Holding

Segregation of the appellant’s trial solely because he is a sitting MLA, without any statutory or factual justification, is unsustainable in law and violates constitutional guarantees of equality and fair trial.

Summary

Mamman Khan, a sitting MLA, was charged in two FIRs relating to large‑scale communal violence in Nuh district. The trial court, citing the need for speedy disposal of cases involving legislators, ordered a separate charge‑sheet and segregated his trial from the co‑accused, a decision affirmed by the High Court. The appellant challenged the segregation, arguing that the offences arose from a single conspiracy and that the CrPC permits joint trials unless distinct facts or prejudice are shown. The Supreme Court held that the segregation was ordered solely on the basis of the appellant’s political status, without any statutory justification, violating Articles 14 and 21 and the procedural safeguards of the CrPC. Consequently, the Court set aside the segregation orders, quashed the separate charge‑sheet, and remitted the matter for a joint trial, disposing of the appeals.

Issues considered

The legality of directing segregation of the trial of a sitting MLA from co‑accused solely on the basis of his political office.
Whether sections 218‑223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permit separate trials in the absence of distinct transactions or demonstrated prejudice.
Whether the directions in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India authorise deviation from the statutory regime governing joint trials.

Legislation cited

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023s. Section 482, s. Section 528
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 218, s. 219, s. 220, s. 221, s. 222, s. 223, s. 223(d)
Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 21
Indian Penal Code, 1860

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether the orders of the trial court, as affirmed by the High Court, directing segregation of the appellant’s trial from that of the co-accused and requiring the filing of a separate charge sheet solely on the ground that the appellant is a sitting MLA, Procedure, 1973 – ss.219 to 223 – Joint trials – Segregation of trial – Permissibility – Appellant-MLA arrayed as one of the accused person along with others , in connection with large-scale communal violence in the Nuh District – Joint proceedings

Subjects

SegregationSeparate charge sheetSitting MLAJoint trialCommunal violenceConspiracyExpeditious disposalArticle 14Article 21Procedural fairness

Judgment

[2025] 10 S.C.R. 131 : 2025 INSC 1113

Mamman Khan
v.
State of Haryana
(Criminal Appeal No. 4002 of 2025)
12 September 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether the orders of the trial court, as affirmed by
the High Court, directing segregation of the appellant’s trial from
that of the co-accused and requiring the filing of a separate charge
sheet solely on the ground that the appellant is a sitting MLA,
legally sustainable.

Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.219 to 223 – Joint
trials – Segregation of trial – Permissibility – Appellant-MLA
arrayed as one of the accused person along with others , in
connection with large-scale communal violence in the Nuh
District – Joint proceedings commenced – However, the
trial court directed the police to file a separate charge-sheet
against the appellant and consequently, segregated his trial
from that of the co-accused – Pursuant thereto, the police filed
separate charge sheets against the appellant, and charges
were framed – Appellant sought quashing of the order of
segregation of his trial – High Court dismissed the petitions,
and upheld the segregation – Sustainability:
Held: Order of the trial court directing segregation of the appellant’s
trial from that of the co-accused, cannot be sustained – No allegation
that the acts attributed to the appellant arise from a distinct
transaction, or that a joint trial would prejudice the prosecution – On
the contrary, the prosecution’s own case rests on an overarching
conspiracy, and interlinked evidence – Segregation was ordered not
on any legally recognized ground such as distinct facts, severable
evidence, or demonstrated prejudice but solely on account of the
appellant’s political office which cannot be justified – Preferential
segregation militates against the equality principle enshrined in
Art.14 – Only ground recorded was the delay occasioned by the

* Author
132 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

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non-appearance of certain co-accused – Appellant was regularly
before the court – No finding recorded that a joint trial would delay
proceedings or cause prejudice to the appellant – Segregation
order passed suo motu by the trial court, without notice or
application, violates the basic principles of procedural fairness
inherent in Art.21 – Evidence against the appellant is identical to
that against the co-accused – Separate trials would necessarily
involve recalling the same witnesses, resulting in duplication, delay,
and the risk of inconsistent findings – High Court confined itself
to the discretionary language of s.223 without evaluating whether
the factual circumstances justified such segregation – Thus, the
segregation of the appellant’s trial, without any legally recognized
justification, unsustainable in law and violative of the appellant’s
right to a fair trial u/Art.21 – No person, whether a sitting MLA or
an ordinary citizen can be subjected to procedural disadvantage
or preferential treatment without express legal justification – While
expeditious disposal of cases involving legislators is undoubtedly
desirable, such administrative prioritization cannot override the
procedural safeguards guaranteed under the Cr.P.C. or the
constitutional mandate of equality – Segregating the appellant’s
trial solely on account of his political office, in the absence of any
legal or factual necessity, amounts to arbitrary classification and
undermines the integrity of the criminal justice process – Impugned
orders passed by the trial Court, as affirmed by the High Court set
aside – Direction to file a separate charge sheet against the appellant
and the segregation of his trial quashed – Matter remitted to the trial
court – Constitution of India – Art.14, 21. [Paras 14, 15, 16.1-24]

Case Law Cited
Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India [2023] 14 SCR
266 : (2024) 1 SCC 185; Nasib Singh v. State, 2021 OnLine
SC 94 – held inapplicable.
R. Dinesh Kumar v. State [2015] 5 SCR 605 : (2015) 7 SCC 497;
State of A.P. v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao [1964] 3 SCR 297 :
AIR 1963 SC 1850 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 671; Chandra Bhal v. State
of U.P. (1971) 3 SCC 983 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 290 – referred to.

List of Acts
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Penal Code, 1860;
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Constitution of India.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 133

Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana

List of Keywords
Segregation; Filing of separate charge sheet; Sitting MLA; Joint
trials; Segregation of trial; Large-scale communal violence in
the Nuh District; Joint proceedings; Separate charge-sheet;
Overarching conspiracy; Interlinked evidence; Expeditious disposal
of criminal cases involving MPs/MLAs; Principal District Judge;
Non-appearance of certain co-accused; Fair trial; Art.21 of the
Constitution; Principles of procedural fairness; Separate trial.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
4002 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.12.2024 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRMM No. 61515 of 2024
With
Criminal Appeal No. 4003 of 2025

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Dr. S Muralidhar, Sr. Adv., Prasanna S., Ms. Rupali Samuel, MA
Karthik, Ms. Ninni Susan Thomas, Ms. Pallak Bhagat.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Deepak Thukral, A.A.G., Akshay Amritanshu, Ms. Pragya Upadhyay,
Ms. Drishti Saraf, Nikhil Goyal, Ravi Vashisht.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

R. Mahadevan, J.

Leave granted in both the SLPs.
2. These appeals have been preferred against the common judgment
and order dated 12.12.2024 passed by the High Court of Punjab
and Haryana at Chandigarh1, whereby the High Court dismissed the

1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
134 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

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appellant’s petitions bearing CRM-M-Nos. 61515 and 61516 of 2024,
filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 (corresponding to Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
19732) seeking to quash the orders dated 02.09.2024 and 28.08.2024
passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Nuh3. By the said orders,
the trial Court directed the prosecution to file a separate charge sheet
against the appellant and ordered segregation of his trial from that
of the co-accused in respect of:
• FIR No.149 dated 01.08.2023 registered under sections 148,
149, 153A, 379A, 395, 397, 427, 436, 506, 201, 120B, 107 of
the Indian Penal Code, 18604, and
• FIR No.150 dated 01.08.2023 registered under sections 148,
149, 153A, 379A, 395, 427, 436, 506, 201, 120B, 107 and 180
IPC, respectively,
both registered at Police Station Nagina, District Nuh.
3. The factual matrix of the present cases is as follows:
3.1. The appellant is a sitting Member of the Legislative Assembly
(MLA) from Ferozepur Jhirka Constituency in Haryana and has
been arrayed as one of the accused in FIR Nos.149 and 150
both dated 01.08.2023 registered at Police Station Nagina,
District Nuh, in connection with large-scale communal violence
that took place in the Nuh District on 31.07.2023.
3.2. During the course of investigation, multiple individuals were
named as accused, and joint proceedings commenced before
the trial Court. However, by orders dated 28.08.2024 and
02.09.2024, the trial Court directed the concerned Station House
Officer to file a separate charge-sheet against the appellant and
consequently, segregated his trial from that of the co-accused.
3.3. Pursuant to the aforesaid directions, the police filed separate
charge sheets against the appellant, charges were framed on
25.11.2024, and the prosecution commenced evidence, with
some witnesses already examined.

2 For short, “Cr.P.C”
3 For short, “the trial Court”
4 For short, “IPC”
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 135

Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana

3.4. Aggrieved by the segregation of his trial, the appellant filed
CRM-M -Nos.61515 and 61516 of 2024 before the High Court
for quashing the aforesaid orders. However, by a common
judgment dated 12.12.2024, the High Court dismissed both
petitions, and upheld the segregation.
3.5. Hence, the appellant has come forward with the present appeals
before this Court.
4. Assailing the impugned judgment, the learned Senior Counsel for
the appellant submitted that the appellant, a sitting MLA, has been
falsely implicated in the FIRs concerning the communal violence in
Nuh District on 31.07.2023. The investigation itself revealed that the
appellant was not present at the location of the incident, and that
there is no material evidence linking him to the alleged offences.
Nevertheless, the relief sought herein is confined only to setting aside
the segregation of his trial from that of the co-accused.
4.1. It was contended that the trial Court directed segregation of the
appellant’s trial solely on the ground that he is a sitting MLA,
which reasoning is arbitrary, legally untenable, and amounts to
a miscarriage of justice. Section 223(d) Cr.P.C. provides that
persons accused of the same offence committed in the course
of the same transaction shall be tried jointly. Joint trials are the
rule, and separate trials are permissible only in exceptional
circumstances expressly contemplated by law. In the present
case, the alleged offences, including rioting and conspiracy
under Section 120B IPC, arise from the same issue; hence, it
is impermissible to try the alleged conspirator separately from
the principal perpetrators.
4.2. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the trial Court
placed reliance on the directions issued by this Court in Ashwini
Kumar Upadhyay v. Union of India5, to justify the segregation.
However, those directions merely call for prioritization of trials
involving MPs/MLAs for expeditious disposal and do not permit
deviation from the statutory scheme, nor authorize separate
charge-sheets or trials solely on the basis of accused’s political
status.

5 (2024) 1 SCC 185
136 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

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4.3. Reference was made to the decisions in Nasib Singh v. State6,
State of A.P. v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao7, and R.
Dinesh Kumar v. State8, which establish that when offences
form part of the same transaction, a joint trial is mandatory, and
that multiplicity of trials arising from the same incident must be
avoided as it causes injustice, prejudice, and delay.
4.4. It was further urged that the trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction
by directing the police to file a separate charge-sheet, as
the discretion to file charge-sheets lies exclusively with the
investigating agency. Even when separate charge-sheets are
filed, if the offences arise out of the same transaction, they
must necessarily be tried jointly. Sections 218 – 223 Cr.P.C
make it clear that “distinct” offences refer to unconnected or
independent acts. In the present case, the alleged conspiracy
links the appellant with the co-accused, making separate trials
legally impermissible.
4.5. It was argued that segregation would enable the prosecution
to tailor its evidence based on prior cross-examination, thereby
causing serious prejudice to the appellant as well as the
co-accused. It would also expose the appellant to multiple
proceedings for the same transaction, in violation of Article
20(2) of the Constitution (protection against double jeopardy)
and the fundamental right to a fair trial under Article 21.
4.6. Finally, it was submitted that neither delay in the appearance of
co-accused nor the desire for expeditious trial provides lawful
justification for segregation. The Code of Criminal Procedure
permits separate trials only in exceptional circumstances, such
as the absconding of co-accused or the existence of distinct
transactions – conditions that are absent in the present case.
4.7. On these grounds, it was prayed that the impugned orders of
the trial Court and the High Court be set aside, and a direction
be issued for a joint trial of the appellant along with the co-
accused, in accordance with law.

6 2021 OnLine SC 94
7 AIR 1963 SC 1850
8 (2015) 7 SCC 497
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 137

Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana

5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent opposed the
appeals and submitted that the appellant challenges the legality of
the orders dated 28.08.2024 and 02.09.2024 passed by the trial
Court in Session Cases arising out of FIR Nos.150 and 149 of 2023,
respectively. By these orders, the trial Court directed the Station
House Officer to file a separate charge-sheet against the appellant,
who is a sitting MLA, and accordingly, segregated his trial from that
of the co-accused. In compliance, separate charge sheets were filed
against the appellant, charges were framed on 25.11.2024, and the
prosecution has already commenced evidence with several witnesses
having been examined.
5.1. It was contended that the segregation of the appellant’s trial was
necessitated to ensure judicial efficiency, as the presence of
43 accused in FIR No.149 and 28 accused in FIR No.150 had
rendered the conduct of a joint trial logistically and procedurally
cumbersome. Repeated non-appearance of certain co-accused
had already resulted in considerable delay.
5.2. Learned counsel submitted that the segregation was intended
to prevent further delay in proceedings and, in fact, facilitates
early disposal. The measure does not, in any manner, prejudice
the appellant’s rights.
5.3. It was further argued that under Section 218 Cr.P.C., the general
rule is that each offence shall be tried separately. While Section
223 enables joint trials, it is couched in discretionary terms and
must be applied only in appropriate cases depending on the
circumstances.
5.4. Reliance was placed on Nasib Singh v. State (supra), where
this Court held that the test for permitting a joint trial includes
consideration of whether it would prejudice the accused or cause
delay in the proceedings. In the present case, the appellant
failed to establish any real or specific prejudice arising out of
the separate trial.
5.5. Further reliance was placed on Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay wherein,
this Court directed all courts to prioritize expeditious disposal
of criminal cases involving elected public representatives. The
action of the trial Court is in consonance with these directions
and is aimed at ensuring speedy adjudication.
138 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

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5.6. It was submitted that the right to a speedy trial is an essential
facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. The segregation of the
appellant’s trial subserves this constitutional guarantee by
enabling timely progress of the case.
5.7. On these premises, the learned counsel prayed for dismissal of
the appeals and for upholding of the impugned orders directing
segregation of the appellant’s trial from that of the co-accused,
submitting that the same are legally sound, procedurally proper,
and constitutionally justified.
6. We have considered the submissions advanced by the learned senior
counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondent and
have carefully perused the materials available on record.
6.1. On 19.12.2024, when SLP (Crl.) No. 18089 of 2024 was taken
up for consideration, this Court granted an order of stay of further
proceedings in S.C. No. 478 of 2024 pending before the Court
of Additional Sessions Judge (Nuh), Haryana. Subsequently, by
order dated 31.01.2025 in SLP (Crl.) Diary No. 58851 of 2024,
this Court granted an order of stay of further proceedings in
S.C. No. 485 / 2024.
7. The principal issue that arises for determination in these appeals is
whether the orders of the trial Court, as affirmed by the High Court,
directing segregation of the appellant’s trial from that of the co-accused
and requiring the filing of a separate charge sheet solely on the
ground that the appellant is a sitting MLA, are legally sustainable.
8. Apparently, FIR Nos.149 and 150 of 2023, were registered in the
aftermath of large-scale communal violence in the Nuh district of
Haryana, which resulted in serious law and order disturbances, loss
of lives, and extensive damage to both public and private property.
These FIRs named several individuals, including the present
appellant, and alleged the commission of offences such as rioting,
dacoity, mischief by fire, and criminal intimidation.
9. The prosecution case proceeds on the basis of an overarching
conspiracy said to involve all the accused persons. The charge
sheet reflects a consolidated investigative approach, founded
upon common evidence, such as call detail records, electronic
communications, video footage, witness statements, and forensic
reports. It is undisputed that the prosecution relies upon largely
common witnesses and interlinked evidence against all the accused.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 139

Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana

10. Despite the unified nature of the allegations, the trial Court ordered
segregation of the appellant’s trial on the premise that proceedings
were being delayed due to the repeated non-appearance of certain
co-accused. The court also noted that, since the appellant is a sitting
MLA, his trial needed to be taken up on a day-to-day basis in view of
the directions issued by this Court in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v.
Union of India (supra), concerning expeditious disposal of cases
against legislators. Consequently, by orders dated 28.08.2024 and
02.09.2024, the trial Court directed the police to file a separate
charge sheet against the appellant. Agrieved thereby, the appellant
preferred Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions seeking quashing of the
proceedings, which came to be dismissed by the High Court.
11. In the present appeals, the challenge has been confined to the
segregation of the appellant’s trial. The appellant submits that the
offences alleged against him arise out of the same transaction as
those involving the co-accused, and hence, by virtue of Section
223 Cr.P.C., a joint trial ought to have been conducted. It is not the
prosecution’s case that the acts attributed to the appellant are distinct
or severable. According to the appellant, conducting a separate
trial would result in serious prejudice to him and impair his right to
a fair trial.
11.1. On the other hand, the respondent contends that segregation
was necessitated by the mandate of this Court in Ashwini
Kumar Upadhyay (supra), which requires expeditious disposal
of criminal cases involving elected representatives. It is further
stated that the direction was purely procedural and intended
to obviate delay caused by the abscondence of certain
co-accused, while ensuring that the trial of the appellant
proceeds in a timely manner.
12. Before addressing the question of the legal permissibility of such
segregation, it would be apposite to extract the relevant portions of
the trial Court’s orders dated 28.08.2024 and 02.09.2024, as affirmed
by the High Court, which read as under:

Order dated 28.08.2024
“….
In the present case, one of the accused namely Sh.
Mamman Khan is MLA of Haryana. The present case is
140 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

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not progressing on account of absence of one accused
or the other. On the other hand, as per direction issued
by Hon’ble Supreme Court, the cases of MPs/MLAs are
to be decided on priority basis by taking up the case on
day to day basis. The case has been identified for current
action plan and therefore, in the interest of justice and
fitness of things, case of accused Mamman Khan is to
be tried separately.
The concerned Ahlmad of this Court is directed to issue
notice to SHO of Police Station Nagina today itself through
Naib Court of this Court with direction to prepare and file
a separate challan of accused Mamman Khan.”

Order dated 02.09.2024
“…
One of the accused namely Mamman Khan is sitting
MLA of Haryana and therefore, his case is to be taken
up on day to day basis as per instructions issued by
Hon’ble Supreme Court from time to time. The case
is not proceeding further as there are large number of
accused and some of them are absent and other seek
adjournment on one pretext or the other.
Resultantly, notice be issued to SHO of Police Station
Nagina to file separate challan of accused Mamman Khan
on the next date of hearing.”
12.1. A plain reading of the above orders makes it clear that the
segregation was directed solely on account of the appellant’s
status as an MLA, so as to facilitate a day-to-day trial in
purported compliance with the directions of this Court in Ashwini
Kumar Upadhyay (supra). Significantly, the record discloses
that no notice was issued to the appellant prior to passing of
the segregation order, nor was there any application filed by the
prosecution seeking such a course of action. The segregation
was thus ordered suo motu, without affording the appellant an
opportunity of hearing.
13. The statutory scheme under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
is clear. Sections 218 to 223 lay down the framework governing the
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 141

Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana

joinder and separation of charges and trials. Section 218 embodies
the general rule that each distinct offence shall be tried separately.
However, the Code carves out specific exceptions to this rule in
Sections 219 to 223, where joint trials are permissible in the interests
of justice.
13.1. In particular, Section 223(d) provides that persons accused
of different offences committed in the course of the same
transaction may be charged and tried together. The legislative
intent underlying these provisions is three-fold: (i)to prevent
multiplicity of proceedings, (ii) to avoid the risk of conflicting
judgments on the same evidence, and (iii) to promote judicial
economy while ensuring fairness to the accused. For ease of
reference, the relevant provisions are set out below:
“218. Separate charges for distinct offences –(1) For
every distinct offence of which any person is accused
there shall be a separate charge, and every such
charge shall be tried separately:
Provided that where the accused person, by an
application in writing, so desires and the Magistrate
is of opinion that such person is not likely to be
prejudiced thereby, the Magistrate may try together
all or any number of the charges framed against
such person.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall affect the operation
of the provisions of Sections 219, 220, 221 and 223.
219. Three offences of same kind within year may
be charged together –
(1) When a person is accused of more offences than
one of the same kind committed within the space
of twelve months from the first to the last of such
offences, whether in respect of the same person or
not, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial
for, any number of them not exceeding three.
(2) Offences are of the same kind when they are
punishable with the same amount of punishment
under the same section of the Indian Penal Code
(45 of 1860) or of any special or local laws:
142 [2025] 10 S.C.R.

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Provided that, for the purposes of this section, an
offence punishable under Section 379 of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be deemed to be an
offence of the same kind as an offence punishable
under Section 380 of the said Code, and that an
offence punishable under any section of the said
Code, or of any special or local law, shall be deemed
to be an offence of the same kind as an attempt to
commit such offence, when such an attempt is an
offence.
220. Trial for more than one offence –
(1) If, in one series of acts so connected together
as to form the same transaction, more offences than
one are committed by the same person, he may be
charged with, and tried at one trial for, every such
offence.
(2) When a person charged with one or more
offences of criminal breach of trust or dishonest
misappropriation of property as provided in sub-
section (2) of Section 212 or in sub-section (1) of
Section 219, is accused of committing, for the purpose
of facilitating or concealing the commission of that
offence or those offences, one or more offences of
falsification of accounts, he may be charged with,
and tried at one trial for, every such offence.
(3) If the acts alleged constitute an offence falling
within two or more separate definitions of any law
in force for the time being by which offences are
defined or punished, the person accused of them
may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, each
of such offences.
(4) If several acts, of which one or more than one
would by itself or themselves constitute an offence,
constitute when combined a different offence, the
person accused of them may be charged with, and
tried at one trial for the offence constituted by such
acts when combined, and for any offence constituted
by any one, or more, of such acts.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 143

Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana

(5) Nothing contained in this section shall affect
Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
221. Where it is doubtful what offence has been
committed –
(1) If a single act or series of acts is of such a nature
that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts
which can be proved will constitute, the accused
may be charged with having committed all or any
of such offences, and any number of such charges
may be tried at once; or he may be charged in the
alternative with having committed some one of the
said offences.
(2) If in such a case the accused is charged with one
offence, and it appears in evidence that he committed
a different offence for which he might have been
charged under the provisions of sub-section (1), he
may be convicted of the offence which he is shown to
have committed, although he was not charged with it.
222. When offence proved included in offence
charged –
(1) When a person is charged with an offence
consisting of several particulars, a combination of
some only of which constitutes a complete minor
offence, and such combination is proved, but the
remaining particulars are not proved, he may be
convicted of the minor offence, though he was not
charged with it.
(2) When a person is charged with an offence and
facts are proved which reduce it to a minor offence,
he may be convicted of the minor offence, although
he is not charged with it.
(3) When a person is charged with an offence, he may
be convicted of an attempt to commit such offence
although the attempt is not separately charged.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to
authorise a conviction of any minor offence where the
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conditions requisite for the initiation of proceedings in
respect of that minor offence have not been satisfied.
223. What persons may be charged jointly – The
following persons may be charged and tried together,
namely:
(a) Persons accused of the same offence committed
in the course of the same transaction;
(b) Persons accused of an offence and persons
accused of abetment of, or attempt to commit, such
offence;
(c) Persons accused of more than one offence of
the same kind, within the meaning of Section 219
committed by them jointly within the period of twelve
months;
(d) Persons accused of different offences committed
in the course of the same transaction;
(e) persons accused of an offence which includes
theft, extortion, cheating, or criminal misappropriation,
and persons accused of receiving or retaining, or
assisting in the disposal or concealment of, property
possession of which is alleged to have been
transferred by any such offence committed by the
first-named persons, or of abetment of or attempting
to commit any such last-named offence;
(f) persons accused of offences under Sections 411
and 414 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or
either of those sections in respect of stolen property
the possession of which has been transferred by
one offence;
(g) persons accused of any offence under Chapter
XII of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) relating to
counterfeit coin and persons accused of any other
offence under the said Chapter relating to the same
coin, or of abetment of or attempting to commit any
such offence; and the provisions contained in the
former part of this Chapter shall, so far as may be,
apply to all such charges:
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 145

Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana

Provided that where a number of persons are charged
with separate offences and such persons do not fall
within any of the categories specified in this section,
the Magistrate [or Court of Session] may, if such
persons by an application in writing, so desire, and
if he [or it] is satisfied that such persons would not
be prejudicially affected thereby, and it is expedient
so to do, try all such persons together.”
14. In the present case, there is no allegation that the acts attributed
to the appellant arise from a distinct transaction, or that a joint trial
would prejudice the prosecution. On the contrary, the prosecution’s
own case rests on an overarching conspiracy, and interlinked
evidence. Segregation was ordered not on any legally recognized
ground – such as distinct facts, severable evidence, or demonstrated
prejudice – but solely on account of the appellant’s political office,
by misapplying the directions in Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay (supra).
15. At the outset, the reliance placed by the trial Court and the High Court
on Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay (supra) appears to be misplaced. As
already noticed earlier, the trial Court, while directing segregation,
categorically recorded that in terms of this Court’s directions, cases
of MPs/MLAs are to be prioritised and taken up on a day-to-day
basis. It is no doubt correct that the said judgment emphasises the
need for expeditious disposal of criminal cases involving MPs / MLAs.
However, it lays down that it is the responsibility of the Principal District
Judge to allocate, as considered appropriate and effective, criminal
cases involving MPs and MLAs to the designated courts. Further,
they do not confer any procedural disadvantage upon an accused
legislator, nor do they authorise deviation from the mandatory legal
norms governing joint trials.
16. The principles governing the conduct of joint or separate trials have
been elaborately dealt with by this Court in Nasib Singh v. State
of Punjab (supra), after a survey of earlier decisions. The relevant
paragraphs are extracted below:
“B. Power to direct joint trial
…
35. Chapter 17 CrPC, 1973 deals with “the charge”. Part
A comprising of Sections 211 to 217 is titled “form of
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charges”. Part B comprising of Sections 218 to 224 is
titled “joinder of charges”.
…
43. The Bench held that holding a separate trial is the
rule and a joint trial is the exception. However, in case
the accused persons commit different offences forming a
part of the same transaction, a joint trial would be the rule
unless it is proved that joint trial would cause difficulty:
(Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao case9, AIR pp. 1861-862,
para 30)
“30. ... No doubt, as has been rightly pointed
out in this case, separate trial is the normal
rule and joint trial is an exception. But while
this principle is easy to appreciate and follow
where one person alone is the accused and the
interaction or intervention of the acts of more
persons than one does not come in, it would
where the same act is committed by several
persons, be not only inconvenient but injudicious
to try all the several persons separately. This
would lead to unnecessary multiplicity of trials
involving avoidable inconvenience to the
witnesses and avoidable expenditure of public
time and money. No corresponding advantage
can be gained by the accused persons by
following the procedure of separate trials.
Where, however, several offences are alleged
to have been committed by several accused
persons it may be more reasonable to follow the
normal rule of separate trials. But here, again,
if those offences are alleged not to be wholly
unconnected but as forming part of the same
transaction the only consideration that will justify
separate trials would be the embarrassment
or difficulty caused to the accused persons in
defending themselves.”
…

9 State of A.P. v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1850 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 671
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 147

Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana

48. The Court in Chandra Bhal case10 observed that a
separate trial on the charge of causing the homicidal
death of one ‘L’ was not contrary to law even if a joint
trial of this offence together with others was permissible.
The Court also observed that this matter was required to
be considered by the trial court at the beginning of the
trial and is not to be determined on the basis of the result
of the trial. The Court further observed that its attention
was not drawn to any material on record suggesting that
prejudice had been caused to the appellant as a result
of a separate trial. It was finally held that the plea of self
defence and the argument that both the offences were
committed during the course of the same transaction was
rejected by both the courts below, and that the court would
not interfere with concurrent findings of fact.
49. The judgment in Chandra Bhal case therefore lays
down three significant principles on joint trials:
49.1. A separate trial is not contrary to law even if a joint trial
for the offences along with other offences is permissible.
49.2. The possibility of a joint trial has to be decided at
the beginning of the trial and not on the basis of the result
of the trial.
49.3. The true test is whether any prejudice has been
sustained as a result of a separate trial. In other words,
a retrial with a direction of a joint trial would be ordered
only if there is a failure of justice.
50. In Essar Teleholdings Ltd. v. CBI11, R.F. Nariman, J.,
speaking for a three-Judge Bench reiterated the principles
which have been enunciated in Chandra Bhal. Further, it
was held that even if the conditions stipulated in Section
223 CrPC to conduct a joint trial have been fulfilled, it may
not be desirous to direct a joint trial if a joint trial would (i)
prolong the trial; (ii) cause unnecessary wastage of judicial
time; and (iii) confuse or cause prejudice to the accused,
who had taken part only in some minor offence.

10 Chandra Bhal v. State of U.P., (1971) 3 SCC 983 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 290
11 (2015) 10 SCC 562 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 1
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51. From the decisions of this Court on joint trial and
separate trials, the following principles can be formulated:
51.1. Section 218 provides that separate trials shall be
conducted for distinct offences alleged to be committed
by a person. Sections 219-221 provide exceptions to this
general rule. If a person falls under these exceptions, then
a joint trial for the offences which a person is charged with
may be conducted. Similarly, under Section 223, a joint trial
may be held for persons charged with different offences
if any of the clauses in the provision are separately or on
a combination satisfied.
51.2. While applying the principles enunciated in Sections
218-223 on conducting joint and separate trials, the trial
court should apply a two-pronged test, namely, (i) whether
conducting a joint/separate trial will prejudice the defence
of the accused; and/or (ii) whether conducting a joint/
separate trial would cause judicial delay.
51.3. The possibility of conducting a joint trial will have to
be determined at the beginning of the trial and not after the
trial based on the result of the trial. The appellate court may
determine the validity of the argument that there ought to
have been a separate/joint trial only based on whether the
trial had prejudiced the right of accused or the prosecutrix.
51.4. Since the provisions which engraft an exception
use the phrase “may” with reference to conducting a joint
trial, a separate trial is usually not contrary to law even if
a joint trial could be conducted, unless proven to cause
a miscarriage of justice.
51.5. A conviction or acquittal of the accused cannot be set
aside on the mere ground that there was a possibility of a
joint or a separate trial. To set aside the order of conviction
or acquittal, it must be proved that the rights of the parties
were prejudiced because of the joint or separate trial, as
the case may be.”
From the above, the following propositions stand reiterated:
(i) Separate trial is the rule under Section 218 Cr.P.C; a joint trial
may be permissible where the offences form part of the same
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 149

Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana

transaction or the conditions in Sections 219 – 223 Cr.P.C.
are satisfied, but even then it is a matter of judicial discretion;
(ii) The decision to hold a joint or separate trial must ordinarily be
taken at the outset of the proceedings and for cogent reasons;
(iii) The two paramount considerations in such decision making are
whether a joint trial would cause prejudice to the accused, and
whether it would occasion delay or wastage of judicial time;
(iv) Evidence recorded in one trial cannot be imported into another,
which may give rise to serious procedural complications if the
trial is bifurcated; and
(v) An order of conviction or acquittal cannot be set aside merely
because a joint or separate trial was possible; interference is
justified only where prejudice or miscarriage of justice is shown.
16.1. Applying the aforesaid principles, we are of the considered
view that the order of the trial Court directing segregation of
the appellant’s trial from that of the co-accused, cannot be
sustained. The only ground recorded was the delay occasioned
by the non-appearance of certain co-accused. The proper
course in such a situation would have been to segregate the
absconding or defaulting accused, not the appellant who was
regularly before the court. By doing so, the trial court inverted
the settled principle and thereby committed a manifest error. No
finding was recorded that a joint trial would delay proceedings
or cause prejudice to the appellant.
16.2. Reliance placed by the respondents on Nasib Singh case
is misconceived. That case concerned consolidation of two
distinct FIRs arising from unrelated acts; it does not support the
arbitrary splitting of a joint trial. Indeed, it reinforces that joint
trials are not only permissible but preferable where offences
arise from the same transaction and evidence is common,
provided no demonstrable prejudice is shown.
17. This Court has consistently held that a fair trial forms part of the
guarantee under Article 21. Departure from established legal
procedure – particularly without hearing the affected party – constitutes
a serious constitutional infraction. The segregation order passed
suo motu by the trial court falls short of these requirements. A
unilateral order for a separate charge sheet and segregated trial,
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passed without notice or application, violates the basic principles of
procedural fairness inherent in Article 21.
18. The contention that the segregation order was passed in the presence
of the appellant’s counsel is equally untenable. Mere physical
presence of counsel cannot be equated with a meaningful opportunity
of hearing. Natural justice requires that the party likely to be affected
by an order must have prior notice and a fair opportunity to present
objections. In the absence of any indication that segregation was under
consideration, the requirement of a fair hearing was not satisfied.
19. It is true that pursuant to the segregation order, separate charge sheets
were filed, charges framed against the appellant, and prosecution
evidence has commenced. However, mere progress of proceedings
cannot cure the inherent illegality in the manner in which segregation
was ordered. Procedural fairness and statutory compliance cannot be
sacrificed for administrative convenience or retrospective justification.
Expediency must operate within the bounds of fairness.
20. We also find that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in directing
the police to file a separate charge-sheet against the appellant. The
discretion to file a charge-sheet lies solely with the investigating
agency. Even where multiple charge-sheets are filed, if the offences
arise out of the same transaction, they must be tried together.
21. Most importantly, the appellant’s status as a sitting MLA cannot, by
itself, justify a separate trial. All accused stand equal before the law,
and preferential segregation militates against the equality principle
enshrined in Article 14. While the right to speedy trial is an essential
facet of Article 21, it cannot be secured at the cost of fairness. Ashwini
Kumar Upadhyay (supra) emphasizes expedition, but nowhere intends
that such expedition be achieved by compromising the fundamental
rights of the accused.
22. In the present case, the evidence against the appellant is identical
to that against the co-accused. Separate trials would necessarily
involve recalling the same witnesses, resulting in duplication, delay,
and the risk of inconsistent findings. The High Court, in affirming
the segregation order, failed to appreciate these consequences and
confined itself to the discretionary language of section 223 Cr.P.C
without evaluating whether the factual circumstances justified such
segregation. Therefore, we hold that the segregation of the appellant’s
trial, without any legally recognized justification, is unsustainable in
law and violative of the appellant’s right to a fair trial under Article 21.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 151

Mamman Khan v. State of Haryana

23. At this juncture, we deem it necessary to reiterate the foundational
constitutional principle enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution,
which guarantees that all persons are equal before the law and
entitled to equal protection of the laws. This principle extends beyond
mere formal equality and requires that legal procedures be applied
fairly and uniformly, irrespective of an individual’s public position or
status. The right to equal access to justice is an essential facet of
the rule of law, and no person – whether a sitting MLA or an ordinary
citizen – can be subjected to procedural disadvantage or preferential
treatment without express legal justification.
23.1. While expeditious disposal of cases involving legislators is
undoubtedly desirable, such administrative prioritization cannot
override the procedural safeguards guaranteed under the
Cr.P.C. or the constitutional mandate of equality. Segregating
the appellant’s trial solely on account of his political office,
in the absence of any legal or factual necessity, amounts to
arbitrary classification and undermines the integrity of the
criminal justice process.
24. In view of the foregoing, the impugned orders dated 28.08.2024
and 02.09.2024 passed by the trial Court, as affirmed by the High
Court in its judgment dated 12.12.2024 are hereby set aside. The
direction to file a separate charge sheet against the appellant and
the consequential segregation of his trial from that of the co-accused
are quashed.
25. The matter is remitted to the trial Court with a direction to conduct a
joint trial of the appellant along with the co-accused, in accordance
with law. The trial Court shall be at liberty to regulate the schedule
of proceedings to ensure expeditious disposal, but shall do so,
without compromising procedural safeguards and only after hearing
all concerned parties.
26. Accordingly, both the criminal appeals are disposed of.
27. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeals disposed of.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain