GAUTAM SATNAMIversusSTATE OF CHHATTISGARH

                 [2026] 4 S.C.R. 417 : 2026 INSC 325

                            Gautam Satnami
                                    v.
                          State of Chhattisgarh
                    (Criminal Appeal No. 1782 of 2026)
                                 07 April 2026
      [Prashant Kumar Mishra* and Vipul M. Pancholi, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant
       is entitled to the benefit of doubt and ought to be acquitted of the
       charge u/s.302 IPC.

                                  Headnotes†
       Circumstantial evidence – Suspicion howsoever strong, cannot
       take the place of proof – Appellant was convicted u/s.302, IPC
       based on inter alia the ‘last-seen’ testimony of PW-4; recovery
       of a blood-stained axe and clothes pursuant to disclosure
       u/s.27; and recovery of the driving licence of the appellant
       from the spot – Interference with:
       Held: The ‘last-seen’ testimony of PW-4 does not inspire
       confidence – The major distinction between the case of the present
       appellant and that of accused No. 2 (who was acquitted) is the
       ‘last-seen’ testimony of PW-4 – If that circumstance is excluded
       from consideration, the position of the present appellant is similar
       enough to that of accused No. 2 and it would be unsafe to sustain
       the conviction of the former, at least preponderantly on the basis
       of this circumstance – Witnesses have either turned hostile or not
       corroborated the case of prosecution on any material particulars in
       relation to the recoveries beyond just admitting their signatures –
       FSL report confirmed that it was human blood that was present
       on the axes and clothes; however, the blood group of either the
       deceased or of the blood present on the weapons or clothes was
       not determined; though it was observed the hair present on the axes
       was similar in morphological and microscopical characteristics to
       the hair recovered from the spot, no conclusive opinion was given
       if it belonged to the deceased; and there was no definitive link



* Author
418                                                               [2026] 4 S.C.R.

                            Supreme Court Reports


       made between the recovered axes and the deceased’s injuries –
       The recovery circumstance remains legally tenuous – Remaining
       circumstances are also weak and inconclusive – As regards motive,
       it is a supporting factor which strengthens an otherwise complete
       chain of evidence but, it cannot replace such a chain where other
       circumstances are missing or weak – Prosecution’s case fails at
       the threshold itself, as each circumstance from which guilt is to be
       inferred is not firmly and fully established – Evidence on record
       may raise suspicion, but, suspicion, however strong, cannot take
       the place of proof – Appellant, like accused No.2 deserves the
       benefit of doubt – Judgment passed by the High Court affirming the
       judgment of the Sessions Judge, is set aside insofar as it relates to
       the appellant – Appellant acquitted – Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.25,
       27. [Paras 22, 24-26, 30, 31 ]

       Constitution of India – Arts.134, 136 – Distinction between
       criminal appeals as a matter of right u/Art.134 and the broader,
       discretionary jurisdiction exercised by this Court u/Art.136:
       Held: u/Art.134, this Court sits as a regular court of appeal, but
       u/Art.136, ordinarily limits itself to correcting manifest illegality
       and/or grave miscarriage of justice – This is particularly apposite
       in a case like the present Appeal, where the Courts below have
       returned concurrent findings of guilt – However, restrictions are not
       absolute – In fact, both provisions underline that this Court has the
       final, Constitutional responsibility to ensure that justice is done, and
       hence, the nature and scope of Court’s powers u/Art.136 are not
       curtailed where the interests of justice so require. [Paras 12, 13]

       Evidence – ‘related’ witness; ‘interested’ witness – Testimony
       of interested witness without corroboration cannot sustain
       conviction:
       Held: A ‘related’ witness is not necessarily an ‘interested’ witness,
       and an ‘interested’ witness need not be a ‘related’ one – Based on
       the evidence on record, it is plausible that a witness such as PW-4
       had the requisite direct or indirect interest in seeing the appellant
       punished – His examination-in-chief and cross-examination disclose
       circumstances suggesting that he himself, or at least his ‘group’ or
       the persons closely associated with him, harboured longstanding
       hostility towards the appellant – Therefore, the finding of the
       Trial Court that it was “not established that the witness had any
       animosity with the accused”, or of the High Court that there is “no
[2026] 4 S.C.R.                                                              419

                Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh


     reason to disbelieve his statement”, is not sound – The possibility
     of PW-4 being an interested witness cannot be ruled out, and
     his testimony, at least without independent corroboration, cannot
     sustain the conviction. [Para 19]

     Circumstantial evidence – Circumstance of motive – Absence
     of – Appellant was convicted u/s.302, IPC:
     Held: Though not expressly considered by Trial Court, it is possible
     accused No. 2’s family relationship with the deceased weighed
     in his favour – In contrast, with respect to the appellant, there is
     some material on the record that points to a specific dispute with
     the deceased – However, the evidence does not establish the
     immediacy or gravity of animosity; if anything, it seems the appellant
     and the deceased continued to be friends and visit one another,
     and may even have been consuming liquor together the evening
     before the deceased died – Motive is a supporting factor which
     strengthens an otherwise complete chain of evidence – It cannot
     replace such a chain where other circumstances are missing or
     weak – Appellant also given the benefit of doubt, acquitted. [Para 30]

                              Case Law Cited
     Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, 1984 INSC
     121 : [1985] 1 SCR 88 – relied on.
     Agniraj & Ors. v. State through Deputy Superintendent of Police,
     CBCID, 2025 INSC 774 : [2025] 5 SCR 856; State of Rajasthan v.
     Smt. Kalki & Anr., 1981 INSC 94 : [1981] 3 SCR 504; Md. Rojali
     Ali & Ors. v. The State of Assam, Ministry of Home Affairs through
     the Secretary, 2019 INSC 223; Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi v. State
     of Gujarat, 2023 INSC 829 : [2023] 12 SCR 220; Ram Singh v.
     State of U.P., 2024 INSC 128 : [2024] 2 SCR 668 – referred to.

                                 List of Acts
     Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Evidence
     Act, 1872; Constitution of India.

                              List of Keywords
     Circumstantial evidence; Suspicion howsoever strong cannot take
     the place of proof; ‘Last-seen’ testimony does not inspire confidence;
     Circumstances missing or weak; Article 134, Constitution of India;
     Article 136, Constitution of India.
420                                                             [2026] 4 S.C.R.

                                Supreme Court Reports


                                  Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       1782 of 2026
       From the Judgment and Order dated 19.07.2017 of the High Court
       of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in CRA No. 677 of 2012.

                                Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant(s):
       A Sirajudeen, Sr. Adv., Ms. Manjeet Chawla, Ms. Shaik Soni
       Ahamed, Vishvanath Agarwal.

       Advs. for the Respondent(s):
       Praneet Pranav, D.A.G., Vinayak Sharma, Ravinder Kumar Yadav.

                         Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                      Judgment

       Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.

1.     Leave granted.
2.     The instant Appeal takes exception to the judgment dated 19.07.2017
       passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal
       Appeal No. 677 of 2012, whereby the judgment and order dated
       28.07.2012 passed by the Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon in Sessions
       Case No. 27 of 2011 was affirmed. The Trial Court had convicted
       the sole appellant, Gautam Satnami @ Gautam Deshlahre, who
       was accused No. 1, under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code,
       18601 and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment with a fine of
       ₹5,000 and in case of default in payment of fine to undergo additional
       rigorous imprisonment for one year.

       FACTUAL MATRIX
3.     The deceased, Dhumman @ Surjeet Bhattacharya, resided alone in
       his house in village Dhourabhata and was engaged in the business
       of selling lentils on his motorbike (Luna). His fufa - Ghasi Ram


1    For short, “IPC”.
[2026] 4 S.C.R.                                                       421

                Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh


     (PW-16), was residing next to his house. The deceased was married
     for 4-5 times, including to one Dharmin Bai (PW-2), who had returned
     to her maternal home a few years before the incident due to disputes
     with the deceased.
4.   In the evening of 13.01.2011, the deceased was consuming liquor
     in his house with Girish Satnami (PW-12) and Tejprakash Satnami.
     At about 7:00 p.m., Dhanraj (PW-3) overheard noises from the
     deceased’s house, and on stopping by, saw the appellant and
     Dwarika Jangde (accused No. 2 since acquitted) present over there.
     The appellant had a liquor bottle in his hand and was abusing the
     deceased, saying that because of him, the appellant had gone to jail,
     and that one day he would kill him. It is said that two years before
     the incident, the appellant and the deceased had fought with another
     villager, Tikam Sahu, and the deceased had secured bail for him
     while the appellant had to go to jail because he was absconding.
     This spawned an ongoing animosity in their friendship.
5.   It is further the case of the prosecution that on the next day i.e.,
     14.01.2011, the accused went to the deceased’s house at night and
     when the deceased opened the door, the accused, armed with axes,
     inflicted multiple incised injuries on him, resulting in instantaneous
     death on account of shock due to excessive haemorrhage. After
     committing the murder, the accused persons fled from the spot. One
     Raja Ram Deshlahare (PW-4), riding pillion, along with Maniram
     Sahu allegedly saw the appellant with an axe near the deceased’s
     house in the headlight of the motorcycle and he found the lights of
     the house were also turned on.
6.   The deceased’s body was discovered the next day. One Hiraman
     (PW-1) saw next morning that the door of the deceased’s house ajar,
     blood on both the door and the floor, and the deceased’s corpse
     partially covered with a bedsheet. He suspected the appellant for the
     murder as the appellant had a criminal antecedent and was having
     enmity with the deceased for some time. Hiraman (PW-1) went
     and informed Ghasi Ram, and they visited the spot. Other villagers
     were also informed, after which merg intimation was lodged by the
     brother-in-law of the deceased namely, Komal Das (PW-8), against
     unknown person(s). Thereafter, the dehati nalishi was registered on
     the same day around 2:00 p.m. wherein Komal Das stated that he
422                                                           [2026] 4 S.C.R.

                           Supreme Court Reports


       saw half-open door of the deceased’s house, blood stains and hair
       on the door, and clothes and other articles scattered near the divan
       bed, as well as the presence of injuries caused by a sharp-edged
       weapon on the person of the deceased. Police officials reached the
       spot, prepared the inquest panchnama of the dead body, and sent
       it for post-mortem.
7.     After the spot-inspection, a seizure memo was prepared, bearing the
       signatures of Komal and Roopdas Sahu (PW-9), wherein the Police
       recorded that they collected the blood-stained hairs and soil, liquor
       bottles, land record in the name of Tularam Bhattacharya (father
       of the deceased), a notebook belonging to the deceased, and the
       driver’s license of the appellant from the spot. A pair of dusty blue
       full-pants with ₹7,800 cash in the pocket was also recovered from
       the ganj (container).
8.     The post-mortem examination, conducted by Dr. Kiran Chandekar
       (PW-10), revealed six injuries on the eyes, face, head, chest, shoulder,
       and finger of the deceased, and noted skull fractures and extrusion
       of brain matter. The medical opinion was that death occurred due to
       shock caused by excessive hemorrhage and had taken place 18-24
       hours before the autopsy (conducted at 4:30 p.m. on 15.01.2011),
       putting the time of death approximately between 4:30 p.m. and 10:30
       p.m. on the previous day. Finally, First Information Report No. 18
       of 2011 was registered under Section 302 IPC against unknown
       person(s) at 8:30 p.m.
9.     Next day i.e., 16.1.2011, the Police took the accused persons into
       custody and questioned them. Allegedly, they gave confessional
       statements on the basis of which the Police arrested them on
       17.1.2011. On 17.1.2011, the Police conducted seizures and
       recovered a blood-stained axe and clothes from each of their houses.
       After the investigation was completed, a charge-sheet was submitted
       and the case was committed for trial before the learned Sessions
       Judge, Rajnandgaon. The learned Sessions Judge in Sessions
       Case No. 27 of 2011 acquitted accused No. 2 (Dwarika Jangde)
       but convicted the present appellant/accused no.1 under Section
       302 of the IPC. As stated above, the appellant had unsuccessfully
       preferred a criminal appeal before the High Court challenging his
       conviction and sentence and now approaches this Court by way of
       the instant Appeal.
[2026] 4 S.C.R.                                                          423

                     Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh


     SUBMISSIONS
10. Mr. A Sirajudeen, learned senior counsel for the appellant, contended
    that the prosecution has failed to present the true origin and genesis
    of the incident and that the material contradictions and omissions
    elicited during cross-examination, which were favourable to the
    appellant, were either ignored or improperly appreciated. Learned
    senior counsel further urged that most prosecution witnesses did not
    support the prosecution’s case vis-à-vis its material particulars and
    specifically, that the seizure witnesses themselves denied signing the
    seizure memos at the spot and their signatures were only obtained
    later. It was also urged that while accused No. 2 was acquitted on the
    same circumstantial evidence, the appellant was convicted without
    any sustainable distinguishing circumstance. Particular emphasis was
    placed on the alleged recovery of the appellant’s driving licence from
    the scene, which was not produced along with the charge-sheet and
    was only later introduced into the record of the Trial Court. Learned
    senior counsel thus argued that the prosecution did not prove the
    charge under Section 302 of the IPC beyond reasonable doubt and
    the conviction is totally unsustainable in law.
11. Per contra, Mr. Praneet Pranav, learned Deputy Advocate General
    for the State of Chhattisgarh, submitted that instant case is a proved
    case of murder. It was contended that both, the Trial Court and the
    High Court, correctly appreciated the evidence on record, and there
    is no perversity warranting interference under Article 136 of the
    Constitution. The prosecution’s case, as accepted by both Courts,
    establishes prior enmity between the appellant and the deceased; a
    quarrel and threat issued by the appellant on the evening preceding
    the incident; the presence of the appellant near the deceased’s
    house on the night of the incident, carrying an axe, as deposed by
    Raja Ram; recovery of a blood-stained axe and clothes pursuant
    to disclosure under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 18722;
    detection of human blood and human hair on the seized articles as
    per the FSL report; and recovery of the driving licence of the appellant
    from the spot. It was further submitted that the appellant failed to offer
    any plausible explanation under Section 313 of the Cr.PC regarding
    these incriminating circumstances, which together form a complete
    and unbroken chain pointing to the guilt of the appellant.


2   For short, “Evidence Act”.
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       ANALYSIS
12. At the outset, it is necessary to acknowledge the well-settled distinction
    between criminal appeals as a matter of right under Article 134 of the
    Constitution, and the broader, discretionary jurisdiction exercised by
    this Court under Article 136. Under Article 134, this Court sits as a
    regular court of appeal, but under Article 136, ordinarily limits itself
    to correcting manifest illegality and/or grave miscarriage of justice.
    This is particularly apposite in a case like the present Appeal, where
    the Courts below have returned concurrent findings of guilt.
13. However, it is equally well-settled that any restrictions are not
    absolute. In fact, both provisions underline that this Court has the
    final, Constitutional responsibility to ensure that justice is done,
    and hence, the nature and scope of Court’s powers under Article
    136 are not curtailed where the interests of justice so require. We
    may profitably refer to this Court’s observation in the recent case
    of Agniraj & Ors. vs. State through Deputy Superintendent of
    Police, CB-CID3, wherein precedents on Article 136 were described
    as “self-imposed constraints on interference” 4 that cannot restrain
    the Court from taking note of “...striking features in the evidence
    which demolish the prosecution’s case.” 5
14. Here, the Trial Court itself has noted that “the case of prosecution is
    based on the circumstantial evidence and there is no direct evidence
    in the case.” This necessarily calls for a careful re-examination of
    certain incriminating circumstances, particularly where they expose
    the chain of evidence to doubt. At this stage, we may briefly recount
    the five ‘golden principles’ laid down in Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda
    vs. State of Maharashtra6, i.e.:
       I.     the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be
              drawn should be fully established;
       II.    the facts so established should be consistent only with the
              hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say. they
              should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that
              the accused is guilty;


3   2025 INSC 774
4   Id at ¶ 39.
5   Id at ¶ 38.1.
6   1984 INSC 121 at ¶3.3.
[2026] 4 S.C.R.                                                         425

                 Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh


     III.   the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
            tendency;
     IV.    they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one
            to be proved; and
     V.     there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave
            any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the
            innocence of the accused and must show that in all human
            probability the act must have been done by the accused.
15. We observe that the strongest circumstance considered by the Courts
    below against the appellant, specifically, is the so-called ‘last-seen’
    evidence of Raja Ram. As discussed above, Raja Ram had deposed
    that he saw the appellant near the deceased’s house on the night of
    the incident, carrying an axe. Raja Ram and other PWs admit that
    there were no street lights near the house of the deceased, and the
    spot was usually covered in darkness. The identification, therefore,
    could only have been made in the light of a motorcycle and possibly,
    the light of the house (as stated by Raja Ram). On the latter point,
    both, Dharmin Bai and Dhanraj, had stated in their cross-examination
    that there was no electricity supply in the deceased’s house. In these
    circumstances, the conditions for reliable visual identification at night
    are certainly doubtful.
16. Moreover, even if Raja Ram’s testimony is accepted at face value,
    it only states that the appellant was present near the deceased’s
    house at about 10:00 p.m. carrying an axe. In this case, the medical
    evidence has not fixed the time of death with enough precision so
    as to conclusively correlate his presence there with the commission
    of the offence. Raja Ram himself does not assert that he saw the
    appellant enter the house, assault the deceased, or perform any overt
    act. The deposition, at best, places the appellant in the vicinity of the
    spot, not with the deceased, and does not possess the ‘clinching’ or
    determinative value that can, by itself, sustain a conviction.
17. We also note that, in his cross-examination, Raja Ram had stated
    that he worked together with Maniram and Maniram’s wife, Madhuri
    Bai, at Bhatiya’s dairy, and that the appellant had also worked there
    earlier. During this period, hostility had developed and the appellant
    had left the dairy. Raja Ram further admitted that the animosity
    between the appellant and Krishna, the elder brother of Maniram, was
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                           Supreme Court Reports


       to such an extent that Krishna left the village, and also that Madhuri
       had earlier lodged a case of eve-teasing against the appellant which
       was eventually compromised in Court, though he denied that he was
       supporting Maniram and Madhuri due to his “family relationship”
       with them. Raja Ram also accepted that he had deposed against
       the appellant in another case and was specifically questioned on
       the point of him and Maniram having given statements against the
       appellant in multiple proceedings.
18. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Smt.
    Kalki & Anr.7 had held:
            “5. …’Related’ is not equivalent to ‘interested’. A witness
            may be called ‘interested’ only when he or she derives
            some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in
            a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. …”
       In Md. Rojali Ali & Ors. vs. The State of Assam, Ministry of Home
       Affairs through the Secretary8, this Court had further clarified:
            “10. …This Court has elucidated the difference between
            ‘interested’ and ‘related’ witnesses in a plethora of cases,
            stating that a witness may be called interested only when
            he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation,
            which in the context of a criminal case would mean that
            the witness has a direct or indirect interest in seeing the
            accused punished due to prior enmity or other reasons,
            and thus has a motive to falsely implicate the accused. …”
19. Therefore, a ‘related’ witness is not necessarily an ‘interested’ witness,
    and an ‘interested’ witness need not be a ‘related’ one. Based on the
    evidence on record, it is plausible that a witness such as Raja Ram
    had the requisite direct or indirect interest in seeing the appellant
    punished. His examination-in-chief and cross-examination disclose
    circumstances suggesting that he himself, or at least his ‘group’ or the
    persons closely associated with him, harboured longstanding hostility
    towards the appellant. Therefore, the finding of the Trial Court that
    it was “not established that the witness had any animosity with the
    accused”, or of the High Court that there is “no reason to disbelieve


7   1981 INSC 94.
8   2019 INSC 223
[2026] 4 S.C.R.                                                         427

                Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh


     his statement”, is not sound. The possibility of Raja Ram being an
     interested witness cannot be ruled out, and his testimony, at least
     without independent corroboration, cannot sustain the conviction.
     Besides, we must point out that the witness’s own conduct also
     discounts the reliability of his testimony. In his cross-examination,
     Raja Ram had admitted that he met the Police on the very day of the
     incident; despite this, his statement under Section 161 of the Cr.PC
     was recorded only on 14.02.2011 i.e., a month after the occurrence.
20. We now turn to the next major incriminating circumstance relied
    upon by the prosecution. Needless to say, under Section 25 of the
    Evidence Act, any ‘confession’ made to a police officer shall not
    be admissible at all. The accused in this case have supposedly
    given ‘memorandums’ or disclosure statements under Section 27 of
    Evidence Act. We will examine if the recoveries supposedly made
    as a consequence of these statements withstand legal scrutiny.
21. Both accused put forth substantially similar narratives in the respective
    disclosure statements. In fact, the language in many places is
    reproduced verbatim in both statements, except the conclusions,
    where they state that the axe and clothes worn at the time of the
    incident are concealed in their respective rooms. The axes and
    clothes were consequently recovered from these spots.
22. Dr. Chandekar had recommended that the seized axes and clothes
    be sent for forensic examination to determine whether the bloodstains
    present on them were human, and whether the hair adhering to the
    axes belonged to the deceased. It was further opined that the injuries
    on the deceased had been inflicted by a hard, sharp-edged object.
    The FSL report confirmed that it was human blood that was present
    on the axes and clothes; however, (i) the blood group of either the
    deceased or of the blood present on the weapons or clothes was
    not determined; (ii) though it was observed the hair present on the
    axes was similar in morphological and microscopical characteristics
    to the hair recovered from the spot, no conclusive opinion was given
    if it belonged to the deceased; and (iii) there was no definitive link
    made between the recovered axes and the deceased’s injuries. In
    fact, Khuman Sahu (PW-5) had stated in cross-examination that
    every farmer in the village kept an axe. In order to bring home the
    guilt of the accused, the seized weapons ought to have at least been
    shown to the doctor for an opinion as to whether they had caused
    the injuries in question.
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23. Now, without even embarking on an independent re-evaluation, we note
    that the Trial Court had considered the entire recovery circumstance
    against accused No. 2 and acquitted him in the following terms:
            “24. On the intimation of the accused Dwarika (No.2), his
            clothes and axe had been seized by the prosecution and as
            per the Report Exhibit P-22 from the Forensic Science Lab,
            blood had been found on thein. There is no evidence on the
            document regarding the presence of the accused Dwarika
            on the scene during the incident. It has not been proved that
            the blood found on the axe and the clothes seized from the·
            accused Dwarika is human blood and there is not any other
            circumstances proved against the accused. It has been held
            in the case of Nehru versus C.G. State, 2005 (1) Manisa
            90 (C.G.) that the only circumstance of blood found on the
            weapon and cloth is enough to connect it to murder. It has
            been held in the case of Hanumant Govind Nardandurkar
            Versus State A.I.R 1960 Supreme Court 29 that the link of
            the circumstances from which the conviction of the accused
            to be concluded has been proved completely. Even if a
            single link is missed, so the accused persons cannot be
            held guilty. It has not been proved that the blood found on
            the axe seized from the accused was human blood and
            the said blood was related to the deceased. Therefore on
            the basis of the only circumstance it cannot be said firmly
            that the accused Dwarika was involved in the murder of
            the deceased Dhumman.”
24. We feel this reasoning adopted applies with equal force to the case
    of the present appellant. The major distinction between the case of
    the present appellant and that of accused No. 2 (Dwarika Jangde) is
    the ‘last-seen’ testimony of Raja Ram, which, as we have discussed
    above, does not inspire confidence. If that circumstance is excluded
    from consideration, the position of the present appellant is similar
    enough to that of accused No. 2 (Dwarika Jangde) that it would be
    unsafe to sustain the conviction of the former, at least preponderantly
    on the basis of this circumstance. In this regard, we refer to the
    observation made by this Court in Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi vs.
    State of Gujarat 9:


9   2023 INSC 829.
[2026] 4 S.C.R.                                                           429

                    Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh


             “15. When there is similar or identical evidence of
             eyewitnesses against two accused by ascribing them the
             same or similar role, the Court cannot convict one accused
             and acquit the other. In such a case, the cases of both the
             accused will be governed by the principle of parity. This
             principle means that the Criminal Court should decide like
             cases alike, and in such cases, the Court cannot make a
             distinction between the two accused, which will amount
             to discrimination.”
                                                  (emphasis supplied)

      This was reaffirmed in Ram Singh vs. State of U.P.10. Therefore, the
      acquittal of accused No. 2 (Dwarika Jangde) persuades us to resolve
      any doubt vis-à-vis the recoveries in favour of the present appellant.
25. Separately, we also note the contradictions in the testimonies of
    the witnesses to (i) both Section 27 memorandums and (ii) both
    seizure memos.
      (i)    Girish and Manna Lal (PW-6) were cited as witnesses to the
             Section 27 statements made by the accused. Girish stated
             that suspicion had initially fallen upon him and that the Police
             had taken him and the appellant into custody at the same time
             and had taken away and kept Girish’s phone for two days.
             Interestingly, he also denied that accused No. 2 made any
             disclosure to the Police. Manna Lal outright turned hostile and
             denied that either accused had disclosed anything and stated
             that the Police had caught him and taken his signature on the
             documents.
      (ii)   Of the two witnesses to the seizure memos, Khuman essentially
             admitted in cross-examination that the seizure memo was not
             signed contemporaneously at the place of recovery, as he stated
             that he affixed his signature around 2:30-3:00 p.m. when he
             was en route to another village. He also stated that the Police
             told him, “You people have made signature on the panchnama,
             so make your signatures on the seizure also.” The second



10   2024 INSC 128 at ¶32.
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            witness, Jhumuk Lal (PW-11), was declared hostile, as he said
            he had incomplete and no information about the recoveries
            made from the present appellant and accused No. 2 (Dwarika
            Jangde), respectively.
       It is evident that the witnesses have either turned hostile or not
       corroborated the case of prosecution on any material particulars
       in relation to the recoveries beyond just admitting their signatures.
       Given that both accused continuously remained in judicial custody
       throughout the trial, the said hostility and non-corroboration can also
       not be attributed to any influence or tampering on their part. The
       recovery circumstance, therefore, remains legally tenuous.
26. Moreover, the remaining distinguishing circumstances relied upon
    the appellant are also weak and inconclusive. In the interest of
    completeness, we will now advert to these circumstances.
27. Much has been made of the alleged recovery of the appellant’s
    driving licence from the spot at around 2:00 p.m. on 15.01.2011.
    This recovery, together with various villagers’ Section 161 Cr.PC
    statements, had directed initial suspicion toward the appellant. Of
    the two witnesses who signed the seizure memo, one of them i.e.,
    Komal, has stated that he did not know which articles the Police
    recovered from the spot of the incident; only that when he was
    standing outside, they showed him the licence and said they were
    taking it. He admits he could not identify the owner of the license
    and was not told who it belonged to either.
28. We further observe that the Investigating Officer, Avadh Ram Sahu,
    (PW-15) admitted in cross-examination that the driving licence was
    not mentioned in or submitted along with the ‘challan’ or charge-
    sheet and had to be subsequently called for and exhibited as Article
    “A”. Later, in his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.PC, the
    appellant had denied that the licence had been recovered from the
    spot and stated that it had instead been taken from his pocket by
    the Police, but the Trial Court had said that the “said explanation
    of the accused [was] not acceptable,” and had considered it an
    incriminating circumstance against the appellant. However, we feel
    that the aforementioned factors, considered cumulatively, reinforce
    that this particular circumstance remains shrouded in doubt and
    cannot be relied upon.
[2026] 4 S.C.R.                                                        431

                Gautam Satnami v. State of Chhattisgarh


29. Even with respect to the circumstance of the alleged altercation
    during the evening of 13.01.2011, Girish, who admits to being
    present in the deceased’s house that day, did not implicate either
    of the accused in his Section 164 Cr.PC statement. Dhanraj, one
    of the two people whose police statements formed the basis of the
    prosecution’s narrative of a prior threat, totally recanted that version
    in his deposition. The other witness, Ghasi Ram, similarly turned
    hostile and stated that he had closed his shop around 8:00-8:30 p.m.
    and did not hear anything before or after. It cannot, therefore, even
    be proved that the appellant quarrelled with and issued a threat to
    the deceased that evening.
30. That leaves only the circumstance of motive. Though not expressly
    considered by Trial Court, it is possible accused No. 2’s (Dwarika
    Jangde) family relationship with the deceased weighed in his favour.
    In contrast, with respect to the appellant, there is some material
    on the record that points to a specific dispute with the deceased.
    However, first, the evidence does not establish the immediacy or
    gravity of animosity; if anything, it seems the appellant and the
    deceased continued to be friends and visit one another, and may
    even have been consuming liquor together the evening before
    the deceased died. Second, motive is a supporting factor which
    strengthens an otherwise complete chain of evidence. It cannot
    replace such a chain where other circumstances are missing or
    weak.
31. Here, the prosecution’s case fails at the threshold itself, as each
    circumstance from which guilt is to be inferred is not firmly and fully
    established. By way of example, it cannot even be said with certainty
    that the driving licence was recovered from the spot in the manner
    alleged, let alone that its presence there was consistent only with
    the hypothesis of guilt. The evidence on record may raise suspicion,
    but, suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. Our
    considered opinion is that the appellant, like accused No. 2 (Dwarika
    Jangde), deserves the benefit of doubt.

     CONCLUSION
32. Accordingly, the Appeal is allowed. The judgment dated 19.07.2017
    passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh in Criminal Appeal No. 677
    of 2012 affirming the judgment and order dated 28.07.2012 passed
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       by the learned Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon in Sessions Case No.
       27 of 2011, is set aside insofar as it relates to the appellant, and
       he is acquitted of the charge under Section 302 IPC. Since he was
       already on bail pursuant to the order of this Court dated 22.04.2025,
       his bail bonds shall stand discharged.
       Pending applications are disposed of.

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed.




       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey