Holding

The High Court may, in exceptional cases, exercise its inherent power under Section 482 CrPC to order further investigation, but it must not prejudice the accused nor dispense with the requirement of a hearing.

Summary

The appellant, a former District Manager, challenged a High Court order that directed the magistrate to order further investigation into his alleged role in the misappropriation of foodgrains, despite the magistrate having taken cognizance only against a lower‑level employee. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court could, under its inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, order such further investigation and whether it must afford the appellant a hearing before doing so. It held that the High Court was justified in ordering further investigation in the exceptional circumstances of the case, but it erred in making prejudicial comments and in failing to give the appellant an opportunity to be heard. Consequently, the order directing further investigation was upheld, while the prejudicial observations were struck down and the matter remitted for fresh consideration with notice to the parties. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The High Court’s power under Section 482 CrPC to direct further investigation when the magistrate has not exercised Section 173(8).
The requirement of audi alteram partem – whether the appellant must be given a hearing before the High Court issues directions for further investigation.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 156, s. 156(3), s. 173(8), s. 190, s. 203, s. 401, s. 482
Constitution of Indias. Article 21, s. Article 226
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 409, s. 420, s. 467, s. 468, s. 471, s. 474

Subjects

Section 482 CrPCFurther investigationInherent powers of High CourtRight to hearingCriminal procedureMisappropriation of goodsMagistrate's jurisdictionArticle 21Fair trial

Judgment

692 [2022]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 15 S.C.R. 692 [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A DEVENDRA NATH SINGH
v.
STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1768 of 2022)
B OCTOBER 12, 2022
[DINESH MAHESHWARI AND ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 482 – Allegations of
defalcation of goods and misappropriation of stocks from the
godown of the Corporation – FIR was registered – Magistrate took
C
cognizance of offences u/ss. 409, 467, 468 and 420 of IPC against
respondent no.3 – Respondent no.3 filed petition u/s. 482 Cr.PC –
High Court observed that an accused in the case ‘as scapegoat to
save the skin’ of the present appellant – Having said so, the High
Court proceeded to direct the Magistrate to give directions to the
D police to further investigate the case in terms of s.173(8) CrPC
regarding the allegations against the appellant – On appeal, held:
The person lodging the FIR with reference to the audit report, i.e.,
the Senior Dy. Collector-cum-District Manager, made imputations
only against the respondent No. 3, who was a class IV employee of
the Corporation but was purportedly posted as an in-charge Assistant
E
Godown Manager by the appellant, who was, at the relevant time,
holding the position of the District Manager – Suffice it to observe
for the present purpose that when all the relevant aspects were duly
projected before the High Court in the petition filed by the respondent
No. 3, the High Court could not have simply ignored the same only
F for the reasons that the informant omitted to state them while lodging
the FIR, and/or the investigating officer overlooked them while
submitting the result of 34 investigation, and/or the Magistrate did
not pay requisite attention to them while taking cognizance – Instant
case is a case of exceptional and special features where the High
Court was justified in ordering further investigation, particularly
G
qua the role of the appellant – Thus, the principal part of the order
impugned, directing further investigation, calls for no interference
– However, High Court was not justified in making such
observations, comments, and remarks, which leave little scope for
an independent investigation and which carry all the potential to
H cause prejudice to the appellant.
692
DEVENDRA NATH SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 693

Dismissing the appeal, the court A
HELD: 1. For what has been noticed various judgments of
Supreme Court, this Court could reasonably cull out the
principles for application to the present case as follows: (a) The
scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is to ensure a
fair trial and that would commence only after a fair and just B
investigation. The ultimate aim of every investigation and inquiry,
whether by the police or by the Magistrate, is to ensure that the
actual perpetrators of the crime are correctly booked and the
innocents are not arraigned to stand trial. (b) The powers of the
Magistrate to ensure proper investigation in terms of Section
156 CrPC have been recognised, which, in turn, include the power C
to order further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) CrPC
after receiving the report of investigation. Whether further
investigation should or should not be ordered is within the
discretion of the Magistrate, which is to be exercised on the facts
of each case and in accordance with law. (c) Even when the basic D
power to direct further investigation in a case where a charge-
sheet has been filed is with the Magistrate, and is to be exercised
subject to the limitations of Section 173(8) CrPC, in an appropriate
case, where the High Court feels that the investigation is not in
the proper direction and to do complete justice where the facts
of the case so demand, the inherent powers under Section 482 E
CrPC could be exercised to direct further investigation or even
reinvestigation. The provisions of Section 173(8) CrPC do not
limit or affect such powers of the High Court to pass an order
under Section 482 CrPC for further investigation or
reinvestigation, if the High Court is satisfied that such a course F
is necessary to secure the ends of justice. (d) Even when the
wide powers of the High Court in terms of Section 482 CrPC are
recognised for ordering further investigation or reinvestigation,
such powers are to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection,
and in exceptional cases. (e) The powers under Section 482 CrPC
are not unlimited or untrammelled and are essentially for the G
purpose of real and substantial justice. While exercising such
powers, the High Court cannot issue directions so as to be
impinging upon the power and jurisdiction of other authorities.
For example, the High Court cannot issue directions to the State
to take advice of the State Public Prosecutor as to under what
H
provision of law a person is to be charged and tried when ordering
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A further investigation or reinvestigation; and it cannot issue
directions to investigate the case only from a particular angle. In
exercise of such inherent powers in extraordinary circumstances,
the High Court cannot specifically direct that as a result of further
investigation or reinvestigation, a particular person has to be
prosecuted. [Para 13][721-G-H; 722-A-G]
B
2. Applying the principles aforesaid to the facts of the
present case, what we find is that, in relation to the allegations of
defalcation of goods and misappropriation of stocks from the
godown of the Corporation, the person lodging the FIR with
reference to the audit report, i.e., the Senior Dy. Collector-cum-
C District Manager, made imputations only against the respondent
No. 3, who was a class IV employee of the Corporation but was
purportedly posted as an in-charge Assistant Godown Manager
by the appellant, who was, at the relevant time, holding the
position of the District Manager. Though several features of the
D actions and omissions at the relevant time have been mentioned
in the audit report, we do not propose to dilate on the same.
Suffice it to observe for the present purpose that when all the
relevant aspects were duly projected before the High Court in
the petition filed by the respondent No. 3, the High Court could
not have simply ignored the same only for the reasons that the
E informant omitted to state them while lodging the FIR, and/or
the investigating officer overlooked them while submitting the
result of investigation, and/or the learned Magistrate did not pay
requisite attention to them while taking cognizance. [Para
14][722-G-H; 723-A-C]
F 3. In the given set of facts and circumstances, this Court is
satisfied that the present one had been such a case of exceptional
and special features where the High Court was justified in ordering
further investigation, particularly qua the role of the appellant.
Thus, the principal part of the order impugned, directing further
G investigation, calls for no interference. [Para 14.1][723-D-E]
4. However, there are certain other aspects and features
of the order impugned which are difficult to be appreciated and
approved. The High Court has chosen to use such harsh and
severe expressions in the impugned order which carry all the
H
DEVENDRA NATH SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 695

potential of causing prejudice to the appellant and even to distract A
a fair and dispassionate investigation. As noticed, the High Court
has made its comments that the ‘entire game was played’ by the
appellant who was holding the position of District Manager. The
High Court has even stated that the appellant was ‘ultimately
responsible for all such irregularities’. The High Court has gone
B
to the extent of observing that the respondent No. 3 was made
an accused in the case ‘as scapegoat to save the skin’ of the
appellant. These and other akin observations in the order
impugned lead to the position as if the High Court has already
concluded on the result of investigation against the appellant. It
is entirely a different matter to order further investigation on C
being prima facie satisfied about the requirement to do so in view
of exceptional circumstances pertaining to a given case but, while
doing so in exercise of inherent powers, the High Court has not
been justified in making such observations and remarks which
are likely to operate over and above the investigation and may
D
cause prejudice to the appellant. As noticed, the principle remains
settled that the High Court cannot issue directions to investigate
the case from a particular angle. [Para 15][723-E-G; 724-A-C]
5. Thus, this Court is of the view that in the given set of
facts and circumstances, though the High Court has rightly
exercised its powers under Section 482 CrPC for directing further E
investigation but, has not been justified in making such
observations, comments, and remarks, which leave little scope
for an independent investigation and which carry all the potential
to cause prejudice to the appellant. [Para 16][724-C-D]
Dharam Pal and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Anr. F
(2014) 3 SCC 306 : [2013] 13 SCR 1052; Abhinandan
Jha & Ors. v. Dinesh Mishra [1967] 3 SCR 668;
Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Ors. v. State of
Gujarat and Anr. (2019) 17 SCC 1 : [2019] 15 SCR
936; Madan Mohan v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. G
(2018) 12 SCC 30 : [2017] 12 SCR 222; Popular
Muthiah v. State (2006) 7 SCC 296 : [2006] 3 Suppl.
SCR 100; Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala and

H
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A Ors. (2008) 3 SCC 542 : [2008] 4 SCR 701; Union of
India and Anr. v. W.N. Chadha (1993) 4 Supp SCC 260
: [1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 594; Manharibhai Muljibhai
Kakadia and Anr. v. Shaileshbhai Mohanbhai Patel and
Ors. (2012) 10 SCC 517 : [2012] 8 SCR 1015; Vinay
Tyagi v. Irshad Ali and Ors. (2013) 5 SCC 762 : [2012]
B
13 SCR 1005; State of Punjab v. Central Bureau of
Investigation and Ors. (2011) 9 SCC 182 : [2011] 11
SCR 281; Neetu Kumar Nagaich v. State of Rajasthan
and Ors. (2020) 16 SCC 777 : [2020] 6 SCR 1015 –
referred to.
C Case Law Reference
[2013] 13 SCR 1052 referred to Para 6.1
[1967] 3 SCR 668 referred to Para 6.1
[2019] 15 SCR 936 referred to Para 6.1
D
[2017] 12 SCR 222 referred to Para 6.1
[2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 100 referred to Para 6.2
[2008] 4 SCR 701 referred to Para 6.3
[1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 594 referred to Para 6.3
E
[2012] 8 SCR 1015 referred to Para 6.3
[2012] 13 SCR 1005 referred to Para 6.4
[2011] 11 SCR 281 referred to Para 7.2

F [2020] 6 SCR 1015 referred to Para 7.4
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1768 of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.09.2018 of the High Court
of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 649 of 2016.
G Siddharth Dave, Sr. Adv., Aditya Singh, Ms. Manisha Ambwani,
Advs. for the Appellant.
Garvesh Kabra, Samir Ali Khan, Aman Pathak, Manish Kumar,
Amit Pawan, Prasanna Mohan, Ms. Ishita Sinha, Sameer Shrivastava,
Hussan Zubair Waris, Dr. Sangeeta Verma, Ms. Shivangi, Aakarsh, Advs.
H for the Respondents.
DEVENDRA NATH SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 697

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.
Delay condoned. Leave granted.
2. The challenge in this appeal is to the order dated 10.09.2018, as
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous B
No. 649 of 2016.
2.1. The said petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 19731 was filed by respondent No. 3 of the present appeal,
against the order dated 21.06.2014, as passed by the ACJM, Barh, District
Patna2 in Barh Police Station Case No. 115 of 2012 whereby, the learned C
Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offences under Sections 409,
467, 468 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 18603 on the allegations
against the respondent No. 3 of misappropriation of stocks worth Rs.
16,99,648/- from the godown of the Bihar State Food and Civil Supplies
Corporation4 during the years 2010-11 and 2011-12.
D
3. The main plank of the submissions before the High Court in the
aforesaid petition by the respondent No. 3 had been that he was only a
Class IV employee of the Corporation and that the ‘entire game was
played’ by the present appellant, who was holding the position of the
District Manager. In that regard, the contents of audit report forming
part of the First Information Report5 were extensively relied upon. E
4. The High Court, after taking note of the submissions made on
behalf of the present respondent No. 3, expressed surprise that the then
District Manager of the Corporation (i.e., the present appellant), who
was ultimately responsible for the illegalities, was given a clean chit by
the informant, i.e., the Senior Dy. Collector-cum-District Manager (in- F
charge of the godown). It was also observed that the present respondent
No. 3, a Class IV employee, could not have been posted at the godown;
and that he was made an accused in the case ‘as scapegoat to save
the skin’ of the present appellant.
4.1. Having said so, the High Court proceeded to direct the G
Magistrate to give directions to the police to further investigate the case
1
‘CrPC’, for short.
2
Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Magistrate’.
3
‘IPC’, for short.
4
Hereinafter referred to as ‘the Corporation’.
5
‘FIR’, for short. H
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A in terms of Section 173(8) CrPC regarding the allegations against the
appellant and to seek the report within a period of three months. The
Court, however, expressed its disinclination to interfere with the impugned
order taking cognizance against the present respondent No. 3 and disposed
of the petition while giving liberty to the respondent No. 3 to raise all the
points at the time of framing the charge which, as per the directions of
B
the High Court, were to be decided by the learned Magistrate after
taking into consideration the material emerging in further investigation
against the appellant.
5. The impugned order dated 10.09.2018 could be usefully
reproduced, in extenso, as under: -
C
“This petition under Section 482 Cr. P. C. has been filed for
quashing the order dated 21.6.2014 passed by the A.C.J.M. Barh,
Patna in Barh P.S. case no. 115 of 2012 by which learned
Magistrate has taken cognizance for the offence under Sections
409,467, 468 and 420 of the I.P.C. against the petitioner.
D
Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and State.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that
petitioner was only a class IV employee in the Bihar State Food
and Civil Supply Corporation Ltd. for short ‘the Corporation”.
E The entire game was played by D.N Singh who was District
Manager which has also come in the Audit Report which is part
of the FIR and annexed as Annexure-2. The informant who was
Senior Dy. Collector-cum-District Manager (Incharge) of the
Godown has not lodged any case against said D.N.Singh the then
District Manager who had played entire game in committing
F misappropriation. The F.I.R. has been lodged only against the
petitioner who was class IV employee and was made In-charge
of the Godown by D.N. Singh against the Circular and Government
policy, which had also come in detail in Audit Report submitted by
the Auditor. The police submitted charge sheet against this petitioner
G on the basis of aforesaid FIR and cognizance has been taken
against the petitioner on the basis of the charge sheet.
This Court is really surprised to find that the then District
Manager of the Corporation, who was ultimately responsible for
all such illegalities, had been given clean chit by the informant. He
was not made accused in the case. The petitioner being the IV
H
DEVENDRA NATH SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 699
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

grade employee, was posted by the then District Manager, namely, A
D.N. Singh, as Incharge Assistant Godown Manager although he
was not entitled to be posted as such. He has been made accused
in the case as scapegoat to save the skin of D.N.Singh, the then
District Manager of Godown.
Learned ACJM, Barh, Patna is directed to give direction to B
the police to further reinvestigate the case in terms of provision of
Section 173(8) of the Cr. P.C. with regard to allegation against
D.N.Singh the then District Manager with regard to allegation of
misappropriation of money and appointing the petitioner who was
class IV employee as In-charge Assistant Godown Manager
against the circulars and directions of the Government. The C
Magistrate will direct the police to complete the re-investigation
with regard to role of then District Manager Sri D. N.Singh in the
entire game of the misappropriation of the money as mentioned in
detail in the audit report in accordance with law and submit report
before him within a period of three months from the date of passing D
of the order by the learned Magistrate.
This Court, at present, is not inclined to interfere with the
impugned order with regard to the petitioner by which cognizance
has been taken against him on the basis of charge sheet submitted
by the police. E
This Cr. Misc. petition is, accordingly, disposed off. The
petitioner is given liberty to raise all the points, as raised in the
present application, at the time of framing of charge, which shall
be considered and disposed off by the learned Court below in
accordance with law after taking into consideration the materials F
which will come during further investigation with regard to
allegation against D. N. Singh the then District Manager.”
6. The order aforesaid is questioned by the appellant in whose
relation the directions have been issued for further investigation, inter
alia, on the ground that investigation is the prerogative of the investigating G
agency/officer and no mandate could be issued to the Magistrate so as
to usurp such powers to investigate. It is also submitted that the impugned
order has been directly in violation of the principles of natural justice
inasmuch as no opportunity of hearing was extended by the High Court
to the appellant.
H
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A 6.1. While elaborating, learned counsel for the appellant has
contended that the High Court, while exercising its powers under Section
482 CrPC, could not have issued a specific direction to the Magistrate to
direct the police to investigate the role of the appellant, who was neither
named in the FIR nor was charge-sheeted and was not even a party
before the High Court. With reference to the Constitution Bench decision
B
in the case of Dharam Pal and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Anr.:
(2014) 3 SCC 306 and the other decisions in Abhinandan Jha & Ors.
v. Dinesh Mishra: (1967) 3 SCR 668 and Vinubhai Haribhai
Malaviya and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Anr.: (2019) 17 SCC 1,
the learned counsel has submitted that the principles remain settled by
C this Court that as per the scheme of CrPC, formation of an opinion as to
whether a person is to be put on trial has been left to the officers in
charge of a police station; and this Court has further held that in a case
where the Magistrate is of the opinion that the final report submitted by
the police is unsatisfactory, he could exercise his powers under Section
156(3) CrPC and direct the police to make a further investigation or
D
straightaway take cognizance under section 190(1)(c) CrPC,
notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the police. However, according
to the learned counsel, directions for exercising such power in a particular
manner could not have been issued by the High Court while dealing with
the petition filed by the respondent No. 3. The learned counsel has also
E referred to the decision in Madan Mohan v. State of Rajasthan and
Ors.: (2018) 12 SCC 30, wherein this Court has observed that a superior
Court could not issue directions to any subordinate Court commanding
them to pass a particular order on any application filed by a party.
6.2. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied upon the
F decision in Popular Muthiah v. State: (2006) 7 SCC 296 to submit
that while dealing with a similar issue where the High Court, in an appeal
against conviction under Section 302 IPC, had issued directions to the
investigating agency to investigate the appellant who had not been sent
up for trial, this Court held that the High Court could not have issued
such a direction in exercise of its inherent powers, as the investigation of
G an offence was a statutory power of the police and it was for the State
to decide whether it wanted to proceed against an accused or not. It
was observed that the High Court could not issue directions to investigate
the case from a particular angle or by a particular agency and hence, it
went beyond its jurisdiction in directing the prosecution of the appellant.
H Therein, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the matter was
DEVENDRA NATH SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 701
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration after hearing the A
appellant.
6.3. In the second limb of submissions, learned counsel for the
appellant has contended that the High Court ought to have given an
opportunity of hearing to the appellant before issuing the impugned
directions. The learned counsel would argue that the test as to whether B
a person is entitled to an opportunity of being heard in challenge to an
order passed by a Magistrate is not dependant on whether such person
had a right to be heard by the Magistrate in the first instance; the
entitlement to hearing has to be assessed independently by considering
the consequences of the proceedings in which a hearing is sought; and a
hearing could be claimed where a substantial right of a person would be C
affected. The learned counsel has referred to the decision in Divine
Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala and Ors.: (2008) 3 SCC 542
wherein, while dealing with the issue whether the High Court could have
passed a judicial order directing an investigation against the appellant
therein without hearing it, this Court held that no judicial order could be D
passed by any Court without providing a reasonable opportunity of being
heard to the person who was likely to be affected by such order while
distinguishing the decision in the case of Union of India and Anr. v.
W.N. Chadha: 1993 Supp (4) SCC 260 by observing that the dictum
in the said judgment would not apply where a challenge was to a judicial
order directing an inquiry or investigation against a person or institution. E
The learned counsel has also relied upon a 3-Judge Bench decision of
this Court in Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia and Anr. v. Shaileshbhai
Mohanbhai Patel and Ors.: (2012) 10 SCC 517, wherein it was
observed that an accused or a person suspected to have committed a
crime has a right to be heard in a criminal revision preferred before the F
High Court or Sessions Judge against an order of dismissal of a complaint
under Section 203 CrPC, as an order passed by the superior Court in
revision, overturning the order of dismissal of the complaint would, in
effect, restore the complaint and hence, cause prejudice to the accused.
6.3.1. It has been contended that in the absence of the appellant, G
the High Court had no occasion to take note of the fact that he had
already been exonerated of all charges after detailed departmental
proceedings and hence, the directions for further investigation were wholly
unwarranted in this case.

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702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A 6.4. Learned counsel for the appellant has also argued that the
High Court could not have directed for further investigation or
reinvestigation in this the matter in view of the dictum of this Court in
Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali and Ors.: (2013) 5 SCC 762, wherein it
was held that fresh/de novo investigation ought to be directed sparingly
and in exceptional circumstances, like where the investigation already
B
conducted is tainted by malafides.
6.5. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the
Magistrate himself, while taking cognizance, could have proceeded
against the present appellant, if he had been satisfied that the materials
on record implicated the appellant to any extent but, when the Magistrate
C opted not to proceed against the appellant, the High Court could not
have issued directions to further reinvestigate the matter qua the appellant,
though it is always open for a Court to proceed against a person not sent
up for trial at the stage of Section 319 CrPC, if the evidence is forthcoming
in that regard.
D 7. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 has supported the
impugned order with the submissions that the appellant was a high-ranking
officer and he appears to have influenced the other officers in the internal
inquiry so as to give him a clean chit. A copy of the audit report dated
31.05.2012 forming the basis of the FIR in question has been placed on
E record and has been exhaustively referred to during the course of
submissions.
7.1. The learned counsel has underscored the observations of this
Court in the case of Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya (supra) that the
ultimate aim of investigation and inquiry, whether by the police or by the
F Magistrate, is to ensure that those who have actually committed the
crime are booked and those who have not, are not arraigned to face
trial. With reference to these and other observations that such
requirements pertain to the spirit of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India, learned counsel has argued that the offences in question, relating
to defalcation of foodgrains which caused hardship to the economically
G weaker sections of the society, need to be properly investigated not only
to book the actual culprits but also to check the recurrence of such a
crime.
7.2. The learned counsel would argue that in the peculiar
circumstances of this case, when it was found that no proper investigation
H was carried out against the appellant, who was the District Manager
DEVENDRA NATH SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 703
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

and overall in-charge of the godowns, the High Court has rightly exercised A
its inherent powers to issue the directions so as to ensure further and
proper investigation in the matter. While relying on the decision of this
Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Central Bureau of Investigation
and Ors.: (2011) 9 SCC 182, the learned counsel has contended that
under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court has the power to order further
B
investigation as also reinvestigation; and that no illegality or jurisdictional
error could be imputed on the order impugned. The learned counsel has
further submitted that when the High Court has the power to direct
further investigation or reinvestigation directly, it also could do so by
issuing directions to the learned Magistrate, who is in seisin of the matter.
7.3. The learned counsel has further contended that the Magistrate, C
before whom a final report is submitted, has the power and authority to
differ with the report and to order further investigation. However, the
existence of this power with the Magistrate does not ipso facto imply
that the High Court, even in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, cannot
direct further investigation in an appropriate case, when it comes to its D
notice that the investigation in a case has not been conducted properly.
7.4. It has further been argued that although the inherent powers
cannot be used by the High Court in a routine manner and can be
exercised only in extreme cases but in the present case, when offence
in question has the consequences for the society at large, the High Court E
cannot be faulted in exercising its inherent powers, which are,
nevertheless, exercised ex debito justitiae. The learned counsel has
particularly referred to paragraph 30 of the aforesaid decision in Popular
Muthiah; and has further relied upon the case of Neetu Kumar Nagaich
v. State of Rajasthan and Ors.: (2020) 16 SCC 777 wherein this
Court has held that when a constitutional Court is satisfied that the F
investigation has not been conducted in an objective manner or conducted
in a manner as to help someone escaping the law, it could direct de novo
investigation so as to prevent miscarriage of criminal justice.
7.5. As regards the contention that no notice was issued to the
appellant before passing of the impugned order, the learned counsel has G
argued, with reference to the decision of this Court in W.N. Chadha
(supra) that, at the stage of investigation, no such notice is required to be
issued to the accused. Learned counsel has also referred to various
other decisions and has submitted that the said decision in W.N. Chadha
has been consistently followed by this Court. The learned counsel would H
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A also submit that though the referred judgments were rendered in the
applications filed by the victim and not by the co-accused but the
underlying principle remains the same that an accused is not required to
be heard at the stage of investigation. Learned counsel would also submit
that if upon receiving the final report, the learned Magistrate could have
ordered further investigation without prior notice to the accused, so could
B
the High Court have, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, which is, if
anything, much wider.
7.6. In the last leg of contentions, learned counsel for respondent
No. 1 has also submitted that before granting of interim stay by this
Court, the requisite investigation had commenced and was transferred
C to the Economic Offences Unit, where the allegations against the
appellant have been found to be prima facie correct but further action
was deferred in view of the stay order of this Court. However, the
investigation hitherto carried out makes it clear that the doubts expressed
by the High Court have been found to be completely justified. Hence,
D the learned counsel would submit in the alternative that, in any case, the
investigation already carried out deserves to be protected so that the
real culprits like the appellant do not escape the process of law.
8. Apart from the submissions aforesaid, it is noteworthy that
though, on behalf of the respondent No. 2 - Corporation, the reply
E submissions are essentially to the effect that in the departmental
proceedings, charges were not proved against the present appellant but
then, in the counter affidavit on behalf of the respondent No. 1 - State,
detailed submissions have been made, essentially refuting the case of
the appellant.

F 8.1. It has, inter alia, been submitted on behalf of the respondent-
State that apart from the present matter, being Barh P.S. Case No. 115
of 2012, there had also been another matter, being Bikram P.S. Case
No. 129 of 2012 against the respondent No. 3 as also the present
appellant; and after the order passed by the High Court, the investigation
in the present case was also carried out by the Economic Offences
G Unit, Bihar along with the aforesaid Bikram P.S. Case No. 129 of 2012.
While indicating prima facie complicity of the appellant, it has also been
pointed out that in the said Bikram P.S. Case No. 129 of 2012, instituted
for offences under Sections 409, 420, 468, 471 and 474 IPC, after finding
prima facie case against the present appellant, prosecution sanction
H has also been obtained. That case relates to misappropriation of the
DEVENDRA NATH SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 705
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

goods worth Rs. 7.69 crores. It is submitted that in the present case, A
prosecution sanction has not been obtained for the appellant having been
given interim protection by this Court. A few passages of the counter
affidavit filed on behalf of the State could be usefully reproduced as
under: -
“13. In fact, the successor in office District Manager had also B
observed for holding a departmental proceeding against this
petitioner and the petitioner was found to have given change of
the go downs to Pramod Ranjan Kumar Sinha even without of
the permission of the Headquarter of the Corporation.
14. Even the petitioner was found to be silent with respect to the C
affairs of the go down change whereof was handed over by this
petitioner a Class Iv employee namely Pramod Ranjan Sinha
inasmuch as on 11.02.2010 on truck bearing Registration No. BR
1G 1051 carrying 104.61.650 Quintals of Wheat from Mokama
Depot left Barh Go-down, however, on 12.02.2010 this truck was
apprehended and it was found to be black marketing, but, this D
petitioner despite Knowledge did not take any steps against the
employee in charge of the go down by removing him from the
post and only value of the wheat was recovered from the salary
of the employee. In fact, the district office has repeateadly
informed about the irregularities at the procurement centers, E
however, the petitioner did not take any steps, nor did he remove
the in change from the procurement center/go down.
15. In fact it has also been reported that despite various irregularities
and Knowledge of such irregularities the petitioner did not take
any pain to atop the some and take corrective measures. F
16. It is stated that being a District Manager it was the responsibility
and prime duty of this petitioner to get the lifting of food grains,
store the same and ensure proper distribution from the go downs,
However, the petitioner failed to do so leading to such huge
misappropriation. In fact, as per the report of the SFC, it was G
found that there is no proof that this petitioner carried out
inspections/visits to the Go downs.
17. During investigation, when statement of the witnesses were
recorded, namely, Radhakant Paswan, Ramashankar Prasad and
Brajkishore Srivastave, the then Assistants, they deposed that the
H
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A petitioner was responsible and that he did not discharge his duties
properly.
18. In fact, besides the present criminal case the petitioner has
also been arraigned as a non-FIR accused in connection with
Bikram Police Station Case No. 129 of 2012 dated 12.06.2012
B instituted under Sections 409/420/468/471/474 of IPC which is
also a case of identical nature. In fact, in this case the prosecution
sanction has also been received from the Corporation against this
petitioner on 13.01.2012.
19. It is stated that in the present case also there is material against
C him as stated above, however, prosecution sanction has not been
obtained as the petitioner has been granted interim protection.
20. That in the above background, the statement made in Para 1
is opposed and contested and it is prayed that the order impugned
may be upheld.”
D 9. We have given anxious consideration to the rival submissions
and have scanned through the material placed on record.
10. As could be readily noticed, the present case carries the
peculiarities of its own inasmuch as only the respondent No. 3 was named
in the FIR and was charge-sheeted on the allegations of defalcation of
E foodgrains in the godown of Corporation. No investigation whatsoever
was carried out in relation to the role of the appellant in the matter.
When the respondent No. 3 attempted to question the order passed by
the learned Magistrate taking cognizance of the offences under Sections
409, 467, 468 and 420 IPC, the High Court, though, remained disinclined
F to interfere with the order so passed by the learned Magistrate but, on
the other hand, expressed surprise that the appellant, the then District
Manager, was given a clean chit by the informant, another officer of the
Corporation; and only the respondent No. 3, a Class IV employee, was
named as an accused. The High Court even proceeded to observe that
the respondent No. 3 had been made accused in the case ‘as scapegoat
G to save the skin’ of the appellant. Therefore, the High Court directed
the learned Magistrate to give directions for further investigation in terms
of Section 173(8) CrPC with regard to the allegations against the
appellant, of misappropriation of money and of appointing the respondent
No. 3 as in-charge Assistant Godown Manager against the circulars and
directions of the Government. The High Court further observed that the
H
DEVENDRA NATH SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 707
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

directions shall be to complete the investigation with regard to the role of A
the appellant in ‘the entire game of the misappropriation of the money
as mentioned in detail in the audit report’. Indisputably, the order
impugned came to be passed by the High Court without the appellant
being a party before it and in the exercise of its inherent powers under
Section 482 CrPC.
B
10.1. Thus, and in view of the submissions made before us, two
principal questions arise for determination in this appeal: one, as to whether
the High Court, in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482
CrPC, was justified in issuing directions to the Magistrate to order further
investigation though, the Magistrate before whom the charge-sheet had
been filed and who had taken cognizance, did not adopt any such process; C
and second, as to whether the High Court was justified in passing the
order impugned without affording an opportunity of hearing to the
appellant?
11. While dealing with the first question as to the High Court’s
exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC in the manner D
the same have been exercised in this matter, we may usefully refer to
the relevant provisions of law, which would be of bearing in the
forthcoming discussion.
11.1. Section 482 CrPC, saving the inherent powers of the High
Court, whereunder and whereby the order impugned has been passed in E
this matter, reads as under: -
“482. Saving of inherent power of High Court.- Nothing in
this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers
of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to
give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of F
the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice.”
11.2. It is indisputable that as per the scheme of CrPC, formation
of an opinion as to whether the person is to be put on trial has been left
to the officer in-charge of a police station; and where the Magistrate is G
of the opinion that the result of investigation in the form of report filed
before him is not satisfactory, he may also order investigation in terms of
Sections 156(3) and/or 173(8) CrPC or he may straightway take
cognizance under Section 190(1)(c).
H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A 11.2.1. Section 156, the relevant parts of Section 173 and Section
190 CrPC read as under: -
“156. Police officer’s power to investigate cognizable case.-
(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order
of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court
B having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such
station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions
of Chapter XIII.
(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any
stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one
C which such officer was not empowered under this section to
investigate.
(3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such
an investigation as above-mentioned.”
*** *** ***
D
“173. Report of police officer on completion of
investigation.- (1) Every investigation under this Chapter shall
be completed without unnecessary delay.
*** *** ***
E (2) (i) As soon as it is completed, the officer in charge of the
police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take
cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form
prescribed by the State Government, stating –
(a) the names of the parties;
F (b) the nature of the information;
(c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with
the circumstances of the case;
(d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if
G so, by whom;
(e) whether the accused has been arrested;
(f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, whether
with or without sureties;
(g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under section 170;
H
DEVENDRA NATH SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 709
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

(h) whether the report of medical examination of the woman has A
been attached where investigation relates to an offence under
Sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA,
376DB or section 376E of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
(ii) The officer shall also communicate, in such manner as may
be prescribed by the State Government, the action taken by him, B
to the person, if any, by whom the information relating to the
commission of the offence was first given.
*** *** ***
(8) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further
investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub- C
section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon
such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains
further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the
Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in
the form prescribed; and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6) D
shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports
as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section
(2).”
*** *** ***
“190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates.- (1) Subject to E
the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class,
and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in
this behalf under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any
offence-
(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such F
offence;
(b) upon a police report of such facts;
(c) upon information received from any person other than a police
officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been
committed. G

(2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate
of the second class to take cognizance under sub-section (1) of
such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try.”

H
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A 11.3. It is hardly a matter of dispute that the Code of Criminal
Procedure contemplates various stages and vests various powers in the
Magistrate to proceed against the persons not named in the charge-
sheet like the provision contained in Section 190(1)(c). These aspects,
essentially of ordinary operation of the general scheme of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, as also underscored in the Constitution Bench
B
decision of this Court in Dharam Pal (supra) and in another decision in
Abhinandan Jha (supra) do not require much elaboration for the purpose
of the present case.
12. As noticed, the present case carries its unique features that
the learned Magistrate had not exercised any such powers in terms of
C Section 156(3) or Section 173(8) or Section 190(1)(c) CrPC but, the
High Court has, while dealing with a petition under Section 482 CrPC,
directed him to direct the police to investigate further, particularly as
regards the role of the appellant; and such exercise of power by the
High Court is in question. In this regard, we may usefully refer to the
D relevant of the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the parties.
12.1. In the case of Vinay Tyagi (supra), this Court dealt with
the wide range of issues relating to the powers of the High Court under
Section 482 CrPC as also the powers of the Magistrate under Section
173 CrPC; and different vistas of the processes of conducting ‘fresh
E investigation’ and/or ‘further investigation’. This Court observed and
held as under: -
“43. At this stage, we may also state another well-settled canon
of the criminal jurisprudence that the superior courts have the
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code or even Article 226 of
F the Constitution of India to direct “further investigation”, “fresh”
or “de novo” and even “reinvestigation”. “Fresh”, “de novo” and
“reinvestigation” are synonymous expressions and their result in
law would be the same. The superior courts are even vested with
the power of transferring investigation from one agency to another,
provided the ends of justice so demand such action. Of course, it
G is also a settled principle that this power has to be exercised by
the superior courts very sparingly and with great circumspection.
44. We have deliberated at some length on the issue that the
powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code do not
control or limit, directly or impliedly, the width of the power of the
H
DEVENDRA NATH SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 711
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

Magistrate under Section 228 of the Code. Wherever a charge- A
sheet has been submitted to the court, even this Court ordinarily
would not reopen the investigation, especially by entrusting the
same to a specialised agency. It can safely be stated and concluded
that in an appropriate case, when the Court feels that the
investigation by the police authorities is not in the proper direction
B
and that in order to do complete justice and where the facts of the
case demand, it is always open to the Court to hand over the
investigation to a specialised agency. These principles have been
reiterated with approval in the judgments of this Court
in Disha v. State of Gujarat 6 , Vineet Narain v. Union of
India7, Union of India v. Sushil Kumar Modi8 and Rubabbuddin C
Sheikh v. State of Gujarat9 .
45. The power to order/direct “reinvestigation” or “de novo”
investigation falls in the domain of higher courts, that too in
exceptional cases. If one examines the provisions of the Code,
there is no specific provision for cancellation of the reports, except D
that the investigating agency can file a closure report (where
according to the investigating agency, no offence is made out).
Even such a report is subject to acceptance by the learned
Magistrate who, in his wisdom, may or may not accept such a
report. For valid reasons, the court may, by declining to accept
such a report, direct “further investigation”, or even on the basis E
of the record of the case and the documents annexed thereto,
summon the accused.
*** *** ***
48. What ultimately is the aim or significance of the expression F
“fair and proper investigation” in criminal jurisprudence? It has a
twin purpose: Firstly, the investigation must be unbiased, honest,
just and in accordance with law; secondly, the entire emphasis on
a fair investigation has to be to bring out the truth of the case
before the court of competent jurisdiction. Once these twin
paradigms of fair investigation are satisfied, there will be the least G
requirement for the court of law to interfere with the investigation,

6
(2011) 13 SCC 337: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 628.
7
(1998) 1 SCC 226: 1998 SCC (Cri) 307.
8
(1996) 6 SCC 500.
9
(2010) 2 SCC 200: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1006. H
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A much less quash the same, or transfer it to another agency. Bringing
out the truth by fair and investigative means in accordance with
law would essentially repel the very basis of an unfair, tainted
investigation or cases of false implication. Thus, it is inevitable for
a court of law to pass a specific order as to the fate of the
investigation, which in its opinion is unfair, tainted and in violation
B
of the settled principles of investigative canons.
49. Now, we may examine another significant aspect which is
how the provisions of Section 173(8) have been understood and
applied by the courts and investigating agencies. It is true that
though there is no specific requirement in the provisions of Section
C 173(8) of the Code to conduct “further investigation” or file
supplementary report with the leave of the court, the investigating
agencies have not only understood but also adopted it as a legal
practice to seek permission of the courts to conduct “further
investigation” and file “supplementary report” with the leave of
D the court. The courts, in some of the decisions, have also taken a
similar view. The requirement of seeking prior leave of the court
to conduct “further investigation” and/or to file a “supplementary
report” will have to be read into, and is a necessary implication of
the provisions of Section 173(8) of the Code. The doctrine of
contemporanea expositio will fully come to the aid of such
E interpretation as the matters which are understood and
implemented for a long time, and such practice that is supported
by law should be accepted as part of the interpretative process.”
(emphasis supplied)

F 12.2. In the case of State of Punjab v. CBI (supra), this Court
had the occasion to deal with a petition challenging the High Court’s
directions for entrusting investigation relating to multiple FIRs to CBI,
where the FIRs had their genesis in the allegations of rape by the
respondent No. 3 against her husband and several other persons. While
dismissing the petition and declining leave to appeal under Article 136 of
G the Constitution of India, this Court exposited on the magnitude of power
of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC for securing the ends of
justice in the following passages: -
“22. Section 482 CrPC, however, states that nothing in CrPC
shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High
H
DEVENDRA NATH SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 713
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

Court to make such orders as is necessary to give effect to any A
order under CrPC or to prevent the abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Thus, the provisions
of CrPC do not limit or affect the inherent powers of the High
Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to
any order of the court or to prevent the abuse of any process of
B
the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The language
of sub-section (8) of Section 173 CrPC, therefore, cannot limit or
affect the inherent powers of the High Court to pass an order
under Section 482 CrPC for fresh investigation or reinvestigation
if the High Court is satisfied that such fresh investigation or
reinvestigation is necessary to secure the ends of justice. C
23. We find support for this conclusion in the following observations
of this Court in Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat10
cited by Mr Dhavan:
“13. It is, however, beyond any cavil that ‘further investigation’
and ‘reinvestigation’ stand on different footing. It may be that D
in a given situation a superior court in exercise of its
constitutional power, namely, under Articles 226 and 32 of the
Constitution of India could direct a ‘State’ to get an offence
investigated and/or further investigated by a different agency.
Direction of a reinvestigation, however, being forbidden in law, E
no superior court would ordinarily issue such a direction.
Pasayat, J. in Ramachandran v. R. Udhayakumar11 opined
as under:
‘7. At this juncture it would be necessary to take note of
Section 173 of the Code. From a plain reading of the above F
section it is evident that even after completion of
investigation under sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the
Code, the police has right to further investigate under sub-
section (8), but not fresh investigation or reinvestigation.’
A distinction, therefore, exists between a reinvestigation and G
further investigation.
***

10
(2009) 6 SCC 332: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1047.
11
(2008) 5 SCC 413: (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 631. H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A 15. The investigating agency and/or a court exercise their
jurisdiction conferred on them only in terms of the provisions
of the Code. The courts subordinate to the High Court even do
not have any inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure or otherwise. The precognizance jurisdiction
to remand vested in the subordinate courts, therefore, must be
B
exercised within the four corners of the Code.”
24. It is clear from the aforesaid observations of this Court that
the investigating agency or the court subordinate to the High Court
exercising powers under CrPC have to exercise the powers within
the four corners of CrPC and this would mean that the investigating
C agency may undertake further investigation and the subordinate
court may direct further investigation into the case where charge-
sheet has been filed under sub-section (2) of Section 173 CrPC
and such further investigation will not mean fresh investigation or
reinvestigation. But these limitations in sub-section (8) of Section
D 173 CrPC in a case where charge-sheet has been filed will not
apply to the exercise of inherent powers of the High Court under
Section 482 CrPC for securing the ends of justice.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.3. The decision of this Court in the case of Popular Muthiah
E (supra) has been referred to by the learned counsel for the contesting
parties in support of their respective contentions. Therein, the High Court,
while exercising its appellate jurisdiction against the judgment and order
convicting and sentencing an accused of the offence under Section 302
IPC, opined that no case was made out to interfere with judgment of the
F Trial Court in regard to the conviction of the charged accused but then,
there was evidence at every stage implicating the other persons too in
the crime; and the action on the part of the investigating officers leaving
them from the array of accused was not simply a bona fide error. The
High Court felt that the Sessions Judge ought to have exercised his
jurisdiction under Section 319 CrPC and while making adverse comments
G as regards conduct of the case, the High Court directed that the
prosecution of such other accused persons be launched. The High Court
further directed that the State shall take the advice of the Public
Prosecutor as to under what Section they were to be charged and tried;
and CB, CID shall take over the matter, reinvestigate, and prosecute
H such other accused persons. The question before this Court was about
DEVENDRA NATH SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 715
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

legality and propriety of the directions so issued by the High Court while A
exercising appellate jurisdiction and without extending an opportunity of
hearing to the persons proposed to be prosecuted. In this backdrop, this
Court exposited on the amplitude as also on the limitation of such powers
of the High Court and remitted the matter to the High Court, for
consideration afresh and after notice to the parties concerned, while
B
observing and holding as under: -
“29. The High Court while, thus, exercising its revisional or
appellate power, may exercise its inherent powers. Inherent power
of the High Court can be exercised, it is trite, both in relation to
substantive as also procedural matters.
C
30. In respect of the incidental or supplemental power, evidently,
the High Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction irrespective
of the nature of the proceedings. It is not trammelled by procedural
restrictions in that:
(i) Power can be exercised suo motu in the interest of justice. D
If such a power is not conceded, it may even lead to injustice to
an accused.
(ii) Such a power can be exercised concurrently with the
appellate or revisional jurisdiction and no formal application is
required to be filed therefor. E
(iii) It is, however, beyond any doubt that the power under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not unlimited. It
can inter alia be exercised where the Code is silent, where the
power of the court is not treated as exhaustive, or there is a specific
provision in the Code; or the statute does not fall within the purview F
of the Code because it involves application of a special law. It
acts ex debito justitiae. It can, thus, do real and substantial justice
for which alone it exists.
*** *** ***
46. The High Court, however, was not correct in issuing a direction G
to the State to take advice of the State Public Prosecutor as to
under what section the appellant has to be charged and tried or
directing CB, CID to take up the matter and reinvestigate and
prosecute the appellant herein. Such a power does not come within
the purview of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A Investigation of an offence is a statutory power of the police. The
State in its discretion may get the investigation done by any agency
unless there exists an extraordinary situation.
*** *** ***
48. The High Court while passing the impugned judgment did not
B bear the said principles in mind. It went beyond its jurisdiction in
directing the prosecution of the appellant before us. In a case of
this nature, where a superior court exercises its inherent jurisdiction,
it indisputably should remind itself about the inherent danger in
taking away the right of an accused. The High Court should have
C been circumspect in exercising the said jurisdiction. When a power
under sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is exercised, the court ordinarily should not interfere
with the statutory power of the investigating agency. It cannot
issue directions to investigate the case from a particular angle or
by a particular agency. In the instant case, not only the High Court
D had asked reinvestigation into the matter, but also directed
examination of the witnesses who had not been cited as prosecution
witnesses. It furthermore directed prosecution of the appellant
which was unwarranted in law.
*** *** ***
E
56. So far as inherent power of the High Court is concerned,
indisputably the same is required to be exercised sparingly. The
High Court may or may not in a given situation, particularly having
regard to lapse of time, exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. For
the said purpose, it was not only required to apply its mind to the
F materials on record but was also required to consider as to whether
any purpose would be served thereby.
57. Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this
case, we are of the opinion that before issuing the impugned
directions, the High Court should have given an opportunity of
G hearing to the appellants herein.
58. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment is
set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for
consideration of the matter afresh. The High Court shall issue
notice to the appellants herein as also the State and pass appropriate
H orders as it may deem fit and proper and in accordance with law.
DEVENDRA NATH SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 717
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

The appeals are allowed with the aforementioned observations A
and directions.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.4. The 3-Judge Bench decision of this Court in the case of
Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya (supra) has also been referred to by the
learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective contentions. B
Therein, this Court did not approve the impugned judgment of the High
Court insofar it was stated that post-cognizance, the Magistrate was
denuded of power to order further investigation. However, this Court
took note of the basic facts of the case that the FIR dated 22.12.2009
was concerned with two criminal acts, namely, preparing of fake and C
bogus Satakhat and power of attorney in respect of the agricultural
land in question, and demanding of an amount of Rs. 2.5 crores as an
attempt to extort money by the accused persons. It was also noticed
that the facts alleged in the application for further investigation were
pertaining to the revenue entries made in favour of R and S, and alleging
as to how their claim over the same land was false and bogus. This D
Court found that the facts alleged in the application for further
investigation were in the nature of a cross-FIR, which had never been
registered. A communication of the Commissioner of Revenue, Gujarat
dated 15.03.2011 to the Collector, Surat was also referred to in this regard.
In an overall comprehension of the matter, and in view of the said E
communication of the Commissioner of Revenue, Gujarat dated
15.03.2011, this Court held that no case for further investigation into the
facts alleged in the FIR dated 22.12.2009 was made out. However, having
regard to what was stated by the Commissioner, this Court directed the
police to register an FIR qua those facts, to be inquired into by a senior
police officer; and this Court issued further directions for appropriate F
steps on the basis of the police report. In the course of this decision, this
Court exposited on the theory and philosophy related with the aim of
investigation and inquiry as also on the wide range of powers of the
police and the Magistrate as regards investigation and further
investigation, inter alia, in the following passages: - G
“18. It is clear that a fair trial must kick off only after an
investigation is itself fair and just. The ultimate aim of all
investigation and inquiry, whether by the police or by the Magistrate,
is to ensure that those who have actually committed a crime are
correctly booked, and those who have not are not arraigned to H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A stand trial. That this is the minimal procedural requirement that is
the fundamental requirement of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India cannot be doubted. It is the hovering omnipresence of Article
21 over CrPC that must needs inform the interpretation of all the
provisions of CrPC, so as to ensure that Article 21 is followed
both in letter and in spirit.
B
*** *** ***
25. It is thus clear that the Magistrate’s power under Section
156(3) CrPC is very wide, for it is this judicial authority that must
be satisfied that a proper investigation by the police takes place.
C To ensure that a “proper investigation” takes place in the sense of
a fair and just investigation by the police—which such Magistrate
is to supervise—Article 21 of the Constitution of India mandates
that all powers necessary, which may also be incidental or implied,
are available to the Magistrate to ensure a proper investigation
which, without doubt, would include the ordering of further
D investigation after a report is received by him under Section 173(2);
and which power would continue to enure in such Magistrate at
all stages of the criminal proceedings until the trial itself
commences. Indeed, even textually, the “investigation” referred
to in Section 156(1) CrPC would, as per the definition of
E “investigation” under Section 2(h), include all proceedings for
collection of evidence conducted by a police officer; which would
undoubtedly include proceedings by way of further investigation
under Section 173(8) CrPC.
*** *** ***
F 42. ……To say that a fair and just investigation would lead to the
conclusion that the police retain the power, subject, of course, to
the Magistrate’s nod under Section 173(8) to further investigate
an offence till charges are framed, but that the supervisory
jurisdiction of the Magistrate suddenly ceases midway through
G the pre-trial proceedings, would amount to a travesty of justice,
as certain cases may cry out for further investigation so that an
innocent person is not wrongly arraigned as an accused or that a
prima facie guilty person is not so left out. There is no warrant for
such a narrow and restrictive view of the powers of the Magistrate,
particularly when such powers are traceable to Section 156(3)
H
DEVENDRA NATH SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 719
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

read with Section 156(1), Section 2(h) and Section 173(8) CrPC, A
as has been noticed hereinabove, and would be available at all
stages of the progress of a criminal case before the trial actually
commences. It would also be in the interest of justice that this
power be exercised suo motu by the Magistrate himself, depending
on the facts of each case. Whether further investigation should or
B
should not be ordered is within the discretion of the learned
Magistrate who will exercise such discretion on the facts of each
case and in accordance with law. If, for example, fresh facts
come to light which would lead to inculpating or exculpating certain
persons, arriving at the truth and doing substantial justice in a
criminal case are more important than avoiding further delay being C
caused in concluding the criminal proceeding…….”
12.5. The case of Divine Retreat Centre (supra) has had the
peculiarity of its own. Therein, the Criminal Case bearing No. 381 of
2005 had been registered at Koratty Police Station on the allegations
made by a female remand prisoner that while taking shelter in the D
appellant-Centre, she was subjected to molestation and exploitation and
she became pregnant; and thereafter, when she came out of the Centre
to attend her sister’s marriage, she was implicated in a false theft case
and lodged in jail. Parallel to these proceedings, an anonymous petition
as also other petitions were received in the High Court, which were
registered as a suo motu criminal case. In that case, the High Court, E
while exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC, directed that the said
Criminal Case No. 381 of 2005 be taken away from the investigating
officer and be entrusted to the Special Investigating Team (‘SIT’). The
High Court also directed the said SIT to investigate/inquire into other
allegations levelled in the anonymous petition filed against the appellant- F
Centre. However, this Court did not approve the order so passed by the
High Court and in that context, while observing that no unlimited and
arbitrary jurisdiction was conferred on the High Court under Section
482 CrPC, explained the circumstances under which the inherent
jurisdiction may be exercised as also the responsibilities of the
investigating officers, inter alia, in the following words: - G

“27. In our view, there is nothing like unlimited arbitrary jurisdiction
conferred on the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. The
power has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution
only where such exercise is justified by the tests laid down in the
H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A section itself. It is well settled that Section 482 does not confer
any new power on the High Court but only saves the inherent
power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the
Code. There are three circumstances under which the inherent
jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order
under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and
B
(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.
*** *** ***
39. The sum and substance of the above deliberation and analysis
of the law cited leads us to an irresistible conclusion that the
C investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for
the police officers whose powers in that field are unfettered so
long as the power to investigate into the cognizable offences is
legitimately exercised in strict compliance with the provisions under
Chapter XII of the Code. However, we may hasten to add that
unfettered discretion does not mean any unaccountable or unlimited
D discretion and act according to one’s own choice. The power to
investigate must be exercised strictly on the condition of which
that power is granted by the Code itself.
40. In our view, the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction
cannot change the investigating officer in the midstream and
E appoint any agency of its own choice to investigate into a crime
on whatsoever basis and more particularly on the basis of
complaints or anonymous petitions addressed to a named Judge.
Such communications cannot be converted into suo motu
proceedings for setting the law in motion. Neither are the accused
F nor the complainant or informant entitled to choose their own
investigating agency to investigate a crime in which they may be
interested.
41. It is altogether a different matter that the High Court in exercise
of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can
G always issue appropriate directions at the instance of an aggrieved
person if the High Court is convinced that the power of
investigation has been exercised by an investigating officer mala
fide. That power is to be exercised in the rarest of the rare case
where a clear case of abuse of power and non-compliance with
the provisions falling under Chapter XII of the Code is clearly
H made out requiring the interference of the High Court. But even
DEVENDRA NATH SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 721
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

in such cases, the High Court cannot direct the police as to how A
the investigation is to be conducted but can always insist for the
observance of process as provided for in the Code.”
(emphasis supplied)
12.6. In the case of Madan Mohan (supra), this Court, of course,
reiterated the settled principles that no superior Court could issue a B
direction/mandamus to any subordinate Court commanding them to pass
a particular order but, the questioned directions had been as regards
dealing with a bail application, which were not approved by this Court
while observing, inter alia, as under: -
“15. In our considered opinion, the High Court had no jurisdiction C
to direct the Sessions Judge to “allow” the application for grant of
bail. Indeed, once such direction had been issued by the High
Court then what was left for the Sessions Judge to decide except
to follow the directions of the High Court and grant bail to
Respondents 2 and 3. In other words, in compliance to the D
mandatory directions issued by the High Court, the Sessions Judge
had no jurisdiction to reject the bail application but to allow it.
16. No superior court in hierarchical jurisdiction can issue such
direction/mandamus to any subordinate court commanding them
to pass a particular order on any application filed by any party. E
The judicial independence of every court in passing the orders in
cases is well settled. It cannot be interfered with by any court
including superior court.”
12.7. In the case of Neetu Kumar Nagaich (supra), this Court
issued directions for de novo investigation in regard to the unnatural F
death of a law student. We need not elaborate on the said decision for
the fact that such directions were issued under the writ jurisdiction of
this Court.
13. For what has been noticed hereinbefore, we could reasonably
cull out the principles for application to the present case as follows:
G
(a) The scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is to
ensure a fair trial and that would commence only after a fair and just
investigation. The ultimate aim of every investigation and inquiry, whether
by the police or by the Magistrate, is to ensure that the actual perpetrators
of the crime are correctly booked and the innocents are not arraigned to
stand trial. H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A (b) The powers of the Magistrate to ensure proper investigation
in terms of Section 156 CrPC have been recognised, which, in turn,
include the power to order further investigation in terms of Section 173(8)
CrPC after receiving the report of investigation. Whether further
investigation should or should not be ordered is within the discretion of
the Magistrate, which is to be exercised on the facts of each case and in
B
accordance with law.
(c) Even when the basic power to direct further investigation in a
case where a charge-sheet has been filed is with the Magistrate, and is
to be exercised subject to the limitations of Section 173(8) CrPC, in an
appropriate case, where the High Court feels that the investigation is not
C in the proper direction and to do complete justice where the facts of the
case so demand, the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC could be
exercised to direct further investigation or even reinvestigation. The
provisions of Section 173(8) CrPC do not limit or affect such powers of
the High Court to pass an order under Section 482 CrPC for further
D investigation or reinvestigation, if the High Court is satisfied that such a
course is necessary to secure the ends of justice.
(d) Even when the wide powers of the High Court in terms of
Section 482 CrPC are recognised for ordering further investigation or
reinvestigation, such powers are to be exercised sparingly, with
E circumspection, and in exceptional cases.
(e) The powers under Section 482 CrPC are not unlimited or
untrammelled and are essentially for the purpose of real and substantial
justice. While exercising such powers, the High Court cannot issue
directions so as to be impinging upon the power and jurisdiction of other
F authorities. For example, the High Court cannot issue directions to the
State to take advice of the State Public Prosecutor as to under what
provision of law a person is to be charged and tried when ordering further
investigation or reinvestigation; and it cannot issue directions to investigate
the case only from a particular angle. In exercise of such inherent powers
in extraordinary circumstances, the High Court cannot specifically direct
G that as a result of further investigation or reinvestigation, a particular
person has to be prosecuted.
14. Applying the principles aforesaid to the facts of the present
case, what we find is that, in relation to the allegations of defalcation of
goods and misappropriation of stocks from the godown of the Corporation,
H the person lodging the FIR with reference to the audit report, i.e., the
DEVENDRA NATH SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 723
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

Senior Dy. Collector-cum-District Manager, made imputations only A
against the respondent No. 3, who was a class IV employee of the
Corporation but was purportedly posted as an in-charge Assistant Godown
Manager by the appellant, who was, at the relevant time, holding the
position of the District Manager. Though several features of the actions
and omissions at the relevant time have been mentioned in the audit
B
report, we do not propose to dilate on the same. Suffice it to observe for
the present purpose that when all the relevant aspects were duly projected
before the High Court in the petition filed by the respondent No. 3, the
High Court could not have simply ignored the same only for the reasons
that the informant omitted to state them while lodging the FIR, and/or
the investigating officer overlooked them while submitting the result of C
investigation, and/or the learned Magistrate did not pay requisite attention
to them while taking cognizance.
14.1. In the given set of facts and circumstances, we are satisfied
that the present one had been such a case of exceptional and special
features where the High Court was justified in ordering further D
investigation, particularly qua the role of the appellant. Thus, the principal
part of the order impugned, directing further investigation, in our view,
calls for no interference12.
15. However, there are certain other aspects and features of the
order impugned which are difficult to be appreciated and approved. The E
High Court has chosen to use such harsh and severe expressions in the
impugned order which carry all the potential of causing prejudice to the
appellant and even to distract a fair and dispassionate investigation. As
noticed, the High Court has made its comments that the ‘entire game
was played’ by the appellant who was holding the position of District
Manager. The High Court has even stated that the appellant was F
‘ultimately responsible for all such irregularities’. The High Court
has gone to the extent of observing that the respondent No. 3 was made
an accused in the case ‘as scapegoat to save the skin’ of the appellant.
These and other akin observations in the order impugned lead to the
12
G
It could be noticed that in the impugned order dated 10.09.2018, the High Court has
employed three different expressions as to the expected course of action where the
Magistrate has been directed to ‘give direction to the police to further reinvestigate ’ and
to ‘direct the police to complete the re-investigation’ as also to consider ‘the materials
which will come during further investigation’. However, it is apparent that on the
substance of the matter, the directions are to ensure ‘further investigation’ in the
matter, particularly with regard to the role of the appellant. H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A position as if the High Court has already concluded on the result of
investigation against the appellant. It is entirely a different matter to
order further investigation on being prima facie satisfied about the
requirement to do so in view of exceptional circumstances pertaining to
a given case but, while doing so in exercise of inherent powers, the High
Court has not been justified in making such observations and remarks
B
which are likely to operate over and above the investigation and may
cause prejudice to the appellant. As noticed, the principle remains settled
that the High Court cannot issue directions to investigate the case from
a particular angle.
16. Thus, we are of the view that in the given set of facts and
C circumstances, though the High Court has rightly exercised its powers
under Section 482 CrPC for directing further investigation but, has not
been justified in making such observations, comments, and remarks, which
leave little scope for an independent investigation and which carry all
the potential to cause prejudice to the appellant. The first question in this
D appeal is answered accordingly.
17. Adverting to the other question, i.e., as to whether the High
Court was justified in passing the order impugned without affording an
opportunity of hearing to the appellant, we may refer to some of the
relevant decisions cited in this regard.
E 17.1. The case of Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia (supra) had
been concerning the exercise of the powers of revision by the High
Court after dismissal of a complaint under Section 203 CrPC. This Court
pointed out that in such a revision petition, the accused/suspect arraigned
in the complaint gets the right of hearing before the Revisional Court, as
F is expressly provided in Section 401(2) CrPC. This Court, however, made
it clear that if the complaint is restored for fresh consideration of the
Magistrate, the persons who are alleged to have committed the crime
shall have no right to participate in the proceedings nor would they be
entitled to any hearing until consideration of the matter by the Magistrate
for issuance of process. This Court said, inter alia, as under: -
G
“53. ….We hold, as it must be, that in a revision petition preferred
by the complainant before the High Court or the Sessions Judge
challenging an order of the Magistrate dismissing the complaint
under Section 203 of the Code at the stage under Section 200 or
after following the process contemplated under Section 202 of
H
DEVENDRA NATH SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 725
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

the Code, the accused or a person who is suspected to have A
committed the crime is entitled to hearing by the Revisional Court.
In other words, where the complaint has been dismissed by the
Magistrate under Section 203 of the Code, upon challenge to the
legality of the said order being laid by the complainant in a revision
petition before the High Court or the Sessions Judge, the persons
B
who are arraigned as accused in the complaint have a right to be
heard in such revision petition. This is a plain requirement of Section
401(2) of the Code. If the Revisional Court overturns the order of
the Magistrate dismissing the complaint and the complaint is
restored to the file of the Magistrate and it is sent back for fresh
consideration, the persons who are alleged in the complaint to C
have committed the crime have, however, no right to participate
in the proceedings nor are they entitled to any hearing of any sort
whatsoever by the Magistrate until the consideration of the matter
by the Magistrate for issuance of process. We answer the question
accordingly. The judgments of the High Courts to the contrary
D
are overruled.”
(emphasis supplied)
17.2. The layout and backdrop of, as also the questions involved
in, the case of W.N. Chadha (supra) were of their own peculiarities.
For the present purpose, suffice it to notice that as regards the process E
and manner of investigation, which included the issues relating to a letter
of rogatory, this Court, inter alia, pointed out the exclusion of the principle
of audi alteram partem in relation to an accused at the stage of
investigation in the following terms: -
“80. The rule of audi alteram partem is a rule of justice and its F
application is excluded where the rule will itself lead to injustice.
In S.A. de Smith’s Judicial Review of Administrative Action,
(4th Edn.) at page 184, it is stated that in administrative law, a
prima facie right to prior notice and opportunity to be heard may
be held to be excluded by implication in the presence of some
factors, singly or in combination with another. Those special factors G
are mentioned under items (1) to (10) under the heading “Exclusion
of the audi alteram partem rule”.
81. Thus, there is exclusion of the application of audi alteram
partem rule to cases where nothing unfair can be inferred by not
H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A affording an opportunity to present and meet a case. This rule
cannot be applied to defeat the ends of justice or to make the law
“lifeless, absurd, stultifying and self-defeating or plainly contrary
to the common sense of the situation” and this rule may be
jettisoned in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive
necessity so demands.
B
*** *** ***
89. Applying the above principle, it may be held that when the
investigating officer is not deciding any matter except collecting
the materials for ascertaining whether a prima facie case is made
C out or not and a full enquiry in case of filing a report under Section
173(2) follows in a trial before the Court or Tribunal pursuant to
the filing of the report, it cannot be said that at that stage rule of
audi alteram partem superimposes an obligation to issue a prior
notice and hear the accused which the statute does not expressly
recognise. The question is not whether audi alteram partem is
D implicit, but whether the occasion for its attraction exists at all.
90. Under the scheme of Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, there are various provisions under which no prior notice
or opportunity of being heard is conferred as a matter of course
to an accused person while the proceeding is in the stage of an
E investigation by a police officer.
*** *** ***
92. More so, the accused has no right to have any say as regards
the manner and method of investigation. Save under certain
F exceptions under the entire scheme of the Code, the accused has
no participation as a matter of right during the course of the
investigation of a case instituted on a police report till the
investigation culminates in filing of a final report under Section
173(2) of the Code or in a proceeding instituted otherwise than on
a police report till the process is issued under Section 204 of the
G Code, as the case may be. Even in cases where cognizance of an
offence is taken on a complaint notwithstanding that the said
offence is triable by a Magistrate or triable exclusively by the
Court of Sessions, the accused has no right to have participation
till the process is issued. In case the issue of process is postponed
as contemplated under Section 202 of the Code, the accused may
H
DEVENDRA NATH SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 727
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

attend the subsequent inquiry but cannot participate. There are A
various judicial pronouncements to this effect but we feel that it is
not necessary to recapitulate those decisions. At the same time,
we would like to point out that there are certain provisions under
the Code empowering the Magistrate to give an opportunity of
being heard under certain specified circumstances.”
B
(emphasis supplied)
17.3. It could also be usefully recapitulated that in the case of
Popular Muthiah (supra), even when not disapproving the exercise of
inherent powers by the High Court irrespective of the nature of
proceedings (of course, while laying down the limitations on such exercise C
of powers), this Court also observed that in the peculiar circumstances
of the case, where investigation was being ordered against the persons
who were not investigated earlier, the High Court should have given
them an opportunity of hearing before issuing the impugned directions.
Thus, the impugned judgment was set aside and the matter was remitted
to the High Court for consideration afresh, after notice to the appellants D
as also to the State.
18. In an appropriate application of the principles aforesaid, we
are clearly of the view that even though the decision in W.N. Chadha
(supra) shall have no direct application to the present case but then, the
observation concerning opportunity of hearing, as occurring in E
Manharibhai Muljibhai Kakadia (supra), also does not enure to the
benefit of the appellant because therein, the matter before the High
Court had been a revision petition governed by Section 401 CrPC and
by virtue of sub-section (2) thereof, opportunity of hearing to the affected
party remains a statutory mandate13. In Popular Muthiah (supra), of F
course, this Court held that the said appellant against whom the High
Court was issuing directions for investigation should have been given an
opportunity of hearing but, that had been the observation in the unique
and peculiar circumstances of the case where the crime in question had
already gone through one round of trial, with one person having been
tried and convicted. Moreover, while disapproving unwarranted directions G

13
Section 401 CrPC provides for the wide revisional powers of the High Court and its
sub-section (2) reads as under: -
“(2) No order under this section shall be made to the prejudice of the accused or
other person unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by
pleader in his own defence.” H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 15 S.C.R.

A of the High Court as regards prosecution of the appellant, this Court also
indicated that the High Court ought to have considered if any purpose
would be served by its directions. It cannot be said that in Popular
Muthiah, this Court has laid down a rule of universal application that in
every such case of exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC for
ordering further investigation (which are even otherwise to be invoked
B
sparingly and in exceptional cases), the Court is obliged to extend an
opportunity of hearing to the person whose actions/omissions are to be
investigated. In our view, the question of opportunity of hearing in such
matters would always depend upon the given set of facts and
circumstances of the case.
C 19. On the facts and in the circumstances of the present case, we
are clearly of the view that no purpose would be served by adopting the
course of Popular Muthiah (supra) where this Court restored the matter
for reconsideration of the High Court with an opportunity of hearing to
the appellant therein. Some of the prominent and peculiar circumstances
D of the present case are that the allegations and imputations have their
genesis in the documentary evidence in the form of departmental
instructions and the audit report; the fact that the appellant was holding
the office of the District Manager at the relevant point of time is not in
dispute; and hereinbefore, we have upheld the exercise of inherent powers
by the High Court in directing further investigation qua the role of the
E appellant.
19.1. We have also taken note of the submissions that, according
to the appellant, he had already been exonerated of all charges after
detailed departmental proceedings; and such a fact did not appear before
the High Court for want of notice to him. For the present purpose, suffice
F it to observe that even if the appellant had been exonerated in the
departmental proceedings, such a fact, by itself, may not be conclusive
of criminal investigation; and for this fact alone, the High Court could
not have ignored all other features of the case and the material factors
that had surfaced before it.
G 20. At this juncture, and in the last segment of this discussion, it
may also be observed that we have taken note of another peculiar feature
connected to this case that apart from the subject-matter of the present
appeal, being Barh P.S. Case No. 115 of 2012, there had also been
another matter, being Bikram P.S. Case No. 129 of 2012 against the
H respondent No. 3 as also the present appellant, pertaining to similar
DEVENDRA NATH SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 729
[DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.]

allegations of misappropriation of goods. As per the submissions made A
on behalf of the State, in the said Bikram P.S. Case No. 129 of 2012,
instituted for offences under Sections 409, 420, 468, 471 and 474 IPC,
after finding prima facie case against the present appellant, prosecution
sanction has also been obtained; and after the order passed by the High
Court, the investigation in the present case was also carried out along
B
with the aforesaid Bikram P.S. Case No. 129 of 2012. According to the
affidavit filed on behalf of the State, prima facie complicity of the appellant
has been found but, in this case, prosecution sanction has not been
obtained for the appellant having been given interim protection by this
Court.
20.1. We would hasten to observe that the aforesaid submissions C
on behalf of the State have only been taken note of without pronouncing
on the merits thereof and while leaving every aspect open for examination
and consideration of the respective investigating agency, sanctioning
authority, and the Court at the appropriate stage and in an appropriate
manner. These submissions have been referred to herein only in order to D
indicate that viewed from any angle, there does not appear any just and
strong reason to restore the matter for reconsideration of the High Court.
21. In the totality of circumstances and in the larger interest of
justice, we are clearly of the view that in this case, the investigation
contemplated by the order impugned should be allowed to be taken to its E
logical end but, while effacing the unwarranted and unnecessary
observations of the High Court14, lest there be any prejudice to any
party only because of such observations. In other words, the entire matter
is left open for examination by the investigating agency, by the sanctioning
authority, and by the Court concerned at the relevant stage and in
accordance with law. F

22. Accordingly and in view of the above, this appeal fails and is,
therefore, dismissed but, with the observations foregoing and while
effacing the unwarranted and unnecessary observations of the High
Court in the order impugned.
G

Ankit Gyan Appeal dismissed.

14
As discussed in paragraph ‘15’ hereinbefore. H