Supreme Court of India
LALITA KUMARIversusGOVT. OF U.P. AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2013 INSC 748
- Decided
- 12 November 2013
- Disposal
- Reference answered
- Bench
- P SATHASIVAM
Holding
Section 154 CrPC imposes a mandatory duty on the officer in charge of a police station to register an FIR whenever the information received discloses a cognizable offence; a preliminary inquiry is not permissible in such cases, though limited inquiry may be conducted when the information does not yet disclose a cognizable offence.
Summary
The Constitution Bench examined whether a police officer must register a First Information Report (FIR) under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) upon receiving information of a cognizable offence, or may first conduct a preliminary inquiry to test its veracity. Relying on the literal meaning of the word "shall" and the legislative history of Section 154, the Court held that registration of an FIR is mandatory when the information discloses a cognizable offence; a preliminary inquiry is only permissible when the information does not yet disclose such an offence. The Court also clarified that mandatory FIR registration does not violate Article 21, that the CrPC (a Concurrent List law) prevails over any inconsistent State Police Acts, and that the CBI Crime Manual cannot override statutory provisions. Specific categories where limited preliminary inquiry may be allowed were listed, and procedural directions were issued for recording inquiries in the General Diary.
Issues considered
- Whether Section 154(1) CrPC imposes a mandatory duty on police officers to register an FIR upon receipt of information disclosing a cognizable offence or permits a preliminary inquiry before registration.
- Whether mandatory registration of an FIR under Section 154 violates the right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.
- Whether provisions of the CBI Crime Manual or State Police Acts can modify the mandatory nature of Section 154.
- Whether the insertion of Section 166A IPC affects the compulsory registration of FIRs for offences other than those listed.
- Whether any inconsistency between the CrPC (Concurrent List) and State Police Acts (State List) renders the latter inoperative to the extent of repugnancy.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 154(1), s. 154(2), s. 154(3), s. 156, s. 157, s. 39, s. 4(2), s. 5
- Constitution of Indias. Article 21, s. Article 254(1)
- Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013s. 13 (insertion of Section 166A)
- Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 166A
- Police Act, 1861s. 44
Subjects
FIRSection 154mandatory registrationpreliminary inquirycognizable offenceArticle 21police dutyCrPC interpretationlawful procedurelaw and order
Judgment
[2013] 14 S.C.R. 713
· LALITA KUMARI · A
v.
GOVT. OF U.P. AND ORS.
(Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 68 of 2008 etc.)
NOVEMBER 12, 2013
B
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI., DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, RANJANA
PRAKASH DESAI, RANJAN GOGOi AND
S.A. BOBDE, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: c
s. 154 - FIR - Registration of - Whether mandatory -
Or requires the police to conduct preliminary inquiry to test
the veracity of such information before registering it - Held:
The condition sine qua non for.registering FIR is that there 0
must be information and the information discloses
commission of cognizable offence - The reasonableness or
credibility of information is not a condition precedent for the
registration of FIR - The provision u/s. 154 is mandatory and
therefore it is mandatory for the police officer to register FIR E
on the basis of information disclosing cognizable offence -
Registration of the FIR is not in contravention of Art. 21 of the
Constitution - However, there may be instances where
preliminary inquiry may be necessary before registration of
FIR e.g. matrimonial disputes, commercial offences, medical
negligence cases, corruption cases etc. - However, such F
inquiry would be only to ascertain as to whether the
information reveals any cognizable offence - Constitution of
India, 1950 - Article 21.
ss.39 and 154(1) - Mandate u/s. 39 to inform about G
commission of an offence - Implication of - Held: It would be
incongruous to suggest that u/s. 39 it is duty of every citizen
to inform about commission of an offence, but it is not
713 H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A obligatory for the Officer incharge of the Police Station to
register the report uls. 154.
s .. 154, 4(2) and 5 - Registration of FIR - Rules in CBI
Crime Manual, regarding preliminary inquiry - Applicability
of - To s. 154 - The concept of holding preliminary inquiry
8
provided in CBI Crime Manual cannot be imported into the
scheme of Cr. P. C. - CBI Crime Manual is not a statute,
enacted by legislature but only a set of administrative orders
and hence cannot supersede Cr.P.C. - Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act, 1946.
c
Penal Code, 1860- s.166A (as inserted by Criminal Law
(Amendment) Act, 2013) - Punishment for non-registration of
FIR for the offences specified in the provision - Implication
of - Held: The provision under s. 166A does not imply that the
o registration of FIR is not compulsory for the offences other
than those specified in s. 166A - Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 - s.154.
Constitution of India, 1950:
E Art.254(1), Seventh Schedule, Concurrent List Entry 2
and State List Entry 2 - Inconsistency between Laws enacted
under Concurrent List and State List - Held: In case of
inconsistency, law enacted under Concurrent List will prevail
over the law enacted under State List - Hence, provisions of
F Code of Criminal Procedure (enacted under Entry 2 of
Concurrent List) would prevail over the provisions of Police
Act and the provisions of Police Act (enacted under State List)
would be void to the extent of repugnancy- Therefore, in case
of inconsistency between s. 154 Cr.P. C. and s. 44 of Police
G Act, s. 154 will prevail and s.44 (or similar provisions) shall be
void to the extent of repugnancy - Police Act, 1861 - s.44.
Art.21 - Right to life - Whether Violated, if FIR is
registered without holding preliminary inquiry - Held:
H Registration of FIR uls. 154 Cr. P. C. is the 'procedure
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 715
established by law' and thus is in conformity with Art.21 - A
Hence registration of FIR as per the provisions of law, does
not violate rights guaranteed under Art. 21.
Investigation - Initiation of - By Police - Held: Police is
not liable to launch investigation in evey FIR which is B
mandatorily registered uls. 154 Cr.P. C. - Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - ss.154 and 157.
Police - Police records - FIR Books and General Diary!
Daily Diary/Station Diary - Distinction between - Discussed.
c
Interpretation of Statutes - Rule of interpretation - Literal
rule of interpretation - Application of - For interpretation of s.
154 Cr.P.C.
Maxim - 'unius est exclusion alterius' - Applicability of -
For interpretation of s. 154 Cr.P.C .. 0
Words and Phrases - Inquiry - Meaning of, in the
context of s. 2(g) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The instant cases were referred to Constitution E
Bench for deciding the question whether a police officer
is bound to register a First Information Report (FIR) upon
receiving information relating to commission of a
cognizable offence uls. 154 Cr.P.C., or the police officer,
has the power to conduct a 'preliminary inquiry' in order
F
to test the veracity of such information before registering
the same. ·
Answering the reference,
w
the Court
HELD: 1.1. FIR is a pertinent document in the criminal G
law procedure and its main object from the point of view
of the informant is to set the criminal law in motion and
from the point of view of the investigating authorities is
to obtain information about the alleged criminal activity
so as to be able to take suitable steps to trace and to H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 14 S.C.R.
A bring to book the guilty. Historical experience has thrown
up cases from both the sides where the grievance of the
victim/informant of non-registration of valid FIRs as well
· as that of the accused of being unnecessarily harassed
and investigated upon false charges have been found to
B be correct. [Paras 23 and 24] [751-A-C]
State of Maharashtra vs. Sarangdharsingh Shivdassingh
Chavan and Anr. (2011) 1 sec 577; Preeti Gupta vs. State
of Jharkhand (2010) 7 sec 667: 2010 (9) SCR 1168;
C A/eque Padamsee and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors.
(2007) 6 SCC 171: 2007 (8) SCR 390 - referred to.
1.2. A perusal of the provisions relating to
registration of FIR manifests the legislative intent in both,
old codes and the new code for compulsory registration
D of FIR in a case of cognizable offence without conducting
any Preliminary Inquiry. [Para 29] [755-E-F]
1.3. A significant change that took place by way of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was with respect
E to the placement of Section 154, i.e., the provision
imposing requirement of recording the first information
regarding commission of a cognizable offence in the
special book prior to Section 156, i.e., the provision
empowering the police officer to investigate a cognizable
offence. As such, the objective of such placement of
F provisions was clear which was to ensure that the
recording of the first information should be the starting
point of any investigation by the police. In the interest of
expediency of investigation since there was no safeguard
of obtaining permission from the Magistrate to commence
G an investigation, the said procedure of recording first
information in their books along with the signature/seal
of the informant, would act as an "extremely valuable
safeguard" against the excessive, mala fide and illegal
exercise of investigative powers by the police. [Para 31]
H [756-A-D]
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 717
1.4. Provisions contained in Chapter XII of the Code A
deal with information to the police and their powers to
investigate. The said Chapter sets out the procedure to
be followed during investigation. The objective to be
achieved by the procedure prescribed in the said Chapter
is to set the criminal law in motion and to provide for all B
procedural safeguards so as to ensure that the
investigation is fair and is not mala fide and there is no
scope of tampering with the evidence collected during the
investigation. [Para 32] [756-D-F]
c·
1.5. It is not correct to say that in view of s.166A IPC,
the legislature accepts that as far as cognizable offences
other than those mentioned in s.166A, IPC are concerned,
police has discretion to hold a preliminary inquiry if there
is doubt about the correctness of the information.
Insertion of Section 166A in the IPC vide Criminal Law D
(Amendment) Act 2013, must be read in consonance with
the provision and not contrary to it. The insertion of
Section 166A was in the light of recent unfortunate
occurrence of offences against women. The intention of
the legislature in putting forth this amendment was to. E
tighten the already existing provisions to provide
enhanced safeguards to women. Therefore, the
legislature, after noticing the increasing crimes against
women in the country, thought it is appropriate to
expressly punish the police officers for their failure to F
register FIRs in these cases. No other meaning than this
can be assigned to for the insertion of the same. [Paras
33 and 34] [757-F-H; 758-A-C]
2.1. The first and foremost principle of interpretatiQn G
of a statute in every system of interpretation is the literal
rule of interpretation. The language employed in Section
154 is the determinative factor of the legislative intent. A
plain reading of Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. provides that any
information relating to the commission of a cognizable
H
offence if given orally to an officer-in-charge of a police
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A station shall be reduced into writing by him or under his
direction. There is no ambiguity in the language of
Section 154(1 ). The language of Section 154(1 ), therefore,
admits of no other construction but the literal
construction. [Paras 36 and 37] [758-D-F; 759-E]
B
B. Premanand and Ors. vs. Mohan Koika/ and Ors.
(2011) 4 SCC 266: 2011 (3) SCR 932; Mis Hira/al Rattan/a/
Etc. Etc. vs. State of UP. and Anr. Etc. Etc. (1973) 1 SCC
216: 1973 (2) SCR 502 - relied on.
c 2.2. The condition that is sine qua non for recording
an FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C. is that there must be
information and that information must disclose a
cognizable offence. If any information disclosing a
cognizable offence is led before an officer in charge of
D the police station satisfying the requirement of Section
154(1 ), the said police officer has no other option except
to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form, that
is to say, to register a case on the basis of such
information. The provision of Secti9n 154 of the Code is
E mandatory and the concerned officer is duty bound to
register the case on the basis of information disclosing
a cognizable offence. Thus, the plain words of Section
154(1) of the Code have to be given their literal meaning.
[Para 39] [762-B-D]
F 2.3. The word "shall" in Section 154(1} of the Code
clearly shows the legislative intent that it is mandatory to
register an FIR if the information given to the police
discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. The
object of using the word "shall" in the context of Section
G 154(1) of the Code is to ensure that all information relating
to all cognizable offences is promptly registered by the
police"and investigated in accordance with the provisions
of law. [Paras 40 and 42] [762-E; 763-B]
H Khub Chand vs. State of Rajasthan AIR 1967 SC 1074:
LALITA \~UMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 719
1967 SCR 120; State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp. A
.(1) sec 335: 1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 259 - relied on.
2.4. Investigation of offences and prosecution of
offenders are the duties of the State. For "cognizable
offences", a duty has been cast upon the police to B
register FIR and to conduct investigation except as
otherwise permitted specifically under Section 157 of the
Code. If a discretion, option or latitude is allowed to the
police in the matter of registration of FIRs, it can have
serious consequences on the public order situation and C
can also adversely affect the rights of the victims
including violating their fundamental fight to equality.
[Para 43] [763-C-D]
2.5. Therefore, the context in which the word "shall"
appears in Section 154(1) of the Code, the object for D
which it has been used and the consequences that will
follow from the infringement of the direction to register
FIRs, all these factors clearly show that the word "shall"
used in Section 154(1) needs to be given its ordinary
meaning of being of "mandatory" character. The E
provisions of Section 154(1) of the Code, read in the light
of the statutory scheme, do not admit of conferring any
discretion on the officer in-charge of the police station for
embarking upon a preliminary inquiry prior to the
registration of an FIR. It is settled position of law that if F ·
the provision is unambiguous and the legislative intent
is clear, the court need not call into it any other rules of
construction. (Para 44) [763-E-G]
3.1. The legislature has consciously used the
expression "information" in Section 154(1) of the Code G
as against the expression used in Section 41(1)(a) and (g)
where the expression used for arresting a person without
warrant is "reasonable complaint" or "credible
information". The expression under Section 154(1) of the
Code is not qualified by the prefix ''reasonable" or H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 14 S.C.R.
A "credible". The non qualification of the word
"information" in Section 154(1) unlike in Section 41(1)(a)
and (g) of the Code is for the reason that the police officer
should not refuse to record any information relating to
the commission of a cognizable offence on the ground
B that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or
credibility of the information. In other words,
reasonableness or credibility of the said information is
not a condition precedent for the registration of a case.
(Para 64) [771-B-E]
c State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp. (1) SCC
335: 1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 259; Ramesh Kumari vs. State
(NCT of Delhi) (2006) 2 sec 677: 2006 (2) SCR 403;
Parka sh Singh Badal vs. State of Punjab (2007) 1 SCC 1:
2006 (10) Suppl. SCR 197; Ram Lal Narang vs. State (Delhi
D Administration) (1979) 2 SCC 322; Lal/an Chaudhary and
Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Anr. (2006) 12 SCC 229: 2006
(7) Suppl. SCR 202 - relied on.
3.2. In terms of the language used in Section 154 of
E the Code, the police is duty bound to proceed to conduct
investigation into a cognizable offence even without
receiving information (i.e. FIR) about commission of such
an offence, if the officer in charge of the police station
otherwise suspects the commission of such an offence.
F The legislative intent is therefore quite clear, i.e., to ensure
that every cognizable offence is promptly investigated in
accordance with law. This being the legal position, there
is no reason that there should be any discretion or option
left with the police to register or not to register an FIR
G when information is given about the commission of a
cognizable offence. [Para 73) [783-0-F]
3.3. The insertion of sub-section (3) of Section 154,
by way of an amendment, reveals the intention of the
legislature to ensure that no information of commission
H of a cognizable offence must be ignored or not acted
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 721
upon which would result in unjustified protection of the A
alleged offender/accused. [Para 74) [783-H; 784-A]
3.4. The maxim expression unius est exclusion
alterius (expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another) applies in the interpretation of Section 154 of the B
Code, where the mandate of recording the information in
writing excludes the possibility of not recording an
information of commission of a cognizable crime in the
special register. [Para 75) [784-B]
4.1. It is not correct to state that information will be C
first recorded in the General Diary and only after
preliminary inquiry, if required, the information will be
registered as FIR. The First Information Report is in fact
the "information" that is received first in point of time,
which is either given in writing or is reduced to writing. It D
is not the "substance" of it, which is to be entered in the
diary prescribed by the State Government. The term
'General Diary' (also called as 'Station Diary' or 'Daily
Diary' in some States) is maintained not under Section
154 of the Code but under the provisions of Section 44 E
of the Police Act, 1861 in the States to which it applies,
or under the respective provisions of the Police Act(s)
applicable to a State or under the Police Manual of a State,
as the case may be. [Paras 48 and 61) [764-G-H; 765-A-
B; 769-F] F
Superintendent of Police, CBI vs. Tapan Kumar Singh
(2003) 6 sec 175: 2003 (3) SCR 485 - relied on.
4.2. It is thus clear that registration of FIR is to be
done in a book called FIR Book or FIR Register. Of G
course, in addition, the gist of the FIR or the substance
of the FIR may also be mentioned simultaneously in the
General Diary as mandate~ in the respective Police Act
or Rules, as the case may be, under the relevant State
provisions. [Para 54) [766-G] H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A Madhu Bala vs. Suresh Kumar (1997) 8 SCC 476: 1997
(3) Suppl. SCR 32; State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal 1992
Supp. (1) sec 335: 1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 259 - relied on.
4.3. The General Diary is a record of all important
transactions/events taking place in a police station,
8
-including departure and arrival of police staff, handing
over or taking over of charge, arrest of a person, details
of law and order duties, visit of senior officers etc. It is in
this context that gist or substance of each FIR being
C registered in the police station is also mentioned in the
Gen'eral Diary since registration of FIR also happens to
be a very important event in the police station. Since
General Diary is a record that is maintained
chronologically on day-to-day basis (on each day,
starting with new number 1), the General Diary entry
D reference is also mentioned simultaneously in the FIR
Book, while FIR number is mentioned in the General
Diary entry since both of these are prepared
simultaneously. [Para 55] [766-H; 767-A-C]
E 4.4. The signature of the complainant is obtained in
the FIR Book as and when the complaint is given to the
police station. On the other hand, there is no such
requirement of obtaining signature of the complainant in
the general diary. Moreover, at times, the complaint given
F may consist of large number of pages, in which case, it
is only the gist of the complaint which is to be recorded
in the General Diary and not the full complaint. This does
not fit in with the suggestion that what is recorded in
General Diary should be considered to be the fulfillment/
G compliance of the requirement of Section 154 of
registration of FIR. In fact, the usual practice is to record
the complete complaint in the FIR book (or annex it with
the FIR form) but record only about one or two
paragraphs (gist of the information) in the General Diary.
H [Para 58] [767-G-H; 768-A-B]
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 723
4.5. Thus registration of FIR is mandatory and also A
that it is to be recorded in the FIR Book by giving a unique
annual number to each FIR to enable strict tracking of
each and every registered FIR by the superior police
officers as well as by the competent court to which
copies of each FIR are required to be sent. [Para 63] [770- B
H; 771-A] '
4.6. Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary
is the record of all information received in a poJice station,
it is directed that all information relating to cognizable C
offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or
leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and
meticulously reflected in the said Diary and the decision
to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected.
[Para 111 (viii)] [802-D-E]
D
5. Section 39 of the Code casts a statutory duty on
every person to inform about commission of certain
offences which includes offences covered by Sections
121 to 126, 302, 64-A, 382, 392 etc., of the IPC. It would
be incongruous to suggest that though it is the duty of E
every citizen to inform about commission of an offence,
but it is not obligatory on the officer-incharge of a Police
Station to register the report. The word 'shall' occurring
in Section 39 of the Code has to be given the same
meaning as the word 'shall' occurring in Section 154(1) F
of the Code. [Para 46] [764-C-D]
6.1. The Code was enacted under Entry 2 of the
Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution while the Police Act, 1861 (or other similar
Acts in respective States) were enacted under Entry 2 of G
the State List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
It is clear from the mandate of Article 254(1) of the
Constitution that if there is any inconsistency between
the provisions of the Code and the Police Act, 1861, the
provisions of the Code will prevail and the provisions of H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A the Police Act would be void to the extent of the
repugnancy. [Paras 59 and 60] [768-C-D; 769-C]
6.2. If at all, there is any inconsistency in the
provisions of Section 154 of the Code and Section 44 of
the Police Act, 1861, with regard to the fact as to whether
8
the FIR is to be registered in the FIR book or in the
General Diary, the provisions of Section 154 of the Code
will prevail and the provisions of Section 44 of the Police
Act, 1861 (or similar provisions of th~ respective
corresponding Police Act or Rules in other respective
C States) shall be void to the extent of the repugnancy.
[Para 61] [769-D-E]
7.1. It is not correct to say that mandatory registration
of FIRs will lead to arbitrary arrest, which will directly be
D in contravention of Article 21 of the Constitution.
Conducting an investigation into an offence after
registration of FIR under Section 154 of the Code is the
"procedure established by law" and, thus, is in
conformity with Article 21 of the Constitution.
E Accordingly, the right of the accused under Article 21 of
the Constitution is protected if the FIR is registered first
and then the investigation is conducted in accordance
with the provisions of law. [Paras 76 and 97] [784-C-D;
794-F]
F 7.2. While registration of FIR is mandatory, arrest of
the accused immediately on registration of FIR is not at
all mandatory. In fact, registration of FIR u/s. 154 and
arrest of an accused person u/s. 41 are two entirely
different concepts under the law, and there are several
G safeguards available against arrest. Moreover, it is also
pertinent to mention that an accused person also has a
right to apply for "anticipatory bail" under the provisions
of Section 438 of the Code if the conditions mentioned
therein are satisfied. The remedy lies in strictly enforcing
H the safeguards available against arbitrary arrests made
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 725
by the police and not in allowing the police to avoid A
mandatory registration of FIR when the information
discloses commission of a cognizable offence. [Paras 98
and 100] [794-G-H; 795-A; 796-A-B]
7.3. Besides, the Code gives power to the police to 8
close a matter both before and after investigation. A police
officer can foreclose an FIR before an investigation under
Section 157 of the Code, if it appears to him that there is
no sufficient ground to investigate the same. The police
officer can also, in a given case, investigate the matter and C
then file a final report under Section 173 of the Code
seeking closure of the matter. Therefore, the police is not
liable to launch an investigation in every FIR which is
mandatorily registered on receiving information relating
to commission of a cognizable offence. [Para 102] [796-F-
H] D
7.4. Thus, the Scheme of the Code not only ensures
that the time of the police should not be wasted on false
and frivolous information but also that the police should
not intentionally refrain from doing their duty of E
investigating cognizable offences. As a result, the
apprehension of misuse of the provision of mandatory
registration of FIR is unfounded and speculative in
nature. [Para 103] [797-E-F]
F
7.5. It is true that a delicate balance has to be
maintained between the interest of the society and
protecting the liberty of an individual. But there are
already sufficient safeguards provided in the Code which
duly protect the liberty of an individual in case of
registration of false FIR. At the same time, Section 154 G
was drafted keeping in mind the interest of the victim and
the society. Therefore, mandatory registration of FIRs
under Section 154 of the Code will not be in contravention
of Article 21 of the Constitution. [Para 105] [798-B-C]
H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A 8. It is true that the concept of "preliminary inquiry" is
contained in Chapter IX of the Crime Manual of the CBI.
However, this Crime Manual is not a statute and has not
been enacted by the legislature. It is a set of administrative
orders issued for internal guidance of the CBI officers. It
B cannot supersede the Code. Moreover, in the absence of
any indication to the contrary in the Code itself, the
provisions of the CBI Crime Manual cannot be relied upon
to import the concept of holding of preliminary inquiry in
the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The CBI
c is constituted under a Special Act, namely, the Delhi
Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 and it derives its
power to investigate from this Act. Though there is
reference to the term 'preliminary inquir}t' and 'inquiry'
under Sections 159 and Sections 202 and 340 of the Code,
that is a judicial exercise undertaken by the Court and not
0
by the Police and is not relevant for the purpose of the
present reference. It may be submitted that Sections 4(2)
and 5 of the Code permit special procedures to be followed
for special Acts. Thus, the powers of the CBI under the
DSPE Act, cannot be equated with the powers of the
E regular State Police under the Code. [Paras 78, 79, 80 and
82] [784-G; 785-A-D; 786-C]
9. Inquiry under the Code is relatable to a judicial act
and not to the steps taken by the Police which are either
F investigation after the stage of Section 154 of the Code or
termed as 'Preliminary Inquiry' and which are prior to the
registration of FIR, even though, no entry in the General
Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary has been made. Though
there is reference to the term 'preliminary inquiry' and
G 'inquiry' under Sections 159 and Sections 202 and 340 of
the Code, that is a judicial exercise undertaken by the
Court and not by the Police and is not relevant for the
purpose of the present reference. [Para 77 & 78] [784-F-
G]
H 10.1. The object sought to be achieved by registering
LALITA KUMAR! v. GOVT. OF U.P. 727
the earliest information as FIR is inter alia two fold: one, A
that the criminal process is set into motion and is well
documented from the very start; and second, that the
earliest information received in relation to the commission
of a cognizable offence is recorded so that there cannot
be any embellishment etc., later. (Para 83] [786-D-E] B
10.2. Principles of democracy and liberty demand a
regular and efficient check on police powers. One way of
keeping check on authorities with such powers is by
documenting every action of theirs. Accordingly, under C
the Code, actions of the police etc., are provided to be
written and documented. (Para 84] (786-F]
10.3. The underpinnings of compulsory registration
of FIR is not only to ensure transparency in the criminal
justice delivery system but also to ensure 'judicial D
oversight'. [Para 86] [787-D]
10.4. The registration of FIR either on the basis of the
information furnished by the informant under Section
154(1) of the Code or otherwise under Section 157(1) of E
the Code is obligatory. The obligation to register FIR has
inherent advantages: a) It is the first step to 'access to
justice' for a victim. It upholds the 'Rule of Law' inasmuch
as the ordinary person brings forth the commission of a
cognizable crime in the knowledge of the State. It also
F
facilitates swift investigation and sometimes even
prevention of the crime. In both cases, it only effectuates
the regime of law. It leads to less manipulation in criminal
cases and lessens incidents of 'ante-dates' FIR or
deliberately delayed FIR. [Para 88] (787-G-H; 788-A-C]
G
10.5. According to the Statement of Objects and
Reasons, protection of the interests of the poor is clearly
one of the main objects of the Code. Making registration
of information relating to commission of a cognizable
offence mandatory would help the society, especially, the H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A poor in rural and remote areas of the country. [Para 92]
[792-C-D]
10.6. The number of Fl Rs not registered is
approximately equivalent to the number of FIRs actually
8 registered. Keeping in view the NCRB figures that show
that about 60 lakh cognizable offences were registered
in India during the year 2012, the burking of crime may
itself be in the range of about 60 lakh every year. Thus,
such a large number of FIRs are not registered every
C year, which is a clear violation of the rights of the victims
of such a large number of crimes. Burking of crime leads
to dilution of the rule of law in the short run; and also has
a very negative impact on the rule of law in the long run
since people stop having respect for rule of law. Thus,
non-registration of such a large number of FIRs leads to
D a definite lawlessness in the society. [Paras 94 and 95]
[794-A-C]
11.1. Although, in unequivocal terms, it is held that
Section 154 of the Code postulates the mandatory
E registration of FIRs on receipt of all cognizable offence,
yet, there may be instances where preliminary inquiry
may be required owing to the change in genesis and
novelty of crimes with the passage of time. One such
instance is in the case of allegations relating to medical
F negligence on the part of doctors. It will be unfair and
inequitable to prosecute a medical professional only on
the basis of the allegations in the complaint. [Para 106]
[798-0-E]
11.2. Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section
G 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission
of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is
permissible in such a situation. If the information received
does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the
necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be
H conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 729
is disclosed or not. If the inquiry discloses the A
commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must be
registered. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in
closing the complaint, a copy of the entry of such
closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith
and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons in B
brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding
further. [Para 111] [800-G-H; 801-A-C]
11.3. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify
the veracity or otherwise of the information received but C
only to ascertain whether the information reveals any
cognizable offence. As to what type and in which cases
preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case. The category of
cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made for
illustration, are: (a) Matrimonial disputes/ family disputes; D
(b) Commercial offences; (c) Medical negligence cases;
(d) Corruption cases; (e) Cases where there is abnormal
delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for
example, over 3 months delay in reporting the matter
without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay. E
[Para 111 v and vi] [801-E-H; 802-A]
11.4. While ensuring and protecting the rights of the
accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry
should be made time bound and in any case it should not F
exceed 7 days. The fact of such delay and the causes of
it must be reflected in the General Diary entry. [Para 111
vii] [802-C]
E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3:
1974 (2) SCR 348; S.M.O. Kiran Pasha vs. Government of G
Andhra Pradesh (1990) 1 SCC 328: 1989 (2) Suppl. SCR
105; D.K. Basu vs. State of W.B. (1997) 1 SCC 416: 1996
(10) Suppl. SCR 284; Uma Shankar Sitani vs. Commissioner
of Police, Delhi and Ors. (1996) 11 SCC 714; Francis Coralie
Mullin vs. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 1 H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A SCC 608: 1981 (2) SCR 516 Common Cause, A Registered
Society vs. Union of India (1999) 6 SCC 667: 1999 (3) SCR
1279 District Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad vs. Canara
Bank (2005) 1 SCC 496: 2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 833;
Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma vs. State of Maharashtra
B (2005) 5 SCC 294: 2005 (3) SCR 345; Superintendent of
Police, CBI vs. Tapan Kumar Singh (2003) 6 SCC 175: 2003
(3) SCR 485; State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Bhagwant Kishore
Joshi (1964) 3 SCR 71; P. Sirajuddin vs. State of Madras
(1970) 1 SCC 595: 1970 (3) SCR 931; Sevi vs. State of Tamil
c Nadu 1981 Supp SCC 43; Shashikant vs. Central Bureau
of Investigation (2007) 1 SCC 630: 2006 (8) Suppl. SCR
474; Rajinder Singh Katoch vs. Chandigarh Admn. (2007) 10
SCC 69: 2007 (11) SCR 246; Vineet Narain vs. Union of
India (1998) 1 sec 226: 1997 (6) Suppl. SCR 595;
Elumalai vs. State of Tamil Nadu 1983 LW (CRL) 121; A.
0
Lakshmanarao vs. Judicial Magistrate, Parvatipuram AIR 1971
SC 186: 1971 (2) SCR 822; State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Ram
Sagar Yadav and Ors. (1985) 1 SCC 552: 1985 (2) SCR 621;
Mona Panwar vs. High Court of Judicature of Allahabad
(2011) 3 SCC 496: 2011 (2) SCR 413; Apren Joseph vs.
E State of Kera/a (1973) 3 SCC 114: 1973 (2) SCR 16; King
Emperor vs. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 18 - referred
to.
Lalita Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.
F (2008) 7 SCC 164; Lalita Kumari vs. Government of Uttar
Pradesh and Ors. (2008) 14 SCC 337; Lalita Kumari vs.
Government of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (2012) 4 SCC 1: 2012
(1) SCR 1066; Govindla/ Chhaganla/ Patel vs. Agricultural
Produce Market Committee, Godhra and Ors. (1975) 2 SCC
G 482: 1976 (1) SCR 451; Ganesh Bhavan Patel and Anr. vs.
State of Maharashtra (1978) 4 SCC 371: 1979 (2) SCR 94;
Jacob Mathew vs. State of Punjab and Anr: (2005) 6 SCC 1:
2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 307; State of West Bengal vs.
Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal
H (2010) 3 SCC 571: 2010 (2) SCR 979; H.N. Rishbud and
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 731
lnder Singh vs. State of Delhi AIR 1955 SC 196: 1955 SCR A
1150; S.N. Sharma vs. Bipen Kumar Tiwari (1970) 1 SCC
653: 1970 (3) SCR 946; Union of India vs. Prakash P.
Hinduja (2003) 6 SCC 195: 2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 307;
Sheikh Hasib alias Tabarak vs. State of Bihar (1972) 4 SCC
773; Ashok Kumar Todi vs. Kishwar Jahan and Ors. (2011) B
3 SCC 758: 2011 (3) SCR 597; Padma Sundara Rao (Dead)
and Ors. vs. State of T.N. and Ors. (2002) 3 sec 533: 2002
(2) SCR 383 Mannalal Khatic vs. The State AIR 1967 Cal
478; Mohindro vs. State of Punjab (2001) 9 SCC 581; Munna
Lal vs. State of Himachal Pradesh 1992 Crl. L.J. 1558; c
Giridhari Lal Kanak vs. State and ors. 2002 Crl. L.J. 2113;
Katteri Moideen Kutty Haji vs. State of Kera/a 2002 (2)
Crimes 143; Re: Subbaratnam and Ors. AIR 1949 Madras
663; Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248:
1978 (2) SCR 621; Chairman Board of Mining Examination
0
and Chief Inspector of Mines and Anr. vs. Ramjee (1977) 2
SCC 256: 1977 (2) SCR 904; La/it Mohan Pandey vs.
Pooran Singh (2004) 6 SCC 626: 2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 737;
Prativa Bose vs. Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikat (1964) 4 SCR
69; Thu/ia Kali vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1972) 3 SCC 393:
1972 (3) SCR 622; Joginder Kumar vs. State of UP. and Ors. E
(1994) 4 sec 260 - referred to.
Case Law Reference:
(2008) 1 sec 164 referred to Para 3
F
(2008) 14 sec 337 referred to Para 4
1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 259 relied on Para 38,
53,
2006 (2) SCR 403 relied on Para 4, 66
G
2006 (10) Suppl. SCR 197 relied on Para 4, 65
1970 (3) SCR 931 relied on Para 4
1981 Supp sec 43 referred to Para 4
2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 474 referred to Para 4 · H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A 2007 (11) SCR 246 referred to Para 4
2012 (1) SCR 1066 referred to Para 5
2011 (3) SCR 932 relied on Para 37
1973 (2) SCR 502 relied on Para 37
B
1976 (1) SCR 451 referred to Para 9
1979 (2) SCR 94 referred to Para 10
2007 (8) SCR 390 referred to Para 26
c (1979) 2 sec 322 referred to Para 10
2006 (7) Suppl. SCR 202 referred to Para 10
(1964) 3 SCR 71 referred to Para 11
2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 307 referred to Para 11
D
2003 (3) SCR 485 referred to Para 12
1967 SCR 120 relied on Para 41
2010 (2) SCR 979 referred to Para 12
E 1955 SCR 1150 referred to Para 13
1970 (3) SCR 946 referred to Para 13
2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 307 referred to Para 13
F (1972) 4 sec 113 referred to Para 13
2011 (3) SCR 597 referred to Para 13
2002 (2) SCR 383 referred to Para 13
AIR 1967 Cal 478 referred to Para 13
G
(2001 > 9 sec 581 referred to Para 16
1992 Crl. L.J. 1558 referred to Para 16
2002 Crl. L.J. 2113 referred to Para 16
H 2002 (2) Crimes 143 referred to Para 16
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 733
AIR 1949 Madras 663 referred to Para 17 A
1978 (2) SCR 621 referred to Para 19
1977 (2) SCR 904 referred to Para 20
2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 737 referred to Para 20
B
(1964) 4 SCR 69 referred to Para 20
(2011 > 1 sec 577 referred to Para 25
2010 (9) SCR 1168 referred to Para·27
1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 32 relied on Para 53 c
1974 (2) SCR 348 referred to Para 70
1989 (2) Suppl. SCR 105 referred to Para 70
1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 284 referred to Para 70 D
(1996) 11 sec 114 referred to Para 70
1981 (2) SCR 516 referred to Para 70
1999 (3) SCR 1279 referred to Para 70
2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 833 referred to Para 70
E
2005 (3) SCR 345 referred to Para 70
1997 (6) Suppl. SCR 595 referred to Para 71
1983 LW (CRL) 121 referred to Para 71 F
1971 (2) SCR 822 referred to Para 71
1985 (2) SCR 621 referred to Para 71
2-011 (2) SCR 413 referred to Para 71
G
1973 (2) SCR 16 referred to Para 71
AIR 1945 PC 18 referred to Para 71
1972 (3) SCR 622 referred to Para 89
(1994) 4 sec 260 referred to Para 99 H
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Crl)
No. 68 of 2008.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
WITH
B
SLP (Crl.) Nos. 5986 of 2006, 5200 of 2009, Crl. A. Nos. 1410
of 2011, 1267 of 2007 & Contempt Pet. (C) No. D 26722 of
2008 in W.P. (Crl.) No. 68 of 2008.
C Mohan Parasaran, SG, K.V. Vishwanathan, A.S.
Chandhiok, Sidharth Luthra, ASG, S.B. Upadhyay, R.K. Dash,
Vibha Datta Makhija, Shekhar Naphade, Krishna Sarma, V.
Madhukar, Subramonium Prasad, Manjit Singh, Dr. Manish
Singhvi, AAG, Mona K. Rajvanshi, B.K. Shahi, Anurag Kashyap,
D B.P. Gupta, Ashwani Kumar, G. Sivabalamurugan, Anis
Mohammad, Dayanadan Pandey, L.K. Pandey, Abhijat P.
Medh, Shalu Sharma, Sudarshan Singh Rawat, Debasis Misra,
Satya Siddiqui, Sarfraz A. Siddiqui, S.K. Mishra, D.S. Mahra,
Dr. Ashok Dhamija, Rajiv Nanda, Sonia Dhamija, P.K. Dey,
T.A. Khan, B.V. Bairam Das, Gaurav Srivastava, Archana
E Singh, Abhisth Kumar, Vikrant Yadav, Kamalendra Mishra,
C.D. Singh, Arjun Dewan, Supriya Juneja, Gurmohan Singh
Bedi, Anandana Handa, Charul Sarin, Mishra Saurabh, Sanjay
Kharde, Shankar Chillarge, Sachin Patil Shubhangi Tuli, Asha
G. Nair, Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, Arputham Aruna & Co.,
F Sharmila Upadhyay, Debasis Mishra, Ena Toli Serna,
Hemantika Wahi, Parul Kumari, Anil Shrivastava, Rituraj
Biswas, Sapam Biswajit Meitei, Khwairakpam Nobin Singh,
Kamini Jaiswal, Jatinder Kumar Bhatia, Mukesh Verma,
Naresh K. Sharma, P.V. Dinesh, Anitha Shenoy, Gopal Singh,
G Manish Kumar, Chandan Kumar, Ritu Raj Biswas, Anil K. Jha,
Riku Sarma, Navnit Kumar, (for Corporate Law Group,) Sumita
Hazarika, Satish Vig, Aruneshwar Gupta, D. Bharathi Reddy,
V.G. Pragasam, S.J. Aristotle, Prabhu Ramasubramanian,
Dharmendra Kumar Sinha, Ajay Pal, R. Nedurmaran, Ranjan
H Mukherjee, A. Subhashini, Dr. Monika Gusain, S.
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 735
Thannanjayan, Sudharshan Singh Rawat, Rameshwar Prasad A
Goyal, Dinesh Sharma, Paritosh Anil, Anvita Cowshish, Kuldip
Singh, M. Yogesh Kanna, Vanita Chandrakant Giri, A. Shanta
Kumar, Sasikala, K.N. Madhusoodhanan, R. Sathish, Vivekta
Singh, Tarjit Singh, Vikas Sharma, Vinay Kuhar, Kamal Mohan
Gupta, Amit Lubhaya, lrshad Ahmad for the Appearing Parties. B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
P. SATHASIVAM, CJI. 1. The important issue which arises
for consideration in the referred matter is whether "a police
officer is bound to register a First Information Report (FIR) upon C
receiving any information relating to commission of a cognizable
offence under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (in short 'the Code') or the police officer has the power
to conduct a "preliminary inquiry" in order to test the veracity
of such information before registering the same?" D
2. The present writ petition, under Article 32 of the
Constitution, has been filed by one Lalita Kumari (minor)
through her father, viz., Shri Bhola Kamat for the issuance of a
writ of Habeas Corpus or direction(s) of like nature against the
E
respondents herein for the protection of his minor daughter who
has been kidnapped. The grievance in the said writ petition is
that on 11.05.2008, a written report was. submitted by the
petitioner before the officer in-charge of the police 'station
concerned who did not take any action on the same. Thereafter,
when the Superintendent of Police was moved, an FIR was F
registered. According to the petitioner, even thereafter, steps
were not taken either for apprehending the accused or for the
recovery of the minor girl child.
3. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in, Lalita Kumari vs. G
Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2008) 7 SCC 164, after
noticing the disparity in registration of FIRs by police officers
on case to case basis across the country, issued notice to the
Union of India, the Chief Secretaries of all the States and Union
Territories and Director Generals of Police/Commissioners of H
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A Police to the effect that if steps are not taken for registration of
FIRs immediately ana the copies thereof are not handed over
to the complainants, they may move the Magistrates concerned
by filing complaint petitions for appropriate direction(s) to the
police to register the case immediately and for apprehending
B the accused persons, failing which, contempt proceedings must
be initiated against such delinquent police officers if no
sufficient cause is shown.
4. Pursuant to the above directions, when the matter was
heard by the very same Bench in Lalita Kumari vs.
C Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2008) 14 SCC 337, Mr.
S.B. Upadhyay, learned senior counsel for the petitioner,
projected his claim that upon receipt of information by a police
officer in-charge of a police station disctosing a cognizable
offence, it is imperative for him to register a case under Section
D 154 of the Code and placed reliance upon two-Judge Bench
decisions of this Court in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal
1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, Ramesh Kumari vs. State (NCT of
Delhi) (2006) 2 SCC 677 and Parkash Singh Badal vs. State
of Punjab (2007) 1 SCC 1. On the other hand, Mr. Shekhar
E Naphade, learned senior counsel for the State of Maharashtra
submitted that an officer in-charge of a police station is not
obliged under law, upon receipt of information disclosing
commission of a cognizable offence, to register a case rather
the discretion lies with him, in appropriate cases, to hold some
F sort of preliminary inquiry in relation to the veracity or otherwise
of the accusations made in the report. In support of his
submission, he placed reliance upon two-Judge Bench
decisions of this Court in P. Sirajuddin vs. State of Madras
(1970) 1 SCC 595, Sevi vs. State of Tamil Nadu 1981 Supp
G SCC 43, Shashikant vs. Central Bureau of Investigation
(2007) 1 SCC 630, and Rajinder Singh Katoch vs.
Chandigarh Admn. (2007) 10 SCC 69. In view of the conflicting
decisions of this Court on the issue, the said bench, vide order
dated 16.09.2008, referred the same to a larger bench.
H
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 737
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
5. Ensuing compliance to the above direction, the matter A
pertaining to Lalita Kumari was heard by a Bench of three-
Judges in Lalita Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh &
Ors. (2012) 4 SCC 1 wherein, this Court, after hearing various
counsel representing Union of India, States and Union
Territories and also after adverting to all the conflicting decisions B
extensively, referred the matter to a Constitution Bench while
concluding as under:-
"97. We have carefully analysed various judgments
delivered by this Court in the last several decades. We C
clearly discern divergent judicial opinions of this Court on
the main issue: whether under Section 154 CrPC, a police
officer is bound to register an FIR when a cognizable
offence is made out or he (police officer) has an option,
discretion or latitude of conducting some kind of
preliminary inquiry before registering the FIR. D
98. The learned counsel appearing for the Union of
India and different States have expressed totally divergent
views even before this Court. This Court also carved out
a special category in the case of medical doctors in the E
aforementioned cases of Santosh Kumar and Suresh
Gupta where preliminary inquiry had been postulated
before registering an FIR. Some counsel also submitted
that the CBI Manual also envisages some kind of
preliminary inquiry before registering the FIR. F
99. The issue which has arisen for consideration in
these cases is of great public importance. In view of the
divergent opinions in a large number of cases decided by
this Court, it has become extremely important to have a
clear enunciation of law and adjudication by a larger Bench G
of this Court for the benefit of all concerned-the courts, the
investigating agencies and the citizens.
100. Consequently, we request the Hon'ble the Chief
Justice to refer these matters to a Constitution Bench of H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A at least five Judges of this Court for an authoritative
judgment."
6. Therefore, the only question before this Constitution
Bench relates to the interpretation of Section 154 of the Code
B and incidentally to consider Sections 156 and 157 also.
7. Heard Mr. S.B. Upadhyay, learned senior counsel for
the petitioner, Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan, learned Additional,
Solicitor General for the Union of India, Mr. Sidharth Luthra,
learned Additional Solicitor General for the State of
C Chhattisgarh, Mr. Shekhar Naphade, Mr. R.K. Dash, Ms. Vibha
Datta Makhija, learned senior counsel for the State of
Maharashtra, U.P. and M.P. respectively, Mr. G.
Sivabalamurugan, learned counsel for the accused, Dr. Ashok
Dhamija, learned counsel for the CBI, Mr. Kalyan Bandopodhya,
D learned senior counsel for the State of West Bengal, Dr.
Manish Singhvi, learned AAG for the State of Rajasthan and
Mr. Sudarshan Singh Rawat.
8. In order to answer the main issue posed before this
E Bench, it is useful to refer the following Sections of the Code:-
"154. Information in cognizable cases.- (1) Every
information relating to the commission of a cognizable
offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police
station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his
F direction, and be read over to the informant; and every
such information, whether giv~n in writing or reduced to
writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving
it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to
be kept by such officer in such form as the State
G Government may prescribe in this behalf.
(2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-
section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the
informant.
H (3) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an
LALITA KUMAR! v. GOVT. OF U.P. 739
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
officer in charge of a police station to record the A
information referred to in subsection (1) may send the
substance of such information, in writing and by post, to
the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied
that such information discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself B
or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer
subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code,
and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in
charge of the police station in relation to that offence.
156. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable C
case. (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may,
without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any
cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the
local area within the limits of such station would have
power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter D
XIII.
(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall
at any stage be called in question on the ground that the
case was one which such officer was not empowered E
under this section to investigate.
(3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may
order such an investigation as above- mentioned.
157. Procedure for investigation: (1) If, from information F
received or otherwise, an officer in charge of a police
station has reason to suspect the commission of an
offence which he is empowered under Section 156 to
investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same to
a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such G
offence upon a police report and shall proceed in person,
or shall depute one of his subordinate officers not being
below such rank as the State Government may, by general
or special order, prescribe in this behalf, to proceed, to
the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
..
A case, and, if necessary, to take measures for the ~scovery
and arrest of the offender:
Provided that-
(a) when information as to the commission of any such
B offence is given against any person by name and the case
is not of a serious nature, the officer in charge of a police
station need not proceed in person or depute a
subordinate officer to make an investigation on the spot;
'
c (b) if it appears to the officer in charge of a police station
that there is no sufficient ground for entering on an
investigation, he shall not investigate the case.
Provided further that in relation to an offence of rape, the
recording of statement of the victim shall be conducted at
D the residence of the victim or ih the place of her choice
and as far as practicable by a woman police officer in the
presence of her parents or guardian or near relatives or
social worker of the locality.
E (2) In each of the cases mentioned in clauses (a) and (b)
of the proviso to sub- section (1), the officer in charge of
the police station shall state in his report his reasons for
not fully complying with the requirements of that sub-section,
and, in the case mentioned in clause (b) of the said
proviso, the officer shall also forthwith notify to the
F
informant, if any, in such manner as may be prescribed by
the State Government, the fact that he will not investigate
the case or cause it to be investigated."
Contentions:
G
9. At the foremost, Mr. S.B. Upadhyay, learned senior
counsel, while explaining the conditions mentioned in Section
154 submitted that Section 154(1) is mandatory as the use of
the word 'shall' is indicative of the statutory intent of the
H legislature. He also contended that there is no discretion left
LALITA KUMAR! v. GOVT. OF U.P. 741
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
to the police officer except to register an FIR. In support of the A
above proposition, he relied on the following decisions, viz., B.
Premanand and Ors. vs. Mohan Koikal and Others (2011) 4
SCC 266, Mis Hirala/ Rattan/al Etc. Etc. vs. State of U.P. and
Anr. Etc. Etc. (1973) 1 SCC 216 and Govindlal Chhaganlal
Patel vs. Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Godhra B
and Ors. (1975) 2 sec 482.
10. Mr. Upadhyay, by further drawing our attention to the
language used in Section 154(1) of the Code, contended that
it merely mentions 'information' without prefixing tfle words
'reasonable' or 'credible'. In order to substantiate this claim, he C
•·· relied on the foll()wing decisions, viz., Bhajan Lal (supra),
Ganesh Bhavan Patel and Another vs. State of Maharashtra
(1978) 4 SCC 371, Aleque Padamsee and Others vs. Union
of India and Others (2007) 6 SCC 171, Ramesh Kumari
(supra), Ram Lal Narang vs. State (Delhi Administration) D
(1979) 2 SCC 322 and Lal/an Chaudhary and Others vs.
State of Bihar and Another (2006) 12 SCC 229. Besides, he
also brought to light various adverse impacts of ailowing police
officers to hold preliminary inquiry before registering an FIR.
E
11. Mr. K.V. Viswanathan, learned Additional Solicitor
General appearing on behalf of Union of India submitted that
in all the cases where information is received under Section
154 of the Code, it is mandatory for the police to forthwith enter
the same into the register maintained for the said purpose, if F
the same relates to commission of a cognizable offence.
According to learned ASG, the police authorities have no
discretion or authority, whatsoever, to ascertain the veracity of
such information before deciding to register it. He also pointed
out that a police officer, who proceeds to the spot under G
Sections 156 and 157 of the Code, on the basis of either a
cryptic information or source information, or a rumour etc., has
to immediately, on gathering information relating to the
commission of a cognizable offence, send a report (ruqqa) to
the police station so that the same can be registered as FIR.
H
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 14 S.C.R.
A He also highlighted the scheme of the Code relating to the
registration of FIR, arrest, various protections provided to the
accused and the power of police to close investigation. In
support of his claim, he relied on various decisions of this Court
viz .. Bhajan Lal (supra), Ramesh Kumari (supra) and Aleque
B Padamsee (supra). He also deliberated upon the
distinguishable judgments in conflict with the mandatory
proposition, viz .. State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Bhagwant Kishore
Joshi (1964) 3 SCR 71, P. Sirajuddin (supra), Sevi (supra).
Shashikant (supra), Rajinder Singh Katoch (supra), Jacob
c Mathew vs. State of Punjab & Anr. (2005) 6 SCC 1. He
concluded his arguments by saying that if any information
disclosing a cognizable offence is led before an officer in-
charge of a police station satisfying the requirements of Section
154(1) of the Code, the said police officer has no other option
except to enter the substance thereof in the prescribed form,
0
that is to say, to register a case on the basis of such
information. Further. he emphasized upon various safeguards
provided under the Code against filing a false case.
12. Dr. Ashok Dhamija, learned counsel for the CBI,
E submitted that the use of the word "shall" under Section 154(1)
of the Code clearly mandates that if the information given to a
police officer relates to the commission of a cognizable offence,
then it is mandatory for him to register the offence. According
to learned counsel, in such circumstances, there is no option
F or discretion given to the police. He further contended that the
word "shall" clearly implies a mandate and is unmistakably
indicative of the statutory intent. What is necessary, according
to him, is only that the information given to the police must
disclose commission of a cognizable offence. He also
G contended that Section 154 of the Code uses the word
"information" simpliciter and does not use the qualified words
such as "credible information" or "reasonable complaint". Thus,
the intention of the Parliament is unequivocally clear from the
language employed that a mere information relating to
H commission of a cognizable offence is sufficient to register an
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 743
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
FIR. He also relied on Bhajan Lal (supra), Ramesh Kumari A
(supra), Aleque Padamsee (supra), Lal/an Chaudhary (supra),
Superintendent of Police, CBI vs. Tapan Kumar Singh (2003)
6 SCC 175, Mis Hirata/ Rattan/al (supra), B. Premanand
(supra), Khub Chand vs. State of Rajasthan AIR 1967 SC
1074, P. Sirajuddin (supra), Rajinder Singh Katoch (supra), B
Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (supra), State of West Bengal vs.
Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal
(201 O) 3 sec 571. He also pointed out various safeguards
provided in the Code against filing a false case. In the end, he
concluded by reiterating that the registration of FIR is mandatory C
under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses
commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry
is permissible in such a situation. Further, he also clarified that
the preliminary inquiry conducted by the CBI, under certain
situations, as provided under the CBI Crime Manual, stands on
a different footing due to the special prov/sions relating to the D
CBI contained in the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act,
1946, which is saved under Sections 4(2) and 5 of the Code.
13. Mr. Kalyan Bandopadhyay, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the State of West Bengal, submitted that E
whenever any information relating to commission of a
cognizable offence is received, it is the duty of the officer in-
charge of a police station to record the same and a copy of
such information, shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the
informant under Section 154(2) of the Code. According to him, F
a police officer has no other alternative but to record the
information in relation to a cognizable offence in the first
instance. He also highlighted various subsequent steps to be
followed by the police officer pursuant to the registration of an
FIR. With regard to the scope of Section 154 of the Code, he G
relied on H.N. Rishbud and lnder Singh vs. State of Delhi AIR
1955 SC 196, Bhajan Lal (supra), S.N. Sharma vs. Bipen
Kumar Tiwari (1970) 1 SCC 653, Union of India vs. Prakash
P. Hinduja (2003) 6 SCC 195, Sheikh Hasib alias Tabarak vs.
State o(Bihar (1972) 4 SCC 773, Shashikant (supra), Ashok H
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A Kumar Todi vs. Kishwar Jahan and Others (2011) 3 SCC 758,
Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Others vs. State of T.N. and
Others (2002) 3 SCC 533, P. Sirajuddin (supra), Rajinder
Singh Katoch (supra), Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (supra) and
Mannalal Khatic vs. The State AIR 1967 Cal 478.
8 14. Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Additional Advocate
General for the State of Rajasthan, submitted that Section
154(1) of the Code mandates compulsory registration of FIR.
He also highlighted various safeguards inbuilt in the Code for
lodging of false FIRs. He also pointed out that the only
C exception relates to cases arising under the Prevention of
Corruption Act as, in those cases, sanction is necessary before
taking cognizance by the Magistrates and the public servants
are accorded some kind of protection so that vexatious cases
cannot be filed to harass them.
D
15. Mr. G. Sivabalamurugan, learned counsel for the
appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1410 of 2011, after tracing
the earlier history, viz., the relevant provisions in the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1861, 1872, 1882 and 1898 stressed
E as to why the compulsory registration of FIR is mandatory. He
also highlighted the recommendations of the Report of the 41 st
Law Commission and insertion of Section 13 of the Criminal
Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 with effect from 03.02.2013.
16. Mr. R.K. Dash, learned senior counsel appearing for
F the State of Uttar Pradesh, though initially commenced his
arguments by asserting that in order to check unnecessary
harassment to innocent persons at the behest of unscrupulous
complainants, it is desirable that a preliminary inquiry into the
allegations should precede with the registration of FIR but
G subsequently after considering the salient features of the Code,
various provisions like Sections 2(4) (h), 156(1 ), 202(1 ), 164,
various provisions from the U.P. Police Regulations, learned
senior counsel contended that in no case recording of FIR
should be deferred till verification of its truth or otherwise in case
H of information relating to a cognizable offence. In addition to
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 745
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
the same, he also relied on various pronouncements of this A
Court, such as, Mohindro vs. State of Punjab (2001) 9 sec
581, Ramesh Kumari (supra), Bhajan Lal (supra), Parkash
Singh Badal (supra), Munna Lal vs. State of Himachal
Pradesh 1992 Crl. L.J. 1558, Giridhari Lal Kanak vs. State and
others 2002 Crl. L.J. 2113 and Katteri Moideen Kutty Haji vs. B
State of Kera/a 2002 (2) Crimes 143. Finally, he concluded that
when the statutory provisions, as envisaged in Chapter XII of
_ the Code, are clear and unambiguous, it would not be legally
permissible to allow the police to make a preliminary inquiry
into the allegations before registering an FIR under Section 154 c
of the Code.
17. Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned Additional Solicitor
General appearing for the State of Chhattisgarh, commenced
his arguments by emphasizing the scope of reference before
the Constitution Bench. Subsequently, he elaborated on various D
judgments which held that an investigating officer, on receiving
information of commission of a cognizable offence under
Section 154 of the Code, has power to conduct preliminary
inquiry before registration of FIR, viz., Bhagwant Kishore Joshi
(supra), P. Sirajuddin (supra), Sevi (supra) and Rajinder Singh E
Katoch (supra). Concurrently, he also brought to our notice the
following decisions, viz., Bhajan Lal (supra), Ramesh Kumari
(supra), Parkash Singh Badal (supra), and Aleque Padamsee
(supra), which held that a police officer is duty bound to register
an FIR, upon receipt of information disclosing commission of F
a cognizable offence and the power of preliminary inquiry does
not exist under the mandate of Section 154. Learned ASG has
put forth a comparative analysis of Section 154 of the·Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1898 and of 1973. He also highlighted
that every activity which occurs in a police station [Section 2(s)) G
is entered in a diary maintained at the police station which may
be called as the General Diary, Station Diary or Daily Diary.
He underlined the relevance of General Diary by referring to
various judicial decisions such as Tapan Kumar Singh (supra),
Re: Subbaratnam & Ors. AIR 1949 Madras 663. He further H
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A pointed out that, presently, throughout the country, in
matrimonial, commercial, medical negligence and corruption
related offences, there exist provisions for conducting an inquiry
or preliminary inquiry by the police, without/before registering
an FIR under Section 154 of the Code. He also brought to our
B notice various police rules prevailing in the States of Punjab,
Rajasthan, U.P., Madhya Pradesh, Kolkata, Bombay, etc., for
conducting an inquiry before registering an FIR. Besides, he
also attempted to draw an inference from the Crime Manual of
the CBI to highlight that a preliminary inquiry before registering
, ca case is permissible and ,legitimate in the eyes of law.
Adverting to the above contentions, he concluded by pleading
that preliminary inquiry before registration of an FIR should be
held permissible. Further, he emphasized that the power to
carry out an inquiry or preliminary inquiry by the police, which
precedes the registration of FIR will eliminate the misuse of the
0
process, as the registration of FIR serves as an impediment
against a person for various important activities like applying
for a job or a passport, etc. Learned ASG further requested this
Court to frame guidelines for certain category of cases in which
E preliminary inquiry should be made.
18. Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the State of Maharashtra, submitted that
ordinarily the Station House Officer (SHO) should record an FIR
upon receiving a complaint disclosing the ingredients of a
F cognizable offence, but in certain situations, in case of doubt
about the correctness or credibility of the information, he should
have the discretion of holding a preliminary inquiry and
thereafter, if he is satisfied that there is a prima facie case for
investigation, register the FIR. A mandatory duty of registering
G FIR should not be cast upon him. According to him, this
interpretation would harmonize two extreme positions, viz., the
proposition that the moment the complaint disclosing
ingredients of a cognizable offence is lodged, the police officer
must register an FIR without any scrutiny whatsoever is an
H extreme proposition and is contrary to the mandate of Article
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 747
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
21 of the Constitution of India, similarly, the other extreme point A
of view is that the police officer must investigate the case
substantially before registering an FIR. Accordingly, he pointed
out that both must be rejected and a middle path must be
chosen. He also submitted the following judgments, viz., Bhajan
Lal (supra), Ramesh Kumari (supra), Parkash Singh Badal B
(supra), and Aleque Padamsee (supra) wherein it has been
held that if a complaint alleging commission of a cognizable
offence is received in the police station, then the SHO has no
other option but to register an FIR under Section 154 of the
Code. According to learned senior counsel, these verdicts c
require reconsideration as they have interpreted Section 154
de hors the other provisions of the Code and have failed to
consider the impact of Article 21 on Section 154 of the Code.
19. Alongside, he pointed out the following decisions, viz.,
Rajinder Singh Katoch (supra), P. Sirajuddin (supra), D
Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (supra) and Sevi (supra), which hold
that before registering an FIR under Section 154 of the Code,
it is open to the police officer to hold a preliminary inquiry to
ascertain whether there is a prima facie case of commission
of a cognizable offence or not. According to learned senior E
counsel, Section 154 of the Code forms part of a chain of
statutory provisions relating to investigation and, therefore, the
scheme of provisions of Sections 41, 157, 167, 169, etc., must
have a bearing on the interpretation of Section 154. In addition,
he emphasized that giving a literal interpretation would reduce F
the registration of FIR to a mechanical act. Parallelly, he
underscored the impact of Article 21 on Section 154 of the
Code by referring to Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India (1978)
1 SCC 248, wherein this Court has applied Article 21 to several
provisions relating to criminal law. This Court has also stated · G
that the expression "law" contained .in Article 21 necessarily
postulates law which is reasonable and not merely statutory
provisions irrespective of its reasonableness or otherwise.
Learned senior counsel pl~aded that in the light of Article 21,
provisions of Section 154 of the Code must be read down to H .
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A mean that before registering an FIR, the police officer must be
satisfied that there is a prima facie case for investigation. He
also emphasized that Section 154 contains implied power of
the police officer to hold preliminary inquiry if he bona fide
. possess serious doubts about the credibility of the information
B given to him. By pointing out Criminal Law (Amendment) Act,
2013, particularly, Section 166A, Mr. Naphade contended that
as far as other cognizable offences (apart from those
mentioned in Section 166A) are concerned, police has a
discretion to hold preliminary inquiry if there is some doubt
c about the correctness of the information.
20. In case of allegations relating to medical negligence
on the part of the doctors, it is pointed out by drawing our
attention to some of the decisions of this Court viz., Tapan
Kumar Singh (supra), Jacob Mathew (supra) etc., that no
D medical professional should be prosecuted merely on the basis
of the allegations in the complaint. By pointing out various
decisions, Mr. Naphade emphasized that in appropriate cases,
it would be proper for a police officer, on receipt of a complaint
of a cognizable offence, to satisfy himself that at least prima
E facie allegations levelled against the accused in the complaint
are credible. He also contended that no single provision of a
statute can be read and interpreted in isolation, but the statute
must be read as a whole. Accordingly, he prayed that the
provisions of Sections 41, 57, 156, 157, 159, 167, 190, 200
F and 202 of the Code must be read together. He also pointed
out that Section 154(3) of the Code enables any complainant
whose complaint is not registered as an FIR by the officer in-
charge of the police station to approach the higher police officer
for the purpose of getting his complaint registered as an FIR
G and in such a case, the higher police officer has all the powers
of recording an FIR and directing investigation into the matter.
In addition to the remedy available to an aggrieved person of
approaching higher police officer, he can also move the
concerned Magistrate by making a complaint under Section
H 190 thereof. He further emphasized that the fact that the
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 749
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
legislature has provided adequate remedies against refusal to A
register FIR and to hold investigation in cognizable offences,
is indicative of legislative intent that the police officer is not
bound to record FIR merely because the ingredients of a
cognizable offence are disclosed in the complaint, if he has
doubts about the veracity of the complaint. He also pointed out B
that the word "shall" used in the statute does not always mean
absence of any discretion in the matter. For the said
proposition, he also highlighted that this Court has preferred
the q.1le of purposive interpretation to the rule of literal
interpretation for which he relied on Chairman Board of Mining c
Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines and Another vs.
Ramjee (1977) 2 SCC 256, Lalit Mohan Pandey vs. Pooran
Singh (2004) 6 SCC 626, Prativa Bose vs. Kumar Rupendra
Deb Raikat (1964) 4 SCR 69. He further pointed out that it is
impossible to put the provisions of Section 154 of the Code in
0
a straightjacket formula. He also prayed for framing of some
guidelines as regards registration or non-registration of FIR.
Finally, he pointed out that the requirement of Article 21 is that
the procedure should be fair and just. According to him, if the
police officer has doubts in the matter, it is imperative that he
should have the discretion of holding a preliminary inquiry in the
E
matter. If he is debarred from holding such a preliminary inquiry,
the procedure would then suffer from the vice of arbitrariness
and unreasonableness. Thus, he concluded his arguments by
pleading that Section 154 of the Code must be interpreted in
the light of Article 21. F
21. Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, learned senior counsel
appearing for the State of Madhya Pradesh submitted that a
plain reading of Section 154 and other provisions of the Code
shows that it may not be mandatory but is absolutely obligatory G
on the part of the police officer to register an FIR prior to taking
any steps or conducting investigation into a cognizable offence.
She further pointed out that after receiving the first information
of an offence and prior to the registration of the said report
(whether oral or written) in the First Information Book maintained H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A at the police station under various State Government
regulations, only some preliminary inquiry or investigative steps
are permissible under the statutory framework of the Code to
the extent as is justifiable and is within the window of statutory
discretion granted strictly for the purpose of ascertaining
B whether there has been a commission or not of a cognizable
offence. Hence, an investigation, culminating into a Final Report
under Section 173 of the Code, cannot be called into question
and be quashed due to the reason that a part of the inquiry,
investigation or steps taken during investigation are conducted
c after receiving the first information but prior to registering the
same unless it is found that the said investigation is unfair,
illegal, mala fide and has resulted in grave prejudice to the right
of the accused to fair investigation. In support of the above
contentions, she traced the earlier provisions of the Code and
current statutory framework, viz., Criminal Law (Amendment)
0
Act, 2013 with reference to various decisions of this Court. She
concluded that Section 154 of the Code leaves no area of doubt
that where a cognizable offence is disclosed, there is no
discretion on the part of the police to record or not to record
the said information, however, it may differ from case to case.
E
22. The issues before the Constitution Bench of this Court
arise out of two main conflicting areas of concern, viz.,
(i) Whether the immediate non-registration of FIR
F leads to scope for manipulation by the police which
affects the right of the victim/complainant to have a
complaint immediately investigated upon
allegations being made; and
(ii) Whether in cases where the complaint/information
G does not clearly disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence but the FIR is compulsorily
registered then does it infringe the rights of an
accused.
H Discussion:
LALITA KUMAR! v. GOVT. OF U.P. 751
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
23. The FIR is a pertinent document in the criminal law A
procedure of our country and its main object from the point of
view of the informant is to set the criminal law in motion and
from the point of view of the investigating authorities is to obtain
information about the alleged criminal activity so as to be able
to take suitable steps to trace and to bring to book the guilty. B
24. Historical experience has thrown up cases from both
the sides where the grievance of the victim/informant of non-
registration of valid Fl Rs as well as that of the accused of being
unnecessarily harassed and investigated upon false charges C
have been found to be correct.
25. An example of the first category of cases is found in
State of Maharashtra vs. Sarangdharsingh Shivdassingh
Chavan & Anr. (2011) 1 sec 577 wherein a writ petition was
filed challenging the order of the Collector in the District of D
Buldhana directing not to register any crime against Mr ..
Gokulchand Sananda, without obtaining clearance from the
District Anti-Money Lending Committee and th.e District
Government Pleader. From the record, it was revealed that out
of 74 cases, only in seven cases, charge sheets were filed E
alleging illegal moneylending. This Court found that upon
instructions given by the Chief Minister to the District Collector,
there was no registration of FIR of the poor farmers. In these
circumstances, this Court held the said instructions to be ultra
vires and quashed the same. It is argued that cases like above F
exhibit the mandatory character of Section 154, and if it is held
otherwise, it shall lead to grave injustice.
26. In Aleque Padamsee (supra), while dealing with the
issue whether it is within the powers of courts to issue a writ
directing the police to register a First Information Report in a G
case where it was alleged that the accused had made
speeches likely to disturb communal harmony, this Court held
that "the police officials ought to register the FIR whenever facts
brought to their notice show that a cognizable offence has been
made out. In case the police officials fail to do so, the modalities H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A to be adopted are as set out in Section 190 read with Section
200 of the Code." As such, the Code itself provides several
checks for refusal on the part of the police authorities under
Section 154 of the Code.
27. However, on the other hand, there are a number of
8
cases which exhibit that there are instances where the power
of the police to register an FIR and initiate an investigation
thereto are misused where a cognizable offence is not made
out from the contents of the complaint. A significant case in this
context is the case of Preeti Gupta vs. State of Jharkhand
C (2010) 7 SCC 667 wherein this Court has expressed its anxiety
over misuse of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(in short 'the IPC') with respect to which a large number of
frivolous reports were lodged. This Court expressed its desire
that the legislature must take into consideration the informed
D public opinion and the pragmatic realities to make necessary
changes in law.
28. The abovesaid judgment resulted in the 243rd Report
of the Law Commission of India submitted on 30th August,
E 2012. The Law Commission, in its Report, concluded that
though the offence under Section 498-A could be made
compoundable, however, the extent of misuse was not
established by empirical data, and, thus, could not be a ground
to denude the provision of its efficacy. The Law Commission
F also observed that the law on the question whether the
registration of FIR could be postponed for a reasonable time
is in a state of uncertainty and can be crystallized only upon this
Court putting at rest the present controversy.
29. In order to arrive at a conclusion in the light of divergent
G views on the point and also to answer the above contentions,
it is pertinent to have a look at the historical background of the
Section and corresponding provisions that existed in the
previous enactments of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
H
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 753
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861 A
"139. Every complaint or information preferred to an officer
in charge of a police station, shall be reduced into writing
and the substance thereof shall be entered in a diary to
be kept by such officer, in such form as shall be 8
prescribed by the local government."
Code of Criminal Procedure, ~872
"112. Every complaint preferred to an officer in charge of
a police station, shall be reduced into writing, and shall be C
signed, sealed or marked by the person making it; and the
substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept
by such officer jn the form prescribed by the local
government."·
D
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882
"154. Every information relating to the commission of a
cognizable offence if given orally to an officer in charge of
a police station,' shall be reduced to writing by him, or under
his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every E
such information, whether given in writing or reduced to
writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving
it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to
be kept by such form as the government.may prescribe in
this behalf." F
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
"154. Every information relating to ,\he commission of a
cognizable offence if given orally to an officer in charge of
a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under G
his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every
such information, whether given in writing or reduced to
writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving
it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to
H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 14 S.C.R.
A be kept by such officer in such form as the Government
may prescribe in this behalf."
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
"154. Information in cognizable cases: 1) Every information
8 relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, it given
orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be
reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be
read over to the informant; and every such information,
whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid,
c shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance
thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer
in such form as the State Government may prescribe in
this behalf.
0 [Provided that if the information is given by the woman
against whom an offence under Sections 326A, 3268,
354, 354A, 3548, 354C, 3540, 376, 376A, 3768, 376C,
3760, 376E or Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code is
alleged to have been committed or attempted, then such
information shall be recorded by a woman police officer
E
or any woman officer:-
Provided further that:-
(a) in the event that the person against whom an offence
F under Sections 354, 354A, 3548, 354C, 3540, 376, 376A,
3768, 376C, 3760, 376E or Section 509 of the Indian
Penal code is alleged to have been committed or
attempted is temporarily or permanently mentally or
physically disabled then such information shall be recorded
G by a police officer, at the residence of the person seeking
to report such offence or at a convenient place of such
person's choice, in the presence of an interpreter or a
special educator, as the case may be;
(b) the recording of such information· shall be
H videographed;
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 755
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
(c) the police officer shall get the statement of the person A
recorded by a Judicial Magistrate under clause (a) of sub-
section (5A) of Section 164 as soon as possible.]
(Inserted by Section 13 of 'The Criminal Law (Amendment)
Act, 2013 w.e.f. 03.02.2013)
B
(2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-
section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the
informant.
(3) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an c
officer in charge of a police station to record the
information referred to in subsection (1) may send the
substance of such information, in writing and by post, to
the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied
that such information discloses the commission of a 0
cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself
or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer
subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code,
and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in
charge of the police station in relation to that offence.
E
A perusal of the above said provisions manifests the
legislative intent in both old ·codes and the new code for
compulsory registration of FIR in a case of cognizable
offence without conducting any Preliminary Inquiry.
F
30. The precursor to t~e present Code of 1973 is the
Code of 1898 wherein substantial changes were made in the
powers and procedure of the police to investigate. The starting
point of the powers of police was changed from the power of
the officer in-charge of a police station to investigate into a G
cognizable offence without the order of a Magistrate, to the
reduction of the first information regarding commission of a
cognizable offence, whether received orally or in writing, into
writing and into the book separately prescribed by the
Provincial government for recording such first information.
H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A 31. As such, a significant change that took place by way
of the 1898 Code was with respect to the placement of Section
154, i.e., the provision imposing requirement of recording the
first information regarding commission of a cognizable offence
in the special book prior to Section 156, i.e., the provision
B empowering the police officer to investigate a cognizable
offence. As such, the objective of such placement of provisions
was clear which was to ensure that the recording of the first
information should be the starting point of any investigation by
the police. In the interest of expediency of investigation since
c there was no safeguard of obtaining permission from the
Magistrate to commence an investigation, the said procedure
of recording first information in their books along with the
signature/seal oi the informant, would act as an "extremely
valuable safeguard" against the excessive, mala fide and
illegal exercise of investigative powers by the police.
0
32. Provisions contained in Chapter XII of the Code deal
with information to the police and their powers to investigate.
The said Chapter sets out the procedure to be followed during
investigation. The objective to be achieved by the procedure
E prescribed in the said Chapter is to set the criminal law in
motion and to provide for all procedural safeguards so as to
ensure that the investigation is fair and is not mala fide and
there is no scope of tampering with the evidence collected
during the investigation.
F
33. In addition, Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior
counsel contended that insertion of Section 166A in I PC
indicates that registration of FIR is not compulsory for all
offences other than what is specified in the said Section. By
Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, Section 166A was
G inserted in Indian Penal Code which reads as under:-
"Section 166A-Whoever, being a public servant.-
(a) knowingly disobeys any direction of the law which
H prohibits him from requiring the attendance at any place
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 757
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
of any person for the purpose of investigation into an A
offence or any other matter, or
(b) knowingly disobeys, to the prejudice of any person, any
other direction of the law regulating the manner in which
he shall conduct such investigation, or 8
(c) fails to record any information given to him under sub-
section (1) of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, in relation to cognizable offence
punishable under Section 326A, Section 3268, Section
354, Section 3548, Section 370, Section 370A, Section C
376, Section 376A, Section 3768, Section 376C, Section
3760, Section 376E, Section 509 shall be punished with
rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than six months but which may extend to two years and shall
also be liable to fine." 0
Section 166A(c) ·1ays down that if a public servant (Police
Officer) fails to record any information given to him under
Section 154(1) of the Code in relation to cognizable offences
punishable under Sections 326A, 3268, 354, 3548, 370, 370A, E
376, 376A 3768, 376C, 3760, 376E or Section 509, he shall
be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall
not be less than six months but may extend to two years and
shall also be liable to fine. Thus, it is the stand of learned
counsel that this provision clearly indicates that registration of
F
FIR is imperative and police officer has no discretion in the
matter in respect of offences specified in the said section.
Therefore, according to him, the legislature accepts that as far
as other cognizable offences are concerned, police has
discretion to hold a preliminary inquiry if there is doubt about
the correctness of the information. G
34. Although, the argument is as persuasive as it appears,
yet, we doubt whether such a presumption can be drawn in
contravention to the unambiguous words employed in the said
provision. Hence, insertion of Section 166A in the IPC vide H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013, must be read in
consonance with the provision and not contrary to it. The
insertion of Section 166A was in the light of recent unfortunate
occurrence of offences against women. The intention of the
legislature in putting forth this amendment was to tighten the
B already existing provisions to provide enhanced safeguards to
women. Therefore, the legislature, after noticing the increasing
crimes against women in our country, thought it appropriate to
expressly punish the police officers for their failure to register
FIRs in these cases. No other meaning than this can be
c assigned to for the insertion of the same.
35. With this background, let us discuss the submissions
in the light of various decisions botli in favour and against the
referred issue.
D Interpretation of Section 154:
36. It may be mentioned in this connection that the first and
foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in every system
of interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation. All that we
E have to see at the very outset is what does the provision say?
As a result, the language employed in Section 154 is the
determinative factor of the legislative intent. A plain reading of
Section 154(1) of the Code provides that any information
relating to the commission of a cognizable offence if given orally
to an officer-in-charge of a police station shall be reduced into
F writing by him or under his direction. There is no ambiguity in
the language of Section 154(1) of the Code.
37. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to the following
observations of this Court in Mis Hiralal Rattan/a/ (supra) which
G are as under:
"22 ... ln construing a statutory provision, the first and
the foremost rule of construction is the literary construction.
All that we have to see at the very outset is what does that
provision say? If the provision is unambiguous and if from
H
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 759
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
that provision, the legislative intent is clear, we need not A
call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes. The
other rules of construction of statutes are called into aid
only when the legislative intention is not clear ... "
The above decision was followed by this Court in B. B
Premanand (supra) and after referring the abovesaid
observations in the case of Hirata/ Rattan/al (supra), this Court
observed as under:
"9. It may be mentioned in this connection that the
first and foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in C
every system of interpretation is the literal 'rule of
interpretation. The other rules of interpretation; e.g. the
mischief rule, purposive interpretation, etc. can .only be
resorted to when the plain words of a statute are
ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if read D
literally would nullify the very object of the statute. Where
the words of a statute are absolutely clear and
unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles of
interpretation other than the literal rule, vide Swedish Match
AB v. SEBI (2004) 11 sec 641. E
The language of Section 154(1), therefore, admits of no
other construction but the literal construction.
38. The legislative intent of Section 154 is vividly
elaborated in Bhajan Lal (supra) which is as under:- F
"30. The legal mandate enshrined in Section 154(1)
is that every information relating to the commission of a
"cognizable offence" (as defined Under Section 2(c) of the
Code) if given orally (in which case it is to be reduced into G
writing) or in writing to "an officer incharge of a police
station" (within the meaning of Section 2(o) of the Code)
and signed by the informant should be entered in a book
to be kept by such officer in such form as the State
Government may prescribe which form is commonly called
H
as "First Information Report" and which act of entering the
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A information in the said form is known as registration of a
crime or a case.
31. At the stage of registration of a crime or a case
on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable
offence in compliance with the mandate of Section 154(1)
B
of the Code, the concerned police officer cannot embark
upon an inquiry as to whether the information, laid by the
informant is reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse
to register a case on the ground that the information is not
reliable or credible. On the other hand, the officer in charge
c of a police station is statutorily obliged to register a case
and t11en to proceed with the investigation if he has reason
to suspect the commission of an offence which he is
empowered under Section 156 of the Code to. investigate,
subject to the proviso to Section 157. (As we have
D proposed to make a detailed discussion about the power
of a police officer in the field of investigation of a
cognizable offence within the ambit of Sections 156 and
157 of the Code in the ensuing part of this judgment, we
do not propose to deal with those sections in extenso in
E the present context.) In case, an officer in charge of a police
station refuses to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him
and to register a case on the information of a cognizable
offence reported and thereby violates the statutory duty
cast upon him, the person aggrieved by such refusal can
F send the substance of the information in writing and by post
to the Superintendent of Police concerned who if satisfied
that the information forwarded to him discloses a
cognizable offence, should either investigate the case
himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police
G officer subordinate to him in the manner provided by sub-
section (3) of Section 154 of the Code.
32. Be it noted that in Section 154(1) of the Code,
the legislature in its collective wisdom has carefully and
cautiously used the expression "information" without
H
LALITA KUMAR! v. GOVT. OF U.P. 761
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
qualifying the same as in Section 41(1)(a) or (g) of the A
Code wherein the expressions, "reasonable complaint"
and "credible information" are used. Evidently, the non-
qualification of the word "information" in Section 154(1)
un_like in Section 41(1)(a) and (g) of the Code may be for
the reason that the police officer should not refuse to B
record an information relating to the commission of a
cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the
ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or
credibility of the information. In other words,
'reasonableness' or 'credibility' of the said information is c
not a condition precedent for registration of a case. A
comparison of the present Section 154 with those of the
earlier Codes will indicate that the legislature had
purposely thought it fit to employ only the word "information"
without qualifying the said word. Section 139 of the Code 0
of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act 25 of 1861) passed
by the Legislative Council of India read that 'every
complaint or information' preferred to an officer in charge
of a police station should be reduced into writing which
provision was subsequently modified by Section 112 of the
E
Code of 1872 (Act 10 of 1872) which thereafter read that
'every complaint' preferred to an officer in charge of a
police station shall be reduced in writing. The word
'complaint' which occurred in previous two Codes of 1861
and 1872 was deleted and in that place the word
'information' was used in the Codes of 1882 and 1898 F
which word is now used in Sections 154, 155, 157 and
190(c) of the present Code of 1973 (Act 2 of 1974). An
overall reading of all the Codes makes it clear that the
condition which is sine qua non for recording a first
information re.port is that there must be information and G
that information must disclose a cognizable offence.
33. It is, thereto.re, manifestly clear that if any
information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before
an officer in charge of a police station satisfying the H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A requirements of Section 154(1) of the Code, the said
police officer has no other option except to enter the
substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to
register a case on the basis of such information.
39. Consequently, the condition that is sine qua non for
8
recording an FIR under Section 154 of the Code is that there
must be information and that information must disclose a
cognizable offence. If any information disclosing a cognizable
offence is led before an officer in charge of the police station
C satisfying the requirement of Section 154(1 ), the said police
officer has no other option except to enter the substance
thereof'in the prescribed form, that is to say, to register a case
on the basis of such information. The provision of Section 154
of the Code is mandatory and the concerned officer is duty
bound to register the case on the basis of information
D disclosing a cognizable offence. Thus, the plain words of
Section 154(1) of the Code have to be given their literal
meaning.
'Shall'
E
40. The use of the word "shall" in Section 154(1) of the
Code clearly shows the legislative intent that it is mandatory to
register an FIR if the information given to the police discloses
the commission of a cognizable offence.
F 41. In Khub Chand (supra), this Court observed as under:
"7 ... The term "shall" in its ordinary significance is
mandatory and the court shall ordinarily give that
interpretation to that term unless such an interpretation
G leads to some absurd or inconvenient consequence or be
at variance with the intent of the legislature, to be collected
from other parts of the Act. The construction of the said
expression depends on the provisions of a particuler Act,
the setting in which the expression appears, the object for
which the direction is given, the consequences that would
H
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 763
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
flow from the infringement of the direction and such other A
considerations ... "
42. It is relevant to mention that the object of using the word
"shall" in the context of Section 154(1) of the Code is to ensure
that all information relating to all cognizable offences is promptly
8
registered by the police and investigated in accordance with
the provisions of law.
43. Investigation of offences and prosecution of offenders
are .the duties of the State. For "cognizable offences", a duty
has been cast upon the police to register FIR and to conduct C
investigation except as otherwise permitted specifically under
Section 157 of the Code. If a discretion, option or latitude is
allowed to the police in the matter of registration of Fl Rs, it can
hatle serious consequences on the public order situation and
can also adversely affect the rights of the victims including D
violating their fundamental right to equality.
44. Therefore, the context in which the word "shall" appears
in Section 154(1) of the Code, the object for which it has been
used and the consequences that will follow from the
E
infringement of the direction to register Fl Rs, all these factors
clearly show that the word "shall" used in Section 154( 1) needs
to be given its ordinary meaning of being of "mandatory"
character. The provisions of Section 154(1) of the Code, read
in the light of the statutory scheme, do not admit of conferring
any discretion on the officer in-charge of the police station for F
embarking upon a preliminary inquiry prior to the registration
of an FIR. It is settled position of law that if the provision is
unambiguous and the legislative intent is clear, the court need
not call into it any other rules of construction.
G
45. In view of the above, the use of the word 'shall' coupled
with the Scheme of the Act lead to the conclusion that the
legislators intended that if an information relating to commission
of a cognizable offence is given, then it would mandatorily be
registered by the officer in-charge of the police station. Reading H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013) 14 S.C.R.
A 'shall' as 'may', as contended by some counsel, would be
against the Scheme of the Code. Section 154 of the Code
should be strictly construed and the word 'shall' should be given
its natural meaning. The golden rule of interpretation can be
given a go-by only in cases where the language of the section
B is ambiguous and/or leads to an absurdity.
46. In view of the above, we are satisfied that Section
154( 1) of the Code does not have any ambiguity in this regard
and is in clear terms. It is relevant to mention that Section 39
of the Code casts a statutory duty on every person to inform
-- c about commission of certain offences which includes offences
covered by Sections 121 to 126, 302, 64-A, 382, 392 etc., of
the IPC. It would be incongruous to suggest that though it is the
duty of every citizen to inform about commission of an offence,
but it is not obligatory on the officer-incharge of a Police Station
D to register the report. The word 'shall' occurring in Section 39
of the Code has to be given the same meaning as the word
'shall' occurring in Section 154(1) of the Code.
'Book'/'Diary'
E
47. It is contented by learned ASG appearing for the State
of Chhattisgarh that the recording of first information under
Section 154 in the 'book' is subsequent to the entry in the
General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary, which is maintained in
police station. Therefore, according to learned ASG, first
F information is a document at the earliest in the general diary,
then if any preliminary inquiry is needed the police officer may
conduct the same and thereafter the information will be
registered as FIR.
G 48. This interpretation is wholly unfounded. The First
Information Report is in fact the "information" that is received
first in point of time, which is either given in writing or is reduced
to writing. It is not the "substance" of it, which is to be entered
in the -diary prescribed by the State Government. The term
H 'General Diary' (also called as 'Station Diary' or 'Daily Diary' in
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 765
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
some States) is maintained not under Section 154 of the Code A
but under the provisions of Section 44 of the Police Act, 1861
in the States to which it applies, or under the respective
provisions of the Police Act(s) applicable to a State or under
the Police Manual of a State, as the case may be. Section 44
of the Police Act, 1861 is reproduced below:- 8
"44. Police-officers to keep diary.-lt shall be the duty of
every officer in charge of a police-station to keep a general
diary in such form as shall, from time to time, be prescribed
by the State Government and to record therein all C
complaints and charged preferred, the names of all
persons arrested, the names of the complainants, the
offences charged against them, the weapons or property
that shall have been taken from their possession or
otherwise, and the names of the witnesses who shall have
been examined. The Magistrate of the district shall be at D
liberty to call for any inspect such diary."
49. It is pertinent to note that during the year 1861, when
the aforesaid Police Act, 1861 was passed, the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1861 was also passed. Section 139 of that E
Code dealt with registration of FIR and this Section is also
referred to the word "diary", as can be seen from the language
of this Section, as reproduced below:-
"139. Every complaint or information preferred to an officer
F
in charge of a Police Station, shall be reduced into writing,
and the substance thereof shall be entered in a diary to
be kept by such officer, in such form as shall be
prescribed by the local government."
Thus, Police Act, 1861 and the Code of Criminal G
~rocedure, 1861, both of which were passed in the same year,
used the same word "diary".
50. However, in the year 1872, a new Code came to be
passed which was called the Code of Criminal Procedure, H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A 1872. Section 112 of the Co.de dealt with the issue of
registration of FIR and is reproduced below:-
"112. Every complaint preferred to an officer in charge of
a Police station shall be reduced into writing, and shall be
signed, sealed, or marked by the person making it; and
B
the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept
by such officer in the form prescribed by the Local
Government."
51. It is, thus, clear that in the Code of Criminal Procedure;
C 1872, a departure was made and the word 'book' was used in
place of 'diary'. The word 'book' clearly referred to FIR book to
be maintained under the Code for registration of FIRs.
52. The question that whether the FIR is to be recorded in
D the FIR Book or in General Diary, is no more res integra. This
issue has already been decided authoritatively by this Court.
53. In Madhu Bala vs. Suresh Kumar (1997) 8 SCC 476,
this Court has held that FIR must be registered in the FIR
Register which shall be a book consisting of 200 pages. It is
E true that the substance of the information is also to be
mentioned in the Daily diary (or the general diary). But, the
basic requirement is to register the FIR in the FIR Book or
Register. Even in Bhajan Lal (supra), this Court held that FIR
has to be entered in a book in a form which is commonly called
F the First Information Report.
54. It is thus clear that registration of FIR is to be done in
a book called FIR book or FIR Register. Of course, in addition,
the gist of the FIR or the substance of the FIR may also be
G mentioned simultaneously in the General Diary as mandated
in the respective Police Act or Rules, as the case may be, under
the relevant State provisions.
55. The General Diary is a record of all important
transactions/events taking place in a police station, including
H departure and arrival of police staff, handing over or taking over
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 767
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
of charge, arrest of a person, details of law and order duties, A
visit of senior officers etc. It is in this context that gist or
substance of each FIR being registered in the police station is
also mentioned in the General Diary since registration of FIR
also happens to be a very important event in the police station.
Since General Diary is a record that is maintained B
chronologically on day-to-day basis (on each day, starting with
new number 1), the General Diary entry reference is also
mentioned simultaneously in the FIR Book, while· FIR number
is mentioned in the General Diary entry since both of these are
prepared simultaneously. c
56. It is relevant to point out that FIR Book is maintained
with its number given on an annual basis. This means that each
FIR has a unique annual number given to it. This is on similar
lines as the Case Numbers given in courts. Due to this reason,
it is possible to keep a strict control and track over the D
registration of FIRs by the supervisory police officers and by
the courts, wherever necessary. Copy of each FIR is sent to
the superior officers and to the concerned Judicial Magistrate.
57. On the other hand, General Diary contains a huge E
number of other details of the proceedings of each day. Copy
of General Diary is not sent to the Judicial Magistrate having
jurisdiction over the police station, though its copy is sent to a
superior police officer. Thus, it is not possible to keep strict
control of each and every FIR recorded in the General Diary F
by superior polic~ officers and/or the court in view of enormous
amount of other details mentioned therein and the numbers
changing every day.
' The signature of the complainant is obtained in the FIR
58.
Book as and when the complaint is given to the police station. G
On the other hand, there is no such requirement of obtaining
signature of the complainant in the general diary. Moreover, at.
times, the complaint given may consist of large number of
pages, in which case it is only the gist of the complaint which
is to be recorded in the General Diary and not the full complaint. H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 $.C.R.
A This does not fit in with the suggestion that what is recorded in
General Diary should be considered to be the fulfillment/
compliance of the requirement of Section 154 of registration
of FIR. In fact, the usual practice is to record the complete
complaint in the FIR book (or annex it with the FIR form) but
B record only about one or two paragraphs (gist of the
information) in the General Diary.
59. In view of the above, it is useful to point out that the
Code was enacted under Entry 2 of the Concurrent List of the
C Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which is reproduced
below:-
"2. Criminal procedure, including all matters included in the
Code of Criminal Procedure at the commencement of this
Constitution."
D
On the other hand, Police Act, 1861 (or other similar Acts
in respective States) were enacted under Entry 2 of the State
List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, which is
reproduced below:-
E "2. Police (including railway and village police) subject to
the provisions of Entry 2A of List I."
60. Now, at this juncture, it is pertinent to refer Article
254(1) of the Constitution, which lays down the provisions
F relating to inconsistencies between the laws made by the
Parliament and the State Legislatures. Article 254(1) is
reproduced as un"der:-
"254. Inconsistency between laws made by
Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of
G States
(1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a
State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by
Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to
H any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 769
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject A
to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by
Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made
by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be,
the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the
Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the B
repugnancy, be void."
Thus it is clear from the mandate of Article 254(1) of the
Constitution that if there is any inconsistency between the
provisions of the Code and the Police Act, 1861, the provisions C
of the Code will prevail and the provisions of the Police Act
would be void to the extent of the repugnancy.
61. If at all, there is any inconsistency in the provisions of
Section 154 of the ·code and Section 44 of the Police Act,
1861, with regard to the fact as to whether the FIR is to be D
registered in the FIR book or in the General Diary, the
provisions of Section 154 of the Code will prevail and the
provisions of Section 44 of the Police Act, 1861 (or similar
provisions of the respective corresponding Police Act or Rules
in other respective States) shall be void to the extent of the E
repugnancy. Thus, FIR is to be recorded in the FIR Book, as
mandated under Section 154 of the Code, and it is not correct
to state that information will be first recorded in the General
Diary and only after preliminary inquiry, if required, the
information will be registered as FIR. F
62. However, this Court in Tapan Kumar Singh (supra), held
that a GD entry may be treated as First information in an
appropriate case, where it discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence. It was held as under:
G
"15. It is the correctness of this finding which is assailed
before us by the appellants. They contend that the
information recorded in the GD entry does disclose the
commission of a cognizable offence. They submitted that
even if their contention, that after recording the GD entry H
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A only a preliminary inquiry was made, is not accepted, they
are still entitled to sustain the legality of the investigation
on the basis that the GD entry may be treated as a first
information report, since it disclosed the commission of a
cognizable offence.
B
16. The parties before us did not dispute the legal position
that a GD entry may be treated as a first information report
in an appropriate case, where it discloses the commission
of a cognizable offence. If the contention of the appellants
is upheld, the order of the High Court must be set aside
c because if there was in law a first information report
disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence, the
police had the power and jurisdi~tion to investigate, and
in the process of investigation to conduct search and
seizure. It is, therefore, not necessary for us to consider
D the authorities cited at the Bar on the question of validity
of the preliminary inquiry and the validity of the search and
seizure.
Xxxxxxx
E
19. The High Court fell into an error in thinking that the
information received by the police could not be treated as
a first information report since the allegation was vague
inasmuch as it was not stated from whom the sum of
rupees one lakh was demanded and accepted. Nor was
F it stated that such demand or acceptance was made as
motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official
act, or for showing or forbearing to show in exercise of his
official function, favour or disfavour to any person or for
rendering, attempting to render any service or disservice
G to any person. Thus there was no basis for a police officer
to suspect the commission of an offence which he was
empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate."
63. It is thus unequivocally clear that registration of FIR is
H mandatory and also that it is to be recorded in the FIR Book
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 771
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
by giving a unique annual number to each FIR to enable strict A
tracking of each and every registered FIR by the superior police
officers as well as by the competent court to which copies of
each FIR are required to be sent.
'Information' B
64. The legislature has consciously used the expression
"information" in Section 154(1) of the Code as against the
expression used in Section 41 ( 1)(a) and (g) where the
expression used for arresting a person without warrant is
"reasonable complaint" or "credible information". The C
expression under Section 154(1) of the Code is not qualified
by the prefix "reasonable" or "credible". The non qualification
of the word "information" in Section 154(1) unlike in Section
41 (1 )(a) and (g) of the Code is for the reason that the police
officer should not refuse to record any information relating to D
the commission of a cognizable offence on the ground that he
is not satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility of the
information. In other words, reasonableness or credibility of the
said information is not a condition precedent for the registration
cla~se. E
65. The above view has been expressed by this Court in
Bhajan Lal (supra) which is as under:-
"32 .... in Section 154(1) of the Code, the legislature in its
collective wisdom has carefully and cautiously used the F
expression ."information" without qualifying the same as in
Section 41 (1 )(a) or (g) of the Code wherein the
expressions, "reasonable complaint" and "credible
information" are used. Evidently, the non-qualification of
the word "information" in Section 154(1) unlike in Section G
41 (1 )(a) and (g) of the Code may be for the reason that
the police officer should not refuse to record an information
relating to the commission of a cognizable offence and to
register a case thereon on the ground that he is not
satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility of the H
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013) 14 S.C.R.
A information. In other words, 'reasonableness' or 'credibility'
of the said information is not a condition precedent for
registration of a case. A comparison of the present
Section 154 with those of the earlier Codes will indicate
that the legislature had purposely thought it fit to employ
s only the word "information" without qualifying the said
word."
66. In Parkash Singh Badal (supra), this Court held as
under:-
C "65. The legal mandate enshrined in Section 154(1)
is that every information relating to the commission of a
"cognizable offence" [as defined under Section 2(c) of the
Code] if given orally (in which case it is to be reduced into
writing) or in writing to "an officer in charge of a police
D station" [within the meaning of Section 2(o) of the Code]
and signed by the informant should be entered in a book
to be kept by such officer in such form as the State
Government may prescribe which form is commonly called
as "first information report" and which act of entering the
E information in the said form is known as registration of a
crime or a case.
66. At the stage of registration of a crime or a case
on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable
offence in compliance with the mandate of Section 154(1)
F of the Code, the police officer concerned cannot embark
upon an inquiry as to whether the information laid by the
informant is reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse
to register a case on the ground that the information is not
reliable or credible. On the other hand, the officer in charge
G of a police st_ation is statutorily obliged to register a case
and then to proceed with the investigation ii he has reason
to suspect the commission of an offence which he is
empowered under Section 156 of the Code to investigate,
subject to the proviso to Section 157 thereof. In case an
H officer in charge of a police station refuses to exercise the
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 773
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
jurisdiction vested in him and to register a case on the A
information of a cognizable offence reported and thereby
violates the statutory duty cast upon him, the person
aggrieved by such refusal can send the substance of the
infor.mation in writing and by post to the Superintendent of
Police concerned who if satisfied that the information B
forwarded to him discloses a cognizable offence, should
either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation
to be made by any police officer subordinate to him in the
manner provided by sub-section (3) of Section 154 of the
Code. c
67. It has to be noted that in Section 154(1) of the
Code, the legislature in its collective wisdom has carefully
and cautiously used the expression "information" without
qualifying the same as in Sections 41 (1 )(a) or (g) of the
Code wherein the expressions "reasonable complaint" and D
"credible information" are used. Evidently, the non-
qualification of the word "information" in Section 154( 1)
unlike in Sections 41 (1 )(a) and (g) of the Code may be for
the reason that the police officer should not refuse to
record an information relating to the commission of a E
cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the
ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or
credibility of the information. In other words.
"reasonableness" or "credibility" of the said information is
not a condition precedent for registration of a case. A F
comparison of the present Section 154 with those of the
earlier Codes will indicate that the legislature had
purposely thought it fit to employ only the word "information"
without qualifying the said word. Section 139 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act 25 of 1861) passed G
by the Legislative Council of India read that "every
complaint or information" preferred to an officer in charge
of a police station should be reduced into writing which
provision was subsequently modified by Section 112 of the
Code of 1872 (Act 10 of 1872) which thereafter read that H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A "every complaint" preferred to an officer in charge of a
police station shall be reduced in writing. The word
"complaint" which occurred in previous two Codes of 1861
and 1872 was deleted and in that place the word
"information" was used in the Codes of 1882 and 1898
B which word is now used in Sections 154, 155, 157 and
190(c) of the Code. An overall reading of all the Codes
makes it clear that the condition which is sine qua non for
recording a first information report is that there must be
an information and that information must disclose a
c cognizable offence.
68. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that if any
information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before
an officer in charge of a police station satisfying the
requirements of Section 154(1) of the Code, the said
D police officer has no other option except to enter the
substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to
register a case on the basis of such information."
67. In Ramesh Kumari (supra), this Court held as under:-
E
4. That a police officer mandatorily registers a case
on a complaint of a cognizable offence by the citizen under
Section 154 of the Code is no more res integra. The point
of law has been set at rest by this Court in State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal. This Court after examining the
F whole gamut and intricacies of the mandatory nature of
Section 154 of the Code has arrived at the finding in paras
31 and 32 of the judgment as under:
"31. At the stage of registration of a crime or
G a case on the basis of the information disclosing a
cognizable offence in compliance with the mandate
of Section 154(1) of the Code, the police officer
concerned cannot embark upon an inquiry as to
whether the information, laid by the informant is
H reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse to
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 775
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
register a case on the ground that the information A
is not reliable or credible. On the other hand, the
officer in charge of a police station is statutorily
obliged to register a case and then to proceed with
the investigation if he has reason to suspect the
commission of an offence which he is empowered B
under Section 156 of the Code to investigate,
subject to the proviso to Section 157. (As we have
proposed to make a detailed discussion about the
power of a police officer in the field of investigation
of a cognizable offence within the ambit of Sections c
156 and 157 of the Code in the ensuing part of this
judgment, we do not propose to deal with those
sections in extenso in the present context.) In case,
an officer in charge of a police station refuses to
exercise the jurisdiction vested in him and to
0
register a case on the information of a cognizable
offence reported and thereby violates the statutory
duty cast upon him, the person aggrieved by such
refusal can send the substance of the information
in writing and by post to the Superintendent of
Police concerned who if satisfied that the E
information forwarded to him discloses a
cognizable offence, should either investigate the
case himself or direct an investigation to be made
by any police officer subordinate to him in the
manner provided by sub-section (3) of Section 154 F
of the Code.
32. Be it noted that in Section 154(1) of the Code,
the legislature in its collective wisdom has carefully and
cautiously used the expression 'information' without G
qualifying the same as in Section 41 (1 }(a} or (g) of the
Code wherein the expressions, 'reasonable complaint' and
'credible information' are used. Evidently, the non-
qualification of the word 'information' in Section 154(1)
unlike in Section 41 (1 }(a} and (g) of the Code may be for H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 14 S.C.R.
A the reason that the police officer should not refuse to
record an information relating to the commission of a
cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the
ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or
credibility of the information. In other words,
B 'reasonableness' or 'credibility' of the said information is
not a condition precedent for registration of a case. A
comparison of the present Section 154 with those of the
earlier Codes will indicate that the legislature had
purposely thought it fit to employ.only the word 'information'
c without qualifying the said word. Section 139 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure of 1861 (Act 25 of 1861) passed
by the Legislative Council of India read that 'every
complaint or information' preferred to an officer in charge
of a police station should be reduced into writing which
provision was subsequently modified by Section 112 of the
D
Code of 1872 (Act 10 of 1872) which thereafter read that
'every complaint' preferred to an officer in charge of a
police station shall be reduced in writing. The word
'complaint' which occurred in previous two Codes of 1861
and 1872 was deleted and in that place the word
E 'information' was used in the Codes of 1882 and 1898
which word is now used in Sections 154, 155, 157 and
190(c) of the present Code of 1973 (Act 2 of 1974). An
overall reading of all the Codes makes it clear that the
condition which is sine qua non for recording a first
F information report is that there must be information and
that information must disclose a cognizable offence."
(emphasis in original)
Finally, this Court in para 33 said:
G
"33. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that if any
information disclosing a cognizable offence is laid before
an officer in charge of a police station satisfying the
requirements of Section 154(1) of the Code, the said
H police officer has no other option except to enter the
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 777
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
substance thereof in the prescribed form, that is to say, to A
register a case on the basis of such information."
5. The views expressed by this Court in paras 31,
32 and 33 as quoted above leave no manner of doubt that
the provision of Section 154 of the Code is mandatory and 8
the officer concerned is duty-bound to register the case on
the basis of such information disclosing cognizable
offence."
68. In Ram Lal Narang (supra), this Court held as under:-
C
"14. Under the CrPC, 1898, whenever an officer in
charge of the police station received information relating
to the commission of a cognizable offence, he was
required to enter the substance thereof in a book kept by
him, for that purpose, in the prescribed form (Section 154 o
CrPC). Section 156 of the CrPC invested the Police with
the power to investigate into cognizable offences without
the order of a Court. If, from the information received or
otherwise, the officer in charge of a police station
suspected the commission of a cognizable offence, he
E
was required to send forthwith a report of the same to a
Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence
upon a police report and then to proceed in person or
depute one of his subordinate officers to proceed to the
spot, to investigate the facts and circumstanees of the case
F
and to take measures for the discovery and \mest of the
offender (Section 157 CrPC). He was required to complete
the investigation without unnecessary delay, and, as soon
as it was completed, to forward to a Magistrate
empowered to take cognizance of the offence upon a
police report, a report in the prescribed form, setting forth G
the names of the parties, the nature of the information and
the names of the persons who appeared to be acquainted
with the circumstances of the case [Section 173(1) CrPC].
He was also required to state whether the accused had
been forwarded in custody or had been released on ba.il. H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 14 S.C.R.
A Upon receipt of the report submitted under Section 173(1)
CrPC by the officer in charge of the police station, the
Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of an offence
upon a police report might take cognizance of the offence
[Section 190(1 )(b) CrPC). Thereafter, if, in the opinion of
B the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence, there was
sufficient ground for proceeding, the Magistrate was
required to issue the necessary process to secure the
attendance of the accused (Section 204 CrPC). The
scheme of the Code thus was that the FIR was followed
c by investigation, the investigation led to the submission of
a report to the Magistrate, the Magistrate took cognizance
of the offence on receipt of the police report and, finally,
the Magistrate taking cognizance issued process to the
accused.
D 15. The police thus had the statutory right and duty
to "register" every information relating to the commission --
of a cognizable offence. The police also had the statutory
right and duty to investigate the facts and circumstances
of the case where the commission of a cognizable offence
E was suspected and to submit the report of such
investigation to the Magistrate having jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the offence upon a police report. These
statutory rights and duties of the police were not
circumscribed by any power of superintendence or
F interference in the Magistrate; nor was any sanction
required from a Magistrate to empower the Police to
investigate into a cognizable offence. This position in law
was well-established. In King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir
Ahmad the Privy Council observed as follows:
G
"Just as it is essential that everyone accused of a crime
should have free access to a Court of justice, so that he
may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with
which he is charged, so it is of the utmost importance that
the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters
H which are within their province and into which the law
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 779
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
imposes on them ttie duty of inquiry. In India, as has been A
shown, there is a statutory right on the part of the police to
investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable
crime without requiring any authority from the judicial
authorities, and it would, as Their Lordships think, be an
unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere B
with those statutory rules by an exercise of the inherent
jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the judiciary and
the police are complementary, not overlapping, and the
combination of individual liberty with a due observance of
law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to c
exercise its own function, always of course, subject to the
right of the Courts to intervene in an appropriate case
when moved under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure
Code to give directions in the nature of Habeas Corpus.
In such a case as the present, however, the Court's
D
functions begin when a charge is preferred before it and
not until then ... In the present case, the police have under
Sections 154 and 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a
statutory right to investigate a cognizable offence without
requiring the sanction of the Court .... "
E
Ordinarily, the right and duty of the police would end with
the submission of a report under Section 173(1) CrPC
upon receipt of which it was up to the Magistrate to take
or not to take cognizance of the offence. There was no
provision in the 1898 Code prescribing the procedure to F
be followed by the police, where, after the submission of
a report under Section 173(1) CrPC and after the
Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence, fresh facts
came to light which required further investigation. There
was, of course, no express provision prohibiting the police G
from launching upon an investigation into the fresh facts
coming to light after the submission of the report under
Section 173(1) or after the Magistrate had taken
cognizance of the offence. As we shall presently point out,
it was generally thought by many High Courts, though H
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A doubted by a few, that the police were not barred from
further investigation by the circumstance that a report under
Section 173(1) had already been submitted and a
Magistrate had already taken cognizance of the offence.
The Law Commission in its 41st report recognized the
B position and recommended that the right of the police to
make further investigation should be statutorily affirmed.
The Law Commission said:
"14.23. A report under Section 173 is normally the
end of the investigation. Sometimes, however, the police
c officer after submitting the report under Section 173 comes
upon evidence bearing on the guilt or innocence of the
accused. We should have thought that the police officer can
collect that evidence and send it to the Magistrate
concerned. It appears, however, that Courts have
D sometimes taken the narrow view that once a final report
under Section 173 has been sent, the police cannot touch
the case again and cannot re-open the investigation. This
view places a hindrance in the way of the investigating
agency, which can be very unfair to the prosecution and,
E for that matter, even to the accused. It should be made
clear in Section 173 that the competent police officer can
examine such evidence and send a report to the
Magistrate. Copies concerning the fresh material must of
course be furnished to the accused."
F
Accordingly, in the CrPC, 1973, a new provision, Section
173(8), was introduced and it says:
"Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude
further investigation in respect of an offence after a report
G under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the
Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the officer
in charge of the police station obtains further evidence,
oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a
further report or reports regarding such evidence in the
H form prescribed; and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 781
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
(6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report A
or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded
under sub-section (2)."
69. In Lal/an Chaudhary (supra), this Court held as under:
"8. Section 154 of the Code thus casts a statutory B
duty 1.1pon the police officer to register the case, as
disclosed in the complaint, and then to proceed with the
investigation. The mandate of Section 154 is manifestly
clear that if any information disclosing a cognizable offence
is laid before an officer in charge of a police station, such C
police officer has no other option except to register the
case on the basis of such information.
9. In Ramesh Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi) this
Court has held that the provision of Section 154 is o
mandatory. Hence, the police officer concerned is duty-
bound to register the case on receiving information
disclosing cognizable offence. Genuineness or credibility
of the information is not a condition precedent for
registration of a case. That can only be considered after E
registration of the case.
10. The mandate of Section 154 of the Code is that
at the stage of registration of a crime or a case on the
basis of the information disclosing a cognizable offence,
the police officer concerned cannot embark upon an inquiry F
as to whether the information, laid by the informant is
reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a
case on the ground that the information is not relevant or
credible. In other words, reliability, genuineness and
credibility of the information are not the conditions G
precedent for registering a case under Section 154 of the
Code."
A perusal of the above-referred judgments clarify that the
reasonableness or creditability of the information is not a H
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 14 S.C.R.
A condition precedent for the registration of a case.
Preliminary Inquiry
70. Mr. Naphade relied on the following decisions in
support of his arguments that if the police officer has a doubt
B about the veracity of the accusation, he has to conduct
preliminary inquiry, viz., E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu
(1974) 4 SCC 3, Maneka Gandhi (supra), S.M.D. Kiran Pasha
vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1990) 1 SCC 328, D.K.
Basu vs. State of W.B. (1997) 1 SCC 416, Uma Shankar
C Sitani vs. Commissioner of Police, Delhi & Ors. (1996) 11
SCC 714, Preeti Gupta (supra), Francis Coralie Mullin vs.
Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608,
Common Cause, A Registered Society vs. Union of India
(1999) 6 SCC 667, District Registrar and Collector,
D Hyderabad vs. Canara Bank (2005) 1 SCC 496 and
Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma vs. State of Maharashtra
(2005) 5 sec 294.
71. Learned senior counsel for the State further vehemently
E contended that in appropriate cases, it would be proper for a
police officer, on receipt of a complaint of a cognizable offence,
to satisfy himself that prima facie the allegations levelled against
the accused in the complaint are credible. In this regard, Mr.
Naphade cited the following decisions, viz. Tapan Kumar
F Singh (supra}, Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (supra). P. Sirajuddin
(supra), Sevi (supra), Shashikant (supra), Rajinder Singh
Katoch (supra), Vineet Narain vs. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC
226, Elumalai vs. State of Tamil Nadu 1983 LW (CRL) 121,
A. Lakshmanarao vs. Judicial Magistrate, Parvatipuram AIR
1971 SC 186, State of UttarPradesh vs. Ram Sagar Yadav
G & Ors. (1985) 1 SCC 552, Mona Panwar vs. High Court of
Judicature of Allahabad (2011) 3 SCC 496, Apren Joseph vs.
State of Kera/a (1973) 3 SCC 114, King Emperor vs. Khwaja
Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 18 and Sarangdharsingh
Shivdassingh Chavan (supra).
H
LALITA KUMAR! v. GOVT. OF U.P. 783
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
72. He further pointed out that the provisions have to be A
read in the light of the principle of malicious prosecution and
the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and
21. It is the stand of learned senior counsel that every citizen
has a right not to be subjected to malicious prosecution and
·every police officer has an in-built duty under Section 154 to B
ensure that an innocent person is not falsely implicated in a
criminal case. If despite the fact that the police officer is not
prima facie satisfied, as regards commission of a cognizable
offence and proceeds to register an FIR and carries out an
investigation, it would result in putting the liberty of a citizen in c
jeopardy. Therefore, learned senior counsel vehemently
pleaded for a preliminary inquiry before registration of FIR.
73. In terms of the language used in Section 154 of the
Code, the police is duty bound to proceed to conduct
investigation into a cognizable offence even without receiving D
information (i.e. FIR) about commission of such an offence, if
the officer in charge of the police station otherwise suspects
the commission of such an offence. The legislative intent is
therefore quite clear, i.e., to ensure that every cognizable
offence is promptly investigated in accordance with law. This E
being the legal position, there is no reason that there should
be any discretion or option left with the police to register or not
to register an FIR when information is given about the
.
commission of a cognizable offence. Every cognizable offence
must be investigated promptly in accordance with law and all F
information provided under Section 154 of the Code about the
commission of a cognizable offence must be registered as an
FIR so as to initiate an offence. The requirement of Section, 154
of the Code is only that the report must disclose the commission
of a cognizable offence and that is sufficient to set the G
investigating machinery into action.
74. The insertion of sub-section (3) of Section 154, by way
of an amendment, reveals the intention of the legislature to
ensure that no information of commission of a cognizable
H
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A offence must be ignored or not acted upon which would result
in unjustified protection of the alleged offender/accused.
75. The maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius
(expression of one thing is the exclusion of another) applies in
B the interpretation of Section 154 of the Code, where the
mandate of recording the information in writing excludes the
possibility of not recording an information of commission of a
cognizable crime in the special register.
76. Therefore, conducting an investigation into an offence
C after registration of FIR under Section 154 of the Code is the
"procedure established by law" and, thus, is in conformity with
Article 21 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the right of the
accused under Article 21 of the Constitution is protected if the
FIR is registered first and then the investigation is conducted
O in accordance with the provisions of law.
77. The term inquiry as per Section 2(g) of the Code reads
as under:
'2(g) - "inquiry" means every inquiry, other than a trial,
E conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court."
Hence, it is clear that inquiry under the Code is relatable
to a judicial act and not to the steps taken by the Police which
are either investigation after the stage of Section 154 of the
F Code or termed as 'Preliminary Inquiry' and which are prior to
the registration of FIR, even though, no entry in the General
Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary has been made.
78. Though there is reference to the term 'preliminary
inquiry' and 'inquiry' under Sections 159 and Sections 202 and
G 340 of the Code, that is a judicial exercise undertaken by the
Court and not by the Police and is not relevant for the purpose
of the present reference.
79. Besides, learned senior counsel relied on the special
H procedures prescribed under the CBI manual to be read into
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 785
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
Section 154. It is true that the concept of "preliminary inquiry" A
is contained in Chapter IX of the Crime Manual of the CBI.
However, this Crime Manual is not a statute and has not been
enacted by the legislature. It is a set of administrative orders
issued for internal guidance of the CBI officers. It cannot
supersede the Code. Moreover, in the absence of any B
indication to the contrary in the Code itself, the provisions of
the CBI Crime Manual cannot be relied upon to import the
concept of holding of preliminary inquiry in the scheme of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. At this juncture, it is also pertinent
to submit that the CBI is constituted under a Special Act, c
namely, .the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 and
it derive its power to investigate from this Act.
80. It may be submitted that Sections 4(2) and 5 of the
Code permit special procedures to be followed for special Acts.
Section 4 of the Code lays down as under: D
"Section 4. Trial of offences under the Indian Penal
Code and other laws. (1) All offences under the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated, inquired
into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the E
provisions hereinafter contained.
(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated,
inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to
the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the
time being in force regulating the manner or place of
F
investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with
such offences."
It is thus clear that for offences under laws other than IPC,
different provisions can be laid down under a special Act to G
regulate the investigation, inquiry, trial etc., of those offences.
Section 4(2) of the Code protects such special provisions.
81. Moreover, Section 5 of the Code lays down as under:
"Section 5. Saving - Nothing contained in this Code shall, H
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect
any special or local law for the time being in force, or any
special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form
of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time
being in force."
B
Thus, special provisions contained in the DSPE Act
relating to the powers of the CBI are protected also by Section
5 of the Code.
82. In view of the above specific provisions in the Code,
C the powers of the CBI under the DSPE Act, cannot be equated
with the powers of the regular State Police under the Code.
Significance and Compelling reasons for registration of
FIR at the earliest
D 83. The object sought to be achieved by registering the
earliest information as FIR is inter alia two fold: one, that the
criminal process is set into motion and is well documented from
the very start; and second, that the earliest information received
in relation to the commission of a cognizable offence is
E recorded so that there cannot be any embellishment etc., later.;
''
84. Principles of democracy and liberty demand a regulari
and efficient check on police powers. One way of keeping
check on authorities with such powers is by documenting every
F action of theirs. Accordingly, under the Code, actions of the
police etc., are provided to be written and documented. For
example, in case of arrest under Section 41 (1 )(b) of the Code,
arrest memo along with the grounds has to be in writing
mandatorily; under Section 55 of the Code, if an officer is
G deputed to make an arrest, then the superior officer has to write
down and record the offence etc., for which the person is to be
arrested; under Section 91 of the Code, a written order has to
be passed by the concerned officer to seek documents; under
Section 160 of the Code, a written notice has to be issued to
H the witness so that he can be called for recording of his/her
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 787
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
statement, seizure memo/panchnama has to be drawn for every A
article seized etc.
85. The police is required to maintain several records
including Case Diary as provided under Section 172 of the
Code, General Diary as provided under Section 44 of the
B
Police Act etc., which helps in documertting every information
collected, spot visited and all the actions of the police officers
so that their activities can be documented. Moreover, every
information received relating to commission of a non-cognizable
offence also has to be registered under Section 155 of the C
Code.
86. The underpinnings of compulsory registration of FIR is
not only to ensure transparency in the criminal justice delivery
system but also to ensure 'judicial oversight'. Section 157(1)
deploys the word 'forthwith'. Thus, any information received D
under Section 154(1) or otherwise has to be duly informed in
the form of a report to the Magistrate. Thus, the commission of
a cognizable offence is not only brought to the knowledge of
the investigating agency but also to the subordinate judiciary.
E
87. The Code contemplates two kinds of FIRs. The duly
signed FIR under Section 154(1) is by the informant to the
concerned officer at the police station. The second kind of FIR
could be which is registered by the police itself on any
information received or other than by way of an informant
[Section 157(1 )] and even this information has to be duly F
recorded and the copy should be sent to the Magistrate
forthwith.
88. The registration of FIR either on the basis of the
information furnished by the informant under Section 154(1) of G
the Code or otherwise under Section 157(1) of the Code is
obligatory. The obligation to register FIR has inherent
advantages:
(a) It is the first step to 'access to justice' for a victim. •
H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A (b) It upholds the 'Rule of Law' inasmuch as the ordinary
person brings forth the commission of a cognizable
crime in the knowledge of the State.
(c) It also facilitates swift investigation and sometimes
even prevention of the crime. In both cases, it only
B
effectuates the regime of law.
(d) It leads to less manipulation in criminal cases and
lessens incidents of 'ante-dates' FIR or deliberately
delayed FIR.
c
89. In Thulia Kali vs. State of Tamil Nadu (1972) 3 SCC
393, this Court held as under:-
"12 ... First information report in a criminal case is an
extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the
D purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced at the
trial. The importance of the above report can hardly be
overestimated from the standpoint of the accused. The
object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the report to the
police in respect of commission of an offence is to obtain
E early information regarding the circumstances in which the
crime was committed, the names of the actual culprits and
the part played by them as well as the names of
eyewitnesses present at the scene of occurrence. Delay
in lodging the first information report quite often results in
F embellishment which is a creature of afterthought. On
account of delay, the report not only gets bereft of the
advantage of spontaneity, danger creeps in of the
introduction of coloured version, exaggerated account or
concocted story as a result of deliberation and consultation.
G It is, therefore, essential that the delay in the lodging of the
first information report should be satisfactorily explained ... "
90. In Tapan Kumar Singh (supra), it was held as under:-
"20. It is well settled that a first information report is
H not an encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 789
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
details relating to the offence reported. An informant may A
lodge a report about the commission of an offence though
he may not know the name of the victim or his assailant.
He may not even know how the occurrence took place. A
first informant need not necessarily be an eyewitness so
as to be able to disclose in great detail all aspects of the B
offence committed. What is of significance is that the
information given must disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence and the information so lodged must
provide a basis for the police officer to suspect the
commission of a cognizable offence. At this stage it is c
enough if the police officer on the basis of the information
given suspects the commission of a cognizable offence,
and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a
cognizable offence has been committed. If he has reasons
to suspect, on the basis of information received, that a 0
cognizable offence may have been committed, he is bound
to record the· information and conduct an investigation. At
this stage it is also not necessary for him to satisfy himself
about the truthfulness of the information. It is only after a
complete investigation that he may be able to report on
the truthfulness or otherwise of the information. Similarly,
E
even if the information does not furnish all the details he
must find out those details in the course of investigation
and collect all the necessary evidence. The information
given disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence
only sets in motion the investigative machinery, with a view F
to collect all necessary evidence, and thereafter to take
. action in accordance with law. The true test is whether the
information furnished provides a reason to suspect the
commission of an offence, which the police officer
concerned is empowered under Section 156 of the Code G
to investigate. If it does, he has no option but to record the
information and proceed to investigate the case either
himself or depute any other competent officer to conduct
the investigation. The question as to whether the report is
true, whether it discloses full details regarding the manner H
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A of occurrence, whether the accused is named, and
whether there is sufficient evidence to support the
allegations are all matters which are alien to the
consideration of the question whether the report discloses
the commission of a cognizable offence. Even if the
B information does not give full details regarding these
matters, the investigating officer is not absolved of his duty
to investigate the case and discover the true facts, if he
can."
91. In Madhu Bala (supra), this Court held:
c
"6. Coming first to the relevant provisions of the
Code, Section 2(d) defines "complaint" to mean any
allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a _
view to his taking action under the Code, that some
D person, whether known or unknown. has committed an
offence, but does not include a police report. Under
Section 2(c) "cognizable offence" means an offence for
which, and "cognizable case" means a case in which a
police officer may in accordance with the First Schedule
E (of the Code) or under any other law for the time being in
force, arrest without a warrant. Under Section 2(r) "police
report" means a report forwarded by a police officer to a
Magistrate under sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the
Code. Chapter XII of the Code comprising Sections 154
F to 176 relates to information to the police and their powers
to investigate. Section 154 provides, inter alia, that the
officer in charge of a police station shall reduce into writing
every information relating to the commission of a
cognizable offence given to him orally and every such
information if given in writing shall be signed by the person
G
giving it and the substance thereof shall be entered in a
book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State
Government may prescribe in this behalf. Section 156 of
the Code with which we are primarily concerned in these
appeals reads as under: ....
H
LALITA KUMAR! v. GOVT. OF U.P. 791
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
9. The mode and manner of registration of such A
cases are laid down in the Rules framed by the different
State Governments under the Indian Police Act, 1861. As
in the instant case we are concernedwith Punjab Police
Rules, 1934 (which are applicable to Punjab, Haryana,
Himachal Pradesh and Delhi) framed under the said Act B
we may now refer to the relevant provisions of those Rules.
Chapter XX.IV of the said Rules lays down the procedure
an officer in charge of a police station has to follow on
receipt of information of commission of crime. Under Rule
24.1 appearing in the Chapter eve'ry information covered c
by Section 154 of the Code must be entered in the First
Information Report Register and the substance thereof in
the daily diary. Rule 24.5 says that the First Information
Report Registe•shall be a printed book in Form 24.5(1)
consisting of 200 pages and shall be completely filled
0
before a new one is commenced. It further requires that
the cases shall bear an annual serial number in each
police station for each calendar year. The other
requirements of the said Rules need not be detailed as
they have no relevance to the point at issue.
E
10. From the foregoing discussion it is evident that
whenever a· Magistrate directs an investigation on a
"complaint" the police has to register a cognizable case
on that complaint treating the same as the FIR and comply
with the requirements of the above Rules. It, therefore, F
\
passes our comprehension as to how the direction of a
Magistrate asking the police to "register a case" makes
an order of investigation under Section 156(3) legally
unsustainable. Indeed, even if a Magistrate does not pass
a direction to register a case, still in view of the provisions G
of Section 156( 1) of the Code which empowers the police
to investigate into a cognizable "case" and the Rules
framed under the Indian Police Act, 1861 it (the police) is
duty-bound to formally register a case and then investigate
•nto the same. The provisions of the Code, therefore, do H
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 14 S.C.R.
A not in any way stand in the way of a Magistrate to direct
the police to register a case at the police station and then
investigate into the same. In our opinion when an order for
investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code is to be
made the proper direction to the police would be "to
B register a case at the police station treating the complaint
as the first information report and investigate into the
same".
92. According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons,
protection of the interests of the poor is clearly one of the main
C objects of the Code. Making registration of information relating
to commission of a cognizable offence mandatory would help
the society, especially, the poor in rural and remote areas of
the country.
D 93. The Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice System
headed by Dr. Justice V.S. Malimath also noticed the plight
faced by several people due to non-registration of FIRs and
recommended that action should be taken against police
officers who refuse to register such information. The Committee
E observed:-
"7.19.1 According to the Section 154 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, the office incharge of a police station
is mandated to register every information oral or written
relating to the commission of a cognizable offen~e. Non-
F registration of cases is a serious complaint against the
police. The National Police Commission in its 4th report
lamented that the police "evade registering cases for taking
up investigation where specific complaints are lodged at
the police stations". It referred to a study conducted by the
G Indian Institute of Public Opinion, New Delhi regarding
"Image of the Police in India" which observed that over
50% of the respondents mention non-registration of
complaints as a common practice in police stations.
H 7.19.2 The Committee recommends that all complaints
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 793
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
should be registered promptly, failing which appropriate A
action should be taken. This would necessitate change in
the mind - set of the political executive and that of senior
officers.
7.19.4 There are two more aspects relating to registration. B
The first is minimization of offences by the police by way
of not invoking appropriate sections of law. We
disapprove of this tendency. Appropriate sections of law
should be invoked in each case unmindful! of the gravity
of offences involved. The second issue is relating to the C
registration of written complaints. There is an increasing
tendency amongst the police station officers to advise the
informants, who come to give oral complaints, to bring
written complaints. This is wrong. R~gistration is delayed
resulting in valuable loss of time in launching the
investigation and apprehension of criminals. Besides, the D
complainant gets an opportunity to consult his friends,
relatives and sometimes even lawyers and often tends to
exaggerate the crime and implicate innocent persons. This
eventually has adverse effect at the trial. The information
should be reduced in writing by the SH, if given orally, E
without any loss of time so that the first version of the
alleged crime comes on record.
7 .20.11 It has come to the notice of the Committee that
even in cognizable cases quite often the Police officers do F
not entertain the complaint and send the complainant away
saying that the offence is not cognizable. Sometimes the
police twist facts to bring the case within the cognizable
category even though it is non-cognizable, due to political
or other pressures or corruption. This menace can be G
stopped by making it obligatory on the police officer to
register every complaint received by him. Breach of this
duty should become an offence punishable in law to
prevent misuse of the power by the police officer."
H
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A . 94. It means that the number of FIRs not registered is
approximately equivalent to the number of FIRs actually
registered. Keeping in view the NCRB figures that show that
about 60 lakh cognizable offences were registered in India
during the year 2012, the burking of crime'ITlay itself be in the
B range of about 60 lakh every year. Thus, it is seen that such a
large number of FIRs are not registered every year, which is a
clear violation of the rights of the victims of such a large number
of crimes.
C 95. Burking of crime leads to dilution of the rule of law in
the short run; and also has a very negative impact on the rule
of law in the long run since people stop having respect for rule
of law. Thus, non-registration of such a large number of Fl Rs
leads to a definite lawlessness in the society.
D 96. Therefore, reading Section 154 in any other form
would not only be detrimental to the Scheme of the Code but
also to the society as a whole. It is thus seen that this Court
has repeatedly held in various decided cases that registration
of FIR is mandatory if the information given to the police under
E Section 154 of the Code discloses the commission of a
cognizable offence.
Is there a likelihood of misuse of the provision?
97. Another, stimulating argument raised in support of
F preliminary inquiry is that mandatory registration of FIRs will
lead to arbitrary arrest, which will directly be in contravention
of Article 21 of the Constitution.
98. While registration of FIR is mandatory, arrest of the
G accused immediately on registration of FIR is not at all
mandatory. In fact, registration of FIR and arrest of an accused
person are two entirely different concepts undenne-Taw, and
there are several safeguards available against arrest.
Moreover, it is also pertinent to mention that an accused person
H also has a right to apply for "anticipatory bail" under the
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 795
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
provisions of Section 438 of the Code if the conditions A
mentioned therein are satisfied. Thus, in appropriate cases, he
can avoid the arrest under that provision by obtaining an order
from the Court.
99. It is also relevant to note that in Joginder Kumar vs.
State of U.P. & Ors. (1994) 4 SCC 260, this Court has held B
that arrest cannot be made by police in a routine manner. Some
important observations are reproduced as under:-
"20 ... ~ arrest can be made in a routine manner on a
mere allegation of commission of an offence made against C
a person. It would be prudent for a police officer in the
interest of protection of the constitutional rights of a citizen
and perhaps in his own interest that no arrest should be
made without a reasonable satisfaction reached after
some investigation as to the genuineness and bona tides o
of a complaint and a reasonable belief both as to the
person's complicity and even so as to the need to effect
arrest. Denying a person of his liberty is a serious matter.
The recommendations of the Police Commission merely
reflect the constitutional concomitants of the fundamental E
right to personal liberty and freedom. A person is not liable
to arrest merely on the suspicion of complicity in an
offence. There must be some reasonable justification in the
opinion of the officer effecting the arrest that such arrest
is necessary and justified. Except in heinous offences, an
F
arrest must be avoided if a police officer issues notice to
person &o attend the Station House and not to leave the
Station without permission would do."
100. The registration of FIR under Section 154 of the Code
and arrest of an accused person under Section 41 are two G
entirely different things. It is not correct to say that just because
FIR is registered, the accused person can be arrested
immediately. It is the imaginary fear that "merely because FIR
has .been registered, it would require arrest of the accused and
thereby leading to loss of his reputation" and it should not be H
796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A allowed by this Oourt to hold that registration of FIR is not
mandatory to avoid such inconvenience to some persons. The
remedy lies in strictly enforcing the safeguards available against
arbitrary arrests made by the police and not in allowing the
police to avoid mandatory registration of FIR when the
B information discloses commission of a cognizable offence.
101. This can also be seen from the fact that Section 151
of the Code allows a police officer to arrest a person, even
before the commission of a cognizable offence, in order to
prevent the commission of that offence, if it cannot be
C prevented otherwise. Such preventive arrests can be valid for
24 hours. However, a Maharashtra State amendment to Section
151 allows the custody of a person in that State even for up to
a period of 30 days (with the order of the Judicial Magistrate)
even before a cognizable offence is committed in order to
D prevent commission of such offence. Thus, the arrest of a
person and registration of FIR are not directly and/or irreversibly
linked and they are entirely different concepts operating under
entirely different parameters. On the other hand, if a police
officer misuses his power of arrest, he can be tried and
E punished under Section 166.
102. Besides, the Code gives power to the police to close
a matter both before and after investigation. A police officer can
foreclose an FIR before an investigation under Section 157 of
F the Code, if it appears to him that there is no sufficient ground
to investigate the same. The Section itself states that a police
officer can start investigation when he has a 'reason to suspect
the commission of an offence'. Therefore, the requirements of
launching an investigation under Section 157 of the Code are
higher than the requirement under Section 154 of the Code. The
G police officer can also, in a given case, investigate the matter
and then file a final report under Section 173 of the Code
seeking closure of the matter. Therefore, the police is not liable
to launch an investigation in every FIR which is mandatorily
registered on receiving information relating to commission of
H a cognizable offence.
LALITA KUMAR! v. GOVT. OF U.P. 797
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
103. Likewise, giving power to the police to close an A
investigation, Section 157 of the Code also acts like a check
on the police to make sure that it is dispensing its function of
investigating cognizable offences. This has been recorded in
the 41 st Report of the Law Commission of India on the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1898 as follows : B
"14.1 ....... If the offence does not appear to be serious and
if the station-house officer thinks there is no sufficient
ground for starting an investigation, he need not
investigate but, here again, he has to send a report to the C
Magistrate who can direct the police to investigate, or if
the Magistrate thinks fit, hold an inquiry himself."
"14.2. A noticeable feature of the scheme as outlined
above is that a Magistrate is kept in the picture at all
stages of the police investigation, but he is not authorized D
to interfere with the actual investigation or to direct the
police how that investigation is to be conducted."
Therefore, the Scheme of the Code not only ensures that
the time of the police should not be wasted on false and
E
frivolous information but also that the police should not
intentionally refrain from doing their duty of investigating
cognizable offences. As a result, the apprehension of misuse
of the provision of mandatory registration of FIR is unfounded
and speculative in nature.
F
104. It is the stand of Mr. Naphade, learned senior counsel
for the State of Maharashtra that when an innocent person is
falsely implicated, he not only suffers from loss of reputation but
also from mental tension and his personal liberty is seriously
impaired. He relied on the Maneka Gandhi (supra), which held G
the proposition that the law which deprives a person of his
personal liberty must be reasonable both from the stand point
of substantive as well as procedural aspect is now firmly
established in our Constitutional law. Therefore, he pleaded for
a fresh look at Section 154 of the Code, which interprets H
798 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A Section 154 of the Code in conformity with the mandate of
Article 21.
105. It is true that a delicate balance has to be maintained
between the interest qf the society and protecting the liberty of
an individual. As already discussed above, there are already
8
sufficient safeguards provided in the Code which duly protect
the liberty of an individual in case of registration of false FIR.
At the same time, Section 154 was drafted keeping in mind
the interest of the victim and the society. Therefore, we are of
the cogent view that 111andatory registration of FIRs under
C Section 154 of the Code will not be in contravention of Article
21 of the Constitution as purported by various counsel.
Exceptions:
0 106. Although, we, in unequivocal terms, hold that Section
154 of the Code postulates the mandatory registration of Fl Rs
on receipt of all cognizable offence, yet, there may be instances
where preliminary inquiry may be required owing to the change
in genesis and novelty of crimes with the passage of time. One
E such instance is in the case of allegations relating to medical
negligence on the part of doctors. It will be unfair and
inequitable to prosecute a medical professional only on the
basis of the allegations in the complaint.
107. In the context of medical negligence cases, in Jacob
F Mathew (supra), it was held by this Court as under:
"51. We may not be understood as holding that doctors
can never be prosecuted for an offence of which rashness
or negligence is an essential ingredient. All that we are
G doing is to emphasise the need for care and caution in the
interest of society; for, the service which the medical
profession renders to human beings is probably the
noblest of all, and hence there is a need for protecting
doctors from frivolous or unjust prosecutions. Many a
complainant prefer recourse to criminal process as a tool
H
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 799
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
for pressurising the medical professional for extracting A
uncalled for or unjust compensation. Such malicious
proceedings have to be guarded against.
52. Statutory rules or executive instructions incorporating
certain guidelines need to be framed and issued by the
B
Government of India and/or the State Governments in
consultation with the Medical Council of ln.dia. So long as
it is not done, we propose to lay down certain guidelines
for the future which should govern the prosecution of
doctors for offences of which criminal rashness or criminal
negligence is an ingredient. A private complaint may not C
be entertained unless the complainant has produced
prima facie evidence before the court in the form of a
credible opinion given by another competent doctor to
support the charge of rashness or negligence on the part
of the accused doctor. The investigating officer should, D
before proceeding against the doctor accused of rash or
negligent act or omission, obtain an independent and
competent medical opinion preferably from a doctor in
government service, qualified in that branch of medical
practice who can normally be expected to give an impartial E
and unbiased opinion applying the Bolam9 test to the facts
collected in the investigation. A doctor accused of
rashness or negligence, may not be arrested in a routine
manner (simply because a charge has been levelled
against him). Unless his arrest is necessary for furthering F
the investigation or for collecting evidence or unless the
investigating officer feels satisfied that the doctor
proceeded against would not make himself available to
face the prosecution unless arrested, the arrest may be
withheld." G
108. In the context of offences relating to corruption, this
Court in P. Sirajuddin (supra) expressed the need for a
preliminary inquiry before proceeding against public servants.
109. Similarly, in Tapan Kumar Singh (supra), this Court H
800 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 14 s. c.R.
A has validated a preliminary inquiry prior to registering an FIR
only on the ground that at the time the first information is
received, the same does not disclose a cognizable offence.
110. Therefore, in view of various counter claims regarding
registration or non-registration, what is necessary is only that
8
the information given to the police must disclose the
commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation,
registration of an FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable
offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR need
not be registered immediately and perhaps the police can
C conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the
limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable
offence has been committed. But, if the information given
clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there
is no other option but to register an FIR forthwith. Other
D considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of
FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given, whether
the information is genuine, whether the information is credible
etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the
investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of FIR, what
E is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie
discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If, after
investigation, the information given is found to be false, there
is always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a
false FIR.
F
Conclusion/Directions:
111. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold:
(i) Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154
G of the Code, if the information discloses
commission of a cognizable offence and no
preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a
situation.
(ii) If the information received does not disclose a
H
:.
LALITA KUMARI v. GOVT. OF U.P. 801 l
~
[P. SATHASIVAM, CJI.]
cognizable offence but indicates the necessity fo,r A
an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted
only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is
disclosed or nc;>t.
(iii) If the inquiry discloses the commission of a B
cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In
cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the
complaint, a copy of the entry of such closure must
be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not
later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief
for closing the complaint and not proceeding further.
c
(iv) The police officer cannot avoid his duty of
registering offence if cognizable offence is
disclosed. Action must be taken against erring
officers who do not register the FIR if information D
received by him discloses a cognizable offence.
(v) The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the
veracity or otherwise of the information received but
only to ascertain whether the information reveals E
any cognizable offence.
(vi) As to what type and in which cases preliminary
inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case. The category of
cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are F,.
J
as under:
(a) Matrimonial disputes/ family disputes
(b) Commercial offences
G
(c) Medical negligence cases
(d) Corruption cases
(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in
, ' ' H
802 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 14 S.C.R.
A initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3
months delay in reporting the matter without .
satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay.
The aforesaid are only illustrations and not
exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant
B
preliminary inquiry.
(vii) While ensuring and protecting the rights of the
accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry
should be made time bound and in any case it
c should not exceed 7 days. The fact of such delay
and the causes of it must be reflected in the General
Diary entry.
(viii) Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary
D is the record of all information received in a police
station, we direct that all information relating to
cognizable offences, whether resulting in
registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be
mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said
Diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary
E
inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned
above.
112. With the above directions, we dispose of the
reference made to us. List all the matters before the
F appropriate Bench for disposal on merits.
Kalpana K. Tripathy Reference Answered.
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