LALU PRASAD YADAVversusSTATE OF BIHAR & ANR.

                         [2010] 4 S.C.R. 334


A                      LALU PRASAD YADAV
                                   v.
                     STATE OF BIHAR & ANR.
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 662 of 2010)
                            APRIL 1, 2010
B
    [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, CJI., R.M. LODHA AND DR. 8.5.
                     CHAUHAN, JJ.]

        Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 378(1) and (2) -
C Appeal against acquittal - Right of State Government to file
  -· In a case where offence was investigated by Delhi Special
  Police Establishment (CBI) - Held: State Government is not
  the competent authority to file an appeal against acquittal in
  such cases - The opening words of s. 378(1) "save as
o otherwise provided in sub-section (2)" are intended to exclude
  the class of cases, mentioned in sub-section (2) out of the
  operation of the body of Sub-section (1) - Delhi Special Police
  Establishment Act, 1946 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
  - s. 417.
E
         Interpretation of Statutes:

         Changes in wordings and phrasing of statutory provision
    - Held: Such changes may be presumed to have been
    deliberate and with purpose to limit, qualify or enlarge the pre-
f   existing law, as the changes of the words employ - Any
    construction which makes the ext!eption clause, with which the
    Section opens, unnecessary and redundant, should be
    avoided.

G        Construction of statute - Language of a statute should
    be read as it is - Any construction resulting in rejection of
    words has to be avoided - However, such rule of construction
    is not without exception.


H                                 334
 LALU PRASAD YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. 335

     Precedent - The essence in a decision is its ratio and A
 not every observation found therein - The observations in a
judgment do no operate as a binding precedent.

     Words and Phrases: 'Save' - Meaning of, in the context
of s. 378(1) Cr.P.C.
                                                              B
    The question for consideration in the present
appeals was whether the State Government has
competence to file an appeal from the judgment passed
by Special Judge, CBI (AHO) acquitting the accused
persons as the c~se has been investigated by the Delhi C
Special Police Establishment (CBI).

    Appellant-accused and CBI contended that the cases
are covered u/s. 378(2) Cr.P.C. and are excluded from the
purview of s. 378(1) by virtue of the opening clause in 0
sub-section (1) "Save as otherwise provided in sub-
section (2)".

     Respondent-State Government contended that use
of expressions "in any case" in sub-section (1) and "also"
in sub-section (2) indicates that legislature intended that E
general rule would be that State Government may file an
appeal in any and every case and Central Government
may additionally fil~ an appeal in a case covered by sub-
section (2); and that ss. 377 and 378 Cr.P.C. are in pari,
materia and interpretation given to s. 377 in Eknath F
Shankarrao Mukkawar case, needs to be accorded to s.
378.

    Allowing the appeals, the Court

     HELD: 1.1. Legislature has maintained a mutually G
exclusive division in the matter of appeal from an order
of acquittal inasmuch as the competent authority to
appeal from an order of acquittal in two types of cases
referred to in sub-section (2) is the Central Government
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    336    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A and the authority of the State Government in relation to
  such cases has been excluded. As a necessary corollary,
  it has to be held, that the State Government is not
  competent to direct its public prosecutor to present
  appeal from the judgment passed by the Special Judge,
B CBI (AHO), Patna. [Para 40] [369-0-E]

       1.2. The opening words of Section 378(1) Cr.P.C. -
  "Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2)" - are in
  the nature of exception intended to exclude the class of
C cases mentioned i~ sub-section (2) out of operation ~f the
  body of sub-section (1 ). These words have no other
  meaning in the context but to qualify the operation of
  sub-section (1) and take out of its purview two types of
  cases referred in sub-section (2), namely, (i) the cases in
  which offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special
D Police ·Establishment constituted under Delhi Special
  Police Establishment Act, 1946 and (ii) the cases in which
  the offence has been investigated by any other agency
  empowered to make investigation into an offence under
  any Central Act other than Cr.P.C. [Para 27] [355-G-H]
E
      1.3. By construing Section 378 in a manner that
  permits appeal from an order of acquittal by the State
  Government in every case, except two class of cases
  mentioned in sub-section (2), full effect would be given
F to the exception (clause) articulated in the opening
  words. The words - "save as otherwise provided in sub-
  section (2)" - were added in 1973 Code; Section 417 of
  1898 Code did not have these words. It is familiar rule of
  construction that all changes in wording and phrasing
G may be presumed to have been deliberate and with the
  purpose to limit, qualify or enlarge the pre-existing law as
  the changes of the words employ. Any construction that
  makes exception (clause) with which a Section opens
  unnecessary and redundant should be avoided. If
  Section 378, sub-sections (1) and (2) is given the
H
 LALU PRASAD YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. 337


interpretation which the State Government claims, that           A
would be rendering the exception (clause)-reflected in the
opening words "save as otherwise provided in sub-
section (2)" - redundant, meaningless and unnecessary.
[Para 27] [356-B-F]
                                                                 B
     1.4. If the Legislature had intended to give the right
of appeal u/s. 378(1) to the State Government in all cases
of acquittal including the class of cases referred to in
sub-section (2), it would not have been necessary to
incorporate the exception (clause) in the opening words.         C
This objective could have been achieved without use of
these words as erstwhile Section 417 of 1898 Code
enabled the State Government to appeal from all cases
of acquittal while in two types of cases mentioned in sub-
section (2) thereof, appeal from the order of acquittal
could be filed under the direction of Central Government         D
as well. [Para 27] [356-G-H]

     1.5. If a latter statute repealing and re-enacting former
statute does not use the same language as in the earlier
one, the alteration must be taken to have been made              E
deliberately. The Parliament in 1973 Code re-enacted the
provision for appeal from order of acquittal with certain
modifications. It changed the language by addition of
words - "save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2)".
The alteration in language by addition of these words            F
gives rise to an inference that the Legislature made
conscious changes in Section 378 (1973 Code). The
addition of words in Section 378(1) by way of exception
(clause) cannot be set at naught by giving same
interpretation which has been given to Section 417 (1898         G
Code). [Paras 29 and 31] [357-D; 360-E~F]

    Khemraj vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1976) 1 SCC
385, held inapplicable.

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    338     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A        Union of India and Anr. v. Hansoli Devi and Ors (2002)
    7 SCC 273; The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The
    State of Bihar and Ors. (1955) 2 SCR 603; D.R. Fraser & Co.
    Ltd. v. The Minister of National Revenue AIR 1949 PC 120,
    referred to.
B
       Robert Mitchell v. Soren Torup (1766) Parker 227;
  Becke v. Smith (1836) 2 Meeson and Welsby 191; The
  Attorney-Genera/ v. Lockwood (1842) 9 Meeson and Welsby
  378; The Sussex Peerage case (1844) XI Clark & Finnelly
C 85; Williams v. Milotin 97 C.L.R.465, referred to.
         Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Tenth Edition,
    Revised); Webster Comprehensive Dictionary (International
    Edition); 'A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage' by Bryan A.
    Garner (1987); 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation' by G.P.
D Singh, 12th Edition, 2010 page 310, referred to.
      2.1. One of the rules of construction of statutes is that
  language of the statute should be read as it is and any
  construction that results in rejection of words has to be
E avoided; the effort should be made to give meaning to
  each and every word used by the Legislature. However,
  such rule of construction of statutes is not without
  exceptions. [Para 32] [361-C]

      Stone v. Yeovil Corp. (1875-76) LR. 1 CPD 691;
F Salmon v. Duncombe and Ors. (1886) 11 AC 627, referred
    to.

      2.2. The main object and legislative intent by the
  opening words - "save as otherwise provided in sub-
G section (2)" - in sub-section (1) of Section 378 Cr.P.C,
  1973 being clear i.e., Jo fetter the general power given to
  the State Government in filing appeal from the order of
  acquittal in two types of cases stated in sub-section (2),
  the use of word "also" in sub-section (2) does not make
H
 LALU PRASAD YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. 339


any sense. The word "also" in sub-section (2), if A
construed in the manner suggested by the State.
Government, may result in reducing the opening words
in s4b-section (1) a nullity and will deny these words their
full play. Since exception (clause) in the beginning of sub-
section (1) has been expressly added in Section 378 and B
it is not possible to harmonise the word "also" occurring
in sub-section (2) with that, it appears that no sensible
meaning can be given to the word "also" and the said
word has to be treated as immaterial. To declare "also"
enacted in sub-section (2) immaterial or insensible is not c
very satisfactory, but it is much more unsatisfactory to
deprive the words - "save as otherwise provided in sub-
section (2)" - of their true and plain meaning. In order that
the exception (clause) expressly stated in the opening
words of sub-section (1) might be preserved, it is
                                                              0
necessary that word "also" in sub-section (2) is treated
as immaterial. [Para 34) [362-D-G; A]

     3.1, The phrase "in any case" in sub-section (1) of
Section 378 means "in all cases", but the opening words
in the said Section put fetters on the State Government E
in directing appeal to be filed in two types of cases
mentioned in sub-section (2). A perusal of Section 24
Cr.P.C. would show that the Central Government
appoints its public prosecutors for conducting
prosecution, appeal or other proceedings on its behalf F
and a State Government appoints its public pr,,secutors
in conducting prosecution, appeal or other proceedings
on its behalf. One has no control over the other. The
Central Government or the State Government, as the case
may be, may appoint a special public prosecutor for the G
purpose of any case or class of cases. Under Section
378(1) the State Government may direct its public
prosecutor to file an appeal from an order of acquittal
while under Section 378(2) the Central Government may
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    340     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A   direct its public prosecutor to file an appeal from an order
    of acquittal. The public prosecutor, thus, has to be
    associated in an appeal from an order of acquittal. [Para
    35, 37) [363-B; 365-F-H]

        3.2. The 1946 Act provides for constitution of a
8
   special police establishment for investigation of certain
   offences or class of offences as notified under Section
   3 of the 1946 Act. A close look to the provisions of 1946
   Act would show that investigation thereunder is a central
   investigation and the officers concerned are under the
C superintendence of the officer appointed by the Central
   Government. It is the Central Government that has the
  superintendence         over    Delhi Special       Police
   Establishment. Therefore, it is the Central Government
  which is concerned with the investigation of the case by
D ·Delhi Special Police Establishment and its ultimate result.
  It is for this reason that sub-section (2) of Section 378
   provides for appeal against acquittal in two types of
  cases mentioned therein on the direction of the Central
  Government by its public prosecutor. The opening words
E in sub-sel:tion (1), thus, qualify the general power given
  to the State Government in filing appeal from an order of
  acquittal so that the central agency, which is solely and
  intimately connected with the investigation of cases
  referred in sub-section (2), may approach the Central
F Government for direction to appeal in appropriate cases.
  [Para 37) [366-A-E]

      4. The essence in a decision is its ratio and not every
  observation found therein. The ratio of decision in Eknath
  Shankarrao Mukkawar case is that the Legislature has
G maintained a watertight dichotomy in the matter of appeal
  against inadequacy of sentence; the competent authority
  to appeal against inadequacy of sentence in two types
  of cases referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 377 is

H
 LALU PRASAD YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. 341
              [R.M. LODHA, J.]
the Central Government. However, it is not correct to say      A
that in Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar case in the absence
of use of word "also" in sub-section (2) of Section 377, it
was held by this Court that the State Government was
incompetent to file an appeal in a case falling under
Section 377(2) and that Parliament remedied the lacuna         B
 by Act 45 of 1978 to include the word "also" therein and
 bring the same in pari materia with the provisions of
Section 378(2) and that the Statement of Objects and
Reasons for the said amendment makes it clear that the
State Government is also competent to file an appeal in        c
a case falling under Section 377(2). In the first place, the
observations in Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar case in
relation to Section 378 do not operate as binding
precedent as construction of Section 378 was neither
under consideration nor in issue in that case. Secondly,
                                                               0
and more importantly, although sub-section (2) of Section
377 came to be amended by Act 45of1978 to include the
word "also" therein, but the Statement of Objects and
Reasons relating to that amendment is of no relevance
insofar as construction of Section 378 (1) and (2) is
concerned. Insofar as Section 378 is concerned, the word       E
"also" occurring in sub-section (2) cannot be accorded
a meaning that would result in wiping out the effect of
controlling words in sub-section (1) - "save as otherwise
provided in sub-section (2)" - which are indicative of
legislative intent to exclude two types of cases mentioned     F
in sub-section (2) out of operation of the body of sub-
section (1). [Para 39] [368-D-H; 369-A-C]

    Eknath Shankaffao Mukkawar vs. State of Maharashtra
(1977) 3 SCC 25, explained and held inapplicable.       G

    State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors. AIR
1968 SC 647, relied on.


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    342     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A                         Case Law Reference:
      (1766) Parker 227          Referred to.        Para 17
      (1836) 2 Meeson and
      Welsby 191                 Referred to.        Para 18
B
      (1842) 9 Meeson and
      Welsby 378                 Referred to.        Para 19
      (1844) XI Clark &
      Finnelly 85                Referred to.        Para 20
c     (2002) 1 sec 213           Referred to.        Para 21
      97 C.L.R. 465              Referred to.        Para 25
     (1955) 2 SCR 603            Referred to.        Para 28
D    AIR 1949 PC 120             Referred to.        Para 29
     (1976) 1 sec 385            held inapplicable. Para 30
     (18'15-76) LR. 1 CPD 691 Referred to.           Para 32
E    (1886) 11 AC 627            Referred to.        Para 33
     (1977) 3 sec 25             Explained and      Para 39
                                 held inapplicable.
     AIR 1968 SC 647             Relied on.          Para 39
F       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    No. 662 of 2010.

        From the Judgment & Order dated 20.9.2007 of the High
    Court of Judicature at Patna in Govt. Appeal No. 1 of 2007.
G
                               WITH
    Crl.A. No. 670 of 2010.

        Ram Jethmalani, Pravin H. Parekh, Chitranjan Sinha, A.
H   Mariarputham, L. Nageshwar Rao, Lata Krishnamurti, P.R.
LALU PRASAD YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. 343


Mala, E.R. Kumar, Sameer, Parekh, sa·urabh Ajay Gupta,               A
Somandari Gaud, Pranav Diesh (for Parekh & Co.) T.A. Khan,
Devadatt Kamat, Arvind, K. Sharma, P.K. Dey (for B. Krishna
Prasad), Vishwajit Singh, Veera Kaul Singh, Ritesh Agarwal,
Siddharth Sengar, Abhindra Maheshwari for the appearing
parties.                                                             B

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     R.M. LODHA, J. 1. Leave granted.

     2. Section 378 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for         c
short, '1973 Code') enacts the provision for appeal from an
order of acquittal. The said provision as it existed prior to 2005
amendment reads:

    "S.378. - Appeal in case of acquittal. - (1) Save as
    otherwise provided in sub-section (2) and subject to the D
    provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5), the State
    Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor
    to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or
    appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than
    a High Court or an order of acquittal passed by the Court E
    of Session in revision.

    (2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in
    which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi
    Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi F
    Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946) or
    by any other agency empowered to make investigation
    into an offence under any Central Act other than this Code,
    the Central Government may also direct the Public
    Prosecutor to present an appeal, subject to the provisions G
    of sub-section (3), to the High Court from the order of
    acquittal.

    (3) No appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall
    be entertained except with the leave of the High Court.
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    344       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A         (4) If such an· order of acquittal is passed in any case
          instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an
          application made to it by the complainant in this behalf,
          grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal,
          the complainant may present such an appeal to the High
B         Court.

          (5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of
          special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be
          entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months,
          where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days
c         in every other case, computed from the date of that order
          of acquittal.

          (6) If, in any case, the application under sub-section (4) for
          the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of
D         acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal
          shall lie under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2)."

         3. The main question presented, in light of the aforesaid
    provision is, namely, as to whether the State Government (of
E   Bihar) has competence to file an appeal from the judgment
    dated 18th December, 2006 passed by Special Judge, CBI
    (AHO), Patna, acquitting the accused persons when the case
    has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police
    Establishment (CBI).

F        4. Shri Lalu Prasad Yadav and Smt. Rabri Devi are
    husband and wife. Both of them have held the office of Chief
    Minister of the State of Bihar. These appeals concern the
    period from March 10, 1990 to March 28, 1995 and April 4,
    1995 to July 25, 1997 when Shri Lalu Prasad Yadav was the
G   Chief Minister, Bihar. Allegedly for acquisition of assets - both
    moveable and immoveable - by corrupt or illegal means
    disproportionate to his known sources of income during the
    aforesaid period, a first information report (FIR) was lodged by
    CBI against Shri Lalu Prasad Yadav and also his wife. As a
H
 LALU PRASAD YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. 345
               [R.M. LODHA, J.]

 matter of fact, lodgement of FIR was sequel to direction by the      A
Patna High Court to CBI to enquire and scrutinize all cases of
excess drawls and expenditure in the Animal Husbandry
Department, Government of Bihar during the period 1977-78
to 1995-96. CBI investigated into the matter and on August 19,
 1998, a chargesheet was filed against Shri Lalu Prasad Yadav         B
and Smt. Rabri Devi in the Court of Special Judge, CBI (AHO),
Patna. The charges were framed against Shri Lalu Prasad
Yadav under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ('PC Act') that during the
said period, he acquired assets which were disproportionate           c
to his known sources of income and on 31st March, 1997 he
had been in possession of pecuniary resources of property in
his name and in the name of his wife and children to the extent
of Rs. 46,26,827/- which he could not satisfactorily account for.
Smt. .Rabri Devi was charged under Section 109 of Indian              D
Penal Code (IPC) read with Section 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the
PC Act for abetting her husband in the commission of the said
offence. The Court of Special Judge, CBI (AHO), Patna, upon
conclusion of trial, vide its judgment dated December 18, 2006
acquitted the accused holding that prosecution failed to prove        E
the charges levelled against them.

     5. It is pertinent to notice here that as per CBI, the central
government after considering the conclusions and findings of
the trial court took a conscious and considered decision that
no ground whatsoever was made for filing an appeal against            F
the judgment of the trial court.

     6. On February 17, 2007 the state government, however,
filed leave to appeal against the order of acquittal dated
December 18, 2006 before the High Court of Judicature at              G
Patna. The accused were arrayed as respondent nos. 1 and 2
respectively and the CBI was impleaded as respondent no. 3.
The Single Judge of the High Court issued notice to the
respondents to show cause as to why leave to appeal be not
granted. In response thereto, on behalf of respondent nos. 1
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    346     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A and 2, a preliminary objection was raised with regard to
  maintainability of appeal by the state government. The
  preliminary objection about the maintainability of appeal raised
  by respondent nos. 1 and 2 was supported by respondent no.
  3 (CBI). The learned Single Judge heard the arguments on the
B question of maintainability of appeal and vide his order dated
  September 20, 2007 overruled the preliminary objection and
  held that appeal preferred by the state government was
  maintainable. It is from this order that two appeals by special
  leave have been preferred. One of the two appeals is by the
c accused and the other by CBI.

          7. We heard Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned senior counsel
    (for accused) and Mr. A. Mariarputham, learned senior counsel
    (for CBI) - appellants - and Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao, learned
    senior counsel for the state government.
D
          8. Mr. Ram Jethmalani submitted that the competence of
    the state government to file an appeal from the judgment and
    order of acquittal ,3 to be determined by Section 378 of the
     1973 Code as it existed prior to 2005; the law in force on the
E   date of the chargesheet. He would submit that the key words
    in Section :178(1) are : "Save as otherwise provided in sub-
    section (2)" and by these words whatever is covered by sub-
    section (2) is left outside the purview of sub-section (1 ).
    According to him, the word "also" in sub-section (2) refers to
F   the mode of exercising substantive right of appeal; the word
    "also" in the changed context means ·likewise' and that means
    that the central government can also instruct the public
    prosecutor to present an appeal; it does not have to file
    vakalatnama signed by the President of India or for the State
G   by the Governor of the State. Learned senior counsel argued
    that the High Court by giving undue weight to the word "also"
    in sub-section (2) has made the opening key words in sub-
    section (1) of Section 378 wholly redundant and useless
    thereby defeating the intention of the Legislature. He would,
H   thus, submit that the court has to adopt one of the two courses,
     LALU PRASAD YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. 347
                  [R.M. LODHA, J.]

 namely, (i) assign to the word another of its meanings which      A
 the word does carry and harmonise it with the effect of the
 dominant words or (ii) reject the word as a useless surplusage.

      9. Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned senior counsel, referred
to the judgment of this Court in Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar
                                                                 8
v. State of Maharashtra, 1 and submitted that the construction
of Section 377 put by this Court where similar words occur,
must apply to the construction of Section 378 as well. He argued
that the reliance placed by the High Court upon the decision of
this Court in the case of Khemraj vs. State of Madhya C
Pradesh 2 was misconceived as the said case has no
application on construction of Section 378 as the controlling
words "save as otherwise provided" did not exist in Section 417
of Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, '1898 Code') and the
observations made in that case are neither ratio decidendi nor
obiter dicta.                                                    D

      10. Lastly, Mr. Ram Jethmalani contended that if there is
a conflict of exercise of executive powers by the state
government and the central government, by virtue of the proviso
to Article 162 of the Constitution of India, the decision of the   E
latter will prevail.

     11. Mr. A. Mariarputham, learned senior counsel for CBI,
adopted the arguments of Mr. Ram Jethmalani. He further
submitted that by addition of words "save as otherwise
provided in sub-section (2)", in Section 378, the Legislature      F
brought changes in erstwhile Section 417 of 1898 Code and
made its intention clear to take class of cases covered by sub-
section (2) out of purview of sub-section (1).

     12. On the other hand, Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao, learned G
senior counsel for the state government, vehemently supported
the view of the High Court to sustain the maintainability of
appeal filed by the state government. He submitted that right
1.    (1977) 3 sec 25.
2.    (1976) 1 sec 385.                                            H
    348      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A   of appeal is a creature of statute and the question whether there
    is right of appeal or not will have to be considered on an
    interpretation of the provision of the statute and not on the
    ground of propriety or any other consideration. According to
    him, when the language of statute is plain and unambiguous
B   then literal rule of interpretation has to be applied and the court
    must give effect to the words used in the statute and it would
    not be open to the courts to adopt a hypothetical construction
    on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the
    alleged object and policy of the Act or to have consideration
c   of equity, public interest or to seek the intention of the
    Legislature. He would submit that the use of the expressions
    "in any case" in sub-section (1) and "also" in sub-section (2)
    clearly indicates that Legislature intended that the general rule
    would be that the state government may file an appeal in any
    and every case [including cases covered by sub-section (2)]
0
    and the central government may additionally file an appeal in
    a case covered by sub-section (2). Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao
    contended that the :nterpretation to the expression "save as
    otherwise provided in sub-section (2)", sought to be placed by
    the appellants, is not in accordance with the logic or the plain
E   language of the provision and such interpretation would result
    in rendering the expression "in any case" in sub-section (1) and
    the word "also" in sub-section (2) redundant and otiose. He
    emphasized that no word or expression used in any statute can
    be said to be redundant or superfluous; that in matters of
F   interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word
    and pay too little attention to other words and no provision in
    the statute and no word in the section can be construed in
    isolation and every provision and every word must be looked
    at generally and in the context in which it is used.
G
         13. Relying upon the case of Eknath Shankarrao
    Mukkawar1, Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao submitted that this Court
    has held that in the absence of use of the word "also" in sub-
    section (2) of Section 377, as contained in sub-section (2) of
H   Section 378, the state government was incompetent to file an
 LALU PRASAD YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. 349
              [R.M. LODHA, J.]

appeal in a case falling under Section 377(2) and now in order    A
to remedy the lacuna pointed out by this Court, Parliament
amended Section 377(2) by Act No. 45 of 1978 to include the
word "also" therein and bring the same in pari materia with the
provisions of Section 378(2). He referred to the Statement of
Objects and Reasons for the said amendment and argued that        B
after the said amendment, the state government is also
competent to file an appeal in a case falling under Section
377(2). Learned senior counsel urged that inasmuch as the
provisions of Section 377 and Section 378 are now in pari
materia and the same interpretation needs to be accorded to       c
Section 378 as well.

       14. Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao, learned senior counsel,
strenuously urged that the interpretation sought to be placed by
the appellants would lead to absurdity inasmuch as (i) even in
                                                                  0
a case where the state government requests and permits
investigation under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act, 1946 (' 1946 Act', for short) and prosecution
is conducted by the public prosecutor appointed by the state
government, the state government would not be entitled to file
an appeal in case of acquittal, but would have to approach the E
central government for the purpose (which has no role or
connection with the investigation or the case); and (ii) in view
of the express amendment to Section 377 of 1973 Code so
as to enable the state government to file an appeal even where
investigation was conducted by the CBI or central agency, the F
state government would be competent to file an appeal in case
of award of inadequate sentence; but in a similar case that
results in acquittal then the state government would not be able
to file an appeal under Section 378.
                                                                  G
      15. In the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, Section 407
prohibited an appeal from acquittal. For the first time, the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1872 provided for an appeal by the
government from an order of acquittal (Section 272). The said
provision was re-enacted in Section 417 of the Code of H
    350      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A   Criminal Procedure, 1882. The provision concerning an appeal
    in case of acquittal was retained in Section 417of1898 Code.
    The provision relating to an appeal from order of acquittal in
    1898 Code (as amended by Amendment Act 26of1955) reads
    as under:-
B
          "S. 417.- Appeal in case of acquittal.- (1) Subject to the
          provisions of sub-section (5), the State Government may,
          in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an
          appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order
          of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court.
c
          (2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in
          which the offence has been investigated by the Delhi
          Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi
          Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, the Central
D         Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to
          present an appeal to the High Court from the order of
          acquittal.

          (3) If sue~ an order of acquittal is passed in any case
          instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an
E
          application made to it by the complainant in this behalf,
          grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal
          the complainant may present such an appeal to the High
          Court.

F         (4) No application under sub-section (3) for the grant of
          special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be
          entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days
          from the date of that order of acquittal.

G         (5) If, in any case, the application under sub-section (3) for
          the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of
          acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal
          shall lie under sub-section (1 )."

        16. In 1973 Code, appeal from an order of acquittal has
H   been retained with some modifications. Section 378, sub-
 LALU PRASAD YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. 351
              [R.M. LODHA, J.)
section (1) opens with the words, "save as otherwise provided            A
in sub-section (2)". The main thrust of the arguments by the
learned senior counsel centered around the opening words,
"save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2)", the phrase "in
any case" in sub-section (1) and the word "also" in sub-section
(2).                                                                     B

      17. Way back in 1766, Parker, C.B., in Robert Mitchell v.
Soren Torup 3 recognized the rule that in expounding Acts of
parliament, where words are express, plain and clear, the
words ought to be understood according to their genuine and
natural signification and import, unless by such exposition a C
contradiction or inconsistency would arise in the Act by reason
of some subsequent clause, from whence it might be inferred
the iritent of the Parliament was otherwise; and this holds with
respect to penal, as well as other Acts.
                                                                         D
                                         4
       18. Parke, 8. in Becke v. Smith, stated the following rule:

       "It is a very useful rule, in the construction of a statute, to
       adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to
       the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with     E
       the intention of the legislature, to be collected from the
       statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or
       repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or
       modified, so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no
       further."
                                                                         F
                                                          5
     19. In The Attorney-General v. Lockwood, the rule
regarding construction of statutes was expounded in the
following words:

        " ..... The rule of law, I take it, upon the construction of all G
       statutes, and therefore applicable to the construction of
       this, is, whether they be penal or remedial, to construe
3.   (1766) Parker 227.
4.   (1836) 2 Meeson and Welsby 191.
5.   (1842) 9 Meeson and Welsby 378.                                     H
    352        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A         them according to the plain, literal, and grammatical
          meaning of the words in which they are expressed, unless
          that construction leads to a plain and clear contradiction
          of the apparent purpose of the act, or to some palpable
          and e.vident absurdity .... ".
B
         20. In The Sussex Peerage, 6 the House of Lords, through
    Lord Chief Justice Tindal, stated the rule for the construction
    of Acts of Parliament that they should be construed according
    to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words
    of the statute are of themselves precise and unambiguous, then
C   no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their
    natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves do, in such
    case, best declare the intention of the Legislature.

         21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India
D   & Anr. v. Hansoli Devi and Others, 7 approved the rule
    exposited by Lord Chief Justice Tindal in The Sussex
    Peerage's case6 and stated the legal position thus:

          "It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that
          when the language of the statute is plain and
E
          unambiguous, then the court must give effect to the words
          used in the statute and it would not be open to the courts
          to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground that such
          construction is more consistent with the alleged object and
          policy of the Act. In Kirkness v. John Hudson & Co. Ltd.,
F         (1955) 2 All ER 345, Lord Reid pointed out as to what is
          the meaning of "ambiguous" and held that:

                  "A provision is not ambiguous merely because it
                  contains a word which in different contexts is
G                 capable of different meanings. It would be hard to
                  find anywhere a sentence of any length which does
                  not contain such a word. A provision is, in my
                  judgment, ambiguous only if it contains a word or
    -------
     (1844) XI Clark & Finnelly 85.
    6.
H   7.   c2002) 7 sec 273.
 LALU PRASAD YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. 353
              [R.M. LODHA, J.]

            phrase which in that particular context is capable of A
            having more than one meaning."

     It is no doubt true that if on going through the plain meaning
     of the language of statutes, it leads to anomalies, injustices
     and absurdities, then the court may look into the purpose        B
     for which the statute has been brought and would try to give
     a meaning, which would adhere to the purpose of the
     statute. Patanjali Sastri, C.J. in the case of Aswini Kumar
     Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369, had held that
     it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside       C
    words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, if they
     can have appropriate application in circumstances
     conceivably within the contemplation of the statute. In
     Quebec Railway, Light Heat & Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry,
    AIR 1920 PC 181, it had been observed that.the legislature
     is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain      D
     and a construction which attributes redundancy to the
     legislature will not be accepted except for compelling
     reasons. Similarly, it is not permissible to add words to a
    statute which are not there unless on a literal construction
    being given a part of the statute becomes meaningless. But        E
    before any words are read to repair an omission in the Act,
    it should be possible to state with certainty that these words
    would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved
    by the legislature had their attention been d;awn to the
    omission before the Bill had passed into a law. At times,         F
    the intention of the legislature is found to be clear but the
    unskilfulness of the draftsman in introducing certain words
    in the statute results in apparent ineffectiveness of the
    language and in such a situation, it may be permissible for
    the court to reject the surplus words, so as to make the          G
    statute effective ...... "

     22. As noticed above, Section 378, sub-section (1 ), opens
with the words - "save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2)".
These words are not without significance. The immediate H
    354       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010] 4 S.C.R.

A question is as to what meaning should be ascribed to these
  words. In Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Tenth Edition,
  Revised), the word "save" is defined thus:

          "save.- formal or poetic/literary except; other than .... "

B        23. In Webster Comprehensive Dictionary (International
    Edition), the word "save" is defined as follows:-

          "save.- Except; but - 1. Except; but 2. Archaic Unless".

        24. A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage by Bryan A.
C Garner (1987) states that "save" is an ARCHAISM when used
  for "except". It should be eschewed, although, as the examples
  following illustrate, it is still common in legal prose. e.g., 'The
  law-of-the-circuit rule forbids one panel to overrule another save
  [read except] when a later statute or Supreme Court decision
D has changed the applicable law'.

         25. In Williams v. Milotin, 8 the High Court·of Australia, while
    construing the words "save as otherwise provided in this Act"
    stated:-
E
          ".... In fact the words "save as otherwise provided in this
          Act" are a reflexion of the words "except" - or "save" - "as
          hereinafter excepted".

       26. Section 378 is divided into six sub-sections. Sub-
F section (1) provides that the state government may direct the
  public prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from
  an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any court
  other than High Court or an order of acquittal passed by the
  court of session in revision. It opens with the words "save as
G otherwise provided in sub-section (2)" followed by the words
  "and subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5)". Sub-
  section (2) refers to two class of cases, namely, (i) those cases
  where the offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special

H   8.   97 C.L.R. 465.
 LALU PRASAD YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. 355
              [R.M. LODHA, J.]
 Police Establishment constituted under 1946 Act and (ii) those         A
cases where the offence has been investigated by any other
 agency empowered to make investigation into an offence under
any Central Act other than 1973 Code and provides that the
 central government may also direct the public prosecutor to
 present an appeal to the High Court from an order of acquittal.        B
 Such an appeal by the central government in the aforesaid two
 types of cases is subject to the provisions contained in sub-
section (3). Sub-section (3) provides that an appeal under sub-
 sections ( 1) and (2) shall not be entertained without leave of the
 High Court. Where the order of acquittal has been passed in a          c
case instituted upon complaint, sub-section (4) provides that the
complainant may apply for special leave to appeal from the
order of acquittal and if such leave is granted, an appeal be
presented by him to the High Court. The limitation is prescribed
in sub-section (5). Insofar as the cases .covered by sub-section        D
(4) are concerned, where the complainant is a public servant,
limitation prescribed is six months from the date of an order of
acquittal and in all other cases, including the cases covered by
sub-sections (1) and (2), a period of sixty days from the date
of the order of acquittal. Sub-section (6) makes a provision that       E
if an application under sub-section (4) for the grant of special
leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is refused, no appeal
from that order of acquittal shall lie under sub-section (1) or under
sub-section (2). We have surveyed Section 378 in its entirety
to have complete conspectus of the provision.
                                                                        F
      27. The opening words - "save as otherwise provided in
sub-section (2)" - are in the nature of exception intended to
exclude the class of cases mentioned in sub-section (2) out of
operation of the body of sub-section (1). These words have no
other meaning in the context but to qualify the operation of sub- G
section (1) and take out of its purview two types of cases
referred in sub-section (2), namely, (i) the cases in which offence
has been investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment
constituted under 1946 Act and (ii) the cases in which the
offence has been investigated by any other agency empowered H
    356      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A to make investigation into an offence under any Central Act
  other than 1973 Code. By construing Section 378 in a manner
  that permits appeal from an order of acquittal by the state
  government in every case, except two class of cases
  mentioned in sub-section (2), full effect would be given to the
B exception (clause) articulated in the opening words. As noticed
  above, the words - "save as otherwise provided in sub-section
  (2)" - were added in 1973 Code; Section 417 of 1898 Code
  did not have these words. It is familiar rule of construction that
  all changes in wording and phrasing may be presumed to have
c been deliberate and with the purpose to limit, qualify or enlarge
  the pre-existing law as the changes of the words employ. Any
  construction that makes exception (clause) with which section
  opens unnecessary and redundant should be avoided. If we
  give to Section 378, sub-sections (1) and (2), the interpretation
  which the state government claims; we would have to say that
0
  no matter that complaint was not lodged by the state
  government or its officers; that investigation was not done by
  its police establishment; that prosecution was neither
  commenced nor continued by the state government; that public
  prosecutor was not appointed by the state government; that the
E state government had nothing to do with the criminal case; that
  all steps from launching of prosecution until its logical end were
  taken by the Delhi Police Special Establishment and yet the
  state government may file an appeal from an order of acquittal
  under Section 378(1). That would be rendering the exception
F (clause) reflected in the opening words - "save as otherwise
  provided in sub-section (2)" - redundant, meaningless and
  unnecessary. If the Legislature had intended to give the right
  of appeal under Section 378( 1) to the state government in all
  cases of acquittal including the class of cases referred to in sub-
G section (2), it would not have been necessary to incorporate
  the exception (clause) in the opening words. This objective
  could have been achieved without use of these words as
  erstwhile Section 417 of 1898 Code enabled the state
  government to appeal from all cases of acquittal while in two
H types of cases mentioned in sub-section (2) thereof, appeal
     LALU PRASAD YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. 357
                   [R.M. LODHA, J.]
from the order of acquittal could be filed under the direction of      A
central government 'as well.

     28. In The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The
 State of Bihar and others9 Venkatarama Ayyar, J. observed:

       "..... It is a well-settled rule of construction that when a
                                                                       B
       statute is repealed and re-enacted and words in the
       repealed statute are reproduced in the new statute, they
       should be interpreted in the sense which had been judicially
       put on them under the repealed Act, because the
       Legislature is presumed to be acquainted with the               C
       construction which the Courts have put upon the words, and
       when they repeat the same words, they must be taken to
       have accepted the interpretation put on them by the Court
       as correctly reflecting the legislative mind ...... "
                              .            -   -~-   ...
                                                                       D
     29. However, if the latter statute does not use the same
language as in the earlier one, the alteration must be taken to
have been made deliberately. In his classic work, Principles of
Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh, 12th Edition, 2010 at
page 310, the following statement of law has been made:
                                                                       E
       "Just as use of same language in a later statute as was
       used in an earlier one in pari materia is suggestive of the
       intention of the Legislature that the language so used in
       the later statute is used in the same sense as in the earlier
       one, change of language in a later statute in pari materia      F
       is suggestive that change of interpretation is intended."

The learned author also refers to the observations of Lord
MacMillan in D.R. Fraser & Co. Ltd. v. The Minister of National
Revenue: 10 "When an amending Act alters the language of the           G
principal Statute, the alteration must be taken to have been
made deliberately".


9.    (1955) 2 SCR 603
10. AIR 1949 PC 120.                                                   H
    358       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 4 S.C.R.

A        30. It is important to bear in mind that this Court in
    Khemraj2 , has put the following construction to Section 417
    of 1898 Code:

          "10. Section 417 Criminal Procedure Code, prior to the
          Amendment Act XXVI of 1955 provided for presentation
B
          of appeals by the Public Prosecutor on the direction of the
          State Government. The 1955 Amendment introduced
          several changes and provided for appeals at the instance
          of the complainant as also on the direction of the Central
          Government in cases investigated by the Delhi Special
c         Police Establishment. Further changes were introduced in
          the matter of appeals against acquittal under Section 378
          of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, with which we
          are not concerned in this appeal in view of the repeal
          provisions under Section 484(1), CrPC.

          11. The Delhi Special Police Establishment (briefly "the
          Establishment"), a central police force, is constituted under
          the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (Act XXV
          of 1946) (briefly the Delhi Act). Under Section 2 of the Act,
E         the Central Government may constitute a special police
          force, called the Delhi Special Police Establishment, for
          investigation of certain offences or class of offences as
          notified under Section 3 of the Delhi Act. Under Section 4
          of the Act the superintendence of the Delhi Special Police
F         Establishment vests in the Central Government and
          administration of the Special Police Establishment vests
          in an officer appointed by the Central Government who
          exercises powers exercisable by an Inspector General of
          Police as the Central Government may specify. Under
          Section 5 the powers and the jurisdiction of the
G
          Establishment can be extended by the Central Government
          to other areas in a State although not a Union territory.
          Once there is an extension of the powers and jurisdiction
          of the members of the Establishment, the members thereof
          while discharging such functions are deemed to be
H
LALU PRASAD YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. 359
             [R.M. LODHA, J.]

  members of the police force of the area and are vested            A
  with the powers, functions and privileges and are subject
  to the liabilities of a police officer belonging to that force.
  The police officer also subject to the orders of the Central
  Government exercises the powers of the officer-in-charge
  of a police station in the extended area. Under Section 6         B
  consent of the State Government is necessary to enable
  the officer of the Establishment to exercise powers and
  jurisdiction in any area in the State not being a Union
  territory or railway area.

    12. Investigation under the Delhi Act is, therefore, a central C
    investigation and the officers concerned are under the
    superintendence of the officer appointed by the Central ·
  . Government. The superintendence of the Establishment is
    also under the Central Government. The Central
    Government, therefore, is concerned with the investigation D
    of the cases by the Establishment and its ultimate result.
    It is in that background that in 1955, Section 417 was
    amended by adding sub-section (2) to the section to
    provide for appeal against acquittal in cases investigated
    by the Establishment also on the-direction of the Central E
    Government. In view of the provisions of the Delhi Act it
    was necessary to introduce sub-section (2) in Section 417
    so that this Central agency which is solely and intimately
    connected with the investigation of the specified offences
    may also approach the Central Government for direction F
   to appeal in appropriate cases.

  13. This, however, does not bar the jurisdiction of the State
  Government also to direct presentation of appeals when
  it is moved by the Establishment. The Establishment can           G
  move either the Central Government or the State
  Government. It will be purely a matter of procedure whether
  it moves the State Government directly or through the
  Central Government or in a given case moves the Central
                                                                    H
    360       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A         Government alone. It will again be a matter of procedure
          when the Central Government decides to appeal it requests
          the State Government to do the needful through the Public
          Prosecutor appointed under the Code.

          14. The word !also' in sub-section (2) of Section 417 is
8
          very significant. This word seems not to bar the jurisdiction
          of the State Government to direct the Public Prosecutor
          to present an appeal even in cases investigated by the
          Establishment. Sub-section (1) of Section 417 is in general
          terms and would take in its purview all types of cases since
c         the expression used in that sub-section is "in any case".
          We do not see any limitation on the power of the State
          Government to direct institution of appeal with regard to
          any particular type of cases. Sub-section (1) of Section 417
          being in general terms is as such of wider amplitude. Sub-
D         section (2) advisedly uses the word 'also' when power is
          given to the Central Government in addition to direct the
          Public Prosecutor to appeal."

        31. The Parliament in 1973 Code re-enacted the provision
E for appeal from order of acquittal with certain modifications. It
  changed the language by addition of words - "save as
  otherwise provided in sub-section (2)". The alteration in
  language by addition of these words gives rise to an inference
  that the Legislature made conscious changes in Section 378
F (1973 Code). We are afraid, the addition of words in Section
  378(1) by way of exception (clause) cannot be set at naught
  by giving same interpretation which has been given to Section
  417 (1898 Code). As a matter of fact, in Khemraj 2· this Court
  did notice that changes have been introduced in the matter of
G appeals against acq:.iittal under Section 378 of the 1973 Code,
  but the Court did not deal with these changes as it was not
  concerned with that provision. In our opinion, the decision of
  this Court in Khemraj 2 cannot be applied as the language used
  in Section 417 (1898 Code) and Section 378 (1973 Code) is
  not in pari materia.
H
  LALU PRASAD YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. 361
               [R.M. LODHA, J.]
       32. Much emphasis, however, has been placed on the word          A
 "also" in sub-section (2) of Section 378 ..by learned senior
 counsel for the state government. It has been urged that by use
of the word "also", competence of the state government in
directing the public prosecutor to file an appeal from an order
of acquittal in the two types of cases covered by sub-section           B
 (2) is not taken away and rather the word "also" suggests that
central government may also direct the public prosecutor to file
an appeal from an order of acquittal in the class of cases
mentioned in sub-section (2). Does the word "also" carry the
meaning as· contended by the learned senior counsel for the             c
state government? One of the rules of construction of statutes
is that language of the statute should be read as it is and any
construction that results in rejection of words has to be avoided;
the effort should be made to give meaning to each and every
word used by the Legislature. However, such rule of.construction        D
of statutes is not without exceptions. In Stone v. Yeovil Corp., 11
Brett J. observed :

     "The word "such" in the second branch of that clause would
     seem at first sight to apply to lancis purchased or taken;
     but, if so read, it is insensible. It is a canon of construction   E
     that, if it be possible, effect must be given to every word
     of an Act of Parliament or other document; but that, if there
     be a word or a phrase therein to which no sensible
     meaning can be given, it must be eliminated. It seems to
     me, therefore, that the word "such" must be eliminated from        F
     this part of the clause."

Archibald, J. concurred with Brett J. thus :

    "But I agree with my Brother Brett that it is a true canon of
construction, that, where a word is found in a statute or in any        G
other instrument or document which cannot possibly have a
sensible meaning, we not only may, but must, eliminate it in
order that the intention may be carried out."

11. (1875-76) L.R. 1 CPD 691.                                           H
    362      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2010) 4 S.C.R.


A       33. In Salmon v. Duncombe and Others, 12 Privy Council
    speaking through Lord Hobhouse stated :

          "It is, however, a very serious matter to hold that when the
          main object of a statute is clear, it shall be reduced to a
          nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of law.
B
          It may be necessary for a Court of Justice to come to such
          a conclusion, but their Lordships hold that nothing can justify
          it except necessity or the absolute intractability of the
          language used. And they have set themselves to consider,
          first, whether any substantial doubt can be suggested as
c         to the main object of the legislature; and, secondly, whether
          the last nine words of sect. 1 are so cogent and so limit
          the rest of the statute as to nullify its effect either entirely
          or in a very important particular."

D       34. The main object and legislative intent by the opening
  words - "save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2)" - in
  sub-section (1) of Section 378 being clear i:e., to fetter the
  general power given to the state government in filing appeal
  from the order of acquittal in two types of cases stated in sub-
E section (2), the use of word "also" in sub-section (2) does not
  make any sense. The word "also" in sub-section (2), if construed
  in the manner suggested by the state government, may result
  in reducing the opening words in sub-section (1) a nullity and
  will deny these words their full play. Since exception (clause)
F in the beginning of sub-section (1) has been expressly added
  in Section 378 and it is not possible to harmonise the word
  "also" occurring in sub-section (2) with that, it appears to us that
  no sensible meaning can be given to the word "also" and the
  said word has to be treated as immaterial. We are not oblivious
G of the fact that to declare "also" enacted in sub-section (2)
  immaterial or insensible is not very satisfactory, but it is much
  more unsatisfactory to deprive the words - "save as otherwise
  provided in sub-section (2)" - of their true and plain meaning.
  In order that the exception (clause) expressly stated in the
H   12. (1886) 11 AC 627.
 LALU PRASAD YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. 363
              [R.M. LODHA, J.]
opening words of sub-section (1) might be preserved, it is         A
necessary that word "also" in sub-section (2) is treated as
immaterial and we hold accordingly.

      35. The phrase "in any case" in sub-section (1) of Section
378, without hesitation, means "in all cases", but the opening
                                                                   8
words in the said Section put fetters on the state government
in directing appeal to be filed in two types of cases mentioned
in sub-section (2).

     36. Section 2(u) of 1973 Code defines "public prosecutor"
which means any person appointed under Section 24 and              C
includes any person acting under the directions of a public
prosecutor. Section 24 reads as follows:

    "S.24. - Public Pr.osecutors.-(1) For every High Court, the
    Central Government or the State Government shall, after        D
    consultation with the High Court, appoint a Public
    Prosecutor and may also appoint one or more Additional
    Public Prosecutors, for conducting in such Court, any
    prosecution, appeal or other proceeding on behalf of the
    Central Government or State Government, as the case            E
    may be.

    (2) The Central Government may appoint one or more
    Public Prosecutors for the purpose of conducting any case
    or class of cases in any district, or local area.
                                                                   F
    (3) For every district, the State Government shall appoint
    a Public Prosecutor and may also appoint one or more
    Additional Public Prosecutors for the district:

          Provided that the Public Prosecutor or Additional
    Public Prosecutor appointed for one district may be            G
    appointed also to be a Public Prosecutor or an Additional
    Public Prosecutor, as the case may be, for another district.

    (4) The District Magistrate shall, in consultation with the
                                                                   H
    364      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010) 4 S.C.R.


A         Sessions Judge, prepare a panel of names of persons,
          who are, in his opinion, fit to be appointed as Public
          Prosecutors or Additional Public Prosecutors for the
          district.

          (5) No person shall be appointed by the State Government
B
          as the Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor
          for the district unless his name appears in the panel of
          names prepared by the District Magistrate under sub-
          section (4).
c         (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (5),
          where in a State there exists a regular Cadre of
          Prosecuting Officers, the State Government shall appoint
          a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor only
          from among the persons constituting such Cadre:
D
                Provided that where, in the opinion of the State
          Government, no suitable person is available in such Cadre
          for such appointment that Government, may appoint a
          person as Public Prosecutor or Additional Public
          Prosecutor, as the case may be, from the panel of names
E
          prepared by the District Magistrate under sub-section (4).

          Explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section,-

          (a) "regular Cadre of Prosecuting Officers" means a Cadre
F         of Prosecuting Officers which includes therein the post of
          a Public Prosecutor, by whatever name called, and which
          provides for promotion of Assistant Public Prosecutors, by
          whatever name called, to that post;

          (b) "Prosecuting Officer'' means a person, by whatever
G         name called, appointed to perform the functions of a
          Public Prosecutor, an Additional Public Prosecutor or an
          Assistant Public Prosecutor under this Code.]

          (7) A person shall be eligible to be appointed as a Public
H
 LALU PRASAD YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. 365
               [R.M. LODHA, J.]
     Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor under sub-      A
     section (I) or sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) or sub-
     section (6), only if he has been in practice as an advocate
     for not less than seven years.

     (8) The Central Government or the State Government may
                                                                   8
     appoint, for the purposes of any case or class of cases, a
     person who has been in practice as an advocate for not
     less than ten years as a Special Public Prosecutor.

          Provided that the Court may permit the victim to
     engage an advocate of his choice to assist the                C
     prosecution under this sub-section.

     (9) For the purposes of sub-section (7) and sub-section
     (8), the period during which a person has been in practice
     as a pleader, or has rendered (whether before or after the    o
     commencement of this Code) service as a Public
     Prosecutor or as an Additional Public Prosecutor .or
     Assistant Public Prosecutor or other Prosecuting Officer,
     by whatever name called, shall be deemed to be the period
     during which such person has been in practice as an           E
     advocate."

     37. A perusal of Section 24 would show that the central
government appoints its public prosecutors for conducting
prosecution, appeal or other proceedings on its behalf and a
state government appoints its public prosecutors in conducting     F
prosecution, appeal or other proceedings on its behalf. One has
no control over the other. The central government or the state
government, as the case may be, may appoint a special public
prosecutor for the purpose of any case or class of cases. Under
Section 378(1) the state government may direct its public          G
prosecutor to file an appeal from an order of acquittal while
under Section 378(2) the central government may direct its
public prosecutor to file an appeal from an order of acquittal.
The public prosecutor, thus, has to be associated in an appeal
                                                                   H
     366      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 4 S.C.R.


  A from an order of acquittal. The 1946 Act provides for
    constitution of a special police establishment for investigation
    of certain offences or class of offences as notified under
    Section 3 of the 1946 Act. A close look to the provisions of
    1946 Act would show that investigation thereunder is a central
 s  investigation and the officers concerned are under the
    superintendence of the officer appointed by the central
    government. It is the central government that has the
    superihtendence over Delhi Special Police Establishment.
    What is, therefore, important to notice is that it is the central
 c  government which is concerned with the investigation of the
    case by Delhi Special Police Establishment and its ultimate
    result. It is for this reason that sub-section (2) of Section 378
    provides for appeal against acquittal in two types of cases
    mentioned therein on the direction of the central government
. D by its public prosecutor. The opening words in sub-section (1),
    thus, qualify the general power given to the state government
    in filing appeal from an order of acquittal so that the central
    agency, which is solely and intimately connected with the
    investigation of cases referred in sub-section (2), may approach
  E the central government for direction to appeal in appropriate
    cases.

          38. The decision of this Court in Eknath Shankarrao
     Mukkawar1, has been referred to and relied upon by Mr. Ram
     Jethmalani as well as Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao. We may
 F   appropriately consider the said decision now. In Eknath
     Shankarrao Mukkawar1, the construction of Section 377
     (appeal against inadequacy of sentence) fell for consideration.
     Section 377 (1) and (2) of 1973 Code with which this Court was
     concerned in Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar1 , reads as follows:-
 G
           "S.- 377.- Appeal by the State Government against
           sentence.- (1) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section
           (2), the State Government may, in any case of conviction
           on a trial held by any court other than a High Court, direct
           the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High
 H
LALU PRASAD YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. 367
             [R.M. LODHA, J.]
  Court against the sentence on the ground of its                  A
  inadequacy.

  (2) If such conviction is in a case in which the offence has
  been investigated by ·the Delhi Special Police
  Establishment, constituted under the Delhi Special Police        8
  Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or by any other
  agency empowered to make investigation into an offence
  under any Central Act other than this Code, the Central
  Government may direct the Public Prosecutor to present
  an appeal to the High Court against the sentence on the          C
  ground of its inadequacy."

  This Court with reference to the aforesaid provision held:

   "10. It is true that Section 378(2) follows the pattern of
   Section 417(2) of the old Code and the right to appeal is       D
   conferred upon both the State Government and the Central
   Government in express terms in Section 378(2). It is clear
  that the legislature has maintained al water-tight dichotomy
  while dealing with the matter of appeal against inadequacy
  of sentence. We a-gree that in the absence of a similar          E
  word "also" in Section 377(2) it is not possible for the court
  to supply a casus omissus. The two sections, Section 377
  and Section 378 CrPC being situated in such close
  proximity, it is not possible to hold that omission of the
  word "also" in Se~ion 377(2) is due to oversight or per          F
  incuriam.

  11. Section 377 CrPC introduces a new right of appeal
  which was not earlier available under the old Code. Under
  sub-section (1) of Section 377 CrPC the State Government
  has a right to appeal against inadequacy of sentence in          G
  all cases other than those referred to in sub-section (2) of
  that section. This is made clear under Section 377(1) by
  its opening clause "save as otherwise provided in sub-
  section (2)". Sub-section .(2) of Section 377, on the other
  hand, confers a right of appeal on the Central Government        H
    368       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A         against a sentence on the ground of its inadequacy in two
          types of cases:

          ( 1) Those cases where investigation is conducted by the
          Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the
          Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946.
B
          (2) Those other cases which are investigated by any other
          agency empowered to make investigation under any
          Central Act not being the Code of Criminal Procedure.

c         12. There is no difficulty about the first type of cases which
          are investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment
          where, certainly, the Central Government is the competent
          authority to appeal against inadequacy of sentence."

       39. The essence in a decision is its ratio and not every
D observation found therein, as stated by this Court in State of
  Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and others13 • The ratio of
  decision in Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar1 is that the
  Legislature has maintained a watertight dichotomy in the matter
  of appeal against inadequacy of sentence; the competent
E authority to appeal against inadequacy of sentence in two types
  of cases referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 377 is the
  central government. However, Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao submitted
  that in Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar1, in the absence of use
  of word "also" in sub-section (2) of Section 377, it was held by
F this Court that the state government was incompetent to file an
  appeal in a case falling under Section 377(2). But now the
  lacuna pointed out by this Court has been remedied; Parliament
  amended by Act 45 of 1978 to include the word "also" therein
  and bring the same in pari materia with the provisions of Section
G 378(2) and the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the said
  amendment makes it clear that the state government is also
  competent to file an appeal in a case falling under Section
  377(2). We are not persuaded by the submission of Mr. L.
  Nageshwar Rao for more than one reason. In the first place,
H   13. AIR 1968 SC 647.
 LALU PRASAD YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. 369
              [R.M. LODHA, J.]
the observations in Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar1, in relation A
to Section 378 do not operate as binding precedent as
construction of Section 378 was neither under consideration nor
in issue in that case. Secondly, and moreJmportantly, although
sub-section (2) of Section 377 came to be amended by Act
45of1978 to include the word "also" therein, but the Statement B
of Objects and Reasons relating to that amendment is of no
relevance insofar as construction of Section 378 ( 1) and (2) is
concerned. Insofar as Section 378 is concerned, the word "also"
occurring in sub-section (2) cannot be accorded a meaning that
                                                                 c
would result in wiping out the effect of controlling words in sub-
section (1) - "save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2)" -
which are indicative of legislative intent to exclude two types
of cases mentioned in sub-section (2) out of operation of the
body of sub-section (1).

     ·40. In our opinion, the Legislature has maintained a D
mutually exclusive division in the matter of appeal from an order
of acquittal inasmuch as the competent authority to appeal from
an order of acquittal in two types of cases referred to in sub-
section (2) is the central government and the authority of the
state government in relation to such cases has been excluded. E
As a necessary corollary, it has to be held, and we hold, that
the State Government (of Bihar) is not competent to direct its
public_prosecutor to present appeal from the judgment dated
December 18, 2006 passed by the Special Judge, CBI (AHO),
Pa~a.                                                             F

      41. In view of what we have discussed above, it is not
necessary to consider the contention of Mr. Ram Jethmalani
founded on the proviso to Article 162 of the Constitution that in
case of conflict of exercise of executive powers by the state G
government and the central government, the decision of the
latter shall prevail.

     42. For the aforesaid conclusions, the reasons given by
the High Court are not correct and the impugned order cannot
be sustained.                                                    H
    370      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 4 S.C.R.


A       43. The result is, both appeals are allowed, the order dated
    September 20, 2007 passed by the High Court is set aside
    and the Govt. Appeal No. 1 of 2007 - State of Bihar v. Latu
    Prasad and others - presented before the High Court of
    Judicature at Patna is rejected as not maintainable.
B
    K.K.T.                                       Appeals allowed.