Supreme Court of India

BALARAM PRASAD AGRAWALversusSTATE OF BIHAR & ORS.

Citation: 1996 INSC 1456
Decided: 10 December 1996
Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
Bench: G N RAY

Holding

The prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the offence of cruelty under Sec. 498‑A, and the accused were convicted accordingly.

Summary

The appellant, father of Kiran Devi, alleged that his daughter was subjected to continuous cruelty by her husband, mother‑in‑law and brother‑in‑law, culminating in her suicide by jumping into a well. The trial court acquitted the accused of murder (Sec. 302) and the High Court upheld that acquittal. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the prosecution had proved the offence of cruelty under Sec. 498‑A, considering the admissibility of hostile witness testimony, hearsay, and presumptions under Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act. The Court held that the evidence, including the father's testimony, corroborated by hostile witnesses and the presumption of continued cruelty, established the accused's culpability for driving the victim to suicide. It also affirmed that under Article 142 the Court could directly decide the liability under Sec. 498‑A without remand. Consequently, the accused were convicted under Sec. 498‑A, and the appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

The admissibility of hostile witness testimony and hearsay in proving cruelty under Sec. 498‑A.
Whether the burden of proof under Sec. 106 of the Evidence Act shifts to the accused for facts within their special knowledge.
The applicability of the presumption of continuity of cruelty under Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act.
The power of the Supreme Court under Article 142 to determine culpability for Sec. 498‑A without ordering a retrial.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 216, s. 222
Constitution of Indias. 142
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 106, s. 114, s. 32, s. 60, s. 8
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120, s. 302, s. 34, s. 498

Subjects

Section 498-Acrueltydowryhearsayhostile witnessSection 106Section 114Article 142circumstantial evidencesuicideburden of proof

Judgment

A BALARAM PRASAD AGRAWAL
v
STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. ••
DECEMBER 10, 1996

B [G.N. RAY AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.]

Evidence Act, 1872 : Section 60.

Hem~ay-Admissibility of-Testimony of witness on basis of informa-
C tion of anotherpeiwn-17ze said infonnant was also examined-Witness also
approached police and lodged FIR based on that information-lnfonnant
turned hostile at trial-Held : even if such infonnation was 1uled out as
hearsay still it remained admissible as conduct of witness who approached
police and lodged FIR on basis of that infonnation-77zis pan of evidence of
· · hostile witness would not be hit by mle of exclusion of hearsay evidence.
D
Section 8-Conduct-Hearsay evidence was admissible if it explained
conduct of witness.

Section 106-Proving of fact-Burden of-Within personal and special
knowledge of accused-Death of housewife in well in courtyard of house of
E her in-laws-When incident took place only deceased and accused were
present in house-Wilful conduct of cme/ty of accused against deceased
spread over years established-Held: burden initially on prosecution to prove
case beyond reasonable doubt-But once that burden was discharged it was
for accused to prove that happened on fateful night which resulted in her
F death since this fact was within personal and special knowledge of ac-
cused-77zis burden not discharged by accused.

Section 32-Death of housewife in welf-Father deposed about what
deceased told him earlier about her sufferings at the hands of accused-Heid.·
such an evidence admissible under S.32.
G
Section 114--Death of housewife in a well-I/I-treatment of deceased
by her husband and in-laws spread over years established-Held: in the
circumstances of the case, it could be presumed that such ill-treatment
continued till she was forced to commit suicide.

H Penal Code, 1860: Section 498-A.
752
RP.AGRAWAL v. STATE 753

Circumstantial evidence-Death of housewife in ~et/ in courtyard of A
house of her in-laws-/11-treatment of deceased by her husband and in-laws
for not bringing sufficient dowry and also for not giving birth to children
establishe~Such ill-treatment continued despite giving birth to two
children-Husband also contemplated to remarry-Deceased earlier t1ied to
commit suicide by jumping in same well but saved by neighbours-When B
incident took place only deceased and accused were present in house-Sound
of qua1Tel and weeping of deceased heard by neighbours-Held: the cir-
cumstances clinchingly established culpability of accuse~eath by accident
ruled out.

Constitution of India, 1950 : Article 142. c
Power of Supreme Court to examine the culpability of the accused
instead of remanding case for retrial-Accused charge-sheeted under Ss.498-
A, 302 and 120-B-But trial court framed charge only under S.302 !PC-Ac-
cused acquitted-Evidence on record clearly attracted charge under S.498-A
Held : in the circumstances of the case, Supreme Court could itself examine D
question of culpability of accused for offence under S.498-A so as to obviate
protraction of trial and multiplicity of proceedings against accuse~ode of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 Ss.216, 222.

Criminal Trial : E
Witness-Hostile witness-Held : evidence of hostile witness could be
relied upon to the extent it co1Toborated prosecution version.

The respondents-accused were acquitted of the charges under Sec·
tiou 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by the F
Additional Judicial Commissioner. This finding was upheld by the High
Court. Hence this appeal by the appellant· original complainant.

According to the prosecution, the deceased was married to respon·
dent No. 2. Even after five to six years of her marriage as no child was G
born respondent No. 3 wanted his younger brother, respondent No. 2, to
marry some other girl by killing the deceased. After the treatment of the
deceased by her father, the appellant-original complainant, she gave birth
to two sons. Despite the aforesaid events the cruelty meted out to the
deceased did not stop. The accused persons persisted in demanding dowry
and as the deceased did not fulfil their requirement the accused started H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A beating her physically and used to torture her causing danger to her life.
Being tired of the torture meted out to her she had earlier tried to jump
in a well about four years ago but was saved by her neighbours.

It was the further case of the prosecution that on the fateful night
B the deceased fell in the well situated in the backyard of the house of her
in-laws which was occupied by all the three accused along with her. On the
next day respondent No. 2 informed the appellant that the deceased had
died after falling in the well. Thereupon the appellant went to the house of
the in- law of the deceased where he found the dead body of the deceased
lying near the well. Some time later the appellant visited the house of the
C accused in order to meet his grandson. At that time he was informed by
the neighbours that on the previous night of the date of occurrence there
was quarrel in the house of the accused and they had heard the crying and
weeping of the deceased and that the deceased was being assaulted by her
in-laws. On this information the appellant lodged a First Information
D Report. After investigation a charge-sheet under Sections 498-A, 120-B and
302 read with Section 34 IPC against the respondents-accused was s•Jb·
mitted and the trial court framed chargesheet under Section 302 read with
Section 34 of the IPC.

In the appeal before this Court on behalf of the appellant it was
E contended that the deceased had suffered a consistent course of cruel
conduct on the part of the accused; that the deceased had earlier tried to
commit suicide by jumping in the same well but she was saved by her
neighbours; that the accused were torturing her and treating her with
extreme cruelty; that under these circumstances though there was no clear
F evidence against the accused regarding their overt act of throwing her in
the well on that fateful night yet she was forced to commit suicide because .
of the cruelty meted out to her by the accused; that the evidence of the
appellant relying upon what the neighbours told him as corroborated by
the evidence of the investigating officer clearly established the lesser
G charge against the accused under Section 498-A of the IPC; that what was
deposed by the appellant would not remain in the realm of hearsay
evidence as the neighbours had been examined as witness; that even though
the police had chargesheeted the accused under Section 498-A the Trial
-.
Court had wrongly failed to frame this alternative charge against the
accused; and that either the matter be remanded for fresh trial or this
H Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India could go into the
8.P. AGRAWAL v. STAIB 755

evidence and take a decision regarding the culpability of the respondent- A
accused for the offence under Section 498-A, !PC.

On behalf of the respondents-accused it was contended that the
evidence on record did mil connect the accused with the offence under
Section 498-A, IPC; that the neighbours who were examined as prosecution
witnesses had turned hostile and did not support the prosecution case; B
that what the a)lpellant had deposed about the information gathered by
him from the neighbours was purely hearsay; that the drowing of the
deceased in the well was a sheer accident and that even if the deceased bad
committed suicide the respondents were not responsible for the said
suicide. c
Allowing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1.1. Even if the nature of information alleged to be conveyed
to the father of the deceased by the neighbours about what was actually
heard by them on the fateful night may be ruled out as hearsay, the fact D
that some information was conveyed to him by the neighbours which
prompted him to rush to police as he entertained grave doubt on the basis
of what was conveyed to him by neighbours about the conduct of the ac- '
cosed on that night and which made him apprehend about their culpabmty
in connection with unnatural death of his daughter, would remain admis-
sible in evidence as the conduct of this witness propelled by the fact of such E
information by neighbours about what the witness did on that day and not
earlier by approaching police. This part of the evidence of the witness would
not be hit by the rule of exclusion of hearsay evidence. [769-F-H; 770-A-B]

Bhugdomal Gangaram & Ors. v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1983) SC 906 F
and J.D. Jain v. The Management of State Bank of India & Anr., AIR (1982) ·
SC 673, relied on.

Subramanian v. Public Prosecutor, (1958) WLR 965, cited.

1.2. On the fateful night apart from the victim only the accused were G
in the house. Thus what happened on that night and what led to the
deceased falling in the well would be wholly within the personal and special
knowledge of the accused. But they kept mum on this aspect. It is of course
true that bnrden is on the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable
doubt. But once the prosecuti~n is found to have shown that the accused
were guilty of persistent conduct of cruelty qua the deceased spread over H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A years as is well established from the unshaken testimony of the father of the
deceased girl, the facts which were in the personal knowledge of the accused
who were present in the house on that fateful night could have been revealed
by them to disprove the prosecution case. This burden under Section 106 of
the Evidence Act, 1872 is not discharged by the accused. [765-B-D]
-
B Shambu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer, AIR (1956) SC 404 and
Collector of Customs, Madras & 01!. v. D. Bhoomiull, AIR SC 859, relied
on.

Baltoc/1 v.Archer, (1774) 1 Cowp 63, cited.
c Best : "Law of Evidence", 12th. Edn. Art. 320, p 291, cited.

2.1. The evidence of the father of the deceased shows that his
daughter's married life in the household of the accused had undergone
rough weather all throughout. She was ill-treated both for not bringing
D dowry amount to the satisfaction of the accused and also for not giving
birth to children. Her husband was also contemplating to remarry. The
complainant's evidence further showed that his deceased daughter had
earlier tried to commit suicide but was saved in the nick of time by
neighbours. Even after birth of two sons ill-treatment of bis deceased
E daughter and quarrels with her continued till the fateful night. It can,
therefore, safely be presumed under Section 114 of the Evidence act, 1872
that the cruel treatment meted ont to the deceased by the accused earlier
had continued unabated till the very last when she was forced to commit
suicide on that fateful night. Such a presumption of continuance of cruel
treatment which is established on record necessarily points an accusing
F linger to the accused. Such presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence
Act has remained unrebutted on record. The complainant's evidence about
what bis deceased daughter told him earlier about her sufferings at the
bands of the accused was clearly admissible under section 32 of the
Evidence Act. [770-G-H; 771-A-C]

G 2.2. It is easy to visualize the unbearable state of affairs on that night
when a young housewife having two minor children, the younger only four
and a half years of age, had to jump in the well to end her miserable
existence in the house of the accused. Unless the torture to her had become
unbearable in the common course of human conduct such a young
H housewife having commitments to life could not have taken the drastic step
B.P.AGRAWAL v. STATE[S.B.MAJMUDAR.J.] 757

to. end her life, leaving her infant sons in the lurch and at the mercy of the A
accused especially when her husband was contemplating a re-marriage.
[772-F-G]

Ambika Prasad Thakur & Ors. v. Ram Ekbal Rai (Dead) by his LRs.
& 010·., AIR (1966) SC 605 and Kali Ram v. State of HP, AIR (1973) SC
2773, relied on. B

3. The prosecution evidence clearly indicates beyond shadow of
reasonable doubt that because of the mistreatment by the accused and the
consistent course of cruelty perpetrated on the deceased, she had on the
fateful night snffered from the last straw that broke the camel's back. C
Earlier she had jumped in the same well to put an end to her miserable
existence but was saved by the neighbonrs. Yet the life for her in the
household of the accused did not improve subsequently. She was, there-
fore, driven to once again try to commit suicide by falling in the very same
well in which she had earlier fallen. But on the second occasion on that D
fateful night when she jumped in the well there was no neighbour to save
her and her life got extinguished. Under these circumstances it cannot be
said that the accused were not responsible for bringing to a tragic end the
life of this young housewife aged 28 years, mother of two children, who
having suffered in such a drastic manner at the hands of the accused as
driven to take the extreme step of committing suicide. This is neither the E
case of murder nor the case of accident. On the facts of the present case
, the prosecution has been able to bring home to the ~ccused beyond shadow
of reasonable doubt offence under Section 498-A, IPC read with Explana-
tion (a). When she was driven to take such a drastic step _all the accused
including acquitted accused mother-in-law were in the house and along F
with them resided the victim and her two minor children. Hence the
accused alone must be held responsible for driving her to commit suicide
by their misconduct which had led to a quarrel and shouting revealing the
voice of a woman as admitted even by the hostile witness who actually
heard the same, being the next door neighbonr. All the circumstances G
proved by the prosecution clinchingly establish the culpability of the
accused themselves and no one else. These established circumstances
wholly rule out any reasonable possibility of innocence of the accused
from any viewpoint. The chain in the circumstantial evidence is so com-
plete against the accused as to rule out any other hypothesis about their
innocence. [773-B-G; 774-A-C] H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A 4. It is true that though police had chargesheeted the accused also
alternatively under Section 498-A the Trial Court framed charge under
Section 302 which is obviously for a graver offence and did not think it fit
to frame any charge under Section 498-A, IPC. But the evidence on record
clearly attracted the said charge. Under these circumstances this Court
B would have been required to remand these proceedings for re-trial on the
available evidence after framing a charge under Section 498-A against the
respondent-accused but that exercise is not required in view of the fact
that Court in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of
India may itself examine the question of culpability of the accused for the
offence under the said Section in the light of the evidence on record so as
C to obviate protraction of trial and multiplicity of proceedings against the
accused. [763-C-E]

E.K Chandrasenan v. State of Kera/a, [1995] 2 SCC 99, relied on.

5. It is well settled that even evidence of hostile witness also to the
D extent it corroborates the p~osecution version can be relied upon. [769-B]
Khujji alias Surendra Tiwari v. State of M.P., AIR (1991) SC 1853 and
Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration, AIR (1976) SC 294, relied on. ,

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: \:riminal Appeal No.
E 402 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 27.7.95 of the Patna High Court
in Cr!. R. No. 10 of 1992 {R).

F S.B. Sanyal, Sr. Adv., Gopal Prasad and K. Pandeya for the Appel-
. !ant.

B.B. Singh and Anjani Kumar Jha for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G S.B. MAJMUDAR, J. In this appeal by special leave under Article
136 of the Constitution of India the appellant-original complainant has
brought in challenge the order of acquittal rendered by the Additional
Judicial Commissioner, Lohardagga in Sessions Trial case against the
respondent-accused and as confirmed in Criminal revision application No.
H 10 of 1992 by the High Court of Patna, Ranchi Bench. While granting
B.P.AGRAWAL v. STATE[S.B.MAIMUDAR.J.] 759

special leave to appeal a Bench of two learned judges of this Court by order A
dated 25th March 1996 rejected special leave petition against respondent
No. 4 original accused no. 2 Smt. Jhalo Devi, mother-in-law of the deceased
while special leave was granted only against respondent nos. l, 2 and 3 who
are the State of Bihar and original accused nos. 1 and 3 respectively.
Accused nos. 1 and 3 are the husband and brother-in-law respectively of B
the deceased Kiran Devi.

In this case a tragic fate visited a young married woman aged 28 years
named Kiran Devi, daughter of the appellant-complainant, who is alleged
to have been murdered by the respondent-accused or to have been forced
to commit suicide by falling in a well situated on the back side of the house C
of the accused.

A few facts leading to these proceedings· deserve to be noted at the
outset. Deceased Kiran Devi was married to respondent No. 2 Paran
Prasad Agrawal in the year 1977. It is the case of the prosecution that even D
after five to six years of her marriage as no child was born respondent no.
4, the mother-in-law of the deceased against whose acquittal the present
proceedings do not survive, and respondent no. 3, the elder brother of the
husband of the deceased wanted accused no. I-respondent no. 2 to marry
some other girl by killing Kiran Devi. It is the further case of the com-
plainant father of the deceased that he got her treated by a gynaecologist E
and subsequently she gave birth to two sons. It is alleged that despite that
aforesaid events the cruelty meted out to Kiran Devi did not stop. They
persisted in demanding dowry and as Kiran Devi did not fulfil their
requirement the accused started beating her physically and used to torture
her causing danger to her life. That being tired of the torture meted out F
to her she had earlier tried to jump in the same well about four years ago.
But she was saved by the neighbours. In this regard Kiran Devi herself had
made a report before the concerned Police Station against her husband
and in-laws. Thereafter Kiran Devi started living at her paternal home.
However at the instance of her father, a compromise was made with her
husband and in-laws and she was brought to the house of her in-laws in G
the year 1988 where she started to reside till the date of her tragic death.
It is the prosecution case that on the fateful night intervening 30th and 31st
October 1988 at about 2.00 a.m. Kiran Devi fell in the well sitnated in the
backyard of the house of her in-laws which was occupied by all the three
accused along with her. That on 31st October 1988 at about 10.00 a.m. her H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A husband respondent no. 2 informed the appellant that his daughter Kiran
Devi had died after falling in the well. Thereupon the appellant went to
the house of her in-laws where he found the dead body· of his daughter
lying near the well. That he got shock of his life. Thereafter he visited the
house of the accused 12th November 1988 in order to meet his grandson.
B At that time he was informed by the neighbours that on the previous night
of the date of the occurrence there was quarrel in the house of the accused
and they had heard the crying and weeping of Kiran Devi and she was
being assaulted by her in-laws. Smelling a rat, on this information the
appellant lodged written report/First Information Report on 12th Novem-
ber 1988 about murder of his daughter Kiran Devi by the accused. It is his
C case that no case was registered by the police against the accused as
approval of the Superintendent of Police had to be obtained. Ultimately
on the complaint of the appellant before the Superintendent of Police the
case was ordered to be registered on 18th January 1990. After investigation
the police submitted chargesheet under Sections 498-A, 302 and 120-B of
D the Indian Penal Code ('IPC' for short) against the respondent- accused
and the acquitted accused mother-in-law of the deceased before the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lohardagga. Ultimately the case was
committed to the Court of Sessions, namely the Additional Judicial Com-
missioner, Lohardagga. The learned Trial Judge framed charges against
the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34, !PC. On the comple-
E lion of the trial the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the prosecn-
tion had not made out any case under Section 302 read with Section 34,
IPC against the accused. The learned Judge in terms held that there was
evidence on record that the members of the family of the accused Paran
Prasad Agrawal used to assault the victim lady Kiran Devi and they also
p used to demand dowry from her and there had also been threat given by
these accused persons to the victim, that they would kill the victim lady and
would get Paran Prasad Agrawal married to another lady. But as the
marriage of Kiran Devi took place in the year 1977 and murder took place
in the year 1988, and thus more than seven years had elapsed, the presump-
tion that Kiran Devi might have been killed for the sake of dowry cannot
G be raised. The learned Judge further held that he had a doubt in his mind
that these accused persons committed murder of Kiran Devi because of
the threat being extended by them but in view of the fact that there was no
Ji:gal evidence he was helpless and he could not convict these accused
persons and the the charges fell to the ground. The appellant carried the
H
B.P.AGRAWAL v. STATE[S.B.MAIMUDAR.J.J 761

· mater in Revision before the High Court. A learned Single Judge of the A
High Court who decided the revision Application came to the conclusion
that no case was made out for him to interfere in revisional proceedings
against the accused as there was no evidence to show that the accused were
responsible for the murder of Kiran Devi.

Learned senior counsel for the appellant Shri .Sanyal vehemently
B
contended that both the courts below had failed to appreciate th~ well
established fact on the record that deceased Kiran Devi had suffered a
consistent course of cruel conduct on the part of the accused. That she had
earlier tried to commit suicide by jumping in the same well but she was
saved by the neighbours. That the accused were torturing her and treating C
her with extreme cruelty. Under these circumstances even though there
may not be any clear evidence against the accused regarding their overt act
of throwing her in the well on that fateful night, it can easily be seen that
at least she was forced to commit suicide because of the cruelty meted out
to her by the accused and evidence of the appellant in this behalf relying D
upon what the neighbours told him as to what transpired in the household
of the accused on that fateful night as corroborated by the evidence of
investigating officer clearly established the lessar charge against the ac-
cused under Section 498-A of the IPC and even though the police had
chargesheeted the accused also under Sectioil 498-A the learned Sessions
Judge had wrongly failed to frame this alternative charge against the E
accused. He, therefore, submitted that either the matter be remanded for
fresh trial or this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India may go into the evidence on record and take ap-
propriate decision about the culpability of the respondent-accused for the
offence under Section 498-A, IPC. F

Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted
that though there was no charge framed under Section 498-A, IPC and as
the prosecution evidence fell short of bringing home the charge under
Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC against the accused the order of G
acquittal as rendered by the Trial Court and as confirmed in revision by
the High Court deserves to be upheld. He, however, fairly stated that if
this Court comes to the conclusion that the accused are required to be
called upon to meet the lesser charge under Section 498-A, IPC then the
accused may be charged accordingly. He also submitted that if this Court
is inclined to appreciate the evidence on record and take decision on merits H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A on the culpability of the accused so far as offence under Section 498-A js
concerned, then according to him the evidence does not connect the
accused with the said offence. That there was nothing on record to show
that the complainant was informed about what happened on the fateful
night by the neighbours as the neighbours who were examined in the case
as prosecution witnesses had turned hostile and did not support the
B prosecution regarding what they were alleged to have stated in their police
statements and to the complainant about the incident of quarrel that took
place on the fateful night. He submitted that what the complainant deposed
about the information gathered by him from the neighbours was purely
hearsay evidence and could not be legally relied upon. It was contended
C by him that once that evidence is ruled out nothing remains on the record
to show as to what actually happened on the night of the incident which
resulted in the drowning of deceased Kiran Devi in the well and that it
could be a case of sheer accident or even assuming that she had committed
suicide there was nothing to show that the accused were responsible for
D the said suicide or had by their wilful conduct driven Kiran Bevi to commit
swcide on that fateful night. He, therefore, contended that in the light of
the evidence available on record even charge under Section 498-A is not
brought home to the accused.

Having given our anxious consideration to these rival contentions we
E have reached the conclusion that the prosecution has not been able to
make out any case against the respondent-accused under Section 302 read
with Section 34, !PC. There is no evidence to show that on that fateful night
the accused or anyone of them had pushed or thrown Kiran Devi in the
well. But that is not the end of the matter. As rightly contended by learned
senior counsel for the appellant the evidence on record clearly indicated
F
that a case was made out against the accused under Section 498-A, !PC.
the said provision reads as under :

"498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting
her to cruelty. whoever, being the husband or the relative of the
G husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation. - For the purposes of this section. "cruelty"
H means -
B.P.AGRAWAL v. STATE[S.B.MAJMUDAR,J.] 763

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to A
drive that woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury
or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical)
or the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a
view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any B
unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is
on account of failure by her or any person related to her to
11
meet such demand.

Now it is of course true that though police had chargesheeted the accused C
also alternatively under Section 498-A the Trial Court framed charge under
Section 302 which is obviously for a graver offence and did not think it fit
to frame any charge under Section 498-A, !PC. But the evidence on record,
as we will presently point out, clearly attracted the said charge. Under
these circumstances we would have been required to remand these
proceedings for re-trial on the available evidence after framing a charge D
under Section 498-A against the respondent-accused but that exercise is
not required in view of the fact that this Court in exercise of powers under
Article 142 of the Constitution of India may itself examine the question of
cnlpability of the accused for the offence under the said Section in the light
of the evidence on record so as to obviate protection of trial and multi- E
plicity of proceedings against the accused.

We have, therefore, thought it fit to consider the question of the
culpability of the respondent-accused for offence under Section 498-A of
!PC It is now well settled that in exercise of powers under Article 142
appropriate orders can be passed in the interest of justice in cases which F
are brought before this Court [See E.K Chandrasenan v. State of Kera/a,
[1995] 2 sec 99. We have accordingly heard the learned counsel for the
parties on this question. We have been taken through the relevant evidence
on the record. Having carefully gone through the evidence on record we
find that the prosecution has been able to bring home the guilt of the G
accused under Section 498-A, !PC.

In this connection we may refer to relevant evidence on record. The
appellant as P .W. 9- had stated on oath that on 31st October 1988 at 10.00
a.m. he was informed by his son-in-law Paran Prasarl Agrawal that his
daughter had died after falling into the well and he accordingly went on H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A the site and saw her dead body. He had further deposed that on 12th
November 1988 he went again to the house of the accused son-in-law to
see his youngest grandson and at that time he enquired of the incident from
the neighbours residing in the Mohalla and his neighbours told him that
on previous night of the incident Kiran Devi was beaten by her mother-in-
law Jhalo Devi, Paran Prasad and the elder brother of Paran Prasad and
B Kiran Devi was shouting 'Bachao Bachao' 'save save' and they also told
that the mother-in-law, husband and elder brother of the husband of Kiran
Devi, Girbar Prasad were telling that they would perform the second
marriage of Paran Prasad after killing her and were threatening to kill her
and this fact was told to him by the neighbours, namely, Shiv Nath Mahto,
C P.W.4, Laxmi Mahto, P.W. 3 and others, namely, Birendra Prasad etc. He
also stated that in his police complaint he had also given the names of these
witnesses who informed him accordingly, namely, Ajay Mittal, Avdhesh
Prasad, Shiv Nath Mahto, Laxmi Mahto and Birendra Prasad. He had also
deposed about the suffering undergone by his daughter at the hands of the
accused in past after her marriage. That his daughter Kiran Devi had
D informed him that her husband used to ask her to bring money from him
and on this he replied that he had already given Rs. 10,000. She also used
to say that her husband Paran Prasad, Girbar Prasad and mother-in-law
Jhalo Devi used to beat her. The marriage of his daughter was solemnised
in the year 1977. For 5-6 years there was no issue from her and hence her
in-law started abusing her and wanted to make a second marriage of Paran
E Prasad. He got Kiran Devi treated at Ranchi and consequently she gave
birth to two Sons. About four years prior to this incident his daughter Kiran
Devi due to the atrocities of her in-laws had jumped into the same well.
However the neighbours had saved her. That after birth of her youngest
son she started living at his house as his son- in-law was not taking her
F back. That he sent his daughter to her in-laws' house after convincing his
son-in-law. In cross examination he stood by his version that the people of
the Mohalla told him that on the fateful night they had personally heard
the sound of quarrel and the threat tb kill her. He also reiterated what he
stated before the police in this connection. He proved two post cards which
he had received when his daughter was pregnant and in these post cards
G he was informed that his son- in-law was trying to get married to one Lalo
Devi. Nothing substantial could be brought out in his cross examination to
discredit his aforesaid version. This version is fully corroborated by the
evidence of P.W. 8 Kedar Nath Pathak, the Investigating Officer. The
aforesaid evidence of the appellant clearly establishes the sufferings under-
gone by his daughter deceased Kiran Devi at the hands of the accused and
H
B.P.AGRAWAL v. STATE[S.B.MAJMUDAR,J.] 765

the situation had so worsened that she had tried to commit suicide even A
earlier and was saved by the neighbours. His evidence about what his
deceased daughter told him earlier about her sufferings at the hands of the
accused was clearly admissible under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. His
evidence further shows that the cruel conduct of the respondent-accused
did not abate and appeared to have continued till the fateful night when
the situation became unbearable to the deceased which resulted in her B
unfortunate death by drowning in the well in the courtyard of the house of
the accused. It is necessary to appreciate that on that fateful night apart
from the viciim only the accused were in the hovse. Thus what happened
on that night and what led to the deceased falling in the well would be
wholly within the personal and special knowledge of the accused. But they C
kept mum on this aspect. It is of course true that burden is on the
prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. But once the
prosecution is found to have shown that the accused were guilty of
persistent conduct of cruelty qua the deceased.spread over years as is well
established from the unshaken testimony of P.W. 9, father of the deceased
girl, the facts which were in the personal knowledge of the accused who D
were present in the house on that fateful night could have been revealed
by them to disprove the prosecution case. This burden under Section 106
of the Indian Evidence Act is not discharged by them. In this connection
we may usefully refer to some of the decisions of this Court on the point.
In the case of Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer, AIR (1956) SC E I
404 Bose, J. speaking for a two member Bench referrjng to the applicability
of Section 108 of the Evidence Act to criminal prosecutions laid down in
paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Report as under :

"(10) Section 106 is an exception to S.101. Section 101 lays down
the general rule about the burden of proof.
F
'Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal
right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which lie
asserts, must prove that those facts exist'
•
Illustration (a) says - G

'A desires a Court to give judgment that B shall be punished
for a crime which A says B has committed.

A must prove that B has committed the crime'. H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A (11) This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the
burden of proof is on the prosecution and S.106 is certainly not
intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed
to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible,
or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to
establish facts are 'especially' within the knowledge of the accused
B and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience."

In the case of Collector of Customs, Madras & Ors. v. D. Bhoormull, AIR
1974 SC 959 another Bench of two learned Judges of this Court while
considering the offence under Sea Customs Act, 1878 earmarked the scope
C of Section 106 of the Evidence Act in the following terms in paragraphs 31
and 32 of the Report :.

"31. The other cardinal principle having an important bearing on
the incidence of burden of proof is that sufficiency and weight of
D the evidence is to be considered - to use the words of Lord
Mansfield in Blaich v.Archar, (1774) 1Cowp63 at p.65 'according
to the proof which it was in the power of one side to prove, and
in the power of the other to have contradicted. Since it is exceed-
ingly difficult, if not absolutely impossible for the prosecution to
prove facts which are especially within the knowledge of the
E opponent or the accused, it is not obliged to prove them as part
of its primary burden.

32. Smuggling is clandestine conveying of goods to avoid legal
duties. Secrecy and stealth being its covering guards, it is impos-
F sible for the Preventive Department to unravel every link of the
process. Many facts relating to this illicit business remain in the
special or peculiar knowledge of the person concerned in it. On
the principle underlying Section 106, Evidence Act, the burden to
establish those facts is cast on the person concerned and if he fails

G
to· establish or explain those facts, an adverse inference of facts
may arise against him which coupled with the presumptive
-
evidence adduced by the prosecution or the Department would
rebut the initial presumption of innocence in favour of the person,
and in the result prove him guilty. As Pointed out by Best in 'Law
of Evidence' (12th Edn. Article 320. Page 291), the "presumption
H of innocence is, no doubt,presumptio juris: but every day's practice
RP.AGRAWAL v. STATE[S.B.MAIMUDAR,J.] 767

shows that it may be successfully encountered by the pre.sumption A
of guilt arising from the recent (unexplained) possession of stolen
property". though the latter is only a presumption of fact. Thus the
)I'··.~

burden on the prosecution or the Department may be considerably
lightened even by such presumption of fact arising in their favour.
However, this does not mean that the special or peculiar
B
knowledge of the person proceeded against will relieve the
prosecution or the Department altogether of the burden of produc-
ing some evidence in respect of that fact in issue. It will only
alleviate that burden to discharge which very slight evidence may
suffice. 11
c
On the other hand the evidence of the appellant-complainant which
had stood the test of cross-examination has clearly established the cul-
pability of the accused so far as their wilful conduct of cruelty against the
deceased is concerned. It is true that what happened on the fateful night
was said to have been conveyed to the complainant by witness Shiv Nath D
Mahto, P.W. 4, Laxmi Mahto, P.W. 3 and others who have all turned
hostile.

It was submitted by learned senior counsel for the appellant that
what was deposed to by the witness P.W.8 would not remain in the realm
of hearsay evidence as these informants have been examined as witnesses. E
It was contended by him that before any oral version of a witness can be
said to be hearsay it must amount to statement of oral version of the witness
based on what he heard from others who are not before the court. In other
words the witness says about what he heard from outsiders. Section 60 of
the Indian Evidence Act lays down that oral evidence must be direct. If it F
refers to a fact which could be heard, it must be the evidence of a witness
who says he heard it. The evidence before the court can be divided into
original and unoriginal. The original is that which a witness reports himself
to have seen or heard through the medium of his own senses. Unoriginal,
also called derivative, transmitted, secondhand or hearsay, is that which a G
witness is merely reporting not what he himself saw or heard, not what has
come under the immediate observation of his own bodily senses, but what
he had learnt respecting the fact through the medium of a third person.
Hearsay, therefore, properly speaking is secondary evidence of any oral
statement. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that if the
informants are examined as witnesses as in the present case, the objection H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A to hearsay disappears as then it becomes the original evidence of the
informant who can be cross-examined about the truth of his information
conveyed to P.W. 6 and in such an eventuality the versions deposed to by
P.W. 6 and the informants will fall for scrutiny and will have to be weighed
by the court with a view to ascertaining as to which on the versions on oath
is a correct one. In this connection we were referred to a decision of this
B Court in the case of Bhugdomal Gangaram & Ors. Etc. v. The State of
Gujarat, AIR (1993) SC 906 wherein at page 910 Varadarajan, J. Speaking
for a two member Bench dealing with evidence of P.W. 12 about what was
informed to him made the following pertinent observations in paragraph
13 of the Report :
c
"Accused Nos. 3 and 5 have been convicted by the learned
single judge under Section 66(1)(b) of the Act. The prosecution
relies on the evidence of P.W. 12 to show that he had received
information in the evening of 12-9-1970 that from Baroda the truck
GTD 4098 would be carrying liquor to Ahmedabad and that
D
accused Nos. 3 and 4 and some other persons would be coming in
a taxi behind the truck. But since the informant has not been
examined as a witness the evidence of P.W. 12 that he was informed
that accused Nos. 3 and 4 would be coming behind the truck in a
taxi is not admissible."
E
It was, therefore, submitted that what is deposed to by a witness about the
information conveyed to him by another would remain hearsay unless the
author of this information also is examined in the case and is subjected to
cross examination. In the latter contingency the objection of hearsay would
F disappear and the court will have to weigh the relative merits and demerits
of the respective versions deposed to by the concerned witnesses, one
affirming an information and another denying the same. On the other hand
it was submitted on behalf of respondent-accused that as informants P.W.
3 and P.W. 4 had turned hostile, version of their alleged information to
P.W. 8 and the details thereof will remain in the realm of hearsay evidence
G as they had not asserted about such information in their exarninations-in-
chief. We find prima facie some force in what learned senior counsel for
the appellant submitted in this connection. However on the facts of the
present case it is not necessary to dilate on this aspect and to decide
whether the details of the information said to have been conveyed to the
H appellant P.W. 6 by these hostile witnesses remained in realm of hearsay
B.P.AGRAWAL v. STATE[S.B.MAJMUDAR,J.] 769

evidence or not. We will assume that contents of this information repre· A
., sented hearsay evidence which could not be considered;. Still as will be
seen presently, there are clinching circumstances well established on the
record by the prosecution which clearly bring home the charge under
Section 498-A, !PC to the respondent-accused.
B
We now proceed to narrate these circumstances. It is now well
settled that every evidence of hostile witness also to the extent it cor-
roborates the prosecution version can be relied upon (Khujji Alias Surendra
Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC (1953) and Sat Paul v.
Delhi Administration, AIR (1976) SC 294. Witness Laxmi Mahto, P.W. 3
in his chief examination before the court stated that he heard in the night c
of the incident sound of quarrel from the house of Paran Prasad Agrawal
(accused-husband of the deceased). A fight was going on inside the house
and the said hullah was of the same. At around 1.00-1.30 a.m. in the night
he heard the said hullah. That was a sound of a woman but he could not
say whose voice was that. This version of his in the examination-in-chief D
lends credence to the version deposed to by the complainant P.W. 6 and
fully supports his case about what the witness is said to have conveyed to
the complainant when he met him on 12th November 1988. So far as the
evidence of hostile witnesses Shiv Nath Mahto, P.W. 4, Laxmi Mahto, P.W.
.- 3 as well as Ajay Mittal, P.W. 2 is concerned it becomes clear that they
have resiled from their original versions before the Investigating Officer E
with a view to help their neighbours the present accused and their contrary
versions on oath before the court were clearly unreliable and false ones.
We would, therefore, reject their versions and on the contrary.rely upon
the natural version of P.W. 6, complainant whose evidence appears to be
more reliable and creditworthy and which gets corroborated even by the F
evidence of hostile witness P.W.3. We may also note that even if the nature
of information alleged to be conveyed to P.W. 6 the father of the deceased
by the neighbours about what was actually heard by them on that fateful
night may be ruled out as hearsay, the fact that some information was
conveyed to him by the neighbours on 12th November 1988 which
prompted him to rush to police as he entertained grave doubt on the basis G
of what was conveyed to him by neighbours about the conduct of the
accused on that night and which made him apprehend about their cul-
pability in connection with unnatural death of his daughter, would remain
admissible in evidence as the conduct of this witness P.W.6 propelled by
the fact of such information by neighbours about what the witness did on H
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A 12th November 1988 and not earlier by approaching police. That part of
his evidence was not shaken in cross examination. Not only that but even
the hostile witnesses P.W. 3 and 4 who are alleged to have given some
-
information to the witness P.W. 6 on 12th November 1988 bad not even
whispered either in their chief examination or cross examination about
B their not having conveyed any information or not having met P.W. 6 on
12th November 1988 as deposed to by P.W. 6 in his evidence. This part of
the evidence of P.W.6 would not be hit by the rule of exclusion of hearsay
evidence. A decision of this Court deserves to be noted on' this aspect. In
the case of J.D. Jain v. The Management of State Bank of India &Anr., AIR
(1982) SC 673 a Bench of three learned Judges speaking through Baharul
C Islam, J. in paragraph 10 of the Report has made the following pertinent
observations:

"The word 'hearsay' is used in various senses. Sometimes it
means whatever a person is heard to say; ;ometimes it means
whatever a person declares on information given by someone else.
D
(See Stephen on Law of Evidence).

The Privy Council in the case of Subramaniam v. Public
Prosecutor, (1958) 1 WLR 985 observed: 'Evidence of a statement
made to a witness who is not himself called as a witness may or
E may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object
of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the
statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed
to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement but the
fact that it was made. The fact that it was made quite apart from
F its truth, is frequently relevant in considering the mental state and
conduct thereafter of the witness or some other persons in whose
presence these statements are made'."

It is also to be appreciated that evidence of father of the deceased
P .W. 6 shows that his daughter's married life in the household of the
G accused had undergone rough weather all throughout. She was ill-treated
both for not bringing dowry amount to the satisfaction of the accused and
also for not giving birth to children. Accused no. 1, her husband, also was
contemplating to remarry one Dalo Devi as letters Ex.4 and 4/1 showed.
Complainant's evidence further showed that his deceased daughter had
H earlier tired to commit suicide but was saved in the nick of time by
B.P.AGRAWAL v. STATE[S.B.MATMUDAR,J.] 771

neighbours. Even after birth of two sons ill-treatment of his deceased A
daughter and quarrels with her continued till the fateful night as deposed
to by complainant P.W. 6 and as corroborated by even hostile witness P.W.
3 as seen earlier. It can, therefore, safely be presumed under Section 114
of the Evidence Act that the cruel treatment meted out to the deceased by
the accused earlier and continued unabated till the very last when she was B
forced to commit suicide on that fateful night. Such a presumption of
continuance of cruel treatment which is established on record necessarily
points '111 accusing finger to the accused. Such presumption under Section
114 of the Evidence Act has remained unrebutted on record. This is
another clinching circumstance well established against the accused. In this
'-" connection we may refer to what this Court said in two of its judgments. C
InAmbika Prasad Thakur& Ors. Etc. v. Ram Ekbal Rai (Dead) by his L.Rs.
and Ors. Etc., AlR (1966) SC 605 a three member Bench of this Court
referring to Illustration (d) of section 114 of the Evidence Act has made
the following pertinent observations in para 15 of the Report :
D
"If a thing or a state of things is shown to exist, an inference of
. its continuity within a reasonably proximate time both forwards
and backwards may sometimes be drawn. The presumption of
future continuance is noticed in illus, (d) to S.114. In appropriate
cases, an inference of the continuity of a thing or state of thing5
backwards may be drawn under this section, though on this point·• E
the section does not give a separate illustration. The rule that the
presumption of continuance may operate retrospectively has been
recognised both in India. This is rule of evidence by which one can
presume the continuity of things backwards. The presumption of
continuity weakens with the passage of time. How far the presump- F
tion may be drawn both backwards and forwards depends upon
the nature of the thing and the surrounding circumstances."

Another three member Bench of this Court in the case of Kali Ram v. State
of Himachal Pradesh, AIR (1973) SC 2773 speaking through Khanna, J.
has made the following pertinent observations in paragraph 24 of the G
Report:

"Leaving aside the cases of statutory presumptions, the onus is
upon the prosecution to prove the different ingredients of the
offence and unless i~ discharges that onus, the prosecution cannot H
772 SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A succeed. The court may, of course, presume, as mentioned in
..,._
'
Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, the existence of any fact
which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the
common course of natural events, human conduct and public and
private business, in their relation to the facts of he particular case.
The illustrations mentioned in that section, though taken from
B different spheres of hu1nan activity, are nut exhaustive. They are
based upon human experience and have to be applied in the
context of the facts of each case. The illustrations are merely
examples of circumstances in which certain presumptions may be
made. Other presumptions of a similar kind in similar circumstan-
c ces can be made under the provisions of the section itself. Whether
or not a presumption can be drawn under the section in a par-
ticular case depends ultimately upon the facts and circumstances
of each case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down. Human
behaviour is so complex that room must be left for play in the·
joints. It is not possible to formulate a series of exact propositions
D
and confine human behaviour within straitjackets. The raw
material here is far too complex to be susceptible of precise and
exact propositions for exactness here is a fake."

It must, therefore, be held that the prosecution had fully established
E its case against the accused that on the fateful night between 30th October
and 31st October 1988 deceased Kiran Devi was subjected to cruelty by
her mother-in-law, her husband accused no. 1 and his elder brother ac-
cused no. 3 which forced her to commit suicide. It is easy to visualise the
unbearable state of affairs on that night when a young housewife having
F two minor children, the younger only four and a half years of age, had to
jump in the well to end her miserable existence in the house of the accused.
Unless the torture to her had become unbearable in the common course
of human conduct such a young housewife having commitments to life
could not have taken the drastic step to end her life, leaving her infant sons
in the lurch and at the mercy of the accused especially when her husband
G accused no. 1 was contemplating a re-marriage. As the Special Leave
Petition of accused No. 2, mother-in-law of deceased Kiran Devi has been .,
dismissed we need not say anything about her culpability. However the
aforesaid evidence clinchingly establishes beyond shadow of reasonable
doubt that respondents, original accused nos., 1 and 3, by their wilful and
H persistent conduct of cruelty on Kiran Devi had driven her to commit
B.P.AGRAWAL v. STATE[S.B.MAJMUDAR,J.] 773
suicide by jumping in the well in the compound of their house. It is not A
possible to agree with the contention of learned counsel for the respon-
dents that she might have accidentally fallen in the well. It has to be kept
in view that at 3.00 O'clock in winter ·night while the deceased would be
sleeping in the house there would have been no occasion for her to go in
the back verandah and fall accidentally in the well which was 25 ft. away B
from the back door of the house as seen from the evidence of P.W. 8 the
Investigating Officer. On the contrary the prosecution clearly indicates
beyond shadow of reasonable doubt that because of the mistreatment by
the accused and the consistent course of cruelty perpetrated on her, she
had on the fateful night suffered from the last straw that broke the camel's
back. Earlier she had jumped in the same well to put an end to her C
miserable existence but was saved by the neighbours. Yet the life for her
in the household of the accused did not improve subsequently. She was,
therefore, driven to once again try to commit suicide by falling in the very
same well in which she had earlier fallen. But on the second occasion on
that fateful night when she jumped in the well there was no neighbour to D
save her and her life got extinguished. Under these circumstances it cannot
be said that the accused were not responsible for bringing to a tragic end
the life of this young housewife aged 28 years mother of two children, who
having suffered in such a drastic manner at the hands of the accused was
driven to take the extreme step of committing suicide. This is neither the
case of murder nor the case of accident. But it is only the case of suicide E
for which the. persistent hostile conduct of the accused over years as
deposed to by P.W. 6 complainant and also the act of cruelty perpetrated
on her on the fateful night as revealed by the aforesaid well established
clinching circumstances, were directly responsible. It is also pertinent to
note that the learned Trial Judge reached that conclusion in para 8 of the p
judgment. However, in his view this was not a dowry death as contemplated
by Section 304-B, !PC as the deceased had died more than seven years
after her marriage. But unfortunately the learned Trial Judge failed to
examine alternative case under Section 498- A which got squarely attracted
on the facts of the present case. It must, therefore, be held that on the facts
of the present case the prosecution has been able to bring home to the G
accused beyond shadow of reasonable doubt offence under Section 498-A,
!PC read with Explanation (a). When she was driven to take such a drastic
step all the accused including acquitted accused mother-in-law were in the
house and along with them resided the victim and her two minor children.
H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
A Hence the accused alone must be held responsible for driving her to
commit suicide by their misconduct which had led to a quarrel and shout-
ing revealing the voice of a woman as admitted even by the hostile witness
P.W. 3 who actually heard the same being the next door neighbour. All the
circumstances proved by the prosecution clinchingly establish the cul-
B pability of the accused themselves and no one else. These established
circumstances wholly rule out any reasonable possibility of innocence of
the accused from any view point. In other words the chain in the cir-
cumstantial evidence is so complete against the accused as to rule out any
other hypothesis about their innocence. We accordingly convict respondent
no. 2 Paran Prasad Agrawal and respondent No. 3 Girbar Prasad Agarwal
C of offences punishable under Section 498-A, !PC.

In view of our aforesaid finding of guilt of the concerned respondent-
accused it will now be necessary to hear them on the question of ap-
propriate sentence to be imposed on them. We, therefore, given an
opportunity to the learned counsel for the respondent to have his say on
D the question of appropriate sentence to be imposed on these accused after
taking instructions from them. It will be open to the learned counsel for
the respondent-accused to furnish material on this aspect by way of af-
fidavits of the concerned accused if thought fit. Accordingly the matter
stands adjourned to 17.1.97 for hearing the accused on the question of
E sentence.

v.s.s. Appeal allowed.

Search Indian case law

Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.

Try "Section 498-A"Sign in to search