Holding

The appellant cannot be treated as a juvenile because the documents relied upon were unreliable, the family register is not a birth certificate, and the plea of juvenility was not made bonafide, so the High Court's order stands.

Summary

The appellant, Manoj @ Monu @ Vishal Chaudhary, was initially declared a juvenile in conflict with law but the High Court set aside that finding and ordered him to stand trial as an adult. He sought to prove his juvenility on the basis of a birth certificate, a school leaving certificate, an ossification test report, and argued that the family register maintained under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act could not be used to determine age. The Supreme Court examined the reliability of each document, held that the birth certificate was issued after the application and therefore unreliable, the school certificate was procured and doubtful, and the ossification test was not conclusive. While the family register is admissible as a public document, it is not a birth certificate and cannot alone establish age. The Court emphasized that a plea of juvenility must be made bonafide; reliance on untruthful or dubious documents precludes the benefit of the juvenile legislation. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the High Court's order upheld.

Issues considered

The admissibility and evidentiary value of the Uttar Pradesh family register for age determination under the Juvenile Justice Act.
Whether a birth certificate issued after filing an application under Section 7A can be relied upon to establish juvenility.
The reliability and conclusiveness of ossification test reports in determining age of an accused.
The requirement that a plea of juvenility be made in a bonafide and truthful manner and the effect of unclean hands.
The correct interpretation of Section 94(2)(ii) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and Rule 12(3)(iii) of the 2007 Rules regarding acceptable documents for age proof.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 35, s. 79
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015s. 94(2)(ii)
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007s. 12(3)(iii)
Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969s. 10(1)(i), s. 8(1)(a)
U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947s. 110

Subjects

juvenile justiceage determinationossification testfamily registerbeneficial legislationevidentiary valueunclean handsbirth certificateSection 94Rule 12

Judgment

[2022] 8 S.C.R. 279 279

MANOJ @ MONU @ VISHAL CHAUDHARY A
v.
STATE OF HARYANA & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 207 of 2022)
FEBRUARY 15, 2022 B
[HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
– s.94(2)(ii) – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Rules, 2007 – r.12(3) – U.P Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 – U.P.
C
Panchayat Raj (Maintenance of Family Register) Rules, 1970 –
Appellant-accused was declared as juvenile in conflict with law by
Additional Sessions Judge – Order set aside by High Court, appellant
ordered to stand trial as an adult – On appeal, held: Plea of juvenility
has to be raised in a bonafide and truthful manner – To seek juvenility,
if the reliance is on a document which is not reliable or is dubious D
in nature, the appellant cannot be treated to be juvenile keeping in
view that the Act is a beneficial legislation – The provisions of the
statute are to be interpreted liberally but the benefit cannot be
granted to the appellant who has approached the Court with
untruthful statement – Appellant approached the Court with unclean
E
hands as the documents relied upon by him are not genuine and
trustworthy, and thus cannot be given benefit of juvenility – View
taken by High Court is a possible view in law and does not call for
any interference.
Juvenile Justice – Determination of Juvenility – Ossification
F
Test – Held: Ossification test varies based on individual
characteristics and hence its reliability has to be examined in each
case – It cannot be reasonably expected to formulate a uniform
standard for determination of the age of the union of epiphysis on
account of variations in climatic, dietetic, hereditary and other
factors affecting the people of the different States of India. G
Juvenile Justice – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2015 – U.P Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 – s.110 – U.P.
Panchayat Raj (Maintenance of Family Register) Rules, 1970 –
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 –
r.12(3) – Family register – Evidentiary value of – Held: How much H
279
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.

A evidentiary value is to be attached to the family register is a question
of fact, but to say that it is entirely not relevant would not be the
correct enunciation of law – The register is maintained in accordance
with the rules framed under a statute – Entries made in the regular
course of the affairs of the Panchayat would thus be relevant but
the extent of such reliance would be in view of the peculiar facts
B
and circumstances of each case – Further, in terms of r.12(3)(iii) of
the Rules, birth certificate issued by corporation or municipal
authority or a panchayat is a relevant document to prove the
juvenility – Family register is not a birth certificate – Therefore, it
would not strictly fall within clause (iii) of r.12(3) – Even s.94(2)(ii)
C of the 2015 Act contemplates a birth certificate issued by a panchayat
to determine the age.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2000 stands repealed by the Juvenile Justice (Care
D and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The procedure for
determining the age is now part of Section 94 of 2015 Act which
was earlier provided under Rule 12 of Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (the Rules). The
appellant relies upon three documents such as a Birth Certificate;
E School leaving Certificate and the Report of the Ossification Test
in support of his plea of being a juvenile, whereas the State relies
upon the family register prescribed by the Family Register Rules.
[Paras 5 and 6][287-F-H; 288-A-B]
2. In the birth certificate issued by the Government of Uttar
F Pradesh, the date of birth is mentioned as 13.05.1993. Such date
of birth was registered on 19.11.2014 after the filing of the
application under Section 7A of the Act on 7.10.2014. Such date
of birth certificate has been arranged to claim benefit under the
2000 Act. The date of birth certificate produced by the appellant
cannot be relied upon as it was obtained after filing of the
G application under Section 7A of the Act on 7.10.2014. As per the
birth certificate, the appellant was born at house. Therefore, in
terms of Section 8(1)(a) and 10(1)(i) of the Registration of Births
and Deaths Act, 1969, birth had to be reported to the Registrar
by the head of the household or by the nearest relative of the
H
MANOJ @ MONU @ VISHAL CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF 281
HARYANA & ANR.

head present in the house or by the oldest adult male person A
present. In case birth is reported within 30 days, it shall be
registered on payment of such late fee as may be prescribed.
There are other conditions for registration of birth after 30 days
as well. Therefore, the Courts have rightly not relied upon date
of birth certificate which was granted on 19.11.2014 as it was
B
obtained after filing of the application and registered many years
after the birth and not immediately or within the prescribed time
period. [Paras 8-10][288-D-G; 289-F-G]
3. The school leaving certificate (Ex. A-3) has been proved
by examining Umesh Kumar, Head Teacher of Adarsh Siksha
Sadan, Pinna. As per the statement of the witness, the school C
was functioning in the year 1999 in Village Kheri, Dudadhari and
was shifted to Village Pinna in the year 2009-2010 where he had
been working as Head Teacher from the year 2000. As per the
certificate, the appellant was a student of such school from
12.7.1999 till 2.7.2003. In cross-examination, he admits that the D
school is a private school and the father of the appellant has not
produced any certificate of the appellant attending the first class.
The appellant was admitted directly in the 2nd standard. He admits
that Exhibit A-1, the admission form, is a loose sheet prepared in
his handwriting and it does not bear any counter signature of any
higher authority. He has not even produced any proof of E
registration of the school with the Education Department. The
so-called admission form was filled up by him in 1999, so was the
school leaving certificate of the year 2003. A perusal of the school
leaving certificate shows that it was issued on 29.9.14 by Principal
of Adarsh Siksha Sadan, Village Kheri, Dudadhari, though the F
school had shifted to Village Pinna in the year 2009-2010. It is
unclear and amusing as to how a certificate be issued by a
particular school which has been shifted to another village. This
makes the process of issuance of certificate doubtful. On the
other hand, Ex R-1 is the certificate produced by the State stating
that no school exists by the name of Adarsh Siksha Sadan in the G
village Kheri, Dudadhari. Such certificate has been issued by
Kanishkvir Singh of Primary School, Kheri. The learned
Additional Sessions Judge or the High Court have not relied
upon such certificate. Such school leaving certificate is unreliable
H
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.

A and that the certificate is only a procured document for proving
juvenility before the court. [Paras 11-14][289-G-H; 290-A-F]
4.1 The Medical Board has opined the age of the appellant
between 23 to 24 years, when the appellant was examined on
13.05.2016. Ossification Test Report has been relied upon by
B the Additional Sessions Judge to allow the plea of juvenility raised
by the appellant. Ossification test varies based on individual
characteristics and hence its reliability has to be examined in
each case. It cannot be reasonably expected to formulate a uniform
standard for determination of the age of the union of epiphysis on
account of variations in climatic, dietetic, hereditary and other
C factors affecting the people of the different States of India. [Paras
15 and 16][290-F-G; 291-C]
Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology by Modi, 26th
Edition, pg. 221 – referred to.

D 4.2 Dr. Rajeev Chauhan, Member of the Medical Board in
his cross-examination admitted that a man with the age of 30 to
32 years would also find the same fusion as found in a man who
has crossed the age of 22 years. The conclusion of the Medical
Board that the appellant was 23 to 24 years cannot be said to be
conclusive or helpful to determine the age of the appellant to be
E less than 18 years on the date of commission of offence. [Para
22][294-C-E]
Jyoti Prakash Rai v. State of Bihar (2008) 15 SCC 223
: [2008] 3 SCR 818; Mukarrab v. State of U.P. (2017)
2 SCC 210 : [2016] 8 SCR 557; Abuzar Hossain v.
F State of West Bengal (2012) 10 SCC 489 : [2012] 9
SCR 244; Parag Bhati v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2016)
12 SCC 744 : [2016] 2 SCR 1089; Ramdeo Chauhan
v. State of Assam (2001) 5 SCC 714 : [2001] 3 SCR
669 – relied on.
G 5.1 The Family Register Rules prescribes preparation of a
Family Register in the State of Uttar Pradesh which contains
family-wise names and particulars of all persons ordinarily residing
in the village pertaining to the Gaon Sabha. Such Rules have been
framed under Section 110 of the U.P Panchayat Raj Act, 1947.
H
MANOJ @ MONU @ VISHAL CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF 283
HARYANA & ANR.

The High Court has relied on such certificate to hold that the A
appellant is not juvenile. A perusal of the Rules shows that one
page is allotted to each family and that any change in the family
consequent upon the births and deaths is required to be
incorporated on such page. The changes are also required to be
laid before the next meeting of Gram Panchayat. Thus, it is evident
B
that such Rules are statutorily framed in pursuance of an Act.
The entries in the register are required to be made by the officials
of the Gram Panchayat as part of their official duty. Neeraj Kumar,
Gram Panchayat Officer of Block Barwala was examined wherein
he stated that the entries in the register are made on the basis of
information given by the family members, though he could not C
depose as to who had made these entries. [Paras 23 and 24][294-
E-F; 296-B-D]
5.2 Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant contends that
the family register cannot be made basis of determining the age
of the juvenile under the provisions of the Act and the Rules D
framed thereunder. Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is
attracted both in civil and criminal proceedings. It contemplates
that a register maintained in the ordinary course of business by a
public servant in discharge of his official duty or by any other
person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of
the country in which such register is kept would be a relevant E
fact. Such Rules are not irrelevant as argued. This family register
does not only contain date of birth but also keeps the records of
any additions in the family, though the evidentiary value needs to
be examined in each case. This Court is unable to approve the
broad view taken by the High Court in some of the cases that F
Family Register is not relevant to determine age of the family
members. It is a question of fact as to how much evidentiary value
is to be attached to the family register, but to say that it is entirely
not relevant would not be the correct enunciation of law. The
register is being maintained in accordance with the rules framed
under a statute. The entries made in the regular course of the G
affairs of the Panchayat would thus be relevant but the extent of
such reliance would be in view of the peculiar facts and
circumstances of each case. In terms of Rule 12(3)(iii) of the
Rules, birth certificate issued by corporation or municipal
authority or a panchayat is a relevant document to prove the H
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.

A juvenility. The family register is not a birth certificate. Therefore,
it would not strictly fall within clause (iii) of Rule 12(3) of the
Rules. Even Section 94(2)(ii) of the 2015 Act contemplates a birth
certificate issued by a panchayat to determine the age. [Paras 26,
32 and 34-37][296-G; 298-A-B; 299-E-H; 300-A]
B Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of U.P. (2006) 5 SCC
584 : [2006] 2 Suppl. SCR 615 – relied on.
Krishna Pal v. State of U.P 2010 SCC OnLine All 695;
Shiv Patta v. State of U.P. 2013 SCC OnLine All 14202
– approved.
C 5.3 The appellant sought to rely upon juvenility only on the
basis of school leaving record in his application filed under Section
7A of the 2000 Act. Such school record is not reliable and seems
to be procured only to support the plea of juvenility. The appellant
has not referred to date of birth certificate in his application as it
D was obtained subsequently. The plea of juvenility has to be raised
in a bonafide and truthful manner. If the reliance is on a document
to seek juvenility which is not reliable or dubious in nature, the
appellant cannot be treated to be juvenile keeping in view that
the Act is a beneficial legislation. The provisions of the statute
are to be interpreted liberally but the benefit cannot be granted
E to the appellant who has approached the Court with untruthful
statement. The appellant has approached the Court with unclean
hands as the documents relied upon by him are not genuine and
trustworthy. Thus, the appellant cannot be given benefit of
juvenility. The view taken by the High Court is a possible view in
F law and does not call for any interference in the present appeal.
[Paras 38 and 39][300-B-E]
Babloo Pasi v. State of Jharkhand and Anr. (2008) 13
SCC 133 : [2008] 14 SCR 161 – relied on.
Hare Ram Chowdhary v. State of U.P. 1989 SCC OnLine
G ALL 438; Anil Kumar v. Suchita. 2009 SCC OnLine
ALL 671; Bahadur v. State of U.P. 2009 SCC OnLine
ALL 1757; Abdul Hakeem Pardhan and Others v. State
of U.P 2015 SCC OnLine ALL 5201; Ram Murti Devi

H
MANOJ @ MONU @ VISHAL CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF 285
HARYANA & ANR.

v. State of U.P. and Others 2021 SCC OnLine ALL A
260; Pramod Kumar Manglik v. Smt. Sadhana Rani
1989 SCC OnLine ALL 125 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2008] 3 SCR 818 relied on Para 18
B
[2016] 8 SCR 557 relied on Para 19
[2012] 9 SCR 244 relied on Para 19
[2016] 2 SCR 1089 relied on Para 19
[2008] 14 SCR 161 relied on Para 20
C
[2001] 3 SCR 669 relied on Para 21
[2006] 2 Suppl. SCR 615 relied on Para 32
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
207 of 2022.
D
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.07.2019 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in C.R.R. No.2258 of 2016 (O&M).
Rajul Bhargava, Sr. Adv., Kartikeya Bhargava, Swapnil Sinha,
Advs. for the Appellant.
Dinesh Chander Yadav, AAG, Dr. Anmol Rattan Sidhu, Sr. Adv., E
Ishwar Chand, Dr. Monika Gusain, Narender Kumar Verma, Advs. for
the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
HEMANT GUPTA, J.
F
1. The challenge in the present appeal is to an order passed by the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh dated 30.07.2019,
whereby an order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Fatehabad declaring the present appellant as juvenile in conflict with
law was set aside and the appellant was ordered to stand trial as an
adult. G

2. The facts relevant for the determination of the present appeal
are that the appellant was arrayed as an accused in respect of an
occurrence on 18.01.2011, wherein the allegation against the appellant
was that he waylaid a car and snatched Rs. 22 lacs from the occupants
H
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.

A of the car. The complainant was one of the occupant of the car,
whereas, another occupant - Bhim Singh lost his life on account of
bullet fired on him. During the pendency of the trial, the appellant moved
an application on 07.10.2014 claiming that he was a juvenile as on the
date of the incident, relying upon his school record disclosing his date
of birth as 13.05.1993. The learned Additional Sessions Judge accepted
B
the plea of the appellant and declared him to be juvenile vide order
dated 09.01.2015. Such order was challenged before the High Court
by way of a revision petition. The revision was allowed on 04.05.2016
and the matter was remitted back to the trial court for adjudicating
afresh.
C 3. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, after remand, found
the appellant to be 16 years 8 months and 5 days old on the date of
incident as per the Ossification Test report. The age of the appellant as
assessed by the Board of Doctors in the report was 23-24 years. The
High Court however while setting aside the order of the learned Additional
D Sessions Judge relied upon the family register prepared under The U.P.
Panchayat Raj (Maintenance of Family Register) Rules, 19701 to hold
that the appellant’s plea of juvenility cannot be allowed. Such order is
the subject matter of challenge in the present appeal.
4. The procedure to be followed for determination of age is
E provided under Rule 12(3)(b) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of Children) Rules, 20072, which reads as:
“12. Procedure to be followed in determination of age:
(1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with
law, the court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee
F referred to in rule 19 of these rules shall determine the age of
such juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a
period of thirty days from the date of making of the application
for that purpose.
(2) The Court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee
G shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child
or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie
on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available,
and send him to the observation home or in jail.
1
For short, ‘Family Register Rules’
2
H For short, the ‘Rules’
MANOJ @ MONU @ VISHAL CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF 287
HARYANA & ANR. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with A
law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court
or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking
evidence by obtaining-
(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available;
and in the absence whereof; B
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than
a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal
authority or a panchayat;
C
(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a)
above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted
Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or
child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the
Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for
the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered D
necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering
his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year
and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into
consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical
opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age E
and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i),
(ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive
proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict
with law. “
5. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, F
20003 stands repealed by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 20154. The procedure for determining the age is now part
of Section 94 of 2015 Act which was earlier provided under
abovementioned Rule 12 of the Rules.
6. Admittedly, there is no matriculation or equivalent certificate as G
contemplated under Rule 12(3)(a)(i). The appellant relied upon date of
birth certificate issued by the school first attended. The learned Additional
Sessions Judge on the other hand relied upon report Exhibit AW1/A
3
2000 Act
4
2015 Act H
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.

A rendered by the Board of Doctors on the basis of Ossification Test report
dated 13.05.2016 wherein the age of the appellant was found to be 23 to
24 years. The learned Additional Sessions Judge gave the benefit of
variation and determined the age as 22 years on the date of report and
thus he was found to be 16 years 8 months and 5 days old. Still further,
the appellant was found entitled to additional benefit of one year in terms
B
of Rule 12(3)(b) of the Rules, therefore, the appellant was held to be
juvenile in conflict with law. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has
not relied upon the school leaving certificate or the date of birth certificate
relied upon by the appellant.
7. The appellant relies upon three documents such as a Birth
C
Certificate; School leaving Certificate and the Report of the Ossification
Test in support of his plea of being a juvenile, whereas the State relies
upon the family register prescribed by the Family Register Rules.
i. Birth Certificate
D 8. First, we shall examine the truthfulness of the birth certificate
issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh wherein the date of birth is
mentioned as 13.05.1993. Such date of birth was registered on 19.11.2014
after the filing of the application under Section 7A of the Act on 7.10.2014.
9. We find that such date of birth certificate has been arranged to
E claim benefit under the 2000 Act. The date of birth certificate produced
by the appellant cannot be relied upon as it was obtained after filing of
the application under Section 7A of the Act on 7.10.2014. As per the
birth certificate, the appellant was born at house. Therefore, in terms of
Section 8(1)(a) and 10(1)(i) of the Registration of Births and Deaths
Act, 19695, birth had to be reported to the Registrar by the head of the
F household or by the nearest relative of the head present in the house or
by the oldest adult male person present. In case birth is reported within
30 days, it shall be registered on payment of such late fee as may be
prescribed. There are other conditions for registration of birth after 30
days as well. The relevant provisions of the Act read thus:
G “8. Persons required to register births and deaths.-(1) It
shall be the duty of the persons specified below to give or cause
to be given, either orally or in writing, according to the best of
their knowledge and belief, within such time as may be prescribed,
5
Registration Act
H
MANOJ @ MONU @ VISHAL CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF 289
HARYANA & ANR. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

information to the Registrar of the several particulars required to A
be entered in the forms prescribed by the State Government under
sub-section (1) of section 16-
(a) in respect of births and deaths in a house, whether residential
or non-residential, not being any place referred to in clauses
(b) to (e), the head of the house or, in case more than one B
household live in the house or the household, and if he is not
present in the house at any time during the period within
which the birth or death has to be reported, the nearest
relative of the head present in the house, and in the absence
of any such person, the oldest adult male person present
therein during the said period; C

xxx xxx xxx
10. Duty of certain persons to notify births and deaths and
to certify cause of death.- (1) It shall be the duty of-
(i) the midwife or any other medical or health attendant at a birth D
or death,
(ii) the keeper or the owner of a place set apart for the disposal of
dead bodies or any person required by a local authority to be
present at such place, or
E
(iii) any other person whom the State Government may specify in
this behalf by his designation.
to notify every birth or death or both at which he or she attended
or was present, or which occurred in such areas as may be
prescribed, to the Registrar within such time and in such manner
F
as may be prescribed.”
10. Therefore, the Courts have rightly not relied upon date of
birth certificate which was granted on 19.11.2014 as it was obtained
after filing of the application and registered many years after the birth
and not immediately or within the prescribed time period.
G
ii. School Leaving Certificate
11. The school leaving certificate (Ex. A-3) has been proved by
examining Umesh Kumar, Head Teacher of Adarsh Siksha Sadan, Pinna.
As per the statement of the witness, the school was functioning in the
year 1999 in Village Kheri, Dudadhari and was shifted to Village Pinna H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.

A in the year 2009-2010 where he had been working as Head Teacher
from the year 2000. As per the certificate, the appellant was a student
of such school from 12.7.1999 till 2.7.2003. In cross-examination, he
admits that the school is a private school and the father of the appellant
has not produced any certificate of the appellant attending the first class.
The appellant was admitted directly in the 2nd standard. He admits that
B
Exhibit A-1, the admission form, is a loose sheet prepared in his
handwriting and it does not bear any counter signature of any higher
authority. He has not even produced any proof of registration of the
school with the Education Department.
12. The so-called admission form was filled up by him in 1999, so
C
was the school leaving certificate of the year 2003. A perusal of the
school leaving certificate shows that it was issued on 29.9.14 by Principal
of Adarsh Siksha Sadan, Village Kheri, Dudadhari, though the school
had shifted to Village Pinna in the year 2009-2010. It is unclear and
amusing as to how a certificate be issued by a particular school which
D has been shifted to another village. This makes the process of issuance
of certificate doubtful.
13. On the other hand, Ex R-1 is the certificate produced by the
State stating that no school exists by the name of Adarsh Siksha Sadan
in the village Kheri, Dudadhari. Such certificate has been issued by
E Kanishkvir Singh of Primary School, Kheri.
14. The learned Additional Sessions Judge or the High Court have
not relied upon such certificate. We find that such school leaving certificate
is unreliable and that the certificate is only a procured document for
proving juvenility before the court.
F iii. Ossification Test Report
15. The Medical Board has opined the age of the appellant
between 23 to 24 years, when the appellant was examined on 13.05.2016.
This report has been relied upon by the learned Additional Sessions Judge
to allow the plea of juvenility raised by the appellant. However, it is to be
G noted that ossification test varies based on individual characteristics and
hence its reliability has to be examined in each case.
16. A textbook of Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology by Modi,
26th Edition, pg. 221, delineates the factors relevant to determining the
age-
H
MANOJ @ MONU @ VISHAL CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF 291
HARYANA & ANR. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

(1) Height and Weight- it is opined that progressive increase in A
height and weight according to age varies so greatly in individuals
that it cannot be depended upon in estimating age in medico-legal
cases.
(2) Ossification of Bones- this sign is helpful for determining the
age until ossification is completed, for skiagraphy has now made B
it possible to determine even in living persons, the extent of
ossification, and the union of epiphysis in bones.
17. Hence, it cannot be reasonably expected to formulate a uniform
standard for determination of the age of the union of epiphysis on account
of variations in climatic, dietetic, hereditary and other factors affecting C
the people of the different States of India.
18. Furthermore, this Court in a judgment reported as Jyoti
Prakash Rai v. State of Bihar6 held that the medical report determining
the age of a person has never been considered by courts of law as also
by the medical scientist to be conclusive in nature. It was also found that D
though the Act is a beneficial legislation but principles of beneficial
legislation are to be applied only for the purpose of interpretation of the
statute and not for arriving at a conclusion as to whether a person is
juvenile or not. The Court held as under:
“12. The 2000 Act is indisputably a beneficial legislation. Principles E
of beneficial legislation, however, are to be applied only for the
purpose of interpretation of the statute and not for arriving at a
conclusion as to whether a person is juvenile or not. Whether an
offender was a juvenile on the date of commission of the offence
or not is essentially a question of fact which is required to be
determined on the basis of the materials brought on record by the F
parties. In the absence of any evidence which is relevant for the
said purpose as envisaged under Section 35 of the Evidence Act,
the same must be determined keeping in view the factual matrix
involved in each case. For the said purpose, not only relevant
materials are required to be considered, the orders passed by the G
court on earlier occasions would also be relevant.
13. A medical report determining the age of a person has never
been considered by the courts of law as also by the medical

6
(2008) 15 SCC 223 H
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.

A scientists to be conclusive in nature. After a certain age it is difficult
to determine the exact age of the person concerned on the basis
of ossification test or other tests. This Court in Vishnu v. State of
Maharashtra [(2006) 1 SCC 283 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 217] opined
: (SCC p. 290, para 20)
B “20. It is urged before us by Mr Lalit that the determination of
the age of the prosecutrix by conducting ossification test is
scientifically proved and, therefore, the opinion of the doctor
that the girl was of 18-19 years of age should be accepted. We
are unable to accept this contention for the reasons that the
expert medical evidence is not binding on the ocular evidence.
C The opinion of the Medical Officer is to assist the court as he
is not a witness of fact and the evidence given by the Medical
Officer is really of an advisory character and not binding on
the witness of fact.”
In the aforementioned situation, this Court in a number of judgments
D has held that the age determined by the doctors should be given
flexibility of two years on either side.”
19. In a judgment reported as Mukarrab v. State of U.P.7, it was
observed that a blind and mechanical view regarding the age of a person
cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by the radiological
E examination. It was also held that the purpose of 2000 Act is not to give
shelter to the accused of grave and heinous offences. Relying upon
judgment of this Court reported as Abuzar Hossain v. State of West
Bengal8 and Parag Bhati v. State of Uttar Pradesh9, it was held as
under:
F “27. In a recent judgment, State of M.P. v. Anoop Singh [State
of M.P. v. Anoop Singh, (2015) 7 SCC 773 : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri)
208] , it was held that the ossification test is not the sole criteria
for age determination. Following Babloo Pasi [Babloo Pasi v. State
of Jharkhand, (2008) 13 SCC 133 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 266]
G and Anoop Singh cases [State of M.P. v. Anoop Singh, (2015) 7
SCC 773 : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 208] , we hold that ossification test
cannot be regarded as conclusive when it comes to ascertaining

7
(2017) 2 SCC 210
8
(2012) 10 SCC 489
9
H (2016) 12 SCC 744
MANOJ @ MONU @ VISHAL CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF 293
HARYANA & ANR. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

the age of a person. More so, the appellants herein have certainly A
crossed the age of thirty years which is an important factor to be
taken into account as age cannot be determined with precision. In
fact in the medical report of the appellants, it is stated that there
was no indication for dental x-rays since both the accused were
beyond 25 years of age.”
B
20. This Court in a judgment reported as Babloo Pasi v. State of
Jharkhand and Anr.10 held that it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay
down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It was held
as under:
“22. It is well settled that it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay C
down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. The
date of birth is to be determined on the basis of material on record
and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties. The
medical evidence as to the age of a person, though a very useful
guiding factor, is not conclusive and has to be considered along
with other cogent evidence.” D

21. In Ramdeo Chauhan v. State of Assam11, it was held that X-
Ray Ossification Test may provide a surer basis for determining the age
of an individual than the opinion of a medical expert but it can by no
means be so infallible and accurate test so as to indicate the exact date
of birth of the person concerned. It was held as under: E

“21. Relying upon a judgment of this Court in Jaya Mala v. Home
Secy., Govt. of J&K [(1982) 2 SCC 538 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 502 :
AIR 1982 SC 1297 : 1982 Cri LJ 1777] the learned defence counsel
submitted that the Court can take notice that the marginal error in
age ascertained by radiological examination is two years on either F
side. The aforesaid case is of no help to the accused inasmuch as
in that case the Court was dealing with the age of a detenu taken
in preventive custody and was not determining the extent of
sentence to be awarded upon conviction of an offence. Otherwise
also even if the observations made in the aforesaid judgment are G
taken note of, it does not help the accused in any case. The doctor
has opined the age of the accused to be admittedly more than 20
years and less than 25 years. The statement of the doctor is no

10
(2008) 13 SCC 133
11
(2001) 5 SCC 714 H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.

A more than an opinion, the court has to base its conclusions upon
all the facts and circumstances disclosed on examining of the
physical features of the person whose age is in question, in
conjunction with such oral testimony as may be available. An X-
ray ossification test may provide a surer basis for determining the
age of an individual than the opinion of a medical expert but it can
B
by no means be so infallible and accurate a test as to indicate the
exact date of birth of the person concerned. Too much of reliance
cannot be placed upon textbooks, on medical jurisprudence and
toxicology while determining the age of an accused. In this vast
country with varied latitudes, heights, environment, vegetation and
C nutrition, the height and weight cannot be expected to be uniform.”
22. It is pertinent to note here that Dr. Rajeev Chauhan, Member
of the Medical Board in his cross-examination admitted that a man with
the age of 30 to 32 years would also find the same fusion as found in a
man who has crossed the age of 22 years. Keeping in view the said
D statement, we find that the conclusion of the Medical Board that the
appellant was 23 to 24 years cannot be said to be conclusive or helpful
to determine the age of the appellant to be less than 18 years on the date
of commission of offence.
iv. Family Register
E 23. The Family Register Rules prescribes preparation of a Family
Register in the State of Uttar Pradesh which contains family-wise names
and particulars of all persons ordinarily residing in the village pertaining
to the Gaon Sabha. Such Rules have been framed under Section 110 of
the U.P Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. The High Court has relied on such
F certificate to hold that the appellant is not juvenile. Such Rules read as
under:
“1. (1) These rules may be called the U.P. Panchayat Raj
(Maintenance of Family Registers) Rules, 1970.
2. Form and preparation of family register.- A family register in
G form A shall be prepared containing family-wise the names and
particulars of all persons ordinarily residing in the village pertaining
to the Gaon Sabha. Ordinarily one page shall be allotted to each
family in the register. There shall be a separate section in the
register for families belonging to the Scheduled Castes. The register
shall be prepared in Hindi in Devanagri scrip.
H
MANOJ @ MONU @ VISHAL CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF 295
HARYANA & ANR. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

3. General conditions for registration in the register.- Every person A
who has been ordinarily resident within the area of the Gaon Sabha
shall be entitled to be registered in the family register.
Explanation.- A person shall be deemed to be ordinarily resident
in a village if he has been ordinarily residing in such village or is in
possession of a dwelling house therein ready for occupation. B
4. Quarterly entries in the family register.- At the beginning of
each quarter commencing from April in each year, the Secretary
of a Gaon Sabha shall make necessary changes in the family
register consequent upon births and deaths, if any occurring in the
previous quarter in each family. Such changes shall be laid before C
the next meeting of the Gaon Panchayat for information.
5. Correction of any existing entry.- The Assistant Development
Officer (Panchayat) may on an application made to him in this
behalf order the correction of any existing entry in the family
register and the Secretary of the Gaon Sabha shall then correct D
the Register accordingly.
6. Inclusion of names in the Register.- (1) Any person whose
name is not included in the family register may apply to the
Assistant Development Officer (Panchayat) for the inclusion of
his name therein. E
(2) The Assistant Development Officer (Panchayat) shall, if
satisfied, after such enquiry as he thinks fit that the applicant is
entitled to be registered in the Register, direct that the name of
the applicant be included therein and the Secretary of the Gaon
Sabha shall include the name accordingly. F
6A Any person aggrieved by an order made under Rule 5 or Rule
6 may, within 30 days from the date of such order prefer and
appeal to the Sub-Divisional Officer whose decision shall be final.
7. Custody and preservation of the register.-(1) The Secretary of
the Gaon Sabha shall be responsible for the safe custody of the G
family register.
(2) Every person shall have a right to inspect the Register and to
get attested copy of any entry or extract therefrom in such manner
and on payment of such fees, if any, as may be specified in Rule
73 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Rules. H
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.

A FORM A
(See RULE 2)
xxx xxx xxx
Note.- In the remarks column the number and date of the order, if
any, by which any name is added or struck off should be given
B
alongwith the signature of the person making the entry.”
24. A perusal of the Rules shows that one page is allotted to each
family and that any change in the family consequent upon the births and
deaths is required to be incorporated on such page. The changes are
also required to be laid before the next meeting of Gram Panchayat.
C Thus, it is evident that such Rules are statutorily framed in pursuance of
an Act. The entries in the register are required to be made by the officials
of the Gram Panchayat as part of their official duty. Neeraj Kumar,
Gram Panchayat Officer of Block Barwala was examined wherein he
stated that the entries in the register are made on the basis of information
D given by the family members, though he could not depose as to who had
made these entries.
25. Jagpal Singh, father of the appellant, had appeared as a witness
to depose that the appellant was born on 13.5.1993. He deposed that
after the birth of the appellant, a daughter was born on 15.4.1996 and
thereafter a son on 21.9.1997. The High Court relied upon Family
E
Register (Exhibit R-4) produced by Neeraj Kumar, RW-2, wherein the
year of birth of the appellant was mentioned as 1990 and 1996 as the
year of birth of daughter and 1998 as the year of birth of another son.
The years of birth of the brother and sister of the appellant are almost
the same as deposed by the father. The High Court found that such
F document cannot be excluded from consideration for the reason as such
document has been prepared in the ordinary course of business of the
Gram Panchayat.
26. Mr. Bhargava, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant
contends that the family register cannot be made basis of determining
G the age of the juvenile under the provisions of the Act and the Rules
framed thereunder. To support such contention, reliance was placed on
the judgments of the Allahabad High Court such as Hare Ram
Chowdhary v. State of U.P.12; Anil Kumar v. Suchita13; Bahadur v.

12
1989 SCC OnLine ALL 438
H 13
2009 SCC OnLine ALL 671
MANOJ @ MONU @ VISHAL CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF 297
HARYANA & ANR. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

State of U.P.14; Abdul Hakeem Pardhan and Others v. State of U.P.15 A
and Ram Murti Devi v. State of U.P. and Others16.
27. Hare Ram Chowdhary is an order referring the matter to
the Full Bench as to whether the decision of that Court in Pramod
Kumar Manglik v. Smt. Sadhana Rani17 is correctly decided. Since
no issue has been finally directed, therefore any observations in the B
reference order are not relevant.
28. In Anil Kumar, the dispute related to an election petition
regarding date of birth of a candidate named Suchita. She claimed herself
to be born on 03.07.1984 as against the date of birth entry in the school
records. The family register was relied upon to prove the date of death C
of her mother. The learned Single Judge Bench held that the family
register is only a document showing the names of the members of the
family and they are ordinarily resident of a village concerned. It cannot
be conclusive proof either of the date of birth or of death of any family
member mentioned therein.
D
29. In Bahadur, the accused relied upon entries in the family
register to declare him as juvenile, relying upon U.P. Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2004. The High Court rejected
the family register on the ground that the entry produced was on the
basis of register prepared in the year 2000 which was prepared on the
E
basis of original register of 1970, but the original register of the year
1970 was not produced.
30. In Abdul Hakeem Pardhan, the Division Bench of the High
Court held that entries made in the family register were never made in
the regular course of official duties. The family register may be an F
evidence to show that the person is living in the family but not an evidence
for ascertaining age.
31. In Ram Murti Devi, the entry in the family register was altered
by the office of District Magistrate. The said issue is not arising for
consideration before this Court. The parties were referred to seek remedy G
in terms of Rule 6A of the Family Register Rules.

14
2009 SCC OnLine ALL 1757
15
2015 SCC OnLine ALL 5201
16
2021 SCC OnLine ALL 260
17
1989 SCC OnLine ALL 125 H
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.

A 32. Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is attracted both in civil
and criminal proceedings. It contemplates that a register maintained in
the ordinary course of business by a public servant in discharge of his
official duty or by any other person in performance of a duty specially
enjoined by the law of the country in which such register is kept would
be a relevant fact. This Court in a judgment reported as Ravinder Singh
B
Gorkhi v. State of U.P.18 held as under:
“23. Section 35 of the Evidence Act would be attracted both in
civil and criminal proceedings. The Evidence Act does not make
any distinction between a civil proceeding and a criminal
proceeding. Unless specifically provided for, in terms of Section
C 35 of the Evidence Act, the register maintained in the ordinary
course of business by a public servant in the discharge of his
official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty
specially enjoined by the law of the country in which, inter alia,
such register is kept would be a relevant fact. Section 35, thus,
D requires the following conditions to be fulfilled before a document
is held to be admissible thereunder: (i) it should be in the nature of
the entry in any public or official register; (ii) it must state a fact in
issue or relevant fact; (iii) entry must be made either by a public
servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any person in
performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country;
E and (iv) all persons concerned indisputably must have an access
thereto.”
33. In Krishna Pal v. State of U.P.,19 the learned single judge of
Allahabad High Court held that a family register is a public record in
terms of the Evidence Act inasmuch as the same is prepared under the
F statutory provisions of Section 15 (xxiii)(e) of U.P. Panchayat Raj Act
read with Rule 2, Rule 67, Rules 142 to 144 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj
Rules, 1947. The family register is prepared under the Uttar Pradesh
Panchayat Raj (Maintenance of Family Registers) Rules, 1970. It is to
be noted that Form(A) also records the date of death of a family member.
G There is yet another Form namely Form (D) which is for registering the
date of birth and death. Both these Forms, therefore, record the date of
death of a person and they are prescribed under the Rules. Needless to
say that the Rules are framed by the State Government and the registers

18
(2006) 5 SCC 584
H 19
2010 SCC OnLine All 695
MANOJ @ MONU @ VISHAL CHAUDHARY v. STATE OF 299
HARYANA & ANR. [HEMANT GUPTA, J.]

prescribed for particular purposes are notified under the Rules. Reference A
may be made to Section 110 (vii) of the 1947 Act for the said purpose.
The Court held as under:-
“In my opinion, a presumption has to be drawn in respect of the
said public document and it cannot be merely disbelieved if the
Gram Panchayat Adhikari had not been produced to prove it. The B
copy of the family register is a public document and a presumption
as to its genuineness is accepted under Section 79 of the Indian
Evidence Act.”
34. In Shiv Patta v. State of U.P.,20 it was held that the family
register is maintained in discharge of statutory duties under the U.P. C
Panchayat Raj (Maintenance of Family Registers) Rules, 1970. Similarly,
date of death is maintained in discharge of statutory duty under
Registration of the Birth and Deaths Act, 1969 and it is a public document
within the meaning of section 74 of the Evidence Act, 1872. The certified
copy of these documents is admissible in evidence under section 77 of
the Evidence Act and carry presumption of correctness under section D
79 of the Act. High Court held that in the absence of any evidence to
prove that it was incorrect, its correctness is liable to be presumed under
section 79 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
35. Therefore, such Rules are not irrelevant as argued by Mr.
Bhargava. This family register does not only contain date of birth but E
also keeps the records of any additions in the family, though the
evidentiary value needs to be examined in each case.
36. We are unable to approve the broad view taken by the High
Court in some of the cases that Family Register is not relevant to determine
age of the family members. It is a question of fact as to how much F
evidentiary value is to be attached to the family register, but to say that
it is entirely not relevant would not be the correct enunciation of law.
The register is being maintained in accordance with the rules framed
under a statute. The entries made in the regular course of the affairs of
the Panchayat would thus be relevant but the extent of such reliance G
would be in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.
37. In terms of Rule 12(3)(iii) of the Rules, birth certificate issued
by corporation or municipal authority or a panchayat is a relevant

20
2013 SCC OnLine All 14202 H
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.

A document to prove the juvenility. The family register is not a birth
certificate. Therefore, it would not strictly fall within clause (iii) of Rule
12(3) of the Rules. Even Section 94(2)(ii) of the 2015 Act contemplates
a birth certificate issued by a panchayat to determine the age.
38. The appellant sought to rely upon juvenility only on the basis
B of school leaving record in his application filed under Section 7A of the
2000 Act. Such school record is not reliable and seems to be procured
only to support the plea of juvenility. The appellant has not referred to
date of birth certificate in his application as it was obtained subsequently.
Needless to say, the plea of juvenility has to be raised in a bonafide and
C truthful manner. If the reliance is on a document to seek juvenility which
is not reliable or dubious in nature, the appellant cannot be treated to be
juvenile keeping in view that the Act is a beneficial legislation. As also
held in Babloo Pasi, the provisions of the statute are to be interpreted
liberally but the benefit cannot be granted to the appellant who has
approached the Court with untruthful statement.
D
39. Therefore, we find that the appellant has approached the Court
with unclean hands as the documents relied upon by him are not genuine
and trustworthy. Thus, we find that the appellant cannot be given benefit
of juvenility. The view taken by the High Court is a possible view in law
and does not call for any interference in the present appeal. Accordingly,
E the appeal is dismissed.

Divya Pandey Appeal dismissed.
(Assisted by : Roopanshi Virang, LCRA)

F

G

H