Holding

The Supreme Court held that Section 387 IPC is a distinct offence punishable for putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt to commit extortion, and delivery of property is not a requisite; therefore, the High Court’s quashing order was erroneous and the appeal was allowed.

Summary

The complainant, a betel nut trader, was threatened at gunpoint by the accused and his associates, who demanded a monthly payment of five lakh rupees and attempted to kidnap him. The trial court issued a summons under Section 387 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for putting the complainant in fear of death to commit extortion, and the accused sought quashing of the summons under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). The High Court quashed the summons, holding that because no property was delivered, an offence under Section 383 IPC (extortion) was not made out and therefore Section 387 IPC could not apply. The Supreme Court examined the statutory language of Sections 383 and 387 IPC, emphasizing that Section 387 punishes the act of putting a person in fear as a distinct offence and does not require the delivery of property. It held that the essential ingredients of Section 387 were prima facie established and that the power to quash under Section 482 must be exercised sparingly. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, restored the proceedings, and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the absence of delivery of property (a requirement of Section 383 IPC) precludes the prosecution under Section 387 IPC.
Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the summons issued under Section 387 IPC.
Interpretation of the essential ingredients of Section 387 IPC as a distinct offence from extortion under Section 383 IPC.
Scope and proper exercise of the inherent power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 200, s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 383, s. 384, s. 385, s. 386, s. 387, s. 388, s. 389

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was justified in observing that since no offence of extortion u/s.383 IPC is made out, consequently, no offence u/s.387 IPC would be made out. Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – ss.383, 387 – On 22.05.2022, when the complainant was three unknown persons carrying rifles in their hands, stopped and threatened him to close down his business of betel nut – They further threatened that he could carry on the business only if he would pay five lakhs per month to the accused person – On the complainant’s

Subjects

ExtortionSection 387 IPCSection 383 IPCPutting a person in fearQuashing of criminal proceedingsSection 482 CrPCInterpretation of penal statutesCriminal Procedure

Judgment

[2025] 7 S.C.R. 364 : 2025 INSC 806

M/s Balaji Traders
v.
The State of U.P. & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2899 of 2025)
05 June 2025
[Sanjay Karol* and Manoj Misra, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in observing that since no
offence of extortion u/s.383 IPC is made out, consequently, no
offence u/s.387 IPC would be made out.

Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.383, 387 – On 22.05.2022, when the
complainant was heading towards his house, the accused,
along with three unknown persons carrying rifles in their
hands, stopped and threatened him to close down his business
of betel nut – They further threatened that he could carry
on the business only if he would pay five lakhs per month
to the accused person – On the complainant’s refusal, the
accused persons not only beat him but also tried to kidnap
him – Complainant filed complaint u/s.200 CrPC – Trial Court
found a prima facie case against the accused person and
issued summons to him u/s.387 IPC – Accused person filed
application u/s.482 CrPC before the High Court for quashing of
summoning order – The High Court quashed the summoning
order – Correctness:
Held: A glance over all the Sections related to extortion would
reveal a clear distinction being carried out between the actual
commission of extortion and the process of putting a person in fear
for the purpose of committing extortion – It can be said in terms
of ss.386 (an aggravated form of 384 IPC) and 387 IPC that the
former is an act in itself, whereas the latter is the process; it is a
stage before committing an offence of extortion – The Legislature
was mindful enough to criminalize the process by making it a distinct
offence – Therefore, the commission of an offence of extortion is
not sine qua non for an offence under this Section – It is safe to

* Author
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 365

M/s Balaji Traders v. The State of U.P. & Anr.

deduce that for prosecution u/s.387 IPC, the delivery of property
is not necessary – As far as quashing is concerned, it is settled
that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with
circumspection in the ‘rarest of rare cases’ and not as an ordinary
rule – The reasoning adopted by the High Court is, on the face
of it, flawed and misplaced – When the Legislature has created
two separate offences with distinct ingredients and punishments,
then assigning the essential ingredient of one to another is not a
correct approach adopted by the High Court – Putting a person
in fear would make an accused guilty of an offence u/s.387 IPC;
it need not satisfy all the ingredients of extortion provided u/s.383
IPC – The instant case is not fit for quashing as the two essential
ingredients for prosecution u/s.387 IPC have been prima facie
disclosed in the complaint, (a) that the complainant has been put
in fear of death by pointing a gun towards him; and (b) that it was
done to pressurize him to deliver Rs.5 lakhs – Thus, the impugned
order dated 28.06.2024 is set aside, and the proceedings emanating
from Complaint Case are restored to the file of the Trial Court.
[Paras 9, 10, 18, 25, 26, 27]

Case Law Cited
Tolaram Relumal v. State of Bombay [1955] 1 SCR 158 : (1954)
1 SCC 961 – followed.
R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay [1986] 2 SCR 621 : (1986) 2 SCC
716; B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7; Dalip
Kaur v. Jagnar Singh [2009] 10 SCR 264 : (2009) 14 SCC 696;
Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [2021] 4
SCR 1044 : (2021) 19 SCC 401; M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State
of Kerala, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 85; R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta
[2008] 14 SCR 1249 : (2009) 1 SCC 516 – relied on.
Dhananjay @ Dhandhanjay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar [2007]
2 SCR 206 : (2007) 14 SCC 768; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
[1990] Supp. 3 SCR 259 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335; Inder Mohan
Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal [2007] 10 SCR 847 : (2007) 12
SCC 1; Motibhai Fulabhai Patel & Co. v. R. Prasad, 1968 SCC
OnLine SC310; Dilip Kumar Sharma v. State of M.P [1976] 2 SCR
289 : (1976) 1 SCC 560; Radha Ballabh v. State of U.P (1995)
Supp. 3 SCC 119; Gursharan Singh v. State of Punjab [1996]
Supp. 5 SCR 705 : (1996) 10 SCC 190; Somasundaram v. State
[2020] 10 SCR 27 : (2020) 7 SCC 722 – referred to.
366 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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Books and Periodicals Cited
Merriam-Webster; Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Tenth Edition
1999.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

List of Keywords
Extortion; Section 387 of IPC; Actual act of extortion; Putting a
person in fear for the purpose of committing extortion; Delivery of
property; Ingredients of extortion; Quashing; Power of quashing.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2899 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.06.2024 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in A482 No. 19550 of 2024

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Anilendra Pandey, Ms. Priya Kashyap, Raj Ranjay Singh.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Shariq Ahmed, Tariq Ahmed, Sunil Kumar Verma, Vinay Vats,
Mohammad Modassir Shams, M/s. Ahmadi Law Offices.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Sanjay Karol, J.

Leave Granted.
1. The instant appeal, preferred by appellant-complainant, arises out
of the judgment and order dated 28th June, 2024 passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Miscellaneous
Application No.19550/2024 whereby the summoning order dated
28th August, 2023 as well as entire proceedings of Complaint Case
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 367

M/s Balaji Traders v. The State of U.P. & Anr.

No.58 of 2022 under Section 387 of the Indian Penal Code, 18601
has been quashed.
2. Brief facts that led to the present appeal are :
The complainant, namely, Prof. Manoj Kumar Agrawal, is a proprietor
of a firm M/s. Balaji Traders, carrying out the business of betel nut
leaves. Sanjay Gupta2, allegedly started a business under the same
name, and litigations are pending between the parties with respect
to Trademark and Copyright claims. On 22nd May, 2022, when the
complainant was heading towards his house, the accused, along with
three unknown persons carrying rifles in their hands, stopped and
threatened him to close down his business of betel nut. They further
threatened that he could carry on the business only if he would pay
five lakhs per month to the accused person. On the complainant’s
refusal, the accused persons not only beat him but also tried to
kidnap him. On failure of police to register First Information Report3,
he approached the Court by filing a complaint u/s 200 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 19734.
3. Pursuant to this complaint, the Trial Court5 after analyzing the oral and
documentary evidence available, found a prima facie case against
the accused person and issued summons to him u/s 387 IPC.
4. Being aggrieved, the accused person approached the High Court
by filing a Miscellaneous Application under section 482 CrPC for
quashing of summoning order dated 28th August, 2023.
5. The High Court, while referring to various judicial pronouncements,
observed that to make out a case of extortion, one of the essential
ingredients is to deliver any property or valuable security under
threat by the complainant to the accused; and that such ingredient
was missing in the instant case as no money was handed over
to the accused person. It further observed that since no offence
of extortion under Section 383 IPC is made out, consequently, no
offence under Section 387 IPC would be made out, thus, finding it
a fit case to be quashed.

1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’
2 Hereinafter ‘accused’
3 FIR
4 Hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’
5 Court of Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge(Dacoit Prabhav Area) Jalaun Place Orai
368 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Trial Court rightly
issued summons on the basis of the statements of witnesses and
the complainant, and the High Court wrongly relied on the judgments
dealing with 384 IPC and not 387 IPC.
7. Learned Counsel for respondent No.2, while relying on Dhananjay
@ Dhandhanjay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar6 submits that
since the essential ingredient of extortion, i.e., delivery of property,
is not met, consequently, the charge under Section 387 IPC
cannot be sustained. Respondent No.2, who is running a similar
business to that of the complainant, had lodged an FIR against
the complainant, as such the instant FIR is directly linked to the
respondent’s enforcement of his Intellectual Property Rights and
made as a counterblast to the respondent’s lawful actions. Further
reliance is placed on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal7; and Inder
Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal8, submitting that criminal
prosecution should not be used as an instrument of harassment, or
for seeking personal vendetta with an ulterior motive of pressurizing
the accused. Further, placing reliance on Motibhai Fulabhai Patel
& Co. v. R. Prasad9; Dilip Kumar Sharma v. State of M.P.10;
and Tolaram Relumal v. State of Bombay11, it is submitted that
since penal statutes have to be construed and interpreted strictly,
section 387 IPC is an aggravated form of extortion and cannot be
stretched to cover mere threats, without any delivery of property
or valuable security.

POSITION OF LAW
8. Before adverting to the facts of the present case, it is imperative to
acknowledge that IPC provides for offences, their ingredients, and
their distinct punishments. The relevant Sections of extortion defined
in Chapter XVII of IPC are reproduced below :

6 (2007) 14 SCC 768
7 (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335
8 (2007) 12 SCC 1
9 1968 SCC OnLine SC 310
10 (1976) 1 SCC 560
11 (1954) 1 SCC 961
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 369

M/s Balaji Traders v. The State of U.P. & Anr.

“Section 383 defines Extortion: Whoever intentionally puts
any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any
other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put
in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable
security or anything signed or sealed which may be
converted into a valuable security, commits “extortion”.
Section 384 Punishment for extortion: Whoever commits
extortion shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to three years,
or with fine, or with both;
Section 385 Putting person in fear of injury in order to
commit extortion-Whoever, in order to the committing
of extortion, puts any person in fear, or attempts to put
any person in fear, of any injury, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
Section 386 Extortion by putting a person in fear of death
or grievous hurt.—Whoever commits extortion by putting
any person in fear of death or of grievous hurt to that
person or to any other, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to ten
years, and shall also be liable to fine
Section 387 Putting person in fear of death or of grievous
hurt, in order to commit extortion: Whoever, in order to
the committing of extortion, puts or attempts to put any
person in fear of death or of grievous hurt to that person
or to any other, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to seven
years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Section 388. Extortion by threat of accusation of an
offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life,
etc.—Whoever commits extortion by putting any person
in fear of an accusation against that person or any other,
of having committed or attempted to commit any offence
punishable with death, or with imprisonment for life, or with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years,
or of having attempted to induce any other person to
370 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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commit such offence, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to ten
years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if the offence
be one punishable under Section 377 of this Code, may
be punished with imprisonment for life.
Section 389. Putting person in fear or accusation of
offence, in order to commit extortion.—Whoever, in order
to the committing of extortion, puts or attempts to put any
person in fear of an accusation, against that person or
any other, of having committed, or attempted to commit,
an offence punishable with death or with imprisonment for
life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years, and
shall also be liable to fine; and, if the offence be punishable
under section 377 of this Code, may be punished with
imprisonment for life.”
(Emphasis Supplied)

9. A glance over all the Sections related to extortion would reveal a
clear distinction being carried out between the actual commission of
extortion and the process of putting a person in fear for the purpose
of committing extortion.
10. Section 383 defines extortion, the punishment therefor is given in
Section 384. Sections 386 and 388 provide for an aggravated form
of extortion. These sections deal with the actual commission of an
act of extortion, whereas Sections 385, 387 and 389 IPC seek to
punish for an act committed for the purpose of extortion even though
the act of extortion may not be complete and property not delivered.
It is in the process of committing an offence that a person is put in
fear of injury, death or grievous hurt. Section 387 IPC provides for
a stage prior to committing extortion, which is putting a person in
fear of death or grievous hurt ‘in order to commit extortion’, similar
to Section 385 IPC. Hence, Section 387 IPC is an aggravated form
of 385 IPC, not 384 IPC.
11. Having deliberated upon the offence of extortion and its forms, we
proceed to analyze the essentials of both Sections, i.e., 383 and
387 IPC, the High Court dealt with.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 371

M/s Balaji Traders v. The State of U.P. & Anr.

12. The essential ingredients of extortion under Section 383 IPC, as laid
down by this Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay12, are :
“60. …The main ingredients of the offence are:
(i) the accused must put any person in fear of injury to
that person or any other person;
(ii) the putting of a person in such fear must be intentional;
(iii) the accused must thereby induce the person so put in
fear to deliver to any person any property, valuable security
or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into
a valuable security; and
(iv) such inducement must be done dishonestly.
Before a person can be said to put any person in fear of
any injury to that person, it must appear that he has held
out some threat to do or omit to do what he is legally bound
to do in future. If all that a man does is to promise to do
a thing which he is not legally bound to do and says that
if money is not paid to him he would not do that thing,
such act would not amount to an offence of extortion. …”
13. But a perusal of Section 387 IPC reveals its essential ingredients,
to be :
(a) Accused must have put a person in fear of death or grievous hurt;
(b) Such an act must have been done in order to commit extortion;
The expression ‘in order to’ has been defined in the following ways:
“in order to” : for the purpose of13
“in order to” : with the purpose of doing14
‘in order to commit extortion’ clearly reveals that it is in the process
of committing the offence of extortion.
14. Thus, it can be said in terms of Sections 386 (an aggravated form
of 384 IPC) and 387 IPC that the former is an act in itself, whereas

12 (1986) 2 SCC 716
13 Merriam-Webster
14 Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Tenth Edition 1999
372 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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the latter is the process; it is a stage before committing an offence
of extortion. The Legislature was mindful enough to criminalize the
process by making it a distinct offence. Therefore, the commission
of an offence of extortion is not sine qua non for an offence under
this Section. It is safe to deduce that for prosecution under Section
387 IPC, the delivery of property is not necessary.
15. In Radha Ballabh v. State of U.P.15, this Court, while dealing with
a case wherein ransom was demanded for releasing the child,
observed that it could not be punishable under Section 386 IPC as no
ransom was extorted. Therefore, the conviction was correctly made
under Section 387 IPC. Similarly, in Gursharan Singh v. State of
Punjab16, the Court upheld the conviction under Section 387 IPC
where money extorted was not paid.
16. Further, in Somasundaram v. State17 a three-Judge Bench of this
Court upheld the conviction under Section 387 IPC, along with other
provisions, on the facts, where the deceased was tied with an iron
chain and rope to a cot and threatened to part with crores of rupees
or else execute the document in their favour. On his failure to do so,
the deceased was killed. Thus, even though there was no delivery
of property, the conviction was upheld by observing that Section 387
IPC is a heightened, more serious form of the offence of extortion in
which the victim is put in fear of death or grievous hurt.
17. After going through the penal provisions related to extortion, it is
also imperative to peruse the necessary principles of quashing, laid
down by this Court through various judicial pronouncements which
govern the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC.
18. This Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P.18, reiterated several principles
of quashing criminal cases/complaints/FIR as laid down, back in the
days in Bhajan Lal (supra) :
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of

15 (1995) Supp. 3 SCC 119
16 (1996) 10 SCC 190
17 (2020) 7 SCC 722
18 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 373

M/s Balaji Traders v. The State of U.P. & Anr.

decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power
under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section
482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced
above, we have given the following categories of cases by
way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised
either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not
be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid
formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of
cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are
so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which
no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
374 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there
is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.”
In Dalip Kaur v. Jagnar Singh19 -
11. There cannot furthermore be any doubt that the High
Court would exercise its inherent jurisdiction only when
one or the other propositions of law, as laid down in R.
Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta [(2009) 1 SCC 516 : (2009) 1
SCC (Cri) 567] is attracted, which are as under: (SCC p.
523, para 15)
“(1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise
its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal
proceeding and, in particular, a first information
report unless the allegations contained therein,
even if given face value and taken to be correct
in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence.
(2) For the said purpose the Court, save and
except in very exceptional circumstances, would
not look to any document relied upon by the
defence.
(3) Such a power should be exercised very
sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR
disclose commission of an offence, the Court
shall not go beyond the same and pass an order
in favour of the accused to hold absence of any
mens rea or actus reus.

19 (2009) 14 SCC 696
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 375

M/s Balaji Traders v. The State of U.P. & Anr.

(4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the
same by itself may not be a ground to hold that
the criminal proceedings should not be allowed
to continue.”
(Emphasis supplied)

A three-Judge Bench of this Court, while summarizing the principles
of quashing in Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra20, has held that the power of quashing should be
exercised sparingly with circumspection in the ‘rarest of rare cases’
and not as an ordinary rule :
“13.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly
with circumspection, in the “rarest of rare cases”. (The
rarest of rare cases standard in its application for quashing
under Section 482CrPC is not to be confused with the norm
which has been formulated in the context of the death
penalty, as explained previously by this Court.)
…
13.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception
and a rarity than an ordinary rule.
…
13.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the
alleged accused, the Court when it exercises the power
under Section 482CrPC, only has to consider whether or
not the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission
of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider
on merits whether the allegations make out a cognizable
offence or not and the Court has to permit the investigating
agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR.”

OUR VIEW
19. It is a well-settled principle of law that penal statutes must be given
strict interpretation. The Court ought not to read anything into a
statutory provision that imposes penal liability.

20 (2021) 19 SCC 401
376 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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20. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Tolaram Relumal (supra) has
observed :
“8. …and it is a well-settled rule of construction of penal
statutes that if two possible and reasonable constructions
can be put upon a penal provision, the Court must lean
towards that construction which exempts the subject from
penalty rather than the one which imposes penalty. It is
not competent for the Court to stretch the meaning of an
expression used by the Legislature in order to carry out
the intention of the Legislature. As pointed out by Lord
Macmillan in London & North Eastern Railway Co. v.
Berriman [London & North Eastern Railway Co. v. Berriman,
1946 AC 278 at p. 295 (HL)] : (AC p. 295)
“… Where penalties for infringement are imposed
it is not legitimate to stretch the language of a
rule, however, beneficent its intention, beyond
the fair and ordinary meaning of its language.”
21. In M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala21, this Court reiterated
the observations made by the Privy Council in respect of the
interpretation of penal statutes :
“10. A decision of the Judicial Committee in ‘Francis Hart
Dyke (Appellant) and Henry William Elliott, and the owners
of the steamtug or Vessel ‘Gauntlet’ [ Law Reports Privy
Council Appeals (4) 1872, p. 184] cited by the learned
counsel as an aid for construction neatly states the principle
and therefore may be extracted : Lord Justice James
speaking for the Board observes at p. 19:
“No doubt all penal Statutes are to be construed
strictly, that is to say, the Court must see that
the thing charged as an offence is within the
plain meaning of the words used, and must
not strain the words on any notion that there
has been a slip, that there has been a casus
omissus, that the thing is so clearly within the
mischief that it must have been intended to be

21 1962 SCC OnLine SC 85
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 377

M/s Balaji Traders v. The State of U.P. & Anr.

included if thought of. On the other hand, the
person charged has a right to say that the thing
charged although within the words, is not within
the spirit of the enactment. But where the thing
is brought within the words and within the spirit,
there a penal enactment is to be construed,
like any other instrument, according to the fair
common sense meaning of the language used,
and the Court is not to find or make any doubt
or ambiguity in the language of a penal statute,
where such doubt or ambiguity would clearly
not be found or made in the same language in
any other instrument.”
22. A three-Judge Bench of this Court has also observed in Dilip Kumar
Sharma (supra) that a penal provision must be strictly construed;
that is to say, in the absence of clear, compelling language, the
provision should not be given a wider interpretation.
23. This Court in R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta22, while discussing the
strict interpretation of penal statutes has held :
“37. Maxwell in The Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn.)
says:
“The strict construction of penal statutes seems
to manifest itself in four ways: in the requirement
of express language for the creation of an
offence; in interpreting strictly words setting
out the elements of an offence; in requiring the
fulfilment to the letter of statutory conditions
precedent to the infliction of punishment; and
in insisting on the strict observance of technical
provisions concerning criminal procedure and
jurisdiction.”
38. In Craies Statute Law (7th Edn. at p. 529) it is said
that penal statutes must be construed strictly. At p. 530
of the said treatise, referring to U.S. v. Wiltberger [5 L Ed
37 : 18 US (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820)] it is observed, thus:

22 (2009) 1 SCC 516
378 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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“The distinction between a strict construction
and a more free one has, no doubt, in modern
times almost disappeared, and the question now
is, what is the true construction of the statute?
I should say that in a criminal statute you must
be quite sure that the offence charged is within
the letter of the law. This rule is said to be
founded on the tenderness of the law for the
rights of individuals, and on the plain principle
that the power of punishment is vested in the
Legislature, and not in the judicial department,
for it is the Legislature, not the Court, which is
to define a crime and ordain its punishment.”
24. The scope of the provision cannot be extended by reading into it
words which are not there. Section 387 IPC, being a penal provision,
has to be strictly interpreted, and no condition/essential ingredient
can be read into it that the Statute/Section does not prescribe.
Since there is no ambiguity in the ingredients of Section 387 IPC,
the observations of Tolaram Relumal (supra) as contended by the
learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.2 would not come
to his rescue.
25. The reasoning adopted by the High Court is, on the face of it, flawed
and misplaced. When the Legislature has created two separate
offences with distinct ingredients and punishments, then assigning
the essential ingredient of one to another is not a correct approach
adopted by the High Court. Nowhere does the Section say that
extortion has to be committed while putting a person in fear of death
or grievous hurt. Instead, it is the other way around, that is to say,
putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt to commit extortion.
Extortion is not yet committed; it is in the process of committing it
that a person is put in fear. Putting a person in fear would make
an accused guilty of an offence under Section 387 IPC; it need not
satisfy all the ingredients of extortion provided under Section 383
IPC. The High Court ought not to have relied on Dhananjay (supra)
as that case, on the face of it, is clearly distinguishable on facts, the
reason being it dealt with allegations of 384 IPC not 387 IPC, and
discussed the elements of extortion.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 379

M/s Balaji Traders v. The State of U.P. & Anr.

26. Without going into the merits of the case, we are of the view that the
instant case is not fit for quashing as the two essential ingredients
for prosecution under Section 387 IPC, as discussed supra have
been prima facie disclosed in the complaint, (a) that the complainant
has been put in fear of death by pointing a gun towards him; and
(b) that it was done to pressurize him to deliver Rs.5 lakhs. The
High Court, while quashing, has wrongly emphasized the fact that
the said amount was not delivered; it failed to consider whether the
money/property was delivered or not, is not even necessary as the
accused is not charged with Section 384 IPC. The allegations of
putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt would itself make
him liable to be prosecuted under Section 387 IPC. The natural
corollary thereof is that the allegation of the criminal case being a
counterblast is negated.
27. With the aforesaid observations, the appeal is accordingly allowed.
The impugned order dated 28th June, 2024 is set aside, and the
proceedings emanating from Complaint Case No.58 of 2022 are
restored to the file of the Trial Court. Parties are directed to appear
before the Trial Court on 12th August, 2025. Parties are further directed
to fully cooperate and the hearing is expedited.
Pending application(s), if any, are disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan