Holding

The FIR is quashed because the predicate offences do not satisfy the statutory definition of anti‑social activity under Section 2(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters & Anti‑Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986.

Summary

The appellants challenged the registration of FIR No.0092/2023 under the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters & Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986, alleging that the three predicate cases cited in the FIR were essentially civil property and monetary disputes. The High Court had dismissed the writ petition and allowed the appellants to seek anticipatory bail, without addressing the merits of the challenge. The Supreme Court examined whether the allegations in the predicate cases fell within the definition of a "gang" and "anti‑social activity" under Section 2(b) of the Act, emphasizing that penal statutes must be strictly construed and that the material must show a real probability of commission of the offences. It held that the cited cases primarily involved civil transactions and lacked the requisite violence, intimidation or public order disturbance contemplated by the Act. Consequently, the Court found the invocation of the Act premature and unjustified, quashing the FIR and setting aside the High Court's order. The appeal was allowed, and the FIR was struck down.

Issues considered

Whether the FIR registered under Sections 2 and 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters & Anti‑Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986, can be quashed on the ground that the predicate offences are civil in nature and do not fall within the definition of a gang under Section 2(b).
Whether the State's discretion to invoke the Gangsters Act is unfettered or must be exercised with strict construction of the statute.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 21
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 395, s. 406, s. 420, s. 427, s. 504, s. 506
Uttar Pradesh Gangsters & Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986s. 2, s. 2(b), s. 2(c), s. 3

Subjects

QuashingSection 2(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters & Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986Invoking the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters & Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986Article 21 of the Constitution of IndiaCivil in natureRight to life and libertyViolenceIntimidationCoercionDisturbing public orderStringent provisionPenal provision, strictly construedCompliance and strict adherenceUnfettered discretionFIR quashed

Judgment

[2025] 3 S.C.R. 65 : 2025 INSC 198

Jay Kishan and Ors.
v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 727 of 2025)
12 February 2025
[Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition
filed by the appellants for quashing the FIR under Sections 2
and 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters & Anti-Social Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1986. FIR against the appellants, if ought to
be quashed.

Headnotes†
Uttar Pradesh Gangsters & Anti-Social Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1986 – ss.2, 3 – Penal Code, 1860 –
ss.420/406/120B/504/395/427/506 – Constitution of India –
Article 21 – The allegations in the Criminal Cases (CCs) cited
in the FIR to invoke the Gangsters Act against the appellants
were civil in nature – FIR against the appellants, if ought to
be quashed:
Held: Yes – Cases cited in the FIR to invoke the Gangsters Act
against the appellants related to certain property and monetary
transactions which were primarily civil in nature – Addition of
various Sections of the IPC in the three CCs may come under
the ambit of the offences specified in s.2(b) of the Gangsters Act
however, mere invocation of certain Sections of the IPC cannot
preclude the Court from lifting the veil to understand what actually
lies beneath the material, which is sought to be made the basis
for invoking the Act – Right to life and liberty guaranteed u/Article
21 cannot be overlooked only because criminal cases have been
registered against a person – Authorities do not have unfettered
discretion to invoke the Gangsters Act – The more stringent or
penal a provision, greater the emphasis and requirement for it

* Author
66 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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to be strictly construed – Compliance and strict adherence mean
that only an eyewash by making allegations with a view to set up
grounds to justify resort to the Act would not suffice – Material(s)
must be available to gauge the probability of commission of the
alleged offence(s) – The CCs do not fall within the net of ‘violence,
or threat or show of violence, or intimidation, or coercion or otherwise
with the object of disturbing public order or of gaining any undue
temporal, pecuniary, material or other advantage’, as mandated
u/s.2(b) of the Gangsters Act – Resort to the Gangsters Act by the
State was premature and uncalled for – FIR quashed – Impugned
judgment set aside. [Paras 23, 24, 26-28]

Case Law Cited
Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [2005] 2 SCR 708 :
(2005) 4 SCC 370; Prem Raj v. Poonamma Menon [2024] 4 SCR
29 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 483; Shraddha Gupta v. State of
Uttar Pradesh [2022] 17 SCR 622 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 514;
Dharmendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 SCC OnLine All
634; Mohammad Wajid v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2023] 11 SCR
313 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951; Md. Rahim Ali @ Abdur Rahim
v. State of Assam [2024] 7 SCR 2329 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC
1695 – referred to.

List of Acts
Uttar Pradesh Gangsters & Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act,
1986; Penal Code, 1860; Constitution of India.

List of Keywords
Quashing; Section 2(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters & Anti-
Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986; Invoking the Uttar Pradesh
Gangsters & Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986; Article
21 of the Constitution of India; Gang; Property and monetary
transactions; Civil in nature; Right to life and liberty; Violence;
Intimidation; Coercion; Disturbing public order; Stringent provision;
Penal provision, Strictly construed; Compliance; Strict adherence;
Invocation of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters & Anti-Social Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1986; Unfettered discretion; Resort to the Uttar
Pradesh Gangsters & Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986;
FIR quashed.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 67

Jay Kishan and Ors. v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
727 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.01.2024 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in CRLMWP No. 19541 of 2023

Appearances for Parties
Ashish Kumar Upadhyay, Anurag Dubey, Meenesh Dubey, Ms.
Anu Sawhney, Ms. Maitri Goal, Ms. Purnima Jain, Satpal Wadhwa,
Bhupendra Kumar Bhardwaj, Ms. Divya Bhardwaj, Advs. for the
Appellants.
Dinesh Kr. Goswami, Sr. Adv., Vishnu Shankar Jain, Parth Yadav,
Ms. Mani Munjal, Ms. Marbiang Khongwir, Yash Giri, Anuj Shukla,
Aditya Giri, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

Heard learned senior counsel/counsel for the parties.
2. Delay condoned.
3. Leave, as prayed for, granted.
4. The present appeal arises out of the Final Judgment and Order dated
17.01.2024 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Judgment”),1
passed by a learned Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature
at Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”) in Criminal
Miscellaneous Writ Petition2 No.19541/2023, whereby the High Court
dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the appellants for quashing the
First Information Report3 being CC4 No.0092 of 2023, under Sections
2 and 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters & Anti-Social Activities

1 2024:AHC:8159:DB.
2 Abbreviated to “CRLMWP”.
3 Abbreviated to “FIR”.
4 Abbreviation for “Case Crime”.
68 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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(Prevention) Act, 1986, (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) lodged
at Police Station - Bamrauli Katara, District - Agra, Uttar Pradesh.

BACKGROUND:
5. The FIR impugned before the High Court came to be registered
against the appellants at the instance of the Station House Officer,
Police Station - Bamrauli Katara on 26.11.2023 alleging, inter alia,
that the appellants, being members of a gang led by Appellant
No.15 were involved in the following three criminal cases: (1) CC
No.119/2022 under Sections 395/427/506 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860;6 (2) CC No.58/2023 under Sections 420/406/120B/504/506 of
the IPC, and; (3) CC No.60/2023 under Sections 120B/420/406/506
of the IPC. Thus, they were liable to be prosecuted for the offences
punishable under the Act.
6. The FIR further narrated that the gang had a criminal history and
with a view to impose a restriction on the activities of the said gang,
the FIR was being registered after obtaining prior approval of the
Gang Chart from the Commissioner of Police, Agra.
7. The appellants assailed the FIR by way of the captioned criminal writ
petition before the High Court on the premise that three predicate
FIRs are related to the property dispute between two families and
the allegations made are civil in nature and hence, the proceedings
under the Act were liable to be quashed.
8. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition and granted liberty to apply
for anticipatory bail/bail, while clarifying that it had not adjudicated
the contentions raised therein.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANTS:
9. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the allegations in
the CCs, basis which provisions of the Act had been invoked against
the appellants, were civil in nature. It was urged that the allegations
therein did not relate to any anti-social activity, and that a purely civil
dispute was being given a criminal colour by the de-facto complainant.
As an example, it was submitted that for the same property and on

5 Hereinafter referred to as “A1”.
6 Hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 69

Jay Kishan and Ors. v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.

the same cause of action, despite Civil Suit No.1380/2022 pending,
CC No.60/2023 has been registered against the appellants.
10. Learned counsel further submitted that CC No.58/2023 was lodged
by Respondent No.57 alleging that he wanted to purchase the land
of the appellants and had paid an advance amount of Rs.54,00,000/-
(Rupees Fifty-Four Lakhs) to the appellants, however, the appellants
refused to execute the Sale Deed in his favour. The appellants
refuted such allegation and countered that sale consideration was
in fact decided as Rs.1,54,40,000/- (Rupees One Crore Fifty-Four
Lakhs and Forty Thousand). As R5 paid only Rs.54,00,000/- (Rupees
Fifty-Four Lakhs) and wanted to pay the balance amount later, hence
the Sale Deed was not executed. The Police’s Inquiry Report also
finds that the sale did not get completed due to non-payment of full
consideration. It was stated that appellants are ready to return the
advance payment, and that a Civil Suit filed by the appellants with
respect to this very transaction is pending.
11. Apropos CC No.60/2023, learned counsel submitted that this case
was lodged by R5’s wife alleging that the appellants executed
Exchange Deed dated 10.01.2023 with her for exchange of
properties. However, she later found out that with regard to the same
property, the appellants had already executed an Agreement to Sell
in favour of one Mr. Sunil Sharma. To this, the appellants contend
that the Exchange Deed has been fully implemented. The informant
therein viz. R5’s wife and the appellants have taken possession and
acquired title of the lands allocated to them, respectively, under the
Exchange Deed. It was stated that the Agreement to Sell supra has
been cancelled through a duly executed and registered Cancellation
Deed.
12. Learned counsel stressed that CC No.119/2022 was lodged under
Sections 395/427/506 of the IPC by one Imran Khan, who is R5’s
henchman, alleging that he was a tenant of one Gayatri Devi
(A1’s mother) on a piece of land and later he purchased the said
property from another Gayatri Devi (a different lady with the same
name as A1’s mother). However, subsequently, Gayatri Devi (A1’s
mother) and the appellants allegedly came and took away some

7 Hereinafter referred to as “R5”.
70 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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of Imran Khan’s belongings and destroyed some structures on the
property. The appellants counter this version by contending that
the land in question is owned by A1’s mother Gayatri Devi. The
tenant/informant, in an attempt to grab the land, at R5’s behest,
it is urged, manufactured a Sale Deed in his favour executed by
a different Gayatri Devi. It is advanced that CC No.119/2022 was
lodged to pre-empt any action from the appellants to take back this
land (owned by A1’s mother) from the tenant/informant Imran Khan
or demand rent for occupation thereof. The appellants have filed
a suit against the different Gayatri Devi who allegedly executed
a Sale Deed in favour of the tenant/informant, which is pending
adjudication. However, during investigation, the Police have dropped
the charge u/s 395 of the IPC.
13. Learned counsel for the appellants summed up his arguments by
stating that the predicate offences alleged in the FIR under challenge
cannot be termed as anti-social activity as they involve cases of civil
nature and between two families. It was canvassed that the present
case is a blatant example of misuse, by the State, of the provisions
of the Act, which has been enacted to control criminal gangs from
terrorizing the public and/or disturbing public peace and tranquillity.

SUBMISSIONS BY RESPONDENTS NO.1, 2 AND 3:
14. Learned counsel for the Respondents No.1, 2 and 3 (State of Uttar
Pradesh and its officers) submitted that the three appellants are
hardened criminals and are running a gang. It was stated that they
are involved in various criminal activities like extortion, fraudulent
property dealings, goondaism, etc. They intimidate innocent and
law-abiding persons of the area. The Commissioner of Police based
on the materials available granted approval for registering the FIR
against the appellants. It was pointed out that a Gang Chart as
required under the Act has been prepared and approved by the
Commissioner of Police, Agra.
15. Learned counsel concluded by submitting that the High Court has
rightly dismissed the CRLMWP as the correctness of allegations needs
to be tested based on the materials collected through investigation.
As in the case at hand, investigation is ongoing, the FIR registered
against the appellants cannot be quashed at a nascent stage.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 71

Jay Kishan and Ors. v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.

SUBMISSIONS BY RESPONDENT NO.5:
16. Learned counsel for R5 submitted that the predicate offences in CCs
No.58/2023, 60/2023 and 119/2022, clearly disclose commission
of cognizable criminal offences and cannot be said to be civil in
nature. The appellants, individually as well as collectively, have used
violence, threat and coercion, with the object of disturbing the public
order and for gaining pecuniary advantage for themselves. It was
submitted that the appellants have indulged in anti-social activities.
17. Further, learned counsel urged that the Civil Suit does not exonerate
the appellants from criminal liability. It was urged that in Iqbal Singh
Marwah v Meenakshi Marwah (2005) 4 SCC 370 and Prem Raj
v Poonamma Menon, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 483, this Court very
expressly laid down the law that there is no bar on a Civil Court
to consider the evidence led in criminal proceedings. It has been
informed that another case i.e., CC No.74/2023 dated 27.09.2023
has also been lodged against the appellants by Imran Khan.
18. It was canvassed that the provisions of the Act are to ensure that
the offences under the Act should be given preference and should
be tried expeditiously and that too, by the Special Courts, to achieve
the object and purpose of the enactment of the Act. Grant of any
sort of relief, submitted learned counsel, to the appellants would
amount to undoing the efforts taken by the State as well as the
victims concerned in trying to bring the appellants’ gang to task. It
was impressed that interference by this Court at this stage would
result in a huge setback to the cause of justice.
19. It was contended that even one single case against the person
concerned can make him liable to be charged under the Act, as held
by this Court in Shraddha Gupta v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2022
SCC OnLine SC 514. A decision of the Allahabad High Court viz.
Dharmendra v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 SCC OnLine All 634
was cited to submit that the law and procedure regarding invocation
of the Act have been duly complied with, in the present case.

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
20. At the outset, it would be useful to reproduce Sections 2(b) and (c)
of the Act, which read as under:
72 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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‘2. In this Act,-
xxx
(b) “Gang” means a group of persons, who acting either
singly or collectively, by violence, or threat or show of
violence, or intimidation, or coercion or otherwise with the
object of disturbing public order or of gaining any undue
temporal, pecuniary, material or other advantage for himself
or any other person, indulge in anti-social activities, namely-
(i) offences punishable under Chapter XVI, or Chapter
XVII, or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code, or
(ii) distilling or manufacturing or storing or transporting or
importing or exporting or selling or distributing any liquor,
or intoxicating or dangerous drugs, or other intoxicants
or narcotics or cultivating any plant, in contravention of
any of the provisions of the U.P. Excise Act, 1910 or the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
or any other law for the time being in force, or
(iii) occupying or taking possession of immovable property
otherwise than in accordance with law, or setting-up false
claims, for title or possession of immovable property
whether in himself or any other person, or
(iv) preventing or attempting to prevent any public servant
or any witness from discharging his lawful duties, or
(v) offences punishable under the Suppression of Immoral
Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, or
(vi) offences punishable under Section 3 of the Public
Gambling Act, 1867, or
(vii) preventing any person from offering bids in auction
lawfully conducted, or tender, lawfully invited, by or on
behalf of any Government department, local body or public
or private undertaking, for any lease or rights or supply of
goods or work to be done, or
(viii) preventing or disturbing the smooth running by
any person of his lawful business, profession, trade
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 73

Jay Kishan and Ors. v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.

or employment or any other lawful activity connected
therewith, or
(ix) offences punishable under Section 171-E of the Indian
Penal Code, or in preventing or obstructing any public
election being lawfully held, by physically preventing the
voter from exercising his electoral rights, or
(x) inciting others to resort to violence to disturb communal
harmony, or
(xi) creating panic, alarm or terror in public, or
(xii) terrorising or assaulting employees or owners or
occupiers of public or private undertakings or factories and
causing mischief in respect of their properties, or
(xiii) inducing or attempting to induce any person to go
to foreign countries on false representation that any
employment, trade or profession shall be provided to him
in such foreign country, or
(xiv) kidnapping or abducting any person with intent to
extort ransom, or
(xv) diverting or otherwise preventing any aircraft or public
transport vehicle from following its scheduled course;
(xvi) offences punishable under the Regulation of Money
Lending Act, 1976;
(xvii) illegally transporting and/or smuggling of cattle and
indulging in acts in contravention of the provisions in the
Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955 and the Prevention
of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960;
(xviii) human trafficking for purposes of commercial
exploitation, bonded labour, child labour, sexual exploitation,
organ removing and trafficking, beggary and the like
activities;
(xix) offences punishable under the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act, 1966;
(xx) printing, transporting and circulating of fake Indian
currency notes;
74 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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(xxi) involving in production, sale and distribution of
spurious drugs;
(xxii) involving in manufacture, sale and transportation of
arms and ammunition in contravention of Sections 5, 7
and 12 of the Arms Act, 1959;
(xxiii) felling or killing for economic gains, smuggling of
products in contravention of the Indian Forest Act, 1927
and The Wildlife Protection Act, 1972;
(xxiv) offences punishable under the Entertainment and
Betting Tax Act, 1979;
(xvv) indulging in crimes that impact security of State,
public order and even tempo of life.
(c) “gangster” means a member or leader or organiser of
a gang and includes any person who abets or assists in
the activities of a gang enumerated in clause (b), whether
before or after the commission of such activities or harbours
any person who has indulged in such activities;’
21. The above definitions are exhaustive.
22. However, the answer to the moot question would lie in the
interpretation accorded to the definitions supra in conformity with
the object and intent of the Act. This would have to be examined in
juxtaposition with the FIR.
23. Scrutiny of the cases cited in the FIR to invoke the Act against the
appellants prima facie reveal that the same substantially relate to
and/or emanate from certain property and monetary transactions.
The said transactions are primarily civil in nature. No doubt, addition
of various Sections of the IPC in the three CCs may come under the
ambit of the offences specified in Section 2(b) of the Act. However,
undoubtedly, mere invocation of certain Sections of the IPC could not
and would not preclude the Court from, in a manner of speaking, lifting
the veil, to understand what actually lies beneath the material, which
is sought to be made the basis for invoking the Act. In Mohammad
Wajid v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951, this
Court stated:
‘34. At this stage, we would like to observe something
important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 75

Jay Kishan and Ors. v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.

invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the
FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the
ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or
vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes
a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more
closely. We say so because once the complainant decides
to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive
for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would
ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all
the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure
that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such
that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute
the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough
for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/
complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether
the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence
are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings,
the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending
circumstances emerging from the record of the case over
and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and
circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court
while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself
only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into
account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/
registration of the case as well as the materials collected
in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case
on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period
of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the
registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby
attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private
or personal grudge as alleged.’
(emphasis supplied)

24. Our reference supra to lifting the veil finds resonance in the ‘read
in between the lines’ approach adverted to in Mohammad Wajid
76 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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(supra). Ultimately, the right to life and liberty guaranteed under Article
218 of the Constitution of India cannot be overlooked only due to the
reason that criminal cases have been registered against a person.
It would be plainly unwise to accord any unfettered discretion to the
authorities concerned when it comes to invoking the Act. The more
stringent or penal a provision, greater the emphasis and requirement
for it to be strictly construed. In Md. Rahim Ali @ Abdur Rahim v
State of Assam, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1695, it was stated:
‘45. The debate has long been settled that penal statutes must
be construed strictly [Tolaram Relumal v. State of Bombay (1954)
1 SCC 961 : (1955) 1 SCR 158 at Para 8; Krishi Utpadan Mandi
Samiti v. Pilibhit Pantnagar Beej Ltd. (2004) 1 SCC 391 at Paras
57-58; Govind Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Appropriate Authority, Income
Tax Dept. (2011) 1 SCC 529 at Para 11, and; Commissioner of
Customs (Import), Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar & Company (2018) 9
SCC 1 at Para 24]. Equally, ‘If special provisions are made in
derogation to the general right of a citizen, the statute, in our
opinion, should receive strict construction. …’ …’9
(emphasis supplied)

25. Compliance and strict adherence mean that only an eyewash by
making allegations with a view to set up grounds to justify resort to
the Act would not suffice. Material(s) must be available to gauge the
probability of commission of the alleged offence(s). Necessarily, this
would have to be of a level higher than being merely presumptive.
We have perused the FIR-CC 92 of 2023, certain extracts from the
English translation whereof read as under:
‘…giving illusion of selling his plot, committing treachery,
to extort money and land, amassing illegal money, for
deriving unfair financial physical benefits through unfair
means, earn money through anti-social activities with
which they maintain them and their families. There is fear
and terror of them in general public. Due to their fear and

8 ‘21. Protection of life and personal liberty.—No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to procedure established by law.’
9 The relevant paragraphs from the decisions referred to in this passage, with added emphasis by the
Court, have been duly footnoted in Md. Rahim Ali (supra).
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 77

Jay Kishan and Ors. v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.

terror, no person of public becomes ready to give witness
against them and to resister case… The gang leader
and the members of the gang have committed antisocial
activities. This gang leader and his active members are
involved in committing anti-social activities. Therefore, it is
not justified for the above accused to remain free between
general public. Keeping in view the crimes committed by
them… ’ (sic)
26. While the three CCs find reference in the FIR-CC 92 of 2023, a
glance at the afore-extract would exhibit a certain vagueness. In
our considered opinion, the same would not meet the threshold
requirement to enable recourse to the Act. Obviously, the allegations
in the CCs are yet to be adjudicated finally by a competent court. We
may hasten to add that not for a minute are we to be misunderstood
to mean that the Act cannot be invoked basis pending cases. Of
course, it can be. However, the case(s) against the person(s) qua
whom the Act is to be invoked cannot be run-of-the-mill – it must
be serious. The severity required for the underlying case(s), we
think, ought not to be judicially strait-jacketed as a lot would turn on
the specific peculiarities of each case. The situation would be very
different though, if the allegations levelled in the underlying case(s)
had been proved at trial - it could have been a good ground to
sustain and justify action under the Act. In that scenario, we would
have ordinarily refrained from any interdiction. In the present matter,
for the three CCs, as trial has yet to commence/is continuing/has
not been concluded, for the present, there remain only indications
and open-endedness to the allegations. In other words, in praesenti,
the underlying CCs do not appear to fall within the net of ‘violence, or
threat or show of violence, or intimidation, or coercion or otherwise
with the object of disturbing public order or of gaining any undue
temporal, pecuniary, material or other advantage’, as mandated under
Section 2(b) of the Act. The situation, thus, would clearly operate to
the benefit of the appellants. As the CCs referred to in the FIR are
three, we are not required to deal with Shraddha Gupta (supra).
27. The matter is capable of being looked at from a different lens. The
complainant(s)/informant(s) in the three CCs have resorted to their
remedies under criminal law. In fact, a fourth CC, as informed by
learned counsel for R5, also stands lodged against the appellants.
78 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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Assuming that all the allegations in the three (or four, including the
CC not referred to in the FIR) CCs are correct, there is no mention
of any instance, post-registration of the said CCs, of the appellants
implementing/acting on the said alleged threats. The complainant(s)/
informant(s) have also resorted, where required, to civil proceedings.
In the overall picture that emerges from the above, resort to the Act
by the State seems premature and uncalled for.
28. For the reasons aforesaid, the FIR namely CC No.0092/2023
stands quashed. The Impugned Judgment shall stand set aside.
Proceedings consequential to CC No.0092/2023 stand effaced.
Observations hereinabove are only on the issues arising and are
not definitive re the pending CCs, which shall be dealt with on their
own merits by the courts concerned. We have also not expressed
our mind on the pending civil proceeding(s) between the private
parties inter-se.
29. I.A. 10 No.123849/2024 is allowed. I.A. No.123851/2024 seeks
exemption from filing official translations of certain Annexures11; in
view of final decision, the said I.A. is disposed of as infructuous. I.A.
No.128534/2024 is allowed; permission granted, the Supplementary
Affidavit is taken on record. I.A. Nos.128536/2024, 137817/2024,
150397/2024 and 190824/2024 seek exemptions, respectively, from
filing official translations of documents appended with the concerned
filings – in light of the final disposal of the matter, these applications
are rendered infructuous and stand closed.
30. The appeal stands allowed in the aforesaid terms.
31. SLP (Criminal) Diary No.2673/202312 is pending before a Coordinate
Bench. The petitioner therein is before this Court for quashing of the
FIR invoking the Act against him and other ancillary reliefs. Order
dated 19.04.2024 therein records as under:
‘1. Learned ASG representing the State of Uttar Pradesh
seeks and is granted eight weeks’ time to consider the
desirability of laying down some parameters/guidelines for

10 Abbreviation for Interlocutory Application.
11 P-1, P-2 and P-3.
12 Gorakh Nath Mishra v State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors..
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 79

Jay Kishan and Ors. v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.

the purpose of invoking provisions of the Uttar Pradesh
Gangster and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986.
2. Post the matter on 02.08.2024.’
32. Pursuant to the above, it was noted in Order dated 12.12.2024 that
guidelines had been formulated by the State. We expect the State
machinery to adhere to the guidelines, subject to orders as may be
passed by the Coordinate Bench in seisin.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey