Holding

Cognizance of the offences under IPC s.353 and s.186 was illegal because the complaint was not filed before a Judicial Magistrate and the FIR did not disclose the ingredients of s.353, warranting quashing of the proceedings.

Summary

The appellant, B.N. John, owned a hostel for underprivileged children and alleged that officials raided it illegally on 3 June 2015, falsely accusing him of assaulting them. An FIR was lodged under IPC s.353, and a charge‑sheet later added s.186, leading the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) to take cognizance and issue summons. The appellant sought quashing of the proceedings, arguing that no written complaint by a public servant was filed as required by CrPC s.195 for s.186, and that the FIR did not disclose any assault or criminal force needed for s.353. The Supreme Court held that the complaint was addressed to an executive magistrate, not a judicial magistrate, violating s.195, and that the FIR lacked the essential ingredients of s.353, rendering the cognizance illegal. Consequently, the Court quashed the criminal proceedings and set aside the High Court’s order.

Issues considered

The validity of taking cognizance of an offence under IPC s.186 without a prior written complaint by a public servant as mandated by CrPC s.195(1).
Whether the FIR disclosed the requisite elements of IPC s.353 to justify cognizance by the CJM.
Whether the complaint filed to a City Magistrate qualifies as a complaint under CrPC s.195, which requires a Judicial Magistrate.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 155, s. 156, s. 195, s. 2(d), s. 350, s. 351
Constitution of India
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 186, s. 353
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
Right to Information Act, 2005

Subjects

Section 353 of IPCSection 186 of IPCSection 155 of CrPCSection 195 of CrPCCognizable offenceNon-cognizable offencePublic servantAssaultCriminal ForceDisturbanceJudicial MagistrateExecutive MagistrateNature of offenceSpecific acts

Judgment

[2025] 1 S.C.R. 12 : 2025 INSC 4

B.N. John
v.
State of U.P. & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 50 of 2025)
02 January 2025
[B.V. Nagarathna and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Appellant herein has sought quashing of criminal proceedings
arising under sections 353 and 186 of IPC.

Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – s.353 and s.186 – According to the
appellant, he is the owner of a hostel used for underprivileged
children – Appellant alleges that the officials illegally conducted
the raid on 03.06.2015 and sought to transfer the children
accommodated in the said hostel to some other location –
Appellant also contended that a false allegation was made
against him that he, along with his party, had attacked and
assaulted the officials while they were conducting the raid –
Pursuant to which, an FIR was lodged against the appellant
and his wife u/s.353 IPC – Subsequently, on completion of
the investigation, charge-sheet was filed alleging commission
of offences u/ss.353 and 186 of the IPC – The appellant has
sought quashing of the said criminal proceedings:
Held: A bare perusal of s.195 (1) of the CrPC clearly indicates
that there is a bar on the court to take cognizance of any offence
punishable u/ss.172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the IPC except on a
complaint in writing made by the concerned public servant to the
court – The State has made a feeble attempt to show that there was
indeed a complaint filed by the District Probation Officer to the City
Magistrate, Varanasi, on 03.06.2015, alleging that the appellants
and his party were creating obstructions to the officials – A careful
examination of the aforesaid letter, however, would reveal that
the said letter in the form of complaint is addressed to the City
Magistrate and not to any Judicial Magistrate – A complaint within

* Author
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 13

B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.

the meaning and scope of the Criminal Procedure Code would
mean such a complaint filed before a Judicial Magistrate and not an
Executive Magistrate – The complaint which is required to be filed
u/s.195 (1) of the CrPC, can only be before a Judicial Magistrate
and not an Executive Magistrate who does not have the power to
take cognizance of an offence or try such cases – In the instant
case, since the complaint was filed before the City Magistrate and
not before a Judicial Magistrate, the requirement of s.195 (1) of the
CrPC was not fulfilled – Under such circumstances, the appellant
has been able to make out a case that taking cognizance of the
offence u/s. 186 of the IPC by the Court of CJM, Varanasi, was
illegal, as before taking such cognizance it was to be preceded by
a complaint in writing by a public servant as required u/s.195(1)
of the CrPC – As far as taking cognizance of the offence u/s.353
of the IPC is concerned, in the FIR there is no allegation of use
of criminal force or assault by the appellant so as to invoke the
provision of s.353 of the IPC – The ingredients of offence u/s. 353
of the IPC are clearly absent in the FIR – Since no ingredient for the
offence u/s.353 of the IPC is found in the FIR, taking cognizance
by the CJM of an offence that is not made out in the FIR does not
appear to be correct – Nothing was mentioned in the complaint/
FIR of any specific acts apart from alleging that the appellant
and his party were creating disturbance – If “disturbance” has to
be construed as “assault” or “criminal force” without there being
specific acts attributed to make such “disturbance” as “assault”
or “criminal face” within the scope of s.353 of the IPC, it would
amount to abuse of the process of law – Also, the contents of the
statements recorded later u/s. 161 of the CrPC clearly appears
to be an afterthought and the allegation of assault/attack was
introduced later on, which is inconsistent with the contents of the
original FIR – Thus, the appellant has been able to make out the
case for quashing the criminal proceedings pending against him.
[Paras 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 33, 34, 42]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.155 – Specific bar on
police to investigate non-cognizable offence:
Held: Section 155 (2) of the CrPC provides that when information
is given to an officer in charge of a police station of the commission
within the limits of such station of a non-cognizable offence, he
shall enter or cause to be entered the substance of the information
in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State
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Government may prescribe in this behalf, and refer the informant
to the Magistrate – Section 155(2) of the CrPC further provides that
no police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the
order of a Magistrate having power to try such a case or commit
the case for trial – Thus, there is a specific bar on the police to
investigate any such non-cognizable offence, without the order of
a Magistrate. [Para 11]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.155 – s.155 refers to a
Judicial Magistrate or Executive Magistrate:
Held: Since the Magistrate referred to u/s.155 under Chapter XII
of the CrPC refers to a Magistrate who has the power to try
such case or commit the case for trial and thus exercises judicial
function, he has to be a Judicial Magistrate – Further, u/s.195 (1)
of the CrPC r/w.s.2 (d) of the CrPC, the complaint, has to be filed
before the court taking cognizance, and the complaint which is
required to be filed u/s.195 (1) of the CrPC, can only be before
a Judicial Magistrate and not an Executive Magistrate who does
not have the power to take cognizance of an offence or try such
cases.[Para 19]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – FIR must disclose nature
of offence:
Held: A criminal process is initiated only with the lodging of
an FIR – Though FIR is not supposed to be an encyclopedia
containing all the detailed facts of the incident and it is merely
a document that triggers and sets into motion the criminal legal
process, yet it must disclose the nature of the offence alleged to
have been committed as otherwise, it would be susceptible to
being quashed. [Para 25]

Case Law Cited
State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors. [1992] Supp. 3 SCR
735 : 1992 Supp. 1 SCC 335; Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P. [1982]
1 SCR 1077 : (1982) 1 SCC 71; CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh [2003]
3 SCR 485 : (2003) 6 SCC 175 – relied on.
State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar [2011] 15 SCR 540 :
(2011) 14 SCC 770; R P Kapoor v. State of Punjab [1960] 3 SCR
388 : AIR 1960 SC 866; State of Bihar v. PP Sharma [1991] 2
SCR 1 : 1992 SCC (Cr) 192; Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 15

B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.

Mohd. Saraful Haq and another [2004] Supp. 5 SCR 790 : 2005
SCC(Cr) 283 – referred to.

List of Acts
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Right
to Information Act, 2005; Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973; Constitution of India.

List of Keywords
Section 353 of IPC; Section 186 of IPC; Section 155 of CrPC;
Section 195 of CrPC; Cognizable offence; Non-cognizable offence;
Public servant; Assault; Criminal Force; Disturbance; Public
servant; Obstructing public servant; Judicial Magistrate; Executive
Magistrate; Nature of offence; Specific acts.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
50 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.09.2023 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in A482 No. 35311 of 2023

Appearances for Parties
Sidharth Luthra, Sr. Adv., Anmol Kheta, Mrs. Tanya Srivastava,
Ms. Anshala Verma, Monu Kumar, Suraj Mishra, Ayush Anand,
K.S. Jaggi, Advs. for the Petitioner.
Ajay Kumar Mishra, AG/Sr. Adv., Garvesh Kabra, Ajay Singh,
Avanish Deshpande, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.

Leave granted.
2. The present appeal has been preferred being aggrieved by the
judgment dated 22.09.2023 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
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(‘CrPC’ for short) in Application No. 35311 of 2023 by which the
appellant’s plea for quashing of the chargesheet No.162 of 2015
dated 20.06.2015, order dated 11.08.2015 taking cognizance
and issuing summons, and the entire proceedings in Case No.
9790 of 2015 arising out of Case Crime No. 290 of 2015 under
Sections 353 and 186 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’ for short),
P.S. Cantt. District Varanasi, U.P., was rejected.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3. It is the plea of the appellant that he is the owner of the premises
and was in charge of managing & maintaining the hostel, which
was being operated by a Non-Governmental Organization, named
Sampoorna Development India. This hostel at the relevant time
was used for underprivileged children by providing facilities for their
accommodation, education and other needs.
3.1 According to the appellant, because of certain personal disputes
with one K.V. Abraham, the latter instituted six false cases
against him, four of them resulted in his acquittal, while in the
other two discharge applications are pending. According to the
appellant, it was at the instance of the said Abraham that the
officials conducted a raid in the said hostel arbitrarily without
authorization and also without providing any prior notice, alleging
that provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015 (‘JJ Act’ for short) as applicable then, were
not followed in running and managing the said hostel.
3.2 It is the allegation of the appellant that the officials illegally
conducted the raid on 03.06.2015 and sought to transfer
the children accommodated in the said hostel to some other
location purportedly on the ground that the hostel was being
run without proper authorization from the competent authority
under the JJ Act.
3.3. It was further contended that a false allegation was made
against the appellant that he, along with his party, had attacked
and assaulted the officials while they were conducting the raid
in connection with which an FIR came to be lodged against
the appellant and his wife, which was registered as FIR No.
290 of 2015 dated 03.06.2015 at the PS Cantt. District, Varanasi
under Section 353 of the IPC.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 17

B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.

3.4. On the basis of the said FIR, the appellant was arrested on
08.06.2015. However, he was granted bail on the same day.
Subsequently, on completion of the investigation, charge-sheet
was filed before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Varanasi
in connection with the said FIR on 20.06.2015 alleging
commission of offences under Sections 353 and 186 of the IPC.
3.5. Pursuant to the filing of the chargesheet, the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Varanasi took cognizance and issued summons to
the appellant vide order dated 11.08.2015, against which the
appellant submitted an application for recalling the said order,
which is pending before the Court of CJM, Varanasi.
3.6. According to the appellant, a complaint alleging commission of
an offence under Section 186 of the IPC would be maintainable
only ifit is preceded by a complaint filed by a public servant
as mentioned under Section 195 (1)(a) of the CrPC before the
court/Magistrate, but there was no such prior complaint filed
by any public servant before the Magistrate.
Further, though the FIR was filed under Section 353 of the IPC,
there were no ingredients to make out a case under the said
section. It is also the case of the appellant that the authorities
had maliciously invoked the penal provision of Section 353 of the
IPC in the FIR merely to make out a cognizable offence against
the appellant to enable the Magistrate to take cognizance, even
though there was no case of any assault or use of criminal force
by the appellant to deter any public servant from discharging
his duty. Hence, taking cognizance of the said FIR by the CJM,
Varanasi under Section 353 of the IPC was unwarranted and
illegal.
3.7 Accordingly, the appellant approached the Allahabad High Court
invoking jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking
quashing of the aforesaid proceedings, that is, Crime Case
No. 290 of 2015 pending before the CJM, Varanasi and orders
taking cognizance and issuing summons in that regard.
3.8 The Allahabad High Court on perusal of the FIR No.290/15 and
the statement of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the
CrPC held that a prima facie case has been made out against
the appellant for being summoned and for prosecution under
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the aforesaid Sections 353 and 186 of the IPC and declined
his plea for quashing the aforesaid criminal case which was
pending before the CJM, Varanasi.
3.9 While dismissing the petition filed by the appellant, the Allahabad
High Court referred to an earlier decision of the High Court
in rejecting the application filed by the co-accused seeking
quashing of the aforesaid proceedings under Section 482 of
the CrPC which was affirmed by this Court on 13.04.2017 by
dismissing the SLP in limine.
In the present impugned order, the High Court observed that
the allegations against the present appellant and co-accused
are same as well as the evidence collected against them and
since the plea of quashing the charge sheet and cognizance
taken against the said co-accused had already been rejected on
merits by the High Court, which was not disturbed by this Court,
no interference was warranted for quashing the proceedings
under Section 482 of the CrPC, filed by the present appellant and
dismissed the petition. Accordingly, the appellant is before us.

SUBMISSION OF THE APPELLANT
4. It is the specific plea of the appellant that cognizance in respect of
an offence under Section 186 of the IPC can be taken by the court
only after a complaint is made in writing by the public servant to
the court as provided under Section 195 (1) of the Cr.P.C. It has
been submitted that in the present case no such written complaint
was filed by any public official as also ascertained by him from the
concerned authority through an application filed to the competent
authority under the Right to Information Act, 2005, whereby he was
informed that no written complaint was filed before the court by any
public servant in connection with Case No. 9790 of 2015 (State Vs
B.N. John and Anr.).
4.1 Further, for invoking the provision of Section 353 of the IPC
there must be a clear allegation of assault or criminal force by
the accused for preventing the public servant from discharging
his duty. However, a careful reading of the FIR would indicate
that no such allegation was made against the appellant of
using criminal force or assault and accordingly, even if the
allegations made in the FIR are taken at their face value, it
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 19

B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.

does not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence
as contemplated under Section 353 of the IPC.
4.2 Accordingly, it has been submitted that taking cognizance by the
CJM, Varanasi, of the aforesaid case under the stated facts and
circumstances is quite illegal and perverse in law, as such, the
same ought to have been quashed by the Allahabad High Court.
It was contended that the Allahabad High Court, however, had
misdirected itself by observing that a prima facie case is made
out on the basis of the contents of the FIR and the statement
of the witnesses recorded under Section 161 CrPC.
4.3 It has also been contended that the Allahabad High Court in
the present case ought not to have taken into consideration the
order passed in respect of the other co-accused, as the legal
issues as highlighted in this appeal, were not considered by the
Allahabad High Court while rejecting the plea of the co-accused
for quashing the complaint. As such, the said decision cannot
be used against the present appellant.

PLEA OF THE RESPONDENT
5. Per contra, it has been submitted on behalf of the State that the
decision rendered by the Allahabad High Court is in consonance
with the law and no grievance can be made as the High Court had
applied the relevant law to the facts of the present case.
Further, it has also been submitted that this Court must be very slow
in interfering with a reasoned order passed by the High Court, and
the impugned order cannot be said to be perverse, illegal, or without
any jurisdiction. It was contended that merely because a different
view could have been taken by the High Court, it does not render
the decision of the High Court illegal, warranting interference from
this Court, and the High Court passed the order after going through
the records.

ANALYSIS
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
7. As far as quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more
or less well settled as regards to the principles to be applied by the
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court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in
State of Haryana Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors., 1992 Supp. (1)
SCC 335 wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles
under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the
following words:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined
and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at
their face value and accepted in their entirety do
not prima facie constitute any offence or make out
a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR
do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)
of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support
of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 21

B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.

without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated
under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the
basis of which no prudent person can ever reach
a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/
or where there is a specific provision in the Code or
the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
(emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clauses no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of
relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made
in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken
at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then
the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by police officer without an order dated by
the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC,
and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act
under which the criminal proceedings is instituted, such proceeding
can be quashed.
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9. Our criminal justice system, rooted in the rule of law, contemplates
different approaches for dealing with serious and non-serious offences.
When complaints pertaining to serious offences are filed, which are
generally categorized as cognizable offences under the CrPC, the
police, on receiving such information of the commission of a cognizable
offence can immediately start the investigation as contemplated
under Section 156 of the CrPC. On the other hand, when it relates to
non-serious offences which are generally categorized as non-
cognizable offences, the law is more circumspect in letting the full
force of the criminal justice system operate. When it is related to
non-cognizable offence there are certain safeguards put in place so
that the invasive, intrusive, and coercive power of the police is not
immediately brought into operation, as enabled under Section 156 of
the CrPC. In such a situation any complaint alleging commission of
non-serious offence(s) or non-cognizable offence(s) made before the
police, has to be vetted by a legally trained person in the presence of
a Judicial Magistrate before the police can initiate the investigation.
Thus, even if the police receives any such complaint relating to
non-cognizable offence, the police cannot start investigation without
there being a green signal from the Magistrate. Further, when such
non- cognizable offence(s) pertaining to officials who are obstructed
from discharging their official duties, there is the additional safeguard
before the Magistrate which permits the investigating authority to
investigate. It must be preceded by a complaint filed by a public
servant before the court/Magistrate. This is to ensure that only genuine
complaints relating to non-serious offences or non-cognizable offences
are entertained by the Magistrate. This is so for the reason that in a
democracy, interactions of the citizen with the public servants is more
frequent in wherein there may be instances where the members of
the public cause obstruction to public servants preventing them from
discharging public duties properly.
With these safeguards, the fine balance between the liberties of
the citizens and the imperatives of the State endowed with coercive
authority to maintain law and order is preserved.
10. Keeping the aforesaid principles and aspects in mind, we shall proceed
to examine the issues and contentions of the parties before us.
11. Chapter XII of the CrPC deals with information given to the police
and their powers to investigate.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 23

B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.

Section 155 (2) of the CrPC provides that when information is given
to an officer in charge of a police station of the commission within
the limits of such station of a non-cognizable offence, he shall enter
or cause to be entered the substance of the information in a book to
be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may
prescribe in this behalf, and refer the informant to the Magistrate.
Section 155(2) of the CrPC further provides that no police officer shall
investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate
having power to try such a case or commit the case for trial.
Relevant portions of Section 155 of the CrPC reads as under:
“155. Information as to non-cognizable cases and
investigation of such cases.—
(1) When information is given to an officer in charge of
a police station of the commission within the limits of
such station of a non-cognizable offence, he shall enter
or cause to be entered the substance of the information
in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the
State Government may prescribe in this behalf, and refer
the informant to the Magistrate.
(2) No police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable
case without the order of a Magistrate having power to
try such case or commit the case for trial.
...........................................................................................
............................................................................................”
Thus, there is a specific bar on the police to investigate any such
non-cognizable offence, without the order of a Magistrate.
12. However, no such bar has been placed when it relates to a cognizable
offence as provided under Sections 154 and 156 of the CrPC, under
which, any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order
of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case that a court having
jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would
have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XII,
as reproduced herein below:
“154. Information in cognizable cases.—(1) Every
information relating to the commission of a cognizable
offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police
station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his
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direction, and be read over to the informant; and every
such information, whether given in writing or reduced to
writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it,
and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be
kept by such officer in such form as the State Government
may prescribe in this behalf:
Provided that if .................................................................”
“156. Police officer’s power to investigate cognizable
case.—(1) Any officer in charge of a police station
may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any
cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the
local area within the limits of such station would have power
to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.
(2) ........................................................................................
............................................................................................”
13. While Section 155 of the CrPC deals with all non-cognizable offences,
where the police cannot investigate without a prior order of the
Magistrate, Section 195 of the CrPC provides additional conditions
under which the Magistrates can take cognizance in respect of certain
kinds of non-cognizable offences as mentioned in the said section,
which includes Section 186 of the IPC with which we are directly
concerned, only after a written complaint is filed by the concerned
public servant to the court/Magistrate.
Relevant portions of Section 195 of the CrPC read as follows:
“195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of
public servants, for offences against public justice and
for offences relating to documents given in evidence.
(1) No Court shall take cognizance—
(a) (i) of any offence punishable under sections
172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal
Code, (45 of 1860), or
(ii) of any abetment of, or attempt to commit,
such offence, or
(iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit such
offence,
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 25

B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.

except on the complaint in writing of the public servant
concerned or of some other public servant to whom
he is administratively subordinate;
.................................................................................
.................................................................................”
14. Since, the appellant has been charged for committing offences
under Sections 186 and 353 of the IPC, it may be appropriate to
reproduce the same.
Section 186 of the IPC reads as follows:
“186. Obstructing public servant in discharge of public
functions.—Whoever voluntarily obstructs any public
servant in the discharge of his public functions, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to three months, or with fine which may
extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.
Section 353 of the IPC reads as follows:
“353. Assault or criminal force to deter public servant
from discharge of his duty.—Whoever assaults or uses
criminal force to any person being a public servant in
the execution of his duty as such public servant, or with
intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging
his duty as such public servant, or in consequence of
anything done or attempted to be done by such person
to the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine,
or with both.”
15. A bare perusal of Section 195 (1) of the CrPC clearly indicates
that there is a bar on the court to take cognizance of any offence
punishable under Section 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the IPC except
on a complaint in writing made by the concerned public servant to
the court. Therefore, if it is found as contended by the appellant
that in respect of the offence under Section 186 of theIPC against
him,no such complaint was filed by the concerned public servant
as contemplated under Section 195 (1)(a) CrPC, the CJM could not
have taken cognizance of the offence under Section 186 of the IPC.
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In this regard, the appellant has specifically pleaded to which there
is no rebuttal from the State that no such complaint was made in
writing by a public servant as required under Section 195(1) of the
CrPC relating to the commission of offence by the appellant under
Section 186 of the IPC.
16. The State has, however, made a feeble attempt to show that there
was indeed a complaint filed by the District Probation Officer to the
City Magistrate, Varanasi, on 03.06.2015, alleging that the appellants
and his party were creating obstructions to the officials in the process
of sending the minor children residing in the institution run illegally
by Sampoorn Development India to other approved institutions and
requested the City Magistrate to take cognizance of the same and
take legal action.
The aforesaid complaint reads as follows:
“To,
City magistrate
Varanasi
Sir,
By your order dated June 3, 2015, letter no. 1346,
Mr B.N. John, Ms Susan John and their people are creating
obstruction in the process of sending the minor children
residing in the non-legal institution run by the Sampoorna
Development Trust to other Institutions legally. Please take
cognizance of this and take further legal action.
Sincerely
Prabhat Ranjan
03/06/2013
District Probation Officer.
Station Head Cantt/CO Cantt.
S/O is creating obstruction in important work necessary
action.”
17. A careful examination of the aforesaid letter, however, would reveal
the following crucial aspect.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 27

B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.

The said letter in the form of complaint is addressed to the City
Magistrate and not to any Judicial Magistrate. As to what is a
complaint is defined under Section 2 (d) of the CrPC which reads
as follows:
“2. Definitions.—In this Code, unless the context otherwise
requires,
(a) ……………………………
(b) ……………………………
(c) ……………………. ……..
(d) “complaint” means any allegation made orally or in
writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action
under this Code, that some person, whether known or
unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include
a police report.
Thus, a complaint within the meaning and scope of the Criminal
Procedure Code would mean such a complaint filed before a Judicial
Magistrate and not an Executive Magistrate.
18. As regards the difference between a Judicial Magistrate and an
Executive Magistrate, it has been clarified by this Court in Gulam
Abbas v. State of U.P. (1982) 1 SCC 71 as follows:
“24. Turning to the 1973 Code itself the scheme of
separating Judicial Magistrates from Executive Magistrates
with allocation of judicial functions to the former and the
executive or administrative functions to the latter, as we
shall presently indicate, has been implemented in the
Code to a great extent. Section 6 provides that there
shall be in every State four classes of criminal courts,
namely, (i) Courts of Session, (ii) Judicial Magistrates of
the First class and, in any metropolitan area, Metropolitan
Magistrates;(iii) Judicial Magistrates of the Second
Class; and (iv) Executive Magistrates; Sections 8 to 19
provide inter alia for declaration of metropolitan area,
establishment of Courts of Session, Courts of Judicial
Magistrates, Courts of Metropolitan Magistrates and
appointments of Sessions Judges, Additional Sessions
Judges, Assistant Sessions Judges, Chief Judicial
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Magistrates, Judicial Magistrates, Chief Metropolitan
Magistrates and Metropolitan Magistrates together with
inter se subordination, but all appointments being required
to be made by the High Court, while Sections 20, 21, 22
and 23 deal with appointments of District Magistrates,
Additional District Magistrates, Executive Magistrates, Sub-
Divisional Magistrates and Special Executive Magistrates
and their respective jurisdictions in every district and
metropolitan area together with inter se subordination,
but appointments being made by the State Government.
Chapter III comprising Sections 26 to 35 clearly shows that
Executive Magistrates are totally excluded from conferment
of powers to punish, which are conferred on Judicial
Magistrates; this shows that if any one were to commit a
breach of any order passed by an Executive Magistrate
in exercise of his administrative or executive function he
will have to be challenged or prosecuted before a Judicial
Magistrate to receive punishment on conviction. Further,
if certain sections of the present Code are compared with
the equivalent sections in the old Code it will appear clear
that a separation between judicial functions and executive
or administrative functions has been achieved by assigning
substantially the former to the Judicial Magistrates and the
latter to the Executive Magistrates. For example, the power
under Section 106 to release a person on conviction of
certain types of offences by obtaining from him security
by way of execution of bond for keeping peace and good
behaviour for a period not exceeding three years — a
judicial function is now exclusively entrusted to a Judicial
Magistrate whereas under Section 106 of the old Code
such power could be exercised by a Presidency Magistrate,
a District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate; but the
power to direct the execution of a similar bond by way
of security for keeping peace in other cases where such
a person is likely to commit breach of peace or disturb
the public tranquillity — an executive function of police
to maintain law and order and public peace which was
conferred on a Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate,
etc. under the old Section 107 is now assigned exclusively
to the Executive Magistrate under the present Section
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 29

B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.

107; Chapter X of the new Code deals with the topic of
maintenance of public order and tranquillity and in that
Chapter Sections 129 to 132 deal with unlawful assemblies
and dispersal thereof, Sections 133 to 143 deal with public
nuisance and abatement or removal thereof, Section 144
deals with urgent cases of nuisance and apprehended
danger to public tranquillity and Sections 145 to 148 deal
with disputes as to immovable properties likely to cause
breach of peace — all being in the nature of executive
(“police”) functions, powers in that behalf have been
vested exclusively in Executive Magistrates whereas under
equivalent provisions under the old Code such powers
were conferred indiscriminately on any Magistrate, whether
Judicial or Executive. In particular it may be stated that
whereas under the old Section 144 the power to take
action in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger
to public tranquillity had been conferred on “a District
Magistrate, a Chief Presidency Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional
Magistrate or any other Magistrate, specially empowered by
the State Government”, under the present Section 144 the
power has been conferred on “a District Magistrate, a Sub-
Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate
specially empowered by the State Government in that
behalf”. Having regard to such implementation of the
concept of separation of judicial functions from executive
or administrative functions and allocation of the former to
the Judicial Magistrates and the latter to the Executive
Magistrates under the Code of 1973, it will be difficult to
accept the contention of the counsel for Respondents 5
and 6 that the order passed by a District Magistrate, Sub-
Divisional Magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate
under the present Section 144 is a judicial or quasi-
judicial order, the function thereunder being essentially
an executive (police) function. ………………………….”
19. Since the Magistrate referred to under Section 155 under Chapter
XII of the CrPC refers to a Magistrate who has the power to try such
case or commit the case for trial and thus exercises judicial function,
he has to be a Judicial Magistrate. Further, under Section 195 (1) of
the CrPC read with Section 2 (d) of the CrPC, the complaint, has to
be filed before the court taking cognizance, and the complaint which
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is required to be filed under Section 195 (1) of the CrPC, can only
be before a Judicial Magistrate and not an Executive Magistrate
who does not have the power to take cognizance of an offence or
try such cases.
20. In the present case, since the complaint was filed before the City
Magistrate and not before a Judicial Magistrate, the requirement of
Section 195 (1) of the CrPC was not fulfilled.
21. Under such circumstances, we are satisfied that the appellant has
been able to make out a case that taking cognizance of the offence
under Section 186 of the IPC by the Court of CJM, Varanasi, was
illegal, as before taking such cognizance it was to be preceded
by a complaint in writing by a public servant as required under
Section 195(1) of the CrPC. A written complaint by a public servant
before the court takes cognizance is sine qua non, absence of which
would vitiate such cognizance being taken for any offence punishable
under Section 186 of the IPC.
22. This leads us to the next consideration as to whether taking
cognizance of the offence under Section 353 of the IPC by the CJM,
Varanasi, was in order or not.
23. For a prohibited act to come within the scope of the offence under
Section 353 of the IPC, such an act must qualify either as an assault
or criminal force meant to deter public servant from discharge of his
duty. Obviously, such an act cannot be a mere act of obstruction which
is an offence under Section 186 of the IPC. The offence contemplated
under Section 353 of the IPC is of a more serious nature involving
criminal force, or assault which attracts more stringent punishment
that may extend to two years. On the other hand, the offence of
obstruction covered under Section 186 of the IPC is punishable by
imprisonment, which may extend to three months at the maximum.
A close examination of Section 353 of the IPC would indicate that
to invoke the aforesaid offence, there must be use of criminal force
or assault on any public servant in the execution of his official
duty or with the intent to prevent or deter such public servant from
discharging his duty. It would be clear from a reading of the provisions
of Section 186 as well as Section 353 of the IPC that Section 353
of the IPC is the aggravated form of offence where criminal force
or assault is involved. Unlike in the case of Section 186 of the IPC
where voluntarily obstructing any public servant in discharge of his
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 31

B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.

official function is sufficient to invoke the said section, in the case
of offence under Section 353 of the IPC as mentioned above, not
only obstruction but actual use of criminal force or assault on the
public servant is necessary.
24. In the present case, however, what can be seen from a perusal of
the contents of the FIR, is that no such allegation of assault or use
of criminal force has been made. The aforesaid FIR is based on the
complaint filed by the District Probation Officer, which has already
been quoted above, and the same has been reproduced verbatim
in the said FIR in which only the allegation of creating disturbance
has been made.
25. In the FIR there is no allegation of use of criminal force or assault
by the appellant so as to invoke the provision of Section 353 of the
IPC. It is to be remembered that a criminal process is initiated only
with the lodging of an FIR. Though FIR is not supposed to be an
encyclopedia containing all the detailed facts of the incident and it
is merely a document that triggers and sets into motion the criminal
legal process, yet it must disclose the nature of the offence alleged
to have been committed as otherwise, it would be susceptible to
being quashed as held in Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) (vide clause 1
of Para 102 of the decision).
This Court in CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh (2003) 6 SCC 175 observed
as follows:
“20. It is well settled that a first information report is not an
encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details
relating to the offence reported. An informant may lodge
a report about the commission of an offence though he
may not know the name of the victim or his assailant. He
may not even know how the occurrence took place. A first
informant need not necessarily be an eyewitness so as to
be able to disclose in great detail all aspects of the offence
committed. What is of significance is that the information
given must disclose the commission of a cognizable
offence and the information so lodged must provide a
basis for the police officer to suspect the commission of a
cognizable offence. At this stage it is enough if the police
officer on the basis of the information given suspects the
commission of a cognizable offence, and not that he must
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be convinced or satisfied that a cognizable offence has
been committed. If he has reasons to suspect, on the
basis of information received, that a cognizable offence
may have been committed, he is bound to record the
information and conduct an investigation. At this stage it
is also not necessary for him to satisfy himself about the
truthfulness of the information………………………”
(emphasis added)
26. However, a perusal of the FIR in issue does not at all indicate the
commission of any crime of use of criminal force or assault by the
appellant to the public servant, except for the offence of obstruction
which is punishable under Section 186 of the IPC. As such the
ingredients of offence under Section 353 of the IPC are clearly absent
in the FIR. To that extent, we are in agreement with the appellant that
since no ingredient for the offence under Section 353 of the IPC is
found in the FIR, taking cognizance by the CJM of an offence that
is not made out in the FIR does not appear to be correct.
27. The High Court, however, has held that on a perusal of the contents
of the FIR and the statement made by the witnesses recorded under
Section 161 of the CrPC, it can be said that a prima facie case has
been made out against the appellant for commission of offences
under Section 353 and Section 186 of the IPC. It is to be noted that
the FIR was filed under Section 353 of the IPC without mentioning
Section 186 of the IPC.
What is to be noted in the present case is that if the appellant had
actually used criminal force or had assaulted the public servants,
which would bring the said acts within the scope of Section 353 of the
IPC, nothing prevented the complainant from mentioning the same
in the FIR being the first information. If such vital and crucial facts
are missing from the FIR of which the complainant was fully aware
of and was already cognizant of, which he could have mentioned at
the first instance, it would indicate that any subsequent mentioning of
these facts in the case by the complainant would be an afterthought
as has happened in the present case. The alleged fact of assault,
or use of criminal force by the appellant could not be said to have
been discovered at a later point of time, as these offensive acts,
if really had happened, would have happened before the filing of
the FIR/complaint and thus should have found mention in the FIR.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 33

B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.

These acts were not something that had happened at a later point
of time, but would have been known to the complainant had these
happened when the complainant and official party were raiding the
hostel managed by the appellant. Thus, the absence of mentioning
these alleged acts which would constitute ingredients of the offence
under Section 353 of the IPC, renders the FIR legally untenable
as far as the offence under Section 353 of the IPC is concerned.
We do not see any reason why the complainant failed to mention
in the FIR the alleged use of criminal force or assault of the public
servants to prevent them from discharging their official duties when
they were raiding the premises.
28. It appears from the impugned order of the High Court that the
High Court also perused the statements of the witnesses recorded
under Section 161 of the CrPC during the investigation. We have
also gone through these statements made by Sh. Prabhat Ranjan,
District Probation Officer; Sh. Satyendra Nath Shukla, City Magistrate;
Sh. Vindhavasini Rai, Addl. District Magistrate; and Sh. Surendra
Dutt Singh, ACM-IV.
What is interesting to note is that Sri Prabhat Ranjan, the District
Probation Officer, Varanasi, who filed the complaint to the City
Magistrate stated in his statement recorded under Section 161 of
the CrPC that the people in the hostel premises attacked the official
team, and thereafter, the FIR was lodged. However, when the FIR
was lodged soon after the alleged incident of attack on the officials,
nothing was mentioned in the complaint filed by him about the attack,
which was the basis for registering the FIR, which we are unable
to comprehend. If indeed there was an attack as alleged, it should
have found mention in the FIR or the written complaint filed before
the City Magistrate soon after the incident.
29. We have also perused the statement of Sri Satyendra Nath Shukla,
the City Magistrate who in his statement recorded under Section 161
of the CrPC on 20.06.2015, stated that the people in the hostel
premises “were creating obstruction in the government work in
the proceeding being carried out. In such a situation, when asked
to submit the records again, the husband, wife and some other
people along with them became aggressive by speaking loudly,
due to which, while somehow trying to escape, around 5:30 pm,
the husband, the wife and others created a difficult situation by
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obstructing the work, which did not allow the rescue to be completed
successfully. After this some children were rescued by the Women
District Program Officer with the help of the District Horticulture
officer, and the children were sent to Ramnagar, after which they
were freed. Then when we asked for the record, Ben John spoke
loudly, and his wife and other children got very angry and seemed
to be intent on becoming forceful. After this, the District Probation
Officer came to me with an application regarding obstruction and
assault in government work, on which I passed the order and the
SHO Cantt registered a case.”
On examination of the said statement of the City Magistrate, we are
of the view that even if the said statement is taken at its face value,
it does not disclose any ingredient of criminal force or assault to
make the offence under Section 353 of the IPC, except for making a
bald statement that they were aggressive without disclosing in what
manner the officials were obstructed or attacked.
30. We have also gone through the statement made by Sri Surendra
Dutt Singh, ACM, 4th District. While he mentions that the appellant
and others became aggressive and attacked all the officers, nothing
has been mentioned as to how they were attacked, but only a very
generalized allegation has been made without specifics.
Similarly, the other witnesses also stated the same effect.
31. We do not see any reason why the aforesaid alleged assault or attack
was not mentioned in the FIR since soon after the alleged incident
happened in the hostel premises, the FIR was lodged. On the other
hand, the written complaint to the City Magistrate only uses the
expression of “creating obstruction” by stating that “Mr. B.N.John, Ms.
Susan John and their people are creating obstruction in the process
of sending the minor children residing in the non-legal institution run
by the Sampoorna Development Trust to other institutions legally.
Please take cognizance of this and take further legal action”.
32. There can be no doubt that there is a sea of difference between
“creating disturbance” and the “assault” and “criminal force” terms
mentioned under Section 353 of the IPC and defined under
Sections 350 and 351 of the IPC respectively.
“Criminal force” has been defined under Section 350 IPC, which
reads as follows:
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 35

B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.

“350. Criminal force. —Whoever intentionally uses force
to any person, without that person’s consent, in order to
the committing of any offence, or intending by the use of
such force to cause, or knowing it to be likely that by the
use of such force he will cause injury, fear or annoyance
to the person to whom the force is used, is said to use
criminal force to that other.”
“Assault” has been defined under Section 351 of the IPC which
reads as follows:
“351. Assault. —Whoever makes any gesture, or any
preparation intending or knowing it to be likely that such
gesture or preparation will cause any person present to
apprehend that he who makes that gesture or preparation
is about to use criminal force to that person, is said to
commit an assault.
Explanation.—Mere words do not amount to
an assault. But the words which a person uses
may give to his gestures or preparation such
a meaning as may make those gestures or
preparations amount to an assault.”
33. If “disturbance” has to be construed as “assault” or “criminal force”
without there being specific acts attributed to make such “disturbance”
as “assault” or “criminal face” within the scope of Section 353 of
the IPC, it would amount to abuse of the process of law. While
“disturbance” could also be caused by use of criminal force or
assault, unless there are specific allegations with specific acts to
that effect, mere allegation of “creating disturbance” cannot mean
use of “criminal force” or “assault” within the scope of Section 353
of the IPC.
34. As noted and discussed above, nothing was mentioned in the
complaint/FIR of any specific acts apart from alleging that the
appellant and his party were creating disturbance. Nothing has been
mentioned how disturbance was created because of assault or use
of criminal force.
Thus, the contents of the statements recorded later under Section 161
of the CrPC clearly appears to be an afterthought and the allegation
of assault/attack was introduced later on, which is inconsistent with
the contents of the original FIR.
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35. Under the circumstances, we are of the view that non mentioning of
these vital facts in the FIR/first complaint,which would indicate assault
or criminal force within the scope of Section 353 of the IPC, would
vitiate the cognizance taken by the CJM. These vital facts, which
constitute the ingredients for offence under Section 353 of the IPC,
were not revealed in the FIR. On the other hand, the contents of the
FIR would reveal the commission of only non-cognizable offence of
obstructing the discharge of official duties of public servants, which
would fall within the scope of Section 186 of the IPC, in which event,
without the order of the Judicial Magistrate, no investigation could have
been launched by the police against the appellant in the said FIR.
It is also to be noted that in the said FIR, Section 186 of the IPC
was not even mentioned. We have already found that no complaint
was lodged by a public servant against the appellant and his party
before the Magistrate/court alleging commission of offence under
Section 186 of the IPC as required under Section 195 (1) of the
CrPC read with Section 155 of the CrPC. The written complaint filed
by the District Probation Officer was not to a Judicial Magistrate but
to an Executive Magistrate, hence was not valid. The police could
not have investigated the said offence under Section 186 of the
IPC. Thus, the very act of taking cognizance at the initial stage by
the CJM, Varanasi, on the basis of the FIR under Section 353 of
the IPC, which does not disclose the ingredients and commission
of cognizable offence under Section 353 of the IPC,appears to
be contrary to law. If the initial process is vitiated, the subsequent
process would also stand vitiated.
In State of Punjab vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar (2011) 14 SCC
770, it was held as follows:
“107. It is a settled legal proposition that if initial action is not
in consonance with law, all subsequent and consequential
proceedings would fall through for the reason that illegality
strikes at the root of the order. In such a fact situation,
the legal maxim sublato fundamento cadit opus meaning
thereby that foundation being removed, structure/work
falls, comes into play and applies on all scores in the
present case.
108. In Badrinath v. Govt. of T.N. [(2000) 8 SCC 395 : 2001
SCC (L&S) 13 : AIR 2000 SC 3243] and State of Kerala
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 37

B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.

v. Puthenkavu N.S.S. Karayogam [(2001) 10 SCC 191]
this Court observed that once the basis of a proceeding
is gone, all consequential acts, actions, orders would fall
to the ground automatically and this principle is applicable
to judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings
equally.”
36. What is evident from the records is that the police entertained the
FIR under Section 353 of the IPC and investigated the same by
conferring jurisdiction upon itself as if it was a cognizable offence
as provided under Section 156 of the CrPC, when commission of
any cognizable offence was not made out in the FIR, which is not
permissible in law. The police added Section 186 of the IPC later, and
the CJM, Varanasi, took cognizance of the offence of Section 186 of
the IPC along with Section 353 of the IPC when no complaint was
made by any public servant to the CJM or any court as required
under Section 195 (1) of the CrPC.
37. We are mindful of the position that where, during the investigation
of a cognizable or non-cognizable offence on the basis of an FIR
lodged, new facts emerge that will constitute the commission of a
non-cognizable offence under IPC, in which event, the police can
continue with the investigation of the non-cognizable offence of which
there cannot be any dispute.
Thus, even if it is assumed that in the course of the investigation
of a cognizable offence, the ingredients of a non-cognizable
offence are discovered then the police could have continued the
investigation without the written complaint to the court or the order
of the court in respect of such non-cognizable offence, as it would
also be deemed to be a cognizable offence under Section 155(4)
of the CrPC, but where the investigation of the cognizable office
itself suffers from legal infirmity and without jurisdiction from the
initial stage, the entire investigation would be vitiated. For this
reason, the police cannot seek the shield under Section 155 (4)
of the CrPC when the FIR did not disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence.
38. As discussed above, the offence allegedly committed by the appellant
as disclosed in the FIR can, at best, be that of a non-cognizable
offence under Section 186 of the IPC, though Section 186 of the IPC
is not even mentioned in the FIR. It is evident that Section 186 of
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the IPC was added subsequently, of which the CJM took cognizance
later. The FIR does indicate that a letter was written by the District
Probation Officer to the City Magistrate, but the said letter pertains
to the filing of the FIR under Section 353 of the IPC and not for
offence under Section 186 of the IPC. Further, the said letter dated
03.06.2015 was not addressed to the CJM, Varanasi, before whom
such a written complaint was supposed to be made to enable the
Court totake cognizance of the offence under Section 186 of the IPC.
39. We have also perused the order dated 13.10.2015 passed by the
High Court in the earlier case filed by Mrs. Susan John, the co-
accused, wherein the High Court declined to quash the charge sheet
No. 162 of 2015 dated 20.6.2015 in the same Case Crime No. 290
of 2015 pending before the Court of CJM, Varanasi, on the ground
that perusal of the material on record and looking into the facts of
the case at that stage, it cannot be said that no offence is made out
against the applicant, and all the submissions made at the Bar relate
to the disputed questions of fact, which cannot be adjudicated by
the court under Section 482 of the CrPC, and at that stage only the
prime facie case is to be seen in the light of the law laid down by this
Court in the cases of R P Kapoor vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1960
SC 866; State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (supra); State of Bihar
vs. PP Sharma, 1992 SCC (Cr) 192 ; and Zandu Pharmaceutical
Works Ltd. vs. Mohd. Saraful Haq and another, 2005 SCC(Cr) 283.
40. However, it is noticed that the High Court did not examine any of the
issues as discussed above in this appeal. The said decision of the
High Court was not interfered with by this Court, and the SLP filed
against the said order dated 13.10.2015 was dismissed in limine
by this Court.
This Court has reiterated that in limine dismissal of a Special Leave
Petition at the threshold without giving any detailed reasons does
not constitute any declaration of law or a binding precedent under
Article 141 of the Constitution. In State of Punjab vs. Davinder Pal
Singh Bhullar (2011) 14 SCC 770, it was held as follows:
“113. A large number of judicial pronouncements made
by this Court leave no manner of doubt that the dismissal
of the special leave petition in limine does not mean that
the reasoning of the judgment of the High Court against
which the special leave petition had been filed before this
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 39

B.N. John v. State of U.P. & Anr.

Court stands affirmed or the judgment and order impugned
merges with such order of this Court on dismissal of the
petition. It simply means that this Court did not consider
the case worth examining for a reason, which may be other
than the merit of the case. An order rejecting the special
leave petition at the threshold without detailed reasons,
therefore, does not constitute any declaration of law or a
binding precedent.”
We are, thus, of the view that said decision of the High Court and
dismissal in limine by this Court will not come in the way of disposal
of this appeal on merits.
41. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that taking cognizance
by the CJM, Varanasi, of the offences under Section 353 of the
IPC and 186 of the IPC was not done by following the due process
contemplated under the provisions of law, and accordingly, the same
being contrary to law, all the orders passed pursuant thereto cannot
be sustained and would warrant interference from this Court.
42. For the reasons discussed above, we are satisfied that the appellant
has been able to make out the case for quashing the criminal
proceedings pending against the appellant before the CJM, Varanasi.
43. Accordingly, we allow this appeal by quashing Case No. 9790 of
2015 arising out of Case Crime No. 290 of 2015 under Sections 353
and 186 of the IPC, under P.S. Cantt, District Varanasi, pending
before the Court of the CJM, Varanasi, and the consequent orders
passed by the CJM, Varanasi in taking cognizance and issuing
summon to the appellant.
Consequently, the impugned order dated 22.09.2023 passed by the
Allahabad High Court in Application Under Section 482 No. 35311
of 2023 is also set aside.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan