Supreme Court of India

HITENDRA VISHNU THAKUR AND ORS.versusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.

Citation: 1994 INSC 237
Decided: 12 July 1994
Bench: A S ANANDFAIZAN UDDIN

Holding

Section 20(4) grants an indefeasible right to bail on the prosecution's default, independent of Section 20(8), and the 1993 amendment is retrospective, but an extension of custody under clause (bb) must be based on a proper report by the public prosecutor.

Summary

The case arose from the murder of Suresh Narsinh Dubey in 1989, for which Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and others were arrested under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA). After a series of investigations, the accused sought bail on the ground that the prosecution had failed to file a charge‑sheet within the statutory period, especially after the 1993 amendment reduced the period to 180 days and introduced a clause (bb) for extension. The Designated Court denied bail, treating the investigating officer’s application as a valid report of the public prosecutor and granting an extension of custody. The Supreme Court held that Section 3(1) of TADA applies only to acts that strictly meet the definition of a terrorist act, that the 1993 amendment is retrospective and applies to pending cases, and that bail under Section 20(4) is an indefeasible right when the prosecution defaults, independent of the considerations in Section 20(8). It further ruled that an extension of time under clause (bb) must be based on a proper report by the public prosecutor, not merely the investigating officer’s application. Consequently, the Court set aside the Designated Court’s order refusing bail and directed the release of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur on bail, while dismissing other related appeals.

Issues considered

The scope and applicability of Section 3(1) of TADA to the facts of the case.
Whether the 1993 Amendment Act 43, which amended Section 20(4) of TADA and Section 167 of the Cr.P.C., operates retrospectively on pending cases.
The true ambit of Section 20(4) and Section 20(8) of TADA concerning the grant of bail and the conditions for extending custody under clause (bb).
Whether an application by the investigating officer can be treated as a report of the public prosecutor for purposes of clause (bb).

Legislation cited

Arms Act, 1959
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 167, s. 167(2), s. 173, s. 173(8), s. 197, s. 260(1), s. 262, s. 263, s. 264, s. 265, s. 438
Constitution of Indias. Article 22(2)
Explosive Act, 1884
Explosive Substances Act, 1908
Inflammable Substances Act, 1952
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987s. 18, s. 20(4), s. 20(4)(b), s. 20(4)(bb), s. 20(8), s. 20(9), s. 20A(1), s. 20A(2), s. 2(l)(h), s. 3(1), s. 6

Subjects

TerrorismTADABailSection 20(4)Section 20(8)Retrospective amendmentDesignated CourtDefault of prosecutionExtension of custodyPublic prosecutor reportAnticipatory bail

Judgment

A HITENDRA VISHNU THAKUR AND ORS. ETC. ETC.
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.

JULY 12, 1994

B [DR. A.S. ANAND AND FAIZAN UDDIN, JJ.J

Terrorists and Dismptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987-Seclion 3(1)
read with Section 2(l)(h).

c ClauseTerrorism within the meaning of Sub-section ( 1) of Section 3 read with
(h) of Sub-section ( 1) of Section 2 of TADA means use of violence
resulting not merely in physical and mental damage lo the victim but also the
prolonged psychological effect it produces or has potentiality to produce on
the Society as a whole.

D Terrorists and. Dismptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987-Section
20(4).

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-

Section 167 (as amended by Amendment Act No. 43 of 1993), Section
E 167 of the Code read with Section 20(4) of TADA is not a provision for grant
of bail but deals with maximum period during which an accused may be kept
in custody and detention to eit'able the investigating agency to complete the
investigation and file the charge-sheet, if any, in the Court.

Terrorists and Dismptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987: Section 18:
F
If the designated court finds that the offence does not even prima facie
fall under TADA, it must not proceed and must transfer the case to regular
court under Section 18 of TADA.

G Terrorists and Disrnptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987-Sub-section
20(4)(bb}--Sections 167 read with Secs. 173-Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973.

If the police fails to complete the investigation and put up a challan
against the accused in accordance with law under Section 173 Cr.P.C., an
H indefeasible right to be enlarged on bail accrnes to the accused after the expiry
360
H.V. 1HAKUR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 361

of the maximum period during which an accused can be kept in custodrThe A
Court is obliged in such a case, to decline die police request for further
remand except in cases governed by Clauses(bb) of Sub-section (4) of Section
20.

Temirists and Disniptive Activities (Prevemion) Act, 1987: Section
20(4) and Section 20(8): B
' '
" The grounds on which bail may be denied under Sub-sectio11(8) of
Section 20 of TADA are irrelevant for the consideration of the prayer of
release on bail on account of the default of the prosecution wider Sub-section
(4) of Section 20 of TADA. C

Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevemion) Act, 1987: Section
20-A(2).

At the stage of sanction for prosecution for an offence under TADA
only the prima facie case should be established to show that the authority D
competent to grant sanction had applied its mind to the facts of the case
before sanction was accorded.

On 09.10.89 one D was shot dead at 10.30 A.M. at a Railway Station
in the presence of his brother-in-law, the eye-witness. The F.I.R. was lodged
by the deceased's brother. Durjng the investigation, two other accused were E
arrested and charge-sheeted. Trial is pending in the Sessions Court. In
February, 1992, the D.I.G. of Police concerned during inspection found
that the case had not been investigated properly. He obtained a complaint
from the deceased's wife and ordered re-investigation. Permission of the
Sessions Court was also obtained under Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. More F
accused were arrested and remanded to judicial custody. The petitioner
and two others read a news item indicating that they were likely to be
arrested in connection with the case. They approached the High Court for
anticipatory bail. After notice to the public prosecutor (P.P.), the High
Court granted interim anticipatory bail. The prosec11tion filed an applica· G
lion in the High Court stating that since in the instant case provisions of
TADA were applicable, the accused could not be admitted to anticipatory
bail because of the exclusion of the provisions of Section 438 of Cr.P.C. in
respect of offences under TADA. The High Court dismissed the an·
ticipatory bail application, but kept effective the order of. interim an·
ticipatory bail for a period of one week to enable the applicants to take H
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP.1 S.C.R.

A recourse to further proceedings.

Writ Petition was filed by the petitioner for a declaration that TADA
was not applicable to the facts of the case. The Writ Petition was dismissed
with the observation that the designated Court under TADA may go into
the question of the applicability of TADA. Special Leave Petition against
B the order of the High Court was dismissed by this Court. Petitioner
surrendered before the police and was later on remanded to judicial
custody. Application for bail was dismissed by the designated court. The
application urging that the provisions of TADA were not applicable was
also dismissed,
c The Parliament enacted Amendment Act No. 43/93 which came Into
force on 22nd May, 1993. Section 20(4)(b) was, inter alia, amended by which
the time for filing the charge-sheet was reduced from one year to 180 days.
A new clause (bb) providing for grant of extention of time for completion
of investigation and filing of challan on report of the P.P. subject to a
D maximum period of one year was Introduced. The petitlon~r filed an
application for bail on the ground that 180 days bad expired on 04.05.93
without any charge·sheet/challan having been filed. On 12.07.93, also ex·
tention of time to complete the investigation was filed and an application
seeking the P.P. opposed the bail application. Bail application was dis·
missed and the extension of time granted till 30th August, 1993 to file the
E
challan/charge· sheet, treating the application of the investigation officer
' of the public prosecutor.
(IO) as a report

Appeal was filed from the judgment and order dated 31.07.93 of the
designated court before the Supreme Court.
F
The following questions arose for consideration:

1. When can the provisions of Section 3(1) of .the Terrorist and
Disruptive Activities Act, 1987. (hereinafter referred to as the TADA) be
attracted?
G
2. Is the 1993 Amendment amending Section 167(2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure by modifying Section 20(4)(b) and adding a new
provision as 20(4)(bb), applicable to the pending cases i.e. is retrospective
in operation'?

H 3. What is the true ambit and scope of Section 20(4) and Section
H.V. THAKUR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 363

20(8) of TADA in the matter of grant of bail to an accused brought before A
the Designated Court and the factors which the Designated Court has to
keep in view while dealing with an application for grant of Bail under
Section 20(4) and for grant of extension of time to the prosecution for
further investigation under clause (bb) of Section 20(4) and incidently
whether the conditions contained in Section 20(8) control the grant of bail
B
under Section 20(4) of the Act also?

It was submitted for· the appellants that despite the constitutional
validity of Section 3 of TADA being upheld by the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Kartar Singh v. 17ie State of Punjab, keeping in view the
stringent nature of the provisions of TADA the offence constituted by C
Section 3 of TADA must be the one which qualifies stricto-senso as a
"terrorist act" and unless the crime alleged against an accused can be
classified as a "terrorist act" in letter and in spirit. Section 3(1) of TADA
has no application and an accused shall have to be tried under the
ordinary penal law and in such a fact situation, it is a statutory obligation D
cast on the Designated Court to transfer the case from that court for its
trial by the regular courts under the ordinary criminal law i~ \iew of the
provisions of Section 18 of TADA. It ls submitted that the Designated
Court should not, without proper application of mind, charge sheet or
convict an accused under Section 3 of TADA simply because the Investigat-
ing officer, decides to Include that section while filing the challan and that E
it ls not open to the State to apply TADA to the ordinary problems arising
out of disturbance of law and order or even to situations arising out of the
disturbance of public order - a more serious type of crime alone would
justify trial under TADA.

On the other hand it was contended for the respondents that since F
the constitutional validity of Section 3 of TADA has been upheld by a
Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh's case it is not permissible to re-ex-
amine its validity on the basis of some argument which might have been
raised before the Constitution Bench but was not so raised.
G
Dismissing the appeals, this Court

HELD: t. Most of the criminal activities constituting a terrorist act
and offences under the penal law, do overlap. However, where an act
complained of is punishable under Section 3 of TADA, it invites more
stringent punishment than the punishment prescribed for the offence H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A under the ordinary penal law. Section 6 of TADA provides even for
imposition of enhanced penalties for a person who with the intent to aid
any terrorist or disruptionist activity, contravenes any of the provisions of
or any rule made under the Arms ·Act, 1959, the Explosive Act, 1884, the
Explosive Substances Act, 1908 or the Inflammable Substances Act, 1952
and renders him liable to punishment for not less than 5 years. The
B punishment may, in certain cases, extend to imprisonment for life with
fine, notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions of acts or the
rules made under the respective acts. [372-E-F]

2.1. "Terrorism 11 is one of the manifestations of increased law-less·
C ness and cult of violence. Violence and crime constitute a threat to an
established order and are a revolt against a civilized society. "Terrorism"
has not been defined under TADA nor is it possible to give a precise
definition of"terrorism". It may be possible to describe it as use ofviolence
when its most important result is not merely the physical and mental
D demage of the victim but the prolonged psychological effect it produces or
has the potential of producing on the society as a whole. There may be
death, injury or destruction of property or even deprivation of individual
liberty in the process but the extent and reach of the intended terrorist
activity travels beyond the effect of an. ordinary crime capable of being
punished under the ordinary penal law of the land and its main objective
E is to overawe the Government or disturb harmony of the society or "ter-
rorise" people and the society and not only those directly assaulted, with
a view to disturb even tempo, peac_e and tranquility of the society and
create a sense of fear and insecurity. A 'terrorist' activity does not merely
arise by causing disturbance of law and order or of public order. The fall
out of the intended activity must be such that it travels beyond the capacity
F
of the ordinary law enforcement agencies to tackle it under the ordinary
penal law. [372-H, 372-A·C]

2.2. 'Terrorism' is generally an attempt to acquire or maintain power
or control by intimidation and causing fear and helplessness in the mind.'
G of the.people at large or any section thereof and is a. totally abnormal
phenomenon. What distinguishes 'terrorism' from other forms of violence,
therefore, appears to be the deliberate and systematic use of coercive
intimidation. The criminal activity in order to invoke TADA must be
committeed with the requisite intention as contemplated 1Jr Section 3(1)
H of the .,Act by use of such weapons as have been enumerated in Section 3(1)
H.V. THAKUR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 365

and which cause or are likely to result in the offences as mentioned in the A
said section. The intended extent and reach of the criminal activity of the
'terrorist' is such which travels beyond the gravity of the mere disturbance
of public order even of a 'virulent nature' and may at times transcend the
frontiers of the locality and may include such anti-national activities which
throw a challenge to the very integrity and sovereignty of the country in its B
democratic polity. Unless the Act complained of falls strictly within the
letter and spirit of Section 3(1) of TADA and is committeed with the
intention as envisaged by that Section by means of the weapons etc. as are
enumerated therein with the motive as postulated thereby, an aet:used
cannot be tried or convicted for an offence under Section 3(1) of TADA. It
is the obligation of the investigation agency to satisfy the Designated Court C
from the material collected by it during the investigation, and not merely
by the opinion formed by the investigating agency, that the activity of the
"terrorist" falls strictly within the parametres of the provisions of TADA
before seeking to charge-sheet an accused.under TADA. The Designated
Court must record Its satisfaction about the existence of a prima facie case, D
on the basis of the material on the record, before it proceeds to frame a
charge sheet against an accused for offences covered by TADA. Even after
an accused has been charge-sheeted for an offence under TADA and the
prosecution leads evidence in the case, it is an obligation of the Designated
Court to take extra care to examine the evidence with a view to find out
whether the provisions of the Act apply or not. The designated Court, is, E
therefore, expected to carefully examine the evidence and after analysing
the same come to a firm conclusion that the evidence led by the prosecution
has established that the case of the accused falls strictly within the four
corners of the Act before recording a conviction against an accused under
TADA. [373-D, G, 376-G, 379GH, 380-A] p

3.1. The proviso to Section 167(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code
read with Section' 20(4)(b) of TADA, therefore, creates an indefeasible
right in an accused person, on account of the 'default' by the investigating
agency in the completion of the investigation within the maximum period G
prescribed or extended, as the case may be, to seek an order for his release
on bail. Once a period for filing the charge sheet has expired and either
no extension under Clause (bb) has been granted by the Designated Court
or the period of extension has also expired, the accused person would be
entitled to move an application for being admitted to bail under sub-sec-
tion (4) of Section 20 TADA read with Section 167 of the Code and the H
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A Designated Court shall release him on bail, if the accused seeks to be so
released and furnishes the requisite bail. We are not impressed with the
argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that on the expiry of the
period during which investigation is required to be completed under
Section 20(4) TADA read with Section 167 of the Code, the Court must
release the accused on bail on its own motion even without any application
B from an accused person, on his offering to furnish bail. In our opinion an
accused is required to make an application if he wishes to be released on
bail on account of the 'default' of the investigatinwprosecuting agency and
once such an application is made, the Court should issue a notice to the
public prosecutor, who may either show that the prosecution bas obtained
C the order for extension for completion of investigation from the court
under clause (bb) or that the challan has been filed in the Designated
Court before the expiry of the prescribed period or even that the prescribed
period has actually not expired and, thus resist the grant of bail on the
alleged ground of 'default'. The issuance of notice would avoid the pos·
D sibility of an accused obtaining an order of bail under the 'default' clause
by either deliberately or inadvertently concealing certain facts and would
avoid multiplicity of proceedings. (384-E-H, 385-A, BJ

3.2. It would, therefore, serve the ends of justice if both sides ·are
heard on a petition for grant of ball on account of the prosecution's
E 'default'. The objection to the grant of bail to an accused on account of the
'default' of the prosecution to complete the investigation and file the
challan within the maximum period prescribed under clause (b) of sub·
section (4) of Section 20 of TADA or within the extended period as
envisaged by clause (bb), has to be limited to the cases where either the
F factual basis of invoking the 'default' clause is not available or the period
for completion of investigation has been extended under clause (bb) and
the like. No other condition, like the gravity of the case, seriousness of the
offence or character of the offender etc. can weigh with the court at that
stage to refuse the grant of bail to an accused under sub-section (4) of
Section 20 TADA on account of the 'default' of the prosecutiqn. It is totally
G inconceivable and unacceptable that the considerations. for grant of bail
under Section 20(8) would be applicable to and control the grant of bail
under Section 20(4) of the Act. The two provisions operate in different
and independent fields. The basis for grant of bail under Section 20(4), as
already noticed, is entirely different from the grounds on which ball may
H be granted under Section 20(8) of the Act. (385-B, F, G & 386·D·E]
H.V. IBAKUR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 367

4. The ambit and scope of Section 20(8) of TADA is no longer A
res-integra. Both the provisions i.e. Section 20(4) and 20(8) of TADA
operate in different situations and are controlled and guided by different
considerations. Thus for seeking extension of time under clause (bb), the
public prosecutor after an independent application of his mind to the
request of the investigating agency, is required to make a report to the B
Designated Court indicating therein the progress of the investigation and
disclosingjustilication for keeping the accused in further custody to enable
the investigating agency to complete the investigation. The public
prosecutor may attach the request of the investigating officer alongwith
his request or application and report, but his report, as envisaged under
clause (bb), must disclose on the face of it, that he has applied his mind C
and was satisfied with the progress of the investigation and considered
grant of further time to complete the investigation nece~sary. The use of
the expression "on the report of the public prosecutor indicating the
progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of
the accused beyond the said period" as occurring in clause (bb) in sub-sec· D
tion(2) of Section 167 as amended by Section 20(4) are important and
indicative of the legislative intent not to keep an accused in custody
unreasonably and to grant extension only on the report of the public
prosecutor. The report of the public prosecutor, therefore, is not merely a
formality but a very vital report, because the consequence of its acceptance E
affects the liberty of an accused and It must, therefore, strictly comply with
the requirements as contained in clause (bb). The request of an investigat-
ing officer fo.r extension of time is no substitute for the report ofthe public
prosecutor. Where either no report as is envisaged by clause (bb) is filed
or the report filed by the public prosecutor is not accepted by the Desig·
nated Court, since. the grant of extension of time under clause (bb) is
F
neither a formality nor automatic, the necessary corollary would be that
an accused would be entitled to seek bail and the court "shall" release him
on bail if he furnishes bail as required by the Designated Court. Since,
both the clauses (b) and ·(bb) as introduced by the Amendment Act, fall
within the realm of procedural law, these would be applicable to pending G
cases since there is no vested right in an accused in the procedural law.
Thus the Amendment Act 43 of 1993 is retrospective in operation and both
clauses (b) and (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20 of TADA apply to the
cases which were pending i."estigation on the date when the amendment
came Into force with effect from 22.05.93 and in which the challan had not H
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A been filed till then. [388-C, 389-A-F, 383-C, 394-C}

5. An accused person seeking bail under Section 20(4) has to make
an application to the court for grant or bail on grounds or the 'default' or
the prosecution and the court shall n:lease the accused on bail after notice
B to the public prosecutor uninfluenced by the gravity of the offence or the
merits of the prosecution case since Section 20(8) does not control the
grant of bail under Section 20(4) of TADA and both the provisions operate
in separate and independent fields. It is, however, permissible for the
public prosecutor to resist the grant or bail by seeking an extension under
C clause (bb) by filing a report for the purpose before the court. However,
no extension shall be granted by the court without notice to an accused to
have his say regarding the prayer for grant of extension under clause (bb).
In this view of the matter, it Is immaterial whether the application for bail
on ground of 'default' under Section 20(4) is filed first or the report as
envisaged by clause (bb) is filed by the public prosecutor first so long as
D both are considered while granting or refusing ball. If the period
prescribed by clause (b) of Section 20(4) has expired and the court does
not grant an extension on the report of the public prosecutor made under
clause \bb), the..:qurt shall release the accused on ball as It would be an
Indefeasible right·of the accused to be so released. Even where the court
E grants an extension under clause (bb) but the charge-sheet Is not filed
within the e<lended· period, the court shall have no option but to release
the accused on tiall, If he seeks It and is prepared to furnish the ball as
directed by the C'il1frt. Moreover, no extension under clause (bb) can be
granted by the 1Des'ignated Court except ou a report of the public
F prosecutor nor i!lih extension be granted for reasons other than those
.,
specifically'contilllied in clause (bb), which must be strictly construed.

[394-D-H, 395-A]

6.1. As would be seen from the application itself, it is not a report of
G the public prosecutor but an application filed by the Sub-Divisional Police
Officer and is addressed to the Designated Judge of the Designated Court.
Admittedly besides the application no other report was filed by the Public
Prosecutor to seek extension of time for completion of the investigation as
envisaged by clause (bb) of Section 20(4) o(TADA read with Section 167(2)
H of the Code. [399-G-H]
H.V. THAKUR,._ STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [DR. ANAND, J.J 369

6.2. From the perusal of the objections of the public prosecutor, A
extracted above, it transpires that the application of the investigating
officer was submitted direct to the Designated Court by the Investigating
Officer and not by the Pnblic Prosecutor and the prayer for release on bail
of the applicant under Section 20(4) was opposed mainly on grounds which
are relevant under Section 20(8) of TADA and not under Section 20(4) of B
the Act. The grounds on which bail may be denied under Section 20(8) of
TADA are irrelevant for the consideration of the prayer for release on bail
on account of the 'default' of the prosecution under Section 20(4) of TADA.
(404-D-E]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. c
732-35/93 etc. etc.

From the Judgment and Order dated the 31st July 1993 of the
Designated Court at Pune in Terrorist Criminal. Misc. Application Nos.
81, 83, 84 and 85/93.
D
K.T.S. Tutsi, K.G. Bhagat, U.R. Lalit, Kapil Sibal, N.T. Vanamalai,
Swaraj Kaushal, P.N. Gupta, Bharat Ramah, P.M. Hegde, Kailash Vasdev,
AM. Khanwilkar, Yatendra Sharma, Raju Ramachandran, M.D. Adkar,
Ejaz Maqbool, K.M. Reddy, AS. Bhasme, Rajeev Sharma, P.N. Bhan, Joy
Basu, K.M. Reddy & AS. Bhasme for the appearing parties. E

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR. ANAND, J. In this batch of criminal appeals and special leave
petitions (criminal} the three meaningful questions which require our
consideration are: (1) when. can the provisions of Section 3(1} of the
F
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act. 1987. (hereinafter referred to as
the TADA} be attracted? (2) Is the 1993 Amendment, amending Section
167(2} of the Code of Criminal Procedure by modifying Section 20(4}(b}
and adding a new provision as 20(4}(b), applicable to the pending case i.e.
is retrospective in operation? And (3) what is the true ambit and scope of G
Section 20(4} and Section 20(8) of TADA in the matter of grant of bail to
an accused brought before the Designated Court and the factors which the
Designated Court has to keep in view while dealing with an application for
grant of Bail under Section 20(4) and for grant of extension of time to the
prosecution for further investigation under clause (bb) of Section 20(4} and H
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A incidently whether the conditions contained in Section 20(8) TADA con-
trol the grant of bail under Section 20(4) of the Act also" We shall take
up for consideration these questions in seriatim.

When can the provisions of Section 3(1) of TADA be attracted'?

B Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that even thought the
constitutional validity of Section 3 of TADA has been upheld by a Con-
stitution Bench of this court in Ka1tar Singh v. The State of Punjab, JT
(1994) 2 SC 423 = (1994) 1 Apex Decisions SC (Criminal) 413, nonetheless
keeping in view the stringent nature of the pro,osions of TADA the offence
c constituted by Section 3 of TADA must be the one which qualifies stricto-
senso as a "terrorist act" and unless the crime alleged against an accused
can be classified as a "terrorist act" in letter and in spirit. Section 3(1) of
TADA has no application and an accused shall have to be tried under the
ordinary penal law and in such a fact situation, it is a statutory obligation
cast on the Designated Court to transfer the case from that court for its
D trial by the regular courts under the ordinary criminal law in -'ew of the
provisions of Section 18 of TADA. It is submitted that the Designated
Court should not, without proper application of mind. charge-sheet or
conv1ct an accused under Section 3 of TADA simply because the investiga-
tion officer, decides to include that Section while filing the challan and that
E it is not open to the State to apply TADA to the ordinary problems arising
out of disturbance of law and order or even to situations arising out of the
disturbance of public order - a more serious type of crime alone would
justify trial under TADA.

Shri K.T.S. Tulsi, the learned Additional Solicitor General and Shri
F Madhava Reddy, Senior Advocate, appearing for the State on the other
hand submitted that since the constitutional validity of Section 3 of TADA
has been upheld by a Constitution Bench in Kartar Singlz's case (supra), it
is not permissible for this Bench to re-examine its validity on the basis of
some argument which might have been raised before the Constitution
G Bench but was not so raised. Three grounds of challenge which were raised
before the Constitution Bench to question the legality and the efficacious-
ness of Sections 3 and 4 of TADA v1z:

"(l) These two Sections cover the acts which constitute offences
under ordinary laws like the Indian Penal Code. Indian Arms Act
H and Explosive Substance Act:
H.V. THAKUR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [DR. ANAND).[ 371

(2) There is no guiding principle laid down when the executive can A
proceed under the ordinary laws or under this impugned Act of
1987: and

(3) This Act and the Sections 3 and 4 thereof should be struck
down on the principle laid down in State of West Bengal v. Anwar
Ali Sarkar, [1952[ SCR 284 and followed in many other cases
B
including A.R. Anntlay v. Union of India, [1988] 2 SCC 764.

were considered by the Constitution Bench aod while upholding the vires
and validity of Sections 3 and 4 of TADA, all the three grounds of
challenge were negatived and therefore after the Constitution Bench Judg- C
ment, it is not permissible to read within the provisions of Section 3
anything more than what the Legislature has specifically provided therein.
To combat the menace of terrorism, it is necessary that restrictive inter-
pretation should not be placed on the provisions of Section 3 of TADA
and simply because the offences under Section 3 of TADA and under the
ordinary penal law overlap, the court should not lay down as a general D
proposition that Section 3 of TADA is inapplicable in all su~ situations
where the offences overlap.

The expression 'terrorist act' has been defined in Section 2{1)(h) of
TADA. It provides that the expression terrorist act "has the meaning E
assigned to it in Sub-Section (1) of Section 3".

Section 3(1) provides as under:

"3. Punishment for terrorist acts - (1) Whoever with intent to
overawe the Government as by law established or to strike terror F
in the people or any section of the people or to alienate any section
of the people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst different
sections of the people does any act or thing by using bombs,
dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances
or fire-arms or other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases
or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological G
or otherwise) of a hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause,
or as is likely to cause, death of, or injuries to any person or persons
or loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property or diruption
of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community,
or detains any person and threatens to· kill or injure such person H
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A in order to compel the Government or any other person to do or
abstain from doing any act, commits a terrorist act."

Section 3 when analysed would show that whoever with intent (i) to
overawe the Government as by law established: or (ii) to .strike terror in
the people or any section of the people or (iii) to alienate any section of
B the people or (iv) to adversely affect the harmony 1mongst different
sections of the people, does any act or things by using (a) bombs or
dyoamite or (b) other explosives substances or (c) inflammable substances
or (d) fire arms or (e) other lethal weapons or (t) poisons or noxious gases
or other chemicals or (g) any other substances (whether biological or
c otherwise) of a hazardous nature in such a nianner as to cause or as is likely
to cause (i) death or (ii) injuries to any person or persons or (iii) loss of
or damage to or destruction of property or (iv) disruption of any supplies
or services essential to the life of the community or (v) detains any person
• and threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the Govern-
D ment or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act, cornntits a
"tmorist act" punishable under Section 3 of TADA.

It is, thus, seen that most of the criminal activities constituting a
terrorist act and offences under the penal law, do overlap. However, where
an act complained of is punishable under Section 3 of TADA, it invites
E more stringent punishment than the punishment prescribed for the offence
under the ordinary penal Jaw. Section 6 of TADA provides even for
imposition of enhanced penalties for a person who with the intent to aid
any terrorist or disruptionist activity, contravenes any of the provisions of
or any rule made under the Arms Act 1959, the Explosive Act, 1884, the
Explosive Substances Act 1908 or the Inflammable Substances Act 1952
F
and renders him liable to punishment for not less than 5 years. The
punishment may, in certain cases, extend to imprisonment for life with fine,
notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions of acts or the rules
made under the respective acts.

G 11
Terrorism 11 is one of the manifestations of increased lawlessness and
cult of violence. Violence and crime constitute a threat to an established
order and are a revolt against a civilized society. 11 Terrorismn has not been
defined under TADA nor is it possible to give a precise definition of
11
terrorism 11 or law down what constitutes "terrorism". It may be possible to
H describe it as use of violence when its most important result is not merely
H.V. TIIAKUR v. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[DR.ANAND,J.) 373

the physical and mental damage of the victim but the prolonged psychologi- A
cal effect it produces or has the potential of producing on the society as a
whole. There may be death, injury, or destruction of property or even
deprivation of individual liberty in the process but the extent and reach of
the intended terrorist activity travels beyond the effect of an ordinary crime
capable of being punished under the ordinary penal law of the land and its B
main objective is to overawe the Government or disturb harmony of the
society or "terrorise" people and the society and not only those directly
assaulted, .with a view to disturb even tempo, peace and tranquility of the
society and create a sense of fear and insecurity. A 'terrorist' activity does
not merely arise by causing disturbance of law and order or of public order.
The fall out of the intended activity must be such that it travels beyond the C
capacity of the ordinary law enforcement agencies to tackle it under the
ordinary penal law. Experience has shown us that "terrorism" is generally
an attempt to acquire or maintain power or control by intimidation and
causing fear and helplessness in the minds of the people at large or any
section thereof and is a totally abnormal phenomenon. What distinguishes D
'terrorism' from other forms of violence, therefore, appears to be the
deliberate and systematic use of coercive intimidation. More often than
not, a hardened criminal today takes advantage of the situation and by
wearing the cloak of "terrorism", aims to achieve for himself acceptability
and respectability in the society because unfortunately in the States ef-
fected by militancy, a 'terrorist' is projected as a hero by his group and E
often even by the misguided youth. It is therefore, essential to treat such a
criminal and deal with him differently than an ordinary criminal, capable
of being tried by the ordinary courts under the penal law of the land. Even
though the crime committed by a 'terrorist' and an ordinary criminal would
be overlapping to an extent but then it is not the intention of the Legislature F
that every criminal should be tried under TADA, where the fall out of his
activity does not extend beyond the normal frontiers of the ordinary
criminal activity. Every 'terrorist' may be a criminal but every criminal
cannot be given the label of a 'terrorist' only to set in motion the more
stringent provisions of TADA. The criminal activity in order to invoke
TADA must be committed with the requisite intention as contemplated by G
Section 3(1) of the Act by use of such weapons as have been ennumerated
in Section 3( 1) and which cause?""-re likely to result in the offences as
mentioned in the said section.~-. ·

The Constitution Bench noticed that the offences arising out of a H
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A terrorist or disruptive activity may overlap the offences covered by the
ordinary penal law and dealing with the situation under which the
provisions of TADA would be attracted, observed:

"As we have indicated above, the Act tends to be very harsh and
drastic containing the stringent provisions and provides minimum
B punishments and to some other offences enhanced penalties also.
The provisions prescribing special procedures aiming at speedy
disposal of cases, departing from the procedures prescribed under
the ordinary procedural law are evidently for the reasons that the
prevalent ordinary procedural law was found to be inadequate and
c not sufficiently effective to deal with the offenders indulging in teTTorist
and disruptive activities, secondly that the incensed offences are
arising out of the activities of the teTTorists and disruptionists which
disrupt or are intended to disrupt even the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of India or which may bring about or support any claim for
the cession of any part of India or the secession of any part of India
D from the Union, and which create teTTor and a sense of insecurity in
the minds of the people. Further, the Legislature being aware of the
aggravated nature of the offences have brought this drastic change in
the procedure under this law so that the object of the legislation may
not be defeated and nullified. (Emphasis supplied)
E
In Usmanbhai Dawoodhai Memon & Ors. v. State of Gujara~ [1988)
2 SCC 271, this Court observed:

"The legislature by enacting the law has treated terrorism as a
F special criminal problem and created a special court called a
Designated Court to deal with the special problem and provided
for a special procedure for the trial of such offences ........................ ..
The act is a special Act and creates a new class of offences called
terrorist acts and disruptive activities as defined in Sections 3(1)
and 4(2) and provides for a special procedure for the trial of such
G offences.

Again, in Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi Advocate etc. etc. v.
Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya & Ors., [1990) 4 SCC 76, after noticing with
approval the opinion of this Court in Usmanbhai's case (supra), it was
H observed:
H.V. TifAKUR v. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[DR.ANAND,J.] 375

"the provisions of the Act need not be resorted to if the nature of A
the activities of the accused can be checked and controlled under
the ordinary law of the land. It is only in those cases where the
law enforcing machinery finds the ordinary law to be inadequate
or not sufficiently effective for tackling the menace of terrorist and
disruptive activities that· resort should be had to the drastic B
provisions of the Act. While invoking a criminal statute, such as
the Act, the prosecution is duty bound to show from the record of
the case and the documents collected in the course of investigation
that facts emerging therefrom prima facie constitute an offence
within the letter of the law. When a statute provides special or
enhanced punishments as compared to the punishments prescriOed C
for similar offences under the ordinary penal laws of the country,
a higher responsibility and duty is cast on the Judge to make sure
there exists prima facie evidence for supporting the charge levelled
by the prosecution. Therefore, when a law visits a person with
serious penal consequences extra care must be taken to ensure D
that those whom the legislature did not intend to be covered by
the express language of the statute are not roped in by stretching
the language of the law."

The Court then considered the facts in Niranjan Singh's (Supra) case and
referred to the statement of the witnesses which had been relied upon by E
the prosecution to attract the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Act. The
court found that the intention of the accused persons in that case was
merely to eliminate Raju and Keshav for gaining supremacy in the under-
world. The Bench noticed that a statement had been made by the inves-
tigating agency to the effect that the activities of the accused were aimed F
at creating terror and fear in the minds of the people in general and
observed:

"A mere statement to the effect that the show of such violence
would create terror or fear in the minds of the people and none G
would dare to oppose them cannot constitute an offence under
Section 3(1) of the Act. That may indeed be the fall out of the
violent act but that cannot be said to be the intention of the
perpetrators of the crime. It is clear from the statement extracted
earlier that the intention of the accused persons was to eliminate
the rivals and gain supremacy in the underworld so that they may H
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A be known as the bullies of the locality and would be dreaded as
such. But it cannot be said that their intention was to strike terror
in the people or a section of the people and thereby commit a
terrorist act. It is clear that there was rivalry between the party of
the accused on the one hand and Raju and Keshav on the other.
The former desired to gain supremacy which necessitated the
B elimination of the latter. With that in view they launched an attack
on Raju and Keshav, killed the former and injured the latter. Their
intention was clearly to eliminate them and not to strike terror in
the people or a section of the people. It would have been a different
matter if to strike terror some innocent persons were killed. In that
c case the intention would be to strike terror and the killings would
be to achieve that objective. In the instant case the intention was
to liquidate Raju and Kashav and thereby achieve the objective of
gaining supremacy in the underworld. The consequence of such
'iolence is bound to cause panic and fear but the intention of
committing the crime cannot be said to be to strike terror in the
D
people or any section of the people."

Thus, keeping in view the settled position that the provmon of
Section 3 of TADA have been held to be constitutionally valid in Kartar
Singh's case and the law laid down by this Court in Usmanbhai's and
E Niranjan's cases (supra), it follows that an activity which is sought to be
punished under Section 3(1) of TADA has to be such which cannot be
classified as a mere law and order problem or disturbance of public order
or even disturbance of the even tempo of the life of the community of any
specified locality but is of the nature which cannot be tackled as an
F ordinary criminal activity under the ordinary penal law by the normal law
enforcement agencies because the intended extent and reach of the criminal
activiiy of the 'terrorist' is such which travels beyond the gravity of the mere
disturbance of public order even of a 'virulent nature' and may at times
transcend the frontiers of the locality and may include such anti-national
G activities which throw a challenge to the very integrity and sovereignty of
the country in its democratic polity. The Constitution Bench in Kartar
Singh's case (supra) repelled the submission of Mr. Jethmalani that the
preamble of the Act gives a clue "that the terrorist and disruptive activities
only mean a virulent form of the disruption of public order" and found the
argument to be "inconceivable and unacceptable". Thus, unless the Act •
H complained of falls strictly within the letter and spirit of Section 3(1) of
H.V.1HAKUR v. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[DR.ANAND,J.] 377

TADA and is committed with the intention as envisaged by that Section by A
means of the weapons etc. as are enumerated therein with the motive as
postulated thereby, an accused cannot be tried or convicted for an offence
.under Section 3(1) of TADA. When the extent and reach of the crime
committed with the intention as envisaged by Section 3(1), transcends the
local barriers and the effect of the criminal act can be felt in other States B
or areas or has the potential of that result being felt there, the provisions
of Section 3(1) would certainly be attracted. Likewise, if it is only as a
consequence of the criminal act that fear, terror or/and panic is caused but
the intention of committing the particular crime cannot be said to be the
one strictly envisaged by Section 3(1), it would be impermissible to try or C
convict and punish an accused under TADA. The commission of the crime
with the intention to achieve the result as envisaged by the section and not
merely where the consequence of the crime committed by the accused
create that result, would attract the provisions of Section 3(1) of TADA.
Thus, if for example a person goes on a shooting spree and kills a number
of persons, it is bound to create terror and panic in the locality but if it D
was not committed with the requisite intention as contemplated by the
section, the offence would not attract Section 3(1) of TADA. On the other
hand, if a crime was committed with the intention to cause terror or panic
or to alienate a section of the people or to disturb the harmony etc. it would
be punishable under TADA, even if no one is killed and there has been E
only some person who has been injured or some damage etc. has been
caused to the property, the provisions of Section 3(1) of TADA would be
squarely attracted. Where the crime is committed with a view to overawe
the Government as by law established or is intended to alienate any section
of the people or adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections.
of the people and is committed in the manner specified in Section 3(1) of
F
TADA, no difficulty would arise to hold that such an offence falls within
the ambit and scope of the said provision. Some difficulty, however, arises
where the intended activity of the offender results in striking terror or
creating fear and panic amongst the people in general or a section thereof.
It is in this situation that the courts have to be cautious to draw a line G
between the crime punishable under the ordinary criminal law and the ones
which are punishable uncier"Seclion 3(1) of TADA. It is of course neither
desirable nor possible to catalogue the activities which would strictly bring
the case of an accused under Section 3(1) of TADA. Each case will have
to be decided on its own facts and no rule of thumb can be applied. H
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A Of late, we have come across some cases where the Designated
Courts have charge-sheeted aod/or convicted ao accused person under
TADA even though there is not even an iota of evidence from which it
could be inferred, even prima facie, let alone conclusively, that the crime
was committed with the intention as contemplated by the provisions of
TADA, merely on the statement of the investigating agency to the effect
B that the consequence of the criminal act resulted in causing panic or terror
in the society or in a section thereof. Such orders result in the misuse of
TADA. The Parliament, ihrough Section 20A of TADA has clearly
manifested its intention to treat the offences under TADA seriously in as
much as under Section 20A(l}, notwithstanding anything contained in the
c Code of Criminal Procedure, no information about the commission of an
offence under TADA shall even be recorded without the prior approval of
the District Superintendent of Police and under Section 20A(2} no court
shall take cognizance of any offence under TADA without the previous
sanction of the authorities prescribed therein. Section 20A, was thus,
D introduced in the Act with a view to prevent the abuse of the provisions of
TADA. .

We would, therefore, at this stage, like to administer a word. of
caution to the Designated Courts regarding invoking the provisions of
TADA merely .because the investigating officer at some stage of the
E investigation chooses to add an offence under same provision of TADA
against an accused person, more often thao not while opposing grant of
bail, anticipatory or otherwise. The Designated Courts should always c'lln-
sider carefully the material available on the,record aod apply their mind
to see whether the provision~ of TADA are even prima facie attracted.
F
The Act provides for the· Constitution of one or more Designated
Courts either by the Central Government or the State Government by
notification in the Official Gazette to try specified cases or class or group
of cases under the Act. The Act makes every offence punishable under the
Act or any rule made thereunder to be a cognizable offence within the
G meaning .of Section 2(c) of the Cr.P.C. The Act vests jurisdiction in the
Designated Court to try all such offences under the Act by giving
precedence over the trial of any other case against an accused in any other
Court (not being a Designated Court) notwithstanding anything contained
in the Code or aoy other law for the time being in force. The conferment
H of power on the Designated Courts to try the offences triable by them,
H.V. THAKUR v. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[DR.ANAND;J.J 379

punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or with A
fine or with both, in a summary manner in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in the Cr.P.C. notwithstanding anything contained in Section
260(1) or 262 Cr.P.C. by applying the provisions of Sections 263-265 of the
Act is a marked departure. The right of appeal straight to the Supreme
Court against any judgment, sentence or order not being an inter-locutory B
order vide Section 19(1) of the Act demonstrates the seriousness with
which the Parliament has treated the offences under TADA. An onerous
duty is therefore cast on the Designated Courts to take extra care to
scrutinise the material on the record and apply their mind to the evidence
and documents available with the investigating agency before charge-sheet-
ing an accused for an offence under TADA. The stringent provisions of C
the Act coupled with the enhanced punishment prescribed for the offences
under the Act make the task of the Designated Court even more onerous,
because graver the offence, greater should be the care taken to see that
the offence must strictly fall within the four comers of the Act before a
charge is framed against an accused person. Where the Designated Court D
without as much as even finding a prima facie case on the basis of the
material on the record, proceeds to charge-sheet an accused ~nder any of
the provisions of TADA, merely on the statement of the investigating
agency, it acts merely as a post office of the investigating agency and does
more harm to meet the challenge arising out of the 'terrorist' activities E
rather than deterring terrorist activities. The remedy in such cases would
be worse than the disease itself and the charge against the State of misusing
the provisions of TADA would gain acceptability, which would be bad both
for the criminal and the society. Therefore, it is the obligation of the
investigating agency to satisfy the Designated Court from the material
collected by it during the investigation, and not merely by the opinion
F
. formed by the investigating agency, that the activity of the "terrorist" falls
strictly within the pararnetres of the provisions of TADA before seeking to
charge-sheet an accused under TADA. The Designated Court must record
its satisfaction about the existence of a prima facie case, on the basis of the
material on the record, before it proceeds to frame a charge-sheet against G
an accused for offences covered by TADA. Even after an accused has been
charge-sheeted for an offence under TADA and the prosecution leads
evidence in the case, it is an obligation of the Designated Court to take
extra care to examine the evidence with a view to find out whether the
provisions of the Act apply or not. The Designated Court is, therefore, H
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A expected to carefuily examine the evidence and after analysing the same
come to a firm conclusion that the evidence led by the prosecution has
established that the case of the accused falls strictly within the four corners
of the Act before recording a conviction against an accused under TADA.

Thus, the true ambit and scope of Section 3(1) is that no conviction
B under Section 3(1) of TADA can be recorded unless the evidence led by
the prosecution establishes that the offence was committed with the inten-
' tion as envisaged by Section 3(1) by means of the weapons etc. as
enumerated in the Section and was committed with the motive as postu-
lated by the said Section. Even at the cost of repetition, we may say that
C where it is only the consequence of the criminal act of an accused that
terror, fear or panic is caused, but the crime was not committed with the
intention as envisaged by Section 3(1) to achieve the objective as envisaged
by the section, an accused should not be convicted for an offence under
Section 3(1) of TADA. To bring home a charge under Section 3(1) of the
Act, the terror or panic etc. must be actually intended with a view to
D achieve the result as envisaged by the said section and not be merely an
incidental fall out or a consequence of the criminal activity. Every crime,
being a revolt against the society, involves some violent activity which
results in some degree of panic or create some fear or terror in the people
or a section thereof, but unless the panic, fear or terror was intended and
E was sought to achieve either of the objectives as envisaged in Section 3(1),
the offence would not fall stricto-senso under TADA. Therefore, as was
observed in Kattar Singh's case by the Constitution Bench:

"Section 3 operates when a person not only intends to overawe the
Government or create terror in people etc. but he uses the arms
F and ammunitions which results in death or is likely to cause and
damage to property etc. In other words, a person becomes a
· terrorist or is guilty of terrorist activity when intention, action and
consequence all the three ingredients are found to exist."

G Where the Designated Court finds, after taking cognizance of the
offence, that the offence does not even prima facie fall under TADA, it
must proceed to act under Section 18 of TADA. That Section r~ad: es
follows:

"18. Power to transfer cases to regular courts - Where, after taking
H cognizance of any offence, a Designated Court is of opinion that
H.V. THAKUR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [DR. ANAND, J.] 381

the offence is not triable by it, it shall, notwithstanding that it has A
no jurisdiction to try such offence, transfer the case for the trial
of such offence to any court having jurisdiction under the Code
and the court to which the case is transferred may proceed with
the trial of the offence as if it had taken cognizance of the offence."

Section 18 vests jurisdiction in a Designated Court to transfer the B
case for trial by any court having jurisdiction under the Cr.P.C. where after,
taking cognizance of an offence, the Designated Court is of the opinion,
for reasons fo be recorded, that the offence is not such as is triable by the
Designated Court in as much as the offence does not fall within the true
ambit and parameters of the provisions of TADA, it is obliged to transfer C
the case to the court of competent jurisdiction for its trial and on such
transfer, the court to which the case is so transferred acquires the jurisdic-
tion to proceed with the trial of the offence, as if the transferee court had
itself taken cognizance of the offence.

Thus, having dealt with the ambit and scope of Section3(1) of TADA D
and considered the situations where its provisions may be attracted in the
established facts and circumstances of the case, w~ shall now take up for
consideration questions 2 and 3 mentioned in the earlier part of this
Judgment. Both. these questions essentially revolve around the grant of bail
to an accused under TADA.· E

Section 20(4) of TADA makes Section 167 of Cr;P.C. applicable in
relation to case involving an offence punishable under TADA, subject to
the modifications specified therein. Clause (a) thereof, provides that .
reference in sub-section (1) of Section 167 to "Judicial Magistrates" shall
be construed as reference to "Judicial Magistrate" or "Executive F
Magistrate" or "Special Executive Magistrates" while clause (b) provided
that reference in sub-section (2) of Section 167 to '15 days', '90 days' and
'60 days' wherever they occur shall be construed as reference to '60 days',
'one year' and 'one year' respectively. This Section was amended in 1993
by the Amendment Act 43/93 with effect from 22.5.1993 and the period of G
'one year' and 'one year' in clause (b) was reduced to '180 days' and 180
days' respectivelv, by modification of sub-section (2) of Section 167. After
clause (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 20 of TADA, another proviso (bb)
was inserted which reads: ·

!'Provided further that, if it is. not possible to com_plete the inves- H
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A ligation within the said period of one hundred and eighty days, the
Designated Court shall extend the said period up to one year, on
the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the
investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the
accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days:
and .... 11
B
Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a person
arrested shall not be detained in custody by the police for a period longer
than that which is reasonable but that such period shall not exceed 24 hours
exclusive of the time necessary for journey from the place of arrest to the
C court of the Magistrate in the absence of a special order under Section 167
of the code. The Constitution of India through Article 22(2) mandates that
every persons who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced
before the nearest Magistrate within a period of 24 hours of such arrest
excluding the time uec~ssary for journey from the place of arrest to that
D Court and that no person shall be detained in custody beyond that period
without the authority of the Magistrate. Thus, the Constitution of India as
well as the Code of Criminal Procedure expect that an arrested person,
who has been detained in custody, shall not be kept in detention for any
unreasonable time and that the investigation must be completed as far as
possible within 24 hours. Where the investigation of the offence for which
E accused has been arrested cannot be completed within 24 hours and there
are grounds for believing that the accusation or information against the
accused is well-founded, the police is obliged to forward the accused
alongwith the case diary to the nearest Magistrate for further remand of
the accused person. The Magistrate, on the production of the accused and
p the case diary, must scrutinise the same carefully and consider whether the
arrest was legal and proper and whether the formalities required by law
have been complied with and then to grant further remand, if the
Magistrate is so satisfied. The law enjoins upon the investigating agency to
carry out the investigation, in a case where a person has been arrested and
detained, with utmost urgency and complete the investigation with great
G promptitude in the prescribed period. Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the
Code lays down that the Magistrate to whom the accused is forwarded may
authorise his detention in such custody, as he may think fit, for a term
specified in that section. The proviso to sub-section (2) fixes the outer limit
within which the investigation must be completed and in case the same is
H not completed within the said prescribed period, the accused would ac·

···'
H.V. THAKUR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [DR. ANAND, J.] 383

quire a right to seek to be released on bail and if he is prepared to and A
does furnish bail, the Magistrate shall release him on bail and suc)l release
shall be deemed to be grant of bail under Chapter XXXIII of th~·.Code of
Criminal Procedure. The said chapter comprises of Sections 436 to,450 but
for our purposes it is only Sections 437 and 439 of the Code which are
relevant. Both these Sections, empower the court to release an accused on ~.ff
bail. The object behind the enactment of Section 167 of the code was that
the detention of an accused person should not be permitted in custody
pending investigation for any unreasonably longer period. However, realis-
ing that it may not be possible to complete the investigation in every case
within 24 hours or even 15 days, as the case may be, even if the investigating C
agency proceeds with utmost promptitude, the Parliament introduced the
proviso to Section 167(2) of the code, prescribing the outer limit within
which the investigation must be completed. Section 167 read with section
20(4) of TADA, thus, strictly speaking is not a provision for 'grant of bail'
but deals with the maximum period during which a person accused of an
offence may be kept in custody and deiention to enable the investigating D
agency to complete the investigation and file the charge-sheet, if necessary,
in the court. The proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code read with Section
20(4)(b) of TADA, therefore, creates an indefeasible right in an accused
person, on account of the 'default' by the investigating agency in the
completion of the investigation within the maximum period prescribed or E
extended, as the case may be, to seek an order for his release on bail. It is
for this reason that an order for release on bail under proviso (a) of Section
167(2) of the Code read with Section 20(4) of TADA is generally termed
as an "order-on-default" as it is granted on account of the default of the
prosecution to complete the investigation and file the challan within the F
prescribed period. As a con~equence of the amendment, an accused after
the expiry of 180 days from the date of his arrest becomes entitled to bail
irrespective of the nature of the offence with which he is charged, where
the prosecution fails to put up challan against him on completion of the
investigation. With the amendment of clause (b) of sub-section (4) of
Section 20 read with the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 of G
Cr.P.C., an indefeasible right to be enlarged on bail accrues in favour of
the accused, if the police fails to complete the investigation and put up a
challan against him in accordanc_e with law under Section 173 Cr.P.C. An
obligation, in such a case, is cast upon the Court, when after the expiry of
the maximum period during which an accused could be kept in custody, to H

_.,.....
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP.1 S.C.R.
.'
A decline the police request for further remand except in cases governed by
clause (bb) of Section 20(4). There is yet another obligation also which is
cast on the Court and that is to inform the accused of his right of being
released on bail and enable him to make. an application in that behalf.
(Hussainara Khatoon's case AIR {1979) 1369). This legal position has been
very ably stated in Aslam Baba/a/ Desai v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1993)
-B S.C. 1, where speaking for the majority, Ahmadi, J. referred with approval
to the law laid down in Rajnikant Jivanla/ Patel &Anr. v. Intelligence Officer,
Narcotic Control Bureau, New Delh~ AIR (1990) S.C. 71, wherein it was
held that:

c "The right to bail under Section 167(2) proviso (a) thereto is
absolute. It is a legislative command and not court's discretion. If
the investigating agency fails to file charge-sheet before the expiry
of 90/60 days, as the case may be, the accused in custody should
be released on bail. But at that stage, merits of the case are not
to be examined. Not at all. In fact, the Magistrate has no power
D . to remand ·a person beyond the stipulated period of 90/60 days.
He must pass an order of bail and communicate the same to the
· accused to furnish the requisite bail bonds."

Thus, we find that once the period for filing the charge-sheet has
·E expired and either no extension under clause (bb) has been granted by the
Designated Court or the period of extension has also expired, the accused.
person would be entitled to move an application for being admitted to bail
under Sub-Section (4) of Section 20 TADA read with Section 167 of the
Code and the Designated Court shall release him on bail, if the accused
F seeks to be so released and furnishes the requisite bail. We are not
impressed with the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that
on the expiry of the period during which investigation is required to be
completed under Section 20(4) TADA read with Section 167 of the Code,
the Court must release the accused on bail on its own motion even without
any application from an accused person, on his offering to furnish bail. In
G our opinion an accused is required to make an application if he wishes to
be released on bail on account of the 'default' of the investigating/prosecut·
ing agency and once such an application is made, the Court should issue
a notice to the public prosecutor, who may either show that the prosecution
has obtained the order for extension for completion of investigation from
H the court under clause (bb) or that the challan has been filed in the
H.V. TIIAKUR v. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[DR.ANAND,J.) 385

Designated Court before the expiry of the prescribed period or even that A
the prescribed period has actually not expired and, thus resist the grant of
bail on the alleged ground of 'default'. The issuance of notice would avoid
the possibility of an accused obtaining an order of bail under the 'default'
clause by either deliberately or inadvertently concealing certain facts and
would avoid multiplicity of proceedings. It would, therefore, serve the ends B
of justice if both sides are heard on a petition for grant of bail on account
of the prosecution's 'default'. Similarly, when a report is submitted by the
public pros~cutor to the Designated Court for grant of extellSion under
clause (bb), its notice should be issued to the accused before granting such
an extension so that an accused may have an opportunity to oppose the
extension on all legitimate and legal grounds available to him. It is true that C
neither clause (b) nor (bb) of Sub-Section (4) of Section 20 TADA
specifically provide for the issuance of such a notice but .in our opinion the
issuance of such a notice must be read into these provisions both in the
interest of the accused and the prosecution as well as for doing complete
justice between the parties. This is a requirement of the principles of D
natural justice and the issuance of notice to the accused or the public
prosecutor, as the case may be, would accord with fair play in action, which
the courts have always encouraged and even insisted upon. It"would also
strike a just balance between the interest of the liberty of an accused on
the one hand and the society _at large, through the prosecuting agency on
the other hand. There is no prohibition to the issuance of such a notice to E
the accused or the public prosecutor in the scheme of the Act and no
prejudice whatsoever can be caused by the issuance of such a notice to any
party. We must as already noticed reiterate that the objection to the grant
of bail to an accused on account of the 'default' of the prosecution to
complete the investigation and file the challan within the maximum period F
prescribed under clause (b) of Sub-Section (4) of Section 20·of TADA or
within the extended period as envisaged by clause (bb), has to be limited.
to the cases where either the factual basis for invoking the 'default' clause
is not available or the period for completion of investigation has been
extended under clause (bb) and the like. No other condition, like the
gravity of the case, seriousness of the offence or character of the offender G
etc. can weigh with the court at that stage to refuse the grant of bail to an
accused under Sub-Section (4) of Section 20 TADA on account of the
'default' of the prosecution.

An application for grant of bail under Section 20(4) has to be H
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. l S.C.R.

A decided on its own merits for the default of the prosecuting agency to file
the charge-sheet within the prescribed or the extended period for comple-
tion of the investigation uninfluenced by the merits or the gravity of the case.
The Court has no power to remand an accused to custody beyond the
period prescribed by clause (b) of Section 20(4) or extended under clause
B. (bb) of the said section, as the case may be, if the challan is not filed only
on the ground that the accusation against the accused is of a serious nature
or the offence is very grave. These grounds are irrelevant for considering
the grant of bail under Section 20(4) of TADA. The learned Additional
Solicitor General rightly did not subscribe to the argument of Mr. Madhava
Reddy (both appearing for the State of Maharashtra) that while consider-
C ing an appli~ation for release on bail under Section 20(4), the court has
also to be guided by the general conditions for grant of bail as provided
by Section 20(8) of TADA. Considering the ambit and scope of the two
provisions, we are of the opinion that It is totally inconceivable and unac-
ceptable that the considerations for grant of bail under Section 20(8) would
D be applicable to and control the grant of bail under Section 20(4) of the Act.
The two provisiom operate in different and independent fields. The basis
for grant of bail under Section 20(4), as already noticed, is entirely different
from the grounds on which bail may be granted under Section 20(8) of the
Act. It would be advantageous at this stage to notice the provisions of
Section 20(8) and (9) of the Act.
E
"(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person
accused of an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made
thereunder shall, "if in custody", be released on bail or on his own
bond unless -
F
(a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose
' the application for such release, and

(b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court
is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he
G is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail.

(9) The limitations on granting of bail specified in Sub-Section (8)
are in addition to the limitations under the Code or any other law
H for the Lime being in force on granting of bail."

•
HY THAKUR v. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[DR. ANAND,J.] 387

As would be seen from the plain phraseology of Sub- Section (8) of Section A
20, it commences with a non-abstante clause and in its operation imposes
a ban on release of a person accused of an offence punishable under
TADA or any rule made thereunder on bail unless the twin conditions
contained in clauses (a) and (b) thereof are satisfied. No bail can be
granted under Section 20(8) unless the Designated Court is satisfied after B
notice to the public prosecutor that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty of such an offence and that he is
not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Sub-Section (9) qualifies
Sub-Section (8) to the extent that the two conditions contained in clauses
(a) and (b) are in addition to the limitations prescribed under the Code of
Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force relating C
to the grant of bail. Strictly speaking Section 20(8) is not the source of
power of the Designated Court to grant bail but it places further limitations
on the exercise of its power to grant bail in cases under TADA, as is amply
clear from the plain language of Section 20(9). The Constitution Bench in
KaTtar Sing/i's case JT (1994) 2 S.C. 423, while dealing with the ambit and D
scope of Sub-Sections (8) and (9) of Section 20 of the Act, quoted with
approval the following observations from Usmanbhai's case (1988] 2 SCC
271:

"Though there is no express provision excluding the applicability
of Section 439 of the Code similar to the one contained in Section E
20(7) of the Act in relation to a case involving the arrest of any
person on an accusation of having committed an offence punish-
able under the Act or any rule made thereunder, but that result
must, by necessary implication, follow. It is true that the source of
power of a Designated Court to grant bail is not Section 20(8) of F
the Act as it only places limitations on such power. This is made
explicit by Section 20(9) which enacts that the limitations on
granting of bail specified in Section 20(8) are 'in addition to the
limitations under the Code or any other law for the time being in
force'. But it does not necessarily follow that the power of a
Designated Court to grant bail is relatable to Section 439 of the G
Code. It cannot be doubted that a Designated Court is 'a court
other than the High Court or the Court of Session' within the
meaning of Section 437 of the Code. The exercise of the power to
grant bail by a Designated Court is not only subject to the limita-
tions contained therein, but is also subject to the limitations placed H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A by Section 20(8) of the Act."
,;:

and went on to add:

/"Reverting to Section 20(8), if either of the two conditions men-
" tioned therein is not satisfied, the ban operates and the accused
B J person cannot be released on bail but of course it is subject to

: Section 167(2) as modified by Section 20(4) of the TADA Act in
' relation to a case under the provisions of TADA."

Thus, the ambit and scope of Section 20(8) of TADA is no longer res-in-
tegm and from the above discussion it follows that both the provisions i.e.
c Section 20(4) and 20(8) of TADA operate in different situations and are
controlled and guided by different considerations.

W.e may, at this stage, also on a plain reading of clause (bb) of
Sub-Section (4) of Section 20 point out that the legislature has provided
D for seeking extension of time for completion of investigation on a report Df
the public prosecutor. The legislature did not purposely leave it to an
Investigating Officer to make an application for seeking extension of time
from the court. This provision is in tune with the legislative intent to have
the investigations completed expeditiously and not to allow an accused to
be kept in continued detention during unnecessary prolonged investigation
E at the w.hims of the police. The legislature expects that the investigation
must be completed with utmost promptitude but where it becomes neces-
sary to seek some more time for completion of the investigation, the
investigating agency must submit itself to the scrutiny of the public
prosecutor in the first instance and satisfy him about the progress of the
F investigation and furnish reasons for seeking further custody of an.accused.
A publi~ prosecutor is an important officer of the State Govt. and is
appointe'd by the State under the Code of Criminal Procedure. He is not
a part of the investigating agency. He is an independent statutory authority.
The public prosecutor is expected to independently apply his mind to the
request' of the investigating agency before submitting a report to the court
G for extension of time with a view to enable the investigating agency to
complete the investigation. He is not merely a post office or a forwarding
agency.' A public prosecutor may or may not agree with the reasons given
by the investigating officer for seeking extension of time and may find that
the investigation had not progressed in the proper manner or that there
H has befn unnecessary, deliberate or avoidable delay in completing the
H.V. TIIAKUR v. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[DR.ANAND,J.] 389

investigation. In that event, he may not submit any report to the court under A
clause (bb) to seek extension of time. 17zus, for seeking extension of time
wider clause (bb ), tlze public prosecutor after an independent application of
lzis mind to tlze request of tlze investigating agency, is required ta make a report
to the Designated Court indicating therein the progress of the investigation
and disclosing justification for keeping the accused in further custody to B
enable the investigating agency to complete the investigation. The public
prosecutor may attach the request of the investigating officer alongwith his
request or application and report, but his report, as envisaged under clause
(bb), must disclose on the face of it, that he has applied his mind and was
satisfied with the progress of the investigation and considered grant of C
further time to complete the investigation necessary. 'the use of the expres·
sion "on the report of the public prosecutor indicating the progress of the
investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused
beyond the said period" as occurring in clause (bb) in Sub-Section (2) of
Section 167 as amended by Section 20(4) are important and indicative of
the legislative intent not to keep an accused in custody unreasonably and D
to grant extension only on the report of the public prosecutor. The report
of the public prosecu\pr, therefore, is not merely a formality but a very vital
report, because the consequence of its acceptance affects the liberty of an
accused and it must, therefore, strictly comply with the requirements as
contained in clause (bb). The request of an investigating officer for exten- E
sion of time is no substitute for the report of the public prosecutor. Where
either no report as is envisaged' by clause (bb) is filed or the report filed by
the public prosecutor is not accepted by the Designated Court, since the
grant of extension of time under clause (bb) is neither a formality nor
automatic, the necessary corollary would be that an accused would be
F
entitled to seek bail and the court "shall" release him on bail if he furnishes
bail as required by the Designated Court. It is not merely the question of
form in which the request for extension under clause (bb) is made but one
of substance. The contents of the report to be submitted by the public
prosecutor, after proper application of his mind, are designed to assist the
Designated Court to independently decide whither or not extension should G
be granted in a given case. Keeping in view t~e consequences of the grant
of extension i.e. keeping an accused in further custody, the Designated
Court must be satisfied for the justification, from the report of the public
prosecutor, to grant extension of time to complete the investigation. Where
the Designated Court declines to grant such an extension, the right to be H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11994] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A released on bail on account of the 'default' of the prosecution becomes
indefeasible and cannot be defeated by reasons other than those con-
templated by Sub-Section (4) of Section 20, as discussed in the earlier part
of this judgment, we are unable to agree with Mr. Madhava Reddy or the
Additional Solicitor General Mr. Tulsi, that even if the public prosecutor
B 'presents' the request of the investigating officer to the court or 'forwards'
the request of the investigating officer to the court, it should be construed
to be the report of the public prosecutor. There is no scope for such a
construction, when we are dealing with the liberty of a citizen. The courts
are expected to zealously safeguard his liberty. Clause (bb) has to be read
and interpreted on its plain language without adding or substitution of any
c expression in it. We have already dealt with the importance of the report
of the public prosecutor and emphasised that he is neither a 'post office'
of the investigating agency nor its 'forwarding agency' but is charged with
a statutory duty. He must apply his mind to the facts and circumstances of
the case and his report must disclose on the face of it that he had applied
D his mind to the twin conditions contained in clause (bb) of Sub-Section (4)
of Section 20. Since, the law requires him to submit the report as envisaged
by the section, he must act in the manner as provided by the Section and
in no other manner. A Designated Court which over-looks and ignores the
requirements of a valid report fails in the performance of one of its essential
E duties and renders its order under clause (bb) vulnerable. Whether the
public prosecutor labels his report as a report or as an applicaiion for
extension, would not be of mush consequence, so long as it demonstrates
on the face of it, that he has applied his mind and is satisfied with the
progress of the investigation and the genuineness of the reasons for grant
of extension to keep an accused in further custody as envisaged by clause
F
(bb) (supra). Even the mere reproduction of the application or request of
the investigating officer by the public prosecutor in his report, without
demonstration of the application of his mind and recording his own satis-
faction, would not render his report as the one envisaged by clause (bb)
and it would not be a proper report to seek extension of time. In the
G absence of an appropriate report, the Designated Court would have no
jurisdiction to deny to an accused his indefeasible right to be released on
bail on account of the default of the prosecution to file the challan within
the prescribed time if an accused seeks and is prepared to furnish the bail
bonds as directed by the court. Moreover, n0 extension can be granted io
H keep an accused in custody beyond the prescribed period except to enable
H.V. THAKUR v. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[DR.ANAND).] 391

the investigation to be completed and as already stated before any extension A
is granted under clause (bb), the accused must be put on notice and
permitted to have his say so as to be able to object to the grant of extension .
•
We shall now consider whether the amendment brought about by Act
43 of 1993 would apply to the pending cases i.e. the cases which were B
pending investigation on the date when the amendment came into force
and in which the charge-sheet or challan had not been filed till 22.5.1993.

We have already noticed that clause (b) of Sub-Section (4) of Section
20 was amended by the Amendment Act No. 43 of 1993 with effect from
22nd May 1993. Besides, reducing the maximum period during which. an C
accused under TADA could be kept in custody pending investigation from
one year to 180 days, the Amendment Act also introduced clause (bb) to
Sub-Section (4) of Section 20 enabling the prosecution to seek extension
of time for completion of the investigation. Does the Amendment Act No.
43 of 1993 have retrospective operation and does the amendment apply to D
the cases which were pending investigation on the date when the Amend-
ment Act came into force? There may be cases where on 22nd May 1993,
the period of 180 days had already expired but the period of one year not
yet over. In such a case, the argument of learned counsel for the appellant
is that the Act operates retrospectively and applies to pending cases and
therefore the accused should be f01thwith released on bail if he is willing E
to be so released and is prepared to furnish the bail bonds as directed by
the court, an argument which is seriously contested by the respondents.

The Designated Court has held that the amendment would operate
retrospectively and would apply to the pending cases in which investigation F
was not complete on the date on which the Amendment Act came into
force and the challan had not till then been filed in the court. From the
law settled by this Court in various cases, the illustrative though not
exhaustive, principles which emerge with regard to the ambit and scope of
an Amending Act and its retrospective operation may be culled out as
follows: G

(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be
prospective in operation, unless made retrospective, either ex-
pressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a Statute which merely
affects procedure, unless such a construction is texturally impos- H
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A sible, is presumed to be retrospective in its application, should not
be given an extended meaning, and should be strictly confined to
its clearly defined limits.

(ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature.
whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal, even
B though remedial, is substantive in nature.

(iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law, but no such
right exists in procedural law.

(iv) A procedural Statute should not generally speaking be applied
c
retrospectively, where the result would be to create new disabilities
or obligations, or to impose new duties in respect of transactions
already accomplished.

(v) A Statute which not only changes the procedure but also
D creates a new rights and liabilities, shall be construed to be
prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided, either ex
pressly or by necessary implication."

In fairness to the learned Additional Solicitor General Mr. Tulsi, it may be
stated that he did not controvert the legal position (both in his oral
E submissions and written arguments) that Amendment Act 43 of 1993
regulating the period of compulsory detention and the procedure for grant
of bail, being procedural in nature, would operate retrospectively. We need
not, therefore, detain ourselves to further examine the question of
retrospective operation of the Amendment Act. On the basis of the sub-
F missions made by learned counsel for the parties, we uphold the finding of
the Designated Court, for the reasons recorded by it and those noticed by
us above that the Amendment o f 1993 would apply to the cases which were
pending investigation on 22nd May 1993 and in which the cha/Ian had not
till then been filed in court.

G The learned Addi. Solicitor General, however, submitted that since
the Amendment Acr had introduced clauses (b) and (bb) to Sub-Section
(4) of Section 20 also, it would be appropriate and desirable that both the
clauses (b) and (bb) must be considered together and treated at per in so
far as the retrospective operation is concerned meaning thereby that clause
H (bb) would also be available to be invoked where the challan had not been
HV. THAKUR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (DR, ANAND,J.) 393

filed till the amendment came into force. Mr. Tulsi argued that since the A
modification brought about by the Amending Act curtailed the period
granted to the investigating agency to complete the investigation, the
Legislature had design,edly introduced clause (bb) to enable the public
prosecutor to make a report to the court when the investigation was still in
progress, indicating progress of the investigation and seek extension of the B
time beyond 180 days, by assigning specific reasons for seeking extension
and as such it would not be proper to treat clause (b) only as applicable
to the pending cases and not clause (bb). We find substance in the
submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General. Both the clauses
have to be harmonised and the legislative intent given a full play. Since, C
both the clauses (b) and (bb) as introduced by the Amendment Act, fall
within the realm of procedural law, these would be applicable to pending
cases since there is no vested right in an accused in the procedural law. The
object which influenced the Parliament to introduce clause· (bb} after
curtailing the period of compulsory detention in custody to 180 days from
one year by amendment of clause (b}, clearly appears to be that if the D
investigating agency, which originally, had one year's time allowed to it to
complete the investigation, could not complete the investigation when the
period was suddenly curtailed to 180 days, it should not be put to a
disadvantage for no fault of its and should be in a position to seek extension
of time for completing the investigation beyond the period of 180 days. E
However, to prevent and abuse of clause (bb) and to avoid seeking of
extension of time in routine manner, the Legislature provided a safeguard
in clause (bb) itself, namely, that extension in such cases could be granted
by the court provided it is satisfied from the report of the public prosecutor
that there are sufficient grounds for grant of such extension. In case clause
F
(b) only and not clause (bb) is held to be applicable to pending cases as
was suggested by Mr. Khanwilkar, it would render clause (bb}almost otiose
in so far as pending cases are concerned and defeat the legislative intent
and further put the prosecution to an unfair disadvantage. The Amendment
Act was not enacted with the object of giving benefit to an accused and
subjecting the prosecuting agency to an unfair disadvantage and leaving it G
almost with no remedy for seeking further.custody of an accused. We are,
thus, of the opinion that Amendment Act 43 in sofar as it modifies the period
prescribed in clause (b) and introduces clause (bb) to Sub-Section (4) of
Section 20, would apply retrospectively and apply to pending cases aS well.
We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with Mr. Khanwilkar that H.
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A clause (b) only and not clause (bb) of Sub-Section (4) of Section 20 should
be held to have retrospective operation. The acceptance of such an argu-
ment would result in the creating of an anomalous situation and defeat the
very object with which clause (bb) was introduced, after the period of
compulsory detention was curtailed under clause (b) of Section 20(4) of
the Act.
B
As a result of our above discussion, it follows that Amendment Act
43 of 1993 is retrospective in operation and both clauses (b) and (bb) of
Sub-Section (4) of Section 20 of TADA apply to the cases which were
pending investigation on the date when the amendment came into force
C with effect from 22.5.1993 and in which the challan had not been filed till
then.

In conclusion, we may (even at the cost of repetition) say that to sum
up, an accused person seeking bail under Section 20(4) ltas to make an
D application to tlte court for grant of bail on grounds of the 'default' of the
prosecution and tlte court shall release the accused on bail after notice to the
public prosecutor uninfluenced by the gravity of the offence or the merits of
the prosecution case since Section 20(8) does not control the grant of bail
under Section 20(4) of TADA and both the provisions operate in separate
and independent fields. It is, however, permissible for the public
E prosecutor to resist the grant of bail by seeking an extension under clause
(bb) by filing a report for the purpose before the court. However, no
extension shall be granted by the court wit/tout notice to an accused to have
his say regarding the prayer for grant of extension under clause (bb). In
this view of the matter, it is immaterial whether the application for bail on
F ground of 'default' under Section 20( 4) is filed first or the report as
envisag,ed by clause (bb) is filed by the public prosecutor first so long as
both are considered while granting or refusing bail. If the period prescribed
by clause (b) of Section 20(4) has expired and the court does not grant an
extension on the report of the public prosecutor made under clause (bb),
the court shall release the accused on bail as it would be an indefeasible
G right of the accused to be so released. Even where the court grants an
extension under clause (bb) but the charge-sheet is not filed within the
extended period, the court shall have no option but to release the accused
on bail, if he seeks it and is prepared to furnish the bail as directed by the
Court. Moreover, no extension under clause (bb) can be granted by the
H Designated Court except on a report of the public prosecutor nor can
H.V. THAKUR v. STATE OFMAHARASHTRA[DR. ANAND, J.] 395

extension be granted for reasons other than those specifically contained in A
clause (bb), which must be strictly construed.

Having answered the questions posed by us in the opening part of
the Judgment, we shall now take up individual cases.

Criminal Appeal No. 732-735 of 1993. B

These appeals are directed against the common judgment and order
of the Designated Court dated 31st July 1993 and though have been
preferred by S/Sh. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur. Raja Maruti Jadhav. Dilip
Shankar Waghcoude and Dhyaneshwar Bhaskar Patil, the same have been· C
pressed and argued on behalf of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur only by Mr. N .T.
Vanarnalai and Mr. Swaraj Kaushal, learned Senior Advocates. A brief
reference to the facts of the case at this stage is desirable.

On 9.10.89 one Suresh Narsinh Dubey, a Real Extate Developer, was
shot dead at about 10.30 A.M. at Nalasopara Railway Station in District D n
Thane in the presence of his brother-in-law. A.S. Tripathi who is the eye
witness. The brother of the deceased, Shri Shyarn Sunder Dubey, on receipt
of the information went to Palghar Police Station and a first information
report was lodged resulting in the registration of a case C.R.No. 90 of 1989.
During the investigation, Patrick Frances Truskar and Ananda E
Ramachandra Patil were arrested in connection with the said case on
20.10.1989. A charge-sheet was filed against them in the Court of Sessions
on 8.7.90. Sessions Case No. 88of1991 is pending disposal in that connec-
tion.
F
In February, 1992, the DIG of Police (Maharashtra Railway Police)
visited Palghar Police Station and after going through the record of the
case, was of the opinion that the investigation has not been prop.erly
conducted in C.R.No. 90 of 1989 and he, therefore, summoned the com-
plainant, Shyam Sunder Dubey. Subsequently, however, the wife of the
deceased met the DIG of Police and presented an application,dated 18.5.92 G
executed by Shyam Sunder Dudey, the complainant. The DIG of Police,
on receipt of the application ordered reinvestigation. An application was
also addressed to the Sessions Judge, Thane under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C.
by the prosecuting agency seeking permission for reinvestigation, after
detailing the reasons therein, which was granted by the court. During the H
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A reinvestigation, some more accused persons were arrested in the said case
and remanded to judicial custody on various days. The petitioner No.l
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur, and two others read a news item in some local
newspaper indicating that they were likely to be arrested in respect of the
murder of the deceased Suresh Narsinh Dubey in C.R.90/1989 and there-
B fore they approached the Bombay High Court for grant of anticipatory bail
on 25.9.92. After notice to the Public Prosecutor, the Bombay High Court
granted interim anticipatory bail to the applicants on 29.9.92. On 30th
September, ·1992, the prosecution filed an application in the High Court
stating that since in the instant case, provisions of TADA were applicable,
C the accused could not be admitted to anticipatory bail, because Section 438
Cr.P.C. was excluded in its application to offences under TADA. The High
Court consequently dismissed the anticipatory bail application of Hitendra
Vishnu Thakur and others but kept effective the order of interim an-
ticipatory bail for a period of one week to enable the applicants to take
D recourse to further proceedings. On 1.10.92 petitioner No.1 and others
filed Writ Petition No. 1261 of 1992 in the High Court of Bombay for a
declaration that for the reasons stated in the Writ Petition the provisions
of TADA were not attracted to the facts of the case. The writ petition was,
however, dismissed on 23.10.92 by the High Court with the observation that
the Designated Court may go into the question of the applicability of the
E provisions of TADA independently at the appropriate stage. Not satisfied
with the order of the High Court of Bombay dated 23.10.92 the petitioner
No.1 and others filed Special Leave Petition (Cr!.) No. 2736/92 against the
said order of the Bombay High Court. On 17.11.92 the Special Leave
Petition (Cr!.) No. 2736/92 was dismissed by this Court. It was, thereafter,
F that on 5.12.92 petitioner No.1, Hitendra Vishnu Thakur, alongwith one
other co-accused surrendered before the Director General of Police,
Maliarashtra. On 4.1.93 he was remanded to judicial custody. An applica-
tion, being TMA No. 62 of 1992, for grant of bail under Section 20(8) of
TADA was dismissed by the Designated Court on 17.7.93. Another ap-
G plication, TMA No. 76/92, filed by the petitioner on 29.9.92, urging that the
provisions of TADA were not attracted and that the case be not tried by
the Designated Court was also dismissed on 2.9 .93, adopting the reasoning .
given in the order dated 17.7.93 in TMA 62/92. While the matters rested
thus, the Parliament enacted Amendment Act No. 43/93 which came into
H force on 22nd May 1993. Among the other amendments made to TADA,
;<J
H.V. THAKUR v. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[DR.ANAND,J.] 397

Section 20(4)(b) was amended by which the time for filing the charge-sheet A
was reduced from one year to 180 days. The Amendment Act also intro-
duced a new provision in the form of clause (bb) providing for grant of
extension of time for completion of investigation and filing of challan on a
repon of the public prosecutor indicating the progress of investigation and
the specific reasons for detention by the Designated Court, subject, how- B
ever, to the maximum period of compulsory detention of one year.

On 6.7.93 the petitioner, Hitendra Vishnu Thakur filed an applica-
tion for grant of bail under Section 20(4) of the Act on the ground that
180 days had expired on 4.6.93 but no charge- sheet/challan had been filed.
On 12.7.93, the Public Prosecutor presented a request of the investigating C
officer dated 29.6.1993 to the Designated Court seeking extension of time
to complete the investigation and objections were also filed to the applica-
tion for bail filed by Hitendra Vishnu Thakur under Section 20(4) of the
Act by the Public Prosecutor. The bail application was dismissed by the
Designated Court on 31.7.93 and the prosecution was granted extension of D
time till 30th of August 1993 to file the challan/charge-sheet treating the
application of the investigating officer as a repon of the Public Prosecutor.
Mis Vanamalai and Swaraj Kaushal, Senior Advocates have assailed the
order dated 31.7.93 by urging that the extension to complete the investiga-
tion has been granted ignoring the requirements of law as contemplated by
clause (bb) and that the prayer for bail under Section 20(4) has been E
rejected on extraneous considerations. Learned counsel, submitted that
once it is found that extension under clause (bb) was erroneously granted,
the right to be released on bail under Section 20(4) of TADA could not
be defeated on any account. Learned counsel for the respondent on the
other hand submitted that the Designated Court rightly rejected the ap- F
plication for grant of bail sought.under Section 20(4) of TADA by taking
into consideration the objections filed by the public prosecutor and the
application of the investigating officer seekinfextension, after detailing the
-. progress of the investigation and furnishing specific reasons for seeking
extension of time.
G
The application for extension which was. treated as a repon of the
Public Prosecutor by the Designated Court and on which exteqsion of time
for completion of investigation and filing of charge-sheet was granted has
been filed by the appellant as an Annexure P-5 which is avail~ble at page
110 of the paper book and reads thus: H
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A 'Out Ward No. 90189-P-1993
Sub-Divisional Police Officer.
Western Railway.
Churchgate, Bombay.

Date: 29, June 1993.
B
To
Hon'ble Designated Judge,
Designated Court,
Pune.
c Sub: Regarding progress of investigation and request for eirtension
of period to file the charge-sheet under C.R. No. 90/89, u/s 3021
338, 114, 120(b), 147, 148, 149 ofIPC and u/s 3/25 (l)(c) of Indian
Arms Act and u/s 3 of TADA registered at Palghar Police Railway
Station.
D
Respected Sir,

With regards to the above. I have to state that with permission .
of District and Sessions Judge of Thane the investigation of the
above case is continued from 23.9.92. In the present case 20
E
accused all named. Out of these 12 accused are arrested at several
places from 23.9.92 and all are in judicial custody. We have
collected sufficient evidence to enable to file case in the court
against the arrested accused. According to Section 20 of TADA
Act, before filing the case in Designated Court it is necessary to
F get the sanction of Director General of Police, Maharashtra State,
Bombay for which the detail report with papers have been sent.

Further it is found that four police_ officers are involved in this
case and to file the case against them a separate report is being
sent to Maharashtra Government for the sanction. We are ready
G to file the case as soon as we get the above mentioned both
permission. Therefore we request you to extend the period for two
months for investigation.

According to the TADA Act it is necessary to file the charge-sheet
H against the arrested accused within one year to the Designated
H.V. THAKUR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [DR. ANAND;J.] 399

Court. But as per Indian Government Order No. 6/8/93. Legal Cell. A
Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, dated
19.5.93. The TADA Act has been amended. As per amended Act
it is necessary to file the charge-sheet within 180 days against the
arrested accused. It is not mentioned in the amendment the date
from which it comes in force.
B
Received on 12.7.93 Respectfully submitted
SD/- Date : 29, June 1993.
Judge. Sd/-
(M.V. Deshmukh)

Sub-Divisional Police Officer
c
D.R.
Churchgate, Bombay.

Submitted to:
D
Shri Vijay Sawant,
Specially appointed Govt. Pleader, •
Designale<l Court, Punt:.

As would be seen from the application itself, it is not a report of the
Public Prosecutor but an application filed by the Sub-Divisional Police E
Officer and is addressed to the Designated Judge of the Designated Court.
Even if it be assumed reads thus:

''Submitted to:
Shri Vijay Sawant,
Specially appointed Govt. Pleader, F
Designated Court, Pune.

that the application was submitted to the Public Prosecutor and not directly
... to the Designated Court, in vain have we searched for any material on the
record to show that the Public Prosecutor filed any report, alongwith this G
application before the Designated Court. In fact learned counsel for the
respondents admitted that besides the application, extracted above, no
other report was filed by the Public Prosecutor to seek extension of time
for completion of the investigation as envisaged by clause (bb) of Section
20(4) of TADA though the Public Prosecutor had filed his objections to
the bail application filed under Section 20(4) of TADA read with Section H
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994[ SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A 167(2) of the Code. The Designated Court treated the application of the
investigating officer as a repmt from the Public Prosecutor as is obvious
from the following observations of the Designated Court:

"It is pertinent to note that in these applications the Investigating
Officer had fmwarded the report i11dicating rite progress of the i11ves-
B tigation 011 29.6.93 and in the said progress report he prayed
extension of l\Vo months time for submitting the charge-sheet on
the ground that the prosecution wants to seek sanction of the
Inspector General Police. It may be noted that as per the Amend-
ment Act, 1993. Section 20A has been added and as per this
c provision, the previous sanction of the Inspector General of Police
would be necessary. Similarly, it is mentioned in the said report
that in this matter four police officers have also been involved and
·prior sanction of the Government for prosecuting the Government
servants as per the provisions of Section 197 Cr.P.C. (is required)
Thus, the investigating officer wants time for making compliance
D of law. Taking into co11sideratio11 very serious and complicated nature
of the offence the prayer for extensio11 of two months time from
29.6.93 appears reasonable for seeki11g sanction to file charge- sheet.
It is contended on behalf of the applicant-accused that a report of
the Public Prosecutor is necessary, it may be noted that the Public
E Prosecutor while giving his reply has referred to this report of the
i11vestigating officer a11d prayed for extension of time. The Public )

Prosecutor is also required to obtain the report from the inves-
tigating officer and on the basis of that report the Public
Prosecutor files the reply in the court. The reply of the Public
Prosecutor, read with the report dated 29.6.93 of the i11vestigati11g
F
officer, is sufficient compliance of the report contemplated under the
proviso (bb) i11dicati11g the progrJss of the investigation. Therefore
the extension will have to be granted to the investigating machinery
for two months from 29.6.93. In the result, the bail cannot be
granted." (Emphasis ours)
G
We are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the view of the
Designated Court that since the application of the investigating officer was
supported by the Public Prosecutor, the request of the investigating agency
could be treated as the report of the Public Prosecutor when read with the
H objections filed by the Public Prosecutor to the bail application. The
H.V. THAKUR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [DR. ANAND, J.] 401

observations of the Designated Court show that the said court lost sight of A
the importance of the report and treated the whole thing in a rather casual
manner. The application of the investigating officer dated 29.6.93.
reproduced above, can by no stretch of imagination be construed as a report
of the Public Prosecutor as envisaged by Section 20(4) (bb) of TADA and
therefore no extension under clause (bb) could have been granted by the B
Designated Court, without the receipt of the report of the Public
Prosecutor. That apart, even if we ignore the discrepancy in the various
dates regarding the presentation of the application in the court it appears
from a bare perusal of the application of the investigating officer that the
Public Prosecutor did not even endorse the application with any comments C
to indicate as to whether or not he was agreeing with the statements
contained in the application. The Public Prosecutor obviously did not apply
his mind to the request of the investigating agency and merely acted as its
'post office'. The Designated Court was deprived of the opportunity of
scrutinising the report of the Public Prosecutor, before granting extension.
We need not, therefore, even comment upon the reasons given by the D
investigating officer in the application to test their correctness or otherwise
because we are firmly of the view that the said letter/application of the
investigating officer cannot be construed or treated as a substitute for the
report of the Public Prosecutor as contemplated by clause (bb) of Section
20(4) of TADA. Faced with this situation, learned counsel for the respon- E
dents submitted that the objections filed by the Public Prosecutor to the
bail application read with the application of the investigating officer may
be held to be substantial compliance with the requirements of clause (bb ).
We cannot agree.
F
The application filed by the appellant Hitendra Vishnu Thakur for
his release on bail under Section 20(4) of the Act reads as follows:

"l. Thal the accused above named was arrested on 5.12.92 in the
above referred Crime Register No.(90/93). The accused is now in
Magistrate custody. The charge-sheet against accused has not been G
filed in this case till date inspite of fact that 180 days have elapsed
since his arrest.,

2. The Terrorist & Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act was
amended on 22.5.93 vide which period allowed for the investigating H
402 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1994] SUPP.1 S.C.R.

A agency for filing of the charge-sheet has .been amended to one
hundred and eighty days.

3. The accused prays that he be released on bail for the following
amongst other grounds.

B GROUNDS.

1. That the investigating agency has not filed the charge-sheet
within the stipulated period of 180 days.

2. That the Public Prosecutor or the investigating agency has not
c filed till date an application or report before this Hon'ble Court
indicating the progress of the investigation and specific reasons for
the detention of the accused beyond the period of 180 days and
· further they have not obtain.ed an order from this Hon'ble Court
to extend the said period of detention beyond 180 days.
D
3. In view of the above the accused as of right is entitled to be
released on bail.

4. The accused is ready and willing to furnish bail as may be
ordered by this Hon'ble Court.
E
It is therefore prayed that the applicant accused be released on
bail.

Date : 6 July, 1993. Sd/-
(Advocate for accused)"
F
The Public Prosecutor filed his objections to the above application and in
the objections it was inter alia stated:

(4) "The concerned investigating officer on 29.6.1993 had forwarded
his report to the Hon'ble Court relating to the progress of the
G investigation. He had also pointed out that, the steps were taken
for obtaining sanction from Director General of Police. Under
these circumstances, averments in para 2 turned up to be false
and misleading.

H xxxx xxxx
H.V. TIIAKUR v. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[DR.ANAND,J.] 403

(6) Without prejudice, to the above contention it is submitted that A
the investigation is not completed as yet. There are serious charges
.of murder, goondaism land grabbing etc. against the accused. The
accused it is apprehended, are having complicity in the course of
investigation. The Investigating Agency has seized pistols and other
lethal fire arms. The report· from the Ballistic Expert is also
B
obtained indicating the link between the crime and its par-
ticipators.

xxxx xxxx xxxx

10. (a) From the record there appearsprima facie evidence to show .,
~

that the applicant is a party to the conspiracy and he knowlingly
facilitated the commission of the terrorist act or an act preparatory
to a terrorist act. Considering the facts and circumstances and the
material on record, there are reasonable grounds for believing that
the applicant-accused is guilty of the offence under the TADA act.
D
xxxx xxxx xxxx

10. (e) There is evidence to show that the applicant is also indulged
in land grabbing and witnesses have stated during the investigation
about the nefarious activities of the applicant and his gangstors
pointing out that the applicant was working for the criminal con- E
spiracy hatched at the Thakur's criminal empire.

xxxx xxxx

10. (k) The broad day light murder of the builder Suresh Dubey
on a railway platform was a part of criminal conspiracy by the F
applicant's gang to spread a terror among the people and indicate
that those who oppose, they will have to pay the penalty in one
form or the other, even face total elimination in the process. In
short the intention will be to strike terror and the killing will be to
achieve that object. G
11. The prosecution submits considering the facts and circumstan-
ces and the material on record, under these circumstances it
cannot be said that the applicant will not abscond, if released on
bail. On the other hand, his close relatives Bhai Thakur, Deepak
Thakur, Bhaskar Thakur are proclaimed offenders and they have H
404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A successfully evaded arrest so far and, therefore, it is quite possible
that this applicant, if released on bail, will contact them and create
hindrance in the smooth going investigation. The prosecution fur-
ther states that the release of these top conspirators at this crucial
juncture will cause irreparable damage in proper conduct of in-
vestigation in the cases involving them and the kind of clout they
B enjoy sufficient for them to muzzle out any note of dissent and
even go to the extent of trying to damage evidence against them
as they had done in the past. The prosecution submits that for
ullfolding the crime in question, the prosecution pleads to the
Hon'ble Court not to grant bail to the conspirators involved in this
c crime."

From the perusal of the objections of the Public Prosecutor, ex-
tracted above, it transpires that the application of the investigating officer
was submitted direct to the Designated Court by the Investigating Officer
D (see para 4} and not by the Public Prosecutor and the prayer for release
on bail of the applicant Hitendra Vishnu Thakur under Section 20(4} was
opposed mainly on grounds which are relevant under Section 20(8) of
TADA and not under Section 20(4) of the Act. The grounds on which bail
may be denied under Section 20(8} of TADA are irrelevant for the con-
sideration of the prayer for release on bail on account of the 'default' of
E the prosecution under Section 20(4) of TADA.

From the above discussion and the admitted fact situation (date of
arrest and period for completion of investigation and not filing of challan
within the prescribed period not being in dispute), in the case of Hitendra
F Vishnu Thakur, we find that the extension of custody under clause (bb)
was erroneously granted by an improper exercise of the j\}risdiction by the
Designated Court by placing an incorrect interpretation on the require-
ments as contemplated by clause (bb) by treating the application of the
investigating officer read with his objections to the bail application as a
report of the Public Prosecutor though without effecting the validity of
G further investigation. In the absence of grant of valid extension of custody
to complete the investigation and file the challan, Hitendra Vishnu Thakur
had acquired an indefeasible and absolute right to be released on bail as
per the provisions of Section 20(4) of the Act, since the accused had
offered to be released on bail on such terms as the Designated Court may
H prescribe. The Designated Court was, therefore, under an obligation to
11.V. THAKUR"· STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [DR. ANAND, .I.] 405

admit and release the appellant on bail under Section 20( 4) of TADA read A
with Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. on the merits of the application under Section
20(4) itself unintluenced by any other considerations.

From the aforesaid discussion it follows that the order of the Desig-
nated Court granting cxte:ision of time for completion of investigation to
the in\·estigating agency to file the challan and therefore authorising his B
detention beyond the prescribed period of compulsory custody in the case
of appellant Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and the refusal of bail lo him under
Section 20(4) of the Act on extraneous considerations cannot be sustained
and we, consequently accept the appeal of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur to that
extent, and set aside the order of the Designated Court refusing to grant c
bail to him under Section 20(4} of the Act. We further direct that Hitendra
Vishnu Thakur be released on bail on his furnishing bail bonds in the sum
of Rs.30.000 with two sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction of the
Designated Court subject, however, to the following conditions:

(1) That appellant, (Hitendra Vishnu Thakur), shall before being released D
on bail furnish the correct and complete address of the place where he
would be residing within the jurisdiction of the Designated Court.

(2) That the appellant shall report at the police station nearest to the place
of his residence every week on Mondays, and
E
(3) The appellant shall not leave the place of his residence and move out
of the jurisdiction of the Designated Court without seeking permission
from the Designated Court and informing the Police Station concerned
about the same.

We wish, however, clarify that since we have directed the release of F
the appellant on account of the default of the prosecution to complete the
investigation and file the challan within the prescribed time as required by
Section 20(4) of TADA, our reference to the facts and circumstances of
the case and the discussion, should be considered only as relevant for that
purpose and nothing said by us expressly or by implication, should be G
construed as any expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 738 OF 1993

Since, bail has been granted to the appellant in Cr!. A. Nos. 732-735
of 1993, we grant the prayer of Mr. Kaushal and dismiss Cr!. A. No. 738 H
-1116 SUPRHIE COURT REPORTS [199-1] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A of 1993 as not pressed at this stage~, \vithout expressing any opinion on
merits.

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 2800/1993.

Heard.
B
Leave granted.

This appeal is preferred against the order of the Designated Court,
Pune dated 2nd September, 1993.

C This appeal, by special leave, IS also filed by Hitendra Vishnu
Thakur.

The appellant filed an application under Section 18 of TADA, being ·
TMA 76 of 1992, asserting that the offence in C.R.No. 90 of 1989 is not
covered by the provisions of TADA and therefore the said case needs to
D be transferred to a regular court for trial. The learned Designated Court
by its order dated 2nd September, 1993, rejected the application holding
that "there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has com-
mitted the offences under the provisions of the Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987. Consequently, the Designated Court,
E Pune has the exclusive jurisdiction to try the qffences under the TADA Act
.and, therefore, the case against the applicant cannot be transferred to a
regular Court under Section 18 of the TADA Act." This order has been
put in issue in this appeal.

While dealing with Criminal Appeal Nos. 732-735 of 1993, we have
F adverted to the brief facts of the case (C.R.No. 90/1989). In its order dated
17th July, 1993, in Criminal Misc. Application No. 62 of 1992, the Desig-
nated Court has dealt with some of ihe statements of the witnesses
recorded during the investigation. Since, the investigation was not complete
and extemion had been granted to the investigating agency to further
investigate and submit the challan within the extended period, it is obvious
G that the investigating agency may have recorded some more evidence in
the case after 17.7.1993. At the time when TMA 76 of 1992 was filed, the
investigation in the case obviously was going on and it would have b~en
premature for the Designated Court, without scrutiny of the entire material
collected during the investigation, to come to any firm conclusion that the
H case was not triable by the Designated Court and was required to be tried
H.V. THAKUR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [DR. ANAND .I.) 407

by the regular Court Some of the statements of the witnesses recorded A
during the investigation, as referred to in the order of the Designated
Court, do indicate that some of the witnesses have deposed lo the activities
of the appellant and others which could be construed as offences triable
under TADA. It was in this fact situation that the Designated Court
rejected the application filed by the appellant under Section 18 of the Act
B
holding that there were reasonable grounds to believe that an offence
under the provisions of TADA had been committed. In the facts and
circumstances of the case the view expressed by the Designated Court on
2nd September, 1993 in TMA 76 of 1992, when the investigation itself was
also not complete, read with the evidence adverted to in its order dated
17.7.93 cannot be said to be unreasonable much less perverse. It is also c
relevant at this stage to refer to the reply affidavit filed by Shri M.W.
Deshmukh, the investigating officer, in reply to Criminal Writ Petition No.
1261 of 1992, which had been filed by the appellant stating that the
provisions of TADA were not attracted to the facts and circumstances of
the case (C.R. No. 90 of 1989). In paragraph 4 of the said affidavit the D
investigating officer stated:
•
"4. I say and submit that the statements recorded after the further
investigation by way of reinvestigation of the case itself bring the
case of the petitioner within the meaning of Section 3 of TADA.
Apart from the relations of the deceased, the statements also have E
been recorded of the eye witnesses who had seen the actual assault
which also authoenticates that at the time of incident, people had
ran helter- skelter in order to save their lives but one passer by
had sustained bullet injury on his person i.e. on the left side of the
chest by inges (sic). It is further pertinent to note that at the F
relevant time, the platform No.2 of Nalasopara Railway Station
was crowded and there were about more than one thousand people
waiting for the arrival of the train and at which time, associates of
the petitioners arrived and fired at random. I say and submit that
this act of the associates of the petitioners was pursuant to the G
conspiracy hatched by and between them and the facts of con-
spiracy only came on surface after the commencement of further
investigation by way of reinvestigation. The statement (of wit-
nesses) relied upon by the investigation required to be maintained
secrecy as they apprehend danger to their lives if their names are
disclosed to the petitioners or their associates, I. therefore, crave H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A leave to refer to and rely upon the statements hitherto recorded
from the time of commencement of furthe~ investigations by way
of reinvestigation at the time of hearing of this petition."

The S.L.P. against the dismissal of the writ petition was dismissed by
this Court. Moreove~· on 23.11.1993 while disposing of SLP No.1643-
B 46/1993 (Batch) titled Hitendra Vishnu Thakur & Ors. v. State of
Maharashtra & Ors., this Court issued directions to the Designated Court
to frame the charges on or before 13.12.1993 and expedite the trial record-
ing therein the undertaking of counsel for the parties that they would not
seek any adjournment on any account thereafter. Thus, in view of the
C circumstances referred to above and the facts adverted to in the order of
the Designated Court, no fault can be found with the order of the Desig-
nated Court rejecting the application of the appellant under Section 18 of
the Act.

We would, however, not like to express any opinion on the merits of
D the case at this stage, because the entire evidence had not been collected
much less scrutinised and analysed by the investigating agency or the
Designated Court when the application under Section 18 of TADA was
filed and disposed of by the court. It shall be open to the appellant to
satisfy the Designated Court at the appropriate stage that there is no
E sufficient or satisfactory evidence of any offence under TADA having been
committed by the appellant and when such a situation should arise, we have
no doubt that the Designated Court will examine and dispose of the matter
in accordance with law. With these observations, the Criminal Appeal
directed against the order dated 2nd September, 1993 in TMA No. 76 of
1992 is dismissed.
F
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NOS. 138-139 OF 1994.

Leave granted.

G The facts leading to the registration of the case C.R. No. 90 of 1989
and the rejection of the application filed by the appellant Hitendra Vishnu
Thakur under Section 20(4) of TADA read with Section 167(2) Cr.P.C.
have been examined to and dealt with by us while dealing with Criminal
Appeal Nos. 732-735 of 1993 and it is not necessary to repeat the same.

H It transpires from the perusal of the memorandum of appeal, filed
H.V. IBAKUR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [DR. ANAND . .l.J 409

by the appellant that the charge-sheet was filed against the appellant and A
others under Section 173 Cr.P.C. on 26th August 1993. In the said charge-
sheet, names of four police officers alongwith 12 other accused besides the
absconding accused were also mentioned. A. note was appended to the
charge-sheet, that a supplementary charge-sheet against them would be
filed after obtaining requisite sanction from the concerned authorities. The
B
supplementary charge-sheet was filed on 13th December 1993, which hap-
pened to be the last date for framing of charges vide the directions of this
Court in ~LP (Cr!.) No. 2230 of 1993 dated 23.11.1993. The appellant and
some of his co-accused made an application before the Designated Court
challenging the validity of Sanction accorded by respondent No. 2,
authorising the Designated Court to take cognizance of the offence against c
the accused. The written sanction was filed in the Designated Court on
24th August, 1993, while the application challenging the validity of sanction
was filed on 6th December, 1993. Apart from oral arguments even written
submissions were filed in support of their respective contentions regarding
the validity or otherwise of the sanction under Section 20-A(Z) of TADA D
by learned counsel for the parties.

Section 20A of TADA which was introduced for the first time by
Amendment Act No. 43 of 1993 and deals with the "cogniwnce of offence"
and reads as under: ·
E
"20A(l) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no in-
formation about the commission of an offence under this Act shall
be recorded by the police without the prior approval of the District
Superintendent of Police.

(2) No court shall take cognizance of any offence under this Act F
without the previous sanction of the Inspector General of Police,
or as the case may be, the Commissioner of Police. 11

The Section was obviously introduced to safeguard a citizen from any
vexatious prosecution under TADA. Vide Section 20A(2) of TADA, no
court can take cognizance of an offence under TADA, unless there is a G
valid sanction accorded by the competent authority as prescribed by the
Section. The grievance that since the Sanction order referred to some of
the activities of the accused person in the year 1984 etc. when the 1987 Act
had not even come into force, it rendered the sanction granted by the
competent authority as invalid was repelled by the Designated Court and H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11994} SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A the correctness of that order has been assailed before us.
We have gone through the order of sanction under Section 20A(2)
of TADA, which has been reproduced by the Designated Court in the
order impugned before us and find that the competent authority had after
proper appraisal of the record and after proper application of its mind
B accorded the sanction. The Designated Court came to the conclusion that
the order of sanction prima facie appeared to be valid. We agree with the
Designated Court, as at the stage when the challenge was laid to the
sanction order under Section 20A{2) of the Act, it is only the 'prima facie'
case which was required to be established to show that the sanctioning
c authority had applied its mind to the facts of the case before sanction was
accorded ..

Whether or not the allegations on the basis of which sanction has
been accorded are true or nol would be established at the trial. Merely
because the competent authurity also referred lo the past history or the
D earlier activities of some of the accused while according sanction under
Section 20A(2) of TADA, it would not vitiate the sanction, which prima
facie appears to be legal and valid. It appears that while challenging the
validity of Sanction accorded by the competent authority under Section
20A(2) of TADA, the accused had also tried to once again raise a fresh
E challenge to the applicability of the provisions of TADA to their case,
which matter stood already rejected by the Designated Court and a writ
petition against that order failed upto this Court. This was not a permissible
course to be adopted by the accused. The Designated Court rightly
rejected both the prayers made in the application i.e. to declare the
Sanction as invalid and to hold that the provisions of TADA were not
F p1ima facie attracted to the case. Nothing has been brought to our notice
either during the oral submissions or in the written submissions to show as
to how the order of Sanction under Section 20A(2) is invalid.

We do not find that the Sanction Order suffers from any infirmity
G whatsoever. There is, therefore, no merit in these appeals and the same are
hereby dismissed.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 736-737 OF 1993.

These appeals are directed against the order of the Designated Court
H dated 31st July 1993 in Criminal Misc. Application No. 91/93 and Crl. Misc.
H.V. THAKUR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [DR. ANAND, J.] 411

Application No .. 93/93. The appeals are confined to the limited question A
whether the appellant ought to have been released under Section 20(4) of
TADA read with Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. because of the default of the
investigating agency to complete the investigation and file the charge-sheet
within the prescribed time.

The appellant was arrested on 22.9.92. The appellant was working as
B
Circle Police Inspector, Thane, during the relevant time. On being
produced before the Magistrate, he was remanded to custody from time to
time and on 20th October, 1992, he was directed to be produced before
the Designated Court since the offence of which he was accused of was
one under TADA. On 23rd October, 1992, the appellant applied for bail C
to the Designated Court and provisional bail was granted to him. His bail
application, however, came to be rejected on 16.1.93 and he surrendered
to the bail bonds. After Section 20 of TADA was amended by Act 43 of
1993, the investigating agency invoked the provisions of clause (bb) of
Sub-Section (4) of Section 20 seeking extension of time for completing the D
investigation and filing the charge-sheet against the appellant, through its
application dated 6.7.93. The appellant also preferred a bail application
before the Designated Court under Section 20(4) of TADA read with
Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. seeking release on· bail on account of the default of
the investigating agency to file the charge-sheet within· the prescribed
period. Both the applications were heard and disposed of together. The E
Designated Court by its order (impugned in these appeals) dated 1.7.93
granted one month's time to the investigating agency to file the charge-
sheet and rejected the appellant's application for release on bail.

On the facts of the present case, Mr. Khanwilkar learned counsel for F
the appellant, submitted that the report of the Special Public Prosecutor
was not a report in the eye of law and since bail under Section 20(4) of
TADA was refused to the appellant only on account of the grant of
extension of time, the order of the Designated Court deserved to be set
aside. The Designated Court while dealing with the applications of the
Public Prosecutor and appellant (Cr.M.P. 91 and 93 of 1993) held: G

"So far as the applicant-accused in T.Crl.M.A.No.93 of 1993 is
concerned, the applicant has filed the application on 8.7.93,
whereas the application for extension of time bearing
T.Crl.M.A.No.91 of 1993 has been filed by the Special Public H
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A Prosecutor on 6.7.93. I have already held above, whether the Public
Prosecutor or the accused comes to the court first is not a criterion
for seeking the relief under Section 167 Cr.P.C. In this matter the
preparedness of the applicant to seek bail from the Court be
gathered from his application for provisional bail bearing
T.Crl.M.A.No. 78 of 1993, which is still pending. The Special Public
B Prosecutor has prayed for extension of time on the ground that
the investigating machinery has not received sanction as required
under Section 197 Cr.P.C. for the prosecution of a public servant.
He is involved in a very serious offence. The prosecution wants
time to comply with the provisions of the law for the purpose of
c filing charge-sheet. Therefore, a reasonable time of one month is
granted. 11

Thus, Crl. Misc. Application No.93 of 1993 was rejected while in Cr!.
Misc. Application No.91 of 1993, one month's time was granted, from the
D date of the order, to file the charge-sheet failing which the appellant was
directed to be released on bail.

We have perused the record. The Public Prosecutor had submitted
a report (Crl. Misc. Application No. 91 of 1993) in the form of an applica-
tion under Section 20(4)(bb) of TADA. We find that the 'application'
• E satisfies the requirements of law and merely because it is labelled as 'an
application', it would not cease to be a report as envisaged by Section
20(4)(bb) of TADA. Learned counsel, however, argued that extension of
time could be granted only for completion of investigation and that the
ground on which extension was sought, namely, that the sanction from the
p Government to launch the prosecution under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was
awaited, did not justify the grant of extension of time.

In the report of the Public Prosecutor, it has been stated that the
appellant is a police officer and while the charge-sheet and supplementary
charge-sheet against other accused persons have already been filed the
G charge.sheet against him would be submitted as soon as sanction from the
Government is received. Sanction, is not, strictly speaking a part of the
investigation and this legal position was conceded by Mr. Tulsi, the learned
Additional Solicitor General also relieving us of the need to refer to the
settled law on this subject. In the absence of sanction there was no bar to
H 5.le the charge-sheet and then produce the Sanction of the competent
H.V. THAKUR 1·. STATF OF MAHARASHTRA [DR. ANAND . .I.] 413

authority subsequently ivith the permission of the Court. We have dealt A
with in extenso the ambit and scope of clause (bb) of Sub-Section (4) of
Section 20 of TADA elsewhere in the judgment. The Designated Court
could gr:.1nt c'1ension of t1;,,e:undc'r clause (bb) on the report of the Public
Prosecutor for con1ph·tion offhl' invl~.StiJ:ation and filing the chall<.1n there-
·aftcr and for no other purpose-. :Tbc~Lcgislat urc has limited the grounds on
B
which e'1cnsion could be .granted. .
and the Designated Court could not add
to those grounds. Since, on its p\•in reading clause (bb) could be invoked
only if the i11rcstigatio11 was no/ C\ilmplete, the Public Prosecutor could not
be permitted to seek extension of'timc under that clause for 'administrative
difficulties' or obtaining-'Sanction' or the like grounds, if investigation \Vas
already complete. If extension of time was to be granted on grounds, other c
than the completion of the investigation, it would defeat the legislative
intent clearly manifested in clauses (b) and (bb) as amended by Act
43/1993, not to keep an accused in custody beyond the time prescribed by
clause (b) or as extended by clause (bb). The grant of extension beyond
the period prescribed by clause (b) very seriously effects the liberty of a D
citizen and the Designated Court commits an error in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, if it grants extension of time ignoring the provisions of clause
(bb). Grant of extension under clause (bb) on grounds extraneous thereto,
at the whims of the investigating agency, cannot be permilted. The very
object of the clause would be defeated if the period of compul.<ory deten-
tion is to be extended in a casual manner for reasons other than those E
envisaged by clause (bb). In the present case, extension has been granted
and bail declined to the appellant on grow1ds not sanctioned by clause (bb)
and the order of Designated Court refusing bail to the appellant cannot be
sustained. The order of the Designated Court in Cr.M.P. No. 93/1993
rejecting the prayer for release on bail under clause (b) of Section 20(4) F
of TADA because of the grant of extension of time under clause (bb) is,
therefore, set aside. For the reasons noticed above as well as those given
by us while dealing with the cases of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (Cr. Appeal
Nos. 732· 735/1993) we direct that the appellant Malarao T. Kakodal be
released on bail on his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs. 30,000 with
two sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction of the Designated Court G
subject, however, to the following conditions :

(1) That appellant shall before being released on bail furnish the correct
and complete address of the place where he would be residing within the
jurisdiction of the Designated Court. H
4i4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11994] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A (2) That the appellant shall report al the police station nearest to the place
of his residence every week on Mondays: and

(3) The appellant shall nol lea\'e the place of his residence and mo,·c out
of the jurisdiction of the Designated Court \\'ithout seeking permission
from the Designated Court and informing the police station concerned
B about the same.

Since, we are directing the release of the appellant on bail on account
of the default of the prosecution to complete the investigation and file the
challan within the prescribed time, nothing said hereabove shoul.d be
c construed as any expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 739 OF 1993.

The appellant is aggrieved of the rejection of his bail application No.
186 of 1993 in TADA Spl.R.A. No. 86 of 1992 by the Designated Court on
D 3.8.1993. The Designated Court granted extension of time to the prosecu-
tion to file the charge-sheet under clause (bb) of Sub-Section (4) of Section
20 of TADA and rejected the prayer for his release on bail under Section
20(4) of TADA read with Section 167(2) of the Code.

The appellant was arrested in connection with TADA R.A.No. 61 of
E 1992, arising out of C.R.No. 217 of 1992 in connection with certain offences
committed on 12.9.1992. After the amendment of Section 20(4) of TADA
by Act 43 of 1993, the appellant sought his release on bail because of the
default of the prosecuting agency to complete the investigation and file the
charge-sheet within the modified period ·as prescribed under Section
F 20(4)(b) of TADA read with Section 167(2) of the Code.

That on the expiry of the prescribed period an accused in custody·
becomes entitled to an order for being released on bail, if he is prepared
to and furnishes bail on account of the default of the prosecution to
complete the investigation and file the charge-sheet within the prescribed
G period is no longer in doubt. Jn the present case, however, we find that
when the bail application of the appellant filed under Section 20(4)(1>) of
TADA read with Section 167(2) of the Code was taken up for considera- ·
tion, the appellant did not press the application and sought liberty of tne
court to apply for bail on merits after the filing of the charge-sheet. This
H becomes obvious from the following observations of the Designated Court:
H.V. THAKUR"· STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [DR. AN,\ND . .I.[ 41~

"I may mention here that this Court had taken up the Bail Ap- A
plications of the applicants-accused for hearing on merits, the
accused Suresh a@ Pappu Kalani and Jayawat Daaaraya Swyarao
did not press their applications on merits and sought liberty of the
Court to apply for bail on merits after the charge-sheet is filed.''

B
Since, the appellant did not press the application for his release on
bail, no fault can be found with the order of the Designated Court in
rejecting the application. Mr. Khanwilkar, learned counsel for the appel-
lant, however, submitted that at no point of time any concession was made
on behalf of the the appellant that he was not pressing the bail application
and that the observations which have been extracted above were made by c
the Designated Court in a different context. The submission does not
appeal to us. In case no such concession had been made it was open to the
appellant to make an application before the Designated Court bringing that
fact to its notice and seeking review and correction of the record. That
course was not adopted by the appellant. It is well settled that if the record D
' .
of a court is to be assailed, a review in that court and not an SLP or an
appeal in the Supreme Court is the remedy (see with advantage [1983] I
SCR 8: \1982) 2 SCC 468 : (1991) JT 4 SC 61). It appears to us that the
argun1cnt now being raised is clearly an after thought, as it was not even
sought Lo be supported in the memorandum of appeal by any affidavit. In
vit\~· of the clear obscrv1:1tions of the De5-!gnatt:d Court \Ve connot accept E
the submission of the learned coun:..el and doubt the correctnc"Ss of the
record of the Designated Court. The argument that the use of the expres-
sion "on merits" in the observations of the Designated Court as extracted
above could apply only to an application for bail under Section 20(8) of
the Act and not to an application filed under Section 20(4) of TADA is F
fallacious. Both the applications, whether filed under Section 20(4) of
TADA or under Section 20(8). of TADA, are required to be disposed of
on their own merits by the Designated Court and, therefore, the distinction
which the learned counsel seeks to draw between the applications filed
under Sections 20(4) and 20(8) of TADA by hair splitting is imaginary and G
has no basis. The observations of the Designated Court clearly go to show
that the application filed by the appellant under Section 20(4) of TADA
read with Section 167(2) of the Code alone was under consideration by
that Court and it was that application which was not pressed. The appellant
cannot now be heard to make any grievance about the dismissal of that bail
application which he did not press. H
416 SUPREME,COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP, l S.C.R.

A In the written submissions filed by Mr. Khanwilkar, an alternative
plea has also been raised in the following terms:

"It is submitted without prejudice to the aforesaid that even as-
suming without admitting that the statement wa. made on behalf
of the Appellant that he was not pressing the application on merits
B and sought liberty for consideration of the said application after
the charge-sheet was filed even then in law the position would not
materially alter to the disadvantage of the appellant for the simple
reason that as submitted earlier the relief that the appellant would
be entitled would relate back to the date of his application,"
c The submission extracted above has no factual foundation on facts.
From the observations (supra) of the Designated Court, it clearly emerges
that the appellant had not sought any liberty for consideration of the bail
application after the charge-sheet was filed. That statement made by the
appellant in the Designated Court is that he did not press the application
D and sought liberty of the cduh to "apply for bail on merits after the charge-
sheet is filed." The appellant certainly is at liberty to apply for bail on merits
after the charge-sheet is filed and as and when such an application is filed
the Designated Court would deal with it in accordance with law. As at
present, however, no fault can be found with the order of the Designated
E Court in rejecting the bail application which was not pressed before that
court. This appeal, thus, has no merits and is accordingly dismissed.

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 740-741 OF 1993.

Ramesh Bhai Patel is the appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 740/93 while
F Shanti Bhai Patel is the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 741of1993. Both
the appellants are aggrieved of the rejection of their bail applications filed
under Section 20(4) of TADA by the Designated Court, vide its order
dated 3.8.93. The Designated Court has granted extension to the prosecu-
. tion to complete the investigation and file the challan in the court on an
G application filed by the Senior Inspector of Police on 14th July, 1993.

Mr. K.G. Bhagat, the learned senior counsel, appearing for the
appellants submitted that the Designated Court fell in error in granting
extension to the prosecution on the application of the Senior Inspector of
Police without any report from the Special Public Prosecutor and for
H reasons which are not contemplated by clause (bb) of Section 20(4) of
H.V. THAKUR 1·. STATE or ~IAJ-l,\11.ASHTRA [DR. AN>\ND . .T.] 417

TADA. We find substance in his submission. The application seeking A
extension of time which was filed before the Designated Court reads as
follows:

"Application for extension for ftuthcr pc1iod to file churgc·.\·hcct in
DEB CID CR.No. 217192.
B
MAY IT PLEASE YOUR HONOUR

I. Sh. Shiwa.ii S. Sawant, Sr. Inspector of Police, DCB CID
U-lll, Bombay, do hereby state on solemnly affirmation as under:

1. I say that I am Investigating Officer in DCB CID C.R.NO. 217/92 C
which was registered by Bycylla Police Station vidc C.R.No. 446
of 1992 and the same was transferred to DCB CID, Bombay, for
further investigation.

2. I say and submit that this branch has arrested 19 accused till
today on the dates mentioned against them. D
3. I say and submit that in this case about 15 accused persons who
arc assailants as well as the main conspirator including Dau<l
Ibrahim Kaskar, Dubai based Don, his henchmen namely, Sunil
Sawant, Sham Kishore Garikapatti, Bacchi Pantle, Baba Gabrial
E
and others have absconded. Non-bailable arrest warrants against
the accused were returned as tfie same could not be executed
inspite of all efforts. Jnterpoles, CBI, Central Government, State
Government has been apprised of the facts of the case in order to
book the absconding accused who had gone out of India. Applica-
tion for proclamation has already been filed before the Hon'ble F
Court.

4. I say and submit that on 7.6.93, this bench has arrested accused
Jaiprakash Singh, Shivcharan Singh @ Nacchi Singh and Prasad
Ramakant Khade, who had taken active part in the commission of
offence and also recovered AK-56 assault rifle, 3 hand grantes, 2 G
magazines and 16 live cartridges. From reliable sources it is learnt
2 to 4 more accused are likely to be arrested very soon. and as such
their interrogation, confrontation, identification, recovery have to
be made. Because of these developments charge-sheet could not
be filed earlier. I say and submit that as far as investigation of H
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP.1 S.C.R.

A accused Nos. 1 to 17 is already completed, the charges are
prepared except for some administrative difficulties, the charge-
sheet could° not be filed.

5. I say that in view of the recent amendment to the Principal Act
of TADA and in view of the above explanation. I submit that Your
B Honour may in the interest of justice, kindly permit us further
extension of time to file charge-sheet against accused Nos. 1 to 17.

And for this act of kindness, the prosecution shall as in duty
bound ever pray.

c (S.S. Sawant)
Sr. Inspector of Police

Solemnly affirmed at Bombay.
This 14th Day of July 1993.
Identified by me
D
Before me
Special Public Prosecutor for Gr. Bombay."

The application, extracted above, does not fall within the parameters of
E clause (bb) of Sub-Section (4) of Section 20 of TADA for the reasons
which we have already given while dealing with the ambit and scope of
clause (bb) of Sub-Section (4) of Section 20 of TADA. The Designated
Court erred in treating the application of the investigating officer as the
report of the Public Prosecutor. The mere identification by the Public
Prosecutor, of the deponent of the affidavit (Investigating Officer) could
F not justify the application to be treated as a report of the Public Prosecutor.
Since, there was no report filed by the Public Prosecutor before the Desig-
nated Court, the Designated Court faulted in granting extension "of com-
pulsory custody" on the application of the Investigating Officer. That apart,
the ground on which extension was sought, as emerging from paragraph 4
G of the application (supra) did not justify the grant of permission for the
extended period in custody even on the report of the Public Prosecutor.
Since, it is admitted in the said paragraph that the investigation against
accused Nos. 1to17 is 'already completed' but thatthe challan could not
be filed 'for some administrative difficulties'; it is obvious that the ground
for seeking extension of the period of compulsory detention of the appel-
H !ant was extaneous to the grounds contemplated by clause (bb) of Section
H.V. TIIAKUR v. STATEOFMAHARASHTRA[DR.ANAND;J.] 419

20(4) of TADA. The Designated Court, therefore, fell in error in granting A
the extension to the prosecution under the said provision. The consequence
of the erroneous extension of time, would have entitled that appellant to
be released on bail under Section 20(4) of TADA read with Section 167(2)
of the Code for the default of the investigating agency without .in any way
affecting the continuation of the investigation but we find that the appel- B
!ants, in th-~ peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, cannot derive any
benefit on that account because before the Designated Court the appel-
lants did not press their bail applications and requested the Designated
Court for consideration of the bail applications after the charge-sheet is filed
implying thereby that the appellants did not "offer" to be released on bail.
The proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code read with Section C
20(4)(b) of TADA expressly p0stulates that if the investigation is not
completed within the prescribed period and the challan filed in court, the
DesigQated Court shall release the accused on bail if 'he is prepared to
and does furnish bail.' By not pressing their bail applications, the appellants
cannot be said to be 'prepared to' be released on bail by furnishing the
bail. Why the appellants chose not to press their applications is not for us D
to conjecturise? The argument of learned counsel for the respondent that
being of the opinion that extension under clause (bb) was likely to be
granted, the appellants chose not to press their applications cannot be
dismissed as a wholly fenciful argument. In any event, the fact remains, that
for the reasons best known to them, the appellants did not press and E
prosecute their bail applications before the Designated Court when the
same were taken up for consideration on merits. Mr. Bhagat, learned
senior counsel appearing for the appellant, however, submitted that the
observations of the Designated Court to the effect that "whereas the
accused Shantilal Prabhubhai Patel and Ramesh Prabhubhai Patel re-
quested this Court to consider their bail applications on merits after the F
charge-sheet is filed" were not correct and that no such concession was
made on behalf of the appellant. We have already rejected a similar
argument while dealing with Criminal Appeal No. 739 of 1993. In these
appeals also the appellants did not approach the Designated Court for
correction of the record. Even in the grounds of appeal before us it was G
not asserted that the concession had been wrongly attributed to the appel·
!ants. The submission is clearly an after thought and an attempt to get out
of a situation of the appellants' own making. We,. therefore, reject the
argument as we find it wholly unacceptable. We are also not persuaded to
accept the submission of Mr. Bhagat, that the reference to the application
H
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SU.PP. 1 S.C.R.

A of the appellant which was not pressed before the Designated Court was to
a different application and not to the bail applications filed under Section
20(4) of the Act read with Section 167(2) of the Code. The submission
defies logic and is apparently an argument of despair. The two bail applica-
tions, No. 195 and 196 of 1993, which were being considered and dealt with
by the Desi~ted Court were the applications filed by the appellants under
B Section 20(4) of TADA read with Section 167(2) of the Code and it is futile
to contend that the Designated Court while considering those applications,
recorded the 'concession' with regard to some other application which was
not under consideration of the Court. The submission of Mr. Bhagat is
without any basis and is unacceptable. Mr. Bhagat lastly submitted that the
C Designated Court should have, keeping in view the. mandate of Section
167(2) of the Code, admitted the appellants to bail because of the default
of the prosecution, ignoring the so called concession. We cannot agree.··
Whereas the period of compulsory custody has been fixed by the Legisla-
ture, there is nothing in the Act which may introduce a stage of compulsory
bail, if the applicant chooses not to be released on bail or furnish the bail
D bonds. Since, the appellants did not prosecute and press their bail applica-
tions for release on bail under Section 20(4) of the Act read with Section
167(2) of the Code before the Designated Court, the rejection of their bail
applications, No. 195/93 196/93, by the Designated Court cannot be found
fault with at all. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned
E order of the Designated Court rejecting the bail applications does not merit
any interference. Both the appeals have, no merit and are hereby dismissed.

We may, however, clarify that the non-interference with the im-
pugned order of the Designated Court, in the peculiar facts and cir-
cumstances of these appeals, should not be construed as any expression of
F opinion on the merits of the case. It has been submitted before us that
applications under Section 20(8) of the TADA have already been filed .and
are pending disposal before the Designated Court. The Designated Court
shall deal with those applications on their own merits, uninfluenced by the
dismissal of these appeals and dispose the same of expeditiously in accord-
ance with law.
G
A.G. Appeals dismissed.

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