Holding

The EVM‑VVPAT mechanism is secure, reliable, and provides sufficient transparency, so the petitioners' demands for paper ballots, physical VVPAT hand‑over, and 100% VVPAT counting are rejected.

Summary

The Association for Democratic Reforms challenged the use of Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) with VVPAT, seeking a return to paper ballots, physical hand‑over of VVPAT slips to voters, and 100% VVPAT counting, alleging possible manipulation. The Supreme Court examined the technical architecture of EVMs, the safeguards built into the ballot, control and VVPAT units, and the extensive testing and random verification that have shown no mismatches. It held that the EVM‑VVPAT system is secure, tamper‑proof, and provides sufficient transparency under the Conduct of Election Rules, and that the petitioners failed to demonstrate any concrete threat to free and fair elections. The Court rejected the demand for paper ballots and 100% VVPAT counting, noting the impracticality and potential for disputes, and affirmed the existing 5‑machine verification regime. It also dismissed the petitions as unmaintainable, while issuing limited forward‑looking directions to seal symbol‑loading units and allow post‑result verification of a sample of EVMs.

Issues considered

The constitutionality and legality of seeking a return to paper ballot system in lieu of EVMs.
Whether the VVPAT slip must be handed to the voter for verification and placed in the ballot box.
The propriety of mandating 100% counting of VVPAT slips alongside electronic counts.
The adequacy of existing safeguards and random VVPAT verification under the Conduct of Election Rules.
The applicability of Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(2) to the right to know that a vote is recorded and counted.
The maintainability of writ petitions based solely on suspicion of infringement of rights.
The applicability of the doctrine of res judicata to public‑interest writ petitions.

Legislation cited

Conduct of Election Rules, 1961s. Rule 49L, s. Rule 49M, s. Rule 49M(3), s. Rule 49M(6), s. Rule 49MA, s. Rule 49O, s. Rule 49S, s. Rule 56D
Constitution of Indias. Article 12, s. Article 19(1)(a), s. Article 19(2), s. Article 226, s. Article 32, s. Article 324
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. Section 177
Representation of the People Act, 1951

Subjects

Elections2024 General ElectionsEVMsPaper ballotsPaper ballot systemBooth capturingVVPATBallot boxBallot unitControl unitManipulation of EVMsVVPAT slipsHackingTamperingFree and fair electionsFirst Level CheckHigher mock pollTwo-stage randomization processFirst randomizationSecond randomizationStrong roomsWrit jurisdictionInfringement of rightDoctrine of res judicataSuspicion of infringement of right

Judgment

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 415 : 2024 INSC 341

Association For Democratic Reforms
v.
Election Commission of India and Another
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 434 of 2023)
26 April 2024
[Sanjiv Khanna* and Dipankar Datta,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Petitioners sought directions for re-introduction of the paper ballot
system; or that the printed slip from the Voter Verifiable Paper Audit
Trail (VVPAT) machine be given to the voter to verify, and put in
the ballot box, for counting; and/or that there should be 100%
counting of the VVPAT slips in addition to electronic counting by
the control unit.

Headnotes
Elections – Electoral Process – Representation of the
People Act, 1951 – Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 – Use of
Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) – EVM-VVPAT mechanism
– Writ petitions filed on the suspicion of the possibility of
manipulation of the EVMs and mismatch in votes cast through
EVMs – Directions sought for returning to the paper ballot
system; or that the printed slip from the VVPAT machine be
given to the voter to verify; and/or for 100% counting of the
VVPAT paper trails in addition to electronic counting:
Held: Per Sanjiv Khanna, J. (for himself and Dipankar Datta,
J.) EVM consists of three units, namely, the ballot unit, the control
unit, and the VVPAT – EVM setup is designed in a rudimentary
fashion and the EVM units are standalone and non-networked, i.e.,
they are unconnectable to any other third-party machine or input
source – In case any unauthorised attempt is made to access the
microcontroller or memory of the EVM, the Unauthorised Access
Detection Mechanism disables it permanently – Advanced encryption
techniques and strong mutual authentication or reception capability
rules out the deciphering of communication between the EVM units
and any unauthorised interaction with the EVM – The programme
loaded in the EVM is key hashed and burnt into a One Time
Programmable microcontroller chip at the time of manufacturing,
thus dispelling any possibility of tampering – All the three units of
* Authors
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the EVM have microcontrollers in which the respective firmware is
burnt – The burnt programme/code is unalterable and cannot be
modified after the EVM is delivered/supplied to Election Commission
of India (ECI) – Every key press of the control unit is dynamically
coded, making it impossible to decode the signal flowing among the
units of the EVM inter se – Firmware of the control unit is agnostic
to any candidate name or political party symbol – The possibility to
hack or tamper with the agnostic firmware in the burnt memory to
tutor/favour results is unfounded – The suspicion that EVMs can be
manipulated for repeated or wrong recording of vote(s) to favour a
particular candidate, rejected – ECI has conducted random VVPAT
verification of 5 polling booths per assembly segment/constituency
for 41,629 EVMs-VVPATs – More than 4 crore VVPAT slips have
been tallied with the electronic counts of their control units – Not
even a single case of mismatch (except one which arose on account
of failure of the presiding officer to delete the mock poll data) or
wrong recording of votes was detected – EVMs subjected to test by
technical experts committee from time to time wherein no fault was
found – The M3 EVMs currently in use are designed by engineers of
BHEL and ECIL and vetted by the aforesaid committee – A number
of safeguards and protocols with stringent checks have been put
in place, as elucidated – Administrative and technical safeguards
of the EVM reviewed in detail – Data and figures do not indicate
artifice and deceit – Imagination and suppositions should not lead
to hypothesize a wrong doing without any basis or facts – Credibility
of the ECI and integrity of the electoral process earned over years
cannot be over-ridden by contemplations and speculations – In N.
Chandrababu Naidu v. Union of India, the direction for counting the
VVPAT paper trail in 5 EVMs per assembly constituency or assembly
segment in a parliamentary constituency was issued to ensure the
highest level of confidence in the accuracy of election results –
Giving physical access to VVPAT slips to voters is problematic and
impractical and will lead to misuse, malpractices and disputes – Not
inclined to modify the directions to increase the number of VVPAT
undergoing slip count – Data and the results do not indicate any
need to increase the number of VVPAT units subjected to manual
counting – EVMs are simple, secure and user-friendly – Moreover,
the incorporation of the VVPAT system fortifies the principle
of vote verifiability, enhancing the overall accountability of the
electoral process – Electoral reforms would be undone by directing
reintroduction of the ballot papers – Submission to return to the
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 417

Association For Democratic Reforms v.
Election Commission of India And Another

ballot paper system, rejected – Per Dipankar Datta, J. (Concurring)
Use of EVMs in elections in India are not without its checks and
balances – Reasonable measures to ensure transparency, such
as tallying VVPAT paper trail in 5 EVMs per assembly constituency
or assembly segment in a parliamentary constituency with votes
polled, are already in place after the decision in N. Chandrababu
Naidu v. Union of India – The aforesaid exercise of tallying has
till date not resulted in any mismatch – This assertion of ECI not
proved incorrect by petitioners – Grounds for the reliefs sought lie
in the realm of apprehension and suspicion – Petitioners neither
able to demonstrate how the use of EVMs in elections violates the
principle of free and fair elections; nor were they able to establish
a fundamental right to 100% VVPAT slips tallying with the votes
cast – Their apprehensions are misplaced – Reverting to the paper
ballot system and burdening the ECI with the onerous task of 100%
VVPAT slips tallying would be a folly. [Paras 17, 19-21, 42, 58, 62,
68-70, 72, 75 and 10-12, 19]
Elections – Electoral Process – Use of Electronic Voting
Machines (EVMs) – EVM-VVPAT (Voter Verifiable Paper Audit
Trail) mechanism – Constitution of India – Article 19(1)(a) –
Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 – r.49M – ‘transparent window’
– Alleged modification of the VVPAT in 2017, whereby the glass
window on the VVPAT was made translucent/tinted instead of
transparent, depriving the voter from knowing whether the vote
cast by him was actually registered and counted – Petitioners
submitted that a voter’s right to be informed u/Article 19(1)(a)
vis-à-vis the electoral process have two facets- right to know
that the vote is recorded as cast; and, secondly that the vote
as cast is counted:
Held: Per Sanjiv Khanna, J. (for himself and Dipankar Datta,
J.) The test for determining the scope of unenumerated rights
is based on tracing them to specific provision of Part III of the
Constitution or to the core values which the Constitution espouses
– Petitioners were neither able to demonstrate how the use of
EVMs in elections violates the principle of free and fair elections;
nor were they able to establish a fundamental right to 100% VVPAT
slips tallying with the votes cast – While the fundamental right of
voters to ensure their vote is accurately recorded and counted
is acknowledged, the same cannot be equated with the right to
100% counting of VVPAT slips, or a right to physical access to
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the VVPAT slips, which the voter should be permitted to put in
the drop box – These are two separate aspects – The former is
the right itself and the latter is a plea to protect or how to secure
the right – The voters’ right can be protected and safeguarded by
adopting several measures – Direction in Subramanian Swamy v.
Election Commission of India for gradual introduction of VVPATs
to guarantee utmost transparency and integrity in the system has
been implemented – The voter can see the VVPAT slip through the
glass window and this assures the voter that his vote as cast has
been recorded and will be counted – Further, ECI was categoric
that the glass window on the VVPAT has not undergone any
change – The term used in r.49M is ‘transparent window’ – The
tinted glass used on the VVPAT printer is to maintain secrecy and
prevent anyone else from viewing the VVPAT slips – Voter in the
voting compartment who is viewing the glass from the top can
have clear view of the slip for 7 seconds – Marginal tint on the
VVPAT glass window, or the fact that the cutting and dropping of
the slip from the roll in to the drop box of the printer is not visible,
does not violate r.49M – The words ‘before such slips get cut’ in
the proviso to r.49M(3) indicate and require that the slip should be
cut from the roll after the elector has seen the print through the
glass window – Use of glass window prevents damage, smudging,
attempt to deface or physically access the VVPAT slip – The
rule ensures that the voter is able to see the slip along with the
serial number with name of the candidate and the symbol for
whom they have voted – Per Dipankar Datta, J. (Concurring)
A citizen’s right ‘to freedom of speech and expression’ u/Article
19(1) is not absolute and the State by virtue of Article 19(2) can
place reasonable restrictions on these rights – The ordainment of
r. 49M (3) is that the VVPAT slip should be momentarily visible to
the voter; and it is not the requirement of the rule that the VVPAT
slip or its copy has to be handed over to the voter – Recording of
the vote cast signifying the choice of the voter and its projection
on the VVPAT slip, albeit for 7 seconds, is fulfilment of the voter’s
right of being informed that his/her vote has been duly recorded
– As long as there is no allegation of statutory breach, there can
be no substitution of the Court’s view for the view of the ECI that
the light in the VVPAT would be on for 7 seconds and not more
– There is in place a stringent system of checks and balances
(Form 17A, 17C, r.56D(4), 56-D), to prevent any possibility of a
miscount of votes, and for the voter to know that his/her vote has
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 419

Association For Democratic Reforms v.
Election Commission of India And Another

been counted – Such a system, which is distinctly more satisfactory
compared to the system of the yester-years, suitably satisfies the
voter’s right under Article 19(1)(a) to know that his/her vote has
been counted as recorded. [Paras 69, 73, 16, 17]
Directions by Supreme Court – 2024 General Elections
underway for constituting the 18th Lok Sabha – Directions
issued to further strengthen the integrity of election process:
Held: On completion of the symbol loading process in the VVPATs
undertaken on or after 01.05.2024, the symbol loading units be
sealed and secured, as directed and be opened, examined and dealt
with as in the case of EVMs; the burnt memory/microcontroller in
5% of the EVMs, that is, the control unit, ballot unit and the VVPAT,
per assembly constituency/assembly segment of a parliamentary
constituency be checked and verified by the team of engineers
from the manufacturers of the EVMs, post the announcement of
the results, for any tampering or modification, on a written request
made by candidates at SI.No.2 or 3, behind the highest polled
candidate. [Para 76]
Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 – r.49MA – Petitioner pleaded
that r.49MA is draconian, arbitrary, and contrary to law as
reference to s.177, Penal Code, 1860 in the written declaration
u/r.49MA is wrong and misconceived:
Held: r.49MA permits the elector to raise a complaint if she/he is
of the view that the VVPAT paper slip did not depict the correct
candidate/political party she/he voted – However, whenever a
challenge is made, the voting process must be halted – An overly
liberal approach could cause confusion and delay hindering the
election process and dissuading others from casting their votes –
However, no comments made on the application of s.177, Penal
Code, 1860 – ECI stated that only 26 such requests in terms of
r.49MA were received, and in all cases, the allegation was found
to be incorrect – Plea that any elector should be liberally permitted
as a routine to ask for verification of vote, rejected. [Para 74]
Elections – Electoral Process – Use of Electronic Voting
Machines (EVMs) – Case laws affirming the efficacy and use
of EVMs in the elections, referred to.
Elections – Electoral Process – EVM-VVPAT (Voter Verifiable
Paper Audit Trail) mechanism – Suggestions as regards
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counting of the VVPAT slips that instead of physically counting
the VVPAT slips, they can be counted by a counting machine;
and barcoding of the symbols loaded in the VVPATs may be
helpful in machine counting:
Held: Suggestions made may be examined by the ECI – These
are technical aspects, which will require evaluation and study, and
hence no comment made either way. [Para 71]
Elections – Electoral Process – Conduct of Election Rules,
1961 – Voting by Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) – EVM-
VVPAT (Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail) mechanism – Free
and fair elections – Procedure and safeguards adopted by
ECI to ensure free and fair elections and the integrity of the
electoral process; features of EVMs; checks and protocols
to ensure and ascertain the legitimacy and integrity of the
EVMs and the election process; data on the performance of
the EVMs; mechanics and safeguards embedded in the EVMs,
discussed.
Elections – Electoral Process – Use of Electronic Voting
Machines (EVMs) – EVM-VVPAT (Voter Verifiable Paper Audit
Trail) mechanism – Advantages – Enumerated.
Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 – Part IV, Chapter II – Voting
by EVMs – rr.49L, 49M (3), (6), 49(O), 49 (S), 56-D; Form 17A,
17C – Preparation of the voting machine by returning officer,
arrangements at the polling station, admission to the polling
stations, and preparation of voting machine for poll.
Constitution of India – Article 32/226 – Writ petitions –
Maintainability – Suspicion of infringement of a right, if
adequate ground to invoke the writ jurisdiction:
Held: Per Dipankar Datta, J. No – A writ petition ought not to be
entertained if the plea is based on the mere suspicion that a right
could be infringed – Suspicion that a right could be infringed and a
real threat of infringement of a right are distinct and different – To
succeed in a claim under Article 32 or 226, one must demonstrate
either mala fide, or arbitrariness, or breach of a law in the impugned
State action – Though a writ of right, it is not a writ of course – Writ
jurisdiction u/Article 32/226 being special and extraordinary, should not
be exercised casually or lightly on the mere asking of a litigant based
on suspicions and conjectures, unless there is credible/trustworthy
material on record to suggest that adverse action affecting a right
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 421

Association For Democratic Reforms v.
Election Commission of India And Another

is reasonably imminent or there is a real threat to the rule of law
being abrogated – It must be shown, at least prima facie, that there
is a real potential threat to a right guaranteed by law to the person
concerned – Mere suspicion that there may be a mismatch in votes
cast through EVMs, thereby giving rise to a demand for a 100%
VVPAT slips verification, is not a sufficient ground for the present set
of writ petitions to be considered maintainable. [Paras 22, 23, 28]
Doctrines – Doctrine of res judicata – Civil Procedure Code,
1908 – s.11 – “public right” in Explanation VI – Applicability
to public interest litigations:
Held: Per Dipankar Datta, J. Doctrine of res judicata is applicable
to writ petitions under Article 32 and Article 226 as well – The
inclusion of the term “public right” in Explanation VI of s.11 of
the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 aims to avoid redundant legal
disputes concerning public rights – Thus, there is no room for
debate regarding the application of s.11 to matters of public interest
litigation presented through writ petitions – Principle of res judicata
is not rigid in cases of substantial public interest and Constitutional
Courts are empowered to adopt a flexible approach in such cases,
acknowledging their far-reaching public interest ramifications –
However, this standard is applicable only when substantial evidence
is presented to validate the irreversible harm or detriment to the
public good resulting from the action impugned – Court must come
to the conclusion that the petition raises substantial grounds not
previously addressed in litigation – Only then it may consider such
a petition; otherwise, it is within its authority to dismiss it at the
threshold – This issue at hand of doubting the efficacy of the EVMs
has been previously raised before this Court and it is imperative
that such issue is concluded definitively now. [Paras 30, 33, 34]

Case Law Cited

In the judgment of Sanjiv Khanna, J. (for himself
and Dipankar Datta, J.)
A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai and Others [1984] 3 SCR 74 :
(1984) 2 SCC 656; Subramanian Swamy v. Election
Commission of India [2013] 14 SCR 565 : (2013) 10
SCC 500; N. Chandrababu Naidu and Others v. Union
of India and Another (2019) 15 SCC 377; Nyaya Bhoomi
and Another v. Election Commission of India, 2018 SCC
422 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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OnLine SC 3919; Tech for All v. Election Commission
of India, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 2353; Prakash Joshi v.
Election Commission of India, 2017 SCC OnLine SC
1734; Madhya Pradesh Jan Vikash Party v. Election
Commission of India; Sunil Ahya v. Election Commission
of India; Kamal Nath v. Election Commission of India
and Others [2018] 12 SCR 842 : (2019) 2 SCC 260
– referred to.

In the judgment of Dipankar Datta, J. (Concurring)
Daryao and Others v. State of U.P. and Others [1962]
1 SCR 574 : AIR 1961 SC 1457; Direct Recruit
Class II Engineering Officers’ Association. v. State of
Maharashtra and Others [1990] 2 SCR 900 : (1990) 2
SCC 715 – followed.
Election Commission of India v Ashok Kumar [2000]
Supp. 3 SCR 34 : (2000) 8 SCC 216; N. Chandrababu
Naidu v. Union of India (2019) 15 SCC 377; D.A.V.
College, Bhatinda v. State of Punjab [1971] Supp. 1
SCR 677 : (1971) 2 SCC 261; Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal
Nala Sangam v. State of Tamil Nadu [2015] 11 SCR
1110 : (2016) 2 SCC 725 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
Legal History of EVMs and VVPATs, Edition 1, January
2024, p.654 – referred to.

List of Acts
Representation of the People Act, 1951; Conduct of Election Rules,
1961; Constitution of India; Penal Code, 1860.

List of Keywords
Elections; 2024 General Elections; EVMs; Paper ballots; Paper
ballot system; Booth capturing; VVPAT; Ballot box; Ballot unit,
Control unit; Manipulation of EVMs; VVPAT slips; Hacking;
Tampering; Free and fair elections; First Level Check; Higher
mock poll; Two-stage randomization process; First randomization;
Second randomization; Strong rooms; Writ jurisdiction;
Infringement of right; Doctrine of res judicata; Suspicion of
infringement of right.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 423

Association For Democratic Reforms v.
Election Commission of India And Another

Case Arising From
EXTRA-ORDINARY ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil)
No. 434 of 2023
(Under article 32 of The Constitution of India)
With
Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 184 and 277 of 2024
Appearances for Parties
Tushar Mehta, SG, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASG, Gopal Sankaranarayanan,
Kapil Sibal, Sanjay R. Hegde, Maninder Singh, Anand Grover, Huzefa
Ahmadi, Ms. Haripriya Padmanabhan, Santosh Paul, Sr. Advs., Abhay
Anil Anturkar, Asim Sarode, Dhruv Tank, Aniruddha Awalgaonkar, Ms.
Surbhi Kapoor, Bhagwant Deshpande, Ms. Neha Rathi, Ms. Kajal
Giri, Kamal Kishore, Vishal Sinha, Prashant Bhushan, Nizamuddin
Pasha, Rahul Gupta, Ms. Ria Yadav, Ms. Alice Raj, Mrs. Suroor
Mandar, Rishabh Parikh, Ms. Aparajita Jamwal, Prateek Kumar,
Ruchir Ranjan Rai, Ms. Ashita Chawla, Ajay Sabharwal, Rangasaran
Mohan, Amarpal Singh Dua, Kanu Agrawal, Ms. Anupriya Srivastava,
Ms. Shivika Mehra, Praneet Pranav, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Pranav
Sachdeva, Zulfiker Ali P.S., Ms. Lakshmi Sree P., Augustine Peter, Ms.
Lebina Baby, Nizam Pasha, Lzafeer Ahmad B. F., Ms. Aayushi Mishra,
Ajay Marwah, Swaroopananda Mishra, Prabhu Ramasubramanian,
Navneet Dugar, Bharathi Mohan M., Manoj Kumar A., Santhosh K.,
Shrutanjay Bharadwaj, Sriharsh Nahush Bundela, Vedant Mishra,
Virendra Mohan, Varun K Chopra, Mehul Sharma, M/s. VKC Law
Offices, Ms. Tasneem Ahmadi, Mehmood Pracha, R.H.A. Sikander,
Ms. Mahima Rathi, Jatin Bhatt, Sanawar, Mohd. Shameem, Ms.
Nujhat Naseem, Advs. for the appearing parties.
Petitioner-in-person
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment
Sanjiv Khanna, J.
Delay in refiling is condoned.
2. At the outset, we take on record that the counsel for the petitioners, in
unison, have stated that the petitioners do not attribute any motive or
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malice to the Election Commission of India1, or for that matter contend
that the Electronic Voting Machines2 have been tutored or configured
to favour or disfavour a candidate or political party. However, due to
possibility of manipulating the EVMs there is suspicion and, therefore,
this Court should step in to instil confidence in the voters3 and the
people. Voters have the right to know that the franchise exercised
by them has been correctly recorded and counted.
3. On a pointed question put by the Court, it was argued, without
prejudice and in the alternative, on behalf of the petitioner –
Association for Democratic Reforms, that the Court should direct:
a) return to the paper ballot system; or
b) that the printed slip from the Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail
machine4 be given to the voter to verify, and put in the ballot
box, for counting; and/or
c) that there should be 100% counting of the VVPAT slips in
addition to electronic counting by the control unit.
4. Other arguments raised relate to — the alleged modification of the
VVPAT in the year 2017, whereby the glass window on the VVPAT
was made translucent/tinted instead of transparent, depriving the voter
from knowing whether the vote cast by him was actually registered
and counted; Rule 49MA of the Conduct of Election Rules, 19615
is draconian, arbitrary, and contrary to law as reference to Section
177 of the Indian Penal Code, 18606 in the written declaration under
Rule 49MA is wrong and misconceived; and lastly, the voters’ right
to know that the vote as cast is duly registered, being a paramount
and indelible fundamental right, any administrative reason and ground
raised by the ECI objecting to 100% counting of the VVPAT paper
trail should be rejected.
5. Paper ballots were the norm, till EVMs were projected as a viable
alternative in 1980s. EVMs were first used in an assembly bye-

1 For short, ‘ECI’.
2 For short, ‘EVMs’
3 ‘Voters’ and ‘Electors’ is used interchangeably.
4 For short, ‘VVPAT’.
5 For short, ‘1961 Rules’.
6 For short, ‘IPC’.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 425

Association For Democratic Reforms v.
Election Commission of India And Another

election in Kerala in 1982. All through the 1980s and early 1990s,
the use of EVMs for elections was discussed and debated by
politicians and experts in the domain of technology and electoral
process, and after due deliberations and review, the EVMs were
accepted and embraced. In view of the legal challenge7 regarding
use of EVMs without legislative approval, the Parliament vide Act
1 of 1989 amended the Representation of the People Act, 19518
allowing the use of EVMs. They were used in the General Elections
in 2004 and have been used in each and every General and other
election thereafter.
6. ECI maintains that the EVMs have been a huge success in ensuring
free, fair and transparent elections across the nation in all elections.
They restrict human intervention, checkmate electoral fraud and
malpractices like stuffing and smudging of votes, and deter the
errors and mischiefs faced in manual counting of ballot papers. While
earlier it was apprehended that the introduction of EVMs will lead
to hardship and disenfranchisement, independent studies showcase
that EVMs have led to increase in voter participation.9 Yet, it is also
true that time and again use of EVMs has been objected to and
questioned, not by one but by all political parties and others. There
have been several litigations in this Court and the High Courts, albeit
the challenge to the use of EVMs has been rejected recording good
grounds and reasons.
7. We deem it appropriate to begin this decision by referring to some
of the earlier case laws and judgments of this Court on the efficacy
and use of EVMs in the elections in this country.
8. This Court in Subramanian Swamy v. Election Commission of India,10
held that a paper trail was an indispensable requirement of free and
fair elections. The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced
below:
“28. From the materials placed by both the sides, we
are satisfied that the ‘paper trail’ is an indispensable

7 See A.C. Jose v. Sivan Pillai and others [1984] 3 SCR 74 : (1984) 2 SCC 656
8 For short, ‘RP Act’.
9 Legal History of EVMs and VVPATs, Edition 1, January 2024, p.654
10 [2013] 14 SCR 565 : (2013) 10 SCC 500
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requirement of free and fair elections. The confidence
of the voters in the EVMs can be achieved only with the
introduction of the “paper trail”. EVMs with Vvpat system
ensure the accuracy of the voting system. With an intent
to have fullest transparency in the system and to restore
the confidence of the voters, it is necessary to set up
EVMs with Vvpat system because vote is nothing but an
act of expression which has immense importance in a
democratic system.
29. In the light of the above discussion and taking notice
of the pragmatic and reasonable approach of ECI and
considering the fact that in general elections all over India,
ECI has to handle one million (ten lakh) polling booths,
we permit ECI to introduce Vvpat in gradual stages or
geographical-wise in the ensuing general elections. The
area, State or actual booth(s) are to be decided by ECI and
ECI is free to implement the same in a phased manner.
We appreciate the efforts and good gesture made by ECI
in introducing the same. For implementation of such a
system (Vvpat) in a phased manner, the Government of
India is directed to provide required financial assistance
for procurement of units of Vvpat.”
Accordingly, to ensure full transparency and confidence of voters, this
Court recommended that EVMs be set up with VVPATs. Amendment
to the 1961 Rules was notified on 14.08.2013 to introduce the VVPAT
mechanism.
9. In N. Chandrababu Naidu and Others v. Union of India and
Another,11 the petitioners prayed that 50% randomised VVPAT slip
verification be conducted in every General and Bye Elections instead
of one EVM per assembly constituency or assembly segment in a
parliamentary constituency. This Court held as under:
“9. At the very outset the Court would like to observe
that neither the satisfaction of the Election Commission
nor the system in vogue today, as stated above, is being
doubted by the Court insofar as fairness and integrity

11 (2019) 15 SCC 377
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Association For Democratic Reforms v.
Election Commission of India And Another

is concerned. It is possible and we are certain that the
system ensures accurate electoral results. But that is not
all. If the number of machines which are subjected to
verification of paper trail can be increased to a reasonable
number, it would lead to greater satisfaction amongst not
only the political parties but the entire electorate of the
country. This is what the Court should endeavour and
the exercise, therefore, should be to find a viable number
of machines that should be subjected to the verification
of Vvpat paper trails keeping in mind the infrastructure
and the manpower difficulties pointed out by the Deputy
Election Commissioner. In this regard, the proximity to
the election schedule announced by the ECI must be
kept in mind.
10. Having considered the matter, we are of the view that
if the number of EVMs in respect of which Vvpat paper
slips is to be subjected to physical scrutiny is increased
from 1 to 5, the additional manpower that would be
required would not be difficult for the ECI to provide
nor would the declaration of the result be substantially
delayed. In fact, if the said number is increased to 5, the
process of verification can be done by the same team
of polling staff and supervisors/officials. It is, therefore,
our considered view that having regard to the totality of
the facts of the case and need to generate the greatest
degree of satisfaction in all with regard to the full accuracy
of the election results, the number of EVMs that would
now be subjected to verification so far as Vvpat paper
trail is concerned would be 5 per Assembly Constituency
or Assembly Segments in a Parliamentary Constituency
instead of what is provided by Guideline No. 16.6, namely,
one machine per Assembly Constituency or Assembly
Segment in a Parliamentary Constituency. We also direct
that the random selection of the machines that would be
subjected to the process of Vvpat paper trail verification
as explained to us by Mr Jain, Deputy Commissioner of
the Election Commission, in terms of the guidelines in
force, shall apply to the Vvpat paper trail verification of
the 5 EVMs covered by the present order.”
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Accordingly, instead of one EVM per assembly constituency or
assembly segment in a parliamentary constituency, as stipulated
under the erstwhile Guideline 16.6 of the Manual on EVM and
VVPAT, it was held that five EVMs per assembly constituency or
assembly segment in a parliamentary constituency would be subject
to VVPAT verification.
10. This Court vide order dated 22.11.2018 dismissed Writ Petition
(Civil) No. 1332/2018 titled Nyaya Bhoomi and Another v. Election
Commission of India, seeking return to the ballot paper system
instead of EVMs.
11. This Court vide order dated 21.05.2019 dismissed Writ Petition (Civil)
No. 692/2019 titled Tech for All v. Election Commission of India,
seeking 100% verification of VVPATs against the EVM outcomes,
as the issue had already been decided in N. Chandrababu Naidu
(supra).
12. Even earlier, this Court vide order dated 30.10.2017 in Prakash
Joshi v. Election Commission of India12, had rejected a similar
prayer with regard to modification of the procedure for counting of
votes by use of EVMs, leaving it to the discretion of the ECI. It was
observed that this Court was not inclined to enter into the said arena.
13. This Court vide order dated 30.09.2022 dismissed Special Leave
Petition (Civil) No. 16870/2022 titled Madhya Pradesh Jan Vikash
Party v. Election Commission of India regarding use of EVMs with
costs. This Court observed that:
“The election process under the representation of the
People Act, 1951 is monitored by a Constitutional Authority
like Election Commission. Electronic Voting Machines
(EVM) process has been utilized in our Country for decades
now but periodically issues are sought to be raised. This
is one such endeavor in the abstract.”
14. Recently, this Court vide order dated 22.09.2023 dismissed
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 826/2023 titled Sunil Ahya v. Election
Commission of India seeking independent audit of the source code
of EVMs. This Court observed that:

12 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1734
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 429

Association For Democratic Reforms v.
Election Commission of India And Another

“The Election Commission is a constitutional entity entrusted
under Article 324 of the Constitution with superintendence
and control over the conduct of the elections. The petitioner
has placed no actionable material on the record of the
Court to indicate that the Election Commission has acted
in breach of its constitutional mandate. Ultimately, the
manner in which the source code should be audited and
the way the audit should be dealt with bears on sensitive
issues pertaining to the integrity of the elections which
are conducted under the superintendence of the Election
Commission. On such a policy issue, we are not inclined
to issue a direction as sought by the petitioner. There is
no material before this Court, at this stage, to indicate
that the Election Commission is not taking suitable steps
to fulfill its mandate.”
15. This Court in Kamal Nath v. Election Commission of India and
Others13, observed that it was without doubt that over the last several
decades ECI has built the reputation of an impartial body and a
constitutional authority which strives to hold fair election in which
the people of this country participate with great trust and faith. The
challenge to the EVMs and prayer for conducting VVPAT verification
on random basis for 10% of the votes was rejected.
16. We could have dismissed the present writ petitions by merely relying
upon the past precedents and decisions of this Court which, in our
opinion, are clear and lucid, and as repeated challenges based on
suspicion and doubt, without any cogent material and data, are
execrable and undesirable. However, we would like to put on record
the procedure and safeguards adopted by the ECI to ensure free
and fair elections and the integrity of the electoral process. For
this purpose, we shall refer to and take on record the features of
EVMs.14 Lastly, we would give two directions, and take on record
suggestion(s) for consideration of the ECI.
17. The EVM consists of three units, namely, the ballot unit, the control
unit, and the VVPAT. The ballot unit acts as a keyboard or a keypad.

13 [2018] 12 SCR 842 : (2019) 2 SCC 260
14 In view of the issue raised, we are not dealing with the post counting handling of EVMs.
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The ballot unit consists of 16 keys/buttons one of which the voter has
to press when he exercises his choice to vote for any candidate. The
keys are political party and candidate agnostic. The serial numbers,
names of the candidates and the symbols of the political parties/
candidates are physically pasted on the ballot unit so as to enable the
voter to identify the corresponding key/button against the respective
candidate and the symbol. The control unit, which is also called the
master unit, remains with the polling/presiding officer. Before the
ballot unit can be used by a voter, the polling/presiding officer is
required to press the ‘BALLOT’ button on the control unit, thereby
enabling the voter to cast his vote on the ballot unit. As soon as the
voter presses the ‘blue button’ and casts his/her vote on the ballot
unit, an LED against the candidate button glows red and the control
unit sends the command to the VVPAT. The VVPAT then prints the
VVPAT slip comprising of the serial number, candidate name and the
symbol. The VVPAT slip, after being printed, is displayed through the
glass window which is illuminated for 7 seconds to enable the voter
to know and verify the serial number, the candidate and the symbol
for whom they have voted. The VVPAT slip then gets cut from the
roll and falls into the box/compartment attached to the VVPAT. The
fall sensor in the VVPAT then sends a confirmation to the control
unit. The control unit records the vote.
18. The control unit, as explained below in some detail, has burnt memory,
which is agnostic and does not have the names of the candidates and
symbols allotted to the candidates or political parties. As noted earlier,
the polling/presiding officer has to activate the EVM by pressing the
‘BALLOT’ button on the control unit. The data stored in the control
unit, upon the vote being cast, records and counts the button or the
key pressed on the ballot unit. The data, therefore, records the total
number of votes as cast by the voters, and the key or the button
number on the ballot unit pressed by the voters for casting their vote.
After the vote is cast and the control unit has recorded the vote, a
loud beep sound confirms the registration of the vote.
19. The EVMs are manufactured and supplied to the ECI by two
public sector undertakings, namely, Bharat Electronics Limited15
(which functions under the Ministry of Defence), and Electronic

15 For short, ‘BEL’.
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Corporation of India Limited16 (which functions under the Department
of Atomic Energy).17 The EVMs in use after 2013 are referred to as
‘M3’ EVMs. The EVM setup is designed in a rudimentary fashion
and the EVM units are standalone and non-networked, that is,
they are unconnectable to any other third-party machine or input
source. In case any unauthorised attempt is made to access the
microcontroller or memory of the EVM, the Unauthorised Access
Detection Mechanism (UADM) disables it permanently. The
advanced encryption techniques and strong mutual authentication
or reception capability rules out the deciphering of communication
between the EVM units and any unauthorised interaction with the
EVM.
20. The programme loaded in the EVM 18 is key hashed and burnt
into a One Time Programmable microcontroller chip at the time
of manufacturing, thus dispelling any possibility of tampering. It is
pertinent to note that all the three units of the EVM – ballot unit,
control unit and VVPAT, have microcontrollers in which the respective
firmware is burnt. The burnt programme/code is unalterable and
cannot be modified after the EVM is delivered/supplied by the
manufacturer to ECI. Every key press of the control unit is dynamically
coded, thus making it impossible to decode the signal flowing among
the units of the EVM inter se. Further, each key press is recorded
with date and time stamp on a real time basis.
21. As mentioned earlier, the firmware of the control unit is agnostic to
any candidate name or political party symbol. The control unit only
recognises the button/key pressed on the ballot unit. The control
unit has a capacity to store up to 2000 vote entries.
22. Apart from the burnt one-time programmable memory, the VVPAT
has a flash memory of 4 megabytes. The flash memory of the VVPAT
is designed to solely store and recognise a bitmap format file. The
VVPAT can store a maximum of 1024 bitmap files containing the
symbol, the serial number and name of the candidate. One candidate’s
name, symbol, and serial number is packed into a single bitmap file

16 For short, ‘ECIL’.
17 Collectively referred to as the ‘manufacturers’.
18 EVM here refers to the ballot unit, the control unit and the VVPAT unit.
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of 4 kilobytes. The VVPAT does not store or read any other software
or firmware.19
23. The VVPAT flash memory is empty and does not contain any symbol
or name related details at the time of supply/delivery to the ECI.
VVPATs in this form/state are stored in warehouses. The control
units and ballot units are also stored and secured in the warehouses.
24. Five to six months before national or state elections are to be
held, the required quantity of the EVMs are taken out from the
warehouses and stored in the designated strong rooms. The EVMs,
after they are put in the strong room, are subjected to First Level
Check20 by engineers of the manufacturers in the presence of
the representatives of the recognised political parties. The FLC is
carried out at the district level under the supervision of the District
Election Officer.
25. During the FLC, 100% or all machines are checked by casting of
vote in each of the 16 buttons on the ballot unit 6 times. Further,
5% of the machines are randomly selected by the representatives
of the recognised political parties for a higher mock poll by them.
Out of the 5% EVMs; 1200 votes are cast in 1% EVMs, 1000 votes
are cast in 2% EVMs and 500 votes are cast in 2% EVMs. The
voting result indicated in the control unit is tallied with the VVPAT
slip count. A list of ‘FLC OK’ EVMs is prepared and shared with all
the recognised political parties.
26. After check and verification that the EVM is working properly, the
control unit of each EVM is sealed with a pink paper seal which is
signed by the representatives of the political parties. Thereafter, the
plastic cabinet of the EVMs cannot be opened. There is no access to
any of the EVM components. Till this stage the VVPAT flash memory
is empty and it does not have any data or symbols.

19 It is apposite to note the difference between firmware and software. Firmware is a form of microcode or
instructions embedded into hardware devices to help them operate effectively. Firmware size is usually
small and ranges in size of a few kilobytes. Software on the other hand, is installed onto a device and
used for interaction, such as browsing the internet, computing, word processing and many more complex
tasks. Software usually runs on the top of operating systems and are usually large in size between
few hundred kilobytes to gigabytes. Software is upgradable or updatable, and its memory is usually
accessible and designed for user interactions. The ECI submits that the VVPATs do not have software as
they only have firmware.
20 For short, ‘FLC’.
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27. 10% of the ‘FLC OK’ EVMs are taken out for training and awareness
purpose in the presence of the recognised political parties. The list
of the training and awareness units is also shared with the political
parties. These training and awareness units are stored separately in
a designated warehouse. EVM demonstration centres are set up at
the District Election Office, and at the Returning Officer Headquarter/
Revenue Sub-Division Offices. Mobile demonstration vans are also
deployed to cover all polling locations. The EVMs used for training
and awareness are thereafter not mingled and are taken back to
the designated warehouse.
28. To dispel any scenario of bias or prior knowledge, the verified
EVMs undergo a two-stage randomization process. It is submitted
that not even the manufacturer of the EVMs would be able to
know the allotment of a particular machine for a particular state
or constituency. The randomization process is conducted without
any human intervention by the EVM Management System software
application. The first randomization is conducted to allocate the EVMs
Assembly constituency/segment-wise. The second randomization is
conducted to allocate the machines polling station wise and for the
reserve pool. The randomization process is done in the presence
of the representatives of the political parties/candidates and the
Central Observers deputed by the ECI. The list of EVMs containing
serial number as randomly allocated constituency wise and then to
a particular polling station are provided to the representatives of the
political parties/candidates.
29. It is important to reiterate that till this stage, particulars of the
candidates or the political parties are not loaded or stored in the
VVPAT. The flash memory of the VVPAT is blank/empty. The control
unit being agnostic to any political party or candidate, only recognises
the push button on the ballot unit. It is programmed to compute the
number of times all and a particular button/key has been pressed.
30. About 10 to 15 days prior to the date of polling, the symbol loading
process is undertaken by using the symbol loading units. The symbols
are loaded in the flash memory of the VVPATs in the form of a bitmap
file, comprising the symbol of the political party/candidate, serial
number and name of the candidate. A laptop/PC with the symbol
loading application is used to create a bitmap file comprising the serial
number, the candidate name and the symbol. This file is loaded on
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VVPAT units by using the symbol loading units. Authorised engineers
of the manufacturers and the District Election Officer are involved in
the symbol loading process. The whole process takes place in the
presence of the candidates or their representatives and a monitor/
TV screen displays the symbol loading process.
31. It is at this stage that the specific button/key on the ballot unit is
allocated to each candidate. The sequence/location of button/key
allocated to a candidate of a political party is done in alphabetical order
on the basis of the name of the candidate, first for the National and
State recognised political parties, followed by other State registered
parties, and then for independent candidates. Thus, the sequence/
location of the button/key on the ballot unit and the consequent
allotment for the purposes of the VVPAT varies from constituency
to constituency. For example, candidate or political party ‘A’ may be
allocated button ‘1’ in one parliamentary constituency, whereas button
‘1’ may be allocated to political party ‘B’ in another constituency.
32. There are 16 buttons/keys on each ballot unit. In case there are
more than 15 candidates (one button is for NOTA), more than
one ballot units are attached to the control unit. A total of 24 ballot
units can be connected to a control unit to make a single EVM set.
Therefore, a maximum of 384 candidates (including NOTA) can be
catered by the EVM.
33. The advantages of the EVM-VVPAT mechanism are noted below:
● It runs on battery/power-packs and does not require any external
power supply.
● Voting is done by pressing a button thereby negating a scenario
of invalid vote akin to an invalid paper ballot.
● It does not permit more than 4 votes per minute, thereby
deterring and disincentivising booth capturing.
● After the pressing of ‘CLOSE’ button on the control unit, there
is no possibility of voting.
● It ensures quick, error-free and mischief-free counting of votes.
● Voter is instantly able to verify the recording of their vote through
the beep sound. Further, the VVPAT slip helps verify that the
vote casted is recorded correctly.
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● By pressing the ‘TOTAL’ button on the control unit at any time,
the total number of votes polled up to the time of pressing the
button is displayed, without indicating the candidate-wise result
of votes.
● The original program, which is political party and candidate
agnostic, is ported on to the microcontroller of the EVM 21
during the manufacturing at the factory. This process is done
way before the elections and it is impossible to know the serial
number of any candidate in advance. Thus, it is not possible
to pre-program the EVM in a spurious manner.
34. After the symbol loading process is completed, all or 100% of the
EVMs, including the VVPATs, are checked by casting one vote by
pressing each candidate button, including NOTA. A higher mock
poll is also conducted in 5% randomly selected units wherein 1000
votes are cast, and the electronic result is tallied with the VVPAT
slip count. The candidates or their representatives are also allowed
to choose the 5% EVMs and conduct a mock poll. Once the symbol
loading process or the candidate setting is completed, and the mock
polls are conducted, the ballot unit of the EVM is also sealed with
the thread or plain paper seals. The symbol loaded VVPATs are
sealed with address tags. The paper seals and address tags bear the
signatures of the representatives of the political parties/candidates.
35. Thus, it is clear that till the symbol loading into the VVPAT is done
by using the symbol loading unit, the EVM is blank and has no data/
particulars of political parties or candidates. One cannot ascertain
and know which button/key in the ballot unit will be allocated to a
particular candidate or a political party.
36. It has been highlighted before us by the ECI that the symbol loading
process conducted by using symbol loading unit in the VVPAT cannot
be equated with the uploading of the software. A bitmap file comprising
of the serial number, name of the candidate and the symbol allocated
to the particular candidate is uploaded in the symbol loading process.
The symbol loading process undertaken by using the symbol loading
unit cannot alter or modify the programme/firmware in the VVPAT

21 The EVM, as earlier observed and we clarify here, means the ballot unit, the control unit and the VVPAT
unit.
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which has been burnt/loaded in the memory. The control unit and
the ballot unit are not subjected to the symbol loading process and
not touched. The burnt/loaded firmware in the control unit and the
ballot unit is and remains candidate and political party agnostic. The
control unit acts and functions as the calculator, computing the total
votes cast on the basis of the number of times the key/button on
the ballot unit are pressed, and the number of times a specific key/
button on the ballot unit is pressed.
37. On the polling date, one and a half hours before the start of polling,
the presiding officer/polling officer takes out the EVMs and conducts
a mock poll of 50 votes. The votes are counted electronically. The
VVPAT paper slips are also counted and tallied with electronic votes.
Each EVM unit is thereupon again sealed with a paper seal of a
different colour. Paper seals are also signed by the candidates or
their representatives.
38. The paper seals used from time to time at different stages have
a serial number. They also have security features and cannot be
replicated. As paper seals are used at different stages, they are
given different colours.
39. The polled EVM22 units are sealed and stored in the strong room in the
presence of the candidates or their representatives. The candidates
or their representatives are also allowed to put their seals on the lock
of the strong room. The strong room is guarded by minimum one
platoon of armed security and has CCTV coverage. The candidates
or their representatives are allowed to stay and watch the strong
room and in case where the entrance to the strong room is not
visible, CCTV display facility is provided.
40. The VVPAT paper slips are in a roll form of 1500 slips. The control
unit can store up to 2000 votes. In view of the restriction on the
number of VVPAT paper slips, each EVM can be used for casting
of up to 1500 votes and not more. The control unit is configured
in a way that each vote would take about 15 seconds. Thus, in
one minute only four votes can be cast. This prevents and checks
bogus voting.

22 The EVM, as earlier observed and we clarify here, means the ballot unit, the control unit and the VVPAT
unit.
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41. As explained earlier and to recapitulate, after each vote is cast by
pressing the button on the ballot unit, the VVPAT glass window
illuminates and the name, serial number, and symbol of the candidate
voted is displayed for 7 seconds to the voter. The display of VVPAT slip
informs and assures the voter that the vote as cast has been recorded.
Thereafter, the VVPAT printer cuts the slip from the roll and the VVPAT
slip drops in the box compartment of the VVPAT. The fall sensor in
the VVPAT printer drop box senses and chronicles the fall of the slip
in the drop box, and thereupon the control unit records the button/
key pressed on the ballot unit. The burnt memory, as noticed above,
which records this data is agnostic to the candidates/political parties.
The control unit records the serial number of the button/key pressed
on the ballot unit by each voter. The presiding officer by pressing the
‘TOTAL’ key on the control unit can ascertain the total number of votes
recorded in the control unit. However, the breakup of votes cast in
favour of each candidate is not known. On the counting day, in the
presence of the candidates/their representatives, the ‘RESULT’ key
on the control unit is pressed. The control unit displays the number
of times each button/key was pressed in the ballot unit on the polling
day, thus depicting the result. EVMs are standalone machines which
cannot be connected to internet. The EVMs do not have any ports so
as to enable a person to have access to the burnt memory.
42. It flows from the above discussion that the possibility to hack or
tamper with the agnostic firmware in the burnt memory to tutor/favour
results is unfounded. Accordingly, the suspicion that the EVMs can
be configured/manipulated for repeated or wrong recording of vote(s)
to favour a particular candidate should be rejected. At this stage we
would refer to other checks and protocols to ensure and ascertain
the legitimacy and integrity of the EVMs and the election process.
43. Part IV, Chapter II of the 1961 Rules, which relates to voting by EVMs,
lays down details of preparation of the voting machine by the returning
officer, arrangements at the polling station, admission to the polling
stations, and preparation of voting machine for poll. The three units
of the EVM have to bear the serial number of the unit, name of the
constituency, serial number and name of the polling station(s), and
the date of poll. Before the commencement of the poll, the presiding
officer has to demonstrate to the polling agent and other persons
present that no vote has already been recorded in the control unit,
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the three units bear the label as prescribed and the drop box of the
VVPAT printer is empty. Paper seal is thereupon used for securing
the control unit. The presiding officer affixes his own signature on
the paper seal and also obtains the signatures of the polling agents
who are desirous of affixing the same. The VVPAT and the ballot
unit are put in the voting compartment and are connected with the
control unit in the manner directed.
44. Before permitting any elector to vote, the polling officer is required
to record the electoral roll number of the elector as mentioned in the
electoral rolls, signature or thumb impression of the elector, name
of the elector and the document produced by the elector in proof
of their identification. These particulars are recorded in Form 17A
prescribed under Rule 49L of the 1961 Rules. The format prescribed
in terms of Form 17A is as under:

Sl.No. Sl.No. of Details of the Signature/ Remarks
elector in document produced Thumb
the electoral by the elector in proof impression
roll of his/her identification of elector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1.
2.
Form 17A is required to be signed by the presiding officer.
45. Every elector is permitted to vote in secrecy in the voting compartment
of the polling station. They are required to press the blue button or
key on the ballot unit against the name and symbol of the candidate/
political party they intend to vote. In terms of the proviso to Rule
49M(3), the elector is entitled to view through the transparent window
of the printer of VVPAT, kept along with the ballot unit inside the
voting compartment, the printed paper slip showing the serial number,
the name and the symbol of the candidate for whom he has voted.
Thereupon, the paper slip gets cut and drops into the drop box
attached to the VVPAT. No elector is permitted to enter the voting
compartment when another voter is inside.
46. Rule 49O deals with the scenario where an elector, even after
entering her/his details in Form 17A and having put signature or
thumb impression thereon, does not vote. The presiding officer is
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then required to make a remark in Form 17A and take the signature
or thumb impression of the elector against such remark.
47. Rule 49M(6) deals with the scenario where the elector who has been
permitted to vote under Rule 49L or Rule 49P refuses, even after the
warning by the presiding officer, to observe the procedure of voting
laid down in Rule 49(M)(3). In such a case, the presiding officer, or
the polling officer under the direction of the presiding officer, shall
not allow such elector to vote. Rule 49M(7) lays down that in such a
scenario, a remark to that effect shall be made against the elector’s
name in Form 17A by the presiding officer under his signature.
48. As per instructions issued by the ECI, the presiding officer is
periodically required to check the total number of votes cast as
recorded in the control unit with the data as recorded in Form 17A.
49. As per Rule 49S, at the close of the poll, the presiding officer is
required to prepare an account of votes recorded in Form 17C. This
is a detailed form, which in Part I, requires the presiding officer to
mention the total number of electors assigned to the polling station,
the total number of voters as entered in the register for voters, that
is, Form 17A, the total number of voters who had decided not to vote
even after recording their details in Form 17A (Rule 49O scenario), and
the total number of voters not allowed to vote (Rule 49M scenario).
The form also requires to give details of the total number of votes
recorded per voting machine. This total number recorded in the voting
machine should tally with the total number of voters entered in Form
17A minus the number of voters deciding not to vote and the number
of voters not allowed to vote. The details of the paper seals supplied
for use, paper seals used, unused paper seals returned to the returning
officer etc. are also recorded and entered after the close of the poll.
50. Under Rule 49S of the 1961 Rules, at the time of close of the poll, the
presiding officer furnishes attested true copy of the account of votes
recorded in Part I of Form 17C to the polling agents of the candidates.
He also retains a receipt of the same from the polling agent.
51. Before start of counting of votes, the serial number of the EVMs
and the paper seals affixed on the EVMs are verified with details
mentioned in Form 17C and are shown to the counting agents. The
total votes displayed by pressing the ‘TOTAL’ button on the control
unit is also tallied with the total votes polled as per Form 17C.
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52. The counting is done in the presence of the polling agents/candidates
by pressing the ‘RESULT’ button on the control unit. The total votes
polled and the total votes polled by each candidate is thereupon
displayed on the display panel.
53. In terms of the directions issued by this Court in N. Chandrababu
Naidu (supra), the VVPAT slips of five polling stations per assembly
constituency/assembly segment of the parliamentary constituency,
are randomly selected and counted. The results are then tallied with
the electronic results of the control unit.
54. It may be relevant here to also refer to Rule 56D of the 1961 Rules,
which reads as under:
“56-D. Scrutiny of paper trail.—(1) Where printer for paper
trail is used, after the entries made in the result sheet are
announced, any candidate, or in his absence, his election
agent or any of his counting agents may apply in writing
to the returning officer to count the printed paper slips in
the drop box of the printer in respect of any polling station
or polling stations.
(2) On such application being made, the returning officer
shall, subject to such general or special guidelines, as
may be issued by the Election Commission, decide the
matter and may allow the application in whole or in part
or may reject in whole, if it appears to him to be frivolous
or unreasonable.
(3) Every decision of the returning officer under sub-rule (2)
shall be in writing and shall contain the reasons therefor.
(4) If the returning officer decides under sub-rule (2) to
allow counting of the paper slips either wholly or in part
or parts, he shall—
(a) do the counting in the manner as may be
directed by the Election Commission;
(b) if there is discrepancy between the votes
displayed on the control unit and the
counting of the paper slips, amend the
result sheet in Form 20 as per the paper
slips count;
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Association For Democratic Reforms v.
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(c) announce the amendments so made by
him; and
(d) complete and sign the result sheet.”
55. Any candidate, or in his absence an election agent or counting agent,
as per the said Rule, can apply in writing to the returning officer to
count the printed paper slips in the drop box in respect of any polling
station(s). The returning officer, subject to any general or special
guidelines issued by the ECI, has to decide the matter and can allow
the application in whole or in part, or may reject the application in
full if it appears to be frivolous or unreasonable. Every decision of
the returning officer is to be in writing and has to contain reasons. If
the returning officer decides to allow counting of paper slips, either
wholly or in part, he has to do so in the manner prescribed in sub-
rule (4) to Rule 56D of the 1961 Rules.
56. As per the ECI guidelines, in case there is any mismatch between
the total number of votes recorded in the control unit and Form 17C
on account of non-clearance of mock poll data or VVPAT slips, in
terms of Rule 56D(4)(b) of the 1961 Rules etc., the printed VVPAT
slips of the respective polling stations are counted and considered
if the winning margin is equal to or less than total votes polled in
such polling stations.
57. At this stage, we would refer to the data on the performance of the
EVMs. More than 118 crore electors have cast their votes since
EVMs have been introduced. In 2019, about 61.4 crore voters had
cast their votes in 10.35 lakh polling stations. 23.3 lakh ballot units,
16.35 lakh control units and 17.40 lakhs VVPAT units were used in
the 2019 General Elections. For the purpose of the 2024 General
Elections, 10.48 lakh polling stations have been established to enable
97 crore registered voters to cast their votes. 21.60 lakh ballot units,
16.80 lakh control units and 17.7 lakh VVPAT units have been made
ready for being used.
58. ECI has conducted random VVPAT verification of 5 polling booths per
assembly segment/constituency for 41,629 EVMs-VVPATs. Further,
more than 4 crore VVPAT slips have been tallied with the electronic
counts of their control units. Not even a single case of mismatch,
(except one which we will refer to subsequently), or wrong recording
of votes has been detected. Returning officers have allowed VVPAT
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slip recounting under Rule 56D in 100 cases since 2017. The VVPAT
slip count matched with the electronic count recorded in the control
unit in all cases.23
59. In the 2019 Lok Sabha Elections, 20,687 VVPAT slips were physically
counted, and except in one case, no discrepancy or mismatch was
noticed.
60. The discrepancy during mandatory verification of VVPAT slips
happened in polling station No. 63, Mydukur Assembly Constituency,
Andhra Pradesh during the 2019 Lok Sabha Elections. On verification,
it was found that the discrepancy had arisen on account of failure
of the presiding officer to delete the mock poll data.24 While it is not
possible to rule out human errors, paragraph 14.5 of Chapter 14 of
the Manual on EVM and VVPATs deals with such situations and lays
down the protocol which is to be followed.
61. During the course of hearing, our attention was drawn to Rule 49MA
which permits an elector to raise a complaint regarding the mismatch
between the name and symbol of the candidate shown on paper slip
generated by the VVPAT and the vote cast on the ballot unit. Such
elector is required to make a written declaration to the presiding
officer. There have been 26 such cases in which the electors have
complained under Rule 49MA. There is not even a single case in
which any mismatch or defect was found.
62. The EVMs have been subjected to test by technical experts committee
from time to time. These committees have approved and did not find
any fault with the EVMs. The M3 EVMs currently in use are designed
by engineers of BHEL and ECIL. These designs are vetted by the
technical experts committee.
63. Our attention was drawn to the query of the Parliamentary Committee
on Government Assurances regarding the data on discrepancy

23 The above figures are updated on the basis of the response given by the ECI to the queries raised by the
Court on 16.04.2024. The figures given in the counter affidavit filed by the ECI are as follows:
38,156 randomly selected VVPATs have been physically counted and they have tallied with the electronic
count of their control unit. Not even a single case of mismatch or transfer of vote meant for candidate A to
candidate B has been detected. Counting of VVPAT slips under Rule 56D has been allowed in 61 cases
but there is not even a single case of mismatch.
24 The said discrepancy was duly rectified in terms of the protocol laid down in the Manual on EVM and
VVPAT.
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between the EVM and VVPAT counts in 2019 Lok Sabha Elections.
Reliance is placed on a news report published in The Wire to submit
that the ECI failed to submit the requisite information and revert back
to the parliamentary committee despite multiple reminders. The ECI
has explained that a reply regarding the said query was sent to the
Parliamentary Committee on 05.07.2019.
64. Reliance was placed on a news report of The Quint to contend that
there were discrepancies in 2019 Lok Sabha Elections, viz. the
electronic votes recorded in the control unit and the total votes polled/
voter turnout. The ECI has explained that the report referred to in
the Quint is with reference to the live voter turnout data uploaded on
the website of the ECI during 2019 Lok Sabha Elections. The voter
turnout data is dynamic in nature and is uploaded by the ECI on real
time approximation by taking inputs from the presiding officers of
the polling stations. Inaccuracies were found in the real-time inputs
given by the presiding officers. However, there was no mismatch of
the data of votes recorded in the EVMs and the data of total votes
recorded in Form 17C. The data in the EVM and Form 17C matched
and accordingly the results were declared in Form 20.
65. On a question being put by the Court, it was stated that a minimum
of 50% of the polling stations are equipped with CCTV cameras. Data
from the CCTV cameras is stored and retained at least for a period
of 45 days from the date of announcement of the polling results.
Similarly, the EVMs are retained in the strong room along with seals
etc. as affixed after counting of the votes. The candidates have the
right to challenge the poll result by filing an election petition within
45 days from the date of election of the returned candidate. The ECI
guidelines/protocol stipulate that confirmation regarding the filing
status of election petitions must be obtained from the relevant High
Courts. If challenge is made, the EVMs are retained in the strong
room along with the seals etc. for a longer period. In cases where
no election petitions are filed, the strongrooms are opened and the
EVMs are shifted to the warehouse.
66. The ECI has also in its counter affidavit stated that the EVMs have
been continuously used in different elections since the year 2000.
The electoral outcome had been divergent, favouring or disfavouring
different political parties. Details of the political parties with maximum
number of seats since 2004 is tabulated as under:
PARTY WITH MAXIMUM NUMBER OF SEATS IN LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY ELECTION SINCE 2004
444

Andhra Pradesh 2004 2009 INC 2014 2019 Meghalaya 2008 INC 2013 INC 2018 INC 2023
INC TDP YSRCP NPEP
Arunachal Pradesh 2004 2009 INC 2014 2019 Mizoram 2008 INC 2013 INC 2018 2023
INC INC BJP MNF ZPM
Assam 2006 2011 INC 2016 2021 Nagaland 2008 2013 NPF 2018 2023
INC BJP BJP NPF NPF NDPP
Bihar 2005 2010 2015 2020 Odisha 2004 BJD 2009 BJD 2014 BJD 2019
RJD JD(U) RJD RJD BJD
Chhattisgarh 2008 2013 BJP 2018 2023 Punjab 2007 2012 SAD 2017 INC 2022
BJP INC BJP SAD AAP
Goa 2007 2012 BJP 2017 2022 Rajasthan 2008 INC 2013 BJP 2018 INC 2023
INC INC BJP BJP
Gujarat 2007 2012 BJP 2017 2022 Sikkim 2004 2009 SDF 2014 2019
BJP BJP BJP SDF SDF SKM
Haryana 2005 2009 INC 2014 2019 Tamil Nadu 2006 2011 2016 2021
INC BJP BJP DMK AIADMK AIADMK DMK
Himachal Pradesh 2007 2012 INC 2017 2022 Telangana 2014 2018 TRS 2023 INC
BJP BJP INC TRS
Jammu & Kashmir 2008 2014 Tripura 2008 2013 2018 BJP 2023
JKNC JKPDP CIP(M) CIP(M) BJP
Jharkhand 2005 2009 BJP 2014 2019 Uttarakhand 2007 BJP 2012 INC 2017 BJP 2022
BJP & JMM BJP JMM BJP
Karnataka 2004 2008 BJP 2013 2018 2023 Uttar Pradesh 2007 2012 SP 2017 BJP 2022
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BJP INC BJP INC BSP BJP
Kerala 2006 2011 2016 2021 West Bengal 2006 2011 TMC 2016 2021
CPI(M) CPI(M) CPI(M) CPI(M) CPI(M) TMC TMC
Madhya Pradesh 2008 2013 BJP 2018 2023 NCT of Delhi 2008 INC 2013 BJP 2015 2020
BJP INC BJP AAP AAP
Maharashtra 2004 2009 INC 2014 2019 Puducherry 2006 INC 2011 AINRC 2016INC 2021
NCP BJP BJP AINRC
Manipur 2007 2012 INC 2017 2022
INC INC BJP
[2024] 5 S.C.R.
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Association For Democratic Reforms v.
Election Commission of India And Another

67. We have referred to the data, after elucidating the mechanics and the
safeguards embedded in the EVMs to check and obviate wrongdoing,
and to evaluate the efficacy and performance of the EVMs. We
acknowledge the right of voters to question the working of EVMs,
which are but an electronic device that has a direct impact on election
results. However, it is also necessary to exercise care and caution
when we raise aspersions on the integrity of the electoral process.
Repeated and persistent doubts and despair, even without supporting
evidence, can have the contrarian impact of creating distrust. This
can reduce citizen participation and confidence in elections, essential
for a healthy and robust democracy. Unfounded challenges may
actually reveal perceptions and predispositions, whereas this Court,
as an arbiter and adjudicator of disputes and challenges, must render
decisions on facts based on evidence and data. This is the reason
why we had re-listed the matters for directions and clarifications on
24.04.2024, when specific points/questions raised were answered
by the ECI. The petitioners were also heard.
68. The counsel for the petitioners, on 24.04.2024, drew our attention
to a Wikipedia article which states that firmware is a software which
provides low-level control of computing device hardware etc. It also
states that programmable firmware memory can be reprogrammed
via a procedure sometimes called flashing. This is stoutly denied by
the officer of the ECI, who states that this would require the EVMs
to be re-engineered by the manufacturers. It is submitted that the
microcontroller used in the EVM has one-time programable memory,
that is, it is unalterable once burned. It is only the VVPAT which has
a flash memory component for the purpose of storing the bitmap
file. To us, it is apparent that a number of safeguards and protocols
with stringent checks have been put in place. Data and figures do
not indicate artifice and deceit. Reprogramming by flashing, even if
we assume is remotely possible, is inhibited by the strict control and
checks put in place and noticed above. Imagination and suppositions
should not lead us to hypothesize a wrong doing without any basis or
facts. The credibility of the ECI and integrity of the electoral process
earned over years cannot be chaffed and over-ridden by baroque
contemplations and speculations.
69. The test for determining the scope of unenumerated rights is based
on tracing them to specific provision of Part III of the Constitution
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or to the core values which the Constitution espouses. While we
acknowledge the fundamental right of voters to ensure their vote
is accurately recorded and counted, the same cannot be equated
with the right to 100% counting of VVPAT slips, or a right to physical
access to the VVPAT slips, which the voter should be permitted to
put in the drop box. These are two separate aspects – the former
is the right itself and the latter is a plea to protect or how to secure
the right. The voters’ right can be protected and safeguarded by
adopting several measures. This Court in Subramanian Swamy
(supra) had directed gradual introduction of VVPATs to guarantee
utmost transparency and integrity in the system. This direction was
made to safeguard the right of the voters to know that the vote
has been correctly recorded in the EVM. The direction has been
implemented. The voter can see the VVPAT slip through the glass
window and this assures the voter that his vote as cast has been
recorded and will be counted. In N. Chandrababu Naidu (supra),
the direction for counting the VVPAT paper trail in 5 EVMs per
assembly constituency or assembly segment in a parliamentary
constituency was issued, primarily as a precautionary measure rather
than a justification or necessity. This decision was aimed at ensuring
the highest level of confidence in the accuracy of election results.
Giving physical access to VVPAT slips to voters is problematic and
impractical. It will lead to misuse, malpractices and disputes. This
is not a case where fundamental right to franchise exists only as
a parchment, rather, the entire electoral process protocol, and the
checks as well as empirical data, ensure its meaningful exercise.
70. VVPAT slip is made of a 9.9 cm x 5.6 cm thermal paper coated with
chemical to ensure print retention for about 5 years. It is very soft
and sticky, which makes the counting process tedious and slow.
The counting process is undertaken through the following steps:
the verification of unique ID of the VVPAT, opening of the VVPAT
drop box, taking out the paper slips, counting the total number of
slips, matching the number of slips with the total votes polled as
per Form 17C, segregation of candidate-wise VVPAT slips, making
candidate-wise bundles of 25 slips and counting of bundles and
leftover slips. There are instances of recounting and reverification of
the slips till the candidate-wise tallying is done. Thus, the counting
process, it is stated, takes about five hours. The counting is done
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 447

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by a team of three officers under CCTV coverage and under direct
supervision of the supervising officer and the ECI observer of the
constituency. Candidates/agents can remain present. We are not
inclined to modify the aforesaid directions to increase the number
of VVPAT undergoing slip count for several reasons. First, it will
increase the time for counting and delay declaration of results. The
manpower required would have to be doubled. Manual counting
is prone to human errors and may lead to deliberate mischief.
Manual intervention in counting can also create multiple charges
of manipulation of results. Further, the data and the results do not
indicate any need to increase the number of VVPAT units subjected
to manual counting.
71. During the course of hearing, it was suggested that instead of
physically counting the VVPAT slips, they can be counted by a
counting machine. This suggestion, including the suggestion that
barcoding of the symbols loaded in the VVPATs may be helpful in
machine counting, may be examined by the ECI. These are technical
aspects, which will require evaluation and study, and hence we would
refrain from making any comment either way.
72. We must reject as foible and unsound the submission to return to the
ballot paper system. The weakness of the ballot paper system is well
known and documented. In the Indian context, keeping in view the
vast size of the Indian electorate of nearly 97 crore, the number of
candidates who contest the elections, the number of polling booths
where voting is held, and the problems faced with ballot papers, we
would be undoing the electoral reforms by directing reintroduction
of the ballot papers. EVMs offer significant advantages. They have
effectively eliminated booth capturing by restricting the rate of vote
casting to 4 votes per minute, thereby prolonging the time needed
and thus check insertion of bogus votes. EVMs have eliminated
invalid votes, which were a major issue with paper ballots and had
often sparked disputes during the counting process. Furthermore,
EVMs reduce paper usage and alleviate logistical challenges. Finally,
they provide administrative convenience by expediting the counting
process and minimizing errors.
73. ECI has been categoric that the glass window on the VVPAT has not
undergone any change. The term used in Rule 49M is ‘transparent
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window’. The tinted glass used on the VVPAT printer is to maintain
secrecy and prevent anyone else from viewing the VVPAT slips. The
voter in the voting compartment who is viewing the glass from the
top can have clear view of the slip for 7 seconds. Marginal tint on the
VVPAT glass window, or the fact that the cutting and dropping of the
slip from the roll in to the drop box of the printer is not visible, does
not violate Rule 49M. The words ‘before such slips get cut’ in the
proviso to Rule 49M(3) indicate and require that the slip should be
cut from the roll after the elector has seen the print through the glass
window. Use of glass window prevents damage, smudging, attempt
to deface or physically access the VVPAT slip. The rule ensures that
the voter is able to see the slip along with the serial number with
name of the candidate and the symbol for whom they have voted.
74. Similarly, we would reject the submission that any elector should be
liberally permitted as a routine to ask for verification of vote. Rule
49MA permits the elector to raise a complaint if she/he is of the
view that the VVPAT paper slip did not depict the correct candidate/
political party she/he voted. However, whenever a challenge is made,
the voting process must be halted. An overly liberal approach could
cause confusion and delay – hindering the election process and
dissuading others from casting their votes.25 ECI has stated that
only 26 such requests in terms of Rule 49MA were received, and in
all cases, the allegation was found to be incorrect.
75. We have conducted an in-detail review of the administrative and
technical safeguards of the EVM mechanism. Our discussion aims
to address the uncertainties and provide assurance regarding
the integrity of the electoral process. A voting mechanism must
uphold and adhere to the principles of security, accountability, and
accuracy. An overcomplex voting system may engender doubt and
uncertainty, thereby easing the chances of manipulation. In our
considered opinion, the EVMs are simple, secure and user-friendly.
The voters, candidates and their representatives, and the officials
of the ECI are aware of the nitty-gritty of the EVM system. They
also check and ensure righteousness and integrity. Moreover, the

25 However, we refrain from making any comments on the application of Section 177 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 449

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Election Commission of India And Another

incorporation of the VVPAT system fortifies the principle of vote
verifiability, thereby enhancing the overall accountability of the
electoral process.
76. Nevertheless, not because we have any doubt, but to only further
strengthen the integrity of the election process, we are inclined to
issue the following directions:
(a) On completion of the symbol loading process in the VVPATs
undertaken on or after 01.05.2024, the symbol loading units
shall be sealed and secured in a container. The candidates or
their representatives shall sign the seal. The sealed containers,
containing the symbol loading units, shall be kept in the strong
room along with the EVMs at least for a period of 45 days post
the declaration of results. They shall be opened, examined and
dealt with as in the case of EVMs.
(b) The burnt memory/microcontroller in 5% of the EVMs, that
is, the control unit, ballot unit and the VVPAT, per assembly
constituency/assembly segment of a parliamentary constituency
shall be checked and verified by the team of engineers from
the manufacturers of the EVMs, post the announcement of
the results, for any tampering or modification, on a written
request made by candidates who are at SI.No.2 or Sl.No.3,
behind the highest polled candidate. Such candidates or their
representatives shall identify the EVMs by the polling station
or serial number. All the candidates and their representatives
shall have an option to remain present at the time of verification.
Such a request should be made within a period of 7 days
from the date of declaration of the result. The District Election
Officer, in consultation with the team of engineers, shall certify
the authenticity/intactness of the burnt memory/ microcontroller
after the verification process is conducted. The actual cost or
expenses for the said verification will be notified by the ECI,
and the candidate making the said request will pay for such
expenses. The expenses will be refunded, in case the EVM is
found to be tampered.
77. The writ petitions and all pending applications, including the
applications for intervention, are disposed of in the above terms.
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Dipankar Datta, J.
1. I have had the privilege of reading the opinion authored by brother
Hon’ble Khanna, J. His Lordship, in my opinion, has dealt with the
legal and techno-legal issues arising in connection with the challenge
to the process of polling of votes through Electronic Voting Machines1
mounted by the writ petitioners and the several intervenors with
unmatchable finesse and admirable clarity. I do not recollect any
previous decision of this Court having explained the working of the
EVMs in such great detail with lucidity and dexterity. The reasons
assigned by His Lordship for negating the challenge, without doubt,
are cogent and valid. The twin directions in the penultimate paragraph,
notwithstanding that the electoral process for constituting the 18th Lok
Sabha is in full swing, are in the nature of forward-looking measures
to strengthen the electoral system by bringing in more transparency.
Such directions do not have the effect of retarding, interrupting,
protracting or stalling the counting of votes, and is a course of action
that seems to be perfectly permissible in the light of the Constitution
Bench decision of this Court in Election Commission of India v
Ashok Kumar2.
2. Though His Lordship’s opinion has my whole-hearted concurrence,
I have thought of penning a few words to express my own views,
keeping in mind the customary challenges that are laid before this
Court whenever an election is reasonably imminent, by way of
emphasis. Hon’ble Khanna, J. and I are speaking through different
judgments, but our voices are not too different.
3. I have heard senior counsel/counsel for the three petitioners suspect,
without however attributing any malice to the Election Commission of
India3 (in which vests the superintendence, direction and control of
elections per Article 324 of the Constitution of India4), the efficacy of
exercise of the right of franchise through the EVMs which, according
to them, are not entirely reliable and open to manipulation, and that
completely tallying the Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail5 slips with

1 EVMs
2 (2000) 8 SCC 216
3 ECI
4 Constitution
5 VVPAT
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the votes cast on the ballot unit is the plausible solution to ensure
a taint-free election. I have also heard counsel for the petitioning
association in the lead matter rely on certain reports to persuade
the Court hold that casting of votes through EVMs is not fool-proof
and that voting through electronic means has been discontinued
by a European nation in compliance with a judicial verdict. He was
also heard to suggest, when called upon by the Court regarding the
nature of relief the petitioning association seeks, that the electoral
process in India should return to the “paper ballot system” upon
discontinuance of voting through the EVMs.
4. I place on record that although such a suggestion was subsequently
withdrawn by counsel in course of the proceedings that ensued
following listing of the writ petitions “For Directions” on 24 April,
2024 to seek clarifications from the ECI on certain points, nothing
much turns on it. The withdrawal was more of an attempt to erase
the impression we, the Judges forming the Bench, were urged to
form by senior counsel for the ECI while arguing that the petitioning
association’s utter lack of bona fides (in invoking this Court’s writ
jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution) is completely exposed
thereby. I have no hesitation to accept the submission of senior
counsel for the ECI that reverting to the “paper ballot system” of the
bygone era, as suggested, reveals the real intention of the petitioning
association to discredit the system of voting through the EVMs and
thereby derail the electoral process that is underway, by creating
unnecessary doubts in the minds of the electorate.
5. It is of immediate relevance to note that in recent years, a trend has
been fast developing of certain vested interest groups endeavouring
to undermine the achievements and accomplishments of the nation,
earned through the hard work and dedication of its sincere workforce.
There seems to be a concerted effort to discredit, diminish, and
weaken the progress of this great nation on every possible frontier.
Any such effort, or rather attempt, has to be nipped in the bud. No
Constitutional court, far less this Court, would allow such attempt
to succeed as long as it (the court) has a say in the matter. I have
serious doubt as regards the bona fides of the petitioning association
when it seeks a reversion to the old order. Irrespective of the fact
that in the past efforts of the petitioning association in bringing about
electoral reforms have borne fruit, the suggestion put forth appeared
inexplicable. Question of reverting to the “paper ballot system”, on
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facts and in the circumstances, does not and cannot arise. It is only
improvements in the EVMs or even a better system that people would
look forward to in the ensuing years.
6. At the same time, one cannot be oblivious that in a society pledged to
uphold the rule of law, none - howsoever high or low – is above the
law. Everyone is subject to the law fully and completely, and authorities
within the meaning of State in Article 12 of the Constitution are no
exception. Concepts of unfettered discretion or unaccountable action
has no place in the matter of governance; hence, neither can the ECI
nor can any other authority claim to possess arbitrary power over
the interests of an individual voter and seek cover from the sunlight
of judicial scrutiny if, indeed, a valid cause is set up for interference.
After all, “let right be done” is also the motto of our nation like any
other civilised State. That the sanctity of the electoral process has
to be secured at any cost has never been in doubt.
7. Conducting elections in India is a difficult task, is an understatement;
rather, it is a humongous task and presents a novel challenge,
not seen elsewhere in the world. India is home to more than 140
crore people and there are 97 crore eligible voters for the 2024
General Elections, which is more than 10% of the world population.
These voters represent the largest electorate in the world. The
Representation of the People Act, 19516 which, to my mind, amidst
the vast legislative landscape of the nation is the most important
enactment after the Constitution of India, is also the most effective
instrument to uphold democratic and republican ideals, which are
the hallmarks of our preambular promise. The RoP Act, which has
established the legal framework for conducting elections, ensures that
each and every citizen has a fair and equal opportunity to exercise
his/her right of vote and to participate in the democratic process for
electing his/her governor. The duties, functions and obligations to be
performed/discharged by the ECI are ordained by the RoP Act, which
are paramount and non-negotiable. Being a complete code in itself,
the RoP Act reinforces the rule of law and upholds the principles of
justice, fairness and transparency. The larger the electorate, greater
are the challenges associated with the elections. As it is, the ECI
has an onerous responsibility to shoulder and there is absolutely no

6 RoP Act
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Election Commission of India And Another

margin for error. Periodical challenges to electoral processes, which
gain momentum particularly when General Elections are imminent,
require the ECI as of necessity to raise robust, valid and effective
defence to spurn such challenges failing which any adverse judgment
by a court is bound to undermine the authority and prestige of the
ECI and bring disrepute to it.
8. The 2024 General Elections, which are proposed to be conducted in
7 (seven) phases and presently underway, will entail an estimated
expenditure of around Rs. 10,00,00,00,00,000 (Rupees One lakh
crore); more than 10 lakh polling booths are required to be setup to
facilitate the voting process. The EVMs are carried to the remotest
areas of this country, occasionally on the backs of horses and
other animals; voting booths have been set up in far-off villages
at the foothills of the Himalayan mountains as well as the delta of
the Sundarbans which are only accessible through boats. These
challenges are unique to India, and the election process has to be
considered in this context.
9. Taking an example, West Bengal is the 13th largest state in terms of
area, spread over 88,752 sq. km. The density of population of the
state is 1028 persons/sq. km. Even a small state like West Bengal is
more densely populated than most European nations. This being the
scenario, any comparison of the nature which was sought to be drawn
on behalf of the petitioning association with a particular European
nation, may not be adequately representative since the demographic
and logistical challenges in the conduct of elections in each country
are unique to it. Also, it was not demonstrated before the Court that
the machines put to use in the electoral system of such nation are
similar and what was said by its court applies ex proprio vigore to India.
10. Electronic voting is not something which is prevalent only in India.
Multiple countries use electronic voting in varying degrees in their
national elections. However, use of EVMs in elections in India are
not without its checks and balances. Reasonable measures to
ensure transparency, such as tallying VVPAT paper trail in 5 EVMs
per assembly constituency or assembly segment in a parliamentary
constituency, are already in place after the decision of this Court in
N. Chandrababu Naidu v. Union of India7. This measure, as has

7 (2019) 15 SCC 377
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been noticed by Hon’ble Khanna, J., was undertaken out of abundant
caution and not as an admission of a flaw in the process.
11. The aforesaid exercise of tallying VVPAT paper trail in 5 EVMs with
votes cast by the electors has not, till date, resulted in any mismatch.
This assertion of the ECI has not been proved to be incorrect by
the petitioners by referring to any credible material or data. So long
no mismatch is detected even after such an exercise, as directed
in N. Chandrababu Naidu (supra), it would defy the sense of logic
and reason of a prudent man to issue a Mandamus to the ECI to
arrange for tallying 100% VVPAT slips on the specious ground of
the petitioners’ apprehension that the EVMs could be manipulated.
12. The petitioning association has relied on the Report titled ‘An inquiry
into India’s Election System: Is the Indian EVM and VVPAT system fit
for democratic elections?’ submitted by the Citizens’ Commission on
Elections8, to emphasize the vulnerabilities of the current electronic
voting system. The CCE Report, on a bare reading, appears to be
the culmination of inputs given by domain experts. For whatever
such report is worth and though counsel claimed that the efficacy
of the voting system through EVMs has been doubted, the CCE
Report itself concludes, inter alia, that no hacking of any EVM has
been detected; what it observes is that there is no guarantee that the
EVMs cannot be hacked. This, in essence captures the underlying
weakness in the petitioning association’s entire case, inasmuch as the
only grounds for the reliefs sought lie in the realm of apprehension
and suspicion. In arguendo, even if the CCE Report is taken on
face value and it is believed that the EVM-VVPAT system can be
hacked, can it be said that there is absence of a redressal mechanism
for the same? Should there be hacking, resulting in violation of a
right of an elector in any manner, and if there be proof adequate
enough to upturn an election result, the law already has in place
a remedy, i.e., an election petition under section 80 of the RoP
Act. Such an election petition can be filed not just by an aggrieved
candidate, but also by a voter, within 45 (forty-five) days from the
date of declaration of the result of election. Since there is already
a remedy in law to allay the fears that have been expressed by
the petitioners, if and when a discrepancy in the results arises, the

8 CCE Report
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 455

Association For Democratic Reforms v.
Election Commission of India And Another

Courts are not powerless to uphold the sanctity of the democratic
process by appropriate intervention.
13. The petitioning association has also attempted to highlight a public
trust deficit with respect to the current voting system by relying
on a survey conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing
Societies – Lokniti, which concluded that a majority of the Indian
population did not trust the EVMs. It is a private report and I find
little reason to trust such a report. Over the years, more and more
voters have participated in the election process. Had the voters any
doubt regarding the efficacy of the EVMs, I wonder whether the voting
percentage would have seen such increase. EVMs have stood the
test of time and the increased voting percentage is sufficient reason
for us to hold that the voters have reposed faith in the current system
and that the report to the contrary, which has been relied on, merits
outright rejection.
14. Next, the petitioners submit that their right to be informed under
Article 19(1)(a) vis-à-vis the electoral process have two facets. First,
a voter has a right to know that the vote is recorded as cast; and,
secondly that the vote as cast is counted. These facets need to be
dealt with separately.
15. A citizen’s right ‘to freedom of speech and expression’ under Article
19(1) is not absolute; the State by virtue of Article 19(2) can place
reasonable restrictions on these rights. There can be no doubt that
the electorate has a right to be informed if the votes, as cast, are
accurately recorded. The dispute, in the present writ proceedings,
centres around the modality of delivering the information. The
petitioners have characterised the present procedure, wherein the
voter after pressing the ‘blue button’ and casting his/her vote can see
his VVPAT slip for 7 seconds through an illuminated glass window, as
inadequate for the voter to verify if his/her vote, as cast, is recorded.
16. To buttress their submission, the petitioners have relied on the proviso
to Rule 49M (3) of the Conduct of Election Rules, 19619. The petitioners
urge that the ECI is not following the statutory mandate provided in
the Election Rules. I am ad idem with the interpretation of the relevant
rule placed by Hon’ble Khanna, J. The ordainment of Rule 49M (3) is

9 Election Rules
456 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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that the VVPAT slip should be momentarily visible to the voter; and it
is not the requirement of the rule that the VVPAT slip or its copy has
to be handed over to the voter. Recording of the vote cast signifying
the choice of the voter and its projection on the VVPAT slip, albeit for
7 (seven) seconds, is fulfilment of the voter’s right of being informed
that his/her vote has been duly recorded. In my considered view, as
long as there is no allegation of statutory breach, there can be no
substitution of the Court’s view for the view of the ECI that the light in
the VVPAT would be on for 7 (seven) seconds and not more.
17. We now address the second facet of the argument based on the right
guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) – the voter’s right to know that his/her
vote, as recorded, has been counted. To deal with this contention,
a question comes to my mind – did this right not exist when the
“paper ballot system”, which the petitioning association wishes to
be reverted to, was in vogue? Then, voters would simply drop their
paper ballots into a box, for it to be safely ferried away to the counting
stations, whereafter the same were counted by election officials far
away from the voter’s scrutiny, with no way of knowing whether the
vote cast by the voter was indeed counted or had not fallen victim
to human error and missed from being counted. In the present far
more technologically advanced system of the EVM – VVPAT, every
voter who enters the polling booth has his/her name recorded, along
with an affixation of signature in the Register of Voters maintained
by the Presiding Officer, as provided by Form 17A of the Election
Rules. Thereafter, the voter presses the desired button on the ballot
unit to cast his/her vote, sees a visual confirmation of the same on
the transparent VVPAT screen and hears a loud beep. At the end
of the voting process, the Presiding Officer is required to record in
Form 17C, not just the total number of voters as per the Register
of Voters, but also the total number of votes recorded per voting
machine as well as those staying away from the voting process
despite affixing signature on the register. The total votes polled as
per Form 17C is then again tallied with the total votes recorded
by the control unit. Rule 56D(4) also provides that if there is any
mismatch between these two totals, the printed VVPAT slips of the
polling station would be counted. Furthermore, if a voter is aggrieved
by a mismatch in the candidate voted for in the ballot unit vis-a-vis
that recorded in the VVAPT, Rule 49M allows the voter to approach
the Presiding Officer. Upon the conclusion of polling, there exists yet
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 457

Association For Democratic Reforms v.
Election Commission of India And Another

another remedy under Rule 56-D, for a candidate to apply for a count
of the VVPAT slips, should any discrepancy be suspected. Thus, it
is manifest that there is in place a stringent system of checks and
balances, to prevent any possibility of a miscount of votes, and for
the voter to know that his/her vote has been counted. There can be
no doubt that such a system, which is distinctly more satisfactory
compared to the system of the yester-years, suitably satisfies the
voter’s right under Article 19(1)(a) to know that his/her vote has been
counted as recorded.
18. The Republic has prided itself in conducting free and fair elections for
the past 70 years, the credit wherefor can largely be attributed to the
ECI and the trust reposed in it by the public. While rational scepticism
of the status quo is desirable in a healthy democracy, this Court
cannot allow the entire process of the underway General Elections
to be called into question and upended on mere apprehension and
speculation of the petitioners. The petitioners have neither been able
to demonstrate how the use of EVMs in elections violates the principle
of free and fair elections; nor have they been able to establish a
fundamental right to 100% VVPAT slips tallying with the votes cast.
19. In view of the foregoing discussion, the petitioners’ apprehensions
are misplaced. Reverting to the paper ballot system, rejecting
inevitable march of technological advancement, and burdening the
ECI with the onerous task of 100% VVPAT slips tallying would be a
folly when the challenges faced in conducting the elections are of
such gargantuan scale.
20. There are two other ancillary issues, to add to the issues already
covered in detail by Hon’ble Khanna, J.
21. The first is the very issue of maintainability of writ petitions of the
nature presented before us. Should mere suspicion of infringement of
a right be considered adequate ground to invoke the writ jurisdiction?
In my opinion, the answer should be ‘NO’.
22. A writ petition ought not to be entertained if the plea is based on
the mere suspicion that a right could be infringed. Suspicion that a
right could be infringed and a real threat of infringement of a right
are distinct and different.
23. To succeed in a claim under Article 32 or 226, one must demonstrate
either mala fide, or arbitrariness, or breach of a law in the impugned
458 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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State action. Though a writ of right, it is not a writ of course. The
writ jurisdiction under Article 32/226 of the Constitution of India
being special and extraordinary, it should not be exercised casually
or lightly on the mere asking of a litigant based on suspicions and
conjectures, unless there is credible/trustworthy material on record to
suggest that adverse action affecting a right is reasonably imminent
or there is a real threat to the rule of law being abrogated. It must
be shown, at least prima facie, that there is a real potential threat to
a right, which is guaranteed by law to the person concerned.
24. I am not oblivious of two decisions rendered by this Court on the
aforesaid issue.
25. A Constitution Bench of this Court in D.A.V. College, Bhatinda v.
State of Punjab10 held thus:
“5. […] a petition under Article 32 in which petitioners make
out a prima facie case that their fundamental rights are
either threatened or violated will be entertained by this
Court and that it is not necessary for any person who
considers himself to be aggrieved to wait till the actual
threat has taken place.”
26. In Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam v. State of Tamil Nadu11
a Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of this Court held:
“12. […] The institution of a writ proceeding need not await
actual prejudice and adverse effect and consequence. An
apprehension of such harm, if the same is well founded,
can furnish a cause of action for moving the Court.”
27. While a writ petition may be instituted, if there is a genuine and
looming threat of a right being trampled upon, what is, however, clear
from the aforesaid decisions is that such threat or apprehension has
to be well founded and cannot be based merely on assumptions and
presumptions as is found in the present set of writ petitions.
28. The mere suspicion that there may be a mismatch in votes cast
through EVMs, thereby giving rise to a demand for a 100% VVPAT
slips verification, is not a sufficient ground for the present set of

10 [1971] Supp. 1 SCR 677 : (1971) 2 SCC 261
11 [2015] 11 SCR 1110 : (2016) 2 SCC 725
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 459

Association For Democratic Reforms v.
Election Commission of India And Another

writ petitions to be considered maintainable. To maintain these writ
petitions, it ought to have been shown that there exists a tangible
threat of infringement; however, that has also not been substantiated.
Thus, without any evidence of malice, arbitrariness, breach of law, or
a genuine threat to invasion of rights, the writ petitions could have
been dismissed as not maintainable. But, considering the seriousness
of the concerns that the Court suo motu had expressed to which
responses were received from the official of the ECI as well as its
senior counsel, the necessity was felt to issue the twin directions in
the greater public interest and to sub-serve the demands of justice.
29. Finally, I wish to touch upon one other issue of importance.
30. It is pertinent to reiterate that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable
to writ petitions under Article 32 and Article 226 as well. The inclusion
of the term “public right” in Explanation VI of Section 11 of the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908 aims to avoid redundant legal disputes
concerning public rights. Given this clarification, there is no room for
debate regarding the application of Section 11 to matters of public
interest litigation presented through writ petitions.
31. In Daryao and others v. State of U.P. and others12, a Constitution
Bench of this Court emphasized that the rule of res judicata is founded
on significant public policy considerations rather than being a mere
technicality. It was clarified that petitioners seeking to challenge a
decision must present new grounds distinct from those previously
raised in order to escape the bar of res judicata. The Bench articulated
this as follows:
“31. […] We are satisfied that a change in the form of attack
against the impugned statute would make no difference
to the true legal position that the writ petition in the High
Court and the present writ petition are directed against the
same statute and the grounds raised by the petitioner in
that behalf are substantially the same.”
32. Another Constitution Bench of this Court in Direct Recruit Class II
Engineering Officers’ Association. v. State of Maharashtra and
others13 followed the aforesaid dictum to hold that the principles

12 [1962] 1 SCR 574 : AIR 1961 SC 1457
13 [1990] 2 SCR 900 : (1990) 2 SCC 715
460 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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of res judicata are not foreign to writ petitions. A reference may be
made to the following paragraph:
35. […] It is well established that the principles of res judicata
are applicable to writ petitions. The relief prayed for on behalf of
the petitioner in the present case is the same as he would have,
in the event of his success, obtained in the earlier writ petition
before the High Court. The petitioner in reply contended that
since the special leave petition before this Court was dismissed
in limine without giving any reason, the order cannot be relied
upon for a plea of res judicata. The answer is that it is not the
order of this Court dismissing the special leave petition which is
being relied upon; the plea of res judicata has been pressed on
the basis of the High Court’s judgment which became final after
the dismissal of the special leave petition. In similar situation
a Constitution Bench of this Court in Daryao v. State of U.P.
[(1962) 1 SCR 574 : AIR 1961 SC 1457] held that where the
High Court dismisses a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution after hearing the matter on the merits, a subsequent
petition in the Supreme Court under Article 32 on the same
facts and for the same reliefs filed by the same parties will
be barred by the general principle of res judicata. The binding
character of judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction is in
essence a part of the rule of law on which the administration
of justice, so much emphasised by the Constitution, is founded
and a judgment of the High Court under Article 226 passed after
a hearing on the merits must bind the parties till set aside in
appeal as provided by the Constitution and cannot be permitted
to be circumvented by a petition under Article 32. An attempted
change in the form of the petition or the grounds cannot be
allowed to defeat the plea […]”.
33. No doubt, res judicata bars parties from re-litigating issues that have
been conclusively settled. It is true that this principle is not rigid in
cases of substantial public interest and Constitutional Courts are
empowered to adopt a flexible approach in such cases, acknowledging
their far-reaching public interest ramifications.
34. However, this standard is applicable only when substantial evidence
is presented to validate the irreversible harm or detriment to the public
good resulting from the action impugned. The Court must come to
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 461

Association For Democratic Reforms v.
Election Commission of India And Another

the conclusion that the petition is not just an old wine in a new bottle,
but rather raises substantial grounds not previously addressed in
litigation. Only under these circumstances may it consider such a
petition; otherwise, it is within its authority to dismiss it at the threshold.
35. This issue at hand of doubting the efficacy of the EVMs has been
previously raised before this Court and it is imperative that such
issue is concluded definitively now. Going forward, unless substantial
evidence is presented against the EVMs, the current system will have
to persist with enhancements. Regressive measures to revert to
paper ballots or any alternative to the EVMs that does not adequately
safeguard the interests of Indian citizens have to be eschewed.
36. I also wish to observe that while maintaining a balanced perspective
is crucial in evaluating systems or institutions, blindly distrusting
any aspect of the system can breed unwarranted scepticism and
impede progress. Instead, a critical yet constructive approach,
guided by evidence and reason, should be followed to make room
for meaningful improvements and to ensure the system’s credibility
and effectiveness.
37. Be it the citizens, the judiciary, the elected representatives, or even the
electoral machinery, democracy is all about striving to build harmony
and trust between all its pillars through open dialogue, transparency
in processes, and continuous improvement of the system by active
participation in democratic practices. Our approach should be guided
by evidence and reason to allow space for meaningful improvements.
By nurturing a culture of trust and collaboration, we can strengthen
the foundations of our democracy and ensure that the voices and
choices of all citizens are valued and respected. With each pillar
fortified, our democracy stands robust and resilient.
38. I conclude with the hope and trust that the system in vogue shall
not fail the electorate and the mandate of the voting public shall be
truly reflected in the votes cast and counted.

Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case:
Writ petitions disposed of.