of the jonga and took a position to fire at the assailants. There is
a clear distinction between the position taken by Rajesh on the one hand
and PW-1 on the other. There is, therefore, sufficient explanation for
C PW-1 receiving not as many bullets injuries as the deceased Rajesh. We
may also add that the submission made by the Appellants is not based on
any evidence but proceeds on a theory of probability. The High Court
has correctly rejected this theorization, which has unfortunately impressed
the Trial Court. This is without any basis. It was, therefore compelling
for the High Court to interfere and correct the glaring mistake of the
D
Trial Court.
115. In a situation like this, when there is a group attack which
lasted for only a few minutes, it is unreasonable to expect an eye-witness
to recount each fact in mathematical detail. A recent decision of this
Court recounted a chaotic situation like this by reviewing the existing
E case laws on the subject. In Abdul Sayeed v. State of Madhya
Pradesh32, this Court held as under:
“27. In the instant case, a very large number of assailants
attacked Chand Khan and Shabir (the deceased), caused
injuries with deadly weapons to them. The incident stood
F concluded within few minutes. Thus, it is natural that the exact
version of the incident revealing every minute detail i.e.
meticulous exactitude of individual acts cannot be given by
the eyewitnesses.
28. The question of the weight to be attached to the evidence
G of a witness that was himself injured in the course of the
occurrence has been extensively discussed by this Court.
Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured
in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally

32
H (2010) 10 SCC 259.
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1085
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes A
with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the
crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order
to falsely implicate someone. “Convincing evidence is required
to discredit an injured witness.”…..”
116. Reiterating the same principle about the evidence of an injured B
witness, this Court in Rajendra Alia Rajappa & Ors v. State of
Karnataka33, held as under:
“18. This Court in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of
Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of
Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546] , C
has considered the minor contradictions in the testimony, while
appreciating the evidence in criminal trial. It is held in the
said judgment that only contradictions in material particulars
and not minor contradictions can be a ground to discredit the
testimony of the witnesses….”
D
117. In light of this, the argument of improbability that while
deceased Rajesh Shukla received 16 bullet injuries, Rakesh and Gudda
received fatal bullet injuries and PW-1 received just one bullet injury,
must be rejected.
118. Yet another argument raised by the Appellants is that, as E
per the injury report of PW-1, he received one bullet injury on the
upper portion of his left thigh. However, as per the testimony of PW-9,
the bandage was not on PW-1’s thigh but on his calf. This statement of
PW-9 must be understood in the context of the statement that PW-1
sustained a bullet injury. This is an important part of the evidence. The
mathematical analysis of PW-9’s evidence is unnecessary. The injury F
report of PW-1 is in corroboration with the evidence of the doctor,
examined as PW-8. Further, even the X-Ray supports the view that
PW-1 received an injury on his left thigh. All these evidences, which
are contemporaneous and credible, cannot be discarded on the basis
of the testimony of PW-9 given four years after the incident. The oral G
and documentary evidence consistently points towards an injury on
the leg of PW-1. That one of the witnesses refers to the injury being
on the calf cannot cast doubt on the presence of PW-1 at the scene of
the offence. The Trial Court committed a serious error in relying on
33
(2021) 6 SCC 178. H
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A the evidence of PW-9 for discarding the entire evidence of PW-1.
This finding was rightly set aside by the High Court.
C. X-Rays and Bed Head Ticket
119. PW-1 and PW-12, both depose that PW-1 went back to the
hospital from the place of occurrence due to the pain of his injury. After
B reaching the hospital, it was stated that PW-1 was advised an X-Ray for
his injuries by PW- 8, who did his preliminary examination. It has been
argued by the Appellants that the X-Ray done on PW-1 was forged for
three reasons (i) there was no entry for treatment of PW-1 in the medico-
legal register or recommendation of X-Ray in the Bed Head Ticket (ii)
C the time of X-Ray of PW-1 is 10 PM, however, the department stops
working at 2 PM (iii) there was no money deposited by PW-1 and
Hardayal for their treatment.
120. We will deal with these submissions by taking the last
argument first. The Medical Officer, PW-8 who treated PW-1 as well
D as Hardayal has deposed that after the preliminary treatment of the
deceased and the victims, a police memo describing the deceased as
well as the injured victims was sent by him to the police station at 9 PM.
It was also stated that the entry of treatment of the victims was made in
the accidental register instead of the medico legal register as the
police did not accompany PW-1 and Hardayal. Therefore, no entry was
E made in the medico legal register. Further, this witness also admitted
that in cases where entries are made in the accidental register, no fees is
charged from the patients. The statement of this witness is important
and it is extracted hereinbelow:
“…..Entry which is made in the medico legal register, which
F are sent by police for medical examination or any doctor
himself conducts the medical examination by writing
application. We do so because no charges are levied of the
matter referred by police and medical fees has to deposit in
the matter of giving application at his own. These injuries
G would have come by some quarrel and from any other reason
or beatings etc., which relates to medical examination. No
charge is deposited in case of accidental case, treatment has
to be given by us, hence we recorded further proceeding in
the accidental register. The report which I have given in respect
of the injuries of those injured, they have been recorded in
H
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1087
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

accidental register. When police has not come with the injured A
and injured has come, neither gives application nor deposits
fees and has asid to do the examination then under compulsion
we write injuries in the accidental register after conducting
his examination. First we demand application from the injured
or says that to come with police when he does not give
B
application then we examined him in the accidental register.
Injured come and write in medico legal case that how the
injuries have come, then we examined him…..”
121. It has also been admitted by the PW-7, the Radiologist, under
whose supervision the X-Ray was done that the X-Ray was conducted
on the reference of the Emergency Medical Officer, PW-8 who sent a C
reference slip for the same. In view of the statements of the doctor PW-
8 as well as the Radiologist, PW-7, there is clarity and certainty about
the entry in the accidental register and as such, there is no money
deposited by PW-1 and Hardayal. There is absolutely no justification for
the Trial Court to conclude that these documents are forged. Seen in the D
context of various contemporaneous documents, supporting the injuries
on the body of PW-1, it is difficult to accept the submission made by the
Appellants that the X-Ray is a forged document or that it is ante-dated.
122. Coming to the submission that the X-Ray of PW-1 and
Hardayal could not have been taken at 10 PM when the department E
closes at 2 PM, we have examined the evidence of PW-7, who has
categorically stated that the X-Ray was taken under his supervision.
The relevant portion of his statement is as under:
“On dated 27 .1. 97 also I was posted at the post of
Radiologist in Dist. Hospital, Hamirpur. On that day under F
my supervision the X-Ray of the right thigh, along with left
thigh and left knee of injured Rajiv Shukla S/o Sh. Bhishm
Shukla R/o Ramedi P.S. Kotwali Hamirpur aged about 31
years was conducted who was referred by E.M.O. District
Hospital, Hamirpur for X-ray. He himself had come from the
emergency ward. In the X-ray one small round metal non- G
transparent (torn paper) was seen in the right thigh, left thigh
and left knee alongwith leg. Report was prepared by me on
the basis of X-ray plate, which bears the identification mark
and thumb impression of the injured. This Rajiv Shukla is
present in the Court, the report exhibited as Ex.A-8. Three X- H
1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A Ray plates exhibited as Ex.44 to 46, which bears thumb
impression of the injured and is attested by me.”
123. This witness was cross-examined at length but he explained
that despite the department normally closing at 2 PM, he insisted that
the X-Ray of PW-1 and Hardayal was actually taken at 10 PM on
B 26.01.1997. The defence tried to discredit this witness by suggesting
that he had some issues with Ashok Kumar Chandel which he denied.
We have no reason to disbelieve this witness. Moreover, it is not
unbelievable that a hospital could make a special provision for X-Ray in
times of immediate medical aid. Instead of referring to and considering
the material evidence on record relating to X-Ray and the bed head
C
ticket, the Trial Court arrived at its own conclusion based on probabilities.
The High Court was therefore justified in setting aside the judgment of
the Trial Court.
D. Electricity failure at the time of the incident
D 124. The last attempt to persuade the court to discard the evidence
of PW-1 is based on an argument that during the period commencing
from 07.30 PM to 08.45 PM, there was no electricity at the scene of the
offence. To make good this argument, the defence examined DW-1,
who was working as an Engineer at the Electricity Distribution Division.
This witness deposed that he received information at 07.50 PM regarding
E the breakdown of the electricity connection at Akil Tiraha; as a result,
the electricity supply discontinued in areas from Kali Chauraha to Devi
Das, which included Subhash Market (place of the occurrence) and
Suphiganj. It was informed that the connection broke down 15-20 mins
before 07.50 PM, i.e., around 7.30 PM. He stated that the connection
F was only restored at 08.45 PM after repairing the broken wires. On this
basis, it was urged that it would have been difficult for PW-1 to identify
the Appellants and also for other witnesses to identify persons around
the market.
125. The High Court examined this issue in detail. It was observed
G that DW-1 has admitted to the fact that although there was an electricity
cut between 07.30 PM to 08.45 PM, he was not sure if the place of
occurrence, i.e., Subhash Market was affected by the same. He went
on to state that there were total of three phases connected to Akil Tiraha,
and out of those three phases, two continued to remain operational despite
the breakdown. DW-1, in his cross-examination, has affirmed that:
H
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1089
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

“…..I am unable to say about how many connection of the A
electricity was connected there at Subahs Bazara from Akil
Tiraha with that phase that is broken and the electricity supply
was interrupted. There in total number of three phases but
after breaking the wire, two phases of electrification were
continued. Akil Tiraha is in very far distance from Subhash
B
Bazaar. I am not able to say about electricity connections
from Akhil Tiraha to Subhash Bazar or whether was connected
there or not….”
126. Having examined the matter in detail, the High Court came
to the correct conclusion that electricity shutdowns are quite common
C
and the public is not solely dependent on street lights. In a place like
Subhash Market, people must keep their own arrangements like
generators in cases of electricity cuts. Moreover, DW-1 clearly admitted
that, “…but after breaking the wire, two phases of electrification
were continued. Akil Tiraha is in very far distance from Subhash
Bazaar. I am not able to say about electricity connections from Akhil D
Tiraha to Subhash Bazar or whether was connected there or not….”.
127. As against the reasoning and the conclusions drawn by the
High Court, the Trial Court has simply referred to the evidence of DW-
1 stating that there was no electricity and immediately concluded that
the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-2 are not trustworthy. The Trial Court E
has not examined the evidence of DW-1 in detail and has, in fact left out
the crucial portion of the evidence. The High Court was, therefore,
completely justified in reversing this finding drawn by the Trial Court.
128. In conclusion, with respect to the issue relating to the presence
of PW-1 as doubted by the Trial Court, we have examined the matter in F
detail. The evidence about the existence of multiple bullet holes on the
jonga establishes ‘indiscriminate’ firing, as stated by PW-1. We have
also seen that the injuries on the body of PW-1 and that of the deceased
persons co-relate with the testimony establishing PW-1’s presence at
the scene of occurrence. Further, the injury on PW-1 at the scene of the
G
offence is proved on the basis of the medical evidence supported by
testimonies of the doctors. Furthermore, we have also seen that the
defence could not probablize their theory that there was no electricity at
the scene of offence in view of the equivocal evidence of their own
witness DW-1.
H
1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A 129. For all these reasons we are of the opinion that the High
Court was correct in its conclusion that the prosecution has successfully
established the presence of PW-1 at the scene of the offence. We are
also convinced that the High Court is justified in reversing the order of
acquittal for the glaring mistakes and distorted conclusions that the
Trial Court has drawn.
B
VI. Presence of PW-2 at the place of incidence
130. Learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that the
evidence of PW-2 must be discarded for the following reasons; (i) he
cannot be accepted as an eye-witness as the injuries on his body are not
C of a firearm (ii) his version is in contradiction to PW-1 who instructed
PW-2 to check on the children and that he is unaware as to who took the
children home (iii) the conduct and behaviour of PW-2 are unnatural
because when his own brother Sri Kant Pandey received fatal injuries,
he chose not to go to the hospital.
D 131. The way to answer this first issue is to refer to the medical
evidence. While the X-Ray report described the injury on PW-2 as “one
small metallic radio opaque shadow is seen in left leg” corroborating
the same, Dr. SK Gupta, PW-7 has, in his own words, stated:
“…Shadow of a small non-transparent radio thing of metal
E was seen in it. I had prepared the report in my handwriting
and signature on the basis of X-ray plates...”
132. The doctor’s evidence as well as the X-Ray report stand
duly corroborated and the Appellants have brought nothing on record to
falsify the same. In light of the report and the testimony, the injury
F sustained by PW-2 has to be believed.
133. With respect to the second issue, there is no confusion or
contradiction about the shifting of the children. We have gone through
the evidence of PW-2 and he has clearly explained that upon hearing
gunshots he rushed to the spot along with Rajesh Shukla and others
and saw PW-1 and Lallan moving the children out of the jonga. In his
G
cross-examination, he stated that he was unaware as to who actually
took the children to the residence. It is after the second incident when
he also received an injury that PW-1 asked him to go home and check
on the children, Chandan and Vipul. It can be seen from his testimony
that:
H
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1091
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

“18. When I reached there, Chandan was outside the Jonga A
and Vipul was being driving out. At that time, in my first
glimpse, Chandan was standing at left side of Jonga. Rajeev
was standing outside the vehicle. He was driving Vipul from
the vehicle. He pulled out Vipul immediately. I cannot tell the
name of the person, with whom Chandan and Vipul were send
B
the home. Then voluntarily told that they were send home along-
with some known person of the mohalla. I cannot tell that
they were taken to the house in some vehicle or on foot.
xxx
22. I was there, when Rajeev Shukla took Rakesh, Gudda, C
Sri Kant, Ved, Rajesh to the hospital by putting them in Jonga.
I cannot tell whether there was someone else in the vehicle or
not, as I had come back to the house. The moment, Rajeev
Shukla sit in the Jonga, I moved to the house as per his
instruction.
D
xxx
29. Rajeev told me to go to the house, I am going to the
hospital. I do not remember whether I had told this fact to the
‘Daroga’ or not”
134. Coming to the third issue, the evidence of PW-2 cannot be E
brushed aside under the assumption that he did not accompany his brother
to the hospital. It is not as if he left his brother on the road and went
home to check on Chandan and Vipul. He saw his own person, PW-1, a
close family associate taking his brother along with PW-1’s own brothers
to the hospital. In such situations, it is natural for people to share F
responsibilities. PW-2 come forward to take care of and protect children.
There is nothing unnatural about it. While PW-1 was taking PW-2’s
brother to the hospital it is natural that PW-2 would take care of the
other emergencies of checking on the children who also received minor
injuries. In any event, there is no standard for expecting a particular
behavior or reaction of a victim. This Court in Rana Pratap and ors v. G
State of Haryana34, held:
“6. Yet another reason given by the learned Sessions Judge
to doubt the presence of the witnesses was that their conduct
34
(1983) 3 SCC 327. H
1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A in not going to the rescue of the deceased when he was in the
clutches of the assailants was unnatural. We must say that
the comment is most unreal. Every person who witnesses a
murder reacts in his own way. Some are stunned, become
speechless and stand rooted to the spot. Some become hysteric
and start wailing. Some start shouting for help. Others run
B
away to keep themselves as far removed from the spot as
possible. Yet others rush to the rescue of the victim, even going
to the extent of counter-attacking the assailants. Every one
reacts in his own special way. There is no set rule of natural
reaction. To discard the evidence of a witness on the ground
C that he did not react in any particular manner is to appreciate
evidence in a wholly unrealistic and unimaginative way.”35
135. For the reasons stated above, there is absolutely no reason
for rejecting the evidence of PW-2 and doubting his presence at the
scene of the offence. The Trial Court was not justified in disbelieving
D the evidence of PW-2.
VII. Discrepancies in the FIR and the Fax sent by the
Superintendent of Police
136. The learned counsels have referred to a fax message said to
have been sent from the office of the Superintendent of Police (SP) to
E the superiors informing them about the occurrence of this very incident.
The contents of this fax are used by the defence to contradict the very
happening of the incident in the manner described by the prosecution.
They also contradict the time of the incident, apart from certain alleged
recoveries.
F 137. This fax message is said to have emanated from the office
of the Superintendent of Police. Except for this fax, we have not been
informed of any role being played by the SP during the investigation. It is
through the evidence of DW-3, examined by the defence on 27.06.2002
that a parallel story advanced by the defence comes into play.
G 138. The circumstances in which the fax never formed a part of
the investigation and that it emanated only with its introduction by DW-

35
This principle has been reiterated in a number of decisions of this court in Leela Ram
(Dead) through Duli Chand v. State of Haryana and anr (1999) 9 SCC 525; State of
U.P. v. Devendra Singh (2004) 10 SCC 616; Kathi Bharat Vajsur and anr v. State of
H Gujarat (2012) 5 SCC 724.
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1093
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

3 examined on 27.06.2002, causes much suspicion about the fax as well A
as its contents. There is nothing to corroborate the contents of the fax.
The prosecution has in fact established the contents of the FIR with
clinching evidence, both oral and documentary. The entire evidence of
the defence was to discredit the eyewitnesses and to show contradictions
in their statements on the basis of contemporaneous documentary
B
evidence. We have already considered those submissions and have
rejected the same by upholding the conclusions drawn by the High Court.
The circumstance in which the fax originated has not been established
to the satisfaction of the Court. The evidence of DW-3 does not inspire
confidence as well.
139. In conclusion, we reject the fax as well as the submissions C
based on the contents of the fax for the reason that firstly, the timings as
indicated in the FIR stand confirmed by other oral and documentary
evidence as discussed earlier. There is nothing to suggest about the
happening of the event as mentioned in the fax. Secondly, as the
prosecution has established the occurrence of the incident as described D
in the FIR on the basis of bullets on the vehicle, empty cartridges, blood
recovery from the place of occurrence coupled with proof of injuries
based on medical evidence we have to accept the story in the FIR and
reject the one propagated in the fax involving Titu leading the attack on
the victims. Even the so-called recovery of a 0.315-bore rifle referred to
in the fax must be rejected and we will explain this aspect in more detail E
while discussing the next argument relating to the recoveries and the
arrest.
140. Fax is not part of the investigation. Even assuming that there
is some defect in the investigation on this count, it will have no bearing
on the prosecution case. This Court has observed in a number of cases, F
that defective investigation by the investigating authorities by itself does
vitiate the case of the prosecution when there are credible eye-witness
testimonies as well as other compelling pieces of evidence. In Karnel
Singh v. State of M.P.36 this Court held that:
“5.….In cases of defective investigation the court has to be G
circumspect in evaluating the evidence but it would not be
right in acquitting an accused person solely on account of
the defect; to do so would tantamount to playing into the hands

36
(1995) 5 SCC 518. H
1094 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A of the investigating officer if the investigation is designedly
defective…..”
141. Similarly in the case of C. Muniappan and Others v. State
of Tamil Nadu37 this Court held:
“55. There may be highly defective investigation in a case.
B However, it is to be examined as to whether there is any lapse
by the IO and whether due to such lapse any benefit should
be given to the accused. The law on this issue is well settled
that the defect in the investigation by itself cannot be a ground
for acquittal. If primacy is given to such designed or negligent
C investigations or to the omissions or lapses by perfunctory
investigation, the faith and confidence of the people in the
criminal justice administration would be eroded. Where there
has been negligence on the part of the investigating agency
or omissions, etc. which resulted in defective investigation,
there is a legal obligation on the part of the court to examine
D the prosecution evidence dehors such lapses, carefully, to find
out whether the said evidence is reliable or not and to what
extent it is reliable and as to whether such lapses affected the
object of finding out the truth. Therefore, the investigation is
not the solitary area for judicial scrutiny in a criminal
E trial…..”
VIII. Unlawful Assembly and Common Object
142. Mr. Siddharth Dave, Senior Counsel, appearing for Ashutosh,
Appellant No. 2 made three-fold submissions. He argued that the
prosecution has failed to prove that there was an unlawful assembly and
F that Appellant No.2 was one of the persons constituting the unlawful
assembly. He submitted that mere presence or association with other
members alone is not sufficient to hold everyone criminally liable as
vicarious or constructive liability can be fastened only if it is proved that
an unlawful assembly is physically formed.
G 143. The submission proceeds on a premise that a prior formation
of an unlawful assembly with a common object is a must and should
have been a condition precedent for roping the accused within the fold
of Section 149, IPC. Mr. Dave submitted that the prosecution has not

37
H (2010) 9 SCC 567.
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1095
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

explained that there was a common object on the basis of which the A
accused came to the spot and fired at the jonga in front of Naseem’s
gun shop. An extension of this very argument is that the prosecution
failed to prove how the unlawful assembly was disbanded after firing in
front of Naseem’s gun shop and again reassembled as an unlawful
assembly before Parma Pandit’s house. These submissions pale into
B
insignificance if we appreciate the true and correct effect of an unlawful
assembly as enunciated by this Court. We will refer to some of the
leading judgments on the point. In the case of Amzad Ali Alias Amzad
Kha and ors v. State of Assam38, this Court held:
“5. ....It is incorrect to claim that prior formation of an
unlawful assembly with a common object is a must and should C
have been found as a condition precedent before roping the
accused within the fold of Section 149 IPC. No doubt the
offence committed must be shown to be immediately connected
with the common object, but whether they had the common
object to cause the murder in a given case would depend and D
can rightly be decided on the basis of any proved rivalry
between two factions, the nature of weapons used, the manner
of attack as well as all surrounding circumstances. Common
object has been always considered to be different from
common intention and that it does not require prior concert
and common meeting of minds before the attack. Common E
object could develop eo instanti and being a question of fact
it can always be inferred and deduced from the facts and
circumstances of a case projected and proved in a given
case…..”
144. Also in Bhargavan and ors v. State of Kerala39, it was F
held by this Court. that:
“14. “Common object” is different from a “common intention”
as it does not require a prior concert and a common meeting
of minds before the attack. It is enough if each has the same
object in view and their number is five or more and that they G
act as an assembly to achieve that object. The “common
object” of an assembly is to be ascertained from the acts and

38
(2003) 6 SCC 270.
H
1096 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A language of the members composing it, and from a
consideration of all the surrounding circumstances. It may be
gathered from the course of conduct adopted by the members
of the assembly. What the common object of the unlawful
assembly is at a particular stage of the incident is essentially
a question of fact to be determined, keeping in view the nature
B
of the assembly, the arms carried by the members, and the
behaviour of the members at or near the scene of the incident.
It is not necessary under law that in all cases of unlawful
assembly, with an unlawful common object, the same must be
translated into action or be successful. Under the Explanation
C to Section 141, an assembly which was not unlawful when it
assembled, may subsequently become unlawful. It is not
necessary that the intention or the purpose, which is necessary
to render an assembly an unlawful one comes into existence
at the outset. The time of forming an unlawful intent is not
material. An assembly which, at its commencement or even
D
for some time thereafter, is lawful, may subsequently become
unlawful. In other words, it can develop during the course of
incident at the spot eo instanti.”
145. Further, the PW-1 is an eye-witness to the first incident before
Naseem’s gun shop. The advent of Raghuvir Singh’s gang in a vehicle is
E immediately after the firing commenced from and in front of Naseem’s
gun shop. PW-1 clearly mentioned about Raguvir Singh, Ashutosh Singh,
Pradeep Singh, Uttam Singh and Bhan Singh wielding weapons and firing
at the jonga. The second incident is vouchsafed by PW-1 as well as
PW-2, who have reached Parma Pandit’s house as the deceased party
F alighted the children Vipul and Chandan and turned the jonga towards
the hospital. Having reached Parma Pandit’s house, these accused again
attacked the jonga and fired indiscriminately. It is therefore futile to
suggest that there was no common object and that the assembly was not
unlawful. In fact, PW-1 spoke of the exhortation by Ashok Kumar
Chandel that “no one from the Shukla Family should escape alive”
G and thereafter all other accused including the Raghuvir group started
firing. This is yet another factor which establishes the existence of a
common object. The argument that the prosecution has not proved when
the unlawful assembly after the first incident was disbanded and when it
reassembled again as an unlawful assembly in front of Parma Pandit’s
H house is also to be rejected for the reason that the distance between the
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1097
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

two places is merely 50-75 meters, and all this happened within a matter A
of minutes. The submissions were advanced as if there is a requirement
to prove a common intention, which is not a requirement for an unlawful
assembly under Section 149 IPC. It is apt to refer to the decision of this
Court in Bhupendra Singh and ors v. State of U.P.40, at this stage:
“14…..Where common object of an unlawful assembly is not B
proved, the accused persons cannot be convicted with the
help of Section 149. The crucial question to determine is
whether the assembly consisted of five or more persons and
whether the said persons entertained one or more of the
common objects, as specified in Section 141. It cannot be
laid down as a general proposition of law that unless an overt C
act is proved against a person, who is alleged to be a member
of an unlawful assembly, it cannot be said that he is a member
of an assembly. The only thing required is that he should have
understood that the assembly was unlawful and was likely to
commit any of the acts which fall within the purview of Section D
141. The word ‘object’ means the purpose or design and, in
order to make it ‘common’, it must be shared by all. In other
words, the object should be common to the persons, who
compose the assembly, that is to say, they should all be aware
of it and concur in it. A common object may be formed by
express agreement after mutual consultation, but that is by E
no means necessary. It may be formed at any stage by all or a
few members of the assembly and the other members may just
join and adopt it. Once formed, it need not continue to be the
same. It may be modified or altered or abandoned at any stage.
The expression ‘in prosecution of common object’ as appearing F
in Section 149 has to be strictly construed as equivalent to
‘in order to attain the common object’. It must be immediately
connected with the common object by virtue of the nature of
the object. There must be community of object and the object
may exist only up to a particular stage, and not thereafter.
Members of an unlawful assembly may have community of G
object up to a certain point beyond which they may differ in
their objects and the knowledge, possessed by each member
of what is likely to be committed in prosecution of their

40
(2009) 12 SCC 447. H
1098 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A common object which may vary not only according to the
information at his command, but also according to the extent
to which he shares the community of object, and as a
consequence of this the effect of Section 149 IPC may be
different on different members of the same assembly.”
B 146. With respect to the submission that the prosecution failed to
establish any vicarious liability, it is enough to refer to the decision of this
Court in Saddik Alias Lalo Gulam Hussein Shaikh and ors v. State
of Gujarat41, where the Court expressly rejected this argument and
held:
C “18. Further, once it is established that the unlawful assembly
had a common object, it is not necessary that all the persons
forming the unlawful assembly must be shown to have
committed some overt act. For the purpose of incurring
vicarious liability under the provision, the liability of other
members of the unlawful assembly for the offence committed
D during the continuance of the occurrence, rests upon the fact
whether the other members knew beforehand that the offence
actually committed was likely to be committed in prosecution
of the common object.”
147. While concluding, we may note that there is no specific finding
E on unlawful assembly and the common object under Section 149 by the
Trial Court. The High Court has discussed this issue and has also relied
on the decision of this Court while dealing with the submission. Having
considered the matter in detail, we are of the opinion that the High Court
has examined the issue from all perspectives and in great detail before
F reversing the decision of the Trial Court. The decision of the High Court
is, therefore unexceptionable.
IX. Recoveries of Weapons, Railway Manarth Card and Arrest
of Sahab Singh
A. Recovery of Railway Manarth Card belonging to Ashok
G Chandel
148. The Appellants made two-fold submissions with respect to
the recovery of the Railway Manarth Card from the place of the incident.
Firstly, the railway card had expired on 12.01.1994 and the present
41
H (2016) 10 SCC 663.
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1099
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

incident being of 1997, it was argued that under no circumstances would A
a person be carrying an expired railway card. Secondly, it is submitted
that the recovery of the card from the place of the incident is doubtful as
it was sealed and stamped separately from all other material objects that
were recovered from the place of the incident. It is also submitted that
the diary entry mentions all other material objects except the Railway
B
Manarth card.
149. With respect to the first issue, the High Court’s view is correct
as it is not unimaginable that accused Ashok Kumar Chandel carried an
expired card. There is nothing unusual or uncommon about carrying
expired cards, as people do it for some reason or another. The
Investigating Officer, PW-12, found the Railway Manarth card at the C
scene of the offence. So far as the submission relating to the irregularity
in the recovery and the marking of the Manarth card is concerned, we
are of the opinion that there is no reason for the IO to plant the card
there, as there is no past enmity between him and Ashok Kumar Chandel.
Once the presence of PW-1 and PW-2, injured eye witnesses is accepted, D
then this argument will make no difference.
B. Recovery of Weapons and the Arrests
150. A little factual background is necessary before noting the
argument raised by the Appellants.
E
151. The Investigating Officer, PW-12, deposed that after
receiving information from an informant that four accused were trying
to escape from Naseem’s gun shop, he, along with Constable Aftab
Ali, PW-11 and other police officers, proceeded to the spot and arrested
the four accused namely Naseem (A6), Bhan Singh (A10), Shyam
Singh (A7) and Sahab Singh (A8). Upon the arrest, one 8x60 bore rifle F
was recovered from Sahab Singh (A8) along with ten brass cartridges
from his belt. PW-11, Constable Aftab Ali, deposed the same and also
mentioned that attempts were made to secure public witnesses.
However, no one was ready due to the apprehension of danger. He
also stated that the recovery memo, Exb. Ka-24 was prepared, and a G
copy was given to Sahab Singh, who tore the same into pieces. In his
evidence, Dy. SP, Sukhram Sonkar, PW-14 stated that PW-12 had in
his statement before the CBCID stated that one rifle along with 18
bullets, ten from the belt and eight from the butt cover of the rifle,
were recovered from Sahab Singh (A8).
H
1100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A 152. It is in the above-referred background, the learned counsels
have raised two contentions. Firstly, the recovery from Sahab Singh
contradicts the contents of the fax, which mentions the recovery of a
0.315 bore rifle and not an 8x60-bore rifle. Secondly, it is also the
contention that the prosecution has not proved the recoveries at all.
B 153. We have already considered and rejected the story set up by
the defence on the basis of the fax message. In fact, the contents of the
fax are referred to only to contradict the nature of the weapon recovered
from Sahab Singh; that is, while the recovery mentioned in the fax refers
to the weapon as a 0.315- bore rifle, the recovery memo, Exb. Ka-24
mentions the weapon as an 8x60- bore rifle.
C 154. It is important to note that the Trial Court accepted this
submission and held it to be a serious contradiction which the prosecution
failed to answer. The High Court has correctly reversed the decision of
the Trial Court as its conclusions are fallacious. There is no distinction
between a 0.315 bore rifle and an 8x60-bore rifle except for the system
D of measurement, one being the British System and another being the
Continental system. The conclusions of the High Court are as under:
“We find that confusion probably occurred in the mind of the
trial court that the 315 bore rifle is different rifle than 8x60
bore rifle which is fallacious. In fact, 8mm rifle in continental
system would be called to be .315 bore rifle in British system
E
because in British system, its measurement is in inches while
in continental system, its measurement is given in mm.,
therefore, this finding of the trial court that no such recovery
was made was found proved from the accused, Sahab Singh
is an erroneous finding on the basis of logic given.”
F 155. We are of the view that the High Court had a substantial and
compelling ground to interfere with this glaring mistake and the distorted
conclusions that the Trial Court has drawn. As the learned counsels for
the Appellants raised and argued this point all over again, we had to
independently verify the conclusion and the finding of the High Court.
G 156. The treatise, W.H.B. Smith on Mauser Rifle and Pistols42
provides a detailed description of an 8x60 sporting rifle under the chapter
42
W.H.B. Smith, Mauser Rifles and Pistols (The Stackpole Company, Pennsylvania,
United States of America, 4th edn, 1954, pg nos. 156, 157)
Also see: 0.315" Sporting Rifle, available at: https://ddpdoo.gov.in/product/products/
product-details/0-315-quot-sporting-rifle. The website of Directorate of Ordnance
H (Coordination and Services) where 0.315 bore rifle is also described as an 8mm rifle.
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1101
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

‘Mauser Sporting Rifles’. The relevant portion is extracted hereinunder A
for ready reference:
“This design was made in Germany specifically for foreign
markets. It was finished much better than those for home
consumption. Various types of sights were provided and this
design was made in both single-trigger and double trigger B
types.
xxx
The usual barrel length of this type is 24 inches.
xxx C
The standard calibers of the 24-inch was as follows: 7x57mm
(.276), 8x60 mm (.315), 9x57 mm (0.355) …”
157. With respect to the second submission, about the doubt cast
on the recoveries, we have the concurrent depositions of PW-10, PW-
11 and PW-12 all of whom consistently speak about the recoveries of D
the rifle and the bullets. The relevant portion of their testimonies are as
under:
158. Head Constable, Munna Lal Mishra, PW-10, stated in his
evidence that:
“…On that day at 11.50 SHO Lalman Verma, SI R.S. Tiwari, E
SI Roshan Lal, Ct. 621 Kamlesh Kumar and Ct. 154 Aftab Ali
along with Jeep and Driver Ram Kishan came at the police
station and produced four accused persons Naseem Ahmad,
Sahab Singh, ·Man Singh, then said Man Singh, Shyam Singh
in the police station. One sealed bundle of Rifle and one sealed F
bundle of cartridges and sample seal were also filed at the
police station and filed one recovery memo of rifle and
cartridge. On the basis of the Memo filed case FIR no.34/97
u/ s 25 Arms Act registered against Sahab Singh and case
FIR No.35/97 u/ s 27 Arms Act registered against Ashok
Chandel. The filed articles with sample seal kept in the G
malkhana….”
159. Constable Aftab Ali, PW-11 in his evidence stated that:
“…Four persons namely Sahab Singh, Naseem, Mansingh,
Shyamsingh were about to go out from the door there that we H
1102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A surrounded and caught them. When we asked the name-
address then one told his name as Naseem, second told his
name Shyam Singh, third one told his name as Bhansingh
and fourth one told his name as Sahab Singh. When the SHO
took the personal search of all four then one rifle and green
colour cartridge belt recovered from the possession of Sahab
B
Singh, which had 10 cartridges and nothing recovered from
any other. Ramsakal Tiwari wrote the Seizure memo at the
spot on the dictation of Lalman Verma and read out the same
and our signatures were obtained and he also signed the same.
Ramfal sealed the cartridges and belt separately. He made
C the sample seal. No public person got ready to give statement
due to their well- being. Copy of memo given to Sahab Singh,
who had torn and threw it….”
160. Investigating Officer, Lalman Verma, PW-12 in his evidence
stated that:
D “….While walking from the riverbank of Betwa when we
reached before the back door of Naseem’s house then we saw
that four accused came out from the back door and on the
signal of the Informant we arrested all four accused persons
on dated 27.1. 97 at 6.30 PM. When we asked their name-
E address then first told his name as Naseem S/ o Hameed, other
told his name as Shyam Singh s / o Birbal, third told his name
as Bhan Singh s / o Man Singh and fourth one told his name
as Sahab Singh s/ o Dalgajan Singh. When personal search
of above three accused persons made as per rules then nothing
recovered from the possession of · ·the accused Naseem,
F Shyam Singh. But a rifle N.P. (illegible) No.20260 got
recovered from the possession of Sahab Singh R/ o Kaloli
Jaar Bhag Lalpura Dist. Hamirpur and then said that 10 brass
cartridges got recovered from the belt tied in the waist, which
was taken into police possession and a memo was written got
written from S.S.I Sh. R.S. Tiwari in the torch light. On inquiry
G
accused Sahab Singh told that this is of Ex.MLA Ashok
Chandel, which was sealed. Signatures of the witnesses taken
after reading out the memo, no public witness got ready
because of considering their well-being. Memo of this is
exhibited as Ex.A-24. Copy of which was given to the
H accused….”
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1103
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

161. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the recovery A
of the 8x60 bore rifle from Sahab Singh (A8) and the arrest of the rest
of the accused, A6, A7 and A10, have been successfully proved by the
prosecution. The clear, consistent and categorical evidence adduced by
the prosecution to prove the recovery of the weapon, bullets as well as
arrests could not have been ignored by the Trial Court. The conclusions
B
drawn by the Trial Court were, therefore not only wrong but glaring
mistakes. These were substantial and compelling reasons for the High
Court to reverse the decision of the Trial Court.
162. An additional argument is raised with respect to the variation
in the number of bullets recovered from the green belt worn by Sahab
Singh. It is argued that while PW-12 states in his testimony that he C
recovered ten bullet cartridges from the belt, PW-14 mentions in his
testimony that PW-12 stated in his statement before the CBCID that he
recovered 18 bullets (10 from the belt and eight from the butt of the
rifle) from Sahab Singh.
163. We consider this to be a minor variation. In any event, PW- D
14 is only stating what PW-12 supposedly mentioned in the statement to
the CBCID. The variation in the number of bullets recovered cannot
have a direct bearing on the recovery itself, particularly when all other
witnesses have spoken about the recovery.
164. As the prosecution has established the occurrence of the E
incident through the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, and we are in
agreement with the judgment of the High Court that these are credible
ocular witnesses whose statements are corroborated by other
contemporaneous evidence, certain minor variations, such as non-
recovery of blood-stained clothes, certain other weapons etc. will not be F
fatal to the case of the prosecution. This principle is well established in
cases where there are credible injured eye-witness testimonies. In
Lakshman Singh v. State of Bihar43, this Court held:
“9. In Mansingh [State of M.P. v. Mansingh, (2003) 10 SCC
414 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 390] , it is observed and held by G
this Court that “the evidence of injured witnesses has greater
evidentiary value and unless compelling reasons exist, their
statements are not to be discarded lightly”. It is further
observed in the said decision that “minor discrepancies do
43
(2021) 9 SCC 191. H
1104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A not corrode the credibility of an otherwise acceptable
evidence”. It is further observed that “mere non-mention of
the name of an eyewitness does not render the prosecution
version fragile”.
9.1 A similar view has been expressed by this Court in the
B subsequent decision in Abdul Sayeed [Abdul Sayeed v. State
of M.P., (2010) 10 SCC 259 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1262] . It
was the case of identification by witnesses in a crowd of
assailants. It is held that “in cases where there are large
number of assailants, it can be difficult for witnesses to identify
each assailant and attribute specific role to him”. It is further
C observed that “when incident stood concluded within few
minutes, it is natural that exact version of incident revealing
every minute detail i.e. meticulous exactitude of individual
acts, cannot be given by eyewitnesses”. It is further observed
that “where witness to occurrence was himself injured in the
D incident, testimony of such witness is generally considered to
be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with an inbuilt
guarantee of his presence at the scene of crime and is unlikely
to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate
someone”. It is further observed that “thus, deposition of
injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong
E grounds for rejection of his evidence on basis of major
contradictions and discrepancies therein”.
9.2 The aforesaid principle of law has been reiterated again
by this Court in Ramvilas [Ramvilas v. State of M.P., (2016)
16 SCC 316 : (2016) 4 SCC (Cri) 850] and it is held that
F “evidence of injured witnesses is entitled to a great weight
and very cogent and convincing grounds are required to
discard their evidence”. It is further observed that “being
injured witnesses, their presence at the time and place of
occurrence cannot be doubted”.”
G 165. In the recent case of M Nageswara Reddy v. State of AP44
it was held that:
“16. Having gone through the deposition of the relevant
witnesses — eyewitnesses/injured eyewitnesses, we are of the

H 44
2022 SCC OnLine SC 268.
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1105
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

opinion that there are no major/material contradictions in A
the deposition of the eyewitnesses and injured eyewitnesses.
All are consistent insofar as Accused 1 to 3 are concerned.
As observed hereinabove, PW 6 has identified Accused 1 to
3. The High Court has observed that PW 1, PW 3 & PW 5
were planted witnesses merely on the ground that they were
B
all interested witnesses being relatives of the deceased. Merely
because the witnesses were the relatives of the deceased, their
evidence cannot be discarded solely on the aforesaid ground.
Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High
Court has materially erred in discarding the deposition/
evidence of PW 1, PW 3, PW 5 & PW 6 and even PW 7. C
xxx
19. Having gone through the reasoning given by the High
Court, we are of the opinion that the High Court has
unnecessarily given weightage to some minor contradictions.
The contradictions, if any, are not material contradictions D
which can affect the case of the prosecution as a whole. PW
6 was an injured eyewitness and therefore his presence ought
not to have been doubted and being an injured eyewitness,
as per the settled proposition of law laid down by this Court
in catena of decisions, his deposition has a greater reliability E
and credibility.”
X. Ballistic Report
166. The last submission made on behalf of the Appellants is in
two parts. Firstly, it is submitted that the ballistic report cannot be relied
on as it is not authenticated and contrary to the requirements of Section F
293 Cr.P.C under which the report is to be made only by the Director/
Deputy Director/ Assistant Director and not by a Scientific Officer.
Secondly, it is argued that the prosecution only sent 8x60 bore rifle for
the ballistic report but has failed to send the 0.315 bore rifle, which is
said to have been recovered from Sahab Singh. G
167. The second argument must straightaway be rejected in view
of our finding that 8x60 bore rifle and 0.315 bore rifle are one and the
same. On the first point, the requirement under Section 293 is in fact
complied with as the report should be treated as under the hand of the
Government Scientific Expert, being the “Director [, Deputy Director
H
1106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A or Assistant Director] of a Central Forensic Science Laboratory or
a State Forensic Science Laboratory” as provided under Section
293(4)(e).
168. The Trial Court yet again took a super technical view of the
matter and rejected the ballistic report, in spite of the fact that the report
B had come from the office of the Assistant Director bearing a seal. We
may note the reasoning of the Trial Court here itself.
“….In reply to this the learned counsel for the prosecution
has drawn my attention towards presence of the seal and
signature of the Assistant Director in the end of the report. In
C this seal is put. On this seal it has been printed that
“forwarded for further necessary ·action” and below that
after leaving some space, by this seal Assistant Director has
been imprinted and signatures are put thereupon. It is clear
that this report is not a report selfsigned by an Assistant
Director but this report is of some Scientific Officer, which
D has been merely forwarded by the Assistant Director. This
report does not fulfil the objectives and conditions of Section
23 Cr.P.C…”
169. After having noted that the report has emanated from the
office of the Assistant Director and also having noted the “presence of
E seal and signature of the Assistant director at the end of the report”,
the Trial Court could not have rejected it. It was, therefore compelling
for the High Court to have reversed the finding of the Trial Court. On
this count, the High Court held as under:
“…Further he has also tried to discard the report of F.S.L. on
F the ground that Section 293 Cr.P.C. provides for an expert’s
report to be admissible only when it is signatured by the
Director/Deputy Director/ Assistant Director of the said lab
and not by any Scientific Officer. We do not subscribe to his
view because it has come on record that the same was
G forwarded by the one of the Director/Deputy Director/
Assistant Director of the said lab under the seal, therefore, it
cannot be discarded and the same would be treated to be
admissible and in this report, it is clearly found that E.C.-12
is found to have been fired by 8 x 60 bore rifle which could
also addressed to be .315 bore rifle….”
H
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1107
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

170. The decision of this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v. A
Mast Ram45 is a complete answer to this submission. In an identical
situation, this Court held that there is no illegality in the way the
prosecution has obtained the ballistic report under Section 293. The
relevant portion of the decision is as under:
“6. Secondly, the ground on which the High Court has thrown B
out the prosecution story is the report of the ballistic expert.
The report of the ballistic expert (Ext. P- X) was signed by
one Junior Scientific Officer. According to the High Court, a
Junior Scientific Officer (Ballistic) is not the officer
enumerated under sub-section (4) of Section 293 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, in the absence of his C
examination such report cannot be read in evidence. This
reason of the High Court, in our view, is also fallacious. Firstly,
the forensic science laboratory report (Ext. P-X) has been
submitted under the signatures of a Junior Scientific Officer
(Ballistic) of the Central Forensic Science Laboratory, D
Chandigarh. There is no dispute that the report was submitted
under the hand of a government scientific expert. Section
293(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure enjoins that any
document purporting to be a report under the hand of a
government scientific expert under the section, upon any
matter or thing duly submitted to him for examination or E
analysis and report in the course of any proceeding under
the Code, may be used as evidence in any inquiry, trial or
other proceeding under the Code. The High Court has
completely overlooked the provision of sub-section (1) of
Section 293 and arrived at a fallacious conclusion that a F
Junior Scientific Officer is not an officer enumerated under
sub-section (4) of Section 293. What sub-section (4) of Section
293 envisages is that the court is to accept the documents
issued by any of the six officers enumerated therein as valid
evidence without examining the author of the documents.
G
xxx
13. In our view, the consistent ocular testimony of PWs 1, 3
and 4 corroborated by the opinion of PW 2 Dr. Sanjay Kumar

45
(2004) 8 SCC 660. H
1108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A Mahajan and the ballistic expert report clearly established
the prosecution case beyond all reasonable doubts and the
High Court fell into grave error of law and facts, resulting in
grave miscarriage of justice.”
171. In view of the fact that the ballistic report has come from the
B office of the Assistant Director bearing his seal and having considered
the same in the context of Section 293(4) Cr.P.C., as explained by this
Court in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Mast Ram46 we are opinion that
the Trial Court committed a serious error in rejecting the ballistic report
and it was necessary and compelling for the High Court to reverse the
C finding of the Trial Court on this count also.
Special Leave Petition and Writ Petition filed by the Informant
(PW-1):
172. PW-1 filed a Special Leave Petition against the judgment of
D the High Court seeking enhancement of the sentence awarded to the
Appellants from life sentence to that of death. We quite appreciate the
grievances and anxiety of the informant whose brothers were murdered
in front of his eyes. He also saw his nephew (his brother’s son) being
murdered at the same place. PW-1 also lost two of his close friends and
family associates. While we symphatise with PW- 1, for the deprivation,
E we are not inclined to entertain the Special Leave Petition for
enhancement of the sentence to death as this is a faction fight and
certainly not a rarest of the rare case qualifying imposition of death
sentence.
173. PW-1 also filed Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 57/2022 under Article
F 32 of the Constitution for a direction to transfer accused no. 5, Ashok
Kumar Chandel to a jail outside Uttar Pradesh for serving out his sentence
in view of his undue influence in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Writ
Petition was filed when the criminal appeal of Ashok Kumar Chandel
(A5) was pending adjudication before this Court. However, in view of
G the present judgment dismissing the criminal appeal and confirming the
conviction and sentence of Ashok Kumar Chandel (A5) we are of the
view that no further order needs to be passed in this writ petition. The
Writ Petition is therefore dismissed.

46
H Ibid.
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1109
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

Conclusions: A
174. As this is an appeal against the decision of the High Court
reversing an order of acquittal. We have examined each and every point
raised by the Appellants. We have also noted the reasoning adopted by
the Trial Court on each issue and contrasted it with the decision of the
High Court to see if the reversal is based on, what this Court mandated B
as, very substantial and compelling reasons or good and sufficient
grounds causing grave miscarriage of justice. Having examined the
matter in detail, we are of the opinion that:
I. The High Court was justified in exercising its appellate
jurisdiction in reversing the order of acquittal as there were C
certain glaring mistakes, and distorted conclusions in the
decision of the Trial Court. The High Court was duty-bound
to reverse the decision as there existed very substantial
and compelling reasons to do so, failing which it would have
caused a grave miscarriage of justice.
D
II. Even though the prosecution has placed material to establish
the existence of a motive on the part of the accused party
to murder five members of the Shukla family and associates,
the motive part is treatednsecondary in view of the fact
that this is a case of direct evidence of injured eye-
witnesses. E

III. We have found that the place of the incident is not
disputed. In fact, the Trial Court itself returned findings about
the first as well as the second event of the incident. These
findings were affirmed by the High Court. Therefore, the
only question related to the persons involved and the manner F
of commission of the offence.
IV. Having examined the contentions relating to (a)
discrepancies in the number of dead bodies brought to the
hospital (b) improbability of the time taken to prepare the
tehreer (c) alleged omissions in the FIR (d) and the G
discharge timing mentioned in the Bed Head Ticket, casting
doubt on the time of lodging the FIR, we find that the
prosecution has explained all the discrepancies beyond a
reasonable doubt. We are convinced that the conclusions
of the Trial Court were based on surmises and conjectures,
H
1110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A and therefore, the High Court is justified in reversing the
judgment of the Trial Court.
V. Having considered the four submissions in support of the
contention that PW-1 and PW-2 are not the eyewitnesses
to the incident, being (a) discrepancy on the bullets marks
B on the jonga, (b) bullet injuries on the deceased and
eyewitnesses on the basis of PW-1 statement, (c) timing of
the X-ray and Bed Head Ticket, and (d) evidence relating
to the failure of electricity at the time of the incident, we
have found that these submissions are contrary to evidence
on record. The prosecution has proved the presence of PW-
C 1 at the place of occurrence and of him being an injured
eye-witness to the incident. We conclude that the inferences
drawn by the Trial Court were based on a misreading of
the evidence, and therefore, the High Court was obliged to
reverse the finding to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.
D VI. Having examined the alternative story of the defence based
on the fax, said to have been sent from the office of the SP
and introduced through the defence witness DW-3, we are
of the opinion that the facts mentioned in the fax are not
supported by any evidence. On the contrary, the facts
E narrated in the FIR are fully corroborated by much of the
documentary evidence and are fully in consonance with
the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. As there is no
evidence to corroborate the events mentioned in the fax
and the evidence of DW-3 does not inspire confidence, to
say the least. The conclusion of the Trial Court that the
F prosecution could not prove the case is totally erroneous.
Such a finding is a glaring mistake as held by this Court in
Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka47 obligating
the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal.
VII. The legal submission that the prosecution has failed to prove
G that there was an unlawful assembly based on a common
object is examined by us independent of the explanation
and conclusions drawn by the High Court. We are of the
opinion that the High Court has correctly appreciated the

47
H Supra no. 24.
ASHOK KUMAR SINGH CHANDEL v. STATE OF U.P. 1111
[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.]

principle and rejected the submission that the prosecution A
has failed to prove a common object and the unlawful
assembly. The decisions of this Court in Amzad Ali v. State
of Assam48, Bhargavan v. State of Kerela 49 as well as
Bhupendra Singh v. State of U.P.50 fully support the view
taken by the High Court. The decision of the High Court on
B
this issue is unexceptionable on fact and law.
VIII. We have also found that the conclusion of the Trial Court
about the recovery of the weapon is based on a perverse
finding as it misunderstood the 8x60-bore rifle to be distinct
from a 0.315 bore rifle. We have perused and extracted the
technical material to prove beyond doubt that there is no C
difference at all. The distinction is only in the measurement
system, one being British and the other being the Continental
system. In view of such a perverse finding, the High Court
had very substantial and compelling reasons to reverse
the findings of the Trial Court. D
IX. We have also found that the arrests of Naseem (A6), Bhan
Singh (A10), Shyam Singh (A7) and Sahab Singh (A8) were
concurrently and consistently spoken by all the witnesses,
PW-10, PW-11 and PW-12. The conclusion drawn by the
Trial Court that the arrest and recovery were doubtful were E
glaring mistakes. The High Court was, therefore, completely
justified in reversing the decision of the Trial Court.
X. The rejection of the FSL (ballistic) report is another grave
mistake of the Trial Court. The conclusion of the Trial Court
that the ballistic report is inadmissible as it is not in F
consonance with the requirement of Section 293 Cr.P.C. is
entirely wrong. We have explained this in detail. In an
identical situation this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh
v. Mast Ram51 has explained how the ballistic report is in
complete compliance of the statutory provision. The High
Court had to necessarily step in to prevent a grave G
miscarriage of justice.
48
Supra no. 38.
49
Supra no. 39.
50
Supra no. 40.
51
Supra no. 45. H
1112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 12 S.C.R.

A 175. For the reasons stated above, we dismiss Criminal Appeal
Nos. 946- 947/2019 filed by Ashok Kumar Chandel, Criminal Appeal
Nos. 1030- 1031/2019 filed by Ashutosh @ Dabbu, Criminal Appeal
Nos. 1269-1270/2019 filed by Pradeep Singh and Uttam Singh, Criminal
Appeal Nos. 1804- 1805/2019 filed by Bhan Singh, Criminal Appeal Nos.
1980-1981/2019 filed by Sahab Singh, Criminal Appeal Nos. 1279-1280/
B
2019 filed by Naseem, and affirm the judgment of the High Court of
Judicature Allahabad in Government Appeal No. 5123/2002 dated
19.04.2019. We are informed that Appellant Raghuvir Singh died on
15.08.2022 pending disposal of these appeals, his Criminal Appeal No.
1046-1047/2019 stands abated. The SLP (Crl.) No. 10742/2019, filed by
C Rajiv Shukla, the informant (PW-1) for enhancement of the sentence is
dismissed.
176. Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 57/2022, filed by the informant (PW-
1), is dismissed.

D 177. There shall be no order as to costs.

Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeals dismissed.
(Assisted by : Aarsh Choudhary, LCRA)

E

F

G

H