Supreme Court of India
HARJINDER SINGHversusTHE STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 634
- Decided
- 5 May 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- VIKRAM NATH
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly exercised its extraordinary power under Section 319 CrPC to summon respondent No.2, and the High Court’s interference was erroneous.
Summary
The appellant, father of the deceased Dharminder Singh, challenged the High Court's order quashing a summons issued by the trial court under Section 319 of the CrPC against respondent No.2 (Varinder Singh) for alleged abetment to suicide. The incident involved a confrontation on 10 May 2016 where the deceased was taunted, leading to his suicide, and the prosecution sought to summon the alleged participant. The High Court set aside the summons, relying on the accused's alibi documents that had not been tested in trial. The Supreme Court examined whether the evidence presented in court—testimony of the deceased’s uncle and the victim’s father—constituted a prima facie case sufficient to invoke Section 319. It held that an alibi is a defence whose burden lies on the accused and that untested documents cannot defeat live evidence. Consequently, the Court affirmed the trial court’s power to summon the accused and reversed the High Court’s order. The appeal was allowed, reviving the summons and directing the accused to appear before the trial court.
Issues considered
- Whether the evidence on record justified the trial court’s exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC to summon respondent No.2.
- Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the trial court’s summoning order at the threshold.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161, s. 173(2), s. 193, s. 319, s. 482
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 306, s. 34
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether the evidence led, in the instant case, justified the Trial Court’s exercise of power u/s.319 CrPC to summon respondent no. 2, and whether the High Court was right in setting that order aside at the threshold. Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 attack was allegedly committed upon victim-deceased – On 10.05.2016, respondent no.2 along with other persons stopped his car near victim and taunted him stating that he and his family should die of shame for not having taken action against the acid-attack assailants – Victim returned
Subjects
Section 319 of CrPCSection 306 of IPCPlea of alibiNature of defencePsychological pressureSelf-destructionCourt’s independent assessmentSummoning under section 319 of CrPC
Judgment
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 168 : 2025 INSC 634
Harjinder Singh
v.
The State of Punjab & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2477 of 2024)
06 May 2025
[Vikram Nath* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the evidence led, in the instant case, justified the Trial
Court’s exercise of power u/s.319 CrPC to summon respondent
no. 2, and whether the High Court was right in setting that order
aside at the threshold.
Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.319 – On 13.03.2016, an
acid attack was allegedly committed upon victim-deceased –
On 10.05.2016, respondent no.2 along with other persons
stopped his car near victim and taunted him stating that he
and his family should die of shame for not having taken action
against the acid-attack assailants – Victim returned home
distressed – Later, his body was recovered near a canal – FIR
registered u/s.306/34 IPC – By order dated 24.11.2021, the
High Court quashed summoning order of respondent no.2 –
During trial, Public Prosecutor filed an application u/s.319 to
summon respondent no.2 – The said application was allowed
by the Trial Court – Respondent no.2 filed application u/s.482
CrPC against the order of the Trial Court – The High Court set
aside the summoning order of respondent no.2 – Correctness:
Held: The primary argument of Respondent no. 2 rests on his
alibi – An alibi, however, is a plea in the nature of a defence; the
burden to establish it rests squarely on the accused – Here, the
documents relied upon, parking chit, chemist’s receipt, OPD card,
CCTV clip, have yet to be formally proved – Until that exercise is
undertaken, they remain untested pieces of paper – To treat them
as conclusive at the threshold would invert the established order
of criminal proceedings, requiring the Court to pronounce upon a
defence before the prosecution is allowed to lead its full evidence –
* Author
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 169
Harjinder Singh v. The State of Punjab & Anr.
Even assuming the documents will eventually be proved, their face
value does not eclipse the prosecution version – The parking slip is
timed at 06:30 a.m.; the chemist’s bill and CCTV images are from
12:09 p.m. – The confrontation is alleged at 08:30 a.m. – A road
journey from Jagowal to Chandigarh of roughly ninety kilometres
in a private vehicle can comfortably be accomplished within the
intervening window – More importantly, abetment to suicide is not
an offence committed at a single moment – It may consist of a
build-up of psychological pressure culminating in self-destruction,
and the law punishes that build-up wherever and whenever it
occurs – If the allegations are true, telling a physically challenged
man that he and his family should die, and doing so in the immediate
aftermath of a grievous acid attack, is not banter – Sensitivity to
the social context, where honour and shame weigh heavily, was
called for – The offence, no doubt, will have to be established at
the trial – Having regard to the purpose of s.319 CrPC, there is no
infirmity in the order of the Trial Court. [Paras 11, 14, 15]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.319 – Power to proceed
against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence:
Held: The provision enables a criminal Court, once seized of the
matter, to bring before it any individual whose complicity becomes
apparent from the evidence that emerges in Court – It is an
exception to the general rule that an accused stands trial only
upon charge-sheet and committal; its object is to ensure that the
trial does not proceed without a participant who, on the material
now available, appears to share criminal liability – The power is
extraordinary and therefore to be exercised with circumspection,
yet it is neither illusory nor deferential to investigative conclusions:
once live evidence evinces a prima-facie case stronger than mere
suspicion, the Court must act. [Para 8]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.319 – When police has
accepted the plea of alibi of the accused – However, the trial
Court has summoned the accused u/s.319 of CrPC:
Held: If, in the midst of that trial, evidence implicating a new
participant surfaces, the Court is duty-bound to act on it – S.319
CrPC would be rendered otiose if an Investigating Officer’s earlier
opinion could freeze the array of accused for all time. [Para 12]
170 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Case Law Cited
Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab [2014] 2 SCR 1: (2014) 3 SCC
92 – followed.
Mahendra Awase vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [2025] 2 SCR 80 :
2025 SCC OnLine SC 107 – referred to.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords
Section 319 of CrPC; Section 306 of IPC; Plea of alibi; Nature
of defence; Psychological pressure; Self-destruction; Court’s
independent assessment; Summoning under section 319 of CrPC.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
2477 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.11.2023 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM-M No. 31120 of 2022
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Ms. Pallavi Singh, G. Balaji.
Adv. for the Respondents:
Vivek Jain, D.A.G., Siddhant Sharma, Chritarth Palli.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Vikram Nath, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal, preferred by the complainant-father (“the
appellant”) of the deceased Dharminder Singh, assails the judgment
dated 21 November 2023 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
at Chandigarh (“the High Court”) allowing Criminal Miscellaneous
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 171
Harjinder Singh v. The State of Punjab & Anr.
Petition No. 31120 of 2022 under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”). By the impugned judgment the High Court
set aside an order dated 04 July 2022 passed by the Additional
Sessions Judge, Sangrur (“the Trial Court”) summoning Varinder
Singh (hereinafter “respondent no. 2”) to face trial under Section
306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) in
First Information Report No. 51 of 2016 registered at Police Station
Amargarh, District Sangrur, Punjab.
3. The facts giving rise to the present appeal are as follows:
3.1 On 13 March 2016 an acid attack was allegedly committed
upon Dharminder Singh by ten persons. That occurrence was
recorded as FIR No. 30 of 2016 under Sections 323, 324,
341, 506, 148, 149 and 326-A IPC; respondent no.2 was not
named therein.
3.2 On 10 May 2016 at around 8.30 am in the morning, Dharminder
Singh and his paternal uncle Jagdev Singh were standing
near their abadi land on Jagowal Road when Gurmail Singh,
respondent no. 2, Santokh Singh and Iqbal Singh, accompanied
by an unidentified person, allegedly stopped their white car and
taunted the deceased, stating that he and his family “should die
of shame” for not having taken action against the acidattack
assailants.
3.3 The deceased returned home in distress, locked himself in a
room, and left the house alone at about 04:00 p.m. When he did
not return by evening, a search party found his bicycle, clothing
and footwear near the Hussainpur canal. On 13 May 2016 his
body was recovered from the canal head at village Salar. The
appellant lodged a complaint the same day; FIR No. 51 of 2016
(“the FIR in question”) was registered under Sections 306/34
IPC, naming, inter alia, respondent no. 2.
3.4 During investigation the police accepted the plea of alibi
advanced by respondent no. 2, who produced, among other
things, a parkinglot slip, outpatient records, a medicine bill and
CCTV footage from PGI Chandigarh timed 06:30 a.m. onward
on 10 May 2016. Endorsing these materials, the investigating
officer filed a report under Section 173 (2) CrPC on 02 August
2016 classifying respondent no. 2 as “innocent”. Consequently,
172 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
only the remaining accused were committed to the Court of
Session.
3.5 On an application by the Public Prosecutor the Trial Court, by
order dated 20 January 2017, summoned respondent no. 2 under
Section 193 of CrPC. Therefore, Respondent no. 2 successfully
challenged that order before the High Court. By the impugned
order dated 24 November 2021 the High Court quashed the
summoning on the ground that there had been no committal
order qua respondent no. 2, while granting liberty to invoke
Section 319 CrPC if credible evidence emerged during trial.
3.6 During the trial, on 08 March 2022 the appellant testified as
PW1, narrating the confrontation of 10th May 2016 and hence
attributing direct participation to respondent no. 2. The Public
Prosecutor relying on the statement of PW-1 as well as on the
statement of Jagdev Singh recorded under Section 161 CrPC
moved an application under Section 319 CrPC to summon
respondent no. 2.
3.7 By order dated 04 July 2022 the Trial Court allowed the
application, observing that PW1’s sworn testimony, corroborated
by Jagdev Singh’s statement, disclosed a primafacie case and
that the plea of alibi was a matter for trial. Respondent no. 2 was
directed to appear on 02 August 2022 to stand trial alongside
the existing accused for the offence under Section 306 IPC.
3.8 Respondent no. 2 approached the High Court under Section
482 CrPC, asserting that the Trial Court had disregarded what
he described as “scientific and documentary proof” of his
whereabouts in Chandigarh at the relevant time and insisting
that only substantially stronger evidence could justify his
addition to the array of accused. The High Court, persuaded
with the submission, was of the view that the Trial Court ought
to have weighed the investigation record, including the parking
slip, CCTV footage and associated inquiries, set aside the
summoning order on 21 November 2023, concluding that the
material adduced fell short of the rigor demanded for invoking
Section 319 CrPC.
4. The appellant has approached this Court contending, inter alia, that
the High Court misapplied the threshold for exercise of power under
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 173
Harjinder Singh v. The State of Punjab & Anr.
Section 319 CrPC, prematurely evaluated an untested alibi and
disregarded direct eyewitness evidence. It is in these circumstances
that the matter now engages our consideration.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant has advanced the following
submissions:
5.1 The police, while filing the final report under Section 173 (2)
CrPC, conflated two distinct occurrences: the acid‑attack of
13 March 2016 (FIR 30/2016), in which respondent no. 2 was
not named, and the incident of 10 May 2016 that forms the
gravamen of the present FIR. Respondent no. 2’s alibi materials
relate only to 10 March 2016 and were erroneously treated as
exonerating him for the later incident.
5.2 Respondent no. 2 has furnished no cogent alibi for 10 May
2016. The documents he now relies on, parking ticket, OPD
card, CCTV clip and supporting statements, were never exhibited
before the Trial Court nor tested in cross‑examination; their
veracity can be adjudicated only at trial.
5.3 The eye‑witness Jagdev Singh, whose Section 161 statement
specifically attributes the fatal taunts to respondent no. 2,
corroborates the sworn testimony of PW‑1. Taken together,
this constitutes prima‑facie “evidence” arising in the course
of trial, satisfying the threshold for exercise of power under
Section 319 CrPC.
5.4 The High Court characterised the confrontation of 10 May 2016
as mere “teasing” and concentrated on the previous acid‑attack,
thereby undervaluing an independent offence of abetment to
suicide that was proximate in time and casually linked to the
deceased’s death.
5.5 By resting its decision on investigation‑stage material concerning
10 March 2016, the High Court prematurely evaluated an
unproven alibi and overlooked the settled principle that the
burden of establishing such a defence lies squarely on the
accused and must be discharged through evidence at trial.
5.6 Section 319 CrPC is intended to prevent the real perpetrator
from escaping trial; once ocular testimony discloses a direct
role, the Court is obliged to summon the person concerned.
174 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
The Trial Court’s order of 04 July 2022 correctly applied this
standard, whereas the High Court’s interference under Section
482 CrPC amounts to a pre‑trial acquittal on disputed facts.
6. Learned counsel for the respondents, respondent no.1 (State of
Punjab) and respondent no.2, have submitted the following arguments:
6.1 The police investigation, supported by a parkingslip timed 06.30
a.m., OPD documentation, medicalstore bill, CCTV footage and
mobiletower records, indicate that respondent no. 2 was at
PGI Chandigarh on 10 May 2016. Moreover statements of the
parkingattendant and chemist, as well as a villagelevel inquiry,
corroborate this. These materials were scrutinised up the chain
of command and the final report under Section 173(2) CrPC
recorded respondent no. 2’s innocence, which the prosecution
never challenged.
6.2 Section 319 CrPC demands evidence stronger than that
required even for framing a charge. The testimony of PW1
merely reiterates the FIR narrative, while Jagdev Singh’s version
remains a Section 161 statement, inadmissible until he enters
the witness box. No fresh or compelling material emerged after
the High Court had earlier (24 November 2021) quashed the
Section 193 summons; the prosecution is essentially seeking
a second bite on the same record.
6.3 The timedistance matrix reinforces the alibi: village Jagowal
is about 90 km from Chandigarh, and the CCTV still shows
respondent no. 2 at PGI at 12:09 p.m., making his presence
at the village confrontation improbable.
6.4 The Trial Court, in summoning respondent no. 2, ignored the
“scientific and documentary” evidence and treated the untested
alibi as a matter for trial, thereby reversing the investigative
conclusion without any stronger contraproof. The High Court
correctly intervened under Section 482 CrPC, holding that the
Trial Court was required to weigh the entire record, including
the investigation dossier, before exercising an extraordinary
power meant to be sparingly used.
6.5 Finally, respondents contend that conflating the acidattack FIR
of 13 March 2016 (in which respondent no. 2 was never named)
with the present FIR has led to misplaced suspicion; repeated
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 175
Harjinder Singh v. The State of Punjab & Anr.
attempts to summon him, despite a consistent exoneration,
amount to harassment rather than pursuit of justice.
7. Having considered the arguments and submissions of the parties
and having examined the material on record, the issue that falls for
consideration before us is whether the evidence led justified the
Trial Court’s exercise of power under Section 319 CrPC to summon
respondent no. 2, and whether the High Court was right in setting
that order aside at the threshold.
8. We shall first examine the scope of Section 319 (1) of the CrPC
which has been reproduced hereunder:
“319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing
to be guilty of offence.
(1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an
offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not
being the accused has committed any offence for which
such person could be tried together with the accused, the
Court may proceed against such person for the offence
which he appears to have committed.”
The provision enables a criminal Court, once seized of the matter,
to bring before it any individual whose complicity becomes apparent
from the evidence that emerges in Court. It is an exception to the
general rule that an accused stands trial only upon chargesheet
and committal; its object is to ensure that the trial does not proceed
without a participant who, on the material now available, appears
to share criminal liability. The power is extraordinary and therefore
to be exercised with circumspection, yet it is neither illusory nor
deferential to investigative conclusions: once live evidence evinces
a prima facie case stronger than mere suspicion, the Court must act.
9. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Hardeep Singh v. State of
Punjab1, observed that Section 319 CrPC is designed to ensure
that every participant in a crime is brought before the Court and
its provisions are therefore to be interpreted constructively and
purposively, so that the true offender does not slip through procedural
gaps. The relevant paras of the judgement are hereunder:
1 (2014) 3 SCC 92
176 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“8. The constitutional mandate under Articles 20 and 21
of the Constitution of India provides a protective umbrella
for the smooth administration of justice making adequate
provisions to ensure a fair and efficacious trial so that the
accused does not get prejudiced after the law has been
put into motion to try him for the offence but at the same
time also gives equal protection to victims and to society
at large to ensure that the guilty does not get away from
the clutches of law. For the empowerment of the Courts
to ensure that the criminal administration of justice works
properly, the law was appropriately codified and modified
by the legislature under CrPC indicating as to how the
Courts should proceed in order to ultimately find out the
truth so that an innocent does not get punished but at
the same time, the guilty are brought to book under the
law. It is these ideals as enshrined under the Constitution
and our laws that have led to several decisions, whereby
innovating methods and progressive tools have been forged
to find out the real truth and to ensure that the guilty does
not go unpunished.
9. The presumption of innocence is the general law
of the land as every man is presumed to be innocent
unless proven to be guilty. Alternatively, certain statutory
presumptions in relation to certain class of offences have
been raised against the accused whereby the presumption
of guilt prevails till the accused discharges his burden
upon an onus being cast upon him under the law to
prove himself to be innocent. These competing theories
have been kept in mind by the legislature. The entire
effort, therefore, is not to allow the real perpetrator of an
offence to get away unpunished. This is also a part of fair
trial and in our opinion, in order to achieve this very end
that the legislature thought of incorporating provisions of
Section 319 CrPC. It is with the said object in mind that
a constructive and purposive interpretation should be
adopted that advances the cause of justice and does not
dilute the intention of the statute conferring powers on the
Court to carry out the abovementioned avowed object and
purpose to try the person to the satisfaction of the Court
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 177
Harjinder Singh v. The State of Punjab & Anr.
as an accomplice in the commission of the offence that
is the subject-matter of trial.”
10. Hence, in our considered opinion, the power under Section 319
CrPC is triggered not by conjecture but by “evidence” that surfaces
in Court. In the present case, narrated in detail how, on the morning
of 10 May 2016, respondent no. 2, together with others, stopped a
car, confronted the deceased and, in the Punjabi vernacular, told
him that he and his family ought to drown themselves for failing to
retaliate. PW1 further described the immediate impact of those words:
the deceased broke down, secluded himself, and a few hours later
left home never to return alive.
11. The primary argument of Respondent no. 2 rests on his alibi. An
alibi, however, is a plea in the nature of a defence; the burden to
establish it rests squarely on the accused. Here, the documents
relied upon, parking chit, chemist’s receipt, OPD card, CCTV clip,
have yet to be formally proved. Until that exercise is undertaken,
they remain untested pieces of paper. To treat them as conclusive
at the threshold would invert the established order of criminal
proceedings, requiring the Court to pronounce upon a defence before
the prosecution is allowed to lead its full evidence. Even assuming
the documents will eventually be proved, their face value does not
eclipse the prosecution version. The parking slip is timed at 06:30
a.m.; the chemist’s bill and CCTV images are from 12:09 p.m. The
confrontation is alleged at 08:30 a.m. A road journey from Jagowal
to Chandigarh of roughly ninety kilometres in a private vehicle can
comfortably be accomplished within the intervening window. More
importantly, abetment to suicide is not an offence committed at a
single moment. It may consist of a buildup of psychological pressure
culminating in selfdestruction, and the law punishes that buildup
wherever and whenever it occurs.
12. Learned counsel for the respondents urged that the police, having
once accepted the alibi, were the best judges of its authenticity
and that their conclusion should not be lightly brushed aside. The
submission overlooks the scheme of the CrPC. Once cognizance is
taken and trial commences, the investigating agency’s view yields
to the Court’s independent assessment. If, in the midst of that
trial, evidence implicating a new participant surfaces, the Court is
dutybound to act on it. Section 319 CrPC would be rendered otiose
178 [2025] 6 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
if an Investigating Officer’s earlier opinion could freeze the array of
accused for all time.
13. It was next argued that PW1’s deposition merely reproduces the FIR.
We are unable to agree. A first information report is only an initial
version; a statement under oath, recorded in Court, is substantive
evidence. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of what stronger material
could be demanded at the summoning stage short of a confession. The
threshold is not proof beyond reasonable doubt; it is the appearance
of involvement which is apparent from evidence adduced in the
proceeding. That threshold was satisfied here.
14. We believe that the High Court, in interfering under Section 482
CrPC, placed decisive reliance on the investigation dossier and
characterised the 10 May 2016 episode as mere “teasing”. Such a
description underplays both the content and the effect of the words
spoken. If the allegations is true, telling a physically challenged man
that he and his family should die, and doing so in the immediate
aftermath of a grievous acid attack, is not banter. Sensitivity to the
social context, where honour and shame weigh heavily, was called
for. The offence, no doubt, will have to be established at the trial. The
Trial Court will also decide whether on facts the offence is established,
keeping in view the law laid down by this Court in Mahendra Awase
vs. State of Madhya Pradesh2 and other judgments interpreting
Section 306 IPC.
15. Having regard to the purpose of Section 319 CrPC, we see no infirmity
in the order of the Trial Court. On the contrary, nonsummoning of
respondent no. 2 would have risked a truncated trial and a possible
failure of justice. The High Court, by elevating unproved defence
documents above sworn testimony, adopted an approach that was
neither consistent with the text of Section 319 CrPC nor consonant
with the realities of a case involving a vulnerable victim. The Court’s
intervention, in effect, foreclosed the prosecution from testing the
alibi and deprived the Trial Court of jurisdiction expressly conferred
upon it.
16. For the reasons recorded above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.
The judgment and order dated 21 November 2023 passed by the
2 2025 SCC OnLine SC 107
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 179
Harjinder Singh v. The State of Punjab & Anr.
High Court of Punjab and Haryana in CRM-M No. 31120 of 2022
is set aside.
17. The order of the Trial Court dated 04 July 2022 summoning respondent
no. 2 to stand trial for the offence punishable under Section 306
IPC shall stand revived. Respondent no. 2 shall appear before the
Trial Court within four weeks from today and thereafter abide by all
further orders of the Trial Court. It will be open to the Trial Court to
regulate the conditions of his release, if any application for bail is
moved, in accordance with law.
18. All observations made herein are confined to the present adjudication
under Section 319 CrPC and shall not influence the final appreciation
of evidence by the Trial Court.
19. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
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