Supreme Court of India
K. PRABHAKAR HEGDEversusBANK OF BARODA
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 997
- Decided
- 19 August 2025
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- DIPANKAR DATTA
Holding
The Court held that while the non‑furnishing of the preliminary inquiry report did not invalidate the inquiry, the Inquiry Officer’s failure to comply with the mandatory component of Regulation 6(17) and the non‑disclosure of the CVC recommendation rendered the disciplinary proceedings vitiated, leading to the quashing of the dismissal order.
Summary
K. Prabhakar Hegde, a former officer of Vijaya Bank (later merged with Bank of Baroda), was dismissed after disciplinary proceedings for alleged irregularities in approving temporary overdrafts. He challenged the denial of the preliminary inquiry report, the failure of the Inquiry Officer to generally question him as required by Regulation 6(17), and the continuation of proceedings beyond his superannuation. The Supreme Court held that the non‑furnishing of the preliminary report did not prejudice him because it was not relied upon, but the Inquiry Officer’s omission to question the appellant on adverse evidence violated a mandatory duty under Regulation 6(17). The Court also found that the Central Vigilance Commission’s recommendation, which was not disclosed to the appellant, vitiated the inquiry. Consequently, the dismissal order was quashed, the appellant was awarded a lump‑sum gratuity, and the appeal was disposed of.
Issues considered
- Whether denial of the preliminary inquiry report, prepared by the sole management witness, vitiated the regular disciplinary inquiry.
- Whether the Inquiry Officer’s failure to generally question the appellant on adverse evidence, as mandated by Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations, vitiated the inquiry.
- Whether continuation of disciplinary proceedings beyond the appellant’s superannuation was permissible under the 1981 Regulations.
Legislation cited
- All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969s. Rule 8(19)
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XLI Rule 33
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898s. Section 342
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. Section 313
- Constitution of Indias. Article 14
- Evidence Act, 1872s. Section 123, s. Section 162
- Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1981s. Regulation 6(17)
Headnote
Issue for Consideration (i) Whether denial of the report of preliminary inquiry prepared by the officer entrusted by Vijaya Bank (which merged with the respondent in the year 2019) to conduct such inquiry, who happened to be the sole management witness, was sufficient to vitiate the regular (ii) whether the failure/omission of the Inquiry Officer to generally question the appellant on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence, as per Regulation 6(17) of the Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1981, vitiated the inquiry;
Subjects
Disciplinary proceedingsDismissal from servicePreliminary inquiry reportSole management witnessRegulation 6(17)SuperannuationNatural justiceCentral Vigilance Commission recommendationPrivilege claimSection 123 Evidence Act
Judgment
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1997 : 2025 INSC 997
K. Prabhakar Hegde
v.
Bank of Baroda
(Civil Appeal No. 6599 of 2025)
19 August 2025
[Dipankar Datta* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
(i) Whether denial of the report of preliminary inquiry prepared
by the officer entrusted by Vijaya Bank (which merged with the
respondent in the year 2019) to conduct such inquiry, who happened
to be the sole management witness, was sufficient to vitiate the
regular inquiry that followed against the appellant; (ii) whether
the failure/omission of the Inquiry Officer to generally question
the appellant on the circumstances appearing against him in
the evidence, as per Regulation 6(17) of the Vijaya Bank Officer
Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1981, vitiated
the inquiry; (iii) whether continuation of disciplinary proceedings
against the appellant beyond superannuation was a permissible
course of action under the 1981 Regulations.
Headnotes†
Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal)
Regulations, 1981 – Appellant dismissed from service –
Whether denial of the report of preliminary inquiry prepared by
the officer entrusted by Vijaya Bank to conduct such inquiry,
who happened to be the sole management witness, was
sufficient to vitiate the regular inquiry that followed against
the appellant:
Held: In the instant case, a perusal of the inquiry report reveals that
no reliance upon the preliminary inquiry report has been placed by
the inquiry officer – Therefore, non-furnishing of the inquiry report
to the appellant is inconsequential – However, an argument that
has been made is that the non-furnishing of the preliminary inquiry
report has caused prejudice to the appellant because such non-
furnishing of the report disabled him to effectively cross-examine
the witness – Argument cannot be accepted – Since the appellant
* Author
1998 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
was duly provided with the deposition of the witness as per the
rules, was allowed to cross-examine the witness on the basis of
the statements made by him and the inquiry officer placed no
reliance upon the preliminary inquiry report, but only upon the
statements of such witness recorded during chief examination
and cross-examination – Therefore, there is no violation of the
principles of natural justice – Also, no prejudice has been caused
to the charged officer for non-furnishing of the preliminary inquiry
report. [Paras 27-29]
Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal)
Regulations, 1981 Regn. 6(17) – Appellant dismissed from
service – Whether the failure/omission of the Inquiry Officer
to generally question the appellant on the circumstances
appearing against him in the evidence, as per Regulation
6(17) of the 1981 Regulations, vitiated the inquiry; whether
continuation of disciplinary proceedings against the appellant
beyond superannuation was a permissible course of action
under the 1981 Regulations:
Held: The Inquiry Officer by not generally questioning the
appellant on the circumstances available in the evidence, which
were unfavourable or adverse to such officer, failed to perform
a mandatory duty – In the present case, the appellant did not
raise any objection in this behalf before the disciplinary authority
but raised the point, generally, of non-adherence to Regulation 6
before the appellate authority – Be that as it may, the appellant
is justified in voicing a grievance that he had not been extended
fair, reasonable and adequate opportunity to defend himself in
terms of Regulation 6 which, in turn, infringed his right protected
by Article 14 of the Constitution – In normal circumstances, the
obvious direction that could follow the foregoing discussions is a
remand to the disciplinary authority to re-start the inquiry from the
stage the same stood vitiated, i.e., requiring the Inquiry Officer to
scrupulously follow Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations –
However, there are circumstances that impede an order for
remand – The foremost being the lack of accessibility to the records
because of the merger of Vijaya Bank with the respondent and
the distance of time since the disciplinary proceedings came to
a close – It is also to be noted that the disciplinary proceedings
were continued beyond the date on which the appellant attained
the age of superannuation – Because of the ultimate order this
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1999
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
Court propose to make, this Court has not dealt with the third
question in the three broad issues framed and such question is
kept open – No useful purpose, therefore, would be served in
ordering a remand. [Paras 55, 58, 72]
Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal)
Regulations, 1981 Regn. 6(17) – Appellant dismissed from
service – Whether the proposed punishment of compulsory
retirement could have been altered to dismissal from service
based on the Central Vigilance Commission recommendation:
Held: The proposed punishment of compulsory retirement could
not have been altered to dismissal from service based on the CVC
recommendation without furnishing the same to the appellant – To
this extent, the appellate order is legally flawed and cannot be
sustained. [Para 71]
Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal)
Regulations, 1981 Regn. 6(17) – Appellant dismissed from
service – Directions issued by the Supreme Court:
Held: Considering the age of the appellant (he is now an
octogenarian) as well as the fact that there were other disciplinary
proceedings pending against him which were not taken to its logical
conclusion because he stood dismissed from service, in considered
view of this Court, interest of justice would be sufficiently served if
this Court makes the following directions: (i) the appellant shall not
be entitled to any terminal benefits except to the extent indicated
hereafter; (ii) he shall only be entitled to a lump-sum amount equal
to the quantum of gratuity which would have been payable to him
had he not been fastened with the order of dismissal; (iii) such
lump-sum amount may be released in favour of the appellant within
a period of eight weeks from date; (iv) no amount on account of
interest shall be payable to the appellant on the said amount; (v)
however, interest @ 9% p.a. shall be payable on such amount if
not released within the period stipulated above; and (vi) the order
of dismissal, in the circumstances, shall stand quashed. [Para 73]
Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal)
Regulations, 1981 – Regn.6(17) – All India Services (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1969 – R. 8(19) – The use of ‘may’ and ‘shall’:
Held: Regn.6(17) as well as r.8(19) refers to both ‘may’ and
‘shall’ – While the first part of reg.6(17) refers to ‘may’, the second
2000 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
part refers to ‘shall’ – To enable the charged officer to explain
circumstances in the evidence appearing against him, the provision
confers a discretion on the Inquiry Officer as well as imposes a
mandatory duty on him – It is discretionary for the Inquiry Officer,
to put questions to the charged officer if he is himself a witness
for the defence, whereas, if the charged officer has not examined
himself as a witness for the defence, the mandate of the law is
that the Inquiry Officer shall generally question the charged officer
on the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him –
The use of ‘may’ and ‘shall’ in the same provision does imply that
Regn. 6(17) means what it says – The words ‘may’ and ‘shall’
have been used to mean ‘may’ and ‘shall’, respectively, and we
cannot possibly conceive of any rule of construction which would
lead us to assume that the framers intended that ‘shall’ in the
second part of Regn. 6(17) should also be read and understood
as ‘may’ – Use of the word ‘shall’, is deliberate to denote that it
is not interchangeable with ‘may’; if it were so, the framers would
have straightaway used ‘may’ instead of ‘shall’ having known that
‘may’ has been used in the first part – Couching of the provision
in such language with ‘may’ and ‘shall’ having distinct connotations
and consequences and bringing about different outcomes in the
course of one and the same inquiry unhesitatingly signals that while
the first part of regn.6(17) is directory, the second part thereof is
mandatory. [Paras 53, 54]
Service Law – Departmental inquiry – Preliminary inquiry
report – When it is to be provided to the delinquent employee:
Held: i) A preliminary inquiry is conducted for the purposes of
determining whether regular disciplinary proceedings are called
for or not; ii) A preliminary inquiry report is an internal document;
iii) A preliminary inquiry report or the findings therein cannot be
used to come to conclusions recorded in the report of inquiry if
such preliminary inquiry report/findings are based on oral and/
or documentary evidence which are obtained behind the back of
the charged employee and such oral/documentary evidence are
not presented in the inquiry in the presence of such employee;
iv) If a preliminary inquiry report or the findings therein are sought
to be relied on, the witnesses whose evidence was relied on in
preparing the same ought to be brought before the inquiry officer
and the charged officer afforded an opportunity to cross-examine
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2001
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
them; v) If a preliminary inquiry report is sought to be relied upon
in the inquiry report, then such preliminary inquiry report must be
provided to the delinquent employee; vi) Once a charge-sheet is
drawn up and has been provided to the charged officer detailing
the charges, the preliminary inquiry report is of no consequence
and need not be provided to him. [Para 25]
Service Law – Dismissal from service – Principle of Natural
Justice – When CVC recommendation is considered by the
disciplinary authority for the purpose of deciding punishment:
Held: The CVC recommendation weighed heavily enough upon
the disciplinary authority so as to convince him to alter the
proposed punishment of compulsory retirement to dismissal of the
appellant – Receipt of the CVC recommendation behind the back
of the appellant and no opportunity having been provided to him
to plead for a lesser punishment, the inquiry stood vitiated – The
CVC recommendation constituted material which was considered
by the disciplinary authority at least for the purpose of deciding
on the punishment that needed to be imposed on the appellant –
Once such recommendation fell for consideration of the disciplinary
authority, a copy of the same could not have been denied to the
appellant – Compliance with the principles of natural justice – A
charged officer cannot be denied any material that the disciplinary
authority looks into for imposing punishment. [Para 64]
Service Law – Disciplinary proceedings – Non-disclosure of
the CVC recommendation – Claim of privilege:
Held: In the instant case, the claim of privilege made by the appellate
authority in defending non-disclosure of the CVC recommendation
to the appellant – The claim of privilege was utterly misconceived –
The claim of privilege cannot be invoked as a matter of reflexive
recourse but must be limited to instances wherein an actual concern
to public interest is envisaged – Each instance must be evaluated
on a case-by-case basis and the State must be wholly convinced
that the disclosure of the documents would cause grave harm and
injury to public interest – The recommendation of the CVC did not
have anything to do with the “affairs of the State” or, if one were
not to be guided by Section 123 of the Evidence Act, anything to
do with national security. [Paras 66, 70]
2002 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Case Law Cited
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation [1985] Supp. 2 SCR
51 : (1985) 3 SCC 545; Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel [1985]
Supp. 2 SCR 131 : (1985) 3 SCC 398; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
[1988] Supp. 1 SCR 1 : (1988) 2 SCC 602; Champaklal Chimanlal
Shah v. Union of India [1964] 6 SCR 190 : 1963 SCC OnLine
SC 42; ECIL v. B. Karunakar [1993] Supp. 2 SCR 576 : (1993)
4 SCC 727 – followed.
SBI v. D.C. Aggarwal [1992] Supp. 1 SCR 956 : (1993) 1 SCC
13; Mohd. Quaramuddin v. State of A.P. (1994) 5 SCC 118; State
of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh [1961] 2 SCR 371 : 1960 SCC
OnLine SC 38; People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India
[2004] 1 SCR 232 : (2004) 2 SCC 476 – relied on.
S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [1981] 1 SCR 746 : (1980) 4 SCC
379; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Prakash Singh [2025] 5 SCR
275 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 891; Sunil Kumar Banerjee v. State
of West Bengal & Ors. [1980] 3 SCR 179 : (1980) 3 SCC 304;
Union of India v. Alok Kumar [2010] 5 SCR 35 : (2010) 5 SCC
349; Vijay Kumar Nigam v. State of MP [1996] Supp. 8 SCR
544 : (1996) 11 SCC 599; Syndicate Bank & Ors. v. Venkatesh
Gururao Kurati [2006] 1 SCR 920 : (2006) 3 SCC 150; UCO
Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor [2007] 7 SCR 543 : (2007) 6 SCC
694; K.C. Mathew v. State of Travancore-Cochin [1955] 2 SCR
1057 : AIR 1956 SC 241; Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta v. State of
W.B. [1969] 2 SCR 104 : AIR 1969 SC 381; Tara Singh v. State
[1951] 1 SCR 729 : (1951) SCC 903; Krishna Chandra Tandon v.
Union of India (1974) 4 SCC 374; Chandrama Tewari v. Union
of India [1988] 1 SCR 1102 : (1987) Supp. SCC 518; Narayan
Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v. State of Maharashtra [1996] Supp. 8
SCR 939 : (1997) 1 SCC 299; Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat
[2013] 5 SCR 200 : (2013) 4 SCC 301; Manoj Kumar v. State of
U.P. (2018) 13 SCC 161; Rama Shankar Singh v. State of West
Bengal [1962] Supp. 1 SCR 49 : AIR 1962 SC 1239; Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR 88 :
(1984) 4 SCC 116; Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand [2020]
9 SCR 482 : (2020) 10 SCC 108; Haryana Financial Corporation v.
Kailash Chandra Ahuja [2008] 10 SCR 222 : (2008) 9 SCC 31;
Brij Nandan Kansal v. State of U.P. [1988] 3 SCR 79 : (1988)
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2003
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
Supp. SCC 761; Amar Chand Butail v. Union of India, AIR 1964
SC 1658; State of U.P. v. Raj Narain [1975] 3 SCR 333 : (1975)
4 SCC 428 – referred to.
List of Acts
Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations,
1981; All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1955; All India
Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969; Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Constitution
of India; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Evidence Act, 1872.
List of Keywords
Disciplinary proceedings; Dismissal from service; Irregularities and
lapses committed in approving temporary overdrafts; Punishment
of compulsory retirement; Non-furnishing of the preliminary inquiry
report; Report of preliminary inquiry; Sole management witness;
Regular inquiry; Failure/omission of the Inquiry Officer to generally
question the appellant on the circumstances appearing against
him in the evidence; Superannuation; Principles of natural justice;
Failed to perform a mandatory duty; Non-adherence to regn.6(7)
Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations,
1981; Not been extended fair, reasonable and adequate opportunity
to defend; Recommendation of the CVC; Recommendation was
denied by claiming privilege; s.123 of the Evidence Act, 1872;
Discretion of the Inquiry Officer.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6599 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.12.2021 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in WA No. 975 of 2009
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, Sr. Adv., M/S. Nuli & Nuli.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Basava Prabhu Patil, Sr. Adv., Ms. Praveena Gautam, Pawan
Shukla, Ms. Tissy Annie Thomas, Rohan Bansla, Arijeet Shukla.
2004 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Dipankar Datta, J.
Preface
1. S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan1 is a landmark decision of this Court,
delivered more than half a century back, delineating the contours
of the principles of natural justice, more particularly the right to be
heard before one is condemned. The supersession of the New
Delhi Municipal Committee was challenged on the ground that it
was in violation of the principles of natural justice, since no show
cause notice was issued before the order of supersession was
passed. Linked with that question was the question whether the
failure to observe the principles of natural justice matters at all,
if such observance would have made no difference, the admitted
or indisputable facts speaking for themselves. The golden words
of Hon’ble O. Chinappa Reddy, J., speaking for the three-Judge
Bench, rings in our ears:
“24. … In our view the principles of natural justice know of
no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have
made any difference if natural justice had been observed.
The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to
any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of
denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from
a person who has denied justice that the person who has
been denied justice is not prejudiced. …”
(emphasis ours)
2. The above passage from S.L. Kapoor (supra) came to be noticed
in the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Olga Tellis v.
Bombay Municipal Corporation2 and met with an unconditional
approval. Hon’ble Y.V. Chandrachud, CJI. speaking for the Bench
(which incidentally included Hon’ble O. Chinappa Reddy, J.) ruled
1 (1980) 4 SCC 379
2 (1985) 3 SCC 545
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2005
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
that the said observations sum up the true legal position regarding
the purport and implications of the right of hearing.
3. Close on the heels of Olga Tellis (supra), another Constitution
Bench upon a survey of precedents on the point of fair and impartial
hearing observed in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel3 as follows:
“95. The principles of natural justice have thus come to be
recognized as being a part of the guarantee contained in
Article 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation
given by this Court to the concept of equality which is the
subject-matter of that article. Shortly put, the syllogism
runs thus: violation of a rule of natural justice results in
arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination; where
discrimination is the result of State action, it is a violation
of Article 14: therefore, a violation of a principle of natural
justice by a State action is a violation of Article 14. Article
14, however, is not the sole repository of the principles of
natural justice. What it does is to guarantee that any law
or State action violating them will be struck down. The
principles of natural justice, however, apply not only to
legislation and State action but also where any tribunal,
authority or body of men, not coming within the definition
of State in Article 12, is charged with the duty of deciding
a matter. In such a case, the principles of natural justice
require that it must decide such matter fairly and impartially.”
(emphasis ours)
4. In another seminal decision, i.e., A.R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak4, a
seven-Judge Constitution Bench while acknowledging that it had
committed an error earlier which needed rectification, went on to
assert that:
“55. … No prejudice need be proved for enforcing the
fundamental rights. Violation of a fundamental right itself
renders the impugned action void. So also the violation of
the principles of natural justice renders the act a nullity. …”
3 (1985) 3 SCC 398
4 (1988) 2 SCC 602
2006 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
5. It has recently been held by us in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram
Prakash Singh5 that just as Articles 14, 19 and 21 constitute a
triumvirate of rights of citizens conceived as charters on equality,
freedom and liberty, the trio of the Constitution Bench decisions in
Olga Tellis (supra), Tulsiram Patel (supra) and A.R. Antulay (supra)
form the bedrock of natural justice principles being regarded as part
of Article 14 and, thereby, obviating the need to demonstrate prejudice
if a challenge were thrown on the ground of violation of Article 14.
6. Reference to these decisions has been made at the inception because
of the particular view we propose to take on consideration of decisions
of a three-Judge Bench in Sunil Kumar Banerjee v. State of West
Bengal & Ors.6 and a coordinate Bench in Union of India v. Alok
Kumar7. Notably, these decisions were relied on by the Division
Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru8 while insisting
on the requirement to demonstrate prejudice in a claim of breach of
principles of natural justice notwithstanding that the employer before
it had violated a statutory regulation by which it was bound.
The Appeal
7. The challenge in this civil appeal, by the appellant K. Prabhakar
Hegde, is to the judgment and order dated 14th December, 20219 in
Writ Appeal No. 975 of 2009 (S-DE). Vide the impugned order, the
High Court allowed the writ appeal carried by the respondent here,
Bank of Baroda. Consequently, the judgment and order of the Single
Judge dated 24th February, 2009 in WP No. 27936/2003, which was
under challenge, stood set aside with the result that the writ petition
of the appellant was dismissed.
Brief Facts
8. The facts relevant for the purpose of deciding this appeal are these:
i. In 1959, the appellant joined Vijaya Bank (which merged with
the respondent in the year 2019) as a clerk.
5 2025 SCC OnLine SC 891
6 (1980) 3 SCC 304
7 (2010) 5 SCC 349
8 High Court
9 impugned order
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2007
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
ii. Between 1959 and 1998, the appellant was promoted several
times. At the relevant time, the appellant was the ‘Zonal Head’
of the Delhi Zonal Office of Vijaya Bank.
iii. On 4th of January, 1999, the appellant was served with a notice
issued by his disciplinary authority. It was alleged that the
appellant was responsible for certain irregularities and lapses
committed in approving temporary overdrafts (TOD) on the
accounts of various parties involving substantial amounts. The
notice also alleged that the appellant had instructed the Assistant
General Manager at the Barakhamba Branch of Vijaya Bank to
grant a TOD of Rs. 15,00,000/- to one M/s Kunal Travels Pvt.
Ltd. via telephone. Another notice was sent on 22nd January,
1999 in respect of a separate incident containing more or less
similar allegations.
iv. Appellant replied to the said notices through letters dated 1st
February, 1999 and 24th February, 1999.
v. On 30th January, 2001, disciplinary proceedings under Regulation
6 of the Vijaya Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal)
Regulations, 198110 were drawn up by issuing a charge sheet.
Appellant replied to the said charge sheet vide letter dated 17th
February, 2001 denying the charges.
vi. The disciplinary authority of the appellant appointed an officer
holding the post of General Manager of Vijaya Bank as the
Inquiry Officer.
vii. The report of the inquiry officer dated 28th November, 2001 was
submitted to the Disciplinary Authority holding that the charges
against the appellant stand proved.
viii. Vide an order dated 17th May, 2002, the Disciplinary Authority
held that though the appellant was due to retire upon
superannuation on 30th June, 2002, disciplinary proceedings
initiated against him vide chargesheet dated 30th January, 2001
would continue. It was further ordered that the appellant shall
not be entitled to any retirement benefits till final orders are
passed in the disciplinary proceedings.
10 1981 Regulations
2008 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
ix. Appellant superannuated from service on 30th January, 2006.
x. Vide an order dated 4th July, 2002, the Disciplinary Authority
imposed on the appellant the punishment of ‘dismissal from
service’.
xi. Aggrieved by the punishment imposed on him, the appellant
approached the Appellate Authority by presenting an appeal. It
was dismissed vide an appellate order dated 27th March, 2003.
xii. Appellant then challenged this order of the Appellate Authority
before the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. A Single Judge of
the High Court allowed the writ petition vide judgment and order
dated 24th February, 2009. The order of dismissal stood quashed
and the appellant held entitled to “consequential benefits on his
having attained the age of superannuation, to which he would
have been entitled in the usual course and in law”.
xiii. Vijaya Bank, aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Single
Judge, carried the same in a writ appeal before the Division
Bench which, as noted above, succeeded. While the appellant’s
writ petition stood dismissed, the order of dismissal passed
by the Disciplinary Authority against the appellant was, thus,
confirmed.
Impugned Order
9. The Division Bench of the High Court framed two issues for its
determination: (i) whether the denial of the preliminary investigation
report prejudiced the charged officer (appellant before us) and
vitiated the proceedings and (ii) whether the stipulation of generally
questioning the charged officer regarding the circumstances appearing
against him in the evidence was a mandatory requirement under
Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations.
10. While deciding issue (i), reliance was placed by the High Court on the
decisions of this Court in Vijay Kumar Nigam v. State of MP11 and
Syndicate Bank & Ors. v. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati12 to hold that
the preliminary report is only to decide and assess whether it would
11 (1996) 11 SCC 599.
12 (2006) 3 SCC 150.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2009
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
be necessary to take any disciplinary action against the delinquent
officer and it does not form any foundation for passing the order.
The High Court further held that since all the documents relied upon
by the Inquiry Officer had been made available to the appellant
and the appellant’s representative having cross-examined the sole
witness for the management in extenso, furnishing of the preliminary
investigation report was not necessary; hence, no prejudice to the
appellant was caused thereby.
11. Regarding issue (ii), the Division Bench held: first, Regulation 6(17)
of the 1981 Regulations is pari materia Rule 8(19) of the All India
Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1955; hence, the decision of
this Court in Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra), which has since been
followed by this Court in the decision in Alok Kumar (supra) is
squarely applicable and compliance with such a regulation is merely
directory and not mandatory. Secondly, the High Court held, on
facts, that the Inquiry Officer had asked the appellant if he wished
to make any submission and in pursuance thereof, he did utilise
the opportunity by making detailed submissions; hence, though the
appellant was not generally questioned as required by Regulation
6(17), such provision had been substantially complied with.
12. As a sequitur, the High Court allowed the writ appeal and set aside
the order of the Single Judge.
Contentions of the parties
13. The appellant has laid siege to the impugned order on, inter alia,
the following grounds:
a. The High Court did not consider the decision rendered by this
Court in ECIL v. B. Karunakar13 and UCO Bank v. Rajinder
Lal Capoor14.
b. The High Court erroneously interpreted the principles of law
laid down in Venkatesh Gururao Kurati (supra).
c. The High Court did not consider that non-furnishing of the report
of preliminary inquiry has itself caused prejudice to the appellant
13 (1993) 4 SCC 727.
14 (2007) 6 SCC 694.
2010 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
as the appellant was unable to defend himself in respect of the
charges against him.
d. Reliance placed by the High Court on Sunil Kumar Banerjee
(supra) was misplaced. The said decision, rendered by a three-
Judge Bench referred to coordinate Bench decisions in K.C.
Mathew v. State of Travancore-Cochin15 and Bibhuti Bhusan
Das Gupta v. State of W.B.16 without, however, noticing an
earlier decision of a four-Judge Bench in Tara Singh v. State17
where it was held to be important to faithfully and fairly observe
Section 342 of the 1898 Code, the object whereof was to
afford the accused a fair and proper opportunity of explaining
the circumstances which appear against him. Though it was
held that every error or omission would not vitiate a trial and
that the question in each case would depend on the degree
of the error and upon whether prejudice had been occasioned
or likely to have been occasioned, in the present case, the
degree of error was at its peak since the Inquiry Officer did
not put a single question to the appellant in respect of the
circumstances appearing in the evidence against him and the
High Court failed to consider that calling upon the appellant to
place his version does not in any manner amount to compliance
of Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations, not to speak of
substantial compliance.
e. The authorities could not have considered the appellant to be
“deemed to be in service” post superannuation and ordering him
to be dismissed from service in the absence of any regulation
in the 1981 Regulations permitting such course of action is
absolutely illegal.
f. The actions of the appellant of giving oral sanctions for the TOD
was normal practice and was done in good faith.
14. Based on the aforesaid contentions, Mr. Nuli, learned senior counsel
for the appellant ably assisted by Ms. Akhila Wali, learned counsel
urged that the entire disciplinary proceedings including the order of
15 AIR 1956 SC 241
16 AIR 1969 SC 381
17 (1951) SCC 903
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2011
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
dismissal and the appellate order be set aside and the respondent
be ordered to release to the appellant full benefits as if he had never
been dismissed.
15. Per contra, Mr. Patil, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondent, defended the administrative actions challenged in
the writ petition and the impugned order on, inter alia, the following
grounds:
a. The High Court rightly decided that since the report of preliminary
inquiry was only to assess and decide whether disciplinary
proceedings should be initiated or not and had not formed the
foundation for passing the order of dismissal from service, denial
of the same to the appellant did not prejudice him.
b. The author of the preliminary inquiry report was the sole witness
for the management in the inquiry and whatever was recorded
by such witness in the preliminary inquiry report was spoken to
by him in course of the inquiry; whereafter the appellant had
cross-examined extensively. There was, thus, no question of
the appellant to feel aggrieved by non-furnishing of the report
of preliminary inquiry.
c. Qua Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations, the appellant
has not demonstrated any prejudice; moreover, the appellant
utilised the opportunity of making submissions when called upon
by the Inquiry Officer and, therefore, the High Court was right
in holding that the concerned regulation is not mandatory and
requires only to be substantially complied with.
d. The appellant did not ever raise any grievance in course of the
inquiry and even subsequently, in his representation against the
inquiry report or the appeal petition that non-compliance with
Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations had prejudiced him
in his defence. For the first time, the appellant raised such a
grievance in the writ petition which is nothing but an afterthought.
e. The decision in Tara Singh (supra) and Sunil Kumar Banerjee
(supra) operate in different legal domains and, therefore, Tara
Singh (supra) being a decision rendered in the criminal appellate
jurisdiction is not applicable in the present proceedings; on the
contrary, Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra) is pat on the point and
propriety demands that we follow the same.
2012 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
f. Continuation of disciplinary proceedings even after the appellant
had attained superannuation cannot be faulted because the
appellant was continued in service till such time the final order
of dismissal from service was passed and this is a permissible
course of action, not warranting interdiction.
Issues
16. Three broad issues emerge for decision:
(i) Whether denial of the report of preliminary inquiry prepared by
the officer entrusted by Vijaya Bank to conduct such inquiry, who
happened to be the sole management witness, was sufficient
to vitiate the regular inquiry that followed against the appellant?
(ii) Whether the failure/omission of the Inquiry Officer to generally
question the appellant on the circumstances appearing against
him in the evidence, as per Regulation 6(17) of the 1981
Regulations, vitiated the inquiry?
(iii) Whether continuation of disciplinary proceedings against the
appellant beyond superannuation was a permissible course of
action under the 1981 Regulations?
17. If indeed the answer to any or all the aforesaid issues is in favour
of the appellant, the relief that he could be entitled would then fall
for our consideration.
Analysis
18. We begin with issue no.1. Unlike the extensive jurisprudence available
on the furnishing of the final enquiry report, our research reveals that
there is significantly less jurisprudence on the issue of furnishing a
preliminary inquiry report. However, the decisions referred to below
provide sufficient light for us to rule on the question before us.
19. At the outset, we refer to the Constitution Bench decision in
Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. Union of India18. The said decision
succinctly delineates the purpose of a preliminary inquiry, albeit in the
context of government employees. Hon’ble K.N. Wanchoo, J. (as the
Chief Justice then was) speaking for the Bench observed as follows:
18 1963 SCC OnLine SC 42
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2013
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
“13. Generally therefore a preliminary enquiry is usually
held to determine whether a prima facie case for a
formal departmental enquiry is made out, and it is very
necessary that the two should not be confused. Even
where government does not intend to take action by way
of punishment against a temporary servant on a report of
bad work or misconduct a preliminary enquiry is usually
held to satisfy government that there is reason to dispense
with the services of a temporary employee or to revert
him to his substantive post, for as we have said already
government does not usually take action of this kind without
any reason. Therefore when a preliminary enquiry of this
nature is held in the case of a temporary employee or
a government servant holding a higher rank temporarily
it must not be confused with the regular departmental
enquiry (which usually follows such a preliminary enquiry)
when the government decides to frame charges and
get a departmental enquiry made in order that one of
the three major punishments already indicated may be
inflicted on the government servant. Therefore, so far as
the preliminary enquiry is concerned there is no question
of its being governed by Article 311(2) for that enquiry is
really for the satisfaction of government to decide whether
punitive action should be taken or action should be taken
under the contract or the rules in the case of a temporary
government servant or a servant holding higher rank
temporarily to which he has no right. In short a preliminary
enquiry is for the purpose of collection of facts in regard
to the conduct and work of a government servant in which
he may or may not be associated so that the authority
concerned may decide whether or not to subject the servant
concerned to the enquiry necessary under Article 311 for
inflicting one of the three major punishments mentioned
therein. Such a preliminary enquiry may even be held ex
parte, for it is merely for the satisfaction of government,
though usually for the sake of fairness, explanation is taken
from the servant concerned even as such an enquiry. But
at that stage he has no right to be heard for the enquiry
is merely for the satisfaction of the government and it
2014 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
is only when the government decides to hold a regular
departmental enquiry for the purpose of inflicting one of
the three major punishments that the government servant
gets the protection of Article 311 and all the rights that
that protection implies as already indicated above. There
must therefore be no confusion between the two enquiries
and it is only when the government proceeds to hold a
departmental enquiry for the purpose of inflicting on the
government servant one of the three major punishments
indicated in Article 311 that the government servant is
entitled to the protection of that Article. That is why this
Court emphasised in Parshotam Lal Dhingra case [(1958)
SCR 828] and in Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh
[(1955) 1 SCR 26] that the ‘motive or the inducing factor
which influences the government to take action under the
terms of the contract of employment or the specific service
rule is irrelevant’.”
20. A coordinate Bench in Krishna Chandra Tandon v. Union of
India19 incontrovertibly held that there is no requirement to furnish
a preliminary inquiry report when the enquiry officer has not relied
upon the same to reach the conclusions recorded in the inquiry
report after a regular inquiry. The relevant passage reads as follows:
“16. … It is very necessary for an authority which orders an
enquiry to be satisfied that there are prima facie grounds
for holding a disciplinary enquiry and, therefore, before
he makes up his mind he will either himself investigate or
direct his subordinates to investigate in the matter and it
is only after he receives the result of these investigations
that he can decide as to whether disciplinary action is
called for or not. Therefore, these documents of the
nature of inter-departmental communications between
officers preliminary to the holding of enquiry have really
no importance unless the Enquiry Officer wants to rely on
them for his conclusions. In that case it would only be right
that copies of the same should be given to the delinquent.
It is not the case here that either the Enquiry Officer or
19 (1974) 4 SCC 374
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2015
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
the CIT relied on the report of Shri R.N. Srivastava or any
other officer for his finding against the appellant. Therefore,
there is no substance in this submission.”
21. The concept of a preliminary inquiry and its ramifications have been
neatly summed up in Chandrama Tewari v. Union of India20. There,
a coordinate Bench of this Court held that:
“4. We have given our anxious consideration to the
submissions made on behalf of the appellant and we
have further considered the aforesaid authorities referred
to by the learned counsel for the appellant but we do not
find any merit in the appellant’s submissions to justify
interference with the High Court’s judgment. Article 311
of the Constitution requires that reasonable opportunity of
defence must be afforded to a government servant before
he is awarded major punishment of dismissal. It further
contemplates that disciplinary enquiry must be held in
accordance with the rules in a just and fair manner. The
procedure at the enquiry must be consistent with the
principles of natural justice. Principles of natural justice
require that the copy of the document if any relied upon
against the party charged should be given to him and
he should be afforded opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses and to produce his own witnesses in his defence.
If findings are recorded against the government servant
placing reliance on a document which may not have been
disclosed to him or the copy whereof may not have been
supplied to him during the enquiry when demanded, that
would contravene principles of natural justice rendering the
enquiry, and the consequential order of punishment illegal
and void. These principles are well settled by a catena of
decisions of this Court. We need not refer to them. However,
it is not necessary that each and every document must be
supplied to the delinquent government servant facing the
charges, instead only material and relevant documents
are necessary to be supplied to him. If a document even
though mentioned in the memo of charges is not relevant
20 (1987) Supp. SCC 518
2016 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
to the charges or if it is not referred to or relied upon by
the enquiry officer or the punishing authority in holding
the charges proved against the government servant, no
exception can be taken to the validity of the proceedings
or the order. If the document is not used against the party
charged the ground of violation of principles of natural
justice cannot successfully be raised. The violation of
principles of natural justice arises only when a document,
copy of which may not have been supplied to the party
charged when demanded is used in recording finding
of guilt against him. On a careful consideration of the
authorities cited on behalf of the appellant we find that
the obligation to supply copies of a document is confined
only to material and relevant documents and the enquiry
would be vitiated only if the non-supply of material and
relevant documents when demanded may have caused
prejudice to the delinquent officer.
***
9. It is now well settled that if copies of relevant and material
documents including the statement of witnesses recorded
in the preliminary enquiry or during investigation are not
supplied to the delinquent officer facing the enquiry and if
such documents are relied in holding the charges framed
against the officer, the enquiry would be vitiated for the
violation of principles of natural justice. Similarly, if the
statement of witnesses recorded during the investigation of
a criminal case or in the preliminary enquiry is not supplied
to the delinquent officer that would amount to denial of
opportunity of effective cross-examination. It is difficult to
comprehend exhaustively the facts and circumstances
which may lead to violation of principles of natural justice or
denial of reasonable opportunity of defence. This question
must be determined on the facts and circumstances of
each case. While considering this question it has to be
borne in mind that a delinquent officer is entitled to have
copies of material and relevant documents only which
may include the copy of statement of witnesses recorded
during the investigation or preliminary enquiry or the copy
of any other document which may have been relied on in
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2017
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
support of the charges. If a document has no bearing on
the charges or if it is not relied on by the enquiry officer
to support the charges, or if such document or material
was not necessary for the cross-examination of witnesses
during the enquiry, the officer cannot insist upon the supply
of copies of such documents, as the absence of copy of
such document will not prejudice the delinquent officer. The
decision of the question whether a document is material
or not will depend upon the facts and circumstances of
each case.”
22. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Narayan Dattatraya
Ramteerthakhar v. State of Maharashtra21 observed that:
“3. … It is then contended that the preliminary enquiry
was not properly conducted and, therefore, the enquiry
is vitiated by principles of natural justice. The preliminary
inquiry has nothing to do with the enquiry conducted after
issue of charge-sheet. The former action would be to find
whether disciplinary enquiry should be initiated against
the delinquent. After full-fledged enquiry was held, the
preliminary enquiry had lost its importance.”
23. Considering the aforesaid decisions as well as other decisions, a
coordinate Bench in Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat22 held that:
“45. In view of the above, it is evident that the evidence
recorded in preliminary inquiry cannot be used in regular
inquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it, and
opportunity to cross-examine the persons examined in
such inquiry is not given. Using such evidence would be
violative of the principles of natural justice.”
24. We may also profitably refer to the decision in Manoj Kumar v.
State of U.P.23 wherein it was held:
“6. …The order also states that a preliminary inquiry was
held to determine if a full-fledged departmental enquiry
was required after which the charge memo was served
21 (1997) 1 SCC 299
22 (2013) 4 SCC 301
23 (2018) 13 SCC 161
2018 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
with full opportunity of defence. The non-furnishing of the
preliminary inquiry report has therefore not prejudiced
the appellant in any manner or vitiated the departmental
proceedings.”
25. The upshot of the aforesaid decisions is that:
i. A preliminary inquiry is conducted for the purposes of determining
whether regular disciplinary proceedings are called for or not;
ii. A preliminary inquiry report is an internal document;
iii. A preliminary inquiry report or the findings therein cannot be
used to come to conclusions recorded in the report of inquiry if
such preliminary inquiry report/findings are based on oral and/or
documentary evidence which are obtained behind the back of
the charged employee and such oral/documentary evidence are
not presented in the inquiry in the presence of such employee;
iv. If a preliminary inquiry report or the findings therein are sought
to be relied on, the witnesses whose evidence was relied on
in preparing the same ought to be brought before the inquiry
officer and the charged officer afforded an opportunity to cross-
examine them;
v. If a preliminary inquiry report is sought to be relied upon in
the inquiry report, then such preliminary inquiry report must be
provided to the delinquent employee;
vi. Once a chargesheet is drawn up and has been provided to the
charged officer detailing the charges, the preliminary inquiry
report is of no consequence and need not be provided to him.
26. Having noted the purpose and reason for conducting a preliminary
inquiry, we now proceed to answer the question as to whether
non-furnishing of the report to the appellant led to the disciplinary
proceedings being vitiated.
27. In the instant case, a perusal of the inquiry report reveals that no
reliance upon the preliminary inquiry report has been placed by the
inquiry officer. Therefore, non-furnishing of the inquiry report to the
appellant is inconsequential.
28. However, an interesting argument that has been made is that the
non-furnishing of the preliminary inquiry report has caused prejudice
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2019
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
to the appellant because such non-furnishing of the report disabled
him to effectively cross-examine the witness. This argument, while
novel, is not impressive. We come to this ineluctable conclusion since
the appellant was duly provided with the deposition of the witness
as per the rules, was allowed to cross-examine the witness on the
basis of the statements made by him and the inquiry officer placed
no reliance upon the preliminary inquiry report, but only upon the
statements of such witness recorded during chief examination and
cross-examination.
29. We, therefore, find no violation of the principles of natural justice;
also, no prejudice has been caused to the charged officer for non-
furnishing of the preliminary inquiry report.
30. This conclusion, is however, premised on the caveat that no rule,
statutory or otherwise, mandates the furnishing of the preliminary
inquiry report in this particular case.
31. We now proceed to answer the next question which is central to the
dispute, i.e., what is the nature of duty that Regulation 6(17) of the
1981 Regulations casts on an Inquiry Officer? Is the provision directory
or mandatory, or is it both directory and mandatory depending on
the fact situation in each case?
32. In Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra), a three-Judge Bench of this Court
had the occasion to consider Rule 8(19) of the All India Services
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 196924, which is pari materia Rule
6(17) of the 1981 Regulations. A point having been taken before the
Bench by the delinquent officer that Rule 8(19) was observed in the
breach by the Inquiry Officer, it was ruled by Hon’ble O. Chinappa
Reddy, J. as follows:
“3. … It may be noticed straightway that this provision is
akin to Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
1898 and Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code of
1973. It is now well established that mere non-examination
or defective examination under Section 342 of the 1898
Code is not a ground for interference unless prejudice is
established, vide, K.C. Mathew v. State of Travancore-
Cochin (AIR 1956 SC 241); Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta
24 1969 Rules
2020 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
v. State of W.B. (AIR 1969 SC 381). We are similarly of
the view that failure to comply with the requirements of
Rule 8(19) of the 1969 Rules does not vitiate the enquiry
unless the delinquent officer is able to establish prejudice.
In this case the learned Single Judge of the High Court as
well as the learned Judges of the Division Bench found
that the appellant was in no way prejudiced by the failure
to observe the requirement of Rule 8(19). The appellant
cross-examined the witnesses himself, submitted his
defence in writing in great detail and argued the case
himself at all stages. The appellant was fully alive to the
allegations against him and dealt with all aspects of the
allegations in his written defence. We do not think that he
was in the least prejudiced by the failure of the Enquiry
Officer to question him in accordance with Rule 8(19).”
33. It follows from the above passage that the Bench in Sunil Kumar
Banerjee (supra), while overruling the contention of the delinquent
officer, held that (i) Rule 8(19) of the 1969 Rules was akin to Section
342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 189825 and Section 313 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 197326; and (ii) in terms of the law
laid down in K.C. Mathew (supra) and Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta
(supra), mere non-examination or defective examination under Section
342 of the 1898 Code is not a ground for interference unless prejudice
is established. On facts, the Bench was of the opinion that though
the Inquiry Officer had not examined the delinquent officer, he was
not prejudiced at all thereby since he was alive to the allegations
against him, had cross-examined the witnesses himself, submitted
his defence in writing in great detail and argued the case himself
at all stages.
34. Sections 342 and 313 of the 1898 and 1973 Codes, respectively,
though bear close resemblance, are not exactly the same. We may,
for ease of understanding, quote the same below:
342. (1) For the purpose of enabling the accused to
explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence
against him, the court may, at any stage of any inquiring
25 1898 Code
26 1973 Code
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2021
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
or trial without previously warning the accused, put such
questions to him as the court considers necessary, and
shall, for the purpose aforesaid, question him generally
on the case after the witnesses for the prosecution have
been examined and before he is called on for his defence.
(2) The accused shall not render himself liable to
punishment by refusing to answer such questions, or by
giving false answers to them; but the court and the jury
(if any) may draw such inference from such refusal or
answers as it thinks just.
(3) The answers given by the accused may be taken into
consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence
for or against him in any other inquiry into or trial for, any
other offence which such answers may tend to show he
has committed.
(4) No oath shall be administered to the accused when
he is examined under sub-section (1).
313. Power to examine the accused.—
(1) In every inquiry or trial, for the purpose of enabling the
accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing
in the evidence against him, the Court—
(a) may at any stage, without previously warning
the accused put such questions to him as the Court
considers necessary;
(b) shall, after the witnesses for the prosecution
have been examined and before he is called on for
his defence, question him generally on the case:
Provided that in a summons-case, where the Court
has dispensed with the personal attendance of the
accused, it may also dispense with his examination
under clause (b).
(2) No oath shall be administered to the accused when
he is examined under sub-section (1).
(3) The accused shall not render himself liable to
punishment by refusing to answer such questions, or by
giving false answers to them.
2022 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(4) The answers given by the accused may be taken into
consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence
for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any
other offence which such answers may tend to show he
has committed.
(5) The Court may take help of Prosecutor and Defence
Counsel in preparing relevant questions which are to be
put to the accused and the Court may permit filing of
written statement by the accused as sufficient compliance
of this section.
35. In K.C. Mathew (supra), a three-Judge Bench while considering the
impact of breach of Section 342 of the 1898 Code observed as follows:
“7. The next argument was that the examination of each
accused under Section 342 of the Criminal Procedure
Code was defective and that that caused prejudice. We
agree that the examination was not as full or as clear as
it should have been but we are not satisfied that there
was any prejudice.
8. It is to be noted that the question of prejudice was not
raised in either of the courts below nor was it raised in the
grounds of appeal to this Court. The point was taken for
the first time in the arguments before us and even there
counsel was unable to say that his clients had in fact
been prejudiced; all he could urge was that there was a
possibility of prejudice.
9. We agree that the omission to take the objection in
the grounds of appeal is not necessarily fatal; everything
must depend on the facts of the case; but the fact that
the objection was not taken at an earlier stage, if it could
and should have been taken, is a material circumstance
that will necessarily weigh heavily against the accused
particularly when he has been represented by counsel
throughout. The Explanation to Section 537 of the Criminal
Procedure Code expressly requires the Court to
‘have regard to the fact whether the objection could
and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the
proceedings’.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2023
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
10. Another strong circumstance is this : the petition for
appeal does not set out the questions that, according to
the appellants, they should have been asked nor does it
indicate the answers that they would have given if they
had been asked. Again, though that is not necessarily fatal
ordinarily it will be very difficult to sustain a plea of prejudice
unless the Court is told just where the shoe pinches. It
is true that in certain exceptional cases prejudice, or a
reasonable likelihood of prejudice, may be so patent on
the face of the facts that nothing more is needed; but that
class of case must be exceptional. After all, the only person
who can really tell us whether he was in fact prejudiced is
the accused; and if there is real prejudice he can at once
state the facts and leave the Court to judge their worth.
But if the attitude of the accused, whether in person or
through the mouth of his counsel, is: ‘I don’t know what I
would have said. I still have to think that up. But I might
have said this, that or the other’, then there will ordinarily
be little difficulty in concluding that there neither was,
nor could have been, prejudice. Here, as elsewhere, the
Court is entitled to conclude that a person who deliberately
withholds facts within his special knowledge and refuses
to give the Court that assistance which is its right and
due, has nothing of value which he can disclose and that
if he did disclose anything that would at once expose the
hollowness of his cause.”
(emphasis ours)
36. Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta (supra) is also a decision of a three-
Judge Bench. The question arising for decision is neatly summed
up in paragraph 4, reading as follows:
“4. … The point in issue is whether the pleader can
represent the accused for purposes of Section 342 and
whether the examination of the pleader in place of the
accused is sufficient compliance with the section in a case
where the Magistrate has dispensed with the personal
attendance of the accused and permitted him to appear
by a pleader. On this question there is a sharp conflict
2024 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of judicial opinion. Most of the decisions up to 1962 are
referred to in Prova Debi v. Mrs Fernandes (AIR 1962
Cal 203). In that case a Full Bench of the Calcutta High
Court by a majority decision held that the Magistrate may
in his discretion examine the pleader on behalf of the
accused under Section 342. This view is supported by
numerous decisions of other High Courts, but from time
to time many judges expressed vigorous dissents and
came to the opposite conclusion. The two sides of the
question are ably discussed in the majority and minority
judgments of the Calcutta case. After a full examination
of all the decided cases on the subject, we are inclined
to agree with the minority opinion.”
(emphasis ours)
37. Section 342 of the 1898 Code was considered and it was explained
in the following words:
“5. Sub-section (1) of Section 342 consists of two parts.
The first part gives a discretion to the court to question
the accused at any stage of an inquiry or trial without
previously warning him. Under the second part the court
is required to question him generally on the case after the
witnesses for the prosecution have been examined and
before he is called for his defence. The second part is
mandatory and imposes upon the court a duty to examine
the accused at the close of the prosecution case in order
to give him an opportunity to explain any circumstances
appearing against him in the evidence and to say in his
defence what he wants to say in his own words. He is
not bound to answer the questions but if he refuses to
answer or gives false answers, the consequences may
be serious, for under sub-section (2) the court may draw
such inference from the refusal or the false answer as it
thinks fit. Under sub-section (3) the answers given by the
accused may be taken into consideration in the inquiry or
trial. His statement is material upon which the court may
act, and which may prove his innocence, (see State of
Maharashtra v. Laxman Jairam (1962 Supp 3 SCR 230).
Under sub-section (4) no oath is administered to him. The
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2025
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
reason is that when he is examined under Section 342,
he is not a witness. … ”
(emphasis ours)
38. Having read the extracted passages of the larger Bench decisions
in between the lines, it appears to us imperative to highlight certain
points. In K.C. Mathew (supra), the plea of defective examination was
raised for the first time in course of arguments before this Court and
not at any previous stage, though fully available to be raised since the
accused were being represented by a counsel. The Bench, having
expressly referred to the provision in Section 537 of the 1898 Code,
which was akin to Section 465(1) of the 1973 Code, considered the
inability of the accused to demonstrate the prejudice suffered by him
in the process of conviction and sentence as one of the grounds for
declining relief. Obviously, on the face of Section 537 of the 1898
Code, a failure of justice had to occasion by any error or irregularity
for being interdicted which was not the case in K.C. Mathew (supra).
Similarly in Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta (supra), this Court observed
that mere non-examination or defective examination under Section
342 is not a ground for interference unless prejudice is established
and, therefore, even in that case, since such plea of prejudice was
not raised in previous rounds of litigation and the non-examination
under Section 342 did not cause any prejudice, the conviction and
sentence was not interfered with looking to the facts in that case.
What is important and stands out for the present case is that the
second limb of Section 342 of the 1898 Code was interpreted by
the three-Judge Bench to be mandatory.
39. This interpretation of Section 342 of the 1898 Code in Bibhuti
Bhusan Das Gupta (supra) also appears to align with the previous
larger Bench decision of four Judges in Tara Singh (supra) wherein,
Hon’ble Vivian Bose, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the
Bench, had the occasion to explain in detail the requirements of
examination of an accused under Section 342. The relevant passage
is extracted below:
“18. It is important therefore that an accused should
be properly examined under Section 342 and, as their
Lordships of the Privy Council indicated in Dwarkanath
Varma v. Emperor (AIR 1933 PC 124), if a point in the
2026 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
evidence is considered important against the accused and
the conviction is intended to be based upon it, then it is right
and proper that the accused should be questioned about
the matter and be given an opportunity of explaining it if
he so desires. This is an important and salutary provision
and I cannot permit it to be slurred over. I regret to find that
in many cases scant attention is paid to it, particularly in
the Sessions Courts. But whether the matter arises in the
Sessions Court or in that of the Committing Magistrate, it
is important that the provisions of Section 342 should be
fairly and faithfully observed.
23. Section 342 requires the accused to be examined for
the purpose of enabling him “to explain any circumstances
appearing in the evidence against him”. Now it is evident
that when the Sessions Court is required to make the
examination under this section, the evidence referred to is
the evidence in the Sessions Court and the circumstances
which appear against the accused in that court. It is not
therefore enough to read over the questions and answers
put in the Committing Magistrate’s Court and ask the
accused whether he has anything to say about them. In
the present case, there was not even that. The appellant
was not asked to explain the circumstances appearing
in the evidence against him but was asked whether the
statements made before the Committing Magistrate and
his answers given there were correctly recorded. That does
not comply with the requirements of the section.
38. The whole object of Section 342 is to afford the accused
a fair and proper opportunity of explaining circumstances
which appear against him. The questioning must therefore
be fair and must be couched in a form which an ignorant or
illiterate person will be able to appreciate and understand.
Even when an accused person is not illiterate, his mind
is apt to be perturbed when he is facing a charge of
murder. He is therefore in no fit position to understand
the significance of a complex question. Fairness therefore
requires that each material circumstance should be put
simply and separately in a way that an illiterate mind, or one
which is perturbed or confused, can readily appreciate and
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2027
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
understand. I do not suggest that every error or omission
in this behalf would necessarily vitiate a trial because I am
of opinion that errors of this type fall within the category of
curable irregularities. Therefore, the question in each case
depends upon the degree of the error and upon whether
prejudice has been occasioned or is likely to have been
occasioned.
39. In my opinion, the disregard of the provisions of Section
342, Criminal Procedure Code, is so gross in this case
that I feel there is grave likelihood of prejudice. But this
is not the only error. … ”
40. Further reference can profitably be made to the decision of another
three-Judge Bench in Rama Shankar Singh v. State of West
Bengal27 where the scope of Section 342 of the 1898 Code was
examined in the light of the relevant Sessions Judge rolling up several
distinct matters of evidence in a single question. It was held thus:
“15. In our view, the learned Sessions Judge in rolling up
several distinct matters of evidence in a single question
acted irregularly. Section 342 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure by the first sub-section provides, insofar as
it is material: “For the purpose of enabling the accused
to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence
against him, the Court … shall … question him generally
on the case after the witnesses for the prosecution have
been examined and before he is called on for his defence”.
Duty is thereby imposed upon the Court to question the
accused generally in a case after the witnesses for the
prosecution have been examined to enable the accused
to explain any circumstance appearing against him. This
is a necessary corollary of the presumption of innocence
on which our criminal jurisprudence is founded. The object
of the section is to afford to the accused an opportunity
of showing that the circumstance relied upon by the
prosecution which may be prima facie against him, is not
true or is consistent with his innocence. The opportunity
must be real and adequate. Questions must be so framed
27 AIR 1962 SC 1239
2028 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
as to give to the accused clear notice of the circumstances
relied upon by the prosecution, and must give him an
opportunity to render such explanation as he can of that
circumstance. Each question must be so framed that the
accused may be able to understand it and to appreciate
what use the prosecution desires to make of the evidence
against him. Examination of the accused under Section 342
is not intended to be an idle formality, it has to be carried
out in the interest of justice and fairplay to the accused :
by a slipshod examination which is the result of imperfect
appreciation of the evidence, idleness or negligence the
position of the accused cannot be permitted to be made
more difficult than what it is in a trial for an offence.”
(emphasis ours)
41. At this juncture, it would be worthwhile to notice the decision of another
three-Judge Bench of this Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v.
State of Maharashtra28, where Section 313 of the 1973 Code was
considered and it was held by Hon’ble S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J. (as
His Lordship then was) that it is vital that any circumstance adverse
to the accused must be put to him under Section 313; otherwise it
must be completely excluded from consideration because the accused
did not have any chance to explain them. Much the same view was
expressed by Hon’ble A. Varadarajan, J. (as His Lordship then was)
in his concurring opinion to the effect that the circumstances not put
to the appellant in his examination under S. 313 of the 1973 Code
have to be completely excluded from consideration.
42. Quite recently, another three-Judge Bench in Maheshwar Tigga v.
State of Jharkhand29 had the occasion to rule that:
“8. It stands well settled that circumstances not put to an
accused under Section 313 CrPC cannot be used against
him, and must be excluded from consideration. In a criminal
trial, the importance of the questions put to an accused
are basic to the principles of natural justice as it provides
him the opportunity not only to furnish his defence, but
28 (1984) 4 SCC 116
29 (2020) 10 SCC 108
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2029
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
also to explain the incriminating circumstances against
him. A probable defence raised by an accused is sufficient
to rebut the accusation without the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt.”
43. Mr. Patil is correct that Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra) is a precedent
that provides adequate guidance for deciding the point under
consideration, since it dealt with a pari materia provision applicable
in course of a departmental inquiry. Obviously, he hinted that we
are bound by such precedent and there is no way a different view
could be taken.
44. In normal circumstances, there could be little reason not to accept
such a contention being bound by the precedent of a larger bench.
However, the vast and expansive development of law in the field
of administrative law in our country since the time Sunil Kumar
Banerjee (supra) was decided (almost four and half decades back),
especially on the rule of fairness in administrative action which is
now acknowledged in the Indian context as the third limb of natural
justice, cannot be overlooked. Coupled with that is the decision in S.L.
Kapoor (supra), authored by none other than Hon’ble O. Chinappa
Reddy, J. himself and the subsequent trio of Constitution Bench
decisions in Olga Tellis (supra), Tulsiram Patel (supra) and A. R.
Antulay (supra) upholding that violation of a mandatory provision
of law relating to fair hearing is in itself prejudice to the person
proceeded against and no need to demonstrate prejudice would
arise. It is of particular importance when His Lordship frowned that
“it ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person
who has been denied justice is not prejudiced.” (emphasis ours). It is
indeed paradoxical for someone who has denied justice to a person
to claim that that person, who was denied justice, is not prejudiced.
45. With the utmost respect and reverence at our command for the
three-Judge Bench that had the occasion to decide Sunil Kumar
Banerjee (supra), our analysis of the legal position reveals that the
precedential value of the said decision stands significantly diminished
for reasons more than one and that such decision must be treated to
be an authority for what it decided based on the reasons assigned
therein.
46. First, there was no independent consideration of Rule 8(19) of the
1969 Rules in the context of the procedural safeguards that delinquent
2030 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
officers under such relevant rules are entitled to claim and enforce.
Consequently, and most significantly, the impact of the words “may”
and “shall” appearing in the same provision do not appear to have
been considered. We propose to interpret Regulation 6(17) of the
1981 Regulations a little later.
47. Secondly, the approach of the larger Bench in interpreting Rule 8(19)
of the 1969 Rules was completely based on consideration of Section
342 of the 1898 Code and the decisions in K.C. Mathew (supra)
and Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta (supra). The law on Section 313
of the 1973 Code, which replaced Section 342 of the 1898 Code,
and the rights of an accused have been explained in detail in several
subsequent decisions of this Court, some of which are noticed above.
Since examination under Section 313 of the 1973 Code has been
recognised as a part of natural justice, failure of the court to place
the circumstances appearing in the evidence to the accused by
putting appropriate questions resulting in his improper examination
in a given case could result in the trial being held to be vitiated. To
make the examination under Section 313 of the 1973 Code more
effective, the Parliament has even amended such provision on
the last day of the year 2009. In view thereof and by passage of
time, the prejudice theory in criminal trials qua Section 313, Cr. PC
examination seems to have suffered some dilution; however, since
we are not dealing with an appeal arising out of a criminal trial, we
may not be understood to have laid down any law in this judgment
that could be cited as a precedent before courts trying criminal
offences. Nonetheless, we hold that K.C. Mathew (supra) was not
the only decision providing guidance. There were other decisions
of high authority which might not have been cited before the Bench
in Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra).
48. Thirdly, assuming that the prejudice theory does have relevance, it is
reasonable to assume that the principle on the basis of which Rama
Shankar Singh (supra) and K.C. Mathew (supra) were decided
by Their Lordships must have been predicated on a consideration
of Section 537 of the 1898 Code in terms whereof, it has to be
demonstrated by the accused, to secure a declaration that the trial
or inquiry stood vitiated, that a failure of justice had occasioned
arising out of the procedure adopted by the court. Insofar as the
1969 Rules or the 1981 Regulations are concerned, there is no such
provision therein like Section 537 of the 1898 Code or Section 465
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2031
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
of the 1973 Code. This marks a significant distinction in trials under
the 1898 Code/1973 Code and inquiries under the 1969 Rules/1981
Regulations. In our considered opinion, this vital aspect cannot be
excluded from our consideration.
49. Fourthly, Bibhuti Bhusan Das Gupta (supra) is a decision which
appears to have been referred only in passing in Sunil Kumar
Banerjee (supra) without noting the law declared therein. The trial
was held to be vitiated for breach of Section 342 of the 1898 Code
since the court had examined the counsel for the accused instead
of the accused. Additionally, the decision in Bibhuti Bhusan Das
Gupta (supra) spelt out in clear terms which parts of Section 342
were directory and which parts were mandatory. Section 342, as
explained by the Bench in such decision, would have a bearing on
our thought process as would be evident from the discussions that
follow.
50. Fifthly, the still larger Bench decision in Tara Singh (supra) went
unnoticed in Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra).
51. Fifthly, it cannot escape notice that in a criminal trial, fate of the
accused is decided by a judicial officer who is an impartial and neutral
arbiter whereas, more often than not, fate of a delinquent officer/
employee hangs on the decisions of inquiry officers who are members
of the same organisation and function under the same employer.
Not that we are sceptical of members of the same organisation
functioning as inquiry officers, which could be dictated by necessity,
but the level of impartiality and neutrality can, in certain cases, be
questionable. This is a vital circumstance which does not appear to
have been considered.
52. Finally, and most importantly, there is a significant difference between
the stages where Section 342, 1898 Code/Section 313, 1973 Code
on the one hand and Rule 8(19) of the 1969 Rules/Regulation
6(17) of the 1981 Regulations on the other, apply. In a criminal
trial, putting questions to the accused by the court to enable him
to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him
under the relevant provision (Sections 342/313) is contemplated at
two stages – (a) before the prosecution concludes its evidence and
(b) after evidence is concluded by the prosecution but before the
accused leads evidence in defence. While in respect of (a) above it
is discretionary for the court to question the accused, qua (b) above,
2032 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
it is mandatory for the court – as explained in Bibhuti Bhusan Das
Gupta (supra). However, the procedure is not exactly the same in
a domestic inquiry of the nature under consideration. In terms of
the procedure for holding inquiry, the examination of the nature
contemplated by Regulation 6(17) is not to be resorted to in the midst
of evidence being led by the management. After the management
closes its evidence, the charged officer has to be given opportunity to
lead evidence in defence. The charged officer is under no obligation
to lead evidence but if he opts therefor, he does so at his own risk
and peril and has to bear the consequences, viz. he cannot then
claim that the Inquiry Officer is bound to question him generally on the
circumstances available in the evidence against him. If the charged
officer elects to lead defence evidence, it could include witnesses
other than the charged officer; or, it could include him as well along
with the other witnesses. The charged officer may even opt not to
examine any other witness but only himself. After the evidence of the
defence witnesses is recorded and evidence of the defence stands
closed, the stage for Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulations, or for
that matter Rule 8(19) of the 1969 Rules, is reached. The difference
is significant, as we presently propose to explain in the light of the
aforesaid options available to the charged officer.
53. Interestingly, Regulation 6(17) as well as Rule 8(19) refers to both
‘may’ and ‘shall’. While the first part of Regulation 6(17) refers to
‘may’, the second part refers to ‘shall’. To enable the charged officer
to explain circumstances in the evidence appearing against him,
the provision confers a discretion on the Inquiry Officer as well as
imposes a mandatory duty on him. It is discretionary for the Inquiry
Officer, to put questions to the charged officer if he is himself a
witness for the defence, whereas, if the charged officer has not
examined himself as a witness for the defence, the mandate of the
law is that the Inquiry Officer shall generally question the charged
officer on the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him.
54. The use of ‘may’ and ‘shall’ in the same provision does imply that
Regulation 6(17) means what it says. The words ‘may’ and ‘shall’ have
been used to mean ‘may’ and ‘shall’, respectively, and we cannot
possibly conceive of any rule of construction which would lead us
to assume that the framers intended that ‘shall’ in the second part
of Regulation 6(17) should also be read and understood as ‘may’.
Use of the word ‘shall’, in our opinion, is deliberate to denote that
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2033
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
it is not interchangeable with ‘may’; if it were so, the framers would
have straightaway used ‘may’ instead of ‘shall’ having known that
‘may’ has been used in the first part. Couching of the provision in
such language with ‘may’ and ‘shall’ having distinct connotations and
consequences and bringing about different outcomes in the course
of one and the same inquiry unhesitatingly signals that while the
first part of Regulation 6(17) is directory, the second part thereof is
mandatory.
55. We, therefore, unhesitatingly hold that the Inquiry Officer by not
generally questioning the appellant on the circumstances available
in the evidence, which were unfavourable or adverse to such
officer, failed to perform a mandatory duty. Any such circumstance,
which was unfavourable or adverse to the appellant, should have
been excluded from the Inquiry Officer’s consideration. It would
not commend acceptance that though the Inquiry Officer acted in
derogation of the 1981 Regulations, nevertheless, his action must
to be upheld on the specious ground that the appellant has failed to
demonstrate prejudice. Neither Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra) nor
Alok Kumar (supra) examined the issue from our standpoint and in
view of the trio – the Constitution Bench decisions in Tulsiram Patel
(supra), Olga Tellis (supra) and A.R. Antulay (supra) - which were
rendered after Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra) and were not noticed
in Alok Kumar (supra), the ratio of the latter decisions may not bind
us. Alok Kumar (supra) relied on Haryana Financial Corporation
v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja30. In Ram Prakash Singh (supra), we
have considered the entire issue of the prejudice theory threadbare
and articulated, as per our understanding, how incomplete reading
of the Constitution Bench decision in B. Karunakar (supra) has
resulted in dilution of its ratio. True it is, the High Court was bound by
Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra) and Alok Kumar (supra) but, in our
opinion, the said decisions cannot come to the aid of the respondent.
56. We have considered the reasoning of the High Court that the
appellant was extended an opportunity by the Inquiry Officer to make
his submissions before the evidence was closed. However, such
an opportunity does not really match the nature of duty cast on the
Inquiry Officer under Regulation 6(17). Such regulation requires the
30 (2008) 9 SCC 31
2034 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Inquiry Officer to question the charged officer, if he has not examined
himself in defence, on the circumstances appearing in the evidence
that are unfavourable or adverse to him. The purpose thereof is to
extend an opportunity to the charged officer to explain away such
unfavourable or adverse circumstances. This is one of the several
procedural safeguards that the 1981 Regulations envisages. The
duty cast and the opportunity extended are not equivalent. The
inquiry under Regulation 6 being quasi-judicial in nature, Regulation
6(17) places an onerous duty on the Inquiry Officer (who is generally
untrained in law) to seriously apply his mind to the evidence on
record and to indicate to the charged officer, as part of the process
of his decision making, that circumstances exist which could weigh
in his mind while arriving at the final findings in the report of inquiry.
Once indicated, the charged officer may or may not explain away the
circumstances but to offer an opportunity to have his say recorded
without indication of the circumstances existing does not and would
not amount to substantial compliance of Regulation 6(17).
57. Having said that, we cannot be oblivious of the fact that the appellant
did not raise any effective objection as to the failure of the Inquiry
Officer to strictly adhere to Regulation 6(17) at any stage prior to
invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. There being a failure
of the Inquiry Officer to question the charged officer, the appellant
ought to have raised the same before the disciplinary authority at
the first instance; and, even if he did not so raise, he ought to have
raised such objection before the appellate authority while he presented
his appeal. If such an objection is not raised at any of the two tiers
and the omission to do so is not explained in the writ petition, the
court may infer that the charged officer was not seriously affected
by non-adherence to Regulation 6(17) and it would be open to it to
pass an appropriate order based on the inference drawn.
58. In the present case, the appellant did not raise any objection in this
behalf before the disciplinary authority but raised the point, generally,
of non-adherence to Regulation 6 before the appellate authority.
Unfortunately, the issue was missed and not addressed because, as we
propose to elaborately refer in the following paragraphs, the appellate
authority devoted its attention more to deal with another significant
objection raised by the appellant and negatived it by assigning lengthy
reasons which, however, do not appeal to us to be convincing. Be
that as it may, the appellant is justified in voicing a grievance before
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2035
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
us that he had not been extended fair, reasonable and adequate
opportunity to defend himself in terms of Regulation 6 which, in turn,
infringed his right protected by Article 14 of the Constitution.
59. The other important aspect, which merits our consideration and
touched upon by us in the earlier paragraph in very brief, admittedly,
was not argued before us by Mr. Nuli. We have noted that such point
was raised before the Single Judge, but, without success. However,
we had the appeal listed once again after reserving judgment to
ascertain Mr. Patil’s view on such point bearing in mind the power of
an appellate court under Order XLI Rule 33, Code of Civil Procedure,
1908. The appellant had vehemently contended before the appellate
authority that initially, the disciplinary authority had proposed to impose
upon the appellant the penalty of compulsory retirement from service.
The Chief Vigilance Officer31 concurred with such proposal of the
disciplinary authority. The file was then placed before the Central
Vigilance Commission32. However, the CVC rejected the proposal of
both the disciplinary authority and the CVO and instead recommended
that the charged officer be not shown any leniency since he has been
found guilty of financial irregularities and, therefore, be ‘dismissed’
from service. According to the appellant, the disciplinary authority
acting on the dictates of the CVC proceeded to dismiss him from
service. Appellant’s gravamen was that the recommendation of
the CVC was never made available to him, affecting his right to a
fair opportunity of defence. When challenged before the appellate
authority, such challenge was rejected on the ground that the CVC
recommendation is a privileged document and that the appellant has
violated the expected code of conduct by referring to such internal
documents which he could not have accessed in normal due course.
60. In SBI v. D.C. Aggarwal33, the question arising for decision was
noted in paragraph 1. The same reads:
“Can disciplinary authority while imposing punishment,
major or minor, act on material which is neither supplied
nor shown to the delinquent is the only issue of substance,
which arises for consideration in this appeal, filed by …?
31 CVO
32 CVC
33 (1993) 1 SCC 13
2036 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
61. In a case almost identical to the present one, this Court while
answering the aforesaid question held that when the disciplinary
authority accepts the recommendation of the CVC which is at variance
with the original proposal of the disciplinary authority, it is incumbent
upon the authority to furnish a copy of the CVC recommendation
to the charged employee before acting on such recommendation.
It was held thus:
“5. Reliance was placed on sub-rule (5) of Rule 50 which
reads as under:
‘(5) Orders made by the Disciplinary Authority or
the Appointing Authority as the case may be under
sub-rules (3) and (4) shall be communicated to the
employee concerned, who shall also be supplied with
a copy of the report of inquiry, if any.’
It was urged that copy of the inquiry report having been
supplied to the respondent the rule was complied with
and the High Court committed an error in coming to
conclusion that principle of natural justice was violated.
Learned Additional Solicitor General urged that the
principle of natural justice having been incorporated
and the same having been observed the Court was not
justified in misinterpreting the rule. The learned counsel
urged that the Bank was very fair to the respondent and
the disciplinary authority after application of mind and
careful analysis of the material on record on its own
evaluation, uninfluenced by the CVC recommendation
passed the order. It was emphasised that if the exercise
would have been mechanical the disciplinary authority
would not have disagreed with CVC recommendations on
punishment. Learned counsel submitted that, in any case,
the disciplinary authority having passed detailed order
discussing every material on record and the respondent
having filed appeal there was no prejudice caused to him.
None of these submissions are of any help. The order is
vitiated not because of mechanical exercise of powers
or for non-supply of the inquiry report but for relying and
acting on material which was not only irrelevant but could
not have been looked into. Purpose of supplying document
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2037
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
is to contest its veracity or give explanation. Effect of non-
supply of the report of Inquiry Officer before imposition of
punishment need not be gone into nor it is necessary to
consider validity of sub-rule (5). But non-supply of CVC
recommendation which was prepared behind the back of
respondent without his participation, and one does not know
on what material which was not only sent to the disciplinary
authority but was examined and relied on, was certainly
violative of procedural safeguard and contrary to fair and
just inquiry. From the letter produced by the respondent,
the authenticity of which has been verified by the learned
Additional Solicitor General, it appears the Bank turned
down the request of the respondent for a copy of CVC
recommendation as ‘The correspondence with the Central
Vigilance Commission is a privileged communication and
cannot be forwarded as the order passed by the appointing
authority deals with the recommendation of the CVC which
is considered sufficient’. Taking action against an employee
on confidential document which is the foundation of order
exhibits complete misapprehension about the procedure
that is required to be followed by the disciplinary authority.
May be that the disciplinary authority has recorded its own
findings and it may be coincidental that reasoning and
basis of returning the finding of guilt are same as in the
CVC report but it being a material obtained behind back
of the respondent without his knowledge or supplying of
any copy to him the High Court in our opinion did not
commit any error in quashing the order. Non-supply of the
Vigilance report was one of the grounds taken in appeal.
But that was so because the respondent prior to service
of the order passed by the disciplinary authority did not
have any occasion to know that CVC had submitted
some report against him. The submission of the learned
Additional Solicitor General that CVC recommendations
are confidential, copy of which, could not be supplied
cannot be accepted. Recommendations of Vigilance
prior to initiation of proceedings are different than CVC
recommendation which was the basis of the order passed
by the disciplinary authority.”
(emphasis ours)
2038 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
62. A similar principle was reiterated in Mohd. Quaramuddin v. State
of A.P.34 as follows:
“3. On merits the tribunal came to the conclusion that
the principle of natural justice had been violated in that
the delinquent was not supplied a copy of the Vigilance
Commission Report although it formed part of the record of
the enquiry and material which the disciplinary authority had
taken into consideration. The tribunal observed that where
such a material which the disciplinary authority relies on is
not disclosed to the delinquent it must be held that he was
denied the opportunity of being heard, meaning thereby
that the audi alteram partem rule had been violated. In the
present case the tribunal found that the directions to this
effect found in the Government Memorandum No. 821/
Services-C/69-8 dated 30-3-1971 had not been adhered
to. Had the tribunal not come to the conclusion that the
suit was barred by limitation, it would have allowed the
appeal preferred by the delinquent.”
63. In an even earlier decision, i.e., Brij Nandan Kansal v. State of
U.P.35, this Court was seized of a similar question. The brief facts
therein were that the appellant, Brij Nandan Kansal, was in the service
of the State of Uttar Pradesh as a member of the U.P. Civil Service
(Executive Branch). He was posted as Regional Transport Magistrate
at Bareilly between June 1962 to October 1964. A number of charges
were framed against the appellant and the State Government referred
the matter to the U.P. Administrative Tribunal constituted under the
U.P. Disciplinary Proceedings (Administrative Tribunal) Rules, 1947
for enquiry into those charges. Out of six charges framed against
the appellant therein, the Tribunal recorded the finding that the first
charge was not proved but it recorded findings against the appellant
therein in respect of the remaining five charges. The Governor issued
a show-cause notice to the appellant therein calling upon him to show
cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service. A detailed
reply was submitted by the appellant commenting on the findings
recorded by the Tribunal on each and every charge. The Tribunal
34 (1994) 5 SCC 118
35 (1988) Supp. SCC 761
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2039
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
considered the reply to the show-cause notice and the comments
on the findings recorded by it earlier on the charges and thereupon
it submitted detailed findings to the Governor. In that report, on a
detailed analysis of the evidence recorded, the Tribunal the finding
that there was no convincing evidence to uphold the charges framed
against the appellant. On receipt of the report of the Tribunal, the
State Government appears to have referred the matter to the Legal
Remembrancer for his opinion. The Legal Remembrancer disagreed
with the findings recorded by the Tribunal in its report, and opined
that there was in fact sufficient evidence on record to hold Charges
2 to 5 against the appellant to have been established. In view of
the opinion submitted by the Legal Remembrancer, the Governor
disregarded the findings recorded by the Tribunal and issued the
impugned order dismissing the appellant from service. This Court,
allowing the appeal, held that:
“7. …The Tribunal was entrusted with the primary duty of
making inquiry and record its findings on the charges. In
that process it could enter into adequacy, insufficiency or
credibility of evidence on record. The Legal Remembrancer
was of the opinion that the Tribunal could not enter into
the realm of adequacy or sufficiency of evidence and for
that purpose he relied upon the well established principles
of judicial review of administrative actions. The Tribunal
was not discharging the functions of a court but on the
other hand it was acting as the inquiring authority and it
had full power to reappraise the evidence and record its
findings and in that process it was open to it to hold that
the evidence on record was not sufficient to sustain the
charges against the appellant. The whole approach of the
Legal Remembrancer was misconceived as a result of
which he opined that the findings recorded by the Tribunal
in appellant›s favour could be ignored. We are of opinion
that the State Government could not ignore the findings
of the Tribunal applying the principles of judicial review
of administrative actions by a court of law. The State
Government committed serious error of law in ignoring
the findings of the Tribunal without giving an opportunity
to the appellant to showcause against the proposed view
of the government and passing the impugned order on
2040 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the basis of the report of the Legal Remembrancer. The
Tribunal’s findings dated 7-7-1970 clearly indicated that
there was no evidence to sustain the charges against the
appellant and in that view the impugned order of dismissal
could not legally be passed against the appellant.
(emphasis ours)
64. We are certain that the CVC recommendation weighed heavily
enough upon the disciplinary authority so as to convince him to alter
the proposed punishment of compulsory retirement to dismissal of
the appellant. Receipt of the CVC recommendation behind the back
of the appellant and no opportunity having been provided to him to
plead for a lesser punishment, the inquiry stood vitiated. The CVC
recommendation constituted material which was considered by the
disciplinary authority at least for the purpose of deciding on the
punishment that needed to be imposed on the appellant. Once such
recommendation fell for consideration of the disciplinary authority, a
copy of the same could not have been denied to the appellant. That
being said, we do not propose to inculcate a standing requirement
upon all disciplinary authorities that a hearing, before punishment is
imposed, should be provided if such requirement is not present in
the relevant rules. What we are insisting upon is compliance with the
principles of natural justice which, in view of the Constitution Bench
decision in B. Karunakar (supra), acknowledges and asserts that a
charged officer cannot be denied any material that the disciplinary
authority looks into for imposing punishment. Such officer is entitled
to access any document that was either used to determine his
blameworthy conduct amounting to misconduct or considered while
imposing punishment.
65. We now turn to deal with another important aspect, i.e., the claim of
privilege made by the appellate authority in defending non-disclosure
of the CVC recommendation to the appellant. While the Indian
Evidence Act, 187236 is not applicable to disciplinary proceedings,
the principles enshrined therein can provide sufficient guidance
on the validity of the claim. In State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev
36 Evidence Act
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2041
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
Singh37, this Court had the opportunity to trace the colonial law on
the point and its development in Indian law. The relevant passages
read as follows:
“13. The principle on which this departure can be and is
justified is the principle of the overriding and paramount
character of public interest. A valid claim for privilege made
under Section 123 proceeds on the basis of the theory that
the production of the document in question would cause
injury to public interest, and that, where a conflict arises
between public interest and private interest, the latter
must yield to the former. No doubt the litigant whose claim
may not succeed as a result of the non-production of the
relevant and material document may feel aggrieved by the
result, and the court, in reaching the said decision, may
feel dissatisfied; but that will not affect the validity of the
basic principle that public good and interest must override
considerations of private good and private interest. Care
has, however, to be taken to see that interests other than
that of the public do not masquerade in the garb of public
interest and take undue advantage of the provisions of
Section 123. Subject to this reservation the maxim silus
populi est supreme les which means that regard for public
welfare is the highest law is the basis of the provisions
contained in Section 123. Though Section 123 does not
expressly refer to injury to public interest that principle is
obviously implicit in it and indeed is its sole foundation.
14. Whilst we are discussing the basic principle underlying
the provisions of Section 123, it may be pertinent to enquire
whether fair and fearless administration of justice itself is
not a matter of high public importance. Fair administration of
justice between a citizen and a citizen or between a citizen
and the State is itself a matter of great public importance;
much more so would the administration of justice as a whole
be a matter of very high public importance; even so, on
principle, if there is a real, not imaginary or fictitious, conflict
between public interest and the interest of an individual in
37 1960 SCC OnLine SC 38
2042 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
a pending case, it may reluctantly have to be conceded
that the interest of the individual cannot prevail over the
public interest. If social security and progress which are
necessarily included in the concept of public good are
the ideal then injury to the said ideal must on principle be
avoided even at the cost of the interest of an individual
involved in a particular case. That is why courts are and
ought to be vigilant in dealing with a claim of privilege
made under Section 123.
15. If under Section 123 a dispute arises as to whether
the evidence in question is derived from unpublished
official records that can be easily resolved; but what
presents considerable difficulty is a dispute as to whether
the evidence in question relates to any affairs of State.
What are the affairs of State under Section 123? In the
latter half of the nineteenth century affairs of State may
have had a comparatively narrow content. Having regard
to the notion about governmental functions and duties
which then obtained, affairs of State would have meant
matters of political or administrative character relating, for
instance, to national defence, public peace and security
and good neighbourly relations. Thus, if the contents of
the documents were such that their disclosure would affect
either the national defence or public security or good
neighbourly relations they could claim the character of a
document relating to affairs of State. There may be another
class of documents which could claim the said privilege
not by reason of their contents as such but by reason
of the fact that, if the said documents were disclosed,
they would materially affect the freedom and candour of
expression of opinion in the determination and execution
of public policies. In this class may legitimately be included
notes and minutes made by the respective officers on
the relevant files, opinions expressed, or reports made,
and gist of official decisions reached in the course of the
determination of the said questions of policy. In the efficient
administration of public affairs Government may reasonably
treat such a class of documents as confidential and urge
that its disclosure should be prevented on the ground of
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2043
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
possible injury to public interest. In other words, if the proper
functioning of the public service would be impaired by the
disclosure of any document or class of documents such
document or such class of documents may also claim the
status of documents relating to public affairs.
16. It may be that when the Act was passed the concept
of governmental functions and their extent was limited,
and so was the concept of the words ‘affairs of State’
correspondingly limited; but, as is often said, words are
not static vehicles of ideas or concepts. As the content
of the ideas or concepts conveyed by respective words
expands, so does the content of the words keep pace with
the said expanding content of the ideas or concepts, and
that naturally tends to widen the field of public interest which
the section wants to protect. The inevitable consequence of
the change in the concept of the functions of the State is
that the State in pursuit of its welfare activities undertakes
to an increasing extent activities which were formerly
treated as purely commercial, and documents in relation
to such commercial activities undertaken by the State in
the pursuit of public policies of social welfare are also apt
to claim the privilege of documents relating to the affairs
of State. It is in respect of such documents that we reach
the marginal line in the application of Section 123; and it
is precisely in determining the claim for privilege for such
border-line cases that difficulty arises.
17. It is, however, necessary to remember that where
the legislature has advisedly refrained from defining the
expression ‘affairs of State’ it would be inexpedient for
judicial decisions to attempt to put the said expression
into a straight jacket of a definition judicially evolved. The
question as to whether any particular document or a class
of documents answers the description must be determined
in each case on the relevant facts and circumstances
adduced before the court. ‘Affairs of State’, according to
Mr Seervai, are synonymous with public business and he
contends that Section 123 provides for a general prohibition
against the production of any document relating to public
business unless permission for its production is given
2044 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
by the head of the department concerned. Mr Seervai
has argued that documents in regard to affairs of State
constitute a genus under which there are two species of
documents, one the disclosure of which will cause no
injury to public interest, and the other the disclosure of
which may cause injury to public interest. In the light of
the consequence which may flow from their disclosure the
two species of documents can be described as innocuous
and noxious respectively. According to Mr Seervai the
effect of Section 123 is that there is a general prohibition
against the production of all documents relating to public
business subject to the exception that the head of the
department can give permission for the production of
such documents as are innocuous and not noxious. He
contends that it is not possible to imagine that the section
contemplates that the head of the department would give
permission to produce a noxious document. It is on this
interpretation of Section 123 that Mr Seervai seeks to build
up similarity between Section 123 and the English law as
it was understood in 1872. In other words, according to
Mr Seervai the jurisdiction of the court in dealing with a
claim of privilege under Section 123 is very limited and
in most of the cases, if not all, the court would have to
accept the claim without effective scrutiny.
18. On the other hand it has been urged by Mr Sastri that
the expression ‘documents relating to any affairs of State’
should receive a narrow construction; and it should be
confined only to the class of noxious documents. Even
in regard to this class the argument is that the court
should decide the character of the document and should
not hesitate to enquire, incidentally if necessary, whether
its disclosure would lead to injury to public interest. This
contention seeks to make the jurisdiction of the court wider
and the field of discretion entrusted to the department
correspondingly narrower.
19. It would thus be seen that on the point in controversy
between the parties three views are possible. The first
view is that it is the head of the department who decides
to which class the document belongs; if he comes to the
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2045
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
conclusion that the document is innocuous he will give
permission to its production; if, however, he comes to the
conclusion that the document is noxious he will withhold
such permission; in any case the court does not materially
come into the picture. The other view is that it is for the
court to determine the character of the document, and if
necessary enquire into the possible consequences of its
disclosure; on this view the jurisdiction of the court is very
much wider. A third view which does not accept either of
the two extreme positions would be that the court can
determine the character of the document, and if it comes
to the conclusion that the document belongs to the noxious
class it may leave it to the head of the department to decide
whether its production should be permitted or not; for it
is not the policy of Section 123 that in the case of every
noxious document the head of the department must always
withhold permission. In deciding the question as to which
of these three views correctly represents the true legal
position under the Act it would be necessary to examine
Section 162. Let us therefore, turn to that section.
66. A summary of the decision leads us to one irresistible conclusion –
that the overriding interest must be of a public nature and only in
such cases can the claim of privilege be sustained. The claim of
privilege cannot be invoked as a matter of reflexive recourse but must
be limited to instances wherein an actual concern to public interest
is envisaged. Each instance must be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis and the State must be wholly convinced that the disclosure of
the documents would cause grave harm and injury to public interest.
67. We further refer to Amar Chand Butail v. Union of India38 where
Hon’ble P.B. Gajendragadkar, CJI. speaking for this Court held that
a claim for privilege cannot be made merely because it would go
against the defence of the State. A claim for privilege can therefore
only be made if it strictly meets the requirements present in the
Evidence Act, failing which, if the Court after a preliminary enquiry is
convinced that the claim of privilege cannot be sustained, the State
may be directed to disclose the said document.
38 AIR 1964 SC 1658
2046 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
68. In State of U.P. v. Raj Narain39, this Court held that public interest
which demands that evidence be withheld is to be weighed against
the public interest in the administration of justice that courts should
have the fullest possible access to all relevant materials. When
public interest outweighs the latter, the evidence cannot be admitted.
The Court also held that it must proprio motu exclude evidence the
production of which is contrary to public interest.
69. Moving closer to this century, this Court in People’s Union for Civil
Liberties v. Union of India40 while dealing with the disclosure of
certain sensitive information under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962
laid down the indicative criteria required to be fulfilled for the claim
of privilege. The instructive passage on the issue reads as under:
“70. For determining a question when a claim of privilege is
made, the Court is required to pose the following questions:
(1) whether the document in respect of which privilege
is claimed, is really a document (unpublished) relating
to any affairs of State; and
(2) whether disclosure of the contents of the document
would be against public interest?
71. When any claim of privilege is made by the State
in respect of any document, the question whether the
document belongs to the privileged class has first to be
decided by the court. The court cannot hold an enquiry into
the possible injury to public interest which may result from
the disclosure of the document in question. The claim of
immunity and privilege has to be based on public interest.
72. The section does not say who is to decide the
preliminary question viz. whether the document is one that
relates to any affairs of State, or how it is to be decided,
but the clue in respect thereof can be found in Section
162. Under Section 162 a person summoned to produce
a document is bound to
39 (1975) 4 SCC 428
40 (2004) 2 SCC 476
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2047
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
‘bring it to the court, notwithstanding any objection
which there may be to its production or to its
admissibility. The validity of any such objection shall
be decided on by the court’.
It further says that:
‘The court, if it seems fit, may inspect the document,
unless it refers to matters of State, or take other
evidence to enable it to determine on its admissibility.’
73. In order to claim immunity from disclosure of unpublished
State documents, the documents must relate to affairs of
the State and disclosure thereof must be against interest
of the State or public interest.”
70. In the present case, the appellate authority did not deny that there was
indeed a recommendation of the CVC. However, the recommendation
was denied by claiming privilege. We are inclined to the view that the
claim of privilege was utterly misconceived. The recommendation of
the CVC did not have anything to do with the “affairs of the State”
or, if one were not to be guided by Section 123 of the Evidence
Act, anything to do with national security; at least, no such attempt
was made by Mr. Patil. We appreciate his predicament that at this
distance of time (the appellate order having been made on 27th
March, 2003) and Vijaya Bank having merged in the respondent in
2019, it is well-nigh difficult for him and the respondents to lay their
hands on such recommendation. Yet, it cannot be ignored that the
appellate order apart from claiming that the recommendation is a
privileged document does not go further to assign any reason, far
less cogent reason, as to how the same could at all be withheld
from the appellant. Reasons that have been assigned are neither
here nor there. Whether or not such a recommendation did exist
was the question, not whether the appellant could have premised
his challenge on such recommendation being an internal document.
71. We are ad idem with the view expressed in D.C. Aggarwal (supra)
that the proposed punishment of compulsory retirement could not
have been altered to dismissal from service based on the CVC
recommendation without furnishing the same to the appellant. To this
extent, the appellate order is legally flawed and cannot be sustained.
2048 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Conclusion
72. In normal circumstances, the obvious direction that could follow
the foregoing discussions is a remand to the disciplinary authority
to re-start the inquiry from the stage the same stood vitiated, i.e.,
requiring the Inquiry Officer to scrupulously follow Regulation
6(17) of the 1981 Regulations. However, there are circumstances
that impede an order for remand. The foremost being the lack of
accessibility to the records because of the merger of Vijaya Bank
with the respondent and the distance of time since the disciplinary
proceedings came to a close. It is also to be noted that the
disciplinary proceedings were continued beyond the date on which
the appellant attained the age of superannuation. Because of the
ultimate order we propose to make, we have not dealt with the
third question noted in paragraph 16 (supra) and such question
is kept open. No useful purpose, therefore, would be served in
ordering a remand.
73. Considering the age of the appellant (he is now an octogenarian)
as well as the fact that there were other disciplinary proceedings
pending against him which were not taken to its logical conclusion
because he stood dismissed from service, in our considered view,
interest of justice would be sufficiently served if we make the
following directions:
(i) the appellant shall not be entitled to any terminal benefits except
to the extent indicated hereafter;
(ii) he shall only be entitled to a lump-sum amount equal to the
quantum of gratuity which would have been payable to him had
he not been fastened with the order of dismissal;
(iii) such lump-sum amount may be released in favour of the
appellant within a period of eight weeks from date;
(iv) no amount on account of interest shall be payable to the
appellant on the said amount;
(v) however, interest @ 9% p.a. shall be payable on such amount
if not released within the period stipulated above; and
(vi) the order of dismissal, in the circumstances, shall stand
quashed.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 2049
K. Prabhakar Hegde v. Bank of Baroda
74. It is ordered accordingly.
75. In the above result, the impugned order of the High Court is also
set aside.
76. The appeal is disposed of on the above terms, without any order
as to costs.
77. Criminal proceedings, if any, pending against the appellant may be
taken to its logical conclusion in accordance with law.
Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "Disciplinary proceedings"Sign in to search