MAHARASHTRA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATIONversusMAHADEO KRISHNA NAIK
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 218
- Decided
- 13 February 2025
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- DIPANKAR DATTA
Holding
The corporation committed suggestio falsi and suppresio veri, the High Court's review jurisdiction was proper, and the appropriate relief is 75% back wages plus full terminal benefits and interest.
Summary
Mahadeo Krishna Naik, a bus driver for Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (MSRTC), was dismissed after a fatal accident in 1996. The Labour Court upheld his dismissal, but the corporation later obtained a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT) award that placed sole blame on the lorry driver, a fact it failed to disclose in the disciplinary proceedings. The High Court, on review, held that MSRTC committed suggestio falsi and suppresio veri by suppressing the MACT award, and allowed a petition for back wages. The Supreme Court affirmed the corporation's misconduct, upheld the High Court's review jurisdiction, and modified the back‑wages award to 75% of the amount due, along with full terminal benefits and interest. The appeal by MSRTC was disposed of, confirming the relief to the respondent.
Issues considered
- Whether the corporation is guilty of suggestio falsi by not disclosing its pleadings before the MACT and of suppresio veri by suppressing the MACT award.
- Whether the single judge of the High Court was justified in exercising review jurisdiction over the Labour Court and writ court orders.
- Whether the High Court should have interfered with the direction for payment of full back wages to the respondent.
- What is the appropriate quantum of relief, including back wages and terminal benefits, to be awarded to the respondent.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 114
- Constitution of India
- Evidence Act, 1872s. 106, s. 17-B
- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 11-A, s. 17-B
- Motor Vehicles Act, 1988s. 140, s. 166
Subjects
Judgment
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 100 : 2025 INSC 218
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation
v.
Mahadeo Krishna Naik
(Civil Appeal No. 13834 of 2024)
14 February 2025
[Dipankar Datta* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the appellant-Corporation is guilty of suggestio falsi by not
disclosing what it had pleaded before the MACT and suppresio veri
by suppressing the award; whether the High Court was justified in
exercising review jurisdiction; and whether the respondent is entitled
to back wages for the period for which he remained out of service.
Headnotes†
Service law – Removal from service – Suggestio falsi and
suppresio veri – Relevance of proceedings of the MACT in
proceedings before the labour court – Respondent working as
bus driver with the appellant-Corporation – Lorry coming from
the opposite direction collided with a bus of the Corporation,
driven by respondent, resulting in a fatal accident – Disciplinary
action against respondent and was dismissed from service –
Dismissal upheld by the Labour court – Writ petition by the
respondent – Dismissed by the High Court – During pendency,
proceedings for compensation initiated by victims of the
accident before the MACT wherein Corporation took a contrary
stand that the lorry driver was responsible for the accident
and the tribunal awarded compensation – On basis thereof, the
respondent applied for review before the High Court – Review
proceeding allowed and directed payment of back wages to
the respondent – Correctness:
Held: Corporation indulged in the misadventure of suggestio falsi
and suppressio veri – Before the Labour Court, the Corporation
established that inquiry conducted against the respondent, was fair,
and the conclusion was arrived at upon due consideration of the
materials on record – Having regard to the clear and specific stand
* Author
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 101
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v.
Mahadeo Krishna Naik
taken before the MACT in its written statement, the Corporation did
make a false representation before the Labour Court amounting
to suggestio falsi – Having not disclosed before the Labour
Court the outcome of the proceedings before the MACT, the
Corporation also guilty of suppresio veri – Relevance of the MACT
judgment and its probative value cannot be gainsaid – In industrial
adjudication, principles of natural justice have to be complied
with – Corporation has been far from fair in its dealings with the
respondent – Corporation did not deliberately refer to the award of
the MACT at two different tiers, and thereby actively suppressed
relevant material from court of law – Contradictory nature of the
stances taken by Corporation, reeks of the Corporation trying
to approbate and reprobate on the same issue – Corporation’s
non-disclosure is suppression of such high magnitude, akin to a
clear fraud on court – Written statement of the Corporation and
its award are documents of immense significance which were
sufficient to tilt the balance in favour of the respondent – Objection
of the Corporation to the Single Judge receiving such document
as evidence in course of exercise of review jurisdiction without
any substance and merits outright rejection – As regards payment
of back wages, the respondent admitted that he was engaged on
a daily wage basis, and because his service was terminated, he
could not find a permanent employment elsewhere – No material
on record to disbelieve him – Also clear that the Corporation
succeeded in getting rid of the respondent by indulging in the
misadventure of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi – Thus, in
the interest of justice the order of the Single Judge awarding
100% back wages modified and respondent awarded 75% of the
back wages from the date of his termination till the date of his
superannuation – Also entitled to full terminal benefits, along with
interest @ 6% p.a. [Paras 24-29, 30-33, 35, 36, 43-49]
Service law – Termination of service – Payment of back
wages, when:
Held: Ordering back wages to be paid to a dismissed employee,
upon his dismissal being set aside by a court of law, is not an
automatic relief – Grant of full or partial back wages has to be
preceded by a fact-finding exercise by the industrial adjudicator/
court to ascertain whether in the interregnum the employee
was gainfully employed – If the employee admits of any gainful
employment and gives particulars of the employment together with
102 [2025] 3 S.C.R.
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details of the emoluments received, or, if the employee asserts
by pleading that he was not gainfully employed but the employer
pleads and proves otherwise to the satisfaction of the court, the
quantum of back wages ought to be awarded on reinstatement is
really in the realm of discretion of the court – While grant of full
back wages is the normal rule, an exceptional case with sufficient
proof has to be set up by the employer to escape the burden of
bearing back wages. [Paras 43, 44]
Maxims – Suggestio falsi and suppresio veri – Meaning of:
Held: Phrases suggestio falsi and suppresio veri embody concepts
of unethical conduct of a party having serious consequences in
various fields including law – Suggestio falsi is a false representation
or a misleading suggestion while suppresio veri connotes
suppression of the truth; an indirect lie, whether by words, conduct,
or artifice – It is a type of fraud. [Paras 23, 24]
Case Law Cited
Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority [2014] 13 SCR
895 : 2015 (3) SCC 49; T.N. State Transport Corpn. (Coimbatore)
Ltd. v. M. Chandrasekaran [2016] 4 SCR 266 : (2016) 16 SCC 16;
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Phool Chand
[2018] 11 SCR 448 : (2018) 18 SCC 229; Deepali Gundu Surwase
v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyala [2013] 9 SCR 1: (2013)
10 SCC 324; State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan [2011]
11 SCR 678 : (2011) 7 SCC 639; Union of India v. N. Murugesan
[2021] 10 SCR 253 : (2022) 2 SCC 25; Hindustan Tin Works (P)
Ltd. v. Employees [1979] 1 SCR 563 : (1979) 2 SCC 80; Surendra
Kumar Verma v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court
[1981] 1 SCR 789 : (1980) 4 SCC 443 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited
Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Edition – referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Evidence Act,
1872; Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Code of Civil Procedure,
1908.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 103
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v.
Mahadeo Krishna Naik
List of Keywords
Removal from service; Back wages; Industrial dispute; Industrial
adjudication; Suggestio falsi; Supressio veri; Dismissal due to
gross negligence; Superannuation; Probative value; Fairness in
procedure; Principles of natural justice; Suppression of evidence;
Contradictory stances of a party; Fraud on court; Full terminal
benefits; Lumpsum compensation to employee; Compensation;
‘He who asserts must prove’; Special knowledge; Reinstatement;
Positive evidence of negative fact; Employment in the interregnum;
Automatic relief of back wages; Review jurisdiction; Daily wage
basis; 100% back wages; Award of 75% back wages; Full terminal
benefits; Suggestio falsi and suppresio veri; Fraud.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13834 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.11.2018 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in RP No. 18 of 2018
Appearances for Parties
Ms. Mayuri Raghuvanshi, Vyom Raghuvanshi, Ms. Akanksha
Rathore, Ms. Kinjal Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
Parvin Waman Satale, Rishabh Jain, S. K. Sarkar, Rajiv Shankar
Dvivedi, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Dipankar Datta J.
The Appeal
1. This appeal by the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation,1
by special leave, is directed against the judgment and order dated
30th November 20182 of Hon’ble S.C. Gupte, J.3 of the High Court
1 Corporation
2 impugned order
3 single judge
104 [2025] 3 S.C.R.
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of Bombay4 allowing a petition for review5 of his earlier order dated
7th February 2017 of dismissal of a writ petition6 instituted by the
respondent. 7 The single judge not only set aside the order of
dismissal of the writ petition passed by him but also set aside the
award passed against Mahadeo by the 4th Labour Court at Mumbai.8
While so reviewing, the single judge also directed the Corporation to
pay all benefits and emoluments including back wages to Mahadeo.
2. The Corporation has taken exception to the impugned order and
contends that the High Court erred in interfering with the decisions
of the Writ Court and the Labour Court in its review jurisdiction.
Factual Matrix
3. The facts emerging from a perusal of the records would reflect that
Mahadeo was appointed by the Corporation as a bus driver on 19th
April, 1988. The incident which formed the genesis of the present
proceedings occurred on 10th May 1996. A lorry coming from the
opposite direction collided at about 22.45 hours with a bus of the
Corporation, driven by Mahadeo, resulting in a fatal accident. Two
passengers travelling on the bus succumbed to their injuries while
several others (around ten) suffered injuries. The monetary loss to the
Corporation arising from the accident was calculated at Rs. 45,000/.
4. As a consequence of this accident, disciplinary action followed against
Mahadeo. Consequent upon an inquiry, the Divisional Traffic Officer9
dismissed Mahadeo from service of the Corporation on 27th May,
1997. Aggrieved by his dismissal, Mahadeo preferred a departmental
appeal which proved abortive. The Union of which Mahadeo was
a member, thereafter, raised an industrial dispute. A reference was
made by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour requiring the Labour
Court The Labour Court, upon considering the evidence led and
hearing the parties to the dispute, held that the inquiry conducted
4 High Court
5 Review Petition No. 18 of 2018
6 Writ Petition No. 154 of 2007
7 Mahadeo
8 Labour Court
9 disciplinary authority
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 105
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v.
Mahadeo Krishna Naik
was fair;10 the findings of the inquiry officer were not perverse;11 and
the punishment inflicted was in proportion to the misconduct proved;
therefore Mahadeo was not entitled to reinstatement in service.
Resting on these findings, the Labour Court answered the reference
by holding that Mahadeo was not entitled to any relief.12
5. Crestfallen, Mahadeo invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court
by applying under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.13 The single
judge dismissed the challenge observing that there was enough
material before the Labour Court to support the findings of the Inquiry
Officer and hence, no interference was warranted.
6. While the reference and then the writ petition was pending,
proceedings for compensation had been initiated by the family
members of the deceased and injured victims of the road accident
under the Motor Vehicles Act, 198814 before the Motor Accidents
Claims Tribunal at Mumbai.15 Mahadeo, after becoming aware of
the proceedings before the MACT, more particularly the contrary
stand taken by the Corporation where the entire blame for the fatal
accident was laid on the feet of the lorry driver as well as the award
of the MACT dated 9th July, 2004,16 applied for review before the
High Court17. The review proceeding succeeded before the High
Court, triggering this appeal.
Impugned Order
7. The single judge, in review, noticed the stand taken by the Corporation
before the MACT that the accident was entirely due to the negligence
of the lorry driver, who was driving carelessly without observing
traffic norms. It was stated before the MACT that the driver of the
lorry drove it into the Corporation’s bus and that no fault could have
at all been attributed to Mahadeo for the accident. Furthermore, in
its defence, the Corporation led evidence before the MACT of the
10 vide preliminary award dated 26th May, 2004
11 vide preliminary award dated 9th December, 2005
12 vide final award dated 16th May, 2006
13 W.P. 154 of 2007
14 the 1988 Act
15 MACT
16 the said award
17 Review Petition No.18 of 2018
106 [2025] 3 S.C.R.
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conductor of the bus and a passenger who emphatically stated
that the lorry driver was completely at fault for the accident. The
single judge noticed the fact that the proceeding before the MACT
culminated into an award for compensation in favour of the claimants
therein, where the MACT recognising the fact that the lorry driver
was at fault, did not affix any liability on the Corporation. Based on
the pleadings and the evidence presented by the Corporation, the
MACT categorically held that the accident took place because of the
negligence of the lorry driver.
8. It became clear to the single judge that such relevant evidence was
suppressed before the Labour Court. This material, in the opinion of
the single judge, had a crucial and conclusive bearing on the case
before the Labour Court.
9. The single judge relied on a decision of this Court reported in
Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority,18 where it was
held that disregard of a vital piece of evidence is one of the factors
to be considered while examining whether an order is perverse. The
single judge further held that if the material produced before the
MACT had been produced before it, the Labour Court would have
reached a diametrically opposite conclusion than the one it reached
in the present case.
10. The Corporation contended that a conclusion reached by a claims
tribunal under the 1988 Act is not binding on the Labour Court, with
which the single judge agreed. However, the single judge held that
the Corporation had admitted in a sworn pleading that the accident
was not due to the negligence of Mahadeo. This newly produced
material, which existed when the Labour Court made its award and
the order dismissing the writ petition was made, could not be produced
by Mahadeo, yet, it was of such a clinching nature that on the face
of this material, no court could come to the conclusion that Mahadeo
was rightly dismissed from service due to gross negligence on his
part amounting to misconduct.
11. Mahadeo pleaded his inability to produce this material before as he
only became aware of the proceedings before the MACT in June, 2017
and received the certified copies of the materials by 23rd June 2017.
18 2015 (3) SCC 49
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 107
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v.
Mahadeo Krishna Naik
This was neither challenged by the Corporation before the single
judge nor was it shown that Mahadeo, despite being aware of the
proceedings before the MACT, went into slumber.
12. Hence, recording satisfaction that a case for review had been set up,
the single judge proceeded to observe that no useful purpose would be
served by remanding the matter to the Labour Court as the materials
spoke for themselves and no case of negligence could be made out
against Mahadeo by the Corporation. Consequently, the Corporation
suffered an order for payment of all benefits and emoluments including
back wages on the basis of continuous service of Mahadeo from
the date of his wrongful termination till his superannuation. Since
Mahadeo had attained the age of superannuation, reinstatement
was denied.
13. The writ petition, thus, stood allowed on review of the earlier order
of dismissal.
Contentions of the Parties
14. On behalf of the Corporation, exception is taken to the impugned
order on the following grounds:
(i) Mahadeo was a trained driver who was responsible for the
safety of the passengers travelling in the bus. It is a fact that
there was extensive damage to the bus and its passengers
by the lorry and even though Mahadeo might have swerved
to avoid the collision, there was a massive impact on account
of the high speed of the bus. To bolster this submission, the
Corporation relied on a decision of this Court in T.N. State
Transport Corpn. (Coimbatore) Ltd. v. M. Chandrasekaran19
where it was held that the injuries caused to the passengers
and the nature of impact raises an inference that the bus was
being driven negligently by the bus driver.
(ii) The proceedings before the MACT and the disciplinary
proceedings stand on completely different footing. The
disciplinary proceedings were aimed at examining the role
of Mahadeo in the collision, whereas the MACT proceedings
aimed to determine the negligence of the drivers involved in
the collision.
19 (2016) 16 SCC 16
108 [2025] 3 S.C.R.
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(iii) Judicial review is limited to analysis of the decision-making
process and the High Court could not have ventured into the
correctness of the decision itself. Once it has been established
that no ground for review was made out on the aspects of
fairness and propriety of the inquiry, the High Court should not
have interfered with the decision of the Labour Court.
(iv) The single judge has substituted its view in the place of the
competent authority and erred in not remanding the matter to
the Labour Court.
(v) Full back wages have been awarded to Mahadeo without any
evidence that he was not gainfully employed during the period
from his termination to his superannuation. The single judge
erred in ignoring the fact that Mahadeo had a blemished service
record, and several punishments had been meted out to him
during his short service period. Reliance has been placed on
the decision Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation,
Jaipur v. Phool Chand 20 to contend that it is settled law that
back wages are not automatic even if termination is set aside;
hence, the single judge erred in not supplying reasons for award
of full backwages.
15. Mahadeo, supporting the impugned order, advanced the following
arguments:
(i) The Corporation has indulged in committing fraud on the Court,
by not disclosing the fate of the judicial proceedings before
the MACT and the pleadings filed therein, to obtain favourable
orders.
(ii) Mahadeo has been fighting this legal battle since 1997 and due
to dismissal from service, he has been unable to find any other
permanent employment as a driver. He has been victimised by
the Corporation and has suffered irreparable financial loss due
to its condemnable actions.
(iii) The impugned order of the single judge granting relief is justified
having regard to the decision of this Court in Deepali Gundu
20 (2018) 18 SCC 229
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 109
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v.
Mahadeo Krishna Naik
Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyala,21 where
this Court has held that if an employee is terminated on the
basis on frivolous allegations in violation of natural justice, that
in itself will be ample justification to award full backwages.
Issues
16. To our mind, the present controversy tasks us to address four issues.
The first is whether, the Corporation is guilty of suggestio falsi by
not disclosing what it had pleaded before the MACT and suppresio
veri by suppressing the said award. Depending on an affirmative
answer to the first issue, the second issue would be whether, on
facts and in the circumstances, the single judge was justified in
exercising review jurisdiction. Again, an affirmative answer to the
second issue would require serious consideration as to whether
any interference with the direction for payment of full back wages
is called for or not. Fourthly and finally, subject to our answers to all
the three issues, what would be the appropriate relief for Mahadeo
needs to be considered.
Written Statement of the Corporation before the Mact
17. To answer the above issues, we need to appreciate what was
the nature of claim before the MACT, what precisely was the
defence raised by the Corporation to avoid liability for payment of
compensation, and what was the outcome of such proceedings.
18. The road accident taking the lives of two young children and causing
injury to several others had given rise to a First Information Report.22
Mahadeo was not named as an accused therein. The driver of the
lorry, involved in such accident, was the sole accused in the FIR.
This fact was known to the Corporation from day one of the accident.
The parents of Nitin Vardekar,23 a deceased passenger aged 17
years, had approached the MACT with a claim for compensation24
under section 166 of the 1988 Act, impleading the Corporation,25 the
21 (2013) 10 SCC 324
22 FIR
23 claimants
24 Application No. 2901/1996
25 OP - 1
110 [2025] 3 S.C.R.
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owner of the lorry26 and the insurer of the lorry27 as opposite parties.
19. To contest the claim of the claimants, the Divisional Controller of the
Mumbai Division of the Corporation, Kurla, Mumbai filed the written
statement, on solemn affirmation, for consideration of the MACT.
Relevant passages from the said written statement read as follows:
“4. …..It is true that when the said S.T. Bus reached at
Pen Phata on Mumbai Goa Highway at Nagothane at
about 22:45 hrs on 10.05.1996 at that time one M/Lorry
bearing Registration no. MRL 8226 came from the opposite
direction in a very fast speed and in rash and negligent
manner and gave heavy dash to the driver side of the S.T.
Bus. It is also true that due to the said impact, the right side
of the S.T. was cut off and the deceased who was sitting
on the right side in the said S.T. Bus sustained injuries.
5. With reference to para 22(ii) of the application, this and
by the correct side of the road (sic). The said S.T. Bus
was fully under the control of the Bus Driver of this Opp.
Party. When the said S.T. Bus came near Pen Phata, at
Nagothane, at that time one M/Lorry bearing registration
no. MRL8226 which was being driven by the driver of the
Opp. Party No. 2, at a fast speed, rashly, negligently and
without any care, caution and proper lookout from the
opposite direction of the S.T. Bus, could not control his
vehicle, came on the wrong side of the road and dashed
against the bus very heavily. The impact was so heavy
that the right portion of the S.T. Bus from the driver’s side
was tore and the passenger i.e. the deceased sustained
injuries. The S.T. Bus driver, on seeing the M/Lorry coming
towards the bus, tried to save his vehicle to his left side
to avoid the accident. However, as the driver of the Opp.
Party No.2 came abruptly in front of the bus in a rash and
negligent manner, it came in contact of the right side of the
S.T. sustained injuries and was removed to the hospital.
It will this be observed that there was no negligence
whatsoever on the part of the S.T. Bus driver, but it was
26 OP - 2
27 OP - 3
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 111
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v.
Mahadeo Krishna Naik
sheer negligence on the part of the driver of the Opp. Party
No. 2 who drove his M/lorry rashly, carelessly and Opp.
Party denies that the accident is of such a nature that it
would not have taken place but for the gross negligence
and rashness of the driver of this Opp. Party and puts
the applicants to the strict proof thereof. This Opp. Party
further denies that the driver of the S.T. Bus was rash
and negligent while driving the same in as much as he
drove the said vehicle at a high, excessive and improper
speed or that he drove the said S.T. Bus without taking
precautions and/or keeping proper lookout or watch for
the traffic and puts the applicant to the strict proof thereof.
This opp. Party further denies that the driver of the S.T.
Bus failed and neglected to apply the breaks and/or failed
to apply the breaks efficiently and/or in sufficient time to
avoid the accident or neglected to manoeuvre the vehicle
so as to avoid the accident and puts the applicant to the
strict proof thereof.”
(emphasis supplied)
Award of the Mact
20. MACT, Mumbai, considering the claim raised by the claimants and
the defence of the Corporation recorded the evidence of, inter alia,
a passenger named Anant Chindarkar28 and the conductor of the
Corporation’s bus named Chandrakant Lokhe,29 respectively. On
the basis of appreciation of the materials on record, the MACT
proceeded to deliver the said award. We consider it appropriate to
extract relevant passages from the said award hereinbelow:
“2. …Applicant Nos.1 and 2 are father and mother
respectively of the deceased Nitin. On 10.5.1996 the
deceased was travelling by S.T. Bus No.MH-12-Q-8712.
It was going along Mumbai Goa Highway. At about 10.45
p.m., it reached at Nagothane. At that time, one Motor
Lorry No.MRL-8226 came from the front side in very fast
28 P.W. 2
29 D.W. 1
112 [2025] 3 S.C.R.
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speed and gave dash to the said S.T. Bus at its’s driver’s
side. Therefore, right side of S.T. Bus was cut off. The
deceased was seriously injured and died on the spot.
****
3. Opposite party No.1 M.S.R.T.C. filed written statement
Exhibit-8. It’s case is that: The said Motor lorry came on
wrong side of the road and dashed the S.T. Bus heavily.
The accident occurred due to sole negligence of the driver
of the said lorry.
****
ISSUES FINDINGS
1) Whether the Applicants prove that Yes
the accident took place due to rash
and negligent driving of vehicle
No.MRL-8226?
2) Whether the Applicants prove that Yes
the deceased died in the said
accident?
Whether the Applicants prove that Yes,
they are entitled to compensation as
alleged? Rs.1,40,000/-
****
8. Applicants examined one Anant Chindarkar as P.W.2
as an eye witness. P.W.2 stated that: On 10.5.1996 he
was accompanying the deceased in the said S.T. Bus.
Deceased was sitting on seat No.25. Near Pen fatta, one
lorry came from front side and gave dash to the S.T. Bus.
That lorry was in great speed. It hit S.T. Bus as it’s middle
portion of the right side. Therefore right side of the S.T.
Bus was torn. The deceased got injuries on his head and
chest. He became unconscious. Police came on the spot
after about 15 to 20 minutes and removed the deceased
to Nagothane Rural Hospital by one private car. P.W.2 and
his friends also went to that hospital. Doctor examined the
deceased and declared him dead. Number of that S.T.
Bus is MH-12-Q-8712. Number of that lorry is MRL-8226.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 113
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v.
Mahadeo Krishna Naik
****
10. Opposite party No.1 M.S.R.T.C. examined one
Chandrakant Lokhe as D.W.1. He stated that on 10.5.1996
he was conductor of the said S.T. Bus. Accident happened
near Nagothane Fatta at about 10.45 p.m. Speed of S.T.
Bus was about 30 K.M.P.H. There was vehicular traffic on
the road. The S.T. Bus was on the left side of the road.
The said lorry came from front side in great speed and
gave dash to middle portion of right side of S.T. Bus. The
accident happened because lorry came to wrong side of
the road. Body of S.T. Bus was torn. The lorry went further
ahead and then overturned. The S.T. Bus was stopped
immediately after the accident. Lorry driver was responsible
for the accident.
****
13. …Spot panchnama Exhibit-23 further shows that: The
said truck No. MRL 8226 after giving dash to the S.T. Bus
went towards western side of the road. Then it hit and
uprooted six stones on the kacha road. Thereafter, it went
below the road and dashed one tree. It was standing there
facing towards the road. Trucks body is of iron. Upper
side of truck’s cabin was broken and was lying near it. It
stopped about 115 feet away from the place of accident.
Driver’s side body of the truck was seen damaged.
****
16. P.W.2 Anant Chindarkar was one of the passengers
in the said S.T. Bus. That fact is not disputed by the other
side. D.W.1 Chandrakant Lokhe was the conductor of the
said S.T. Bus. It is also not disputed. P.W.2 and D.W.1
were, therefore, supposed to have personal knowledge
and experience of the circumstances in which the accident
occurred. Both of them blamed driver of the said lorry for
the occurrence.
****
20. For the aforesaid reasons I find that the accident took
place because of rash and negligent driving of the said
114 [2025] 3 S.C.R.
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truck No.MRL-8226. Issue No.1 is, therefore, answered
affirmatively.
****
25. Consequently, the applicants are entitled to get total
compensation of Rs.1,40,000/- (Rs.1,30,000 + Rs.10,000).
Admittedly: Deceased died in the accident in question. The
said motor lorry was involved in it. It was insured with the
New India Assurance Co. Ltd., on the date of the accident.
The Opposite party No.2, Ramesh Suryawanshi is owner
of the said lorry. Therefore, I find that Opposite Party No.2
and Insurer are liable to pay aforesaid compensation of
Rs.1,40,000/- to the applicants. Issue No.3 is answered
accordingly.
****
27. Hence, the following order:
ORDER
Application is partly allowed with proportionate costs.
Opposite party No.2 Ramesh Suryawanshi and the Insurer
the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Both are ordered to
pay jointly and severally Rs.1,40,000 (Rupees One Lakh
Forty Thousand Only) to the applicants alongwith interest
at the rate of 6% p.a. From the date of the filing of the
application i.e. 27.8.1996 till payment.
It is inclusive of payment under sec.140 of Motor Vehicles
Act by way of No-Fault Liability.
The case against Opposite party No.1, M.S.R.T.C. is
dismissed.”
(emphasis supplied)
Analysis and Reasons
21. We now proceed to address each of the first three issues, in seriatim,
with the answer to the fourth and final issue being made part of the
answer to the third issue.
22. The Latin phrases suggestio falsi and suppresio veri embody concepts
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 115
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v.
Mahadeo Krishna Naik
of unethical conduct of a party having serious consequences in
various fields including law.
23. According to Black’s Law Dictionary,30 suggestio falsi is a false
representation or a misleading suggestion while suppresio veri
connotes suppression of the truth; an indirect lie, whether by words,
conduct, or artifice. It is a type of fraud.
24. That the Corporation indulged in the misadventure of suggestio falsi
and suppresio veri is incontrovertible.
25. Before the Labour Court, the Corporation did not leave any stone
unturned to establish that not only was the inquiry conducted against
Mahadeo fair, but the conclusion arrived at in course of such inquiry
that Mahadeo was guilty of misconduct in rashly and negligently
driving the bus of the Corporation leading to loss suffered by it was
established upon due consideration of the materials on record. Having
regard to the clear and specific stand taken before the MACT in its
written statement, which has been quoted above, the Corporation
did make a false representation before the Labour Court amounting
to suggestio falsi. Also, having not disclosed before the Labour
Court the outcome of the proceedings before the MACT, a fortiori,
that it had not been found liable to pay any compensation to the
passengers who either died and were injured based on what the
version in the written statement was and the argument advanced
on its behalf to absolve itself of any liability, the Corporation is also
guilty of suppresio veri.
26. The conduct of the Corporation when Mahadeo was struggling to find
a foothold before the single judge in view of the contours of judicial
scrutiny of awards of industrial adjudicators cannot also escape notice.
Perhaps, the Corporation thought that the proceedings before the
MACT not having been brought to the notice of the Labour Court
by Mahadeo previously, he was blissfully ignorant of the same and,
therefore, the Corporation would steal a march over him by not
making the appropriate disclosure. The Corporation was caught
off-guard when Mahadeo produced the written statement and the
award of the MACT before the single judge in his review petition.
27. The relevance of the MACT judgment and its probative value to
30 11th Edition
116 [2025] 3 S.C.R.
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the case at hand cannot be gainsaid. To be relevant, a piece of
evidence relied on by a party must be shown to have some logical
connection to the case and its admission would be necessary to prove
or disprove a fact. Once the evidence is found to be relevant and is
admitted arises the question of its probative value. Probative value,
as is well-known, refers to the weight or persuasive power of the
evidence. It is not always necessary that a piece of evidence found
relevant to a case would still demand significant probative value. An
assessment has to be made by the court as to how convincing or
persuasive the evidence is and how effective it would be to prove
or disprove a fact.
28. We are conscious that the law of evidence per se does not apply to
industrial adjudication. Nevertheless, the general principles do apply.
In any event, in industrial adjudication, principles of natural justice
have to be complied with. Fairness in procedure has developed as
the third limb of natural justice. The manner in which the Corporation
conducted itself before the Labour Court does not behove a creature
of a statute. It has been far from fair in its dealings with Mahadeo.
29. The Corporation did not deliberately refer to the award of the MACT
at two different tiers, and thereby actively suppressed relevant
material from a court of law. We do not propose to enter the arena
of controversy as to whether the award of the MACT is binding on
the Labour Court. However, the Corporation could not have at any
rate resiled from what it pleaded in its own written statement before
the MACT on a sworn affidavit and deliberately withhold the same.
This Court has always taken a serious view against suppression
of evidence in a judicial proceeding. In State of M.P. v. Narmada
Bachao Andolan,31 a three-Judge bench of this Court observed:
“164. It is a settled proposition of law that a false statement
made in the court or in the pleadings, intentionally to
mislead the court and obtain a favourable order, amounts to
criminal contempt, as it tends to impede the administration
of justice. It adversely affects the interest of the public in
the administration of justice. Every party is under a legal
obligation to make truthful statements before the court, for
the reason that causing an obstruction in the due course
31 (2011) 7 SCC 639
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 117
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v.
Mahadeo Krishna Naik
of justice ‘undermines and obstructs the very flow of the
unsoiled stream of justice, which has to be kept clear and
pure, and no one can be permitted to take liberties with it
by soiling its purity’.”
30. Even if we keep the award of the MACT aside, it is clear from the
pleadings of the Corporation before the MACT and the Labour Court
that the Corporation has attempted to get the best of both worlds.
The contradictory nature of the stances taken by the Corporation
before the Labour Court and the MACT reeks of the Corporation
trying to approbate and reprobate on the same issue. It is bound to
cause immense prejudice to Mahadeo if the Corporation is allowed
to reverse its stance to suit its own interests. This Court in Union
of India v. N. Murugesan32 while holding that it will be inequitable
and unfair if a party is allowed to challenge a position while enjoying
its fruits, ruled:
“26. These phrases are borrowed from the Scots law. They
would only mean that no party can be allowed to accept
and reject the same thing, and thus one cannot blow hot
and cold. The principle behind the doctrine of election is
inbuilt in the concept of approbate and reprobate. Once
again, it is a principle of equity coming under the contours
of common law. Therefore, he who knows that if he objects
to an instrument, he will not get the benefit he wants
cannot be allowed to do so while enjoying the fruits. One
cannot take advantage of one part while rejecting the
rest. A person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an
instrument while questioning the same. Such a party either
has to affirm or disaffirm the transaction. This principle
has to be applied with more vigour as a common law
principle, if such a party actually enjoys the one part fully
and on near completion of the said enjoyment, thereafter
questions the other part. An element of fair play is inbuilt
in this principle.”
(emphasis supplied)
31. The Corporation, without an iota of doubt, being in the dominant
32 (2022) 2 SCC 25
118 [2025] 3 S.C.R.
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position has attempted and achieved success in stealing a march
over Mahadeo by indulging in suggestio falsi and suppressio veri.
The actions of the Corporation have resulted in Mahadeo being
robbed of a stable livelihood and has caused irreparable harm to
him. It would not behove any court, much less this Court, to allow
such free reign to a party. Omission, neglect and/or failure – whatever
be the cause - the Corporation’s non-disclosure of what its stand
was before the MACT and what was ultimately held by the MACT
to the Labour Court as well as the single judge is suppression of
such high magnitude that it can safely be held to be akin to a clear
fraud on court.
32. It also appears to us that the actions of the Corporation were
motivated. The track record of Mahadeo would show that he had
been involved in 8 collisions before the collision with the lorry. Why
the Corporation did not get rid of Mahadeo before is best known to
it. However, wanting to get rid of Mahadeo, the Corporation on this
occasion found a convenient excuse in the collision and went ahead
to dismiss him in the most unfair manner.
33. The first issue is, thus, answered in the affirmative.
34. Moving on to the second issue, the same need not detain us for
long in view of our answer to the first issue.
35. Section 114 read with Order XLVII, CPC does permit the court to
look into any document, having a bearing on the lis decided earlier,
which was not on record because despite exercise of due diligence
the same could not be produced by a party. It would invariably reduce
to an examination as to whether the document has such intrinsic
worth that if the same had been produced, the outcome could have
been different.
36. The written statement of the Corporation filed before the MACT
and its award are documents of immense significance which were
sufficient to tilt the balance in favour of Mahadeo. The objection
of the Corporation to the single judge receiving such document as
evidence in course of exercise of review jurisdiction is wholly without
any substance and merits outright rejection.
37. Accordingly, the second issue too is answered in favour of Mahadeo.
38. It is now time to consider the important point of award of back wages.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 119
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v.
Mahadeo Krishna Naik
39. There is no dearth of judicial precedents on such point. While not
referring to all the precedents, we may notice only a couple of them
here.
40. Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees33 is a decision rendered
by a bench of three Judges of this Court. The following passage from
the judgment authored by Hon’ble D.A. Desai, J. (as His Lordship
then was) is instructive:
“9. It is no more open to debate that in the field of
industrial jurisprudence a declaration can be given that the
termination of service is bad and the workman continues
to be in service. The spectre of common law doctrine
that contract of personal service cannot be specifically
enforced or the doctrine of mitigation of damages does
not haunt in this branch of law. The relief of reinstatement
with continuity of service can be granted where termination
of service is found to be invalid. It would mean that the
employer has taken away illegally the right to work of
the workman contrary to the relevant law or in breach
of contract and simultaneously deprived the workman of
his earnings. If thus the employer is found to be in the
wrong as a result of which the workman is directed to be
reinstated, the employer could not shirk his responsibility
of paying the wages which the workman has been
deprived of by the illegal or invalid action of the employer.
Speaking realistically, where termination of service is
questioned as invalid or illegal and the workman has to
go through the gamut of litigation, his capacity to sustain
himself throughout the protracted litigation is itself such
an awesome factor that he may not survive to see the
day when relief is granted. More so in our system where
the law’s proverbial delay has become stupefying. If after
such a protracted time and energy consuming litigation
during which period the workman just sustains himself,
ultimately he is to be told that though he will be reinstated,
he will be denied the back wages which would be due to
him, the workman would be subjected to a sort of penalty
33 (1979) 2 SCC 80
120 [2025] 3 S.C.R.
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for no fault of his and it is wholly undeserved. Ordinarily,
therefore, a workman whose service has been illegally
terminated would be entitled to full back wages except to
the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced
idleness. That is the normal rule. Any other view would
be a premium on the unwarranted litigative activity of the
employer. If the employer terminates the service illegally
and the termination is motivated as in this case viz. to
resist the workmen’s demand for revision of wages, the
termination may well amount to unfair labour practice. In
such circumstances reinstatement being the normal rule,
it should be followed with full back wages. Articles 41 and
43 of the Constitution would assist us in reaching a just
conclusion in this respect. … “
(emphasis supplied)
41. Close on the heels of Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. (supra) came
another seminal decision on entitlement to back wages by another
three-Judge Bench in Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Govt.
Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court.34 Hon’ble O. Chinappa
Reddy, J. (as His Lordship then was) in His Lordship’s inimitable
style remarked:
“6. … Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation
of ‘bread and butter’ statutes. Welfare statutes must, of
necessity receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation
is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief,
the court is not to make inroads by making etymological
excursions. ‘Void ab initio’, ‘invalid and inoperative’ or
call it what you will, the workmen and the employer are
primarily concerned with the consequence of striking
down the order of termination of the services of the
workmen. Plain common sense dictates that the removal
of an order terminating the services of workmen must
ordinarily lead to the reinstatement of the services of the
workmen. It is as if the order has never been, and so it
must ordinarily lead to back wages too. But there may
34 (1980) 4 SCC 443
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 121
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v.
Mahadeo Krishna Naik
be exceptional circumstances which make it impossible
or wholly inequitable vis-à-vis the employer and workmen
to direct reinstatement with full back wages. For instance,
the industry might have closed down or might be in severe
financial doldrums; the workmen concerned might have
secured better or other employment elsewhere and so
on. In such situations, there is a vestige of discretion left
in the court to make appropriate consequential orders.
The court may deny the relief of reinstatement where
reinstatement is impossible because the industry has
closed down. The court may deny the relief of award of
full back wages where that would place an impossible
burden on the employer. In such and other exceptional
cases the court may mould the relief, but, ordinarily the
relief to be awarded must be reinstatement with full back
wages. That relief must be awarded where no special
impediment in the way of awarding the relief is clearly
shown. True, occasional hardship may be caused to an
employer but we must remember that, more often than
not, comparatively far greater hardship is certain to be
caused to the workmen if the relief is denied than to the
employer if the relief is granted.”
(emphasis supplied)
42. There have been decisions of this Court rendered thereafter where a
shift in approach on awarding full back wages is clearly discernible.
However, a coordinate bench of this Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase
(supra) considered a dozen precedents on award of back wages
upon reinstatement (referred to in paragraphs 13 and 14). Speaking
through Hon’ble G. S. Singhvi, J. (as His Lordship then was), the
legal position was neatly summed up in the following words:
“22. The very idea of restoring an employee to the position
which he held before dismissal or removal or termination
of service implies that the employee will be put in the
same position in which he would have been but for the
illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered
by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise
terminated from service cannot easily be measured in
terms of money. With the passing of an order which has
122 [2025] 3 S.C.R.
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the effect of severing the employer-employee relationship,
the latter’s source of income gets dried up. Not only
the employee concerned, but his entire family suffers
grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of
sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food
and all opportunities of education and advancement in life.
At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and
other acquaintance to avoid starvation. These sufferings
continue till the competent adjudicatory forum decides
on the legality of the action taken by the employer. The
reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by
a finding of the competent judicial/quasi-judicial body or
court that the action taken by the employer is ultra vires
the relevant statutory provisions or the principles of natural
justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages. If
the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee
or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits,
then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that
during the intervening period the employee was gainfully
employed and was getting the same emoluments. The
denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered
due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to
indirectly punishing the employee concerned and rewarding
the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back
wages including the emoluments.”
x x x
38. The propositions which can be culled out from the
aforementioned judgments are:
38.1. In cases of wrongful termination of service,
reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages
is the normal rule.
38.2. The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while
deciding the issue of back wages, the adjudicating authority
or the court may take into consideration the length of service
of the employee/workman, the nature of misconduct, if any,
found proved against the employee/workman, the financial
condition of the employer and similar other factors.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 123
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v.
Mahadeo Krishna Naik
38.3. Ordinarily, an employee or workman whose services
are terminated and who is desirous of getting back wages
is required to either plead or at least make a statement
before the adjudicating authority or the court of first
instance that he/she was not gainfully employed or was
employed on lesser wages. If the employer wants to avoid
payment of full back wages, then it has to plead and also
lead cogent evidence to prove that the employee/workman
was gainfully employed and was getting wages equal to
the wages he/she was drawing prior to the termination
of service. This is so because it is settled law that the
burden of proof of the existence of a particular fact lies
on the person who makes a positive averment about its
existence. It is always easier to prove a positive fact than
to prove a negative fact. Therefore, once the employee
shows that he was not employed, the onus lies on the
employer to specifically plead and prove that the employee
was gainfully employed and was getting the same or
substantially similar emoluments.
38.4. The cases in which the Labour Court/Industrial
Tribunal exercises power under Section 11-A of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and finds that even though
the enquiry held against the employee/workman is
consistent with the rules of natural justice and/or certified
standing orders, if any, but holds that the punishment
was disproportionate to the misconduct found proved,
then it will have the discretion not to award full back
wages. However, if the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal
finds that the employee or workman is not at all guilty of
any misconduct or that the employer had foisted a false
charge, then there will be ample justification for award of
full back wages.
38.5. The cases in which the competent court or tribunal
finds that the employer has acted in gross violation of the
statutory provisions and/or the principles of natural justice
or is guilty of victimising the employee or workman, then
the court or tribunal concerned will be fully justified in
directing payment of full back wages. In such cases, the
superior courts should not exercise power under Article
124 [2025] 3 S.C.R.
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226 or 136 of the Constitution and interfere with the
award passed by the Labour Court, etc. merely because
there is a possibility of forming a different opinion on the
entitlement of the employee/workman to get full back
wages or the employer’s obligation to pay the same.
The courts must always keep in view that in the cases of
wrongful/illegal termination of service, the wrongdoer is
the employer and the sufferer is the employee/workman
and there is no justification to give a premium to the
employer of his wrongdoings by relieving him of the
burden to pay to the employee/workman his dues in the
form of full back wages.
38.6. In a number of cases, the superior courts have
interfered with the award of the primary adjudicatory
authority on the premise that finalisation of litigation
has taken long time ignoring that in majority of cases
the parties are not responsible for such delays. Lack of
infrastructure and manpower is the principal cause for delay
in the disposal of cases. For this the litigants cannot be
blamed or penalised. It would amount to grave injustice
to an employee or workman if he is denied back wages
simply because there is long lapse of time between the
termination of his service and finality given to the order
of reinstatement. The courts should bear in mind that in
most of these cases, the employer is in an advantageous
position vis-à-vis the employee or workman. He can avail
the services of best legal brain for prolonging the agony
of the sufferer i.e. the employee or workman, who can
ill-afford the luxury of spending money on a lawyer with
certain amount of fame. Therefore, in such cases it would
be prudent to adopt the course suggested in Hindustan
Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. Employees [(1979) 2 SCC 80].
38.7. The observation made in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. K.P.
Agrawal [(2007) 2 SCC 433] that on reinstatement the
employee/workman cannot claim continuity of service as of
right is contrary to the ratio of the judgments of three-Judge
Benches referred to hereinabove [Hindustan Tin Works
(P) Ltd. (supra) and Surendra Kumar Verma (supra)] and
cannot be treated as good law. This part of the judgment
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 125
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v.
Mahadeo Krishna Naik
is also against the very concept of reinstatement of an
employee/workman.”
(emphasis supplied)
43. We cannot but endorse our wholehearted concurrence with the
views expressed in the aforesaid decisions. Taking a cue therefrom,
it can safely be concluded that ordering back wages to be paid to a
dismissed employee - upon his dismissal being set aside by a court
of law – is not an automatic relief; grant of full or partial back wages
has to be preceded by a minor fact-finding exercise by the industrial
adjudicator/court seized of the proceedings. Such exercise would
require the relevant industrial court or the jurisdictional high court
or even this Court to ascertain whether in the interregnum, that is,
between the dates of termination and proposed reinstatement, the
employee has been gainfully employed. If the employee admits of any
gainful employment and gives particulars of the employment together
with details of the emoluments received, or, if the employee asserts
by pleading that he was not gainfully employed but the employer
pleads and proves otherwise to the satisfaction of the court, the
quantum of back wages that ought to be awarded on reinstatement
is really in the realm of discretion of the court. Such discretion
would generally necessitate bearing in mind two circumstances
: the first is, the employee, because of the order terminating his
service, could not work for a certain period under the employer and
secondly, for his bare survival, he might not have had any option
but to take up alternative employment. It is discernible from certain
precedents, duly noticed in Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra), that
the courts are loath to award back wages for the period when no
work has been performed by such an employee. Such a view is no
doubt debatable, having regard to the ratio decidendi in Hindustan
Tin Works (P) Ltd. (supra), Surendra Kumar Verma (supra) and
Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra). Though the latter decision was
cited before the coordinate bench when it decided Phool Chand
(supra), any thoughtful discussion appears to be absent.
44. There is one other aspect that would fall for consideration of the court.
In certain decisions, noticed in Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra), it
has been opined that whether or not an employee has been gainfully
employed is within his special knowledge and having regard to Section
106 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the burden of proof is on him. What
126 [2025] 3 S.C.R.
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is required of an employee in such a case? He has to plead in his
statement of claim or any subsequent pleading before the industrial
tribunal/labour court that he has not been gainfully employed and
that the award of reinstatement may also grant him back wages. If
the employee pleads that he was not gainfully employed, he cannot
possibly prove such negative fact by adducing positive evidence.
In the absence of any contra-material on record, his version has to
be accepted. Reference in this connection may be made to Section
17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which confers a right on
an employee to seek “full wages last drawn” from the employer while
the challenge of the employer to an award directing reinstatement
in a higher court remains pending. There too, what is required is
a statement on affidavit regarding non-employment and with such
statement on record, the ball is in the court of the employer to satisfy
the court why relief under such section ought not to be granted by
invoking the proviso to the section. We see no reason why a similar
approach may not be adopted. After the employee pleads his non-
employment and if the employer asserts that the employee was
gainfully employed between the dates of termination and proposed
reinstatement, the onus of proof would shift to the employer to prove
such assertion having regard to the cardinal principle that ‘he who
asserts must prove’. Law, though, seems to be well settled that if the
employer by reason of its illegal act deprives any of its employees
from discharging his work and the termination is ultimately held to
be bad in law, such employee has a legitimate and valid claim to be
restored with all that he would have received but for being illegally
kept away from work. This is based on the principle that although
the employee was willing to perform work, it was the employer who
did not accept work from him and, therefore, if the employer’s action
is held to be illegal and bad, such employer cannot escape from
suffering the consequences. However, it is elementary but requires
to be restated that while grant of full back wages is the normal rule,
an exceptional case with sufficient proof has to be set up by the
employer to escape the burden of bearing back wages.
45. We hasten to add that the courts may be confronted with cases
where grant of lumpsum compensation, instead of reinstatement
with back wages, could be the more appropriate remedy. The courts
may, in such cases, providing justification for its approach direct such
lumpsum compensation to be paid keeping in mind the interest of
the employee as well as the employer.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 127
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v.
Mahadeo Krishna Naik
46. Mahadeo has admitted in his counter affidavit filed before this Court of
being engaged in badli work on a daily wage basis. At the same time,
it is his specific case that because his service was terminated by the
Corporation, he could not find a permanent employment elsewhere.
There is no material on record to disbelieve Mahadeo. Since the exact
quantum of wages earned by Mahadeo is not available and at the
same time it is clear as crystal that the Corporation succeeded in its
attempt to get rid of Mahadeo by indulging in the misadventure of
suppressio veri and suggestio falsi, we are of the considered opinion
that interest of justice would be sufficiently served if, in modification of
the order of the single judge awarding 100% back wages, Mahadeo
is awarded 75% of the back wages from the date of his termination
till the date of his superannuation.
47. The third issue having thus been answered, we are left with the
fourth and final issue.
48. It is ordered that Mahadeo is entitled to 75% of the back wages from
the date of his termination till the date of his superannuation. This
would be apart from Mahadeo being entitled to full terminal benefits,
along with interest @ 6% per annum, had he never been dismissed
from service. It is ordered accordingly.
49. The amounts Mahadeo is entitled to in terms of this order shall be
released in his favour by the Corporation within three months from
date of its communication; in default, the said amount shall carry
further interest @ 2% from such default till full payment.
Conclusion
50. With the aforesaid modification of the impugned order, this civil
appeal stands disposed of.
51. Parties shall bear their own costs.
Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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