ASHOK SADARANGANI & ANR.versusUNION OF !NOIA & ORS.

                        [2012] 3 S.C.R. 826


A                ASHOK SADARANGANI & ANR.
                                 v.
                     UNION OF !NOIA & ORS.
                (Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 26 of 2011)

                         MARCH 14, 2012
B
       . [ALTAMAS KABIR AND J. CHELAMESWAR, JJ.]

        CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950: Article 142 - Extra-
  ordinary powers of the Supreme Court to quash the criminal
C proceedings - Dispute between banks and petitioners over
  non-payment of dues - Compromise - Continuance!
  Quashing of criminal proceeding after compromise -
  Permissibility - Held: Ordinarily, continuance of a criminal
  proceeding after a compromise has been arrived at between
o the complainant and the accused, would amount to abuse of
  the process of court and an exercise in futility - In such
  situation, inherent powers of the courts can be invoked -
  However, exercise of inherent powers would depend entirely
  on the facts and circumstances of each case - In the instant
E case, special case was registered alleging that the petitioners
  had secured credit facilities from Bank by submitting forged
  property documents as collaterals and utilized such facilities
  in a dishonest and fraudulent manner - The actual owner of
  the property had also filed a criminal complaint against the
F petitioners - The emphasis was, thus, more on the criminal
  intent of the petitioners than on the civil aspect involving the
  dues of the Bank in respect of which a compromise was
  worked out, therefore, writ petitioners were not entitled to
  quashing of criminal proceedings.

G      The writ petitioner no.1 opened a Current Account in
  the name of his proprietary concern with the Bank of
  Maharashtra and various credit facilities were sanctioned
  to it. The Bank sought additional collateral security of
  Rs.56 lacs from petitioner no.1, who, submitted a Lease
H                             826
ASHOK SADARANGANI & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 827
                & ORS.
Deed in respect of an immovable property leased by 'HS'      A
and his family members, through their Constituted
Attorney, 'KM'. The petitioners were Directors of the said
company.

     Subsequently, six irrevocable Import Letters of Credit 8
for a total sum of Rs.188.01 lacs were opened by the Bank
of Maharashtra on behalf of proprietary concern of
petitioner no.1 for import of houseware items. The
documents relating to the said Letters of Credit, including
Bills of Lading, Invoice and Bills of Exchange, were
accepted and collected by petitioner no.1 on behalf of the C
firm from the Bank and he undertook to make payment
on the due date. However, the petitioners defaulted in
payment of their liability of about 188 lacs towards the
Bank. Criminal case was registered at the behest of the
Bank of Maharashtra. On the complaint of the Union D
Bank of India another case was registered by the Central
Bureau of Investigation against the petitioners alleging
that they had secured the credit facilities by submitting
forged property documents as collaterals and utilized
such facilities in a dishonest and fraudulent manner by E
opening Letters of Credit in respect of foreign supplies
of goods, without actually bringing any goods but
inducing the Bank to negotiate the Letters of Credit in
favour of foreign suppliers and also by misusing the
Cash Credit facility. Charge-sheet was filed in the said F
Special Case. At about the same time, a criminal case was
registered against 'KM' and others under Section 120-B,
r/w 465, 467, 468 and 471, IPC. The said case was
registered primarily on th~ accusation that 'KM' in
connivance with petitioner No.1, had sought to sell or G
dispose of the property belonging to 'HS' and that the
Powers of Attorney which had been used by 'KM' in the
transactions, were not genuine. In 2000, a civil suit was
filed by 'HS' against 'KM' for cancellation of the Powers
of Attorney.                                                H
    828      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 3 S.C.R.


A      While the criminal case against the petitioners was
  pending, the Union Bank of India wrote to petitioner no.1
  offering a One-Time Settlement of the disputes relating to
  the transactions in question. Subsequently, a
  compromise proposal relating to the transaction between
B the petitioners and the Bank was also mooted by the
  Asset Recovery Branch of the Bank of Maharashtra and
  a communication was addressed to petitioner no.1,
  which, however, made it clear that such compromise
  should not be construed as settlement of criminal
c complaints/investigations/ proceedings pending in the
  court against the borrowers/guarantors. Pursuant to such
  offer of One-Time Settlement, dues of both the Banks
  were cleared by the petitioners and they, therefore,
  entered into a compromise with the petitioners indicating
  that they had no further claim against the petitioners.
0
       The issue for consideration in the instant writ petition
  was whether an offence which is not compoundable
  under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code,
  1973 can be quashed in the facts and circumstances of
E the case. A separate application was made in the writ
  petition. for stay of further proceedings.

          Dismissing the writ petition, the Court

        HELD: 1. Continuance of a criminal proceeding after
F a compromise has been arrived at between the
  complainant and the accused, would amount to abuse of
  the process of court and an exercise in futility, since the
  trial could be prolonged and ultimately, may conclude in
  a decision which may be of any consequence to any of
G the other parties. The exercise of inherent powers would
  depend entirely on the facts and circumstances of each
  case. In other words, not that there is any restriction on
  the power or authority vested in the Supreme Court in
  exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution,
H but that in exercising such powers the Court has to be .
 ASHOK SADARANGANI & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 829
                 & ORS.
circumspect, and has to exercise such power sparingly           A
in the facts of each case. Once the circumstances in a
given case were held to be such as to attract the
provisions of Article 142 or Articles 32 and 226 of the
Constitution, it would be open to the Supreme Court to
exercise its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the      B
Constitution to quash the proceedings, the continuance
whereof would only amount to abuse of the process of
Court. In the instant case, the allegation was that as part
of a larger conspiracy, property acquired on lease from
a person who had no title to the leased properties, was         c
offered as collateral security for loans obtained. Apart
from that the actual owner of the property has filed a
criminal complaint against 'KM' and the petitioners who
had held himself out as the Attorney of the owner and his
family members. Thus, the emphasis was more on the              0
criminal intent of the petitioners than on the civil aspect
involving the dues of the Bank in respect of which a
compromise was worked out. Therefore, the reliefs
prayed for in the writ petition cannot be granted. [Paras
17, 18, 20) [838-E-H; 839-A, F-G; 840-C-G)
                                                                E
    Nikhil Merchant v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr.
(2008) 9 SCC 677: 2008 (12) SCR 236; B.S. Joshi v. State
of Haryana (2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 (2) SCR 1104; Manoj
Sharma v. State & Ors. (2008) 16 SCC 1: 2008 (14) SCR
539 - Distinguished.                                            F

     Central Bureau of Investigation, SPE, S/U(X), New Delhi
v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., Calcutta (1996) 5 SCC 591:
1996 (3) Suppl. SCR 360; Shiji@ Pappu & Ors. v. Radhika
&Anr. (2011) 10 SCC 705; Rumi Dhar (Smt.) v. State of West      G
Bengal & Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 364: 2009 (5) SCR 553; Sushi/
Suri v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. (2011) 5 SCC
708; Central Bureau of Investigation v. Ravi Shankar Prasad
& Ors. (2009) 6 SCC 351 - referred to.
                                                                H
    830       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 3 S.C.R.


A                          Case Law Reference:
     2008 (12) SCR 236              Distinguished      Paras 10, 11,
                                                       12,13,15,17,
     1996 (3) Suppl. SCR 360 referred to               Paras 10,13,
B                                                      15
     2003 (2) SCR 1104              Distinguished      Paras 11,12,
                                                       13,17,
     2008 (14) SCR 539              Distinguished      Paras 11,12,
c                                                      16,17
     (2011) 10 sec 105              referred to        Para 11
     2009 (5) SCR 553               referred to        Paras 15,18
     (2011) 5 sec 108               referred to        Para 15,
D
     (2009) 6 sec 351               referred to        Para 18
        CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Crl.)
    No. 26 of 2011.
E         Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

       Mohan Jain, ASG, Mukul Rohtagi, lndu Malhotra, Saurabh
  Kirpal, Sanjay Agarwal, Sujay N. Kantawal, K.L. Janjani, P.K.
  Dey, D.K. Thakur, Alok Kumar, Arvind Kumar Sharma,
F Shubham Aggarwal, Shankar Chillarge, Asha Gopalan Nair,
  Rachana Joshi lssar, Nidhi Tewari, Ambeeran Rasool, Alok
  Prakash, O.P. Gaggar for the appearing parties.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G        ALTAMAS KABIR, J. 1. The issue which has been raised
    in this writ petition is whether an offence which is not
    compoundable under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure
    Code, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the "Cr.P.C.", can be
    quashed in the facts and circumstances of the case.
H
 ASHOK SADARANGANI & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 831
         & ORS. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]

     2. The writ petitioner No.1, Ashok Sadarangani, opened          A
a Current Account No.314 in the name of his proprietary
concern, M/s. lnternat lmpex, Mumbai, with the Bank of
Maharashtra, Overseas Branch, Mumbai. The said account
was subsequently converted by the Bank into Cash Credit
Account No.3 and Cash Credit facility of Rs.125 lacs, Import         B
Letter of Credit facility of Rs.100 lacs, Bank Guarantee facility
of Rs.20 lacs and Forward Contracts upto a limit of Rs.300 lacs,
were sanctioned and such decision was conveyed to the
Petitioner No.1 by the Bank by its letter dated 7th July, 1999.
On 16th October, 1999, the Bank sought additional collateral         c
security of Rs.56 lacs from the Petitioner No.1, who, on 29th
December, 1999, submitted a Lease Deed dated 29th
December, 1999, in respect of an immovable property leased
to M/s. Nitesh Amusements Pvt ..Ltd. by Shri Homi D. Sanjana
and his family members, through their Constituted Attorney, Shri     C
Kersi V. Mehta. The Petitioners herein were Directors of the
aforesaid company.

      3. In December, 2000, six irrevocable Import Letters of
Credit for a total sum of Rs.188.01 lacs were opened by the
Bank of Maharashtra on behalf bf M/s. lnternat lmpex, Mumbai,        E
for import of "houseware items & rechargeable lanterns" and
"velvet four-way and upholstery materials". The do.cuments
relating to the said Letters of Credit, including Bills of Lading,
Invoice and Bills of Exchange, were accepted and collected by
the Petitioner No.1 on behalf of the firm from the Bank and he       F
undertook to make payment on the due date. However, the
Petitioners defaulted in payment of their liability of about 188
lacs towards the Bank. On 10th April, 2003, R.C.No.3/E/2003/
CBl/EOW/MUM in Case No.3/CPW/2004, was registered at
the behest of the Bank of Maharashtra. On 30th June, 2003,           G
on the complaint of the Union Bank of India, Special Case No.3
of 2004, in CBI Case R.C.No.8/E.2003/MUM, was registered
by the Central Bureau of Investigation, hereinafter referred to
as "CBI", against the Petitioners alleging that they had secured
the credit facilities by submitting forged property documents as     H
    832        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 3 S.C.R.


A collaterals and utilized such facilities in a dishonest and
  fraudulent manner by opening Letters of Credit in respect of
  foreign supplies of goods, without actually bringing any goods
  but inducing the Bank to negotiate the Letters of Credit in favour
  of fo~eign suppliers and also by misusing the Cash Credit
B facility.
          •·
       4. Charge-sheet was filed in the said Special Case No.3
  of 2004 on 14th January, 2004. At about the same time, a
  criminal case, being No.236 of 2001, was registered against
  Shri Kersi Mehta and others under Section 120-B, r/w 465,
C 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, hereinafter referred
  to as the "IPC". The said case was registered primarily on the
  accusation that Shri Kersi Mehta, in connivance with the
  Petitioner No.1, had sought to sell or dispose of the property
  belonging to Shri Homi D. Sanjana, situated at Kandivli and
D Aksha and that the Powers of Attorney dated 11.1.1996 and
  24.1.1999, which had been used by Shri Kersi Mehta in the
  transactions, were not genuine.

       5. In 2000 a Civil Suit, being S.C. Suit No.4849 of 2000,
E was filed by Shri Homi D. Sanjana, in the City Civil Court at
  Bombay, against Shri Kersi Mehta and various Government
  authorities, in which the relief sought for was for a direction upon
  Shri Kersi Mehta to deliver up to the Court the said two Powers
  of Attorney for cancellation of the same.
F       6. It is a matter of record that, although, the Petitioner No.1
    has surrendered and is on bail and facing trial, the Petitioner
    No.2 is yet to be arrested in connection with the case.

      7. While the criminal case against the Petitioners was
G proceeding, the Union Bank of India wrote to the Petitioner No.1
  on 27th September, 2010, offering a One-Time Settlement of
  the disputes relating to the transactions in question.
  Subsequently, on 27th September, 2010, a compromise
  proposal relating to the transaction between the Petitioners and
H the Bank was also mooted by the Asset Recovery Branch at
 ASHOK SADARANGANI & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 833
         & ORS. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
Mumbai of the Bank of Maharashtra and a communication was            A
addressed to the Petitioner No.1, which, however, made it clear
that such compro~ise slilould not be construed as settlement
of criminal complaints/investigations/ proceedings pending in
the court against the borrowers/guarantors. As has been
submitted during the course of hearing of the writ petition,         B
pursuant to such offer of One-lime Settlement, dues of both the
Banks have been cleared by the Petitioners and they have,
therefore, entered into a compromise with the Petitioners
indicating that they had no further claim against the Petitioners.

      8. It is in this background that a separate application was
                                                                     c
made in the writ petition, being Criminal Misc. Petition No.1110
of 2012, for stay of further proceedings in R.C.No.3/E/2003/CBI/
EOW/ MUM filed by the CBI and pending before the Additional
Metropolitan Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanade, Mumbai, and
also Special Case No.3 of 2004 in CBI Case RC No.8/E/2003/           D
MUM filed by the CBI before the Special Judge at Mumbai,
together with Criminal Case No.236 of 2001, registered with
Kherwadi Police Station, Sandra (East), Mumbai. The same
has also been taken up for consideration along with the writ
petition for final disposal.                                         E

     9. Appearing in support of the writ petition, Shri Mukul
Rohatgi, learned Senior Advocate, submitted that the issue,
which has fallen for consideratfon in the writ petition, has been
considered in great detail in several decisions of this Court.       F
Learned counsel submitted that in some cases this Court had
exercised its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of
India to quash proceedings which were not compoundable, but
the common thread which runs through almost all the judgments
is that the power to interfere with even non-compoundable            G
cases was not doubted, but the same was required to be used
very sparingly and only in special circumstances.

    10. Shri Rohatgi submitted that the facts of this case are
almost identical to the facts of the case in Nikhil Merchant Vs.
Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. [(2008) 9 SCC 677],           H
    834      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2012] 3 S.C.R.


A which was decided on 20th August, 2008. Shri Rohatgi
  submitted that as far back as in 1996, a similar issue had come
  for consideration before this Court in Central Bureau of
    Investigation, SPE, SIU(X), New Delhi Vs. Duncans Agro
    Industries Ltd., Calcutta [(1996) 5 SCC 591], in which the
B provisions of Section 320 Cr.P.C. were considered in regard
  to offences which constituted both civil and criminal wrong,
  including the offence of cheating. In the said case, this Court
  while considering the aforesaid issue held that compromise in
  a civil suit for all intents and purposes amounted to
c compounding of the offence of cheating. Furthermore, In the
  said case, the investigati!Jns had not been completed even till
  1991, even though there was no impediment to complete the
  same. Having further regard to the fact that the claim of the
  Bank had been satisfied and the suit instituted by the Banks
  had been compromised on receiving their dues, this Court was
0
  of the view that the complaint and the criminal action initiated
  thereupon, should not be pursued any further.
        11. Shri Rohatgi then referred to the decision of this Court
  in Nikhil Merchant's case (supra), to which one of us (Kabir,
E J.) was a party. In the said case, what was urged was that though
  an offence may not be compoundable, it did not take away the
  powers of this Court to quash such proceedings in exercise of
  its inherent jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, and
  even Section 320 Cr.P.C. could not fetter such powers, as had
F been earlier held in B.S. Joshi Vs. State of Haryana [(2003) 4
  sec 675]. It had also been contended on behalf of the Union
  of India that the power under Article 142 of the Constitution was
  to be exercised sparingly and only in rare cases and not
  otherwise. The fact that such a power vested in the Supreme
G Court under Article 142 of the Constitution or the High Court
  under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was never in doubt, only the manner
  of its application was in issue and it was held that such power
  was to be used sparingly in order to prevent any obstruction to
  the spring of justice. Taking an over all view of the facts in the
H said case and keeping in mind the decision in B.S. Joshi's
 ASHOK SADARANGANI & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 835
         & ORS. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
case and the compromise arrived at between the company and            A
the Bank and the consent terms, this Court took the view that
technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of
quashing of the criminal proceedings, since the continuance of
the same after the compromise had been arrived at between
the parties, would be a futile exercise. Reference was also           B
made to another decision of this Court in Manoj Sharma Vs.
State & Ors. [(2008) 16 SCC 1], where following the decisions
rendered in 8. S. Josh i's case and in Nikhil Merchant's case
(supra) and after referring to various other decisions, this Court
ultimately came to the conclusion that continuance of the criminal    c
proceedings before the trial court would be an exercise in futility
and, accordingly, qu~shed the same.

     12. To buttress his aforesaid submissions, Mr. Rohatgi
then referred to and relied upon the decision in Shiji @ Pappu
& Ors. Vs. Radhika & Anr. [(2011) 10 SCC 705], where also             D
the question of quashing of proceedings relating to non-
compoundable offences after a compromise had been arrived
at between the rival parties, was under consideration. After
examining the powers of the High Court under Section 482
Cr.P.C., the learned Judges came to the conclusion that in the        E
facts and circumstances of the case, the continuance of
proceedings would be nothing but an empty formality and that
Section 482 Cr.P.C. in such circumstances could be justifiably
invoked by the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process
of law. The learned dudges, who decided the said case, took           F
into consideration the decisions rendered by this Court in B.S.
Joshi's case, Nikhil Merchant's case and also Manoj Sharma's
case (supra) in arriving at the aforesaid decision.
     13. Mr. Rohatgi submitted that application of the law as
laid down in the Duncans Agro lndustries's case, and,                 G
thereafter, in B.S. Joshi's case, followed in Nikhil Merchant's
case, as also in Manoj Sharma's case (supra), gave sufficient
indication that the powers under Article 142 of the Constitution,
as far as the Supreme Court is concerned, and Section 482
Cr.P.C., as far as the High Courts are concerned, could not be        H
    836     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 3 S.C.R.

A fettered by reason of the fact that an offence might not be
  compoundable but in its own facts was capable of being
  quashed.
          14. On the other hand, learned Additional Solicitor General,
    Shri Mohan Jain, urged that even if the Banks and the
B   Petitioners had settled their disputes and had also entered into
    a compromise settlement, that did not absolve the Petitioners
    of the offence, which they had already committed under the
    criminal laws, which was explicitly indicated in the settlement
    itself. Shri Jain submitted that the gravity of the offence would
C   be revealed from the various transactions which were effected
    by the writ petitioners in order to camouflage their intention of
    offering as security a property in respect of which they had no
    title. As innocent as it may seem to be, it is more than a
    coincidence that the Petitioners offered as security a leasehold
D   property which had been acquired from one Shri Kersi Mehta,
    who had used a Power of Attorney alleged to have been
    executed by Shri Homi D. Sanjana and his family members and
    in respect whereof a criminal case had been filed by Shri Homi
    against the said Kersi Mehta and the writ petitioners. $hri Jain
E   contended that the entire transaction was based on a fraud
    perpetrated on Shri Homi D. Sanjana and his family members
    and, in fact, no title to the property in question had ever passed
    to the Petitioners.
        15. Shri Jain submitted that in Rumi Dhar (Smt.) Vs. State
F of West Bengal & Anr. [(2009) 6 SCC 364], a Bench of two
  Judges while considering the maintainability of criminal action
  where the liability was both civil and criminal, had occasion to
  consider the effect of a judgment in civil proceedings in respect
  of a loan obtained by fraud. As an off-shoot of the aforesaid
G question, another question raised was regarding the
  continuance ofthe criminal proceedings after settlement and
  repayment of a loan, wherein it was held that where settlement
  is arrived at by and between the creditor bank and debtor, the
  offence committed as such, does not come to an end. The
H judgment of a tribunal in civil proceedings and, that too, when
ASHOK SADARANGANI & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 837
        & ORS. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
it is rendered on the basis of the settlement entered into             A
between the parties, would not be of much relevance in a
criminal proceeding in view of the provisions of Section 43 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which provides that judgments
in civil proceedings will be admissible in evidence only for
limited purposes. However, in deciding the said matter, the            B
Bench took note of the decision in Nikhil Merchant's case
(supra), as also the judgment rendered in Duncans Agro
Industries case (supra). While considering the said judgments,
the learned Judges ultimately observed that the jurisdiction of
the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India is not in     c
dispute, but that exercise of such power would depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case. After referring to the
decision in Nikhil Merchant's case (supra), this Court also held
that the High Court, in exercise of i~s jurisdiction under Section
482 Cr.P.C. and the Supreme Court in terms of Article 142 of           D
the Constitution, would ordinarily direct the quashing of a charge
involving a crime against society, particularly, when both
quashing of a case, continuance whereof after the settlement
is arrived at between the parties, would be a futile exercise.
Reference was then made to another decision of this Court in
Sushi/ Suri Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. ((2011)
                                                                       E
5 SCC 708], in which the Bench was called upon to deliberate
upon the very same issue, as has been raised in the present
writ petition. In the said case, after discussing earlier decisions,
including those rendered in 8.S. Joshi's case (supra) and in
Nikhil Merchant's case (supra), the Court, while placing               F
reliance on the decision in Rumi Dhar's case (supra), observed
that while the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 142 of the
Constitution was not in dispute, the exercise of such power
would, however, depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case.                                                             G

     16. The learned Additional Solicitor General contended
that having regard to the divergent views expressed by different
Benches of this Court, when the same issue surfaced in Gian
Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Anr., SLP (Crl:) No. 8989 of2010,          H
    838      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 3 S.C.R.


A wherein the decisions in 8.S. Joshi's case, Nikhil Merchant's
  case and Manoj Sharma's case (supra) came to be
  considered, the Bench comprised of two Judges, was of the
  view that the said decisions required reconsideration and
  directed that the matter be placed before a larger Bench to
B consider the correctness of the said three decisions. Shri Jain
  urged that as the same issue which was involved in the present
  case was also the subject matter of the reference to a larger
  Bench, this Court should abstain from pronouncing judgment
  on the issue which was the subject matter in the said reference.
c Shri Jain urged that in the circumstances mentioned
  hereinabove, no relief could be given to the Petitioners on the
  writ petition and the same was liable to be dismissed.

          17. Having carefully considered the facts and
    circumstances of the case, as also the law relating to the
D   continuance of criminal cases where the complainant and the
    accused had settled their differences and had arrived at an
    amicable arr~ngement, we see no reason to differ with the views
    that had been taken in Nikhil Merchant's case or Manoj
    Sharma's case (supra) or the several decisions that have come
E   thereafter. It is, however, no coincidence that the golden thread
    which runs through all the decisions cited, indicates that
    continuance of a criminal proceeding after a compromise has
    been arrived at between the complainant and the accused,
    would amount to abuse of the process of court and an exercise
F   in futility, since the trial could be prolonged and ultimately, may
    conclude in a decision which may be of any consequence to
    any of the other parties. Even in Sushi! Suri's case on which
    the learned Additional Solicitor General had relied, the learned
    Judges who decided the said case, took note of the decisions
G   in various other cases, where it had been reiterated that the
    exercise of inherent powers would depend entirely on the facts
    and circumstances of each case. In other words, not that there
    is any restriction on the power or authority vested in the
    Supreme Court in exercising powers under Article 142 of the
H   Constitution, but that in exercising such powers the Court has
 ASHOK SADARANGANI & ANR. v. UNION OF INDIA 839
         & ORS. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.)
to be circumspect, and has to exercise such power sparingly            A
in the facts of each case. Furthermore, the issue, which has
been referred to a larger Bench in Gian Singh's case (supra)
in relation to the decisions of this Court in B.S. Joshi's case,
Nikhil Merchant's case, as also Manoj Sharma's case, deal
with a situation which is different from that of the present case.     B
While in the cases referred to hereinabove, the main question
was whether offences which were not compoundable, under
Section 320 Cr.P.C. could be quashed under Section 482
Cr.P.C., in Gian Singh's case the Court was of the view that a
non-compoundable offence could not be compounded and that              c.
the Courts should not try to take over the function of the
Parliament or executive. In fact, in none of the cases referred
to in Gian Singh's case, did this Court permit compounding of
non-compoundable offences. On the other hand, upon taking
various factors into consideration, including the futility of
                                                                       0
continuing with the criminal proceedings, this Court ultimately
quashed the same.
     18. In addition to the above, even with regard to the
decision of this Court in Central Bureau of Investigation Vs.
Ravi Shankar Prasad & Ors. [(2009) 6 SCC 351], this Court              E
observed that the High Court can exercise power under Section
482 Cr.P.C. to do real and substantial justice and to prevent
abuse of the process of Court when exceptional circumstances
warranted the exercise of such power. Once the circumstances
in a given case were held to be such as to attract the provisions      F
of Article 142 or Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, it would
be open to the Supreme Court to exercise its extraordinary
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution ~o quash the
proceedings, the continuance whereof would only amount to
abuse of the process of Court. In the instant case the dispute         G
between the petitioners and the Banks having been
compromised, we have to examine whether the continuance of
the criminal proceeding could turn out to be an exercise in futility
without anything positive being ultimately achieved.
     19. As was indicated in Harbhajan Singh's case (supra),           H
     840      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2012] 3 S.C.R.

 A the pendency of a reference to a larger Bench, does not mean
   that all other proceedings involving the same issue would
   remain stayed till a decision was rendered in the reference. The
   reference made in Gian Singh's case (supra) need not,
   therefore, detain us. Till such time as the decisions cited at the
 B Bar are not modified or altered in any way, they continue to hold
   the field.

           20. In the present case, the fact situation is different from
     that in Nikhil Merchant's case (supra). While in Nikhil
     Merchant's case the accused had misrepresented the financial
· C status of the company in question in order to avail of credit
     facilities to an extent to which the company was not entitled, in
     the instant case, the allegation is that as part of a larger
     conspiracy, property acquired on lease from a person who had
     no title to the leased properties, was offered as collateral
  D security for loans obtained. Apart from the above, the actual
     owner of the property has filed a criminal complaint against Shri
     Kersi V. Mehta who had held himself out as the Attorney of the
     owner and his family members. The ratio of the decisions in
     8.S. Joshi's case and in Nikhil Merchant's case or for that
  E matter, even in Manoj Sharma's case, does not help the case
     of the writ petitioners. In Nikhil Merchant's case, this Court had
   · in the facts of the case observed that the dispute involved had
     overtures of a civil dispute with criminal facets. This is not so
     in the instant case, where the emphasis is more on the criminal
  F intent of the Petitioners than on the civil aspect involving the
     dues of the Bank in respect of which a compromise was
     worked out.
        21. In the·different fact situation of this case and those in
   8.S. Joshi's case or in Nikhil Merchant's case (supra), we are
 G not inclined to grant the reliefs prayed for in the writ petition and
   the same is accordingly dismissed.
           22. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

 H D.G.                                      Writ Petition dismissed.