DR. MEHMOOD NAYYAR AZAMversusSTATE OF CHATTISGARH AND ORS.

                    [2012] 8 S.C.R. 651


              DR. MEHMOOD NAYYAR AZAM                             A
                              v.
          STATE OF CHATTISGARH AND ORS.
            (Civil Appeal Noo. 5703 of 2012)

                     AUGUST 03, 2012
                                                                  B
   [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.)

     Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21 - Right to life -
Custodial torture - Compensation for - Appellant-doctor
arrested in respect of alleged criminal offences and sent to      C
police custody - Self-humiliating words were written on a
placard and the appellant was asked to hold it and
photographs were taken - The photographs were circulated in
general public and were also filed by one of the respondents
in a revenue proceeding - Appellant sought public law remedy      D
for grant·of compensation - High Court arrived at the finding
that appellant was indeed subjected to custodial torture and
accordingly directed him to submit representation to the State
Government for grant of compensation - Appellant submitted
such representation, but the State Government rejected the        E
same - Appellant thus did not receive any compensation for
number of years - On appeal, held: The precious right
guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be denied
to convicts, undertrials, detenus and other prisoners in
custody, except according to the procedure established by law     F
by placing such reasonable restrictions as permitted by law -
When an accused is in custody, his Fundamental Rights are
not abrogated in toto - Any treatment meted out to an accused
while he is in custody which causes humiliation and mental
trauma corrodes the concept of human dignity - On facts,          G
clearly the appellant underwent mental torture at the hands
of insensible police officials and was subjected to social
humiliation - The inhuman treatment can be well visualized
 when the appellant came out from custody and witnessed his
                             651                                  H
    652      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A photograph being circulated with the self-condemning words
  written on it - This withers away the very essence of life as
  enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution - Jn the facts
  and circumstances of the case, appellant entitled to Rs.5
  lakhs as compensation - Respondent-State directed to grant
B such amount and later recover it from the salary of the erring
  officials - Human Rights - Universal Declaration of Human
  Rights, 1948 - Article 5 -Police - Duty of the police authorities.

         Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 32 and 226 - Writ
   proceedings seeking enforcement or protection of
C fundamental rights - Grant of 'compensation' in such
   proceedings - Nature of - Held: When the court moulds the
   relief by granting 'compensation' in proceedings under Article
   32 or 226 seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental .
   rights, it does so under the public law by way of penalizing the
D wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the ..public wrong on the
   State which has failed in its public duty to protect the
   fundamental rights of the citizen - The payment of
   compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it is
   generally understood in a civil action for damages under the
E private law but in the broader sense of providing relief by an
   order of making 'monetary amends' under the public Jaw for
   the wrong done due to breach of public duty, by not protecting
   the fundamental rights of the citizen - The compensation is
  in the nature of 'exemplary damages' awarded against the
F wrongdoer for the breach of its public Jaw duty and is
  independent of the rights available to the aggrieved party to
  claim compensation under the private law in an action based
  on tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent
  jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law
G - Public Law remedy.
       Words and Phrases - "harassment" and "torture" -
    Meaning of.

        The appellant, an Ayurvedic Doctor with a B.A.M.S.
H
    DR. MEHMOOD NAYYAR AZAM v. STATE OF                  653
               CHATTISGARH
degree, used to raise agitations and spread awareness           A
against exploitation of people belonging to weaker and
marginalized sections of the society which apparently
hurt the vested interests of the local coal mafia, trade
union leaders, police officers and other groups. He was
arrested in respect of the alleged offence under Indian         B
Penal Code, 1860 and the Electricity Act, 2003. There was
a direction by the Magistrate for judicial remand but
thereafter instead of taking him to jail, the next day he was
brought to the police station. In police custody, self-
humiliating words were written on a placard and the             c
appellant was asked to hold it and photographs were
taken. The photographs were circulated in general public
and were also filed by one of the respondents in a
revenue proceeding.

     The appellant filed writ petition before the High Court    D
with a prayer for punishing the erring officials on the
foundation that their action was a complete transgression
of human rights which affected his fundamental right
especially his right to live with dignity as enshrined under
Article 21 of the Constitution. In the writ petition, prayer    E
was also made for awarding him compensation to the
tune of Rs.10 lakhs.

     The High Court found that the appellant was
harassed at the hands of police officers and thereby it did     F
tantamount to custodial torture and eventually directed
the appellant to submit a representation to the State
Government for grant of compensation. It is an admitted
position that the State authorities had taken cognizance
of the harassment meted out to the appellant by the             G
erring personnel of the police department and initiated
departmental enquiry against them in which they were
found guilty and punishment had also been awarded to
them.
                                                                H
    654      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 8 S.C.R.

A      Subsequently, the appellant submitted a
  representation but the State Government rejected the
  same stating that the appellant had put forth the claim of
  compensation on the ground of defamation; and being
  a case of defamation, the issue of compensation could
B only be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
  and the State Government could not take any decision
  in this regard.

       The question which therefore arose for consideration
  in the instant appeal was whether the appellant should
C be asked to initiate a civil action for grant of damages on
  the foundation that he was defamed or he should be
  granted compensation on the bedrock that he was
  harassed in police custody.

D         Allowing the appeal, the Court

         HELD:1.1. The reverence of life is insegragably
    associated with the dignity of a human being who is
    basically divine, not servile. The spark of life gets more
E   resplendent when man is treated with dignity sans
    humiliation, for every man is expected to lead an
    honourable life which is a splendid gift of "creative
    intelligence". When a dent is created in the reputation,
    humanism is paralysed. Living with dignity has been
    enshrined in our Constitutional philosophy and it has its
F   ubiquitous presence, and the majesty and sacrosanct
    dignity cannot be allowed to be crucified in the name of
    some kind of police action. The aforesaid prologue gains
    signification since in the case at hand, a doctor,
    humiliated in custody, sought public law remedy for grant
G   of compensation and the High Court, despite no factual
    dispute, has required him to submit a representation to
    the State Government for adequate relief pertaining to
    grant of compensation after expiry of 19 years with a
    further stipulation that if he is aggrieved by it, he can take
H   recourse to requisite proceedings available to him under
     DR. MEHMOOD NAYYAR AZAM v. STATE OF              655
                CHATTISGARH
law. This is not only asking a man to prefer an appeal       A
from Caesar to Caesar's wife but it also compels him like
a cursed Sisyphus to carry the stone to the top of the
mountain wherefrom the stone rolls down and he is
obliged to repeatedly perform that futile exercise. [Paras
2, 3] [662-E-H; 663-A-D]                                     B

     1.2. As a social activist, the appellant ushered in
immense awareness among the down-trodden people
which caused discomfort to the people who had vested
interest in the coal mine area. The powerful coal mafia,     C
trade union leaders, police officers and other persons
who had fiscal interest felt disturbed and threatened him
with dire consequences and pressurized him to refrain
from such activities. Embedded to his committed stance,
the appellant declined to succumb to such pressure and
continued the activities. When the endeavor failed to        D
silence and stifle the agitation that was gaining strength
and momentum, a consorted maladroit effort was made
to rope him in certain criminal offences. [Para 4] [663-F-
H]
                                                            E
     2. If the functionaries of the Government become law-
breakers, it is bound to breed contempt for law and
would encourage lawlessness and every man would
have the tendency to become law unto himself thereby
leading to anarchy. No civilized nation can permit that to F
happen, for a citizen does not shed off his fundamental
right to life, the moment a policeman arrests him. The
right to life of a citizen cannot be put in abeyance on his
arrest. The precious right guaranteed by Article 21 of the
Constitution of India cannot be denied to convicts, G
undertrials, detenus and other prisoners in custody,
except according to the procedure established by law by
placing such reasonable restrictions as are permitted by
law. [Para 22] [672-E-H]

     D.K. Basu v. State of WB. AIR 1997 SC 610: (1997) 1     H
    656     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A SCC 416 and Joginder Kumar v. State of UP. (1994) 4 SCC
  260 - relied on.

       3. The term "harassment" in its connotative expanse
  includes torment and vexation. The term "torture" also
  engulfs the concept of torment. The. word "torture" in its
8
  denotative concept includes mental and psychological
  harassment. [Para 23] [673-D]

         P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon, Second Edition -
    referred to.
c
        4. When an accused is in custody, his Fundamental
  Rights are not abrogated in toto. His dignity cannot be
  allowed to be comatosed. The right to life is enshrined
  in Article 21 of the Constitution and a fortiorari, it includes
0 the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along
  with it. Inhuman treatment has many a facet. It
  fundamentally can cover such acts which have been
  inflicted with an intention to cause physical suffering or
  severe mental pain. It would also include a treatment that
E is inflicted that causes humiliation and compels a person
  to act against his will or conscience. A man's reputation
  forms a facet of right to life as engrafted under Article 21
  of the Constitution. There is no shadow of doubt that any
  treatment meted out to an accused while he is in custody
  which causes humiliation and mental trauma corrodes
F the concept of human dignity. The majesty of law protects
  the dignity of a citizen in a society governed by law. It
  cannot be forgotten that the Welfare State is governed by
  rule of law which has paramountcy. The Constitution as
  the organic law of the land has unfolded itself in manifold
G manner like a living organism in the various decisions of
  the court about the rights of a person under Article 21 of
  the Constitution of India. When citizenry rights are
  sometimes dashed against and pushed back by the
  members of City Halls, there has to be a rebound and
H when the rebound takes place, Article 21 of the
    DR. MEHMOOD NAYYAR AZAM v. STATE OF               657
               CHATTISGARH
Constitution springs up to action as a protector. That is    A
why, an investigator to a crime is required to possess the
qualities of patience and perseverance. It is the
sacrosanct duty of the police authorities to remember that
a citizen while in custody is not denuded of his
fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution.      B
The restrictions imposed have the sanction of law by
which his enjoyment of fundamental right is curtailed but
his basic human rights are not crippled so that the police
officers can treat him in an inhuman manner. On the
contrary, they are under obligation to protect his human     c
rights and prevent all forms of atrocities. A balance has
to be struck. [Paras 26, 28, 30, 36 and 38] [675-D-G; 676-
A-B-C; 677-C-E; 678-E-F]

     Suni/ Gupta and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and
others (1990) 3 SCC 119: 1990 (2) SCR 871; Bhim Singh, D
MLA v. State of J & K (1985) 4 SCC 677; Francis Coralie
Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and others
(1981) 1 SCC 608: 1981 (2) SCR 516; D.K. Basu v. State of
WB. AIR 1997 SC 610 : (1997) 1 SCC 416; Kharak Singh
v. State of U. P. (1964) 1 SCR 332; Arvinder Singh Bagga v. E
State of U.P. and others AIR 1995 SC 117: 1994 (4) Suppl.
SCR 310; Smt. Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry and
another (1989) 1 SCC 494: 1989 (1) SCR 20; Board of
Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar
Raghavendranath Nadkarni and others (1983) 1 SCC 124: F
1983 (1) SCR 828; Smt. Se/vi and others v. State of
Karnataka AIR 2010 SC 1974: 2010 (5) SCR 381;
Vishwanath Slo Sitaram Agrawal v. Sau. Sar/a Vishwanath
Agrawal 2012 (6) SCALE 190; Nandini Sathpaty v. P. L. Dani
AIR (1978) SC 1025: 1978 (3) SCR 608 and Delhi Judicial G
Services Association v. State of Gujarat (1991) 4 SCC 406:
1991 (3) SCR 936 - relied on.

    Munn v. Illinois (1877) 94 US 113 and D. F. Marion v.
Davis 55 ALR 171 - referred to.                           _H
    658     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 8 S.C.R.

A      5.1. In the case at hand, the appellant, while in
  custody, was compelled to hold a placard in which
  condemning language was written. He was
  photographed with the said placard and the photograph
  was made public. It was also filed in a revenue proceeding
B by the 5th respondent. The High Court recorded that the
  competent authority of the State has conducted an
  enquiry and found the erring officers to be guilty. The
  High Court recorded the findings in the favour of the
  appellant but left him to submit a representation to the
c concerned authorities. This Court granted an opportunity
  to the State to deal with the matter in an appropriate
  manner but it rejected the representation. This Court is
  really concerned how in a country governed by rule of
  law and where Article 21 of the Constitution is treated to
  be sacred, the dignity and social reputation of a citizen
0
  has been affected. [Para 39] [679-D-G]

         5.2. As perceived from the admitted facts borne out
    on record, the appellant has been humiliated. Such
    treatment is basically inhuman and causes mental
E   trauma. Any psychological torture inflicts immense
    mental pain. A mental suffering at any age in life can carry
    the brunt and may have nightmarish effect on the victim.
    The hurt develops a sense of insecurity, helplessness
    and his self-respect gets gradually atrophied. In the case
F   at hand, the police authorities possibly have some kind
    of sadistic pleasure or to "please someone" meted out
    the appellant with this kind of treatment. It is not to be
    forgotten that when dignity is lost, the breath of life gets
    into oblivion. In a society governed by rule of law where
G   humanity has to be a laser beam, as our compassionate
    constitution has so emphasized, the police authorities
    cannot show the power or prowess to vivisect and
    dismember the same. When they pave such path, law
    cannot become a silent spectator. [Para 40] [679-H; 680-
H   A-E]
      DR. MEHMOOD NAYYAR AZAM v. STATE OF                 659
                 CHATTISGARH
      Jennison v. Baker (1972) 1 All ER 997 1006 - referred      A
to.

      "Kaplan & Sadock's Synopsis of Psychiatry" - referred
to.

     6.1. It is clear that the appellant was tortured while he   B
was in custody. When there is contravention of human
rights, the inherent concern as envisaged in Article 21
springs to life and enables the citizen to seek relief by
taking recourse to public law remedy. [Para 41] [680-G-
H]                                                               c
     6.2. The purpose of public law is not only to civilize
public power but also to assure the citizen that they live
under a legal system which aims to protect their interests
and preserve their rights. Therefore, when the court             D
moulds the relief by granting 'compensation' in
proceedings ul!der Article 32 or 226 seeking enforcement
or protection of fundamental rights, it does so under the
public law by way of penalizing the wrongdoer and fixing
the liability for the public wrong on the State which has        E
failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights
of the citizen. The payment of compensation in such
cases is not to be understood, as it is generally
understood in a civil action for damages under the private
law but in the broader sense of providing relief by an
                                                                 F
order of making 'monetary amends' under the public law
for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, by not
protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen. The
compensation is in the nature of 'exemplary damages'
awarded against the wrongdoer for the breach of its
public law duty and is independent of the rights available       G
to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the
private law in an action based on tort, through a suit
instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction or/and
prosecute the offender under the penal law. [Para 43]
[681-G-H; 682-A-D]                                               H
    660     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A        6.3. On a reflection of the facts of the case, it is
    luculent that the appellant had undergone mental torture
    at the hands of insensible police officials. He might have
    agitated to ameliorate the cause of the poor and the
    downtrodden, but, the social humiliation that has been
B   meted out to him is quite capable of destroying the heart
    of his philosophy. It has been said that philosophy has
    the power to sustain a man's courage. But courage is
    based on self-respect and when self-respect is dented,
    it is difficult even for a very strong minded person to
c   maintain that courage. The initial invincible mind paves
    the path of corrosion. As is perceptible, the mindset of
    the protectors of law appears to cause torment and insult
    and tyrannize the man who is helpless in custody. There
    can be no trace of doubt that he is bound to develop
    stress disorder and anxiety which destroy the brightness
0
    and strength of the will power. It has been said that
    anxiety and stress are slow poisons. When torment is
    added, it creates commotion in the mind and the slow
    poisons get activated. The inhuman treatment can be well
    visualized when the appellant came out from custody and
E   witnessed his photograph being circulated with the self-
    condemning words written on it. This withers away the
    very essence of life as enshrined under Article 21 of the
    Constitution. Regard being had to the various aspects
    and taking note of the totality of facts and circumstances,
F   a sum of Rs.5.00 lacs (Rupees five lacs only) should be
    granted towards compensation to the appellant and,
    accordingly, it is so directed. The said amount shall be
    paid by the respondent State within a period of six weeks
    and be realized from the erring officers in equal
G   proportions from their salary as thought appropriate by
    the competent authority of the State. [Para 46] [684-C-H;
    685-A]

      Nilabati Behera v. State or Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746:
H 1993 (2) SCR 581; Sube Singh v. State of Haryana AIR 2006
    DR. MEHMOOD NAYYAR AZAM v. STATE OF             661
               CHATTISGARH
SC 1117: 2006 (2) SCR 67 and Hardeep Singh v. State of A
Madhya Pradesh (2012) 1 SCC 748 - relied on.

                    Case Law Reference:
  (1997) 1 sec 416         relied on      Para 19, 21,
                                          26, 38          B
  (1994) 4 sec 260         relied on      Para 21, 22
  1990 (2) SCR 871         relied on      Para 24
  (1985) 4 sec 677         relied on      Para 25         c
  1981 (2) SCR 516         relied on      Para 26
  (1964) 1 SCR 332         relied on      Para 27
  (1877) 94 us 113         referred to    Para 27
                                                          D
  1994 (4) Suppl. SCR 310relied on        Para 29
  1989 (1) SCR 20          relied on      Para 31
  55 ALR 171               referred to    Para 31
  1983 (1) SCR 828         relied on      Para 32         E

  2010 (5) SCR 381         relied on      Para 33
  2012 (6) SCALE 190       relied on      Para 34
  1978 (3) SCR 608         relied on      Para 36         F
  1991 (3) SCR 936         relied on      Para 37
  1972 1 All ER 997 1006 referred to      Para 40
  1993 (2) SCR 581         relied on      Para 42
                                                          G
  2006 (2) SCR 67          relied on      Para 44
  (2012) 1 sec 748         relied on      Para 45

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
5703 of 2012.                                             H
    662      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A       From the Judgment & Order dated 3.8.2010 of the High
    Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in W.P. No. 1156 of 2001.

          Niraj Sharma for the Appellant.

         Dr. Rajesh Pandey, Mahesh Pandey, Mridula Ray
B   Bharadwaj, Atul Jha, Sandeep Jha, Dharmendra Kumar Sinha,
    Arvind Kumar, Jogy Scaria for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. Leave granted.
c
         2. Albert Schweitzer, highlighting on Glory of Life,
   pronounced with conviction and humility, "the reverence of life
   offers me my fundamental principle on morality". The aforesaid
   expression may appear to be an individualistic expression of
D a great personality, but, when it is understood in the complete
   sense, it really denotes, in its conceptual essentiality, and
   connotes, in its macrocosm, the fundamental perception of a
  thinker about the respect that life commands. The reverence
   of life is insegragably associated with the dignity of a human
E being who is basically divine, not servile. A human personality
   is endowed with potential infinity and it blossoms when dignity
   is sustained. The su~tenance of such dignity has to be the
  superlative concern of every sensitive soul. The essence of
  dignity can never be treated as a momentary spark of light or,
F for that matter, 'a brief candle', or 'a hollow bubble'. The spark
  of life gets more resplendent when man is treated with dignity
  sans humiliation, for every man is expected to lead an
  honourable life which is a splendid gift of "creative intelligence".
  When a dent is created in the reputation, humanism is
G paralysed. There are some megalomaniac officers who
  conceive the perverse notion that they are the 'Law' forgetting
  that law is the science of what is good and just and, in very
  nature of things, protective of a civilized society. Reverence for
  the nobility of a human being has to be the corner stone of a
H body polity that believes in orderly progress. But, some, the
    DR. MEHMOOD NAYYAR AZAM v. STATE OF                    663
         CHATTISGARH [DIPAK MISRA, J.)
incurable ones, become totally oblivious of the fact that living   A
with dignity has been enshrined in our Constitutional philosophy
and it has its ubiquitous presence, and the majesty and
sacrosanctity dignity cannot be allowed to be crucified in the
name of some kind of police action.
                                                                   B
     3. The aforesaid prologue gains signification since in the
case at hand, a doctor, humiliated in custody, sought public law
remedy for grant of compensation and the High Court, despite
no factual dispute, has reeiuired him to submit a representation
to the State Government for adequate relief pertaining to grant C
of compensation after expiry of 19 years with a further
stipulation that if he is aggrieved by it, he can take recourse to
requisite proceedings available to him under law. We are
pained to say that this is not only asking a man to prefer an
appeal from Caesar to Caesar's wife but it also compels him
like a cursed Sisyphus to carry the stone to the top of the D
mountain wherefrom the stone rolls down and he is obliged to
repeatedly perform that futile exercise.

     4. The factual matrix as uncurtained is that the appellant,
an Ayurvedic Doctor with B.A.M.S. degree, while practising in E_
West Chirmiri Colliery, Pondi area in the State of Chhattisgarh,
used to raise agitations and spread awareness against
exploitation of people belonging to weaker and marginalized
sections of the society. As a social activist, he ushered in
immense awareness among the down-trodden people which F
caused discomfort to the people who had vested interest in the
coal mine area. The powerful coal mafia, trade union leaders,
police officers and other persons who had fiscal interest felt
disturbed and threatened him with dire consequences and
pressurized him to refrain from such activities. Embedded to G
his committed stance, the petitioner declined to succumb to
such pressure and continued the activities. When the endeavor
failed to silence and stifle the agitation that was gaining
strength and momentum, a consorted maladroit effort was
made to rope him in certain criminal offences.
                                                                   H
    664       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2012] 8 S.C.R.


A         5. As the factual narration further unfolds, in the initial
    stage, cases under Section 110/116 of the Criminal Procedure
    Code were initiated and thereafter crime No. 15/92 under
    Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'the IPC') and
    crime No. 41/92 under Sections 427 and 379 of the IPC were
B   registered. As the activities gathered further drive and became
    more pronounced, crime No. 62/90 was registered for an
    offence punishable under Section 379 of the IPC for alleged
    theft of electricity. In the said case, the appellant was taken into
    custody.
c         6. Though he was produced before the Magistrate on
    22.9.1992 for judicial remand and was required to be taken to
     Baikunthpur Jail, yet by the time the order was passed, as. it
    was evening, he was kept in the lock up at Manendragarh
     Police Station. On 24.9.1992, he was required to be taken to
D   jail but instead of being taken to the jail, he was taken to Pondi .
    Police Station at 9.00 a.m. At the police station, he was abused
    and assaulted. As asseverated, the physical assault was the
    beginning of ill-treatment. Thereafter, the SHO and ASI, the
    respondent Nos. 3 and 4, took his photograph compelling him
E   to hold a placard on which it was written :-

          "Main Dr. M.N. Azam Chhal Kapti Evam Chor Badmash
          Hoon". (I, Dr. M. N. Azam, am a cheat, fraud, thief and
          rascal).
F        7. Subsequently, the said photograph was circulated in
    general public and even in the revenue proceeding, the
    respondent No. 5 produced the same. The said atrocities and
    the torture of the police caused tremendous mental agony and
    humiliation and, hence, the petitioner submitted a complaint to
G   the National Human Rights Commission who, in turn, asked the
    Superintendant of Police, District Koria to submit a report. As
    there was no response from the 2nd respondent the
    Commission again required him to look into the grievances
    and take proper action. When no action was taken by the
H
     DR. MEHMOOD NAYYAR AZAM v. STATE OF                     665
          CHATIISGARH [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
respondent or the police, the petitioner was compelled to            A
invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court of
Judicature at Bilaspur, Chattisgarh with a prayer for punishing
the respondent Nos. 4, 5 & 7 on the foundation that their action
was a complete transgression of human rights which affected
his fundamental right especially his right to live with dignity as   B
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution. In the Writ
Petition, prayer was made for awarding compensation to the
tune of Rs. 10 lakhs.

      8. After the return was filed, the learned single Judge
        a
passed detailed order on 3.1.2003 that the Chief Secretary . C
and the Director General of Police should take appropriate
steps for issue of direction to the concerned authorities to take
appropriate action in respect of the erring officers. Thereafter,
some developments took place and on 24.3.2005, the Court
recorded that the writ petitioner was arrested on 22.9.1992 and D
his photograph was taken at the police station. The learned
single Judge referred to Rule 1 of Regulation 92 of Chhattisgarh
Police Regulations which lays down that no Magistrate shall
order photograph of a convict or other person to be taken by
the police for the purpose of Identification under Prisoners Act, E
1920, unless he is satisfied that such photograph is required
for circulation to different places or for showing it for the purpose
of identification to a witness who cannot easily be brought to a
test identification at the place where the investigation is
conducted or that photograph is required to be preserved as F
a permanent record. Thereafter, the learned single Judge
proceeded to record that not only the photograph of the writ
petitioner had been taken with the placard but had also been
circulated which had caused great mental agony and trauma
to his school going children. Thereafter, he referred to G
Regulation 737 of the Chhattisgarh Police Regulations which
relates to action to be taken by the superior officer in respect
of an erring officer who ill-treats an accused.

     9. After referring to various provisions, the learned single
                                                                     H
    666       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A Judge called for a report from the Chief Secretary. On
   18.11.2005, the Court was apprised that despite several
  communications, the Chief Secretary had not yet sent the
  report. Eventually, the report was filed stating that the appellant
  was involved in certain cases including grant of bogus medical
B certificate and regard being had to the directions issued in
  1992 that the photograph of the offender should be kept on
  record, the same was taken and affixed against his name and
  after 7.9.1992, it was removed from the records. It was also
  stated that the Sub-Inspector had been imposed punishment
c of "censure" by the Superintendent of Police on 19.11..2001. It
  was also set forth that on 3.5.2003, a charge-sheet was served
  on all the erring officers and a departmental enquiry was held
  and in the ultimate eventuate, they had been imposed major
  penalty of withholding of one annual increment with cumulative
  effect for one year commencing 27.5.2004. That apart, on
0
  19.7.2005, a case had been registered under Section 29 of
  the Police Act against the erring officers.

        10. It is apt to note here that when the matter was listed
  for final hearing for grant of compensation, the learned single
E Judge referred the matter to be heard by a Division Bench.

         11. The Division Bench referred to the prayer clause and
    various orders passed by the learned single Judge and
    eventually directed the appellant to submit a representation to
F   the Chief Secretary for grant of compensation. We think it
    appropriate to reproduce the relevant paragraphs of the order
    passed by the Division Bench: -

          "4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that during
          the pendency of the writ petition, Relief Clause No. 7.3 was
G         fulfilled under the directions of this court and now only the
          compensation part, as claimed in Relief Clause No. 7.5A,
          remained there.

          5.   In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the
H         respondent State authorities have taken cognizance of the
    DR. MEHMOOD NAYYAR AZAM v. STATE OF                     667
         CHATTISGARH [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
    harassment meted out to the petitioner by the erring           A
    personnel of the police department and initiated
    departmental enquiry against them in which they were
    found guilty and punishment has also been awarded to
    them."
                                                                   B
     12. After issuing notice, this Court, on 17.2.2012, thought
it apposite that the appellant should submit a representation
within a week which shall be considered by the respondents
within four weeks therefrom ..

     13. In pursuance of the aforesaid order, the appellant        C
submitted a representation which has been rejected on
19.3.2012 by the OSD/Secretary, Government of Chhattisgarh,
Home (Police) Department. In the rejection order, it has been
stated as follows: -
                                                                   D
          "In the aforesaid cases, the arrest and the action
    regarding submission of chargesheet in the Hon'ble Court
    was in accordance with law.

    (2) On 24.9.92 the police officers taking your photograph
    and writing objectionable words thereon was against the        E
    legal procedure. Considering this, action was taken
    against the concerned guilty police officers in accordance
    with law and two police officers were punished.

     (3) In your representation, compensation has been             F
     demanded on the following two grounds:

     A. Defamation was caused due to the police officers
     taking photograph.

     B. Your wife became unwell mentally. She is still unwell.     G

     C. Difficulty in marriage of daughter.

            Regarding the aforesaid grounds, the actual position
     is as follows:
                                                                   H
    668         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A          A.    Defamation is such a subject, the decision on which
                 is within jurisdiction of the competent court. No
                 decision pertaining to defamation has been
                 received from the court of competent jurisdiction.
                 Therefore, it would not be proper for the State
B                Government to take a decision in this regard.

           B.    Regarding mental ailment of your wife, no such
                 basis has been submitted by you, on the basis of
                 which any conclusion may be drawn.

C          C.    On the point of there being no marriage of children
                 also no such document or evidence has been
                 produced by you before the Government along with
                 the representation, on the basis of which any
                 decision may be taken.
D
               Therefore, in the light of the above, the State
          Government hereby rejects your representation and
          accordingly decides your representation."

        14. Mr. Niraj Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the
E appellant, submitted that when the conclusion has been arrived
  at that the appellant was harassed at the hands of the police
  officers and in the departmental enquiry they have been found
  guilty and punished, just compensation should have been
  awarded by the High Court. It is further urged by him that this
F Court had directed to submit a representation to grant an
  opportunity to the functionaries of the State to have a proper
  perceptual shift and determine the amount of compensation
  and grant the same, but the attitude of indifference reigned
  supreme and no fruitful result ensued. It is canvassed by him
G that it would not only reflect the non-concern for a citizen who
  has been humiliated at the police station, but, the manner in
  which the representation has been rejected clearly exhibits the
  imprudent perception and heart of stone of the State. It is
  argued that the reasons ascribed by the State authority that
H defamation is such a subject that the issue of compensation
     DR. MEHMOOD NAYYAR AZAM v. STATE OF                      669
          CHATTISGARH [DIPAK MISRA, J.)
has to be decided by the competent court and in the absence           A
of such a decision, the Government cannot take a decision as
regards the compensation clearly reflects the deliberate
insensitive approach to the entire fact situation inasmuch as the
High Court, in categorical terms, had found that the allegati9ns
were true and the appellant was harassed and thereby it did           B
tantamount to custodial torture and there was no justificatinn to
adopt a hyper-technical mode to treat it as a case of defamation
in the ordinary sense of the term and requiring the appellant to
take recourse to further adjudicatory process and obtain a
decree from the civil court.
                                                                      c
     15. Mr. Atul Jha, learned counsel appearing for the State,
has supported the order of the High Court as well as the order
passed by the competent authority of the State who has rejected
the representation on the foundation that when the appellant puts
forth a claim for compensation on the ground of defamation,           D
he has to take recourse to the civil court and, therefore, no fault
can be found with the decision taken either by the High Court
or the subsequent rejection of the representation by the
a_uthority of the State.
                                                                      E
     16. The learned counsel appearing for the private
respondents has submitted that they have already been
punished in a disciplinary proceeding and, therefore, the
question of grant of compensation does not arise and even if
it emerges, the same has to be determined by the civil court
                                                                      F
on the base of evidence adduced to establish defamation.

     17. At the very outset, we are obliged to state that five
aspects are clear as day and do not remotely admit of any
doubt. First, the appellant was arrested in respect of the alleged
offence under Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Electricity Act,        G
2003; second, there was a direction by the Magistrate for
judicial remand and thereafter instead of taking him to jail the
 next day he was brought to the police station; third, self-
 humiliating words were written on th.e placard and he was
 asked to hold it and photographs were taken; and fourth, the         H
    670       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A   photographs were circulated in general public and were also
    filed by one of the respondents in a revenue proceeding; and
    five, the High Court, in categorical terms, has found that the
    appellant was harassed.

         18. In the aforesaid backdrop, the singular question
8   required to be posed is that whether the appellant should be
    asked to initiate a civil action for grant of damages on the
    foundation that he has been defamed or this Court should grant
    compensation on the bedrock that he has been harassed in
    police custody.
c
         19. At this juncture, it is condign to refer to certain
    authorities in the field. In D.K. Basu v. State of WB. 1 it has been
    held thus: -

          "10. "Torture" has not been defined in the Constitution or
D
          in other penal laws. "Torture" of a human being by another
          human being is essentially an instrument to impose the will
          of the "strong" over the "weak" by suffering. The word
          torture today has become synonymous with the darker side
          of human civilization.
E
              "Torture is a wound in the soul so painful that
        sometimes you can almost touch it, but it is also so
        intangible that there is no way to heal it. Torture is anguish
        squeezing in your chest, cold as ice and heavy as a stone,
F       paralyzing as sleep and dark as the abyss. Torture is
        despair and fear and rage and hate. It is a desire to kill
     - _and destroy including yourself."

                                                   -Adriana P. Bartow

G         11. No violation of any one of the human rights has been
          the subject of so many Conventions and Declarations as
          "torture" - all aiming at total banning of it in all forms, but
          in spite of the commitments made to eliminate torture, the

H 1. AIR 1997 SC 610 : (1997) 1 sec 416
     DR. MEHMOOD NAYYAR AZAM v. STATE OF                       671
          CHATTISGARH [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
     fact remains that torture is more widespread now than ever A
     before. "Custodial torture" is a naked violation of human
     dignity and degradation which destroys, to a very large
     extent, the individual personality. It is a calculated assault
     on human dignity and whenever human dignity is wounded,
     civilization takes a step backward - flag of humanity must B
     on each such occasion fly half-mast.

     12. In all custodial crimes what is of real concern is not only
     infliction of body pain but the mental agony which a person
     undergoes within the four walls of police station or lock-        C
     up. Whether it is physical assault or rape in police custody,
     the extent of trauma, a person experiences is beyond the
     purview of law."

     20. We have referred to the aforesaid paragraphs to
highlight that this Court has emphasized on the concept of D
mental agony when a person is confined within the four walls
of police sta'tion or lock-up. Mental agony stands in
contradistinction to infliction of physical pain. In the said case,
the two-Judge Bench referred to Article 5 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 which provides that "No one E
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment". Thereafter, the Bench adverted to
Article 21 and proceeded to state that the expression "life or
personal liberty" has been held to include the right to live with
human dignity and thus, it would also include within itself a F
guarantee against torture and assault by the State or its
functionarie.s. Reference was made to Article 20(3) of the
Constitution which postulates that a person accused of an
offence shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself.

     21. It is worthy to note that in the case of O.K. Basu (supra), G
the concern shown by this Court in Joginder Kumar v. State of
U.P2. was taken note of. In Joginder Kumar's case, this Court
voiced its concern regarding complaints of violation of human

2.   (1994) 4 sec 2so.                                                 H
    672        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2012] 8 S.C.R.


A   rights during and after arrest. It is apt to quote a passage from
    the same: -

                "The horizon of human rights is expanding. At the
          same time, the crime rate is also increasing. Of late, this
          Court has been receiving complaints about violations of
B
          human rights because of indiscriminate arrests. How are
          we to strike a balance between the two?

                 A realistic approach should be made in this direction.
          The law of arrest is one of balancing individual rights,
c         liberties and privileges, on the one hand, and individual
          duties, obligations and responsibilities on the other; of
          weighing and balancing the rights, liberties and privileges
          of the single individual and those of individuals collectively;
          of simply deciding what is wanted and where to put the
D         weight and the emphasis; of deciding which comes first -
          the criminal or society, the law violator or the law abider... "

           22. After referring to the case of Joginder Kumar (supra),
    A.S. Anand, J. (as his Lordship then was), dealing with the
E    various facets of Article 21, stated that any form of torture or
    cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would fall within the
    ambit of Article 21 of the Constitution, whether it occurs during
    investigation, interrogation or otherwise. If the functionaries of
    .the Government become law-breakers, it is bound to breed
    contempt for law and would encourage lawlessness and every
F   man would have the tendency to become law unto himself
    thereby leading to anarchy. No civilized nation can permit that
    to happen, for a citizen does not shed off his fundamental right
    to life, the moment a policeman arrests him. The right to life of
    a citizen cannot put in abeyance on his arrest. The precious
G   right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot
    be denied to convicts, undertrials, detenus and other prisoners
    in custody, except according to the procedure established by
    law by placing such reasonable restrictions as are permitted
    bylaw.
H
      DR. MEHMOOD NAYYAR AZAM v. STATE OF                      673
           CHATTISGARH [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

    23. At this juncture, it becomes absolutely necessary to            A
appreciate what is meant by the term "harassment". In P.
Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon, Second Edition, the term
"harass" has been defined, thus: -

      "Harass. "injure" and "injury" are words having numerous          B
      and comprehensive popular meanings, as well as having
      a legal import. A line may be drawn between these words
      and the word "harass" excluding the latter from being
      comprehended within the word "injure" or "injury". The
      synonyms of "harass" are: To weary, tire, perplex, distress
      tease, vex, molest, trouble, disturb. They all have relation
                                                                        c
      to niental annoyance, and a troubling of the spirit."

     The term "harassment" in its connotative expanse includes
torment and vexation. The term "torture" also engulfs the
concept of torment. The word "torture" in its denotative concept        D
includes mental and psychological harassment. The accused
in custody can be put under tremendous psychological
pressure by cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.

      24. At this juncture, we may refer with profit to a two-Judge     E
Bench decision in Sunil Gupta and others v. State of Madhya
Pradesh and others3 . The said case pertained to handcuffing
where the accused while in judicial custody were being escorted
to court from jail and bound in fetters. In that context, the Court
stated that the escort party should record reasons for doing so
                                                                        F
in writing and intimate the court so that the court, considering
the circumstances may either approve or disapprove the action
of the escort party and issue necessary directions. The Court
further observed that when the petitioners who had staged
'Dharna' for public cause and voluntarily submitted themselves
for arrest and who had no tendency to escape, had been                  G
 subjected to humiliation by being handcuffed, such act of the
escort party is against all norms of decency and is in utter
 violation of the principle underlying Article 21 of the Constitution

 3.   (1990) 3 sec 119                                                  H
    674       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A of India. The said act was condemned by this Court to be
  arbitrary and unreasonably humiliating towards the citizens of
  this country with the obvious motive of pleasing 'someone'.

       25. In Bhim Singh, MLA v. State of J & K4, this Court
  expressed the view that the police officers should have greatest
8
  regard for personal liberty of citizens as they are the custodians
  of law and order and, hence, they should not flout the law by
  stooping to bizarre acts of lawlessness. It was observed that
  custodians of law and order should not become depredators
C of civil liberties, for their duty is to protect and not to abduct.

       26. It needs no special emphasis to state that when an
  accused is in custody, his Fundamental Rights are not
  abrogated in toto. His dignity cannot be allowed to be
  comatosed. The right to life is enshrined in Article 21 of the
D Constitution and a fortiorari, it includes the right to live with
  human dignity and all that goes along with it. It has been so
  stated in Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union
  Territory of Delhi and others5 and D.K. Basu (supra).

E        27. In Kharak Singh v. State of U. P., 6 this court approved
    the observations of Field, J. in Munn v. lllinois7 :-

          "By the term "life" as here [Article 21] used something
          more is meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition
          against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and
F         faculties by which life is enjoyed."

        28. It is apposite to note that inhuman tre.atment has many
  a facet. It fundamentally can cover such acts which have been
  inflicted with an intention to cause physical suffering or severe
G mental pain. It would also include a treatment that is inflicted

    4.   (1985) 4 sec 677.
    5.   (1981) 1 sec 608.
    6.   (1964) 1 SCR 332.
H 7. (1877) 94 us 113.
     DR. MEHMOOD NAYYAR AZAM v. STATE OF                       675
          CHATTISGARH [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

that causes humiliation and compels a person to act against            A
his will or conscience.

     29. In Arvinder Singh Bagga v. State of UP. and others8,
it has been opined that torture is not merely physical but may
even consist of mental and psychological torture calculated to
                                                                       8
create fright to submit to the demands of the police.

    30. At this stage, it is seemly to refer to the decisions of
some of the authorities relating to a man's reputation which
forms a facet of right to life as engrafted under Article 21 of the
Constitution.                                                       C

      31. In Smt. Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry and
another9, this Court reproduced an observation from the
decision in 0. F. Marion v. Davis 10 :-
                                                                       D
      "The right to enjoyment of a private reputation, unassailed
      by malicious slander is of ancient origin, and is necessary
      to human society. A good reputation is an element of
      personal security, and is protected by the Constitution
      equally with the right to the enjoyment of life, liberty and
      property."                                                   E

      32. In Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v.
Di/ipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkami and others 11, it has
been ruled that right to reputation is a facet of right to life of a
citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution.                          F

     33. In Smt. Se/vi and others v. State of Kamataka 12, while
dealing with the involuntary administration of certain scientific
techniques, namely, narcoanalysis, polygraph examination and
the Brain Electrical Activation Profile test for the purpose of G
8.   AIR 1995 SC 117.
9.   (1989) 1   sec 494.
10. 55 ALR 171.
11. (1983) 1    sec 124.
12. AIR 2010 SC 1974.                                                  H
    676        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A   improving investigation efforts in criminal cases, a three-Judge
    Bench opined that the compulsory administration of the
    impugned techniques constitute 'cruel, inhuman or degrading
    treatment' in the context of Article 21. Thereafter, the Bench
    adverted to what is the popular perception of torture and
B   proceeded to state as follows: -

          "The popular perceptions of terms such as 'torture' and
          'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment' are associated with
          gory images of blood-letting and broken bones. However,
          we must recognize that a forcible intrusion into a person's
c         mental processes is also an affront to human dignity and
          liberty, often with grave and long-lasting consequences. [A
          similar conclusion has been made in the following paper:
          Marcy Strauss, 'Criminal Defence in the Age of Terrorism
          - Torture', 48 New York Law School Law Review 201-274
D         (2003/2004 )). "

         After so stating, the Bench in its conclusion recorded as
    follows: -

          "We have also elaborated how the compulsory
E
          administration of any of these techniques is an unjustified
          intrusion into the mental privacy of an individual. It would
          also amount to 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment' with
          regard to the language of evolving international human
          rights norms."
F
         34. Recently in Vishwanath S/o Sitaram Agrawal v. Sau.
    Sar/a Vishwanath Agrawa/1 3, although in a different context,
    while dealing with the aspect of reputation, this Court has
    observed as follows: -
G
          " ........ reputation which is not only the salt of life, but also
          the purest treasure and the most precious perfume of life.
          It is extremely delicate and a cherished value this side of


H   13. 2012 (6) SCALE 190.
    DR. MEHMOOD NAYYAR AZAM v. STATE OF                     677
         CHATTISGARH [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
    the grave. It is a revenue generator for the present as well   A
    as for the posterity."

    35. We have referred to these paragraphs to understand
how with the efflux of time, the concept of mental torture has
been understood throughout the world, regard being had to the      8
essential conception of human dignity.

      36. From the aforesaid discussion, there is no shadow of
doubt that any treatment meted out to an accused while he is
in custody which causes humiliation and mental trauma
corrodes the concept of human dignity. The majesty of law C
protects the dignity of a citizen in a society governed by law. It
cannot be forgotten that the Welfare State is governed by rule
of law which has paramountcy. It has been said by Edward
 Biggon "the laws of a nation form the most instructive portion
 of its history." The Constitution as the organic law of the land D
 has unfolded itself in manifold manner like a living organism in
 the various decisions of the court about the rights of a person
 under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. When citizenry rights
 are sometimes dashed against and pushed back by the
 members of City Halls, there has to be a rebound and when E
 the rebound takes place, Article 21 of the Constitution springs
 up to action as a protector. That is why, an investigator to a
 crime is required to possess the qualities of patience and
 perseverance as has been stated in Nandini Sathpaty v. P. L.
~~~                                                                F
     37. In Delhi Judicial Services Association v. State of
 Gujarat'~ while dealing with the role of police, this Court
 condemned the excessive use of force by the police and
 observed as follows:-
                                                                   G
      "The main objectives of police is to apprehend offenders,
      to investigate crimes and to prosecute them before the
      courts and also to prevent commission of crime and above
 14. AIR 1978 SC 1025.
 15. (1991) 4 sec 406.                                             H
     678      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2012] 8 S.C.R.

 A         all to ensure law and order to protect citizens' life and
          property. The law enjoins the police to be scrupulously fair
          to the offender and the Magistracy is to ensure fair
          investigation and fair trial to an offender. The purpose and
          object of Magistracy and police are complementary to
 B        each other. It is unfortunate that these objectives have
          remained unfulfilled even after 40 years of our Constitution.
          Aberrations of police officers and police excesses in
          dealing with the law and order situation have been subject
         of adverse comments from this Court as well as from other
c        courts but it has failed to have any corrective effect on it.
         The police has power to arrest a person even without
         obtaining a warrant of arrest from a court. The amplitude
         of this power casts an obligation on the police and it must
         bear in mind, as held by this Court that if a person is
         arrested for a crime, his constitutional and fundamental
D
         rights must not be violated."

        38. It is imperative to state that it is the sacrosanct duty of
   the police authorities to remember that a citizen while in custody
   is not denuded of his fundamental right under Article 21 of the
E Constitution. The restrictions imposed have the sanction of law
  by which his enjoyment of fundamental right is curtailed but his
  basic human rights are not crippled so that the police officers
  can treat him in an inhuman manner. On the contrary, they are
  under obligation to protect his human rights and prevent all
F forms of atrocities. We may hasten to add that a balance has
  to be struck and, in this context, we may fruitfully quote a
  passage from D. K. Basu (supra): -

        "There can be no gainsaying that freedom of an individual
        must yield to the security of the State. The right of
G
        preventive detention of individuals in the interest of ser.urity
        of the State in various situations prescribed under different
        statutes has been upheld by the Courts. The right to
        interrogate the detenus, culprits or arre:;tees in the interest
        of the nation, must take precedence over an individual's
H
   DR. MEHMOOD NAYYAR AZAM v. STATE OF                      679
        CHATIISGARH [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
    right to personal liberty ........... The action of the State, A
    however, must be "right, just and fair". Using any form of
    torture for extracting any kind of information would neither
    be 'right nor just nor fair' and, therefore, would be
    impermissible, being offensive to Article 21. Such a crime-
    suspect must be interrogated-indeed subjected to sustain B
    and scientific interrogation-determined in accordance with
    the provisions of law. He cannot, however, be tortured or
     subjected to third degree methods or eliminated with a
     view to elicit information, extract confession or derive
     knowledge about his accomplishes, weapons etc. His c
     constitutional right cannot be abridged except in the
     manner permitted by law, though in the very nature of things
     there would be qualitative difference in the method of
     interrogation of such a person as compared to an ordinary
     criminal."
                                                                     D
     39. In the case at hand, the appellant, while in custody, was
compelled to hold a placard in which condemning language
was written. He was photographed with the said placard and
the photograph was made public. It was also filed in a revenue
proceeding by the 5th respondent. The High Court has                 E
recorded that the competent authority of the State has
conducted an enquiry and found the erring officers to be guilty.
The High Court has recorded the findings in the favour of the
appellant but left him to submit a representation to the
concerned authorities. This Court, as has been indicated             F
earlier, granted an opportunity to the State to deal with the
matter in an appropriate manner but it rejected the
 representation and stated that it is not a case of defamation.
We may at once clarify that we are not at all concerned with
defamation as postulated under Section 499 of the IPC. We            G
 are really concerned how in a country governed by rule of law
 and where Article 21 of the Constitution is treated to be sacred,
 the dignity and social reputation of a citizen has been affected.

     40. As we perceive, from the admitted facts borne out on
                                                                     H
     680        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 8 S.C.R.


A record, the appellant has been humiliated. Such treatment is
   basically inhuman and causes mental trauma. In "Kaplan &
   Sadock's Synopsis of Psychiatry", while dealing with torture,
   the learned authors have stated that intentional physical and
   psychological torture of one human by another can have
B emotionally damaging effects comparable to, and possibly
   worse than, those seen with combat and other types of trauma. ·
  Any psychological torture inflicts immense mental pain. A
  mental suffering at any age in life can carry the brunt and may
   have nightmarish effect on the victim. The hurt develops a sense
c of insecurity, helplessness and his self-respect gets gradually
  atrophied. We have referred to such aspects only to highlight
  that in the case /at hand, the police authorities possibly have
  some kind of sadistic pleasure or to "please someone" meted
  out the appellant with this kind of treatment. It is not to be
  forgotten that when dignity is lost, the breath of life gets into
0
  oblivion. In a society governed by rule of law where humanity
  has to be a laser beam, as our compassionate constitution has
  so emphasized, the police authorities cannot show the power
  or prowess to vivisect and dismember the same. When they
  pave such path, law cannot become a silent spectator. As
E Pithily stated in Jennison v. Baker16 :-

         "The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those
         who defy if go free, and those who seek its protection lose
         hope."
F
        41. Presently, we shall advert to the aspect of grant of
  compensation. The learned counsel for the State, as has been
   indicated earlier, has submitted with immense vehemence that
  the appellant should sue for defamation. Our analysis would
  clearly show that the appellant was tortured while he was in
G custody. When there is contravention of human rights, the
  inherent concern as envisaged in Article 21 springs to life and
  enables the citizen to seek relief by taking recourse to public
  law remedy.
H   16. (1972) 1 All Er 997, 1006.
    DR. MEHMOOD NAYYAR AZAM v. STATE OF                       681
         CHATTISGARH [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
     42. In this regard, we may fruitfully refer to Nilabati Behera     A
v. State or Orissa' 7 wherein it has been held thus: -

     "A claim in public law for compensation for contravention
     of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the protection
     of which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an B
     acknowledged remedy for enforcement and protection of
     such rights, and such a claim based on strict liability made
     by resorting to a constitutional remedy provided for the
      enforcement of a fundamental right is 'distinct from, and
      in addition to, the remedy in private law for damages for
      the tort' resulting from the contravention of the fundamental C
      right. The defence of sovereign immunity being
       inapplicable, and alien to the concept of guarantee of
       fundamental rights, there can be no question of such a
       defence being available in the constitutional remedy. It is
       this principle which justifies award of monetary D
       compensation for contravention of fundamental rights
        guaranteed by the Constitution, when that is the only
        practicable mode of redress available for the contravention
        made by the State or its servants in the purported exercise
        of their powers, and enforcement of the fundamental right E
        is claimed by resort to the remedy in public law under the
        Constitution by recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of the
        Constitution."

      43. Dr. A.S. Anand J., (as his Lordship then was), in his             F
 concurring opinion, expressed that the relief of monetary
 compensation, as exemplary damages, in proceedings under
 Article 32 by the Supreme Court or under Article 226 by the
 High Courts for established infringement of the indefeasible
 right guaranteed under Article 21 is a remedy available in public          G
 law and is based on the strict liability for contravention of the
 guaranteed basic and indefeasible rights of the citizen. The
  purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but also
  to assure the citizen that they live under a legal system which
  17. (1993) 2 sec 746.                                                     H
        682    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 8 S.C.R.

    A  aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights.
       Therefore, when the court moulds the relief by granting
       'compensation' in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 seeking
      enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does so
      under the public law by way of penalizing the wrongdoer and
  B fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has
      failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the
      citizen. The payment of compensation in such cases is not to
      be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action for
      damages .under the private law but in the broader sense of
 c    providing relief by an order of making 'monetary amends' under
     the public law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty,
      by not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen. The
     compensation is in the nature of 'exemplary damages' awarded
     against the wrongdoer for the breach of its public law duty and
     is independent of the rights available to the aggrieved party to
 0
    claim compensation under the private law in an action based
    on tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent
    jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law.

      44. In Sube Singh v. State of Haryana' 8, a three-Judge
E Bench of the Apex Court, after referring to its earlier decisions,
  has opined as follows: -

          "It is thus now well settled that award of compensation
          against the State is an appropriate and effective remedy
F         for redress of an established infringement of a fundamental
          right under Article 21, by a public servant. The quantum of
         compensation will, however, depend upon the facts and
         circumstances of each case. Award of such compensation
         (by way of public law remedy) will not come in the way of
         the aggrieved person claiming additional compensation in
G
         a civil court, in enforcement of the private law remedy in
         tort, nor come in the way of the criminal court ordering
         compensation under Section 357 of Code of Civil
         Procedure."
H 18. AIR2006SC1117.
     DR. MEHMOOD NAYYAR AZAM v. STATE OF                       683
          CHATTISGARH [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
     45. At this stage, we may fruitfully refer to the decision in A
Hardeep Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh 19 • The appellant
therein was engaged in running a coaching centre where
students were given tuition to prepare for entrance test for
different professional courses. On certain allegation, he was
arrested and taken to police station where he was handcuffed B
by the police without there being any valid reason. A number
of daily newspapers published the appellant's photographs and
 on seeing his photograph in handcuffs, the appellant's elder
 sister was so shocked that she expired. After a long and
 delayed trial, the appellant, Hardeep Singh, filed a writ petition     c
 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur that the
 prosecution purposefully caused delay in conclusion of the trial
 causing harm to his dignity and reputation. The learned single
 Judge, who dealt with the matter, did not find any ground to
 grant compensation. On an appeal being preferred, the Division
                                                                    0
 Bench observed that an expeditious trial ending in acquittal
 could have restored the appellant's personal dignity but the
 State instead of taking prompt steps to examine the
 prosecution witnesses delayed the trial for five long years. The
 Oivision Bench further held there was no warrant for putting the
 handcuffs on the appellant which adversely affected his dignity. E
 Be it noted, the Division Bench granted compensation of Rs.
 70,0001-. This Court, while dealing with the facet of
 compensation, held thus:-

      "Coming, however, to the issue of compensation, we find           F
      that in light of the findings arrived at by the Division Bench,
      the compensation of Rs. 70,000/- was too small and did
      not do justice to the sufferings and humiliation undergone
      by the appellant. In the facts and circumstances of the
      case, we feel that a sum of Rs. 2,00,00/- (Rupees Two             G
      Lakhs) would be an adequate compensation for the
      appellant and would meet the ends of justice. We,
       accordingly, direct the State of Madhya Pradesh to pay to

  19. (2012) 1   sec 748.                                               H
     684       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 8 S.C.R.


 A         the appellant the sum of Rs. 2,00,000/-(rupees Two Lakhs)
           as compensation. In case the sum of Rs.70.000/- as
           awarded by the High Court, has already been paid to the
           appellant, the State would naturally pay only the balance
           amount of Rs.1,30,000/- (Rupees One Lakh thirty
 B         thousand)".

        Thus, suffering and humiliation were highlighted and
     amount of compensation was enhanced.

         46. On a reflection of the facts of the case, it is luculent
C that the appellant had undergone mental torture at the hands
    of insensible police officials. He might have agitated to
    ameliorate the cause of the poor and the downtrodden, but, the
   social humiliation that has been meted out to him is quite
   capable of destroying the heart of his philosophy. It has been
D said that philosophy has the power to sustain a man's courage.
   But courage is based ort self-respect and when self-respect is
   dented, it is difficult even for a very strong minded person to
   maintain that courage. The initial invincible mind paves the path
   of corrosion. As is perceptible, the mindset of the protectors
E of law appears to cause torment and insult and tyrannize the
   man who is helpless in custody. There can be no trace of doubt
   that he is bound to develop stress disorder and anxiety which
  destroy the brightness and strength of the will power. It has
   been said that anxiety and stress are slow poisons. When
F torment is added, it creates commotion in the mind and the slow
  poisons get activated. The inhuman treatment can be well
  visualized when the appellant came out from custody and
  witnessed his photograph being circulated with the self-
  condemning words written on it. This withers away the very
G essence of life as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution.
  Regard being had to the various aspects which we have
  analysed and taking note of the totality of facts and
  circumstances, we are disposed to think that a sum of Rs.5.00
  lacs (Rupees five lacs only) should be granted towards
  compensation to the appellant and, accordingly, we so direct.
H
    DR. MEHMOOD NAYYAR AZAM v. STATE OF               685
         CHATTISGARH [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
The said amount shall be paid by the respondent State within A
a period of six weeks and be realized from the erring officers
in equal proportions from their salary as thought appropriate
by the competent authority of the State.

     47. Consequently, the appeal is allowed to the extent
                                                              8
indicated above. However, in the facts and circumstances of
the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

B.B.B.                                     Appeal allowed.