Holding

The conviction under both the IPC and the POCSO Act is valid, and the appropriate sentence is life imprisonment without the stipulation of serving the remainder of the appellant's natural life.

Summary

The appellant, Gyanendra Singh, was convicted for raping his nine‑year‑old daughter, resulting in convictions under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the POCSO Act, with a life sentence and a fine. He appealed, arguing that because the offences overlapped, the special law (POCSO) under Section 42A should prevail, rendering the IPC convictions and the harsher life‑imprisonment term invalid. The Supreme Court examined Sections 42 and 42A of the POCSO Act, holding that Section 42 governs the choice of the greater punishment, while Section 42A deals only with procedural consistency and cannot override the enabling provision. The Court found the conviction under both statutes justified, but erred in the High Court’s direction that the life term must run for the appellant’s natural life. Accordingly, the Court restored the trial Court’s sentence of life imprisonment without the natural‑life stipulation and ordered the fine, with both sentences to run concurrently. The appeal was partially allowed, correcting the sentencing but upholding the convictions.

Issues considered

Whether the conviction for offences under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the IPC should be set aside in favour of the special law provision under Section 42A of the POCSO Act.
Whether the High Court erred in directing that the life imprisonment term must extend to the appellant's natural life.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 376(2)(f), s. 376(2)(i)
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012s. 3, s. 4, s. 42, s. 42A

Subjects

Sections 42, 42A of POCSO ActSections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPCOffence both under IPC and POCSO ActPunishment of greater degreeSentence of life imprisonmentImprisonment for remainder of natural lifeRigour of sentenceSpecial law vs General law

Judgment

[2025] 3 S.C.R. 490 : 2025 INSC 335

Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh
v.
State of U.P.
(Criminal Appeal No(s). 1257 of 2025)
07 March 2025
[Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the conviction of the appellant ought to have been recorded
under the IPC or whether the provisions of the Special law, i.e.,
Section 42A of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act,
2012, would prevail thereby, vitiating the sentence awarded to
the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)
(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC.

Headnotes†
Sentence/Sentencing – Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act, 2012 – ss.42, 42A – Interpretation – Penal Code,
1860 – ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) – Appellant convicted for
offences u/ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC and ss.3/4, POCSO
Act, life imprisonment awarded – Appeal rejected by High
Court with certain modification – Plea of the appellant that
as the offences were overlapping, POCSO Act being special
law would prevail over IPC and hence, the appellant could
not have been convicted for both the offences:
Held: Conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable
u/ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC and ss.3/4, POCSO Act is wholly
justified – Under s.42, POCSO Act, when the alleged acts or
omissions constitute offence both under the IPC and the POCSO
Act then, the law which prescribes the punishment of greater
degree would have to be applied – s.42 and s.42A, POCSO Act
operate in completely different spheres – s.42A, POCSO Act
cannot be interpreted so as to override the scope and ambit of
enabling provision, i.e., s.42, POCSO Act – Since, ss.376(2)(f)
and 376(2)(i), IPC provide for a higher sentence as compared
to ss.3/4, POCSO Act, the trial Court was justified in choosing

* Author
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 491

Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P.

the former to award punishment in terms of s.42, POCSO Act –
However, the High Court erred in directing that the appellant
would have to serve life imprisonment for remainder of his natural
life as provided u/ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC – Under these
provisions it is not mandated that the convict must be awarded
life imprisonment – The sentence of life imprisonment awarded by
the trial Court for the offence u/ss.3/4, POCSO Act revived – For
offences punishable u/ss.376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i), IPC, the accused
to undergo imprisonment for life, as awarded by the trial Court,
without the stipulation that the life term will enure till the natural
life of the appellant and fine, as directed. [Paras 19, 21, 23, 25,
26, 30, 31]

Case Law Cited
Shiva Kumar @ Shiva @ Shivamurthy v. State of Karnataka
[2023] 4 SCR 669 : (2023) 9 SCC 817; Navas @ Mulanavas v.
State of Kerala [2024] 3 SCR 913 : 2024 SCC Online SC 315;
Veerendra v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2022] 4 SCR 225; Swamy
Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka [2008] 11 SCR 93 : (2008)
13 SCC 767 – referred to.

List of Acts
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Penal
Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

List of Keywords
Sections 42, 42A of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences
Act, 2012; Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of Penal Code, 1860;
Offence both under the IPC and the POCSO Act; Punishment of
greater degree; Sentence of life imprisonment; Imprisonment for
remainder of person’s natural life; Rigour of the sentence awarded
increased; Sentence of life imprisonment; Life term; Till the natural
life; Special law; General law.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1257 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.08.2019 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in JA No. 6590 of 2016
492 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
R Balasubramanian, Sr. Adv., Santosh Kumar Pandey,
B Venkatraman, Debasish Mishra.
Adv. for the Respondent:
Adarsh Upadhyay, Ms. Pallavi Kumari, Shashank Pachauri.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Mehta, J.

1. Heard.
2. Delay condoned.
3. Leave granted.
4. This appeal, preferred on behalf of the appellant-accused1, takes an
exception to the judgment dated 2nd August, 2019, passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad2 dismissing Jail Appeal No.
6590 of 2016 preferred by the appellant.
5. The Division Bench, while dismissing the appeal, affirmed the
judgment and order dated 16th September, 2016, passed by the
learned Additional Sessions Judge Court No.2, Fatehpur3 in Sessions
Trial No. 06 of 2016, arising out of Case Crime No. 236 of 2015
registered at Police Station Chandpur, District Fatehpur, convicting
the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f)
and 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code, 18604 and Sections 3/4 of
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 20125. The appellant
was awarded punishment of imprisonment for life along with a
fine of Rs. 25,000/-. In default of payment of aforesaid fine, it was
ordered that the appellant was to undergo two months of additional
imprisonment on each count.

1 For short, ‘appellant’.
2 Hereinafter, being referred to as the ‘High Court’.
3 Hereinafter, being referred to as the ‘trial Court’.
4 Hereinafter, being referred to as ‘IPC’.
5 Hereinafter referred to as ‘POCSO Act’.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 493

Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P.

6. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant, Gyanendra Singh @
Raja Singh, is the father of victim (PW-2) who was of about 9 years
at the time of the incident. On 28th October,2015, an FIR6 came to be
lodged by the wife of the appellant, Smt. Rajani, at P.S. Chandpur,
District Fatehpur, alleging inter alia, that she had gone to her parental
house about two months ago with her youngest son Krishna, aged
about 2 years, leaving her minor daughter, the victim herein, aged
about 9 years, and a son named Vishnu, aged about 4 years at her
matrimonial house in the custody of her husband, i.e., the appellant.
On 22nd October, 2015 at about 8:00 p.m., the appellant enticed the
minor victim (PW-2) and took her to the rooftop and committed sexual
assault upon the child. She was detained on the roof by threatening
her. The minor victim came down from the roof in the morning and
narrated the whole incident to her grandfather, Ram Naresh Singh
(PW-3), who, in turn, telephonically informed the informant about the
occurrence. The appellant went absconding after the incident. The
informant (PW-1) got frightened because of the incident and did not
go to her matrimonial home. She somehow mustered the courage and
approached the police station along with her father Ranjeet Singh and
father-in-law, Ram Naresh Singh (PW-3), as well as the victim and
filed the FIR7 against the appellant. It was, inter alia, urged in the FIR
that the child victim should be medically examined. It was also stated
in the FIR that a day prior to the lodging of the report, the informant
had approached the District Headquarter, Fatehpur from where she
was redirected to approach P.S. Chandpur for lodging the FIR.
7. Investigation was undertaken by Rajesh Kumar Singh (PW-7),
Investigating Officer (I.O.). The minor victim was subjected to
medical examination by Dr. Manisha Shukla (PW-4) who opined that
no external injury was found on the body of the victim. On internal
examination, redness was seen present over the labia minora in the
vagina of the victim and her hymen was intact. Forensic material was
collected from the oral, vaginal, vulval and anal swab of the minor
victim, slide was prepared and sent for pathological examination,
D.N.A. mapping and examination of presence of spermatozoa. The
place of the incident was inspected, the site plan was prepared and
accordingly, the appellant was arrested.

6 (Exh. Ka.1) FIR Case Crime No. 236 of 2015.
7 Supra note 4.
494 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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8. The certificate of date of birth was collected from the school. The child
was examined under Section 164 of Code of Criminal Procedure,
19738 wherein she made an emphatic allegation of penetrative sexual
assault against the appellant.
9. Investigation was concluded and the charge-sheet was filed against
the appellant in the trial Court for the offences punishable under
Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC and Sections 3/4/5 of the
POCSO Act. The trial Court framed charges against the appellant
for the said offences, who pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
As many as 9 witnesses were examined and 8 documents were
exhibited by the prosecution in its evidence. After the completion of
prosecution evidence, the appellant was questioned under Section
313 CrPC and was confronted with the allegations as appearing
in the prosecution case, which the appellant denied and claimed
to have been falsely implicated. The appellant stated that he had
earlier lodged an FIR against his wife, the informant herein, and
his father (PW-3) and therefore, a false case had been registered
against him. He further stated that at the time of the incident, the
child was residing with his sister. No evidence was led from the
side of the defence.
10. Upon hearing the arguments advanced by the defence counsel and
the public prosecutor and appreciating the evidence available on
record, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant
as stated above.9 The appeal preferred by the appellant was rejected
by the High Court vide judgment dated 2nd August, 2019, which is
assailed in this appeal by special leave.
11. While entertaining the special leave petition, notice limited to the
question of sentence was issued by this Court vide order dated 2nd
September, 2024.
12. Shri R. Balasubramanian, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant advanced a solitary submission urging that the trial Court
ought not to have convicted the appellant for the offences punishable
under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) IPC because the acts alleged
are defined as offences in both category of laws, i.e., the general

8 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘CrPC’.
9 Refer, Para 5 of this judgment.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 495

Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P.

laws, i.e., the IPC, as well as in the special law, i.e., the POCSO Act.
Since the offences are overlapping, the special law would prevail
over the general law and hence, conviction of the appellant could
not have been recorded by the trial Court for both the offences. He
placed reliance on Section 42A of the POCSO Act and urged that
the said provision makes it clear that the provisions of the POCSO
Act are not in derogation of any other law and that the provisions of
the POCSO Act have an overriding effect on the provisions of any
other law to the extent of inconsistency.
13. Shri R. Balasubramanian, learned senior counsel, further urged that
the trial Court awarded sentence of life imprisonment to the appellant
for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of
IPC, but the High Court in the appeal against conviction, has modified
the judgment of the trial Court and has increased the rigor of the
punishment by directing that the appellant would have to undergo life
imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life as provided under
Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC and that there would be no
requirement of a separate sentence for the offence punishable under
Sections 3/4 of the POCSO Act. The learned counsel submitted that
without there being any appeal for enhancement of sentence, the
High Court, in an appeal against conviction filed by the appellant,
ought not to have enhanced the rigor of the punishment awarded
to the appellant and, to this extent, the judgment of the High Court
is illegal and deserves to be set aside.
14. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State
vehemently and fervently opposed the submissions advanced by the
appellant’s counsel. He urged that the appellant has been convicted
for a reprehensible act and the heinous offence of subjecting his
own minor daughter to forcible sexual assault and as such, the High
Court10 was fully justified in awarding the enhanced punishment to
the appellant under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC. On these
grounds, he implored this Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the
judgment of the High Court.
15. We have gone through the submissions advanced at the Bar and
have gone through the material placed on record.

10 Vide its order dated 02.08.2019, in the case no. Jail Appeal No. 6590 of 2016
496 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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16. Shri R. Balasubramanian, learned senior counsel for the appellant,
fairly did not assail the guilt of the appellant as recorded by the trial
Court and affirmed by the High Court but in spite thereof, we have
carefully scrutinized the material available on record and find that
there is wholesome evidence justifying the conviction of the appellant
for the offences as alleged.
17. The only moot question which thus, requires adjudication is whether
the conviction of the appellant ought to have been recorded under
the IPC or whether the provisions of the Special law, i.e., Section
42A of POCSO Act, would prevail thereby, vitiating the sentence
awarded to the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections
376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC.
18. Sections 42 and 42A of the POCSO Act would be relevant to adjudicate
this issue and are reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference: -
“42. Alternate punishment.— Where an act or omission
constitutes an offence punishable under this Act and
also under sections 166A, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D,
370, 370A, 375, 376, [376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D,
376DA, 376DB], [376E, section 509 of the Indian Penal
Code or section 67B of the Information Technology
Act, 2000 (21 of 2000)], then, notwithstanding anything
contained in any law for the time being in force, the
offender found guilty of such offence shall be liable to
punishment only under this Act or under the Indian Penal
Code as provides for punishment which is greater in
degree.
42A. Act not in derogation of any other law.— The
provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in
derogation of the provisions of any other law for the
time being in force and, in case of any inconsistency,
the provisions of this Act shall have overriding effect
on the provisions of any such law to the extent of the
inconsistency.”
19. A bare perusal of Section 42 of the POCSO Act, would make it clear
that when the alleged acts or omissions constitute offence both
under the IPC and the POCSO Act then, the law which prescribes
the punishment of greater degree would have to be applied.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 497

Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P.

20. Shri R. Balasubramanian, learned senior counsel, tried to draw a
distinction by urging that Section 42A of the POCSO Act, provides
that where there is an inconsistency between the provisions of the
POCSO Act and any other law, the provisions of the special law
would have an overriding effect to the extent of the inconsistency. He
submitted that since the offence under Sections 3/4 of the POCSO
Act does not carry punishment of imprisonment for life, which means
imprisonment for remainder of person’s natural life, the accused could
only have been punished under the said provision and not under
Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC, looking to the inconsistency
in the sentence provided.
21. We feel that the said submission lacks merit. On the face of it, the
fields of operation of Section 42 and Section 42A are in completely
different spheres. Section 42 specifically deals with the quantum
of punishment mandating that when a particular act or omission
constitutes an offence, both under the POCSO Act and also under
the provisions of the IPC or the Information Technology Act, 2000
then, the offender found guilty of the offence would be liable to
punishment under the POCSO Act or under the provisions of the
IPC whichever provides a punishment of a greater degree.
22. Section 42A of POSCO Act, on the other hand, deals with the
procedural aspects and gives an overriding effect to the provisions of
the POCSO Act over any other law for the time being in force where,
the two acts are inconsistent with each other. Hence, the provisions
of Section 42A of POSCO Act, by no stretch of imagination, can
be interpreted so as to override the scope and ambit of enabling
provision, i.e., Section 42 of POCSO Act.
23. Consequently, we are of the view that conviction of the appellant
for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i)
of IPC and Sections 3/4 of POCSO Act is wholly justified. However,
we feel that the High Court erred while directing that the appellant
would have to serve life imprisonment for remainder of his natural
life as provided under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC.
24. We may note that the said direction was passed in an appeal against
conviction filed by the appellant. Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i),
are punishable as below: -
“376. Punishment for rape.— (1) Whoever, except in
the cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape,
shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either
498 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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description for a term which [shall not be less than ten
years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and
shall also be liable to fine].
(2) Whoever,—
(a)-(e )….
(f) being a relative, guardian or teacher of, or
a person in a position of trust or authority
towards the woman, commits rape on such
woman; or
(g)-(h)….
(i) 11 commits rape, on a woman incapable
of giving consent; or shall be punished with
rigorous imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than ten years, but which
may extend to imprisonment for life, which
shall mean imprisonment for the remainder
of that person’s natural life, and shall also
be liable to fine.”
(emphasis supplied)

25. Thus, under this provision, the Courts have been given discretion to
award punishment for a term sentence of minimum 10 years or of
imprisonment for life. Where the sentence awarded in the discretion
of the Court is for life, the same shall mean imprisonment for the
remainder of that person’s natural life. Hence, there is no mandate
of law that under these provisions, the convict must be awarded life
imprisonment.
26. The trial Court, however, had awarded imprisonment for life to the
appellant while convicting him for the offences punishable under
Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC. Since, the said Sections of
IPC provides for a higher sentence as compared to Sections 3/4 of
POCSO Act, the trial Court was justified in choosing the former to
award punishment in terms of Section 42 of POCSO Act. However,
we have to consider whether the award of imprisonment for life,
which means imprisonment for remainder of person’s natural life,

11 Clause (i) omitted by Act 22 of 2018 S.4. (w.e.f. 21-4-2018).
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 499

Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P.

was warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. This
Court in case of Shiva Kumar @ Shiva @ Shivamurthy v. State
of Karnataka12, held as below:-
“14. Hence, we have no manner of doubt that even in a
case where capital punishment is not imposed or is not
proposed, the Constitutional Courts can always exercise
the power of imposing a modified or fixed-term sentence
by directing that a life sentence, as contemplated by
“secondly” in Section 53 of the IPC, shall be of a fixed
period of more than fourteen years, for example, of twenty
years, thirty years and so on. The fixed punishment cannot
be for a period less than 14 years in view of the mandate
of Section 433-A CrPC.”
27. The High Court, while deciding the appeal against conviction preferred
by the appellant, observed that the sentence of life imprisonment
awarded by the trial Court for the offences punishable under Sections
376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC would extend to the remainder of the
natural life of the appellant. This direction was merely a clarification
to keep the sentence in tune with the language of the sentencing
provision. Nevertheless, the fact remains that because of this
clarification, the rigour of the sentence awarded has been increased
to the effect that the appellant would have to spend the remainder
of his natural life in prison without any possibility of early release.
28. Hon’ble Shri K.V. Vishwanathan, J., speaking for a three-Judge
Bench of this Court, in Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala13
considered the issue of sentencing beyond the period of 14 years
and held as below:-
“17. The question before us is what should be the
appropriate sentence and whether the High Court was
justified in adopting the Swamy Shraddhananda v. State
of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 line of cases and even
it was justified whether the fixing of the quantum at 30
years without remission was the appropriate sentence, in
the facts and circumstances of the case?
...

12 (2023) 9 SCC 817
13 2024 SCC Online SC 315
500 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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25. Swamy Shraddananda (supra), since affirmed
subsequently in Union of India v. V. Sriharan alias
Murugan, (2016) 7 SCC 1, resolved a judge’s dilemma.
Often it happens that a case that falls short of the rarest
of the rare category may also be one where a mere
sentence of 14 years (the normal benchmark for life
imprisonment) may be grossly disproportionate and
inadequate. The Court may find that while death penalty
may not be warranted keeping in mind the overall
circumstances, a proportionate penalty would be to fix
the period between 14 years and for the imprisonment
till rest of the life without remission. Addressing this
issue felicitously in Swamy Shraddananda (supra) Justice
Aftab Alam speaking for the court, held as follows:
“92. The matter may be looked at from a slightly
different angle. The issue of sentencing has
two aspects. A sentence may be excessive and
unduly harsh or it may be highly disproportionately
inadequate. When an appellant comes to this Court
carrying a death sentence awarded by the trial court
and confirmed by the High Court, this Court may
find, as in the present appeal, that the case just falls
short of the rarest of the rare category and may feel
somewhat reluctant in endorsing the death sentence.
But at the same time, having regard to the nature of
the crime, the Court may strongly feel that a sentence
of life imprisonment subject to remission normally
works out to a term of 14 years would be grossly
disproportionate and inadequate. What then should
the Court do? If the Court’s option is limited only to two
punishments, one a sentence of imprisonment, for all
intents and purposes, of not more than 14 years and
the other death, the Court may feel tempted and find
itself nudged into endorsing the death penalty. Such
a course would indeed be disastrous. A far more just,
reasonable and proper course would be to expand
the options and to take over what, as a matter of
fact, lawfully belongs to the Court i.e. the vast hiatus
between 14 years’ imprisonment and death. It needs
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 501

Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P.

to be emphasised that the Court would take recourse
to the expanded option primarily because in the facts
of the case, the sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment
would amount to no punishment at all.”
(emphasis supplied)

29. In the case of Veerendra v. State of Madhya Pradesh, this Court,
while considering the case involving the offences under the POCSO
Act as well as under 376(2)(i) of the IPC, confined the life imprisonment
to mean actual imprisonment for a period of 30 years. While doing
so, the Bench relied upon the celebrated judgment of this Court in
the case of Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka.14
30. Keeping in view the aforesaid exposition of the law, we thus, direct
that the ends of justice would be served by restoring the judgment
of the trial Court and directing that the sentence of life imprisonment
awarded to the accused, by the trial Court, for the offence under
Sections 3/4 of the POCSO Act shall stand revived.
31. For the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)
(i) of IPC, the accused is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for
life, as awarded by the trial Court, without the stipulation that the
life term will enure till the natural life of the appellant and a fine of
Rs. 5,00,000/- and in default, to further undergo imprisonment of
two years. Both the sentences shall run concurrently.
32. The fine, upon being deposited, shall be paid to the victim.
33. The appeal is partially allowed in these terms.
34. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal partially allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey

14 (2008) 13 SCC 767