JUGRAJversusSTATE OF PUNJAB

                       [2010] 4 S.C.R. 895


                           JUG RAJ                                 A
                              v.
                      STATE OF PUNJAB
              (Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 2005)
                      JANUARY 27, 2010*
                                                                   B
     [HARJIT SINGH BEDI AND A.K. PATNAIK, JJ.]

    Penal Code, 1860:

      s. 302134 - Murder - Four persons alleged to have shot       c
dead a local MLA - Convictio~f?Ytrial court - Acquittal by
High Court of three of the accused ...:. Observation by High
Court that medical evidence did not support prosecution case
inasmuch as five incised injuries caused to deceased were
inflicted at least two hours after his death and prosecution       D
failed to explain these injuries - HELD: Out of four eye
witnesses only two were examined - Presence of one of the
two witnesses examined seems to be doubtful .... There is delay
in lodging FIR and despatch of special report - Story given
by other eye-witness was concocted to explain the delay in
                                                                   E
lodging FIR - No reference of names of accused in FIR
though one of the eye witnesses• claimed to have come to
know their names during incident - In the circumstances, the
best that can be said for the proseqution is that the matter was
finally determined in the early hours of the following day and
the FIR was thereafter lodged and then ante timed - This           F
appears to be the import of the judgment of High Court as
well - Besides, save for recovery of the gun, which was stated
to have been made pursuant to statement of the appellant,
the evidence with regard to all accused was identical - The
evidence a~ to who fired the gun is ambivalent - Besides, the      G
gun did not belong to the appellant and was not despatched
to Forensic Science Laboratory promptly - In the light of
observations of High Court itself there seems to be uncertainty
* Judgment Recd. on 12.5.2010
                                895                                H
    896     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A with regard to the prosecution case - Cowts below have
    somewhat stretched credibility beyond a point which requires
    interference by this Court - Judgments of courts below set
    aside and appellant acquitted - Delay in lodging FIR and
    despatch of special report as also in despatch of crime
B   weapon to Forensic Science Laboratory ..., Evidence - Non-
    explanation of injuries on deceased caused two hours after
    his death.

        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
C   Appeal No. 594 of 2005.

        From the Judgment & Order dated 7.12.2004 of the High
    Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal
    No. 597 of 2002.

                                WITH
D
          Criminal Appeal No.595 of 2005.

       Anurag Kishore, Abhinav Shrivastava and Kamakshi S.
    Mehlwal for the Appellant.
E         Goodwill lndeevar anri Kuldeep Singh for the Respondent.

          The following Order of the Court was delivered

                                ORDER

F   Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 2005

         1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
    of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dated 7th December,
    2004 whereby the High Court has allowed the appeal of three
G   of the co-accused but has dismissed the appeal of the
    appellant.

          2. The facts of the case are as under:

        2.1. At about 9:00p.m. on the night of December, 1, 1996,
H   Bachhitter Singh, a former member of the Punjab Legislative
            JUGRAJ v. STATE OF PUNJAB                       897


 Assembly representing Kharar constituency was travelling in his A
 jeep on the Landran-Kharar Road along with Sadhu Singh -
 P.W. 2, .Narinder Singh P.W. 5, Gurmail Singh and one Ajit
 Singh Padiala. As they were passing by the warehouses at
 Landran, Bachhitter Singh told Narinder Singh P.W. 5 that as
 the bonnet of the jeep was loose, it should be properly fastened.· B
 On this Narinder Singh stopped the jeep and locked the bonnet
 and then returned to his seat when a Maruti car carrying four
 persons reached there. The driver of the car remained seated
 in the car with the engine on but the three passengers, all Sikh
 boys 20-25 years of age got out. Of the three persons one of C
 them was armed with a .12 bore gun and the other two were
 armed with naked kripans. One of the boys who was armed
 with naked kripan got hold of Narinder Singh P.W. by his neck
 and thereaner gave two blows to Bachhitter Singh on his right
 flank. The second person started grappling with Bachhitter D
 Singh on which the latter stumbled and fell down. The third
person who was armed with a shot gun then fired a shot ihto
the chest and arm of Bachhitter Singh. The assailants then
broke the headlights of the jeep and drove away in their Maruti
car. Sadhu Singh P.W. 2 accompanied by Ajit Singh left the E
site of the incident leaving Narinder Singh and Gurmail Singh
to guard the dea~ body and made their way towards Kharar
Police Station about 8 kms. away but as they reached close
to Swaraj Tractor Factory just short of Kharar they came across
a police Gypsy with S.H.O. Sub-Inspector Rajinder Singh on
patrol duty. The Inspector along with Sadhu Singh and Ajit Singh F
returned to the place of incident and saw Bachhitter Singh lying
dead on which they picked up his body and removed it to the
Kharar Hospital. Sadhu Singh thereafter recorded the First
Information Report at about 11:15p.m. the same night i.e. on
the 1st of December, 1996 in which he did not name any of G
the assailants although he gave their physical description. A
Special Report was allegedly despatched through Constable
Jaspal Singh to the Magistrate shortly after midnight which was
received by P.W. 9- Gurmeet Kaur, Judicial Magistrate, Kharar
at 9:15a.m. on 2nd December, 1996. The Sub Inspector also H
    898      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010) 4 S.C.R.


A   returned to the place of incident on the morning of the 2nd
    December, 1996 to carry out further investigations and
    amongst other items picked up two empty .12 bore shells and
    a piece of a broken sling of a shot gun and these were duly
    deposited in the Malkhana and subsequently despatched to the
B   Forensic Science Laboratory. He also recorded the statements
    of the eye witnesses including Narinder Singh -P.W. 5. In the
    meanwhile, it appears that the accused made extra judicial·
    confessions to P.W. 6 and P.W. 7 Kuljeet Singh and Kuldip
    Singh respectively and Jugraj Singh appellant also made a
C   disclosure statement which led to the recovery of the .12. bore
    gyn allegedly used in the murder. It transpired after investigation
    that this weapon belonged to Gurmail Singh, Jugraj Singh's first
    cousin and he too was prosecuted for offences punishable
    under Sections 29 and 30 of Arms Act and was duly convicted
D   and has already undergone the sentence as of now. The
    Forensic Science Laboratory in its Report opined that the two
    spent cartridges recovered from the place of incident had been
    fired from the gun in question. The trial court in its judgment
    dated 13th August, 2002, held that the statements of Sadhu
E   Singh P.W. 2 and Narinder Singh P.W. 5 inspired confidence,
    that there was no delay in the lodging of the FIR and if there
    was any it had been explained by the pro.secution, that the
    refusal of the accused to join the identification parade was a
    point to be taken against them as there was no evidence to
F   suggest that they had been shown to the witnesses prior to the
    proposed identification parade and that the extra judicial
     confessions made to P.W. 6 and P.W. 7 further corroborated
    the prosecution story. The trial court accordingly convicted and
     sentenced the accused as under:-

G         (i) Jugraj Singh, Kulwinder Singh, Kuljit Singh and
          lnderpreet Singh were sentenced to undergo imprisonment
          for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each for the offence
          under Section 302/34 and in default of payment of fine to
          further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of four
H         years each.
            JUGRAJ v. STATE OF PUNJAB                         899


     (ii) Jugraj Singh, Kuljit Singh, Kulwinder Singh and           A
     lnderpreet Singh were also sentenced to undergo rigorous
     imprisonment for a period of two years each under Section
     324/34 of the IPC.

           (iii) Jugraj was sentenced to undergo rigorous            8
     imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine
     of Rs. 1,000/- under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 and
     in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous
     imprisonment for four months. It was also directed that all
     the sentences would run concurrently.
                                           ~                        c
     2.2. An appeal was thereafter taken to the High Court. The
High Court by the impugned judgment dated 7th December,
2004 allowed the appeal of Kuldip Singh, Kulwinder Singh and
lnderpreet Singh and dismissed the appeal filed by the present
appellant Jugraj Singh. In arriving at its decision, the High Court · D
observed that the medical evidence did not support the
prosecution story inasmuch as the five incised injuries caused
to the deceased were inflicted at least two hours after his death
and not immediately after he had sustained the gun shot injuries
and that the prosecution had not been -able to explain the E
presence of these injuries, despite the fact that Gurmail Singh
and Narinder Singh had been left behind to guard the spot after
Sadhu Singh had left for the police.station to report the murder.
The High Court also held that the statements of Kuldip Singh,
P.W. 6 with regard to the extra judicial confession of Jugraj and F
Kulwinder Singh and of Ajit Singh P.W. 7 with respect to Kuljit
Singh and lnderpreet Singh could not be believed and the story
projected by them appeared to be a concocted one. The Court,
however, held that the recovery of the gun from Jugraj Singh
appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 595 of 2005 which had been G
preceded by a disclosure statement was a material
circumstance against him and the fact that the portion of the
sling which had been broken off from the main part of the gun
had been found by the Forensic Science Laboratory to be of
the same make and quality, was positive corraboration that the H
    900      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 4 S.C.R


A person who had shot the deceased was indeed Jugraj Singh.
  The Court then examined the circumstances with regard to the
  other three accused and found that there were no corroborating
  evidence to supplement the statements of the two eye
  witnesses with regard to their involvement and in conclusion
B observed as under:-

                 "Our conclusion is irresistible that the matter was
          reported to the police some time at night but the case was
          finalized in the early hours on December 2, 1996,
          whereafter the special report was delivered to the
c         Magistrate at 9:15a.m. The deceased had a gun shot injury
          on his chest with two corresponding exist wounds but no
          ante:mortem kirpan injuries. The post-mortem nature of the
          wounds as described by the Medical Board was such that
          they had been inflicted at least two hours after Bachhitter
D         Singh had died, not immediately after the gun shot injuries.
          However, the above glaring defects in the prosecution case
          do not compel us to hold that Sadhu singh (P.W. 2) and
          Narinder Singh (P.W. 5) did not witness the occurrence.
          These two witnesses had accompanied the deceased in
E         his jeep and did not witness the occurrence although their
          version was exaggerated and they had included Kulwinder
          Singh, Kuljit Singh and lnderpreet Singh also as accused.
          The recovery of the kirpans from Kulwinder Singh and
          Kuljit Singh and the car from lnderpreet Singh did not
F         establish that they had also participated with Jugraj Singh
          in committing ;the murder of Bachhitter Singh."

         3. We have heard the. learned counsel for the parties at
    length in the appeal before us.
G     4. We find that out of the four eye witnesses only Sadhu
  Singh P.W. 2 and Narinder Singh P.W. 5 had been examined.
  Admittedly, Sadhu Singh P.W. 2, the author of the FIR did not
  know the accused by name or by face and had only given
  general descriptions as to their identities or features. Narinder
H Singh, P.W. 5, was however, very clear in his evidence when
             JUGRAJ v. STATE OF PUNJAB                       901


 he stated that he knew the names of the accused as they were A
 calling out to each other by their pet names during the cour~e
 of the entire incident. It has come in evidence that when Sadhu
 Singh had made his way to the Police Station to record the FIR,
 Narinder Singh P.W. 5 had also been present at that time. In
 this view of the matter, there appears to be some merit in the B
 stand of the counsel for the appellant that had Narinder Singh
 been present at the place of incident or at the time of the
 recording of the FIR the names of the accused would have
 figured in the FIR itself. In this background, the delay in the
 lodging of the FIR and the delivery of the Special Report          c
 becomes significant. It is the admitted position that the incident
 happened at 9:00p.m., on the 1st of December, 1996 on the
 Landran-Kharar road about 8 kms. short of Kharar. Sadhu
 Singh had been at pains to say that he had to walk the distance
 of 8 kms: as th~ jeep had refused to start. Narinder Singh, P. W. .
                                                                     0
the driver of the jeep too had stated likewise but they were
confronted with their police statements where they had made
 no such claim. We are of the opinion that the story given by
 Sadhu Singh was concocted to explain, to a small extent, the
delay in the lodging of the FIR. Be that as it may, even on
admitted facts, the SHO, Rajinder Singh had reached the place E
of incident at about 9:30 or 1O:OOp.m. and the hospital at Kharar
a short time later and the party had then moved on to the police
station about% km. away from the hospital where the FIR had
been recorded at about 11:15p.m. With the Special Report
being delivered within Kharar itself at 9:15a.m. the next day as F
per the statement of Ms. Gurmee.et Kaur, the Judicial
Magistrate. The prosecution, has, however, doubted the veracity
of the statement of the Magistrate on the basis of the affidavit
sworn by Constable Jaspal Singh who deposed that the copies
of the Special Report had bee11 handed over to him shortly after G
mid night and he had taken a copy first to the SSP, Ropar and
to the Circle Officer Ropar about 35 kms. away and then
returned to Kharar and handed over the report to the Magistrate
at 3:30a.m. - a fact which has been denied by Ms. Gurmeet
Kaur. It is, therefore, obvious that the best that can be said for H
    902     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [20'10] 4 S.C.R

A   the prosecution is that the matter had been finally determined
    in the early hours of 2nd December, 1996 and the FIR had
    thereafter been lodged and then ante timed. This appears to
    be the import of the judgment of the High Court as well.

          5. There is another significant circumstance in the
8
    prosecution story. It is the case of the prosecution that two shots
    had been fired at Bachhitter Singh which caused his immediate
    death. The Doctor, however, found five incised post mortem
    injuries on the dead body as well. No explanation is forthcoming
C   as to how these had been caused inasmuch as that the dead
    body had not remained unguarded even for a moment and
    though Sadhu Singh had left for the police station, Narinder
    Singh P.W. 5 and Gurmail Singh P.W. 2 had been left b_ehind
    to guard the site and that the SHO Rajinder Singh had reached
    the spot within an hour or two as per the prosecution version.
D   We are further of the opinion that save for the recovery of the
    gun, the evidence with regard to all the accused was identical.
    The High Court has in its judgment clearly recognised this fact
    and has given clear and precise findings (quoted above), but
    nevertheless dismissed the appeal of Jugraj Singh while
E   acquitting the other three accused on the identical evidence.

         6. Mr. Kuldip Singh the learned counsel for the State, has
    however, submitted that the fact that the gun had been
    recovered at the instance of Jugraj Singh and that the empty
F   shells had been found to match the gun was a circumstance in
    favour of the prosecution. It is true that the Report of the
    Forensic Science Laboratory does indicate that the cartridges
    had been fired from the gun. The question is as to who had fired
    the gun and to our mind the evidence on this is ambivalent. It
G   must also be seen that the empty cartridges had been
    despatched to the Forensic Science Laboratory on the 4th
    December, 1996 and the gun recovered a day later on the
    basis of the disclosure statement made by Jugraj Singh, had
    been despatched to the Forensic Science Laboratory on the
    12th of December. We are unable to understand as to why the
H
            JUGRAJ v. STATE OF PUNJAB                        903


gun had not been despatched more promptly._ Even otherwise,         A
a connection between Jugraj Singh and the gun could have
been found had it been said that he was the owner thereof.
Incidentally, this is not the case as the gun was admittedly
owned by Gurdeep Singh who was prosecuted, convicted and
sentenced under Sections 29 and 30 of th Arms Act and his           B
appeal is also before us today which we are told would be
infructuous in a manner as he has already undergone his
sentence. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in the light of
the observations of the High Court itself there seems to be
uncertainty with regard to the prosecution story and the courts     c
below had somewhat stretched its credibility beyond a point
which requires that we should interfere in the matter.

     7. We, accordingly, allow the appeal, set aside'the
judgment of the trial court as well as the High Court and acquit
the appellant. He shall be released from custody forthwith if not   D
wanted in any other case.

    8. Criminal Appeal No. 595 of 2005 filed by Gurdeep
Singh is dismissed as having becomes infructuous as the
appellant has already served the sentence.

R.P.                                     Appeals disposed of.
                           [2010] 4 S.C.R. 904


A                        R. HANUMAIAH & ANR.
                                       v.
         SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA
               REVENUE DEPARTMENT & ORS.
             (Civil Appeal Nos. 1588-1589 of 2008)
B
                          FEBRUARY 24, 2010*
        [R.V. RAVEENDRAN AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]

          Suit:
c
        Suit for declaration of title and injunction - Plaintiffs
  claiming to be owners of the suit land - Reliance placed on
  various documents - Trial court decreeing the suit - High
  Court setting aside the decree - On appeal, held: The suit
D land was a Government land - The land was not subjected
  to any land revenue - Documents relied on, do not establish
  title of the plaintiffs on the lands - Mysore Revenue Manual
  - Paras 236 and 376 - Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1961
  - s. 67.
E
        Suit for declaration of title - Against Government and
    against private individual - Difference between - discussed.

         Suit for declaration of title against Government - Grant
    of decree - Criteria for - Discussed.
F
        Suit for declaration of title against Government - Onus
  to prove title - Held: It is for the claimants to establish their
  title to suit properties - Weakness of Government's defence
  or absence of contest, are not sufficient to decree declaratory
G suits against the Government.

        Adverse possession - Right adverse to the Government
    - Claim of - Held: To claim adverse possession, claimant's

    •    judgment Recd. on 24.4.2010
H                                      904
 R. HANUMAIAH v. SEC. TO GOVT. OF KARNATAKA 905
                      REV. DEPTI..
possession should be actual, open and visible, hostile to the A
owner and continued during entire period necessary to create
bar under the law of limitation.

      Appellant-plaintiffs filed the present suit for
 declara'ffon of title and consequential relief of permanent 8
 injunction in respect of the suit land (Survey Nos. 30 and
 31 ), against the respondent-defendants. Appellants
 claimed to be owners of a tank in Survey No. 30 and a
 barren land in Survey No. 31. They claimed that the ·suit
.land was part of the land owned by their ancestors, and c
 they were in continuous possession of the suit land as
 owners. The app~llants filed a suit for permanent
 injunction when City Improvement Trusts Board
 attempted to interfere with their possession of the tank
 (Survey No. 30). Subsequently the present suit was filed
                                                              0
 wherein the appellants-plaintiff claimed title over the suit
 land Survey Nos. 30 and 31, placing reliance on Exs. P1,
 P2, P10, P11, P12 and P18. During pendency of the
.present suit, first suit was dismissed. Appeal against the
 order was also dismissed by High Court observing that E
 the judgment would not affect the pending (present) suit.
 Plea of the respondent-defendants w_as that Survey
 No.30 was a Government tank shown as Kharab land in
 the revenue records and Survey No. 31 was also a
 governrrient barren land shown in revenue records as F
 Government Kharab land.
                                                                  ~·   .
     Trial court decreed the suit holding that appellants
had made out their possession and title with regard to the
suit property. High.Court, in appeal, set aside the decree.
Hence the present appeals.                                  G

     Dismissing the appeals, the Court

   HELD: 1.1. The appellants were not registered as the
owners or khatedars or occupiers of the suit lands in any H
    906     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010) 4 $.C.R.


A revenue records. They did not have any document of title
  referring to the suit properties. The appellants did not
  have possession. Even assuming that the tank in Survey
  No. 30 was repaired/ maintained by the ancestors of
  plaintiff at some point of time, there is no document to
B show that the tank was used, maintained or repaired by
  the appellants or their predecessors during more than half
  a century before the filing of the suit. The suit has to fail.
  (Para 21) (926-B-D]

c        1.2. The High Court, being the first appellate court is
    the final court of fact. It has, after examining the evidence
    exhaustively recorded a finding that the appellants have
    not established their title or possession. There is no error
    in the findings and conclusions of the High Court. The
0   appellants who came to court claiming title, not having
    established title, their suit is liable to be dismissed. [Para
    19] [925-D-E]

        2.1. Suits for decfaration of title against the
  Government, though similar to suits for declaration of title
E against private individuals differ significantly in some
  aspects. The first difference is in regard to the
  presumption available in favour of the Government. All
  lands which are not the property. of any person or which
  are not vested in a local authority, belong to the
F Government. All unoccupied lands are the property of the
  Government, unless any person can establish his right
  or title to any such land. This presumption available to
  the Government, is not available to any person or
  individual. The second difference is in regard to the
G period for which title and/or possession have to be
  established by a person suing for declaration of title.
  Establishing title/possession for a period exceeding
  twelve years may be adequate to establish title in a
  declaratory suit against any individual. On the other hand,
H title/possession for a period exceeding thirty years will
 R. HANUMAIAH v. SEC. TO GOVT OF KARNATAKA 907
                    REV. DEPTT.
have to be established to succeed in a declaratory suit A
for title against Government. This follows from Article 112
of Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a longer period
of thirty years as limitation in regard to suits by
Government as against the period of 12 years for suits
by private individuals. The reason is obvious. B
Government properties are spread over the entire State
and it is not always possible for the Government to
protect or safeguard its properties from encroachments.
Many a time, its own officers who are expected to protec~
its properties and maintain proper records, either due to c
negligence or collusion, create entries in records to help
private parties, to lay claim of ownership or possession
against the Government. Any loss of Government
property is ultimately the loss to the community. Courts
owe a duty to be vigilant to ensure that public property D
is not converted into private property by unscrupulous
elements. [Para 15] [921-G-H; 922-A-E]

     2.2. Many civil courts deal with suits for declaration
of title and injunction against Government, in a casual· E
manner, ignoring or overlooking the special features
relating to Government properties. Instances of such
suits against Government being routinely decreed, either
ex parte or for want of proper contest, merely acting upon
the oral assertions of plaintiffs or stray revenue entries F
are common. Whether the Government contests the suit
or not, before a suit for declaration of title against a
Government is decreed, the plaintiff should establish,
either his title .by producing the title deeds which
satisfactorily trace title for a minimum period of thirty G
years prior to the date of the suit (except where title is
claimed with reference to a grant or transfer by the
Government or a statutory development authority), or by
establishing adverse possession for a period of more
than thirty years. In such suits, courts cannot, ignoring H
    908    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A the presumptions available in favour of the Government,
  grant declaratory or injunctive decrees against the
  Government by relying upon one of the principles
  underlying pleadings that plaint averments which are not
  denied or traversed are deemed to have been accepted
B or admitted. [Para 16] [922-G-H; 923-A-B]

        2.3. Section 67 of K~rnataka Land Revenue Act, 1961
    declares that all tanks and all lands which are not the
    property of any person are the property of the State
c   Government. Weakness of Government's defence or
    absence of contest, are not therefore sufficient to decree
    declaratory suits against the Government. It is for the
    appellants to establish their title to the suit properties.
    [Para 18] [924-E; 925-B-C]
D      2.4. A court should necessarily seek an answer to the
  following question, before it grants a decree declaring title
  against the Government : whether the plaintiff has
  produced title deeds tracing the title for a period of more
  than thirty years; or whether the plaintiff has established
E his adverse possession to the knowledge of the
  Government for a period of more than thirty years, so as
  to convert his possession into title. Incidental to that
  question, the court should also find out whether the
  plaintiff is recorded to be the owner or holder or
F occupant of the property in the Revenue Records or
  Municipal Records, for more than thirty years, and what
  is the nature of possession claimed by the plaintiff, if he
  is in possession - authorized or unauthorized;
  permissive; casual and occasional; furtive and
G clandestine; open, continuous and hostile; deemed or
  implied (following a title). [Para 16] [923-C-E]

      2.5. Mere temporary use or occupation without the
  animus to claim ownership or mere use at sufferance will
H not be sufficient to create any right adverse to the
 R. HANUMAIAH v. SEC. TO GOVT. OF KARNATAKA 909
                      REV. DEPTT.

Government. In order to oust or defeat the title of the          A
Government, a claimant has to establish a clear title which
is superior to or better than the title of the Government
or establish perfection of title by adverse possession for
a period of more than thirty years with the knowledge of
the Government. To claim adverse possession, the                 B
possession of the claimant must be actual, open and
visible, hostile to the owner (and therefore necessarily
with the knowledge of the owner) and continued during
the entire period necessary to create a bar under the law
of limitation. In short, it should be adequate in continuity,    C
publicity and in extent. Mere vague or doubtful assertions
that the claimant has been in adverse possession will not
be sufficient. Unexplained stray or sporadic entries for a
year or for a few years will not be sufficient and should
be ignored. By its very nature, a claim based on adverse         D
possession requires clear and categorical pleadings and
evidence, much more so, if it is against the Government.
[Para 17] [923-F-H; 924-A-B]
              /
On facts:
                                                                 E
     3.1. Exhibit P18 is an extract of the register
maintained by the Public Works Department showing the
details of tanks in Bangalore Division. The said extract
is in respect of Serial No.279 from the said register relating
to a tank described as 'Maistry Kere' or 'Maistry Pa/yada        F
Kere' in Jakkasandra village,_ the extent of the water body
being 11 acres. The name of the tank is followed by the
word 'private' in the register an!:! gives particulars of the
Achkat area of the tank (that is area of land irrigated by
the said tank) in the year 1906-07. The appellants took the      G
plea that the description of the tank as 'private' in the
Tank Register would demonstrate that the tank did not
belong to the Government and that it was privately
owned. The High Court however held that the mere use
of the word 'private' after the description of the tank, will    H
    910    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A not establish appellant's title or possession in regard to
  Survey No.30. [Para 5] [916-E-G]

       3.2. A reading of Para 376 of the Mysore Revenue
  Manual shows that a private tank can be constructed by
8 a private individual, either in his own land or on
  Government unoccupied land. It also shows that private
  individuals may restore Government tanks. Therefore it
  follows that when a tank is described as 'private' in the
  Tank Register, that by itself will not establish that the land
c where the tank is situated is private land. When a tank
  enumerated in the Tank Register maintained by the
  Government, adds to the description of the tank, by the
  word 'private', it merely shows that the tank in question
  had been constructed by a private individual but it does
D not lead to the inference that the land on which the tank
  is constructed belonged to a private individual. [Para 7]
  [917-G-H; 918-A-B]

         3.3. Para 236 of the Manual shows that a private land
    on being converted into a private tank would not get full
E   exemption or remission from payment of land
    assessment, but was extended only a partial remission.
    In fact, if a tank was constructed on a private land, the
    land would be continued to be assessed to land revenue
    with appropriate partial remission. On the other hand, if
F   it is a Government unoccupied land on which a private
    individual is permitted to construct the tank, it will
    continue to be shown as Government Kharab land and
    will not be subj~cted to any land revenue. In this case
    neither Survey N'p.30 nor Survey No.31 is assessed to
G   land revenue and are shown as Government Kharab land
    in all revenue records (vide Ex. 07, 08, 09, 010, 011 and
    012). Unarable lands including tanks are described as
    Phut Kharab. The Tank register extract (Ex.015) and
    other documents produced by respondents show that
H   the tank was breached and BOA had formed a layout in
 R. HANUMAIAH v. SEC. TO GOVT. OF KARNATAKA 911
                     REV. DEPTI.
 a major portion of the tank land and the remaining area A
was being developed into a park by the Forest
 Department. Therefore, Ex. P18 proves that Survey No.30
was not a land owned by a private individual and that it
belonged to Government. [Para 8) [918-C-F]
                                                             B
      3.4. Ex. P1 which is an extract of Phut Pahani
(Inspection Statement showing the old survey numbers
and corresponding new numbers of lands and full
information regarding tenure and occupancy of the land,
described in the Mysore Revenue Manual), did not relate C
to nor provide proof of ownership of any land. Ex.P1
merely disclosed that when it was inspected on 18.6.1871,
survey no.25 of Jakkasandra measuring 10 acres 28
guntas was a tank and that it was repaired by
predecessor of appellant. This document therefore does
                                                             0
not help the appellants to prove title of their predecessor
to the tank. Unless the title to the land on which the tank
is situated is established, the mere fact that the tank was
shown to have been maintained or repaired by any private
individual will not make him the owner of the tank. At best E
it will show that the tank was maintained by him as a
private tank for the purpose of irrigation. [Para 10) [919-.
D-F]

     3.5. Ex.P2 (settlement deed) does not refer to the
tank. It does not give the total extent of the land. It does F
not disclose whether Survey. Nos. 30 and 31 formed part
of Da/avai Dinne owned by the ancestors of appellants at
any point of time. The settlement deed merely shows that
the predecessor of the appellants had settled certain land,
known as Dalavai Dinne which was assessed to land G
revenue, to his son and does not help the appellant to
establish title to either survey Nos. 30 or 31. While the
settlement deed describes the land settled as land
assessed to land revenue, significantly, Survey Nos. 30
or 31 which are now claimed by the appellants as part of H
    912    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A   Da/avai Dinne were never assessed to land revenue, but
    were always described as Government Kharab land.
    Ex.P1 and P2 are therefore of no assistance to the
    appellants. [Para 11] [919-G-H; 920-A-C]

B     3.6. Ex.P.10 and P11 are contract notes executed by
  contractors said to have been engaged by the
  predecessor of the appellants for execution of certain
  works relating to the tank at Dalavai Pa/ya. They are not
  signed by the predecessor of the appellants. Even
C assuming that the documents (Ex.P10 and P11) are
  genuine and related to a tank situated in Survey No.30,
  they would not help the appellants to establish title to
  Survey No. 30, or Survey. No. 31. [Para 12) [920-E-F]

       3.7. Ex.P12 is said to be the Tank Majkur Register
D Extract maintained by the Assistant Superintendent of
  Land Records, Bangalore Sub-Division, showing that Re-
  survey No.30 measured 11 acres 21 guntas and the entire
  extent was karab (tank) and it corresponded to old survey
  No.25. It also records that the tank was dug by and was
E later repaired by predecesors of the appellants about 25
  years ago and thereafter no one has repaired it and it is
  in the state of good repair. The date of inspection or entry
  is not mentioned and it does in no way help the appellants
  to prove title to the land. [Para 13) [920-H; 921-A-B]
F
       3.8. The land acquisition reference proceedings relied
  upon by the appellant did not relate to Survey Nos. 30 or
  31. It is related to other lands and the issue before the
  court was a dispute between the appellant and some
G other claimants. There is no adjudication of the title of the
  appellants or their ancestors in regard to Survey Nos. 30
  or 31. Nor is there any finding by the court which can
  support the appellants' claim to Survey No.30 or Survey
  No. 31. Therefore, the High Court has rightly rejected the
H
 R. HANUMAIAH v. SEC. TO GOVT. OF KARNATAKA 913
                       REV. DEPTI.

said judgment as not relevant for examining the title of A
the appellants. [Para 14) [921-C-E]

      3.9. The first appellant had earlier filed a suit for a
permanent injunction, claiming that he was in possession
of Survey. No. 30 (tank). That suit and appeal therefrom B
were dismissed by recording a finding that he failed to
establish possession. The observation of the High Court
while dismissing the appeal from the decision in the
earlier injunction suit, that the dismissal will not come in
the way of plaintiff establishing title in the subsequent C
suit for declaration of title, will not dilute the finding
recorded by the trial court and High Court that the first
appellant was not in possession, which has attained
finality. [Para 20] [925-F-H; 926-A)

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.                D
1588-1589 of 2008.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 4.9.2007 of the High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in R.F.A. No. 448 & 529 of
1996.                                                      E

    Raju Ramachandran, Sanjay R. Hegde, Joseph Pookkatt,
Bhardwaj, S. Iyengar, S.N. Bhat for the Appellants.

    S.S. Javeli, Basava Prabhu Patil, S.K. Kulkarni, M. Gireesh
Kumar, A.S. Kulkarni, Vijay Kumar, Anitha Shenoy, Rashmi           F
Nanda Kumar for the Respondents.

    The Order of the Court was delivered by

                            ORDER                                  G
     R.V. RAVEENDRAN J. 1. These appeals by special leave
are by the plaintiffs in a suit (O.S.No.714 of 1982 before the
City Civil Judge, Bangalore City) for a declaration of title and
consequential relief of permanent injunction in respect of
                                                                   H
    914      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010) 4 S.C.R.


A   Sy.Nos. 30 and 31 of Jakkasandra Village, Segur Hobli,
    Bangalore South Taluk.

        2. The case of plaintiffs in brief is as follows : Plaintiffs are
  the owners of a tank called "Maistry Kere" bearing Survey
  No.30, (Old Survey No.25) measuring 11 acres 21 guntas and
8
  land bearing Survey No.31 (Old Survey No.26) measuring 1
  acre 9 guntas situate in Jakkasandra Village, described in the
  plaint schedule as items 1 and 2. The said tank and land were
  earlier part of Block No.61 measuring 297 Acres 16 Guntas
C known as 'Dalavai Dinne', which belonged to their Great great
  grandfather - Kurakalu Venkataramana Maistry. That the said
  Venkataramana Maistry executed a deed of settlement dated
  7.1.1874 (Ex. P.2) settling the said Dalavai Dinne upon his son
  Chikkahanumaiah. The said Dalavai Dinne identified as Block
D No.61 was re-surveyed and allotted Re-Survey Nos.16, 19, 20,
  21, 23, 27 to 35. A portion of the said Dalavai Dinne measuring
  102 acres was acquired for St. John's Medical College under
  final notification dated 30.4.1963. Another extent of 180 acres
  of land therein was acquired for forming of Koramangala
E Layout, under final notification dated 28.9.1965. After such
  acquisition, the appellants were left with only Survey Nos.30
  and 31 (suit schedule items 1 and 2 from out of the Dalavai
  Dinne) and they·continued in possession thereof as owners.
  The documents trace their title for more than one and half
  centuries; and the suit properties have been owned and
F possessed by the family from around 1850, originally by
  Venkataramana Maistry, later his son Chikkahanumaiah,
  thereafter his son Kurakalu Ramaiah, thereafter his son B.M.
  Ramaiah, and finally the plaintiffs. When the City Improvement
  Trusts Board (predecessor of Bangalore Development
G Authority) attempted to interfere with their possession of Maistry
  Tank (Sy.No.30), the first appellant filed a suit (OS No.1 of 1976
  in the Court of Civil Judge, Bangalore Rural District later
  renumbered as OS No.1305 of 1980 on the file of City Civil
  Court, Bangalore) for a permanent injunction. However,
H subsequently the appellants filed a comprehensive suit -
R. HANUMAIAH v. SEC. TO GOVT. OF KARNATAKA 915
      REV. DEPTT. [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

O.S.No.714of1982, for a declaration of title and consequential A
injunction on 15.3.1982 against Government of Karnataka and
Bangalore Development Authority in regard tc;> Sy.Nos.30 and
31. During the pendency of the second suit, the first suit for
injunction was dismissed on 16.9.1985 and the appeal filed by
the appellant against the said dismissal was also dismissed B
by the High Court on 20.12.1994, with an observation that
anything stated in the said judgment with reference to the title
to the suit land (Sy.No.30) will not affect the pending suit for
declaration of title in OS No. 714 of 1982.
                                                                 c
     3. The respondents resisted .the said suit. According to
them, Survey No.30 was a government tank shown as Kharab
land in t~e revenue records. Survey No.31 was also government
barren land shown as Government Kharab. lanc! in the revenue
records. The appellants were neither the owners nor were they D
in possession of the said survey Nos.30 and 31. On the said
pleadings necessary issues relating to tjtle, adverse
possession, relief claimed were framed and parties went to trial.
Both sides let in oral and documentary evidence. After
appreciating the evidence, the trial court by its judgment dated E
19.4.1996 decreed· the suit. It held that the appellants had made
out their title and possession in regard to the suit properties.
Feeling aggrieved, the respondents filed an appeal and a
learned Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka by the
impugned judgment dated 4.9.2007, allowed the appeal, set F
aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissed
the suit. The High Court held that the appellants had neither
made out title nor possession in respect of the suit properties.
The said judgment and decree is challenged in thi.s appeal by
special leave.
                                                                  G
     4. The appellants claimed title, and possession on the
basis of title. The revenue records, in particular Ex. 04, D5, D7
to 012, show the two survey numbers as 'Government tank'
and 'Government barren land'. The names of appellants are not
                                                                 H
    916      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2010] 4 S.C.R.


A   entered as owners in the revenue records. Though several
    documents have been marked by the parties, the entire case
    of appellants' in regard to title depends upon the documents
    Ex. P-1, P-2, P-10, P-11, P-12 and P-18. While the trial court
    held that these documents established the title of the appellants
B   and consequently they were entitled to possession, the High
    Court on re-examination and re-appreciation of the evidence,
    in particular, the said documents, held that the appellants did
    not make out any title nor possession in regard to the suit
    properties. Therefore, the only question that arise for our
c   consideration is whether Ex. P1, P2, P10, P11, P12 and P18
    establish appellants' title to suit properties and whether the High
    Court committed an error in law in rejecting the said documents.
    In view of it, we will briefly analyse each of these documents.

D Re: Ex P.18
          5. Exhibit P18 is an extract of the register maintained by
    the Public Works Department showing the details of tanks in
    Bangalore Division. The said extract is in respect of Serial
    No.279 from the said register relating to a tank described as
E   Maistry Kere or Maistry Palyada Kere in Jakkasandra village,
    the extent of the water body being 11 acres. The name of the
    tank is followed by the word 'private' in the register and gives
    particulars of the Achkat area of the tank (that is area of land
    irrigated by the said tank) in the year 1906-07. The appellants
F   contend that the description of the tank as 'private' in the Tank
    register would demonstrate that the tank did not belong to the
    government and that it was privately owned. The High Court
    however held that the mere use of the word 'private' after the
    description of the tank, will not establish appellant's title or
G   possession in regard to Survey No.30.

         6. The appellants relied on paras 236(b) and 376 of the
    Mysore Revenue Manual in support of their contention that
    private tanks existed in the State of Mysore and that the State
H   Government recognized the natural right of private individuals
 R. HANUMAIAH v. SEC. TO GOVT. OF KARNATAKA 917
       REV. DEPTT. [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

to construct and own tanks. The appellants contended that               A
when the records maintained by the Government in the usual
course of business; showed a particular tank as 'private', it was
a clear admission that the tank was not a government tank but
was privately owned. We may refer to the ~rovisions of the
Mysore Revenue Manual relied on by the appellants. Section              B
IV thereof related to "Private enterprise tanks". Para 236(b)
stated that there were about 318'Private enterprise tanks in the
State. Para 376 of the Manual deals with construction of
Saguvali Kattes (irrigation tanks) by the landholders, the
relevant extract of which is extracted below :                          C

     "376 (1). The right of land-holders to construct "Saguvali
     Kattes" on their own lands is not affected by :-

     (a) Section XX, paragraph 13 of the Rules of 1890 under
     the Land Revenue code, which relates to the construction           D
     of private tanks on Government unoccupied land: or

     (b) Appendix F to the said Rules, which relates to the
     restoration by private individuals of Government tanks and
     wells long in disuse.                                              E

     (2) Private individuals have the natural right to construct
    ·tanks on their own lands (Kandayam or lnam), $0 long as
     they do not thereby materially diminish the water flowing
     in defined channels through their lands for the benefit of         F
     Government works and private proprietors lower down
     such channels.

     xxxxxxxx

     7. A carsful reading of para 376 of the Manual shows that          G
a private tank can be constructed by a private individual, either
in his own land or on Government unoccupied land. It also
shows that private individuals may restore Government tanks.
Therefore it follows that when a tank is described as 'private'
in the tank register, that by itself will not establish that the land   H
    918     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A where the tank is situated is private land. To put it differently,
  when a tank enumerated in the Tank register maintained by the
  government, adds to the description of the tank, by the word
  'private', it merely shows that the tank in question had been
  constructed by a private individual but it does not lead to the
B inference that the land on which the tank is constructed
  belonged to a private individual.

         8. Para 236 shows that a private land on being converted
    into a private tank would not get full exemption or remission from
C   payment of land assessment, but was extended only a partial
    remission. In fact, if a tank was constructed on a private land,
    the land would be continued to be assessed to land revenue
    with appropriate partial remission. On the other hand, if it is a
    Government unoccupied land on which a private individual is
    permitted to construct the tank, it will continue to be shown as
0
    Government kharab land and will not be subjected to any land
    revenue. In this case neither Sy. No.30 nor Sy.No.31 is
    assessed to land revenue and are shown as Government
    Kharab land in all revenue records (vide Ex. 07, 08, 09, 010,
E   011 and 012). Un arable lands including tanks are described
    as Phut Kharab. The Tank register extract (Ex.015) and other
    documents produced by respondents show that Maistry Palya
    tank (Sl.No.279 in the Register) was breached and BOA had
    formed a layout in a major portion of the tank land and the
F   remaining area was being developed into a park by the forest
    department. We, therefore, cannot accept the contention of the
    appellant that Ex. P18, proves that Survey No.30 was a land
    owned by a private individual or that it did not belong to
    Government.

G Re : Ex. P1 and P2

      9. Ex.P2 is the copy of the settlement deed dated 7.1.1874
  executed by Venkataramana Maistry under which he settled
  upon his son Chikkahanumaiah, the Dalavai Palya, which was
H a land assessed to land revenue, bounded East by
 R. HANUMAIAH v. SEC. TO GOVT. OF KARNATAKA 919
       REV. DEPTI. [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

Jakkasandra boarder, South by Sabapathi Modaliyar Garden, A
West by Muni Reddy land and North by Srinangara Kere. Ex.
P1 which is an extract of Phut Pahani chit of Jakkasandra,
relating to revenue inspection of 18.6.1871. It shows that Survey
No.25 measuring 10 acres 38 guntas in Jakkasandra village
was a tank and described it as Phut Kharab land; that it formed B
part of Block No.61; and that the said tank was repaired by one
Venkataramana Maistry. The appellants rely on Exs. P1 and
P2 to prove the title of his ancestor Venkataramana Maistry in
regard to the old tank situated in Survey No.25 measuring 10
acres 38 guntas and that the said survey No.25 was part of C
Block No. 61 (Dalayai ·Dinne in Jakkasandra) settled by
Venkataramana Maistry on his son under the settlement deed
(Ex.P2) dated 7.1.1874.

     10. Phut Pahani is described in the Mysore Revenue
                                                                    0
Manual as an Inspection Statement showing the old survey
numbers and corresponding new numbers of lands and full
information regarding tenure and occupancy of the land. The
Phut Pahani did not relate to nor provide proof of ownership of
any land. Ex.P1 merely disclosed that when it was inspected E
on 18.6.1871, survey no.25 of Jakkasandra measuring 10
acres 28 guntas was a tank and that it was repaired by
Venkataramana Maistry. This document therefore does not help
the appellants to prove title of Venkataramana Maistry to the
tank. Unless the title to the land on which the tank is situated is F
established, the mere fact that the tank was shown to have been
maintained or repaired by any private individual will not make
him the owner of the tank. At best it will show that the tank was
maintained by him as a private tank for the purpose of irrigation.

    11. Ex.P2 (settlement deed) does not refer to the tank. It G
does not give the total extent of the land. It does not disclose
whether Sy. Nos. 30 and 31 formed part of Dalavai Dinne
owned by the ancestors of plaintiffs at any point of time. The

                                                                   H
    920     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A   settlement deed merely shows that the Venkataramana Maistry
    had settled certain land known as Dalavai Dinne which was
    assessed to land revenue to his son Chikkahanumaiah and
    does not help the appellant to establish title to either survey
    Nos.30 or 31. The fact that the ancestors of the appellants
B   owned a large extent of land in Jakkaasandra village is not in
    dispute. In fact the appellant got compensation in regard to 102
    acres of land acquired for St. John's Medical College and 180
    acres of land acquired for Koramangala Layout aggregating to
    nearly 282 acres of land. While the settlement deed describes
c   the land settled as land assessed to land Revenue, significantly,
    survey Nos. 30 or 31 which are now claimed by the appellants
    as part of Dalavai Dinne were never assessed to land revenue,
    but were always described as Government Kharab land. Ex.P1
    and P2 are therefore of no assistance to the appellants.

D   Re : Ex. P10 & P11

        12. The appellant next relied on Ex.P10 and P11 which are
   .two centract notes. Ex.P10 is said to be of the year 1854-55.
   Ex.P .11 is said to be of the year 1865. These are contract notes
E executed by contractors said to have been engaged to
  _Venkataramana Maistry for execution of certain works relating
   to the tank at Dalavai Palya. They are not signed by
   Venkataramana Maistry. As noticed earlier, the fact that
   Venkataramana Maistry had constructed a tank or maintained
F a tank, will not establish ownership to the land in which a tank
   was situated. Even assuming that the documents (ExP10 and
   P11) are genuine and related to a tank situated in Sy. No.30,
   they would not help the appellant~ to establish title to
   Sy. No. 30, or Sy. No.31.
G
   Re : Ex.P12

        13. Ex.P12 is said to be the Tank Majkur Register Extract
    maintained by the AssistantSuperintendent of Land Records,
H   Bangalore Sub-Division, showing that Re-survey No.30
    R. HANUMAIAH v. SEC. TO GOVT. OF KARNATAKA 921
         REV. DEPTI. [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

 measured 11 acres 21 guntas and the entire extent was karab       A
 (tank) and it corresponded to old survey No.25. It also records
 that the tank was dug by father of Ramaiah of Maistry Palya,
that it was repaired by Ramaiah about 25 years ago and
thereafter no one has repaired it and it is in the state of good
 repair. The date of inspection or entry is not mentioned and it   B
_d~es in no way help the appellants to prove title to the land.

Re : Judgment in Land Acquisition case

       14. The appellant next relied upon the certified copy of the
judgment of the rel'efen'ce court in LA. Misc. No.307 of 1966 C
by (Principal Civil Judge,_)3angalore City) and connected cases
 (which the High Court tu'ok on record as evidence while hearing
.the appeal). The land acquisition reference proceedings did not
 relate to Sy Nos. 30 or 31. It is related to other lands and the
 issue before the court was a dispute between the appellant and D
 some other claimants. The judgment sets out the case of the
 parties that Block No.61 called as Dalavai Dinne corresponded
 to survey Nos.16, 19, 20, 21, 23, and 27 to 35 and also refers
 to some of the documents which are produced in this case
 also. There is no adjudication of the title of the appellants or E
 their ancestors in regard to Survey Nos. 30 or 31. Nor is there
 any finding by the court which can support the appellants' claim
 to Sy. No.30 or Sy.No. 31. Therefore, the High Court has rightly
 rejected the said judgment as notrelevant for examining the
 title of the appellants.                                           F

Nature of proof required in suits for declaration of title
against the Government

  . .15. Suits for declaration of title against the government,    G
though similar to suits for declaration of title against private
individuals differ significantly in some aspects. The first
difference is in regard to the presumption available in favour
of the government. All lands which are not the property of any
0

person or which are not vested In a local authority, belong to     H
    922      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A   the government. All unoccupied lands are the property of the
    government, unless any person can establish his right or title
    to any such land. This presumption available to the government,
    is not available to any person or individual. The second
    difference is in regard to the period for which title and/or
B   possession have to be established .by a person suing for
    deClaration of title. Establishing title/possession for a period
    exceeding twelve years may be ad~quate to establish title in a ·
    declaratory suit against any individual. On the other hand, title/
    possession for a period exceeding thirty years will have to be
C   established to succeed in a declaratory suit for title against
    government. This follows from Article 112 of Limitation Act,
    1963, which prescribes a longer period of thirty years as
    limitation in regard to suits by government as against the period
    of 12 years for suits by private individuals. The reason is
D   obvious. Government properties are spread over the entire
    state and it is not always possible for the government to protect
    or safeguard its properties from encroachments. Many a time, ..
    its own officers who are expected to protect its properties and
    maintain proper records, either due to negligence or collusion,
E   create entries in records to help private parties, to lay claim of
    ownership or possession against the government. Any loss of
    government property is ultimately the loss to the community.
    Courts owe a duty to be vigilant to ensure that public property
    is not converted into private property by unscrupulous elements.
F
         16. Many civil courts deal with suits for declaration of title
  and injunction against government, in a casual manner, ignoring
  or overlooking the special features relating to government
  properties. Instances of such suits against government being
G routinely decreed, either ex parte or for want of proper contest,
  merely acting upon the oral assertions of plaintiffs or stray
  revenue entries are common. Whether the government contests
  the suit or not, before a suit for declaration of title against a
  government is decreed, the plaintiff should establish, either his
H title by producing the title deeds which satisfactorily trace title
 R. HANUMAIAH v. SEC. TO GOVT. OF KARNATAKA 923
       REV. DEPTI. [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

for a minimum period of thirty years prior to the date of the suit A
(except where title is claimed with reference to a grant or
transfer by the government or a statutory development authority),
or by establishing adverse possession for a period of more than
thirty years. In such suits, courts cannot, ignoring the
prel?umptions available in favour of the government, grant B
declaratory or injunctive decrees against the government by
relying upon one of the principles underlying pleadings that
plaint averments which are not denied or traversed are deemed
to have been accepted or admitted. A court should necessarily
seek an answer to the following question, before it grants a C
decree declaring title against the government : whether the
plaintiff has produced title deeds tracing the title for a period
of more than thirty years; or whether the plaintiff has established
his adverse possession to the knowledge of the government
for a period of more than thirty years, so as to convert his o
possession into title. Incidental to that question, the court should
also find out whether the plaintiff is recorded to be the owner
or holder or occupant of the property in the revenue records or
municipal records, for more than thirty years, and what is the
nature of possession claimed by the plaintiff, if he is in E
possession - authorized or unauthorized; permissive; casual
and occasional; furtive and clandestine; open, continuous and
hostile; deemed or implied (following a title).

      17. Mere temporary use or occupation without the animus F
to claim ownership or mere use at sufferance will not be
sufficient to create any right adverse to the Government. In order
to oust or defeat the title of the government, a claimant has to
establish a clear title which is superior to or better than the title
of the government or establish perfection of title by adverse G
possession. for a period of more than thirty years with the
knowledge of the government. To claim adverse possession,
the possession of the claimant must be actual, open and visible,
hostile to the owner (and therefore necessarily with the
knowledge of the owner) and continued during the entire period
                                                                      H
    924      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A   necessary to create a bar under the law of limitation. In short,
    it should be adequate in continuity, publicity and in extent. Mere
    vague or doubtful assertions that the claimant has been in
    adverse possession will not be sufficient. Unexplained stray or
    sporadic entries for a year or for a few years will not be
B   sufficient and should be ignored. As noticed above, many a time
    it is possible for a private citizen to get his n~me entered as
    the occupant of government land, with the help of collusive
    government servants. Only entries based on appropriate
    documents like grants, title deeds etc. or based upon actual
c   verification of physical possession by an authority authorized
    to recognize such possession and make appropriate entries
    can be used against the government. By its very nature, a claim
    based on adverse possession requires clear and categorical
    pleadings and evidence, much more so, if it is against the
o   government. Be that as it may.

    Position in this case

         18. Section 67 of Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1961
    declares that all tanks and all lands which are not the property
E   of any person are the property of the state government. Sub-
    section (1) thereof which is relevant for our purpose is extracted
    below:

          "67. Public roads, etc., and all lands which are not the
F         property of others belong to the Government.-(1) All
          public roads, streets, lanes and paths, bridges, ditches,
          dikes and fences, on or beside the same, the bed of the
          sea and of harbours and creeks below high water mark
          and of rivers, streams, nallas, lakes and tanks and all
G         canals and water-courses and all standing and flowing
          waters, and all lands wherever situated which are not
          the property of individuals or of aggregate of persons
          legally capable of holding property, and except in so
          far as any rights of such persons may be established, in
H         or over the same, and except as may be otherwise
 R. HANUMAIAH v. SEC. TO GOVT. OF KARNATAKA 925
         REV. DEPTI. [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

     provided in any law for the time being in force, are and            A
     are hereby declared to be with all rights in or ov~r the
     same or appertaining thereto, the property of the
     State Government.

                                              (emphasis supplied)        B

Weakness of government's defence or absence of contest, are
not therefore sufficient to decree declaratory suits against the
government. It is for the appellants to establish their title to the ·
suit properties.
                                                                         c
      19. The respondents have relied upon several documents
(mainly revenue records) to establish that the suit lands belong
to the government. It is not be necessary to examine or refer
to them, as the core issue is whether the appellants who filed
the suit for declaration of title against the government, have D
made out their title or posselJSion to the suit properties. The
High Court, being the first appellate court is the final court of
fact. It has, after examining the ~Yidence exhaustively recorded
a finding that the appellants have not established their title or ·
possession. We find no error in the findings and conclusions E
of the High Court. We concur with the findings of the High Court,
though for reasons slightly different from those of the High
Court .. The appellants who came to court claiming title, not ·
having established title, their suit is liable to be dismissed.
                                                                         F
     20. One more aspect requires to be noticed. The first
appellant had earlier filed a suit (OS No.1 of 1976 renumbered
as OS No.1305 of 1980) for a permanent injunction, claiming
that he was in possession of Sy. No.30 (tank). That suit and
appeal therefrom were dismissed by recording a finding that              G
he failed to establish possession. The observation of the High
Court while dismissing the appeal from the decision in the
earlier injunction suit, that the dismissal will not come in the way
of plaintiff establishing title in the subsequent suit for declaration
                                                                         H
    926      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A   of title, will not dilute the finding recorded by the trial court and
    High Court that the first appellant was not in possession, which
    has attained finality.

       21. No other material has been relie9 upon by the
B appellants to establish their title or possession. The appellants
  were not registered as the owners or khatedars or occupiers
  of the suit lands in any revenue records. They did not have any
  document of title referring to the suit properties. The appellants
  did not have possession. Even assuming that the tank in Sy.No.
C 30 was repaired/ maintained by the ancestors of plaintiff at
  some point of time, there is no document to show that the tank
  was used, maintained or repaired by the appellants or their
  predecessors during more than half a century before the filing
  of the suit. The suit has to fail.
D         22. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no ground to
    interfere with the judgment and decree of the High Court. The
    appeals are dismissed. The application for intervention is also
    dismissed.

    K.K.T.                                        Appeals dismissed.