Holding

The death sentences are commuted to life imprisonment for a minimum of 25 years as the case does not satisfy the 'rarest of rare' criteria and mitigating circumstances were not duly considered.

Summary

The appellants Manoj, Rahul (Govind) and Neha Verma were convicted for the triple murder of three women during a robbery on 19 June 2011 and sentenced to death, which the High Court affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the trial and appellate courts failed to provide an effective sentencing hearing under s.235(2) CrPC and that the evidence, including the manner of Neha's arrest, the delayed test identification parade, and certain forensic reports, was unreliable. While the prosecution proved the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court found that mitigating factors such as the accuseds' young age, lack of prior criminal record and good conduct in prison were not properly considered. Applying the "rarest of rare" test and the five golden principles, the Court concluded that death was not warranted and commuted the sentences to life imprisonment for a minimum term of 25 years.

Issues considered

The appropriateness of the death penalty under the 'rarest of rare' doctrine
Whether the accused were afforded a proper sentencing hearing under s.235(2) CrPC
The reliability of key evidential elements: Neha's arrest, TIP delay, chance witness testimony, fingerprint, DNA and shoe‑print analyses
The consideration of mitigating circumstances in sentencing
Whether the circumstantial evidence satisfied the five golden principles for conviction

Legislation cited

Arms Act, 1959s. 25(1-B)(B), s. 27
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 102(3), s. 235(2), s. 313
Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920s. 2(a), s. 4(a)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 397, s. 449

Subjects

death penaltyrarest of raresentencing hearingmitigating circumstancescircumstantial evidenceforensic evidencefingerprint analysisDNA evidencetest identification paradecapital punishment

Judgment

452 [2022]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 9 S.C.R. 452 [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A MANOJ & ORS.
v.
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 248-250 of 2015)
B MAY 20, 2022
[UDAY UMESH LALIT, S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND
BELA. M. TRIVEDI, JJ.]
Sentence / Sentencing – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 397 –
Triple murder, in course of robbery – Three accused – Trial Court
C
convicted the accused-appellants u/s. 302 IPC and imposed death
penalty on them – High Court confirmed the conviction – On appeal,
held: Both the trial Court and High Court failed to provide an
effective sentencing hearing to the accused at the relevant stage
which is a right u/s 235(2) CrPC – The crime that the appellants
D were held guilty of, was heinous, and its execution was vicious and
cruel – The repeated stabbings of two of the deceased almost in a
frenzy on the one hand and the defenceless state of the victims, on
the other, highlights that the accused were willing to go ahead with
their plans of robbing after eliminating the three women – At the
same time, the young age of the accused at the time of the incident
E
and lack of criminal antecedents cannot be lost sight of – Prosecution
case is silent on any real motive that may have instigated or moved
the three accused to have pre-planned for the commission of murder
other than robbery itself – Death sentence of all three accused
commuted to life imprisonment for a minimum term of 25 years –
F Arms Act – s.27.
Criminal Trial – Death Sentence – When to be awarded –
Discussed – A two-step process has to be followed to determine
whether a case deserves death sentence – Firstly, that the case
belongs to the ‘rarest of rare’ category, and secondly, that the option
G of life imprisonment would simply not suffice – For the first step,
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances would have to be
identified and considered equally – For the second, the court has
to consider whether the alternative of life imprisonment was
unquestionable foreclosed as the sentencing aim of reformation was
unachievable, for which the State must provide material.
H
452
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 453

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Test Identification A
Parade – TIPs are meant to test witness veracity and their capability
to identify unknown persons – TIPs should be conducted at the
earliest possible time to eliminate the chance of accused being shown
to witnesses before the identification parade, which might otherwise
affect such witnesses’ memory – No provision of law enables an
B
accused to claim TIP as a matter of right – Delay or failure in holding
TIP ipso facto does not render the evidence inadmissible or
unacceptable, however it affects the credibility and weight attached
to such identification.
Evidence Act, 1872 – Circumstantial Evidence – Principles
applicable to appreciation of evidence – The correct approach of C
courts trying criminal cases involving circumstantial evidence should
be that the circumstances alleged, be fully established – All the facts
so established should be consistent only with hypothesis of the guilt
of the accused – Circumstances should be conclusive and of such
tendency that they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis D
but the one proposed to be proved.
Criminal Trial – Practice and Procedures – Omission of
prosecution witness to state a fact – Effect of: The omission of some
of the prosecution witnesses to mention a particular fact, or
corroborate something, which is deposed to by other witnesses does E
not ipso facto favour an accused – However, more important is
whether the omission to depose about a fact is so fundamental that
the prosecution version becomes shaky and incredulous.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 24 – Role of Public
Prosecutor in Criminal Trial – Public prosecutor occupies a statutory F
office of high regard – They are not part of the investigating agency,
rather an independent statutory authority who serve as officers to
the court – The role of the public prosecutor is intrinsically dedicated
to conducting a fair trial and not for a ‘thirst to reach the case in
conviction’.
G
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.172, 173 –
Maintenance of case diary mandatory – Police have the power to
investigate freely and fairly, in the course of which, it is mandatory
to maintain a diary where the day-to-day proceedings are to be
recorded with specific mention of time of events, places visited,
departure and reporting back, statements recorded, etc – Criminal H
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A Court is empowered to summon these diaries u/s 172(2) for purpose
of inquiry or trial, s. 173(3) makes it clear that the accused cannot
claim any right to peruse them, unless the police themselves, rely on
it to refresh their memory or if the court uses it for contradicting the
testimony of the police officers.
B Criminal Trial – Fundamental canons of criminal
jurisprudence founded on Arts. 20 and 21 of the Constitution require
not just the investigating agency but also courts in their own
independent field, to ensure that investigation is fair and does not
hamper the individual’s freedom, except in accordance with law,
i.e., ensure adherence to the rule of law.
C
Criminal Trial – Practical guidelines to collect mitigating
circumstances – Trial Court must elicit information from the accused
and the State both – The State must for an offence carrying capital
punishment - at the appropriate stage, produce material which is
preferably collected beforehand, before the Sessions Court
D disclosing psychiatric and psychological evaluation of the accused
– This will help establish proximity to the accused person’s frame of
mind – The State must in a time-bound manner collect additional
information pertaining to the accused –Information regarding the
accused’s jail conduct and behaviour, activities the accused involved
E themselves in, and other related details should be called for in the
form of a report from the relevant jail authorities.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sentencing – An effective
sentencing hearing to the accused at the relevant stage is a right
under s.235(2).
F Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD:1. The goal of reformation is ideal, and what society
must strive towards – there are many references to it peppered
in this court’s jurisprudence across the decades – but what is
lacking is a concrete framework that can measure and evaluate
G it. Unfortunately, this is mirrored by the failure to implement prison
reforms of a meaningful kind, which has left the process of
incarceration and prisons in general, to be a space of limited
potential for systemic reformation. The goal of reformative
punishment requires systems that actively enable reformation
and rehabilitation, as a result of nuanced policy making. As a small
H
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 455

step to correct these skewed results and facilitate better A
evaluation of whether there is a possibility for the accused to be
reformed (beyond vague references to conduct, family
background, etc.), it is necessary to frame practical guidelines
for the courts to adopt and implement, till the legislature and
executive, formulate a coherent framework through legislation.
B
These guidelines may also offer guidance or ideas, that such a
legislative framework could benefit from, to systematically collect
and evaluate information on mitigating circumstances. [Para 212]
[573-E-H]
2.1. There is urgent need to ensure that mitigating
circumstances are considered at the trial stage, to avoid slipping C
into a retributive response to the brutality of the crime, as is
noticeably the situation in a majority of cases reaching the
appellate stage. To do this, the trial court must elicit information
from the accused and the state, both. The state, must - for an
offence carrying capital punishment - at the appropriate stage, D
produce material which is preferably collected beforehand, before
the Sessions Court disclosing psychiatric and psychological
evaluation of the accused. This will help establish proximity (in
terms of timeline), to the accused person’s frame of mind (or
mental illness, if any) at the time of committing the crime and
offer guidance on mitigating factors (1), (5), (6) and (7) spelled E
out in Bachan Singh. Even for the other factors of (3) and (4)- an
onus placed squarely on the State- conducting this form of
psychiatric and psychological evaluation close on the heels of
commission of the offence, will provide a baseline for the appellate
courts to use for comparison, i.e., to evaluate the progress of the F
accused towards reformation, achieved during the incarceration
period. [Paras 213 & 214][574-B-E]
2.2. The State must in a time-bound manner, collect
additional information pertaining to the accused. An illustrative,
but not exhaustive list is as follows: a) Age; b) Early family G
background (siblings, protection of parents, any history of violence
or neglect); c) Present family background (surviving family
members, whether married, has children, etc.; d) Type and level
of education; e) Socio-economic background (including conditions

H
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A of poverty or deprivation, if any.); f) Criminal antecedents (details
of offence and whether convicted, sentence served, if any); g)
Income and the kind of employment (whether none, or temporary
or permanent etc); h) Other factors such as history of unstable
social behaviour, or mental or psychological ailment(s), alienation
of the individual (with reasons, if any) etc. This information should
B
mandatorily be available to the trial court, at the sentencing stage.
The accused too, should be given the same opportunity to produce
evidence in rebuttal, towards establishing all mitigating
circumstances. [Para 215][574-E-H; 575-A-C]
2.3 Information regarding the accused’s jail conduct and
C behaviour, work done (if any), activities the accused has involved
themselves in, and other related details should be called for in
the form of a report from the relevant jail authorities (i.e., probation
and welfare officer, superintendent of jail, etc.). If the appeal is
heard after a long hiatus from the trial court’s conviction, or High
D Court’s confirmation, as the case may be – a fresh report (rather
than the one used by the previous court) from the jail authorities
is recommended, for an more exact and complete understanding
of the contemporaneous progress made by the accused, in the
time elapsed. The jail authorities must also include a fresh
psychiatric and psychological report which will further evidence
E the reformative progress, and reveal post-conviction mental
illness, if any. [Para 216][575-C-E]
3.1. In the instant case, there can be no doubt that the crime
committed by the three accused was brutal, and grotesque. The
three defenceless victims were women of different age groups
F (22, 46, 76 years) who were caught off-guard and severely
physically assaulted, resulting in their death, in the safety and
comfort of their own home. To have killed three generations of
women from the family of PW-1, is without a doubt, grotesque.
The manner of the offence was also vicious and pitiless – Ashlesha
G and Rohini, were stabbed repeatedly to their death, while Megha
was shot point blank in the face. The post-mortem (Ex. P44)
reflects that the stab wounds were extensive – ranging across
the bodies of the victim. The extensive bleeding at the crime

H
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 457

scene further reflects cruel and inhumane manner of attack, A
against the three women. The crime in itself, could no doubt be
characterised as “extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical,
revolting or dastardly manner so as to arouse intense and extreme
indignation of the community” as defined in Machhi Singh. These
are the aggravating circumstances. On an application of the
B
Bachan Singh test (as clarified and explained, in numerous
decisions), however, the mitigating circumstances need to be
considered (and that too, liberally and expansively). [Para 218 &
219][576-C-G]
3.2. It is unfortunate to note that both the trial Court, and
High Court, failed to provide an effective sentencing hearing to C
the accused, at the relevant stage, which is a right under Section
235(2) CrPC recognised by this court in several cases. In fact, it
was argued by the accused that the trial court in contravention of
this court’s judgments, had proceeded to hear on sentencing
almost immediately, depriving the accused of the opportunity to D
put forth their case for a less stringent sentence. The trial court
order on sentencing, records in passing - the plea of ‘young age’
and ‘socio-economic factors’ as mitigating circumstances, but
reflects, at best, a mechanical consideration of the same. Swayed
by the brutality of the crime and “shock of the collective and
judicial conscience”, the High Court affirmed imposition of the E
death penalty solely on the basis of the aggravating circumstances
of the crime, with negligible consideration of mitigating
circumstances of the criminal. This is in direct contravention of
Bachan Singh. [Para 223][578-B-E]
3.3. The crime that the appellants have been held guilty of, F
is heinous; its execution was vicious and cruel, by any stretch of
imagination. The deception practised by the appellants, in entering
the flat, and, when encountering resistance, attacking the three
women, was calculated and ruthless. The repeated stabbings of
two of the deceased, almost in a frenzy, on the one hand, and the G
defenceless state of the victims, on the other, highlights that the
accused were willing to go ahead with their plans (of robbing)
after eliminating the women of three generations. No doubt, two
of the victims appear to have put up resistance, if one looks at

H
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A the stab wounds inflicted all over their bodies, including on their
arms and faces. They were unarmed and weak. At the same time,
the young age of the accused at the time of the incident (35, 20,
22 respectively) and lack of criminal antecedents (except in the
case of Manoj, who was allegedly involved in a case of petty theft)
cannot be lost sight of. Further, the prosecution case is silent on
B
any real motive that may have instigated or moved the three
accused to have pre-planned for the commission of murder – other
than robbery, itself. This coupled with the fact that Rahul was
shot in his leg during the commission of the crime, indicates that
perhaps it is reasonable to assume that they were amateurs in a
C robbing-gone-wrong situation, who were not intent on taking the
lives of these three women. One can surmise that having ventured
to rob, perhaps they did not contemplate the kind of resistance
that was put up by the victims, which led them to act the way they
did, to continue with their plan, and ensure that the victims did not
survive to tell the tale. [Paras 224 & 225][578-D-F; 579-A-D]
D
3.4. The reports received from the Superintendent of Jail
reflect that each of the three accused, have a record of overall
good conduct in prison and display inclination to reform. It is
evident that they have already, while in prison, taken steps
towards bettering their lives and of those around them, which
E coupled with their young age unequivocally demonstrates that
there is in fact, a probability of reform. On consideration of all
the circumstances overall, it is found that the option of life
imprisonment is certainly not foreclosed. Imposition of death
sentence would be unwarranted in the present case. It would be
F appropriate and in the overall interests of justice to commute
the death sentence of all three accused, to life imprisonment for
a minimum term of 25 years. [Para 226 & 228][579-D-E; 580-A-
B]
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684;
G Machhi Singh and Others v. State of Punjab, [1983]
SCR 3 413; Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of
Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 : [1985] 1 SCR 88;
Anil v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 4 SCC 69 : [2014]
3 SCR 34 and Rajesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi)
(2011) 13 SCC 706 – relied on.
H
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 459

Umesh Tukaram Padwal & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra A
(2019) 8 SCC 567; Lal Singh and others v. State of
U.P 2003 (12) SCC 554; Muthuswami v. State of Madras
AIR 1954 SC 4; Mohammed Abdul Hafeez v. State of
AP (1983) 1 SCC 143; Mohd. Aman & Anr. v. State of
Rajastha (1997) 10 SCC 44; Chandran @ Surendran
B
& Anr. v. State of Kerala (1991) Supp (1) SCC 39; Noor
Aga v.State of Punjab (2008) 16 SCC 417 : [2008] 10
SCR 379; Chunthuram v. State of Chhattisgarh (2020)
10 SCC 733 : [2020] 8 SCR 1071; Reena Hazarika v.
State of Assam (2019) 13 SCC 289 : [2018]
13 SCR 1108; Suresh Sakharamb Nangare v. State of C
Maharashtra (2012) 9 SCC 249 : [2012] 7 SCR 1186;
State of Andhra Pradesh v.Dr. M.V. Ramana Reddy &
Ors (1991) 4 SCC 536 : [1991] 3 SCR 600; Rajesh
Govind Jagesha v. State of Maharashtra (1999) 8 SCC
428 : [1999] 4 Suppl. SCR 277; Matru @ Girish
D
Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1971) 2 SCC 75 :
[1971] 3 SCR 914; Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab
AIR 1956 SC 415; Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab 1996
(6) SCALE 72; Hari Om v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021)
4 SCC 345; SMoosa Patel v. State of Gujarat (2011) 2
SCC 198 : [2011] 2 SCR 121; Puran v. State of Punja E
AIR 1953 SC 459 Darya Singh v. State of Punjab [1964]
7 SCR 397; Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab (2009) 9
SCC 719 : [2009] 13 SCR 774; Malkhan Singh v. State
of MP. (2003) 5 SCC 746 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 443;
Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1978) 3 SCC 86 :
F
[1978] 3 SCR 694; Shyamlal Ghosh v. State of West
Bengal (2012) 7 SCC 646 : [2012] 10 SCR 95; Sonvir
v. State (NCT) of Delh (2018) 8 SCC 24 : [2018] 7
SCR 830; Ashish Jain & Ors. v. Makrand Singh (2019)
3 SCC 770 : [2019] 1 SCR 345; Hari Om @ Hero v
State of UP (2021) 4 SCC 345; Dharam Deo Yadav v. G
State of UP (2015) 5 SCC 509; Pantangi Balarama
Venkata Ganesh v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2009) 14
SCC 607 : [2009] 11 SCR 636; Santosh Kumar Singh
v. State Through CBI (2010) 9 SCC 747 : [2010] 13
SCR 901; Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu v. John David
H
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A (2011) 5 SCC 509 : [2011] 7 SCR 354; Krishan Kumar
Malik v. State of Haryana (2011) 7 SCC 130 : [ 2011]
8 SCR 774; Surendra Koli v. State of Uttar Pradesh &
Ors. (2011) 4 SCC 80 : [2011] 2 SCR 939; Sandeep v.
State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 6 SCC 107 : [2012] 5
SCR 952; Rajkumar v. State of Madhya Prades (2014)
B
5 SCC 353 : [2014] 3 SCR 212; Mukesh & Ors. v.
State for NCT of Delhi & Ors. (2017) 6 SCC 1 : [2017]
6 SCR 1; Anil v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 4 SCC
69 : [2014] 3 SCR 34; Pattu Rajan v. The State of Tamil
Nad (2019) 4 SCC 771 : [2019] 5 SCR 535; State of
C Bihar v. Kapil Singh [1968] 3 SCR 310; Mohd. Aman
v. State of Rajasthan (1997) 10 SCC 44; Balbir Singh
v State of Punjab 1996 (6) SCALE 72; Hanumant v.
The State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1953 SC 343; Tufail
v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1969) 3 SCC 198; Ram Gopal
v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1972 SC 656; State of
D
U.P. v. Anil Singh (1988) Supp SCC 686; C. Muniappan
v. State of Tamil Nadu (2010) 9 SCC 567 : [2010] 10
SCR 262; Surajit Sarkar v. State of West Bengal (2013)
2 SCC 146 : [2012] 13 SCR 634; Shanker & Ors. v.
State of Madhya Prades (2018) 15 SCC 725 : [2018] 6
E SCR 814; Harijana Thirupala and Ors. v. Public
Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. Hyderabad (2002) 6
SCC 470 : [2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 379; Rammi @
Rameshwar v. State of Madhya Prades (1999) 8 SCC
649 : [1999] 3 Suppl. SCR 1; Appabhai and Anr. v.
State of Gujarat 1988 Supp (1) SCC 241; Vinod Kumar
F
v. State of Haryana (2015) 3 SCC 138 : [2015] 1
SCR 328; Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of
Maharashtr (1973) 2 SCC 793 : [1974] 1 SCR 489;
Kartike Malhar v. State of Bihar (1996) 1 SCC 614 :
[1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 239; Ramashish Yadav v. State of
G Bihar (1999) 8 SCC 555 : [1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 285;
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra (1994)
4 SCC 602 : [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 360; Deepak
Aggarwal v. Keshav Kaushik (2013) 5 SCC 277 : [2013]
1 SCR 402; Shiv Kumar v. Hukam Chan (1999) 7 SCC
467 : [1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 81; Siddharth Vasisht @
H
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 461

Manu Sharma v. State of NCT Delhi (2010) 6 SCC 1 : A
[2010] 4 SCR 103; Mukund Lal v. Union of India 1989
Supp (1) SCC 622 : [1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 524; Malkiat
Singh v. State of Punjab (1991) 4 SCC 341 : [1991] 2
SCR 256; Inadequacies and Deficiencies, in re v. State
of Andhra Pradesh (2021) 10 SCC 598; Jagmohan
B
Singh v. State of Uttar Prades (1973) 1 SCC 20 : [1973]
2 SCR 541; Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v.
State of Maharashtra (2009) 6 SCC 498 : [2009] 9
SCR 90; Shankar KisanraoKhade v. State of
Maharashtra (2013) 5 SCC 546 : [2013] 6 SCR 949;
Swamy Shraddananda (2) @ Mural Manohar Mishra C
v. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767 : [2008] 11
SCR 93; Sangeet & Anr. v. State of Haryana (2013) 2
SCC 452 : [2012] 13 SCR 85; Mohd. Farooq Abdul
Gafur & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra (2010) 14 SCC
641 : [2009] 12 SCR 1093; Chhannu Lal Verma v. State
D
of Chattisgarh (2019) 12 SCC 438 : [2018] 14
SCR 355; Swamy Shraddananda (2) @ Mural Manohar
Mishra v. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767 :
[2008] 11 SCR 93; Sangeet & Anr. v. State of Haryana
(2013) 2 SCC 452 : [2012] 13 SCR 85; Manoharan v.
State by Inspector of Police, Variety Hall Police Station, E
(2019) 7 SCC 716 : [2019] 18 SCR 1007; Sangeet &
Anr. v. State of Haryana (2013) 2 SCC 452 : [2012] 13
SCR 85; Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of
Maharashtra (2013) 5 SCC 546 : [2013] 6 SCR 949;
Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra
F
(2019) 12 SCC 460 : [2018] 14 SCR 585; Ravji v. State
of Haryan (1996) SCC 2 175 : [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR
195; Surja Ram v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 6 SCC
271 : 1996] 6 Suppl. SCR 783; Dayanidhi Bisoi v. State
of Orissa (2003) 9 SCC 310; Mohan Anna Chavan v.
State of Maharashtra, (2008) 7 SCC 561 : [2008] 8 G
SCR 1072; Bantu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 11
SCC 113 : [2008] 11 SCR 184; Shivaji v. State of
Maharashtra, (2008) 15 SCC 268; State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Sattan @ Satyendra and Ors. (2009) 4 SCC
736 : [2009] 3 SCR 643; Rajesh Kumar v. State (2011)
H
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A 13 SCC 706; Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of
Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767 : [2008] 11 SCR 93;
Union of India v. V Sriharan (2016) 7 SCC 1 : [2015]
14 SCR 613; Lehna v. State of Haryana (2002) 3 SCC
76 : [2002] 1 SCR 377; Mahesh Dhanaji Shinde v.
State of Maharashtra (2014) 4 SCC 292 : [2014] 3
B
SCR 406; Gurvail Singh v. State of Punjab (2013) 2
SCC 713 : [2013] 1 SCR 783; Mulla & Anr. v. State of
U.P. (2010) 3 SCC 508 : [2010] 2 SCR 633;
Kamleshwar Paswan v. UT Chandigarh (2011) 11 SCC
564 : [2011] 1 SCR 647; Sunil Gaikwad v. State of
C Maharashtra (2014) 1 SCC 129 : [2013] 9 SCR 295;
Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014) 3 SCC
1 : [2014] 1 SCR 609; Dilip Premnarayan Tiwari v. State
of Maharashtra (2010) 1 SCC 775 : [2009] 16
SCR 322; Malkiat Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab
(1991) 4 SCC 341 : [1991] 2 SCR 256; Muniappan v.
D State of T.N. (1981) 3 SCC 11 : [1981] 3 SCR 270;
Birju v. State of M.P., (2014) 3 SCC 421 : [2014] 1
SCR 1047; Bharat Singh vs. State (NCT of Delhi)
Order dated 17.04.2014, DSR No. 1/2014; Anil v. State
of Maharashtra (2014) 4 SCC 69 : [2014] 3 SCR 34;
E Md. Mannan @ Abdul Mannam v. State of Bihar (2019)
16 SCC 584 : [2019] 8 SCR 266; Allaudin Mian v. State
of Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 5 : [1989] 2 SCR 498;
RameshbhaiChandubhai Rathod v. State of Gujarat
(2009) 5 SCC 740; Rajesh Kumar v. State (NCT of
Delhi) (2011) 13 SCC 706; Mukesh v. State (NCT of
F Delhi) (2017) 3 SCC 717; Chhannulal Verma v. State
of Chhattisgarh (2019) 12 SCC 438 : [2018] 14
SCR 355; Santa Singh v. State of Punjab (1967) 4 SCC
190; Allaudin Mian v. State of Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 5 :
[1989] 2 SCR 498; Ajay Pandit @ Jagdish v. State of
G Maharashtra (2012) 8 SCC 43 : [2012] 10 SCR 70;
Gurvail Singh & Anr v. State of Punjab (2013) 2 SCC
713 : [2013] 1 SCR 783; Amit v. State of Uttar Pradesh
(2012) 4 SCC 107 : [2012] 1 SCR 1009; Shyam Singh
@ Bhima v. State of Maharashtra (2017) 11 SCC 265;
Ramnaresh & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh (2012) 4
H SCC 257 : [2012] 3 SCR 630 and M.A Antony @
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 463

Antappan v. State of Kerala (2020) 17 SCC 751 – A
referred to.
R v Dohoney & Adams 1997 1997 (1) Crl App Rep
369; District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial
District v. Osborne 557 U.S. 52 (2009) – referred to.
185th Report, on Review of the Indian Evidence Act, 2003 B
– referred to.
Case Law Reference
(2019) 8 SCC 567 referred to Para 24
[2003] 12 SCC 554 referred to Para 26 C
AIR 1954 SC 4 referred to Para 26
(1983) 1 SCC 143 referred to Para 26
(1997) 10 SCC 44 referred to Para 36
(1991) Supp (1) SCC 39 referred to Para 36 D

[2008] 10 SCR 379 referred to Para 39
[2020] 8 SCR 1071 referred to Para 39
[2018] 13 SCR 1108 referred to Para 40
E
[2012] 7 SCR 1186 referred to Para 45
[1991] 3 SCR 600 referred to Para 48
[1999] 4 Suppl. SCR 277 referred to Para 48
[1971] 3 SCR 914 referred to Para 48
F
AIR 1956 SC 415 referred to Para 49
[1996] 6 SCALE 72 referred to Para 49
(2021) 4 SCC 345 referred to Para 50
[1985] 1 SCR 88 relied on Para 51
G
[2011] 2 SCR 121 referred to Para 65
AIR 1953 SC 459 referred to Para 94
[1964] 7 SCR 397 referred to Para 94
[2009] 13 SCR 774 referred to Para 94 H
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 443 referred to Para 100
[1978] 3 SCR 694 referred to Para 100
[2012] 10 SCR 95 referred to Para 100
[2018] 7 SCR 830 referred to Para 114
B [2019] 1 SCR 345 referred to Para 114
(2021) 4 SCC 345 referred to Para 116
(2015) 5 SCC 509 referred to Para 137
[2009] 11 SCR 636 referred to Para 139
C
[2010] 13 SCR 901 referred to Para 139
[2011] 7 SCR 354 referred to Para 139
[2011] 8 SCR 774 referred to Para 139
[2011] 2 SCR 939 referred to Para 139
D
[2012] 5 SCR 952 referred to Para 139
[2014] 3 SCR 212 referred to Para 139
[2017] 6 SCR 1 referred to Para 139
[2014] 3 SCR 34 relied on Para 139
E
[2019] 5 SCR 535 referred to Para 140
[1968] 3 SCR 310 referred to Para 148
(1997) 10 SCC 44 referred to Para 148

F [1996] 6 SCALE 72 referred to Para 148
AIR 1953 SC 343 referred to Para 149
(1969) 3 SCC 198 referred to Para 149
AIR 1972 SC 656 referred to Para 149
G (1988) Supp SCC 686 referred to Para 157
[2010] 10 SCR 262 referred to Para 157
[2012] 13 SCR 634 referred to Para 157
[2018] 6 SCR 814 referred to Para 157
H [2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 379 referred to Para 157
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 465

[1999] 3 Suppl. SCR 1 referred to Para 158 A
1988 Supp (1) SCC 241 referred to Para 158
[2015] 1 SCR 328 referred to Para 159
[1974] 1 SCR 489 referred to Para 160
[1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 239 referred to Para 160 B
[1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 285 referred to Para 168
[1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 360 referred to Para 171
[2013] 1 SCR 402 referred to Para 171
C
[1999] 2 Suppl. SCR 81 referred to Para 171
[2010] 4 SCR 103 referred to Para 171
[1988] 3 Suppl. SCR 524 referred to Para 173
[1991] 2 SCR 256 referred to Para 173
D
(2021) 10 SCC 598 referred to Para 178
(1980) 2 SCC 684 relied on Para 182
[1973] 2 SCR 541 referred to Para 183
[2009] 9 SCR 90 referred to Para 185
E
[2013] 6 SCR 949 referred to Para 185
[2008] 11 SCR 93 referred to Para 186
[2012] 13 SCR 85 referred to Para 186
[2009] 12 SCR 1093 referred to Para 186 F
[2018] 14 SCR 355 referred to Para 186
[1983] SCR 3 413 relied on Para 189
[2008] 11 SCR 93 referred to Para 189
[2012] 13 SCR 85 referred to Para 189 G
[2019] 18 SCR 1007 referred to Para 189
[2012] 13 SCR 85 referred to Para 193
[2013] 6 SCR 949 referred to Para 194
[2018] 14 SCR 585 referred to Para 195 H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 195 referred to Para 198
[1996] 6 Suppl. SCR 783 referred to Para 198
(2003) 9 SCC 310 referred to Para 198
[2008] 8 SCR 1072 referred to Para 198
B [2008] 11 SCR 184 referred to Para 198
(2008) 15 SCC 268 referred to Para 198
[2009] 3 SCR 643 referred to Para 198
(2011) 13 SCC 706 relied on Para 199
C
[2008] 11 SCR 93 referred to Para 200
[2015] 14 SCR 613 referred to Para 200
[2002] 1 SCR 377 referred to Para 203
[2014] 3 SCR 406 referred to Para 204
D
[2013] 1 SCR 783 referred to Para 204
[2010] 2 SCR 633 referred to Para 204
[2011] 1 SCR 647 referred to Para 204
[2013] 9 SCR 295 referred to Para 204
E
[2014] 1 SCR 609 referred to Para 204
[2009] 16 SCR 322 referred to Para 204
[1991] 2 SCR 256 referred to Para 205

F [1981] 3 SCR 270 referred to Para 206
[ 2014] 3 SCR 34 referred to Para 206
[2014] 1 SCR 1047 referred to Para 210
[2014] 3 SCR 34 referred to Para 217
G [2019] 8 SCR 266 referred to Para 223
[1989] 2 SCR 498 referred to Para 223
(2009) 5 SCC 740 referred to Para 223
(2011) 13 SCC 706 referred to Para 223
H (2017) 3 SCC 717 referred to Para 223
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 467

[2018] 14 SCR 355 referred to Para 223 A
(1967) 4 SCC 190 referred to Para 223
[1989] 2 SCR 498 referred to Para 223
(2011) 13 SCC 706 referred to Para 223
[2012] 10 SCR 70 referred to Para 223 B
[2013] 1 SCR 783 referred to Para 226
[2012] 1 SCR 1009 referred to Para 226
(2017) 11 SCC 265 referred to Para 226
C
[2012] 3 SCR 630 referred to Para 226
(2020) 17 SCC 751 referred to Para 226
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
Nos. 248-250 of 2015
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.09.2014 of the High Court D
of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in Criminal Reference No.4/2013/DA/8
and Criminal Appeal Nos.3 and 266 of 2014 respectively.
Ms. Anjana Prakash, Sr. Adv., Kaustubh Anshuraj, Shri Singh,
Ms. Shivani Misra, Ms. Shreya Rastogi, Anirudh Sanganeria, Ms. Sridevi
Panikkar, Advs. for the Appellants. E
Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi, AAG, Sunny Choudhary, Ms. Saumya
Kapoor, Siddhanth, Shikhar Kishore, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J. F
1
1. The present judgment will dispose of three appeals preferred
by three accused persons. They were convicted under Section 302 of
Indian Penal Code (IPC) (3 counts) imposed with death penalty by the
judgment and orders of the First Additional Sessions Judge, Indore 2.
This was confirmed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya G
Pradesh atIndore3.

1
Criminal Appeal No. 248-250/2015
2
Dated 13.12.2013 passed in Sessions Case No. 536/2011
3
Dated 29.09.2014 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 3/2014, 266/2014 & Criminal
Reference No. 04/2013 H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A 2. The appellants (Manoj, Rahul @ Govind and Neha Verma,
hereafter referred by their names) were convicted for offence punishable
under Section 302 IPC (three counts) for committing the murder, during
the course of robbery, of Megha Deshpande, Ashlesha Deshpande and
Smt. Rohini Phadke on 19.06.2011. All three appellants were sentenced
to capital punishment with fine of 1000/- on each count, and in default
B
of payment of fine, to undergo 6 months additional rigorous imprisonment
(RI) on each count. Under Section 397 IPC, they were sentenced to
undergo 10 years RI with fine of 1000/- and in default of payment of
fine, 6 months additional RI. Under Section 449 IPC, they were
sentenced to undergo 10 years RI with fine of 1000/-, and in default of
C payment of fine, 6 months additional RI.Manoj and Rahul@ Govind were
also convicted for offence punishable under Section 25(1-B) (B) of the
Arms Act and sentenced to undergo 1 yearRI with fine of 1000/- and
in default of payment of fine, 6 months additional RI.Rahul wasalso
convicted under Section 27 of the Arms Act and sentenced to undergo 3
D years RI with fine of 3000/- and in default of payment of fine, 6
months additional RI.
Facts
3. The facts are that PW-1 Niranjan Deshpande rented a part of
House no. 24 Shrinagar Main from its landlord PW-5 Vishal Pandey,
E few days before the date of incident i.e., 19.06.2011. Niranjan’s wife
Megha, daughter Ashlesha and mother-in-law Smt. Rohini Phadke were
at those premises, residing there. In the evening of that dayanother tenant
PW-2 Dipti Kapil who lived on the same floor told PW-5 Vishal Pandey
that Niranjan’s flat was bolted from the outside and reported seeing
F patches of blood on the door. On receiving this information, the landlord
went to enquire. When no one opened the door, he looked through the
open window and saw the dead bodies of the deceased persons lying
near the bedroom door and blood was on the floor. He called his neighbour
PW-9 Mahesh Parmar and Mukesh on the spot, before telephoning PW-
1 Niranjan Deshpande to reach there immediately. PW-5 Vishal Pandey
G also lodged a first information report (FIR) at Police Station MIG Colony,
Indore4 which was recorded by PW-31 Inspector Mohan Singh Yadav
(investigating officer”IO”). The FIRalleging that some unknown persons
murdered the three deceased ladies with sharp weapons and fled the

4
H FIR No. 401/2011 dated 19.06.2011
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 469
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

scene, registered offences punishable under Section 302 IPC and 25 A
Arms Act.
4. The police reached the premises and prepared a spot map of
the crime scene. Several articles found at the spot were seized. It was
later (on the next day) reported that Megha’s golden bangles and
Mangalsutra, Rohini Phadke’s two gold bangles, and Ashlesha’s mobile B
phone, camera and ATM cards were missing. Investigation started and
on 22.06.2011 at around 06:00 AM, PW-28 Vijay Chauhan while on
patrolling duty, spotted Neha Verma outside an ATM near L.I.G, under
suspicious circumstances. On receiving this information, the IO (PW-
31) along with PW-4 Banno Solanki and others, reached the spot. Neha C
Verma was searched. This yielded an ATM card, which belonged to the
deceased Ashlesha. Neha was taken for questioning; her disclosure
statements led to her subsequent arrest. Based on information she
provided, the police recovered some robbed articles from her house.
5. Upon disclosure statements of Neha the other accused i.e., D
Rahul @ Govind and Manoj were arrested and from their possession
the robbed jewellery, knife anda pistol was seized. Investigation revealed
that during the alleged incident Rahul @ Govind inadvertently shot his
own foot and recorded a false FIR in this regard at the Annapurna Police
Station by dehatinalisi dated 19.06.20115 against unknown persons.
Accordingly, an FIR6 was registered by PW-30 ASI R.S. Makwana for E
offences punishable under Sections 294, 307 and 34 IPC. Manoj was
also injured during the incident and secured treatment from PW-8 Dr.
Achutmal Tejwani. The clothes and shoes worn by the accused were
seized; and parts of the broken and disposed mobile phone and camera
were also recovered and seized pursuant to their disclosure statements. F
The appellants underwent identification parade. Their fingerprints were
examined, the seized articles were sent for chemical and DNA test and
permission for prosecution was taken.
6. After conclusion of investigation, the police filed a final report
indicting the appellants for commission of offence under Sections 302, G
397 and 449 IPC and Section 25, 27 of Arms Act. The trial court framed
charges against the accused under Sections397/34 in alternative 302/34

5
Ex. P103-C
6
Ex. P107 H
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A and 449 IPC, and besides these charges Manoj was charged under section
25(1-B) (B) of Arms Act, 1959 and Rahul @ Govind was charged under
S. 25(1-B) (B) and 27 of Arms Act. All the appellants abjured their guilt
and claimed trial. The prosecution examined 36 witnesses and produced
certain documents (Ex. P1-P129) in support of their case. After recording
the evidence of prosecution, the appellants’ statements were recorded
B
under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code(CrPC). The appellants
examined a total of 6 defence witnesses and produced certain documents
(Ex. D1-D50) in support of their case.
Trial Court’s findings
C 7. As the entire case was based on circumstantial evidence, upon
appreciation of the material evidence adduced by the prosecution, thetrial
court concluded that the accused persons were present at the scene of
occurrence on 19.06.2011 at about 5:00-5:15 PM and that evidence of
experts who lifted the fingerprints of the accused (from the house) along
D with the testimonies of PW-1, PW-2, PW-5, PW-9 and PW-31 proved
that they had entered into the house. Upon recovery of the knife and
firearm which caused the death, it was established by way of chemical,
DNA as well as ballistic examination that those articles were used and
that during the sequence of the incident, blood of the deceased persons
was found on the clothes of the accused persons.The trial court further
E concluded that the footprints at the crime scene were similar to those of
the shoes recovered from the accused persons, and the gun shot injury
caused by the bullet which hit the foot of Rahul @ Govind as well as the
bullet which hit the body of the deceased, were fired from the same
weapon, which was recovered from his possession. It was held that this
F left no doubt in establishing the guilt of Rahul and Manoj, and duringthe
whole incident The evidence also proved Neha’s presence at that time.
The trial court held that this established her involvement in the crime
along with the accused persons; every hypothesis of the innocence of
the accused was ruled out.
G 8. After considering the evidence on record, the trial court
convicted the appellants of committing the offences they were charged
with. On the point of sentence, the trial court took the view that given
the magnitude and diabolic manner in which the offences were committed,
the case on hand fell under the category of rarest of the rare case and
warranted death penalty.
H
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 471
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

High Court’s findings confirming the Trial Court’s order A
7
9. The Division Bench of the High Court confirmed the sentences
imposed on the appellants and the reference made by the trial court was
answered in the affirmative. The High Court concluded that the forensic
experts as well as the neighbours and the investigating officer had seen
the blood-stained floor, walls, and bedsheets, and that the evidence B
produced on record with respect to them did not leave any major lacuna
in the case of the prosecution; further, the presence of the accused in
the house, their intention of committing such a heinous crime, and the
manner in which the accused persons had caused the death, had been
duly proved.
C
10. The High Court relied upon the statements of fingerprint expert
PW-24 K.K. Dwivedi who visited the site and lifted the chance
fingerprints which matched with the appellants’ fingerprints, as well
asjewellery recovered from their possession -which was identified by
PW-1 and PW-3 as belonging to the deceased. The weapons (knife and
country made pistol) used for the commission of the offence were D
recovered from the accused and the same was proved. Also, the accused
persons were duly identified in open court by the witnesses pursuant to
their depositions.
11. The High Court further held thatthe accused, during their
examination under Section 313 CrPC failed to explain their conduct and E
even gave incorrect and false answers. It therefore affirmed the trial
court’s conclusions and findings.
12. Upon examination of whether this case would fall in the
category of “rarest of rare case” to justify the imposition of capital
punishment on the appellants, the High Court was of the view that as the
F
incident shook the collective conscience of the community and the acts
of murder committed by the appellants were so gruesome, merciless
and brutal, the aggravating circumstances far outweighed the mitigating
circumstances and hence,this case fell under the category of rarest of
the rare case which manifests society’s abhorrence of such crime.
Contentions on behalf of the Appellants G
13. Ms. Anjana Prakash, learned senior counsel appearing pro
bono for Rahul and Manoj, contended that the evidence of witnesses,
7
High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore vide order dt. 29.09.2014 in Criminal
Appeal No. 3/2014,Criminal Reference No. 4/2013and Criminal Appeal No. 266/2014.
H
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A i.e., police witnesses and private witnesses in this case raise questions
as to whether Neha was arrested at the time and at the spot claimed by
the prosecution, whether her disclosure statements were genuine, whether
the disclosures were made as claimed, and whether subsequent arrests
and recoveries were in the manner claimed by the prosecution.
B 14. It was urged that PW-4 lady constable Banno Solanki deposed
to having gone to the ATM machine, searched Neha, leading to recovery
of Ashlesha’s ATM card. However, she contradicted the IO and other
witnesses about the place of her interrogation. PW-4 deposed that
Nehawas interrogated at the Police Station where she said that some
ornaments and ATM cards were in her house.This was confirmed byPW-
C 6 Triyambak @ Prafulla and PW-36 Mulayam Singh Yadav. However,
the prosecution did not explain why no arrest memo/information memo
was prepared at the Police Station. It is argued that this is pertinent as
there is a serious dispute about the arrests and recoveries itself, as also
the manner claimed by the prosecution. Also, PW-4 the female constable
D escorting the female accused, did not corroborate the prosecution that
any recoveries were made from Neha’s house after her interrogation.
She was silent about whether she was part of the police team which
went to the house of Neha in her examination-in-chief. In cross
examination she deposed to sitting in the same vehicle as Neha while
going to her house. The presence of PW-4 is only confirmed by witnesses
E of the search team (i.e., PW-3 Dr Deepak Hari Ranadey and PW-31 IO
Mohan Singh). PW-4 further did not support the prosecution that Neha
had disclosed the names of Rahul and Manoj or having accompanied
Neha (which would be expected, the accused being a woman) to the
house of the two accused and the resulting subsequent recoveries. She
F deposed that the police party returned to the police station from Neha’s
house inthe private vehicle. This suggests that the arrest memo (Ex. P9)
and Information Memo (Ex. P10) made at that time and place is false
and as a result, the subsequent story of Neha leading the police party to
the houses of Rahul and Manoj are also false.
G 15. It was further stated that PW-31 deposed that PW-28 Vijay
Chauhan, informed PW-19 Y.R. Gaikwad, about spotting a girl standing
suspiciously near an ATM for which PW-19 made a Station Diary entry
and informed him via wireless. PW-31 therefore went to the police station,
constituting a team – comprising himself, PW-4, PW-19, PW-28 and
PW-36 – which left for the ATM spot and thereafter to Neha’s house
H
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 473
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

(and those of Rahul and Manoj). It is submitted that neither was the A
Station Diary produced, nor did PW-19 corroborate the deposition of
PW-31 at all. Likewise, there was variance between the statement of
PW-28 and PW-31, on whether he was in the raiding party that went to
Neha’s house.
16. Counsel further argued that PW-31 deposed about various B
persons accompanying him, when he learnt about Neha loitering
suspiciously. However, he omitted to mention PW-19, who received
information and told him about Neha’s movement, at PW-28’s behest.
This suggests that Neha was in fact, interrogated at the Police Station.
So, there was no reason for not preparing an arrest memo or recording
disclosure statement at that point in time, in the police station itself, even C
though the ATM card had been recovered. PW-31 did not offer any
explanationas to why the disclosure was made on the way in the police
vehicle. Counsel also referred to PW-4’s deposition, which was silent on
this aspect. Furthermore, counsel highlighted that though family members,
particularly Neha’s father were available, they were not intimated about D
her arrest, nor were their signatures taken on the arrest memo. It was
urged that all these in fact corroborate the defence submission that Neha’s
arrest did not take place as contended by the prosecution.
17. Moving on to the arrest of Rahul and Manoj, some
discrepancies in the form of injuries found on their person and the manner E
their occurrence was recorded before their disclosure statements (Ex.
P12-P13 in the case of Rahul and Ex. P15-P16 in the case of Manoj),
were pointed out.How these injuries occurred in fact was recorded
before the disclosure statement. It was submitted that after Neha’s arrest,
recoveries were made from Rahul’s house (Ex. P14) at 09:10 AM. Here,
Ex. P12 i.e., arrest memo dated 22.06.2011 of Rahul @ Govind made no F
mention of any injury on Rahul’s foot despite mentioning an old firearm
wound on the left elbow in column 9 of the arrest memo, which is where
the police noted the injuries. It was urged that this was an irreconcilable
circumstance against the prosecution’s case that Rahul had a bullet injury
on his left leg. G
18. It was submitted that Manoj’s arrest then took place at 10:05
AM from his house (Ex. P15). His disclosure statement was recorded
at 10:15 AM (Ex. P16) and seizures were made at 10:35 AM (Ex. P17).
The arrest memo of Manoj (Ex. P15), however, does not record the
injury on the elbow even while it notes signs of an injury on the nose in H
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A column 9 of the arrest memo which is where the police is supposed to
record injuries present on the body of the accused at the time of arrest.
The prosecution case is that on 22.06.2011 from 6:00 AM till 4:40 PM
various seizures were made and documents were prepared. However,
there is evidence to show that a press conference was held in the office
of DW-3 Sanjay Rana, IG Indore between 12:30 PM to post 1:00 PM
B
and even before the press conference, PW-31 IO had informed him that
the investigation was done and Neha was arrested, and that he had
conducted the seizure procedure from the accused. This falsifies the
story of the recovery of shoe at the instance of Rahul Ex. P21 [reliance
is placed on DW-3 and DW-5].
C 19. Ms. Prakash contended that PW-31 IO deposed to
interrogating Rahul on 23.06.2011 before two witnesses -but did not
name them. Rahul reportedly disclosed that he had kept his clothes and
knife in a bag in his motorcycle and Manoj had broken the stolen mobile
and camera and thrown them near a Maruti Showroom. He then prepared
D the information memo (Ex. P28) at 07:50 AM. He interrogated Manoj in
the presence of two witnesses (who he did not name) who allegedly
confessed that he had concealed the clothes and shoes worn by him in
his father’s almirah and had thrown a broken mobile near the Maruti
showroom at Rau. He then prepared information memo (Ex. P31),
recorded at 08:05 AM. PW-31 also interrogated Neha in the presence
E of two witnesses (who were again, not named) who revealed that she
had kept her clothes and sandalsworn by her in the dicky of her Scooty.
He then prepared information memo (Ex. P34) at 08:15 AM. It was
submitted that since the accused had made their disclosures on the date
of their arrest, it appears strange and unnatural that truncated recovery
F statements would be given at different stages of investigation.Counsel
urged that there was no explanation as to why PW-31 IO does not reveal
either the time of recording of statements or the names of the witnesses.
20. Commenting on the recoveries made on 23.06.2011, it was
submitted that no explanation was furnished as towhy truncated
recoveries were made on different dates, aswas claimed by the
G
prosecution. Further, the witness to these recoveries PW-7 Sandeep
Narulkar, appears to be a stock witness who stated that he reached the
police station at 8:45 AM on 23.06.2011, i.e., after the disclosure
statements (Ex. P28, P31 and P34) were recorded. In the chief
examination, this witness deposed that Rahul disclosed before him that
H he could get the clothes, knife, lens of camera recovered. Manoj disclosed
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 475
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

keeping his clothes in his father’s house and Neha about having kept her A
clothes in her vehicle parked behind a hospital. Then police prepared
memos Ex. P28, P31 and P34 respectively and recovered articles of
which memos were prepared as Ex.P29,P31 &P34 respectively.It is
pointed out that PW-7 does not say anything about a lady police officer
in the team which would have been required on account of involvement
B
of female accusedNeha.It was urged that non-examination of the other
witness (Prakash lchke) assumes great significance and without any
explanation for his non-examination it cannot be said that the recoveries
are reliable.
21. Counsel cast serious doubts as to the recovery by police on
22.06.2011 and 23.06.2011. She particularly pointed to the fact that a C
photograph of Rahul wearing a black beaded bracelet was found from
his house and seized as Ex. P14. This was not made pursuant to any
disclosure and apparently was seized during the process of seizing other
items. During the cross-examination of PW-31 IO, a suggestion was
made that this picture was clicked when the bracelet was forced to be D
worn by the accused. The IO denied the suggestion. Likewise, a
photograph of Manoj, wearing sunglasses was seized from his house
and exhibited as Ex. P17. This was in the course of his disclosure
statement leading to recovery of other articles. However, in Rahul’s
case, there was no disclosure statement. Neither of the seizure memos
mentioned from where in the premises, these articles were found. Further, E
the recoveries were not spoken about in the depositions of the recovery
witnesses.
22. It was next argued that neither PW-3 nor PW-6 said anything
regarding the sealing of the seized items Ex. P11, P14 and P17) in their
presence on 22.06.2011 and 23.06.2011.Similarly, the witness (for F
recoveries made on 23.06.2011)PW-7, did not mention who placed seals
on the items Ex. P29, P30, P32, P33 and P35. PW-6 could not recollect
the sealing of the articles on 22.06.2011. Likewise in Ex. P35 disclosure
by Neha and recovery of items on 23.06.2011 do not mention the sealing
of the items. Counsel also compared the depositions of the panch
G
witnesses with the evidence of PW-12 Tehsildar and PW-36 Mulayam
Singh Yadav (head constable, MIG). It was submitted that these
witnesses nowhere mentioned the particulars of sealing, what kind of
seals were placedor the signatures of persons, who had witnessed the
recovery and sealing of the articles. It is therefore argued that the
recoveries on 22.06.2011 are unreliable. Learned counsel submitted that H
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A in all likelihood, the accused were in police custody for a longer period
than what was projected, which raises doubts over the veracity and
voluntariness of the disclosure statements by them. She also submitted
that recoveries of next day i.e., 23.06.2011 are similarly unreliable as
they were not recorded in the presence of witnesses PW-7 and Prakash
Ichke. PW-7 arrived at the police station that day at 8:45 AM, the
B
disclosure statements however were recorded earlier between 7:50 and
8:15 AM – evidenced by Ex. P28, P31 and P34. Signatures of the
witnesses were taken on those documents. It was submitted that the
oral evidence completely undermines and falsifies preparation of
documents at the date and time mentioned. Therefore, recoveries are
C dubious inasmuch as they purport to have been made pursuant to
disclosure statements on the same day, which were recorded before the
witnesses even reached the police station. Another suspicious
circumstance according to counsel was that recoveries were made in
the afternoon, starting from 02:45 PM after a gap of 6 hours. The timing
of Ex. P29, P30, P32, P33 and P35, are shown in this regard. It is argued
D that when the disclosure statements were recorded latest at 8:15 AM,
the police did not offer any explanation why the recoveries took place in
the afternoon only after a lapse of six hours.
23. It was further submitted that recoveries are also suspect because
the details were published in newspapers, both on 22.06.2011 and
E 23.06.2011. Learned counsel relied on Ex. D4, published on 22.6.2011
which mentions the recovery of a pistol and knife from the accused.These
recoveries were made that day at 9:30 AM and 10:35AM. Importantly,
thelearned counsel argued that the chain of custody of the shoe allegedly
belonging to Rahul which was seized from an open place within jurisdiction
F of the Annapurna police station on 22.6.2011 as propounded by the
prosecution,issuspectas it was soon photographed in a newspaper
published on 23.6.2011, while in the hands of the police officer. Reliance
is placed on Ex. D6 in this regard.
24. It was next pointed out that the accused were produced before
a magistrate on 23.6.2011. The record reveals that the arrests were
G
made in the morning of 22.06.2011, and several articles were seized
pursuant to the disclosure statements of the accused and consequently,
recoveries effected. However, the magistrate was not shown these
articles nor was any memo produced before the magistrate at the time
of the production of the accused on 23.6.2011. This procedural irregularity
H as highlighted by the senior counsel is contrary to Section 102(3) CrPC
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 477
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

which requires every police officer to forthwith report seizure of any A
article to a magistrate having jurisdiction.Counsel relies on Umesh
Tukaram Padwal & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra8, to say that non-
compliance is fatal to the prosecution story.
25. Ms. Prakash also contended that PW-10 Dilip Sen is a chance
witness whose testimony is unreliable because it contains contradictions B
and material improvements. It contains a material contradiction regarding
his reporting to the police about seeing all the three accused. In his
examination-in-chief, he stated that he read about the incident in the
newspaper and therefore, went and informed the police about the incident.
In his cross examination, however, he said that he did not read the
C
newspaper and went to the police station without reading the newspaper.
He also mentions going to the police station for another reason (to get a
gumasta license) and upon overhearing discussions going on there about
this case, he volunteered information. Further his testimony is unbelievable
as, given the description of the scene of crime, the clothes of the accused
should have also been smeared with blood. The recovery memos of the D
clothes of the accused (Ex. P29, P32, and P35) shows that the clothes
worn by the accused on the day of the incident were light in colour on
which blood would have been easily visible. Moreover, PW-10 explained
his presence near the place of occurrence since he wanted to check if
House No. 23 was available for rental purposes. However, the
E
prosecution has not sufficiently established his presence near the place
of occurrence as the owner of House No. 23 was not examined and no
other evidence was led to confirm the presence of PW-10 at the place
of occurrence. PW-10 further improved from his statement under Section
161 CrPC (Ex. D7) with respect to Neha’s presence at the place.
Likewise, learned counsel submitted that PW-8 Achyutmal Tejwani F
(whose deposition was relied on by the prosecution, to say that he treated
Manoj), is an unreliable witness. His credentials as a medical practitioner,
was doubted: counsel relied on the witnesses’ cross-examination and
submitted that this witness had migrated to India from Pakistan, and in
all probability was beholden to the police. G
26. Learned counsel submitted that the delay of 25 days in
conducting the test identification parade (TIP) is unexplained. The delay
assumes significance since unveiled photographs of the accused were

8
(2019) 8SCC 567
H
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A published across newspapers starting from 23.06.2011. In this regard,
reliance is placed on Ex. D6,D45 and D48 which are newspaper articles
containing photographs. Furthermore, it was submitted that the procedure
of the TIP was questionable as Rahul and Manoj were made to stand
together in the TIP line-up. The identification memo does not record the
appearances of the other persons. Ms. Prakash submitted that Rahul
B
and Manoj do not look similar - she relied on the arrest memos Ex. P12
and P15 to support her argument. PW-10 in his cross examination stated
that some persons were tall, others were short; some were fair and
others, dark. Therefore, the combined TIP procedure was faulty and
could not have been relied on. In this regard, counsel relied on Lal Singh
C and others v. State of U.P 9, Muthuswami v. State of Madras 10 and
Mohammed Abdul Hafeez v. State of AP11 to say that in the absence of
individual distinguishing features, a TIP of the accused conducted after
a relatively long time may not be relied upon by the courts.
27. Learned senior counsel submitted that there was serious doubt
D about the identity of Rahul, who was referred to as “Govind” in all
documents until the preparation of his arrest memo Ex. P12 on 22.06.2011.
There was no reason why an alias for Rahul was associated with him in
the arrest memo. This raises doubt about the identity of the individual.
All documents relating to the medical treatment for the bullet injury as
well as the case proceeding (Crime No. 377/2011 registered by PW-29
E crucially on the date of occurrence) refer to him as Govind. These were
Ex.P103 – dehatinalisi at 10:30 PM on 19.06.2011; Ex. P97 - letter of
police to the District Hospital & report of District Hospital Indore after
examination of wounds and referring him to M.Y Hospital; Ex.P104 -
Crime details recorded at 11 PM on 19.06.2011; Ex. P105 - FIR of the
F shooting incident at 12:15 AM on 20.06.2011; Ex.P101 -case closure
report on 29.06.2011; Ex.P113 at MY hospital signed by PW-32 Dr.
Nilesh Guru on 20.06.2011.
28. Learned counsel submitted that the non-identification by the
treating doctors (PW-26 and PW-32) of Rahul, or even of PW-30 RS
G Makwana (of PS Annapurna) in TIP or in court, on the one hand, and his
identification by PW29 Gourishankar Chadar (of PS Annapurna) in court
as Govind @ Rahul, assumes significance. Rahul was allegedly admitted

9
2003 (12) SCC 554
10
AIR 1954 SC 4
11
H (1983) 1 SCC 143
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 479
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

in MY Hospital and there was ample opportunity for the treating doctors, A
nurses, and other hospital staff to identify him. Their omission to do so,
raises serious doubts.
29. Ms. Prakash argued that material was suppressed regarding
admission in hospital. In this regard, it is pointed out that Ex. P113 only
mentions the date of admission as 20.06.2011 and the name of the patient B
is mentioned as Govind. There is no information on record regarding the
treatment given to him and the time of his discharge. This is more crucial
as no one from the hospital has deposed in order to prove the identity of
the person being treated. Likewise, chain of custody of the bullet extracted
from Rahul was not proved. In this regard it was contended that PW-32
Dr. Nilesh Guru extracted the bullet and deposited it in the medico-legal C
case section at MY Hospital on 20.06.2011. He did not depose to sealing
the bullet at all. A sealed bullet was collected by PW-30 from MY Hospital
from an unknown doctor on 23.06.2011. The bullet was not sealed in
front of PW-30. Therefore, there is no evidence on record to prove who
sealed the bulletand when. It was urged that the magistrate’s remand D
order dated 23.06.2011 omitsmentioning of any injuries,especially on
Appellant 2 Rahul@ Govind which would have been visible since hehad
been hospitalised. Furthermore, no MLCs of the accused persons were
produced during the trial. It was also contended that the prosecution
version regarding reporting of a false case and seeking medical treatment
and informing PS Annapurna to alert them of the bullet by Rahul is E
unbelievable. Ex. P97 shows that it was prepared at PS Annapurna.
From the document it appears that Govind was sent to the District Hospital
with a forwarding letter that curiously has a note seeking opinion on
whether the injury is self-inflicted. This directly contradicts the story of
PW-29 that Rahul @ Govind had shouted and alerted the police that he F
was going to the District Hospital.
30. In terms of Ex. P104 Rahul had signed the spot map prepared
on 19.06.2011 at 11:00 PM. However, it is also the case of the prosecution
that Rahul was going to get his injured foot treated and was admitted in
hospital during that time.It appears that Constable Dinesh took Rahul to
G
the District Hospital and subsequently to MY Hospital. That constable
has not been examined and no reasons for non-examination were given.
Learned counsel submitted that there is no material about how Rahul
went from District Hospital to the MY Hospital with a gunshot injury, or
who took him from the District Hospital to MY Hospital and who
conducted his x-ray. H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A 31. It was next argued that as far as seizure memo of the right
shoe is concerned, the memo (Ex. P75) was drawn at PS Annapurnaat
the behest of Abhay Tiwari, who too was not examined by the prosecution.
This makes the contents of the document inadmissible. PW-20 Harbhajan
Singh did not remember the logo on the shoe. He also did not depose as
to which foot (left or right foot) did the shoe fit, or its size. He did not say
B
whether it was a sports or leather shoe and also does not describe laces.
PW-20 deposed that it was seized in his presence, however, he does not
mention whether the same was sealed in front of him. PW-29 merely
described that Abhay Tiwari found the shoeand it was contended that
this was hearsay evidence. Importantly, there was no inquiry by the
C prosecution to prove that the seized shoe was even the same size as
Rahul @ Govind’s. His foot size could have been measured
underSections 2(a) and 4 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920
which wasnot done.
32. It was next urged that there were serious gaps in the TIP of
D the jewellery held on 09.07.2011 by PW-12 Tehsildar. In this regard, it
was pointed that PW-3 Deepak Ranade deposedthose two bangles were
removed from Rohini’s hand and one kudi (earring) was removed from
her body and handed over to him. During jewellery identification
proceedings, PW-1 identified Megha’s four (4) bangles and Rohini’s two
(2) bangles. It is unclear if bangles identified by PW-1 included those
E
handed over to PW-3. Further, if the bangles of deceased Rohini given
to PW-3 were not the same as those identified by PW-1, the two
recovered bangles from the accused were not matched with those given
to PW-3. It was also unclear if the jewellery was mixed with other items
having similar designs, as required by law. Similar pieces of broken
F mangalsutra should have been kept during the identification proceedings
as well. Further, the identification memo (Ex. P1) did not indicate how
many similar pieces of jewellery were mixed along with the jewellery
identified.There is discrepancy in the evidence of PW-1 and PW-3 as to
what was said to havebeen stolen when questioned on 21.06.2011.
G According to PW-3, on 21.06.2011when he went along with PW-1 to
the house of the deceased, PW-1 only informed about the missing camera.
33. Challenging reliance on the DNA analysis report, counsel
submitted that there was inordinate delay in sending items to the forensic
science laboratory (FSL). The items seized on 23.06.2011 were sent for
examination to the FSL on 13.07.2011 (after 20 days) as seen by Ex.
H
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 481
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

P115. This delay was not explained by the prosecution. Therefore, it A
was urged that records of the police malkhana and conditions of
safekeeping of items were important in this case. Also, statistical analysis
was not conducted which is an integral part of the scientific process.
The lack of cross examination of the DNA expert PW-35Dr. Pankaj
Shrivastava on this was argued to be immaterial since this goes to
B
admissibility of the DNA report as scientific evidence and this court
should consider this serious gap in the scientific process. Counsel
submitted that blood reference samples of the deceased were not collected
and tested. The blood collected on cotton swabs found next to the dead
bodies at the crime scene were used as reference samples, which is
unreliable. Lastly, counsel urged that no laboratory records were submitted C
– PW-35 mentioned that in the observation sheet details of the samples
received and the testing were noted. This sheet was not submitted with
the laboratory report. Also, electropherograms were not submitted with
the laboratory reports.
34. Turning next to the ballistic reports and the prosecution’s claim D
that the bullet extracted from Rahul’s foot, and that recovered from
Megha’s body were fired from the same weapon, it was argued, that
these circumstances were not proved, because of the unreliability with
regard to the manner of Rahul’s arrest, doubts about his identity, manner
of seizure of the bullet from his foot, its sealing, custody, and production
E
in court. Counsel submitted that the articles were received by the ballistic
expert only on 14.07.2011; the ballistics report Ex. P120 is dated
30.07.2011.
35. Doubts were expressed about seals on the items seized from
the crime scene, which included the fired cartridges. According to the
F
counsel their consequent matching with the test fire cartridge was
unreliable. It was urged that the presence of copper during the chemical
analysis of the shoe is unreliable since the shoe was seized at Annapurna
PS and the witness Abhay Tiwari was not examined. Further, the live
cartridge’s primer cap (seized from the place of occurrence) had fallen
during examination by PW-16 Bheem Bahadur who was from the Arms G
Branch and had sealed the cartridge. He, however, did not say that he
had reloaded it. During the ballistics examination however, it was
found that Article A-6 contained a live 7.65mm caliber pistol cartridge
which was marked LR1 (in Ex. P120). The description of LR1 states
that it is a reloaded live cartridge. The seals of the arms branch on the
H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A live bullet were intact when they were sent to the FSL on 13.07.2011
(Ex. P115). These facts raised doubts about the chain of custody of
Article A-6 (the live cartridge) given the discrepancies in its condition.
Further, it is unclear as to what was used for the test firing by the FSL:
if the live cartridge was used, it would not be possible since the primer
cap had fallen off, making it unusable. The Report (Ex. P120) did not
B
mention the use of another test ammunition for the firing test, whose
description should have been provided as part of the report to ensure
that the same ammunition is being used. Counsel submitted that the fired
cartridges found at the left side and the legs of the deceased were not
photographed- as evident from scene of crime report (Ex. P77) and
C crime scene photos (Ex.P56).PW-9 did not see the bullet in his hand and
said that it was small in size. It is not explained how he recalls the caliber
(KF 7.65) written on the bullet and fired cartridge.
36. Learned senior counsel submitted that the circumstances
relating to lifting of fingerprints, their being forwarded for expert
D examination, and the report, were not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
It is urged that with regards to chance prints found at the place of
occurrence, PW-5 Vishal Pandey did not mention signing of the fingerprint
slips. Elimination prints were not taken from anyone present at the crime
scene. To prove that fingerprints were of the accused, the identity of the
specimen prints were not proved since neither the signature of the
E accused nor their photographs were affixed on Ex. P41, P42, or P43,
contrary to what was stated by PW-13 Vijay Singh Chauhan (constable)
who mentioned that he took signatures of the accused persons. The
specimen prints were not taken before the magistrate on 23.06.2011,
and rather on the next day (24.06.2011) at PS MIG. Sending of fingerprints
F for examination: No witness (PW-13, PW-24, or PW-31) has deposed
anything suggesting that prints were sent to the fingerprint branch in a
sealed condition. The rule of prudence of taking prints before the
magistrate under Section 5 of Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 was
breached. Further, specimen fingerprints of the accused were sent to
the fingerprint branch after an unexplained delay of 3 days, i.e., 27.06.2011
G despite both departments being in Indore. The fingerprint expert’s report
(Ex. P84) is not credible because elimination of the deceased’s prints
was not explained by PW-24 KK Dwivedi (fingerprint expert) or in his
report Ex. P84. Only the final conclusion of elimination has been written
about. There is no scientific evidence that fingerprints are unique for all
H individuals and therefore, heavy reliance cannot be placed on it. It is only
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 483
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

corroborative in nature.Further,the counsel highlighted that the fingerprints A
were not lifted from the knives, pistol and ornaments seized from the
accused. Counsel relied on Mohd. Aman & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan12
and Chandran @ Surendran & Anr. v. State of Kerala13, for arguing
that fingerprint proof cannot ipso facto lead to conviction.
37. Learned senior counsel then argued that the shoeprint report B
(Ex. P125) mentioned that the chance shoeprints were incomplete and
unclear, despite which the expert proceeded with the examination and
came to a finding of the prints being identical to F6 (right), G4 (right),
and H3 (which does not specify which side, as per Ex. 125). Rahul’s
foot impression was not taken as per Section 4 read with Section 2(a) of
Identification of Prisoners Act along with Rule 822(4) of MP Police C
Regulations Rules. It was urged that this was important in proving that
Rahul wore shoe size 44. PW-5 mentioned that there was a lot of blood
on the floor. Elimination prints of shoes were not collected from PW-5
or anyone else present at the scene of occurrence. At this point it is
worth noting that among others, five persons had entered the place of D
occurrence to act as witnesses to the inquest proceedings. The scene of
crime report (Ex. P77) mentioned that the shoeprints were bloodied and
partial in nature. All these cast doubts about authenticity and reliability
of the footprint expert’s report.
38. Mr. Shri Singh, learned counsel arguing pro bono on behalf of E
the appellant Neha, supplemented the contentions of Ms. Anjana Prakash.
He questioned the prosecution version about Neha’s arrest. He submitted
that officially Neha’s arrest memo(Ex. P9) was prepared at Devendra
Nagar. When Neha was arrested, a personal Seizure Memo (Ex. P10)and
a Disclosure Memo (Ex. P11)was prepared. No explanation as to why
Neha’s search outside the ATM (Ex. P22) did not yield the phone seized F
through Ex.P9, was given. PW-31 IO admittedthat this was not recorded
in Neha’s arrest memo. Pertinently, the prosecution neither conducted a
technical investigation of the seized phone nor providedany explanation
as to why investigation was not conducted in this regard.Further, DW-1
SI Deepika Shinde admitted to conducting an analysis of the CDRs 14. G
The CDRs were not produced before the trial court.

12
(1997) 10 SCC 44
13
(1991) Supp (1) SCC 39
14
Call detail records, which list out the incoming and outgoing calls received and made
from the instrument. H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A 39. It was urged that these omissions impel the court to draw an
adverse inference, under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act1872 against
the police, casting grave doubt over Neha’s apprehension, her arrest,
and subsequent recoveries. Reliance is placedin this regard on Noor
Aga v. State of Punjab15 and Chunthuram v. State of Chhattisgarh16.
B 40. Learned counsel further argued that PW-4 Banno Solanki
(lady constable) was cross-examined on 30.09.2011 i.e., just three months
after the incident. In cross-examination, the suggestion given was that
Neha was brought to the police station on the evening of 21.06.2011 by
DW-1 SI Deepika Shinde. PW-4 was silent regarding her role in searching
Neha’s residence on 22.06.2011, though she claimed she was present
C during Neha’s apprehension earlier. PW-28, during cross-examination
about DW-1’s role, deposed that he and DW-1 received an out-of-turn
promotion. PW-6, too during cross-examination, admitted that DW-1 was
a part of the raiding team. These facts were effaced from the record.
This was consistently the line of defence during the trial. Both courts
D below disregarded this aspect of Neha’s defence –though the
involvement of DW-1, in the investigation of this case was proved
conclusively. Further, despite several opportunities, the prosecution failed
to explain the acts of DW-1 during the investigation, or why her role was
specifically erased. Reliance is placed in this regard on Reena Hazarika
v. State of Assam17. It was urged that this warrants adverse inference
E against the prosecution, creating doubt over its reliability.
41. It was argued that the testimony of DW-1 Deepika Shinde in
fact shows that technical evidence was analysed on the date of the
incident itself. This does not square with the complete absence of
telephonic evidence in the testimonies of the investigating team including
F PW-4, PW-28, PW-31. Telephonic evidence about whether the accused
spoke to each other, or knew each other, or whether the deceased spoke
to any of the accused, or the triangulation of location was not collected
during the investigation and has been kept out of the trial. It was urged
that in its place, this court now had to rely upon the ipse dixit of the
G investigation team, knowing that electronic evidence was not only
available, but was surreptitiously used to Neha’s detriment. It was pointed
out that PW-31 IO made no reference to the presence of officials of the

15
(2008) 16 SCC 417
16
(2020) 10 SCC 733
H 17
(2019) 13 SCC 289
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 485
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

Crime Branchon 19.06.2011, 20.06.2011, or 21.06.2011. However, PW- A
28, Vijay Singh Chauhan made reference to his Crime Branch posting,
and informing PW-19 YR Gaikwad, what he (i.e., PW-28) saw on
22.06.2011. However, PW-19 in histestimony was silent on receiving
any information from PW-28on 22.06.2011. DW-1’s capacity for
conducting investigation was questioned on the ground that the CrPC
B
does notpermit parallel/multiple investigations in the same case.
42. It was submitted that despite recovery of the “Oriflame”
document from Neha, the prosecution did not rely on the documentas an
exhibit. The prosecution did not examine any official from the company
to provide any context whatsoever as to the forms, catalogue or, perfume
recovered from Neha’s residence on 22.06.2011 (Ex.P11). There is no C
evidence to suggest that theform seized from Neha was filled in by the
deceased Megha; nor was the latter ’s signature identified or
proved.Counsel stressed that the independent witnesses who deposed
to such a form do not indicate that there were any signatures on it. PW-
3 merely stated that a paper/document (of “Oriflame”) was recovered D
from Neha’s residence. He did not indicate whether the form was filled.
PW-6 stated that certain articlesincluding the form were seized in his
presence but did not indicate their nature/details. While PW-3 identifiedthe
form incourt, no question for the purpose of identifying the handwriting
onsuch form was put to him. The signatures of the independent witnesses,
as well as the police personnel at the time of such seizure werenot found E
on the pullanda containing the form. The only witness providing any
details with reference to the “Oriflame” form is PW-31 IO. It was urged
that these “details” too were meresurmises of PW-31 untested during
the investigation or trial. It was also pointed out that all questions put to
Neha, relating to the recovery of the Oriflame form, were denied. While F
PW-1, in his examination-in-chief states that his wife was a consultant
at Oriflame, the form seized from Neha’s house was not shown to
him. Evidence in this regard may have been forthcoming from him. In
fact, neither PW-1, nor any Oriflame employee admitted the handwriting
of Megha. The prosecution did not conduct any forensic examination
of the form to establish the alleged handwriting/signature of Megha. G
Further, PW-l was also involved in a TIP for the seizures of articles
seized, where certain jewellery, allegedly belonging to the deceased,
waspurportedly identified by him. Inexplicably the “Oriflame” form
was not put to him by the prosecution in these proceedings. Therefore,
it is evident that the “Oriflame” document does not connect the deceased, H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A Megha, or her relation of dealing with Nehaas there was no investigation
on this document. Therefore, barring the ipse dixit of PW-31 IO, there
is nothing suggesting that the “Oriflame” form was filled for Megha, or
filled or signed by her.
43. Mr. Shri Singh next urged that DW-1 Deepika Shindehad
B admitted to going to the spot on 19.06.2011, based on a request made by
the control room. She also sought information from the officials at PS
MIG, and thereafter spoke to the deceased persons’ neighbours. However,
DW-1 could not provide any details in this regard during her examination-
in-chief. Though DW-1 stated that she examined the CDRs of the accused
persons, she provided no specific details of such analysis in her testimony.
C DW-1 also admitted interrogating Neha. DW-1 further confirmed that
she was informed by a source that Neha would leave her house wearing
a pair of jeans and a maroon top. This information was received by DW-
1 prior to Neha’s arrest, and therefore presumably DW-1, by her own
admission, was involved in the investigation even beyond 22.06.2011.
D Further, DW-1 stated that she shared the source information withher
colleagues and subordinates. PW-28, while giving patently false testimony
in court also stated that when he saw Neha at LIG Tiraha, she was
dressed in “black jeans and a maroon top”. PW-28’s deposition shows
how he allegedly spotted Neha, which is belied by DW-1’s testimony.
Despite sucha deposition, the prosecution elected not to cross-examine
E DW-1.
44. It was argued that DW-1 Deepika Shinde’s presence during
the investigation was confirmed by PW-7’s testimony. He is alleged to
be an independent witness to the recoveries from Neha’s residence on
22.06.2011. At paragraph 14 of his testimony and during cross-
F examination, he admitted that DW-1 was a part of the raiding team- a
fact that has been kept out of the record.Counsel submitted that all these
facts can be simply answered by Neha’s illegal custody before 22.06.2011.
It was strongly urged that Neha’s personal search and the recoveries
from her residence were tainted and the records and seizures pertaining
G to these purported proceedings could not be relied upon. The staccato
manner in which the purported record of the prosecution reflected events
taking place on 22.06.2011 indicated that the police fabricated the record,
resulting in Neha’s false implication.
45. Mr. Singh next argued that the prosecution did not prove any
H prior relationship between the accused. Neither was any material produced
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 487
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

to suggest that the three accused knew each other or had any prior plan, A
agreement or common intention to commit a robbery at the place of
incident.The prosecution admittedly had access to the CDRs of the
accused persons and could have demonstrated the fact whether there
was a relationship, which there was none. Either way the CDR evidence
was crucial to the prosecution and the lack of explanation as to why it
B
was not a part of the investigation casts doubts on the investigation and
its fairness.It was stated that while the official investigation claimed that
no CDRs were accessed (PW-31’s statement is relied on for this), the
unofficial investigation (or, that material kept away from court) conducted
by DW-1 admitted having access to and analysing the CDRs. This aspect
lends credence to the defence that the present investigation was improper C
and that it would be unsafe to rely upon it to render findings of the
accused’s guilt. Reliance is placed on Suresh Sakharam Nangare v.
State of Maharashtra18 in this regard.
46. It was further argued that while convicting Neha under Section
302 read with 34 IPC, the courts belowfailed to appreciate that there is D
no material to suggest that shehad any common intention with the co-
accused persons, much less a common intention to commit murder.
Further, the nature of Neha’s conviction highlights that no weapon was
recovered from her; she did not suffer any injury and none of her personal
items of belonging were recovered from the crime scene.
E
47. Supplementing Ms. Prakash’s arguments regarding PW-10,
it was argued that the testimony of this chance witness was unreliable
due to gaps and contradictions. PW-10’s cross-examination revealed
that his examination-in-chief was an improvement over his statement
under Section 161 CrPC –the witness had embellished his version of the
incident, such as the fact of the injury of the accused persons, and more F
pertinently,Neha’s statement having arrived on her Scooty and telling
one of the boys to take the other injured boy to the hospital. PW-10 also
contradicted himself regarding what brought him to the police station
and regarding the TIP. In his examination-in-chief, he stated that a woman
constable was present at the TIP, whereas during cross-examination, G
the witness stated that no woman constable was present at such
proceedings. Further, while PW-12 the tehsildar, PW-18 Pratap Kumar
Agasia, and PW-11 Raju Sen, stated that both PW-10 and PW-11
appeared for the TIP together, PW-10 did not mention the presence of
18
(2012) 9 SCC 249 (para 21) H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A PW-11 on such day. It was furthermore, urged that PW-10’s credibility
was questionable as he appeared to be a stock witness – he deposed
during his cross-examination that he had previously appeared as a witness
for theprosecution in another case registered at PS Palasia.
48. Mr. Singh urged that the prosecution did not give any explanation
B about the delay inconducting the TIP proceedings, given that PW-10 had
informed about him sighting three persons on 20.06.2011, barely a day
after the incident; whereas the TIP was conducted much later on
14.07.2011, by which date the photographs of the accused had been
published in newspapers. Reliance was placed on the judgments of this
court which observed thata delay in a TIP must be explained to place
C reliance on the testimonyof a witness. Reference is made to this court’s
judgments in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Dr. M.V. Ramana Reddy &
Ors. 19 And Rajesh Govind Jagesha v. State of Maharashtra 20. It
was submitted that apart from being delayed, and procedurally
questionable, the TIP conducted on 14.07.2011 did not yield any
D information that was notalready part of the public domain. Counsel relied
on Matru @ Girish Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh21 where this
court observed that identification tests are not substantive evidence and
may only be used for the purpose of helpingthe investigating agency
with the progress of the investigation.
E 49. It was argued that the Shoeprint Report (Ex. P125) contains
contradictory statements, making it unreliable. Further, it did not provide
any conclusive material regarding the shoeprints found at the scene of
crime and were found to be negative for matches. It was pointed out
that for shoeprints obtained by the police, no moulds were made from
the availablephysical prints at the site and instead colour photos of the
F footprints were obtained. The camera used for taking such photos did
not have the time/date, though suchfeatures were available. During
analysis of colour photos, the photographs were found insufficient to
reach any conclusion regarding the footprints in Ex. P118. It was argued
that no individual shoe characteristics were found from the prints. The
G print or design of the soles were missing in the photoprints, and it could not
be ascertained if the sole print of the sandal at H3 matched with any print
found at the scene of crime. However, inexplicably the report concludes

19
(1991) 4 SCC 536 (para 23)
20
(1999) 8 SCC 428 (para 4-5)
21
H (1971) 2 SCC 75 (para 17)
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 489
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

that E8 and E9 are photos identical to H3. The shoeprint said to have A
been obtained from Neha does not specify whether it is of the right or
the left foot. It was submitted that this court in Pritam Singh v. State of
Punjab22 and Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab23 found that footprints
are a weak andrudimentary evidence. Counsel urged that the evidence
led by the prosecution itself isweak and admits that there was insufficient
B
material to conduct thecomparison, yet the comparison was carried out
as in terms of Ex. P125, the Examination Report, SFSL, Sagar. Further,
the seizures relating to the shoeprints were only sent to FSL, Sagar on
13.07.2011- as seen from Ex. P115 - after anunexplained delay.
50. Mr. Singh next argued that the fingerprint report relating to
chance prints was not reliable,and at best can only be used as C
corroborative evidence. In this regard, it was argued that the fingerprints
obtained from the crime scene were from an open place, accessible to
the public, between the period when the door had been opened by PW-
5 till the arrival of the investigating agency. Whilecollecting chance
fingerprints, no fingerprints of the persons present/neighbours, or other D
members of the household, were taken inorder to eliminate such prints.
PW-3, PW-5, and PW-24 were cross-examined on this account. They
deposed that the fingerprints of othersto whom the place was accessible,
were not taken. With regard to the report (Ex. P84) prepared by the
finger-print expert, PW 24 K. K. Dwivedi while conducting the analysis
of the fingerprints, some concerns were pointed out. Firstly, failure to E
describe the method/procedure for lifting of the prints; secondlyfailure
to obtain elimination prints of other persons, for which no explanation
has been provided by the police;thirdly, that the expert was unable to
provide an explanation about the fact that none of thefingerprints
analysed matched those of any of the deceased persons;and fourthly, F
the expert did not explain why the process under the Madhya Pradesh
Police Rules regarding dissection of fingerprint of corpses i.e., Rule 824,
was not followed while obtaining the prints of thedeceased persons. It
was further urged that the expert didnot provide a robust process for
analysis. The analysis described by fingerprint expert PW-24 claims to
rely on an 8-point method. The method followed by PW-24 merely G
describes Level I of the ACE- V Method (Analysis, Comparison,
Evaluation and VerificationMethod), used by investigating agencies across

22
AIR 1956SC 415
23
1996 (6) SCALE 72 H
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A jurisdictions. Level 2 and 3 of the ACE-V method was not followed.
The 8-point matching system, followed for the analysis,was argued to
be insufficient and not in compliance with such method.Counsel relied
on Hari Om v. State of UttarPradesh24 to argue that the question of
confirmation bias in this regard cannot be ruled out, given that the prints
of the accused were not anonymised whileproviding such information to
B
the expert analysing the fingerprints.
51. Counsel for the appellants urged that in the present case, crucial
circumstances, such as Neha’s arrest (which constituted the breakthrough
in the investigation), the narration and deposition of the chance witness
PW-10, and the inconsistences relating to the recoveries, as well as the
C expert reports, lead to grave doubts. It was submitted that in cases based
on circumstantial evidence, the five “golden principles” enunciated by
this court in Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra25 have
to be fully established and that the court should be convinced that the
accused “must be” guilty and not “may be” guilty. Further, the facts so
D established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of
the accused, that is to say they should not be explainable on any
other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. The circumstances
should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. The circumstances should
exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and there
must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable
E ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused
and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done
by the accused.
52. It was submitted that the complete “blackout” of the role of
DW-1, in the face of her admission to being involved with the
F investigation, her receiving an out-of-turn promotion for solving the case,
her deposition that she had analysed the CDRswhich were never
produced, or relied on, and her involvement before Neha’s arrest, as
well as her involvement during the arrest and subsequent questioning, all
pointed to grave doubts about the circumstances which actually led to
G Neha’s arrest. It was strongly urged that this cast a doubt on her entire
role. Likewise, the piecemeal recoveries affected on two different dates,
at the behest of the three accused, the improbability of the accused
retaining incriminating articles like weapons, even while allegedly getting
24
(2021) 4 SCC 345 (para 25, 38-41, 43)
25
H (1984) 4 SCC 116
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 491
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

rid of clothes, shoes, and vehicles etc., cast doubts and suspicions about A
the genuineness of recovery of the articles. It was argued that all this,
coupled with the untrustworthiness of the chance witness PW-10 – his
contradictions in deposition, admission to being a stock police witness,
and who by his admission saw the accused for a very brief while, as
well as the inexplicable delay in holding TIP – together undermine the
B
prosecution story about identification of the accused, and their alleged
role in the crime.
Submissions of the state
53. Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi, learned Additional Advocate
General (AAG) for the State of Madhya Pradesh, argued that this court C
should not disturb the concurrent findings of the appellant’s guilt recorded
by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, and confirmed by the High
Court in its impugned judgment. She submitted that though the case is
based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution was successful in
proving beyond reasonable doubt, every circumstance, and also in
conclusively establishing the guilt of the accused/appellants, on a D
cumulative reading of all circumstances. She emphasized that the
conclusive nature of the evidence is such that any hypothesis of the
appellants’ innocence is ruled out and that the only conclusion that can
be reached is that they and none others, are guilty of the crime of triple
murder, which they were charged with. E
54. Heavy reliance was placed on the findings in the ballistic report,
wherein each circumstance was proved by the expert evidence. In this
regard, counsel relied on Ex. P25, the map of the crime spot prepared by
PW-31 IO which found two fired cartridges (at Point 7) and one live
bullet (at Point 6). The bullets were seized and recorded at Ex. P27, the F
seizure memo. The post-mortem report Ex. P44 indicated and forwarded
a bullet, recovered from Megha’s body. The recovery of this bullet was
also deposed to by PW-15 Dr. P. S. Thakur. The bullet was seized under
memo Ex. P127. Likewise, PW-32 had extracted a bullet from Rahul’s
foot, in the early hours of 20.06.2011 at MY Hospital. The bullet was
deposited under memo Ex. P113, in the hospital’s medico-legal cell. It G
was later seized under memo Ex. P108 on 23.06.2011. The seizure of a
knife and pistol from Rahul’s possession was recorded at Ex. P14. This
pistol was examined and test fired: a report, Ex. P120 was given by the
ballistic expert, confirming that the spent bullets (the cartridges of which
were seized from the crime scene), the live bullet (also seized from the H
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A crime scene), the bullet extracted from Rahul’s foot, and the bullet
extracted from Megha’s body, were all fired from the same pistol, which
was recovered and seized at the behest of Rahul (Ex. P14). Counsel
also relied on Ex. P52 the report of the armourer. It was argued further
that the seizure, sealing and proper custody of these articles was spoken
to by PW-3, PW-5, and PW-19, besides PW-31 IO. There is neither any
B
contradiction nor any gap in their testimonies; further the ballistic report
fully support the prosecution version that the bullets recovered were
fired from the weapon seized at the behest of Rahul, from his house.
55. The AAG argued that the ballistic report as well as medical
opinion establishes the fact that except one injury on deceased Megha’s
C forehead, all injuries which caused death of all three deceased were due
to the two knives recovered at the instance of accused Rahul and Manoj.
Learned counsel relied on the testimony of PW-15, the doctor who
conducted the post-mortems on the deceased, as well as his report (Ex.
P44). It was argued that from the crime scene till report and thereafter,
D seals were maintained and the chain of custody of articles were constantly
intact, without any break. Seizure witnesses supported these facts in
their statements.
56. Regarding the shoeprints, counsel for the state relied on Ex.
P31 and P32 (regarding seizure of shoes at the behest of Manoj); Ex.
E P34 and P35 (regarding seizure of shoe at the behest of Neha); Ex. P21
(seizure on 22.06.2011); Ex. P77 (inspection report of the crime scene
by PW-21 Senior scientific officer);Ex. P115 (forwarding of these samples
for testing); Ex. P75 seizure memo of a shoe recorded by PS Annapurna
on 23-06-2011; deposition of PW-20, who witnessed seizure of shoe;
shoe print report (Ex. P125); and the deposition of the PW-31 IO. It was
F submitted that these witnesses did not contradict themselves, and the
prosecution had fully and satisfactorily established the presence of the
shoe print reports, as well as their matching, from the prints obtained
from the crime scene. These proved that the accused and no other were
present in the premises, when the crime was committed.
G 57. The AAG argued that the main motive behind the murders
was robbery. This was established by the recovery of the stolen articles
pursuant to the disclosure statements proved by Ex. P10 and Ex. P11
which were seized after Neha’s disclosure statement; the seizure of
articles pursuant to statement of Rahul (Ex. P13 and Ex. P14); and
H recovery pursuant to statement of Manoj (Ex. P16 and P17). During the
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 493
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

TIP of the articles, PW-1 Niranjan Deshpande identified the looted articles A
(such as jewellery items) as those belonging to the deceased, which was
also corroborated by the testimony of PW-12, the tehsildar. Furthermore,
PW-4 Banno Solanki also supported the seizure of the ATM card from
Neha, when she was detained and later, arrested on 22.06.2011. PW-27,
a bank officer, deposed that the ATM card (Ex. P98) recovered pursuant
B
to Neha’s disclosure statement, was issued by his bank. It was urged
that all these proved beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution allegations
that the accused had conspired and entered the premises where the
deceased lived, with the motive of looting. The disclosure and recovery
of the looted articles, as well as their recoveries and later identification,
from the premises of the accused, disclosed their direct link with the C
murders, and established that they were the perpetrators.
58. It was submitted that the appellants have sought to discredit
the prosecution by alleging that Neha was arrested earlier, and for that
purpose, exaggerated the role played by DW-1 Deepika Shinde. The
appellants sought to insinuate that that officer played a prominent role in D
the investigation, and was taken off it, and that her role in solving the
crime, earned her an out of turn promotion. The AAG urged that the
appellants relied upon the statement of DW-1 Deepika Shinde,who had
never claimed that she had made any arrest in the present case. As an
officer of the crime branch she was involved initially in assisting or helping
E
ascertain the basic details, as the victims were women. DW-1 was posted
with a unit called “We care for you”, which focusses upon women’s
protection. Soon after Neha’s arrest,the IO felt that DW-1 was not needed
to do anything further. Her promotion was based upon her contribution
and role in many cases and this being just one for her initial response
cannot be considered that significant. It was submitted that her hidden F
role, alleged by the appellants, is a bogey. While she admitted to analysing
call details, it is forthcoming from the trial proceedings, that the call
details had no role – much less any significance, in the investigation, or
pinning the accused, their arrest, or recovery of articles at their behest.
Therefore, the theory of the appellants’ counsels that Neha was not G
actually arrested as projected by the prosecution, or as found, is without
any basis, but merely argumentative.
59. The AAG submitted that chance witness PW-10 witnessed
the immediate aftermath of the crime, as he saw the three accused
leaving after committing the crime. He described, at the earliest
H
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A opportunity- on 20.06.2011, that two boys (one injured at the ankle, and
the other at the elbow, and both bleeding as a result of the injuries) were
sitting on a bike, when a girl in a Scooty appeared, and asked them to go
to a doctor for examination. The so-called discrepancies highlighted by
the appellants, are neither material, nor of such importance to discredit
the entire version given by him, in the course of his deposition in court. It
B
was urged that nothing worthwhile was elicited in PW-10’s cross-
examination. He clearly identified the three individuals, at the earliest
opportunity, i.e. after knowing about the occurrence of the crime and
also unhesitatingly identified them in court, in the presence of PW-18,
the Naib Tehsildar. The latter witness corroborated the testimony of
C PW-10 as regards identification.
60. The IO also proved seizure of Suzuki service book and clothes,
at Neha’s behest on 23.06.2011 which linked with the recovery of the
scooty (again, at her behest) later on that day, from a place where it had
been hidden. The seizures were also corroborated by the testimony of
D PW-7, who further identified the articles (Ex. Z-1, Z-2 and Z-3) in court.
61. Ms. Chaturvedi submitted that the fingerprint expert’s evidence
unerringly pointed to all appellants’ complicity and guilt. It was highlighted
that four sets of fingerprints were lifted, by PW-24 (i.e., Ex P80) on
19.06.2011. The fingerprints of the deceased (Ex. P81, Ex. P82 and Ex.
E P83) were lifted on 20.06.2011, by Constable Dinesh. The fingerprints
of the three accused/appellants were obtained on 24.06.2011 (Ex. P41,
Ex. P42 and Ex. P43) by PW-13 constable Vijay Singh. His deposition
was sought to be discredited by the appellants, by pointing out that while
the fingerprint samples were obtained, according to him, the accused
had signed on the forms (but which were not actually found); and further,
F that the forms did not contain the photographs of the accused. The learned
AAG pointed out that the form used, is the one as required in the Madhya
Pradesh Police manual, and there is no requirement of a witness, at the
time of obtaining fingerprint samples. Furthermore, the cross examination
of this witness was not worthwhile as nothing significant was elicited
G from them.
62. The AAG emphasized that the report of the fingerprint expert
(Ex. P84) dated 11.07.2011 by PW-24 K.K. Trivedi, fully supported the
prosecution. It established that four fingerprints could be developed and
compared with chance fingerprints found at the crime scene. The report
H clearly stated that two fingerprints lifted from the site (A and B) matched
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 495
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

with the sample fingerprint of Rahul; fingerprint D matched with the A
fingerprint of Manoj and fingerprint E matched with the fingerprint of
Neha. PW-17 Satyanarayan Patel had photographed the crime scene,
including the spots where prints were collected, which corroborated
beyond any doubt, that the appellants were present at the crime scene.
63. It was argued that a crucial circumstance that has to be B
considered is that appellants Rahul @ Govind and Manoj were also injured.
PW-30 R.S. Makwana, ASI who was posted at Annapurna PS stated
that the appellant No. 2 Rahul @ Govind’s leg was wounded. This was
also informed to T.I. Gaurishankar Chadar, who wrote dehatinalisi (Ex.
P103); Crime no. 377/11 under Sections 294, 307, 34 IPC was registered.
PW-26 Mukesh Bhachawat deposed that on 19.06.2011 Constable C
Dinesh of Annapurana PS brought accused Rahul; he found an injuryon
his right toe, which had a charring firearm wound. The statement of the
IO was that on the basis of information received from Rahul, a shoe
(size 44) for the left leg was recovered in the presence of witnesses
from the nearby RTO Office. Both the shoes which were seized were D
brown coloured with three holes and seized within the jurisdiction of PS
Annapurna. One shoe had a gunshot mark and the other shoe belonged
to Rahul. From the statement of the medical officer, the right toe of right
leg of Rahul @ Govind had a gunshot injury and the recovered right
shoe had a gunshot hole. Rahul’s medical report supported the fact that
he had sustained one gunshot injury on the toe of his right leg. E

64. It is argued that the DNA reports established that the blood
stains found on shoes and clothes of accused, matched the body fluid of
the deceased. The DNA report, coupled with deposition of PW-35
established that body fluid of deceased Megha was found on Rahul’s
articles (Ex. F4, F5); body fluid of deceased Ashlesha was found on F
Manoj’s articles (Ex. G1, G3); and Neha’s sandal (Ex. H2) had traces
of deceased Megha’s body fluids.
65. The learned counsel argued that the facts of the case were
proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt toindicate that the
accused and none else, were the three persons who had committed the G
crime for which both courts below had convicted them. It was argued
that no prosecution can prove facts perfectly and that some lapses or
inconsistencies are bound to occur, given the tricks memories play because
of which witnesses may not recollect events perfectly or in chronological
H
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A order. To make her point, the AAG relied on the observations cited by
this court in Moosa Patel v. State of Gujarat26.
66. It was lastly argued that the appellants offered no explanation
when the incriminating circumstances were put to them, under Section
313 CrPC. It was stressed that this court in many decisions has in fact
B held that examination of accused under Section 313 CrPC manifests the
principles of natural justice- audi alteram partem, by curtailing all
interferences at that stage from counsel, prosecutors, witnesses, third
parties, etc. The accused may be asked to furnish some explanation as
regards the incriminating circumstances associated with him, and the
court must take note of such explanation. Therefore, by essentially
C establishing a dialogue between the accused and trial court, the
examination of accused under Section 313 CrPC is not a mere formality
and the answers given by the accused have a practical utility. It was
submitted that the complete lack of any explanation, much less a
reasonable explanation, only meant that the accused could not justify
D their conduct; they had no argument to offer.
67. In view of these submissions, the AAG concluded that this
court should not interfere, under its special leave appellate jurisdiction
with the concurrent findings of guilt, recorded by the courts below, based
on a full and fair appreciation of all the evidence and material on the
E record.
Analysis and Findings
I. Neha’s arrest
68. PW-28 (Vijay Singh Chauhan) deposed that he saw Neha
F loitering suspiciously at 6.00 AM on 23.06.2011, near an ATM. He relayed
this to P.S. MIG, where the information was received by PW-19 Gaikwad.
The IO(PW-31), formed a team consisting of PW-13 (Vijay Singh), PW-
36 (Mulayam Singh), Constable Devendra and PW-4 (Banno Solanki,
the woman constable). This party went to the site, and confronted Neha;
her body search was conducted by PW-4 which yielded Ashlesha’s ATM
G Card. The search memo (in which time recorded is 06.40 AM) was
produced as Ex. P22. Neha was taken in for questioning and later arrested.
69. PW-28’s testimony is supported by PW-4, PW-31 and PW-
36. However, deposition of PW-19 (Y.R. Gaikwad) is silent about the

26
H (2011) 2 SCC 198 (para 22)
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 497
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

reporting of Neha’s suspicious activity – and what was deposed by PW- A
28, as corroborated by others. Constable Devendra was not examined.
This omission is per se, insignificant because while proving certain facts
and events if by and large, witnesses are consistent, any omission can
be overlooked.
70. Nevertheless, a few aspects urged by the appellants with B
respect to the events proximate to, and surroundingNeha’s arrest bear
scrutiny. DW-1 Deepika Shinde (who was promoted as inspector when
she deposed) – admitted to analysing call detail records and importantly,
to receiving information -from an undisclosed‘source’- that Neha would
be at the spot – from where she was ultimately arrested on 22.06.2011,
and that she would be in jeans and a maroon-coloured top. DW-1 deposed C
that she had received this tip offprior to Neha’s arrest, i.e., before 6:30
AM, and she shared this this information with the police. PW-28, however,
denied the involvement of DW-1.During the trial, the defence had relied
on certain documents – notably Ex. D-32 and Ex. D-46, to say that DW-
1 received an out of turn promotion for her role in solving the crime. D
That out of turn promotion was givento DW-1 and PW-28, was admitted
by both of them. It is evident, therefore, that DW-1 received prior
information regarding Neha’s likely whereabouts and further details even
to the extent of a description of her attire. The prosecution’s studied
silence with respect to her role is not just mystifying but is a matter of
concern. E
71. The prosecution sought to establish through the testimonies of
the IO as well as PW-3 (Deepak Ranade) and PW-6 (Triyambak @
Prafulla), that Neha was taken to the police station and questioned.They
then proceeded to Neha’s house.As per the IO’s testimony, the raiding
party included PW-19 and PW-4. The further prosecution case in the F
statements of PW-31, PW-3 and PW-6 was that Neha was interrogated
on the way to her house and later arrested, after which her disclosure
statement was recorded leading to the recovery of the stolen articles at
her behest. At this instance also there was not even a slight whisper by
any prosecution witness about DW-1 Deepika Shinde’s role.
G
72. During her deposition, DW-1 affirmed that she had gone to
the crime scene on 19.06.2011 itself.She also admitted that
“I had analysed call records in the instant case.Today, I cannot
tell as to which call and as to how it was analysed by me.I
had not investigated the instant matter.I recall that I had H
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A interrogated one accused in this matter later.I might have
interrogated lady accused (Neha Verma) present in the Court
is the same person whom I had interrogated.”
Later, DW-1 was unable to state the precise time in terms of
number of hours after the incident when she had interrogated Neha.
B However, she was clear that she did so after Neha’s arrest by PS
MIG.She further clarified that she had “interrogated Neha Verma in
MIG Police Station itself.”PW-7 Sandeep Narulkar who concededly
joined the investigation as a panch witness on 23.06.2011, admitted in
the cross-examination that DW-1"Police Sub-Inspector was not with
us, she was in other vehicle”.This witness was cross-examined on
C 02.03.2012 but he failed to identify her on that day.He, however, admitted
that he could not remember how many lady officers were present during
the investigation on 23.06.2011 i.e., the day on which he was asked to
present as a witness.
73. As observed earlier, an interesting feature is the fact that close
D on the heels of the arrest of the present appellants and recovery of
incriminating articles, the police department promoted some of its officers
and employees including DW-1 and DW-28.Both these personnel did
not belong to the MIG Police Station but were positioned in the Crime
Branch.Ex. D30 (proved by DW-4 Pawan Srivastava, Inspector General
E of Police who had issued it) which was placed on record during the
cross-examination of PW-1, is the order issued by the office of the Senior
Superintendent of Police, District-Indore on 26.06.2011 bearing
S.No.SSP/Indore/PA/Reward/11/2005A. Its inter alia pertinently reads
as follows: -
“In the afternoon on 19.06.2011, gruesome murder of Bank
F
Officer Niranjan Deshpande’s wife Megha Deshpande,
daughter-Ashlesha Despande and mother-in-law Rohini
Fadke residing in the first floor of House No. 24, Shrinagar
Main Colony in posh area of the city was committed by
stabbing with knife. Total 22 stab wounds were found the
G person of Ashlesha.
On coming to know about this triple murder, within no time
resident near to the place of incidents gathered, the crowd
was so big which created law and order problem.The murders
committed in the broad daylight, raised many questions on
H the functioning of Indore Police and pubic started questioning
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 499
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

that when women are not safe in posh colony situated in the A
center of the city then how the women residing in other part
or the city will feel themselves to be safe. All the police officers
rushed to the place of incident and started taking control of
law and order. Electronic Media and Newspapers widely aired
the said incident which resulted fear in the mind of public
B
also their trust in the police administration weakened. Keeping
in mind priority and gravity of the said incident, Senior
Officers Constituted a police team of able officers & officials
in which Sub-Inspector Deepika Shinde (In-charge We Care
for You) and R. 2906 Vijay Singh were specially included in
the team and at the same time the declaration of reward to the C
police officer solving the incident, was made.
Immediately after the incident, at about 20.00 hours in the
night on 19.06.2011, through Police control Room, directions
were issued to Sub- Inspector Deepika Shinde to reach at the
place of incident i.e. 24 Shrinagar Main immediately. After D
reaching the place of incident, she discussed with the family
members and neighbours about the people Visited at the time
of incident whereupon it revealed that before the incident a
friend (female) of deceased Ashlesha was seen leaving her
house and secret information about her other activities were
gathered. E

Under the supervision of Manoj Rai, Additional District Crime
Branch Superintendent of Police, District Crime Branch and
Jitendra Singh, Dy. S.P,. District Crime Branch, call details
of mobile numbers 9981147765, 9669191385 and
9826635615 of deceased Ashlesha Deshpande and Megha F
Deshpande respectively were obtained. Sub-Inspector
Deepika Shinde was deputed to analyse and gather detailed
information about college mates of deceased Ashlesha and
deceased Megha Deshpande’s colleagues working in Oriflame
company who using her professional skill and technique, G
noticed a mobile No.8103807143 regularly talking to
deceased Megha on the date of the incident and prior thereto
stated location of the said suspected mobile phone to be at
the place of incident. Later Sub-Inspector Deepika Shinde
established through call details location and IMEI search,
H
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A the said suspected mobile was being used by Neha’s father
Anil Verma r/o Indore and at present mobile Nos. 9009090142
& 9826065288 stated to be used in the said mobile.
On 22.06.2011, through analysis of call details of the
Suspected mobile number, Sub-Inspector Deepika Shinde,
B established Neha Verma r/o H.N.10 Devendra Nagar Indore
to be Connected with the said incident. In addition, Sub-
Inspector Deepika Shinde using her information system and
intelligent inputs, gather this information that today on 22
(illegible) Neha Verma wearing black jeans pant and maroon
colour top has left home and on analysing the call details
C ofsuspected Neha Verma, present location of suspected Neha
Verma to be near LIG Tiraha Indore to R. 2906 Vijay Singh.
After the incident, not finding any clue or the incident despite
all out efforts for three days by the Indore Police, crisis of
law and order has been created due to pressure and protest
D from public, media and other social organisations. In such
circumstances, Sub-inspector Deepika Shinde by her all-out
efforts and devotion for continuous 72 hours, established a
lead in the form of Neha Verma for identification & arrest of
the killers and working on the same this triple murder case
E was solved and succeeded in arrestof Neha Verma and other
Rahul @ Govind Maratha and Manoj Balai involved in the
case.
While interrogating female accused Neha Verma extensively
by applying psychological method, S.I. Deepika Shinde
F extracted information about accomplices and also extensively
interrogating other two accused, collected information about
the incident which led to solving in the case.
Sub-inspector Deepika Shinde showing her proficiency in
analysis showing her proficiency in analysing call details and
G professional skill with her hard work and devotion gathered
and made available information of identification, appearance,
name and address of the first suspect Neha Verma and her
involvement incident on the basis of which only a direction
for search for accused of the incident be fixed.
H XXXXXXX XXXXXXX XXXXXXX
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 501
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

Sub-Inspector Deepika Shinde establishing identity of the A
accused of the unknown accused in the said triple murder
has played a significant role in solving the case which shows
her professional excellence, perseverance and devotion for
duty. Had she not established identity of Neha Verma, accused
in the said triple murder case, arrest of the accused in the
B
said was impossible and by her ability, she has established
identity of the accused persons and solving the said case, a
good message went in the public and their confidence was
re-stored in police. In the past as well, service of the Sub-
Inspector has been excellent.
In view of the said brave and commendable work by Sub- C
Inspector Deepika Shinde, under Para No. 70 (a) of Police
Regulation, she is recommended for out of turn promotion to
the post of Inspector keep her morale high and in future,
while discharging her police duties with diligence and
perseverance, she brings laurels to the department.” D
74. Similarly, in reply to an R.T.I. query by DW-6 Anil Verma
(Neha’s father), the P.I.O., Police Headquarters at Bhopal sent a response
(dated 22.05.2012), No.PH/10/Record/RTI/70/12/506/12.The material
part of this document, produced as Ex. D-46, is extracted below:
“Subject: Information under Section 6 (1) Right to E
Information Act, 2005.
Reference: Your application dated 29.02.12,16.03. 2012,
23.03.12 and 26.03. 12.
Kindly peruse above referred applications information
received sought on two points by you, is as under: F

1. Photocopy of Committee Report dated 24.12.2011
regarding out of turn promotion to Sub-Inspector Deepika
Shinde, is enclosed.
2. On 19.06.2011, Smt. Deepika Shinde, Sub-Inspector on G
searching arrested Neha Verma, Rahul @ Govind and Manoj
Balai, the main accused of triple murder case of Bank Officer
Nilanjay Despande’s wife Megha Deshpande, daughter-
Ashlesha Deshpande and mother-in-law Rohini Phadke
residing in House No. 24, Shrinagar Main Colony, under PS-
MIG, Indore City.” H
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A 75. The admissions by DW-1 on three aspectsi.e., (a) analysing
call details in respect of certain mobile numbers; (b) obtaining source
information from an informer which was passed on to MIG Police Station;
(c) interrogation of Neha after her arrest,in the MIG police station, thus
stand proved. PW-7’s deposition also suggests that DW-1 was with the
investigation team even on 23.06.2011 and hence, provides independent
B
corroboration in supporting the appellants’ arguments in this regard.
76. DW-1’s role in the pre-arrest, intelligence-information gathering,
the arrest, interrogation of Neha, which the prosecution tried to studiously
keep away from the court thus, leads one to conclude that its version
with respect to apprehension and arrest of Neha are not believable.It is
C
also a matter of record that DW-3, the then Inspector General of Police
Sanjay Rana admitted that the police department had issued Ex. D32 on
04.10.2011 containing a list including at S.No.26 - an unnamed informant
-of persons given awards for their contribution.In the present case, all
these materials i.e., evidence of DW-1 and DW-7 as well as the
D documents issued by the police departments/state governments itself,
clearly points towards the involvement of DW-1, not merely at a peripheral
stage, but on a pervasive basis, even after, in regard to the enquiry in the
immediate aftermath of the crime, gathering intelligence information with
respect to the probable accused; analysing call details, participating in
the arrest, interrogation of the accused and even an involvement with
E
further investigating steps leading to recovery of articles.
77. DW-6 Anil Verma (Neha’s father) in his statement had deposed
that Neha was taken away for questioning much earlier, on 19.6.2011
itself. He deposed that on 21.06.2011 one Kishan Panwar from Crime
Branch went to him and said that Neha was using a stolen mobile phone
F
for which an inquiry was being conducted.At his behest, DW-6 asked
Neha to reach home immediately.Once she reached, DW-6 contacted
Kishan Panwar and informed him about her return from the office.He
reached DW-6’s house 15-20 minutes later with DW-1.They checked
Neha’s mobile phone and then left the place stating that Neha would be
G taken for about an hour and a half for inquiry. DW-1 did not disclose
where she would be taken but allowed the witness DW-6 to accompany
them at a distance.According to DW-6, Neha was taken to SP’s Office
at Regal Crossing and taken upstairs.The witness was not allowed to go
there, andinstead was asked to leave, at which point he went home
along with his son. He stated further that on 23.06.2011 at 07:30 AM or
H
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 503
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

so he was asked telephonically to keep Neha’s clothes outside, as the A
police was coming to collect them.The police reached DW-6’s house in
the evening at which point they took a maroon top and one pair of jeans.
The witness was cross-examined by prosecution to suggest that his
deposition was false; he denied it.
78. What is evident from an overall reading of the prosecution B
version as compared to the testimonies of DW-1, DW-3 and DW-4 as
well as the documentary evidence is that the “breakthrough”, claimed
by the prosecution resulting from Neha’s arrest on 22.06.2011 is not
correct.The police had knowledge about the sim cards of deceased
Aslesha and Megha. Apparently, the call details of these were analysed
by DW-1.However, the prosecution kept these details away from the C
trial.Likewise, although PW-28 and PW-31 both elaborately described
how Neha was arrested (especially role played by PW-4, PW-19 who
relayed the information and the participation of PW-3, PW-6 as well as
PW-36),all of them were conspicuously silent about DW-1. Whereas
DW-1 admitted, in no uncertain terms, at two different places, to having D
participated in the interrogation of Neha and also having given information
regarding her likely whereabouts- including the clothes that she would
wear,leading to her arrest.The cat was out of the bag, so to say when
PW-7 admitted that DW-1 participated in the recovery of articles on
23.06.2011, a day after the arrest of all the appellants.
E
79. Having regard to all these circumstances, the prosecution
version with respect to Neha’s arrest and interrogation cannot be
believed. The suppression of these facts, from the court, attracts an
adverse inference that the prosecution’s version with respect to manner
of Neha’s arrest, and the role of DW-1, is unreliable.
F
80. The question which then arises is: what is the impact of the
rejection of the manner of Neha’s arrest in the prosecution’s case? The
appellant urged that, the entire story – i.e., disclosure statements and
the recoveries effected on 22.06.2011 and 23.06.2011, has to be rejected.
This court is of the opinion that such a drastic approach is uncalled for.
Concededly the present case is entirely based on circumstantial evidence. G
The rejection of the prosecution version with respect to Neha’s arrest
would mean that only that circumstance is held not to be proved. It is not
that Neha’s arrest provided sole foundation of the prosecution case. In
some ways, it is an entry point; its rejection would mean that the court
should proceed cautiously with other evidence, objectively determine H
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A whether all other circumstances were proved beyond reasonable doubt,
and whether in the end the guilt of the accused and not others, has been
so proved.
II. Circumstances relating to arrest of theotherappellants
81. If the circumstances leading to Neha’s arrest on 22.06.2011
B be disbelieved, what remains as a matter of the record is that she was
interrogated in the presence of PW-3 and PW-6 that day. It is necessary
to analyse the depositions of these witnesses. PW-3 is a relative of the
deceased, as well as Niranjan Deshpande (PW-1). He was present on
19.06.2011 and witnessed the seizure and sealing of blood samples,
C fingerprints and the articles found at the crime scene. He was also a
witness to the inquest proceedings. He deposed that the IO (PW-31)
asked him, in the morning of 22.06.2011 to reach the Police Station, with
some other person. PW-31, however, did not support PW-3 about asking
him to bring another person. Nevertheless, PW-3 and PW-6 reached the
police station at around 7:30 AM.Neha’s arrest is shown at 08:10 AM;
D the disclosure statement and recovery of two golden bangles, a broken
mangalsutra, 3 guriyas, gold pendant, an ATM card belonging to
deceased Megha, an Oriflame perfume bottle and an Oriflame form
(apparently with Megha’s signature) were witnessed by PW-3. He also
deposedwith respect to the arrest of Rahul (at 9:00 AM), disclosure
E statement by him and recovery of various articles i.e., a pistol, a knife,
two golden bangles, part of a broken mangalsutra containing a “guriya”
and chain (weighing approximately 9 grams), a black guriya, and Rahul’s
photograph (wearing a black beaded bracelet on his right hand). He
further testified to the arrest of Manoj at 10:05 AM, on 22.06.2011, his
disclosure and pointing to articles, leading to their recovery (Ex. P16&
F Ex. P17). The recovered articles included two golden bangles, portion
of a broken mangalsutra, a knife and a photograph with Manoj in
sunglasses. PW-6 corroborated those facts.
82. PW-3’s testimony was impeached pointing to the discrepancy
in time. He reached the police station after 7:30 AM. Further, in cross-
G examination, the witness was not able to depose about particulars of the
houses the police party went to, who were there, etc. Likewise, a question
mark was raised about PW-6. It was urged that the IO never asked
another witness to accompany PW-3. It was urged these witnesses are
interested persons, as they are related to the deceased and PW-1.Another
H argument regarding the recoveries on 22.06.2011 were that it is
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 505
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

unbelievable that Rahul and Manoj would have kept the looted articles A
and the weapons used to assault and kill the deceased, given that they
tried to dispose of other articles such as shoes, camera, clothes, etc. and
hide the bike and scooty, etc. In the opinion of the court, the manner of
arrest of these individuals, has been spoken to by and largeconsistentlyby
the two witnesses PW-3 and PW-6 who have corroborated the IO’s
B
deposition. However, in respect of Neha, what is not explained is why
PW-4 (Banno Solanki) did not participate in her arrest and search of her
premises. After having called PW-4, to ensure compliance with the law
that a woman police constable should apprehend, search and arrest a
female accused, the prosecution has offered no explanation as to why
PW-4 was not involved in the further proceedings. PW-4 admitted that C
she was sitting in the car when the team proceeded to Neha’s house.
Her presence in the team is confirmed by PW-3 as well as the IO. PW-
4 herself does not corroborate the prosecution version about recoveries
made from Neha’s house.
83. As observed earlier, the seizure memos detailing the articles D
seized at the behest of the accused: Ex. P11 (Neha) included an ATM
Card which belonged to Megha, the deceased; Ex. P14 (Rahul) included
looted jewellery (golden bangles, part of broken mangalsutra), a country
made pistol, a knife measuring 35.5 cm, and a photograph of him wearing
a black diamond-like beaded bracelet on his right hand; Ex. P17 (Manoj)
E
included looted jewellery (two gold bangles, part of a broken
mangalsutra), an iron knife of overall length of 34.5 cm and a photograph
of him wearing brown coloured sunglasses.As per the prosecution, these
articles are related to their crime.
84. PW-3 and PW-6, both depose that after the seizure of the
F
article each of them remained with the police till 5:00 PM on
22.06.2011.The prosecution version is that the arrest of all three accused
persons were completed by 10:05 AM, their disclosure statements
recorded, and all the articles seized by 10.35 AM (as per Ex. P17).There
is no explanation as to why further investigation was not taken up.All
that seems to have occurred on 22.06.2011 thereafter, i.e,. after 10:35 G
AM, was the nails of the accused were cut and seizure memos prepared
(as deposed to by PW-3 and PW-6). The seizure memos in this regard
are Ex. P18, P19 and P20. These were drawn in the early afternoon:
Ex. P18 (13:05 hrs); Ex. P19 (13:15 hrs) and Ex. P20 (13:25 hrs). The
prosecution alleged that later at Rahul’s behest the left shoe worn by
H
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A him during the incident was seized at 16:40 hrs from an open area near
his house (Ex. P21).
85. The prosecution did not explain why there were breaks in the
investigation, given that the disclosure statements of all accused,and
consequent recoveries took place in the morning of 22.06.2011.It is also
B a matter of record that though the accused were arrested that day they
were only produced before the magistrate on the next day.In other words,
there was no impediment for the police to have proceeded further or
taken immediate steps to secure all evidence.This aspect is, in this Court’s
opinion, important because even if the manner in which Neha was arrested
was to be discounted (as discussed earlier) the fact that they were
C arrested in the presence of PW-3 and PW-6, further proceedings and
investigative steps including the seizure of articles at the behest of the
accused and pursuant to their statements, stand proved.These are reasons
why the events of 22.06.2011 (after the arrest of the accused, and
recoveries were made at their behest) have to be segregated and seen
D differently from the events and circumstances relied upon by the
prosecution on other dates.
86. The credibility of PW-3 and PW-6, in this Court’s opinion,
cannot be doubted.PW-3 was present on 19.06.2011, after discovery of
the murderous attack and PW-1 Niranjan Deshpandestayed with him
E after reaching Indore. He (PW-3) was the deceased Rohini’s nephew
and even performed the funeral rites of the deceased.Likewise, PW-6
lived in Village Barlai which is about 45 minutes by bus, from Jaora
(where PW-3 resided). He knew PW-3 and had known Rohini for about
10-15 years.He reached PW-3’s house when the latter asked him to
ccompanyy him to the police station, since Neha had been caught and
F her search had yielded an ATM card which belonged to Ashlesha. Of
these two witnesses, PW-3 is related to the deceased; however, PW-6
was not. Both witnesses corroborated each other’s testimony and prove
the prosecution story about Neha’s questioning, her arrest, disclosure
statement, recoveries made pursuant to her statement, as well as the
arrest, disclosure statements and recoveries made from Rahul and
G
Manoj.Furthermore, there is no discrepancy between their testimonies
and that of the IO (PW-31). Another piece of evidence is that PW-27,
an officer of Bank of India, Ujjain deposed that he issued a letter (Ex.
P98) to the SHO containing the ATM card numbers. Megha’s ATM
card, recovered pursuant to Neha’s disclosure statement, was issued by
H his bank; this was among the articles seized on 22.06.2011.
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 507
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

87. An overall analysis of the testimonies of PW-3 and PW-6 A
shows that despite some inconsistencies, which can be put down to
imperfect or faulty recollection of sequence of events, or about the people
present etc., their testimonies are credible. The effect of their depositions
is that they witnessed the disclosure statements of Neha, Rahul and
Manoj, and also witnessed the recovery of articles and their seizure by
B
the police, which were recorded in seizure memos (Ex. P11, P14 and
P17).
III.Recoveries of 23.06.2011
88. PW-7 Sandeep Narulkar is an independent witness, who
C
testified to the disclosure statements of the accused Rahul and Manojon
23.06.2011 and the recoveries made pursuant to it. He deposed to
witnessing Rahul telling the police about the incident of 19.06.2011 and
that in that incident, a camera and two mobile sets were looted. Rahul
gave information about the camera, motorcycle, clothes worn, and knife
used at the time of incident; he said that he could get the articles D
recovered. Then police prepared a disclosure memo (Ex. P28) witnessed
and signed by PW-7. He said that on Rahul’s direction, the police
recovered the motorcycle in question from beneath a small bridge over
Pithampur road, onedark brown coloured trouser, afull sleeved grey
coloured shirt, and a blood-stained iron knife with metal handle (Ex.
E
P29).Further, the police also seized a lens of a broken camera (Ex. P30).
Both seizure memos (Ex. P29, P30) contained PW-7’s signature.When
shown in Court, he also identified the articles (brown colour full pant,
knife, one lens of broken camera). He further statedthat police
interrogated Manoj before him and Manoj gave information about
robberyand murder, and about the clothes and shoes worn at the time F
ofincident and told that he could get them recovered. The police then
prepared memorandum Ex. P31 containing the witnesses’ signature.As
per Manoj’s direction, the police seized a “firoji” coloured t-shirt, a black
coloured blood-stained full pant, a blue underwearand a pairof micro-
leather black coloured shoes from his father’s house; the seizure memo G
for these articles (Ex. P32) also contained his signature. He identified
the articles -clothes, shoes anda broken Samsung mobile phone, recovered
by police from a vacant plot near Maruti showroom under seizure
panchnama (Ex. P33) with the witnesses’ signature. He mentioned that
the mobile phone’s IMEI number was 352450/03/115949/9.
H
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A 89. PW-7 also witnessed Neha’s interrogation whereshe provided
information aboutcommitting robbery and murder; and told the police
that she had hidden and could point out clothes and sandals worn at the
time of incident, and Suzuki Access vehicle (Ex. P34). At her pointing
out, the police seized the Suzuki Access Scooty in question, from behind
the old OPD of M.Y. Hospital, from which: one service book, one blood-
B
stained pink full sleeve shirt with white lining, a light blue coloured jeans
with three buttons on the back pocket, a pair of ladies black coloured
high heeled sandals with brown strip attached at the front and in the
back of which, above the heels a chain was attached containing blood
stains. These were seized by police (Ex.P35) containing the witnesses’
C signature. PW-7 identified these articles in court.
90. An overall reading of the depositions of PW-7 and PW-13
shows that disclosure statements were made by all the accused in the
morning of 23.06.2011.However, the recovery of articles pursuant to
the disclosure statements were in the afternoon: Ex. P29 (which relates
D to Rahul and evidenced the seizure of the motorcycle, a knife and his
clothing) was at 15:30 hrs; Ex. P30 (which too at the behest of Rahul
leading to seizure of a broken camera) at 16:40 hrs; Ex. P32 (pair of
shoes, a t-shirt, a trouser and an underwear seized at the behest of
Manoj) at 14:45 hrs; Ex. P33(the other seizure at Manoj’s behest, of
broken mobile phone) at 16:00 hrs; and Ex. P35 (seizure of clothing
E
items, blood-stained black sandals and Suzuki Scooty, at Neha’s behest)
at 17.30 hrs.The prosecution made no attempt to show why piecemeal
recoveries were made when according to its witnesses, on the very first
day i.e.,on 22.06.2011, all the three accused had disclosed their roles in
the crime and their willingness to cooperate as well as the recovery of
F the articles related to the crime - including those belonging to them or
hidden by them.
91. The second unexplained feature is why two sets of witnesses
were joined in the proceedings, on two consecutive dates.PW-3 and
PW-6, witnessed the arrest of the three accused, their disclosure
G statements and recoveries made on the first day i.e., on 22.06.2011. An
entirely different set of witnesses were called on the next day i.e.,
23.06.2011 (PW-7 and Prakash Ichke).Furthermore, one of the recovery
witnesses for 23.06.2011 (Prakash Ichke) was not examined. As noted
previously, the recovery witnesses received phone call at around 7-8
AM and were asked to report to the Police Station which they did at
H
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 509
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

around 8-8.30 AM on 23-06-2011; the disclosure statements made by A
the accused on that day were recorded at different points of time but
before 10.00 AM.However, the prosecution does not explain the absence
of any activity between around 10AM and 1.30 PM when the first
recovery was made that day.PW-7on his own admission stated that he
was acquainted with the deceased family; apparently, his cell phone
B
numbers was known to them.As noted earlier, he also admitted that
DW-1 Dipika Shinde had participated in the investigation proceedings
that day.
92. All these factors, in the opinion of this court cast doubt on the
prosecution version as to what occurred on the next day i.e.,
C
23.06.2011.Given that the accused were detained and arrested in the
early morning of 22.06.2011, that they made disclosure statements, and
there were recoveries that dayat their behest, which were completed
that morning itself, the instalment or episodic procedure adopted by the
investigation, throws doubts about its veracity.Nothing prevented the
prosecution from acting on the statements made by the accused and D
collecting all the evidence – which by its admission was readily available
and easily accessible (given the knowledge of the accused which they
were willing to share) on the day of their arrest on 22.06.2011.Even if
there were some impediments, in terms of, lack of time or otherwise,the
involvement of an entirely different set of panch witnesses, without
E
explaining why the other witnesses who had evidenced recoveries on
22.06.2011 could not be asked to participate, underlines that doubt.The
doubt gets further heightened by the fact that PW-7 knew the deceased
family - and also claimed that his mobile number was available with
them.The IO (PW-31) does not in his statement say anything about this.He
was silent as to why PW-7 instead of the other three was involved in the F
proceedings in 23.06.2011, and regarding the non-examination of Prakash
Ichke, the other witness to the recoveries.Since all the recoveries were
made from open areas with no special features to highlight whether they
were from certain hidden spaces, such recoveries of articles cannot be
equated with the kind of recoveries made on 22.06.2011.This aspect is
G
important because clothes seized by the police (which according to the
prosecution were lying in open area, and thus exposed to elements) were
articles from which samples for DNA were collected to ascertain if
there were any matches with the DNA markers foundon samples
collected from the deceased and the crime scene.
H
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A IV.Testimony of PW-10, the eyewitness
93. The prosecution relied heavily upon the testimony of PW-
10.This witness claimed that in the evening of 19.06.2011, he saw two
boys trying to start a motorcycle one of them was bleeding from the
ankle, and the other, at the forearm.He added that a girl arrived on a
B Scooty and advised them that it would be better to go to the hospital.The
witness alleged that he had informed the police on the day after the
incident i.e., 20.06.2011. He stated in cross-examination that after learning
about the murder he claimed that he went to the police station. Later, he
said that he went there to obtain a “gumasta” license. He admitted that
he did not read newspapers but added that when he went to the police
C station, there was some discussion going on about the murder, upon which
he volunteered to provide information and got his statement recorded.The
witness said that he owned a tea shop and worked as a property broker;
he later admitted that he did not have any registration as property
broker.He also admitted to having previously deposed as a witness on
D behalf of the police in some other case. PW-10’s presence near the
scene of crime, or rather after it, is explained by him, somewhat
unconvincingly, as his effort to ascertain if some property was vacant.
He is what one can call as a chance witness.
94. A chance witness is one, who appears on the scene suddenly.
E This speciesof witness was described in Puran v. State of Punjab27 in
the following terms:
“Such witnesses have the habit of appearing suddenly on the
scene when something is happening and then of disappearing
after noticing the occurrence about which they are called
F later on to give evidence.”
This court has sounded a note of caution about dealing with the
testimony of chance witnesses. In Darya Singh v. State of Punjab28 it
was observed that:
“…where the witness is a close relation of the victim and is
G shown to share the victim’s hostility to his assailant, that
naturally makes it necessary for the criminal courts examine
the evidence given by such witness very carefully and scrutinise

27
AIR 1953 SC 459
28
H 1964 (7) SCR 397
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 511
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

all the infirmities in that evidence before deciding to act upon A
it. In dealing with such evidence, Courts naturally begin with
the enquiry as to whether the said witnesses were chance
witnesses or whether they were really present on the scene of
the offence.…..If the criminal Court is satisfied that the witness
who is related to the victim was not a chance-witness, then
B
his evidence has to be examined from the point of view of
probabilities and the account given by him as to the assault
has to be carefully scrutinised.”
In Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab29 again, this court held that:
“22. The evidence of a chance witness requires a very cautious C
and close scrutiny and a chance witness must adequately
explain his presence at the place of occurrence (Satbir v. Surat
Singh30, Harjinder Singh v. State of Gujarat, Acharaparambath
Pradeepan and Anr. v. State of Kerala31 and Sarvesh Narain
Shukla v. Daroga Singh 32). Deposition of a chance witness
D
whose presence at the place of incident remains doubtful
should be discarded (vide Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan33).”
95. In the opinion of this court the deposition of this witness (PW-
10) cannot be taken at face value.PW-10 improved upon his statement
made to the police and was confronted in this regard. His initial statement
to the police did not mention the presence of the girl (whom he identified E
as Neha in court). Likewise, he improves upon his statement, by deposing
in court that the girl had asked two boys to one injured seriously to the
hospital. In addition, his contradictions as to what led him to the police
station on 20.0.2011 – obtaining a gumasta license, or to report the crime;
and his presence at the scene of the crime – as a property broker checking F
vacancy of a property, who admittedly had no license for this business,
are material. These contradictions are serious inasmuch as they strike
at the root of the witness’s credibility. His prevarications and
improvements especially about the presence of a girl are too serious and
fundamental to overlook. Very crucially this witness appears to be a
G

29
(2009) 9 SCC 719
30
(1997) 4 SCC 192
31
(2006) 13 SCC 643
32
(2007) 13 SCC 360
33
(2004) 10 SCC 632 H
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A stock witness. For all the aforesaid reasons the depositions of PW-10
cannot be accepted.
V. Identification of Manoj by PW-8
96. The prosecution relied on the testimony of PW-8 Achyutmal
Tejwani to say that Manoj had obtained treatment from him. The witness,
B during his deposition stated that he had studied from a Science College
in Pakistan. He admitted to not being licensed to practise medicine, by
the Medical Council of India; he also admitted that he did not hold any
permission to practise as a doctor, but ran Kavita clinic. He identified
Manoj in court, and said that on 19.06.2011, Manoj had secured treatment
C for an injury on his elbow, and another boy (who spoke in Sindhi)
accompanied him.He proved Ex. P37, the slip issued by him, containing
the prescription for Manoj, which was seized on 25.06.2011 (Ex. P36)
by the IO (PW-31), who deposed to it.
97. This court is of the opinion that PW-8 is not a reliable witness.
Apart from the fact that he is admittedly an unqualified professional, and
D
an unlicensed one- at best a quack, counsel for the appellants quite
correctly point out that his previous links with the police cannot be ruled
out, for the reason that he migrated, later than during Partition, from
Pakistan. The probability of him practising his profession under the shadow
of police patronage, for some kind of quid pro quo, i.e., being a
E convenient witness, leaves a lurking suspicion. The police did not involve
him during the test identification parade; admittedly, Manoj was in fact
taken to him during the investigation. In these circumstances, the
testimony of this witness is not credible. This circumstance is therefore,
held not to be proved.
F VI.Test Identification Parade of the accused
98. The prosecution relied upon the testimonies of PW-10 and
PW-18 (Pratap Kumar Agasiya, Naib Tehsildar). Both deposed that PW-
10 had correctly identified Manoj and Rahul by specifically tapping their
heads.According to PW-18, both the accused were made to stand with
10 other persons resembling them.The result of this identification memo
G
i.e., the test identification parade (“TIP”) proceedings were recorded as
Ex. P38, where Manoj and Rahul were identified by PW-10, and Ex.
P40 where only Manoj was identified by PW-11 Raju Sen.Likewise,
PW-18 deposed that in a separate proceedingrecorded as Ex. P39, PW-
10 had identified Neha from amongst five other girls who had similar
H physical features.
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 513
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

99. The main argument against the TIP proceedings was that it A
was held after an inordinate delay. The appellants were arrested on
22.06.2011 and remained in custody till 30.06.2011. It was urged that no
attempt was made to involve a magistrate, to have their TIPs either at
that time, or thereafter and that the TIP was held only on 14.07.2011.
Ex. P38, the TIP relating to Rahul and Manoj, records the names of 10
B
other men who the accused were made to stand with, anywhere as per
their choice. Each person was covered with a blanket, upto their neck.
It records that no police personnel were present when the proceedings
took place, and the witness correctly identified the accused.
100. A popular and widely used method of accused identification,
by witness, in criminal trials, is the identification parade. TIP procedures C
are used, where witnesses who claim to have seen the accused at, or
about the time of occurrence to identify such accused from the midst of
other individuals, who bear physical attributes similar to them, without
any aid or other source. TIPs are meant to test witness veracity and
their capability to identify unknown persons. TIPs should normally be D
conducted at the earliest possible time to eliminate the chance of accused
being shown to witnesses before the identification parade, which might
otherwise affect such witnesses’ memory. TIPs are conducted during
investigation; however, there is no provision of law enabling an accused
to claim it as a matter of right, as held in Malkhan Singh v. State of
MP.34 In Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu35 this court outlined the E
utility and weight of a TIP. There is no hard and fast rule that delay or
failure in holding the TIP ipso facto renders the evidence inadmissible
or unacceptable; it however, affects the credibility and weight attached
to such identification, as held in Shyamlal Ghosh v. State of West
Bengal 36. F
101. This court has discussed earlier, with respect to credibility
PW-10’s testimony and why it cannot be taken at face value. Even
otherwise, the fact remains that he omitted to mention basic details about
the distance from between where he was, and where he saw the accused.
Further, his account suggests that he apparently saw the accused, G
fleetingly. No attempt was made by the prosecution to draw a sketch or
to show the approximate distance from where this witness (who is vital

34
(2003) 5 SCC 746 (para 7).
35
(1978) 3 SCC 86 (para 18).
36
(2012) 7 SCC 646 H
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A to its case) observed the accused. Given these facts, and the delay
(unexplained by the prosecution, which had by its account, wrapped up
the case by end of June 2011) to conduct the TIP after the accused’s
arrest, renders the TIPsuspect. It cannot be said that the TIPs conducted
and the subsequent dock identification, by PW-10 of the accused, are
among the circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt.
B
VII.Recovery of articles and their Test Identification
102. On the day of their arrest (22.06.2011), the accused made
disclosure statements and pointed out to the police the places where the
articles looted, or those relatable to the crime, were kept or hidden.
C These articles were seized on the same morning. In terms of Ex. P11,
the articles recovered at Neha’s behest inter alia were, twobent golden
bangles approximately worth 50,000/-, a golden pendant, three guriya,
and part of a mangalsutra with chain and guriya approximately worth
22,000, Megha’s ATM card issued by Bank of India. Similarly, Ex.
P14 (recoveries made at Rahul’s behest) evidences two bent golden
D bangles having aeronuma design approximately worth 50,000/-,
aguriya, part of a mangalsutra with chain approximately worth
20,000/-. Lastly, Ex. P17 (recoveries made at Manoj’s behest) included
inter alia, two bent golden bangles having round design approximately
worth 50,000/-, a guriya, part of a mangalsutra with chain
E approximately worth 20,000/-.
103. On the previous day (21.06.2011), PW-1 Niranjan Deshpande
had reported that some articles - 2 ATM cards (Megha and Ashlesha),
Megha’s mobile, Ashlesha’s camera and specific jewellery items
(belonging to Megha and Rohini), were missing from the premises.
F 104. On 09.07.2011, a TIP of the articles was conducted, under
the supervision of PW-12 Zamil Khan, who was informed that the
procedure was to be conducted. He deposed that the TIP was carried
out at the Bharatiya Sangeet Kala Academy, Sector G, MIG colony,
where a policeman from MIG police Station reached with a sealed packet.
G One Anil Soni also reached there with a similar packet. He said that two
packets were opened and their contents were mixed together. Thereafter
PW-1 reached the place; he observed the articles and identified them.
PW-12 deposed as follows:
“In the identification, identifier Niranjay Deshpande had
identified two gold bangles crumbled, one gold pendal (sic
H
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 515
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

pendent), one broken Mangalsutra of a chain and stud with A
Guriya, two gold Arrow like bangles, one broken gold
Mangalsutra, two gold designed bangles, one broken gold
Mangalsutra of chain and one Guriya.”
105. The witness also deposed that after the identification was
completed, the jewellery was re-sealed and the jewellery items brought B
by Anil Soni were taken away. He also identified the jewellery (which
had been identified by PW-1 before him) in court. PW-1 deposed among
similar lines. The only difference between the two depositions is that
PW-1 stated that PW-7 was present (as a matter of fact, he was not, as
is evident from the testimony of PW-7). Apart from urging this to be an
C
inconsistency, counsel for appellants also cast suspicion on the TIP of
the jewellery, urging that neither Anil Soni nor the police constable who
took the sealed items to the venue of the TIP was examined. In this
court’s opinion, these omissions are minor, and do not shake the essential
credibility of the proper identification of the jewellery. In fact, during
cross examination, PW-12 clearly deposed that besides him no one was D
present during the TIP of the articles and that after PW-1 completed the
identification, he drew the memo (Ex. P1) and kept the jewellery
separately; the rest were taken away by Anil Soni.
106. In this court’s opinion, a joint reading of the testimonies of
PW-1 and PW-12, on the one hand, and the TIP proceedings on the E
other (Ex. P1, dated 09.07.2011) establishes that the prosecution proved
that the identification of the looted articles, were correctly identified by
PW-1.The accused’s counsel had sought to urge that the articles were
common pieces of jewellery, without any distinctive features and that
PW-1 could hardly know these- particularly,jewellery of his mother-in-
F
law. If one keeps in mind that PW-1 had reported the loss of the articles,
and listed them specifically, in his statement which was given to the
police on 21.06.2011, their subsequent recovery, at the behest and pointing
out of the accused, and their correct identification by PW-1 before PW-
12, there cannot bedoubts on itscredibility. During cross examination,
PW-1 was not questioned about how he could identify jewellery articles G
of his wife, daughter and mother-in-law. There can be various reasons,
why someone may be able to recollect or remember jewellery or other
valuables. There cannot be any general assumption that a husband would
not be able to remember or recollect the personal articles of his wife, or
that a wife cannot be expected to recollect and identify the personal
H
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A effects of her husband. It all depends on the personality and individual
traits of human being, which uniquely differ from each other. It is possible
that PW-1 had an eye for detail; it is equally possible that he was present
when the valuables were bought; or yet, it is further possible that they
were part of a set, presented to the deceased individuals. The recollection,
reporting and identification of the mangalsutra, is more specific. PW-1
B
could reasonably be assumed to be aware of that article, belonging to
Megha, his wife. In these circumstances, the evidence relating to the
recovery of items belonging to the deceased, recovered from the
accused’s premises at their behest, and their correct identificationby
PW-1 during TIPwere provedbeyond reasonable doubt, by the
C prosecution.
VIII. The circumstances relating to expert evidence regarding
the appellants’ fingerprints
107. PW-21Dr. Sudhir Sharma, Senior Scientific Officer in Scene
of Crime Mobile Unit, deposed that when he reached the crime scene
D on 19.06.2011 at 6:35 PM, the main door of the flat was open and not
sealed. In his deposition he mentioned the shoe marks and other physical
evidence which existed, and also was cross examined about whether
they were tampered with. Additionally, he stated that a computer was in
the flat, which could have been seized, but he was unaware as to whether
E it was seized or not.
108. PW-24KK Dwivedi (the fingerprint expert) searched the
crime scene for possibility of lifting impressions of fingerprints. A set of
five fingerprints (i.e., Ex. P80, “chance fingerprints”) were lifted by
him, and signed by two witnesses (PW-5 and PW-9) as well as himself.
F He claimed that PW-17 Satyanarayan Patel (photographer of crime
scene) had taken photographs of the spots, from where the prints were
collected. However, this is neither corroborated by the testimony of PW-
17, nor in the exhibits on record.
109. Prints A and B were lifted from the inner back portion of
G door of bedroom adjoining the bathroom on the first floor; Prints C and
D were lifted from the outer portion of door of bedroom adjoining the
kitchen; and Print E was lifted from the inner portion of the same door.
Upon examination, A, B, D, and E were found suitable for comparison.
110. The fingerprints of the deceased [Ex. P81 (Megha), Ex. P82
(Rohini) and Ex. P83 (Ashlesha)] were lifted by constable Dinesh on
H
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 517
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

20.06.2011. Constable Dinesh, however, was not examined by the A
prosecution in the course of trial. The fingerprints of the three appellants
[Ex. P41 (Rahul), Ex. P42 (Manoj), and Ex. P43 (Neha)] were obtained
by PW-13 constable Vijay Singh on 24.06.2011 who deposed in chief
examination that he took the signatures of the three accused persons
(who were present in court and identified by him), on their respective
B
fingerprint slips, and later sent them to the SSP Office. In cross-
examination he deposed to being trained by the fingerprint department
and that he was competent to take prints. He observed an injury/cut
caused by a knife, on the ring finger of Rahul’s right hand, and no other
injuries on the fingers of the three accused. It also mentioned that he did
not obtain any written consent from the accused. C
111. The report of the fingerprint expert (Ex. P84) dated 11.07.2011
by PW-24 K.K. Trivedi, coupled with his testimony, forms the crux of
the prosecution case regarding fingerprints. On 27.06.2011, fingerprints
of the accused were received and compared with the chance fingerprints
by PW-24, who used the 8-point method and found that prints A and B D
matched with the index and middle finger respectively of Rahul’s right
hand; fingerprint D matched with the middle finger of Manoj’s right
hand, and Print E matched with Neha’s right thumb. The fingerprint
report was sent to the Director, Finger Print Bureau Bhopal by PW-24
on 06.07.2011 which was verified by the former vide letter dated
11.07.2011. The prosecution relied on these findings to corroborate the E
presence of the appellants at the crime scene.
112. Interestingly, PW-24 KK Dwivedi in his chief examination
has stated that letter no. AC Branch/E/80/11 dated 20.06.2011 was sent
by Finger Print Branch Indore to MIG Police Station for comparison of
chance fingerprints with the fingerprints of family members/suspects. F
However, his cross-examination reveals no such letter was on the record.
The cross-examination also shows that he did not obtain fingerprints of
any other person (including family members of the deceased) or article
that was present at the place of the incident, for the purpose of comparison
- a point which has been urged by the counsels on behalf of the appellants, G
laboriously. He also deposed that there was neither a mark of the whole
palm on the door, nor bloody fingerprints on the door; and the other
fingerprints available on the door were unfit for lifting.
113. The appellants’ counsel questioned the circumstances relating
to the fingerprint evidence, on grounds such as (i) absence of any H
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A elimination print; (ii) irregularity in obtaining the appellant’s fingerprints;
(iii) non-examination of constable Dinesh (who collected the fingerprints
of the deceased for the process of elimination) by the prosecution; (iv)
the absence of covering letter, along with the fingerprint expert’s report,
when produced in court; and (v) the fingerprints of the appellants were
not procured in accordance with law, as there was no compliance with
B
Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920.
114. This court would take up the last argument, at the outset. In
Sonvir v. State (NCT) of Delhi37, it was held that the provisions of the
Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920, were not mandatory, but
ratherdirectory, and that they only affirm the bona fides of the sample-
C taking (of the fingerprints of an accused) and eliminate the possibility of
evidence fabrication. This court however, made it clear that not following
or complying with the provisions of the Act, would not per se vitiate the
evidence, in a given case. This was again affirmed in Ashish Jain &
Ors. v. Makrand Singh 38.
D 115. In the present case, PW-24’s deposition corroborates the
lifting of the fingerprints by constable Dinesh in his presence. Therefore,
the non-examination of constable Dinesh is not fatal to the prosecution’s
case regarding fingerprints. As far as the integrity of the crime scene is
concerned, PW-21 deposed that though the door to the flat was open,
E when he reached there, the police were standing outside and it was not
possible that the crime scene was contaminated. The IO (PW-31)
admitted that the crime scene was not sealed when the investigation
took place on the evening of 19.06.2011; however, he clarified that the
forensic department personnel who reached the site before him had
secured the place. Given this consistent evidence, this court is of opinion
F that the possibility of members of the public or unauthorized persons,
contaminating the crime scene, so soon after the incident was reported,
is remote.
116. Fingerprints collected at a crime scene from all personnel
who were at the scene and who might have inadvertently touched physical
G evidence, are known as ‘elimination prints’. In the present case,
elimination prints of the deceased were obtained on 20.06.2021; they
were part of the record. The record would show that PW-3, PW-5, PW-

37
(2018) 8 SCC 24
38
H (2019) 3 SCC 770
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 519
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

9 were present at the crime scene, but admittedly their fingerprints were A
not obtained. It appears from the testimony of PW-9 that initially, the
witnesses were asked to be outside, but later, asked to join the
proceedings, to witness the seizures made. All the three witnesses,
consistently deposed regarding fingerprint experts’visit to the site, the
use of powder on the surfaces and lifting of fingerprints. PW-5, in cross
B
examination said that his fingerprint was not obtained. During hearing,
counsel for the appellants had repeatedly emphasized that elimination
prints were not taken from others present at the crime scene; they also
highlighted that fingerprint were not lifted from the knives, pistol and
ornaments seized from the accused. In the opinion of this court, nothing
material turns on this aspect. In a recent judgment -which the appellants C
relied on-, i.e. Hari Om @ Hero v State of UP39 this court acquitted the
accused, on the ground that the fingerprint expert’s opinion, even if
accepted, would could not have been the sole basis of conviction. What
is important is whether the crime scene was secured, and whether the
lifting of prints was witnessed. On both counts, the prosecution evidence
D
is credible and worthy of acceptance. These are also corroborated by
the testimony of PW-21, the Senior Scientific Officer, and the crime
scene report dated 20.06.2021 (Ex. P77) tendered by him.
117. The other aspect, relating to fingerprint evidence is that the
fingerprint report (Ex. P84) was prepared on 11.07.2011.Ex. P85 to Ex.
P92 are photographs of the fingerprints lifted (these were annexed to E
the fingerprint report Ex. P84). The fingerprint report was enclosed with
a letter (Ex. P93). Given that the expert deposed to lifting the prints,
which were corroborated by the three witnesses (PW-3, PW-5 and PW-
9) apart from the IO, the credibility of this circumstance, i.e., the lifting
of the prints from the crime scene, their match with the sample prints of F
the accused, and the expert’s testimony stand proved. The appellant’s
arguments questioning the credibility of this part, on the ground of delay
in the report, the prints being chance prints, lack of elimination prints, or
the crime scene not being shown to have been secured, etc, are
insubstantial and are rejected.
G
IX. Circumstances relating to injuries on the deceased
118. The post-mortem report (Ex. P44) indicates the extent of
injuries on the bodies of the deceased. Megha (aged 46) had a firearm

39
(2021) 4 SCC 345 H
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A injury on the forehead and 4 deep stab wounds (abdomen, shoulder and
chest). Rohini (aged 76) had stab wounds across her body - ranging
from her fingers and hands, arms, and numerous injuries on her abdomen
and chest which had pierced her vital organs. Similarly, Ashlesha (aged
22) received numerous stab injuries across her body – including, her
fingers, hands and forearms, hip, neck, abdomen and chest which pierced
B
her vital organs, back, and many superficial stab wounds on her thighs.
119. The expert opinion of PW-15Dr. Thakur (the doctorwho
conducted the post-mortem) was that the cause of death of Megha, was
shock caused by firearm injuries and haemorrhage. Rohini and Ashlesha’s
death was due to shock and haemorrhage from their numerous stab
C injuries. All three deaths were homicidal in nature. This witness
confirmed- both in his opinion and his testimony that all injuries on the
three deceased, except the gunshot injury (No. 1- on the body of Megha)
could have been caused by the two knives, seized from the possession
of Rahul and Manoj, respectively (Articles A and B, forwarded to him
D for opinion under query Ex. P47).
X. The Ballistic report
A. The recovery of bullets from the crime scene and the
deceased Megha

E 120. Three cartridges (one live, and two shells) were seized by
the IO (PW-31) on 19.06.2011 from the crime scene. He prepared the
site map (Ex. P25 and Ex. P-26) and recovery memo (Ex. P27) witnessed
by PW-5 (landlord Vishal Pandey) and PW-9 (one Mahesh Parmar,
neighbour of informant Vishal Pandey). The IO deposed to preparing
the site map witnessed by PW-5 and to seizing one empty, spent cartridge
F (lying on the floor near the body of Ashlesha), one empty, spent cartridge
from near bed, and one unused, live cartridge from near the body (head)
of Rohini. He also deposed that all the cartridges had the inscription
‘K.F. 7.65’ on them. PW-5 deposed that the spot map was prepared in
front of him and similarly deposed as to the location of two cartridges –
G found under the bed and near Rohini’s body. However, the appellants
did not cross-examine PW-5 about the number of bullets seized, i.e., on
the third bullet. PW-9 also deposed on similar lines.
121. PW-15 (doctor conducting the post-mortem examination)
deposed that on 20.06.2011, PW-33 S.S Kujur brought the dead body of
Megha Deshpande with a cover letter at 11:00 AM; and the post-mortem
H
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 521
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

began at around 11:45 AM. Post-mortem was conducted along with Dr. A
Prashant Rajput and Dr. N. Fadse (both were not examined). On post-
mortem of deceased Megha’s body, a bullet was recovered. The
extraction of bullet is described as wound no. 1 and the bullet was
recovered from anterior of cranium. PW-15 deposed that all the articles
were sealed, labelled and handed over to PW-33. The post-mortem report
B
(Ex. P44) was prepared and taken from MY hospital to the police station
by PW-33, and a seizure memo (Ex. P127) was prepared by PW-34
Mahesh Prasad Yadav. The seizure report was witnessed by Head
Constable Shambhunath and Constable Ramjan, both of whom were not
examined. PW-33’s deposition corroborated the facts relating to him
and his involvement. C
122. Further, PW-15 in his cross-examination stated that the
weapon was shot in contact with the body and that he could not state
which weapon caused injuries to Megha. In cross-examination, PW-33
admitted that no specimen seal was obtained by him from the doctor and
no receipt was given to the doctor upon receiving the said articles. Further, D
he stated that on 19.06.2011 he took the bodies to the hospital by police
vehicle after 6:00 PM. He deposed to going home after locking the
mortuary (as it was night time) and leaving the keys in the hospital. PW-
34 Mahesh Prasad Yadav deposed about preparing of seizure memo
(Ex. P127) on 20.06.2011 upon presentation of the articles by PW-33;
and in cross-examination he admitted to not sending a copy of seizure E
memo to the hospital, not filling column no. 10 regarding description of
the seized items, the sample seal not being marked, and that he did not
mark the number of articles on the items mentioned in the seizure memo.
He further deposed that he did not open the packets to see what was
inside and also did not receive the post-mortem report himself, but only F
made a roznamchaentry regarding seizure of items. The joint reading of
the testimonies of PW-15, PW-33 and PW-34 establishes that a bullet
was extracted by the doctor (PW-15), and a seizure memo was prepared
in connection; the articles seized were then sealed (although no mark
was placed on the seal).
G
B. Recovery of bullet from Rahul and facts relating to it
123. Parallel to the recovery of the cartridges from the crime
scene, the prosecution story was that the accused Rahul suffered a
bullet injury during the incident. The prosecution alleged that Rahul went
to Annapurna police station and reported a false case of shooting. As to H
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A this, PW-30 R.S. Makwana, (A.S.I Annapurna PS) deposed that on
19.06.2011 he saw Rahul @ Govind coming to the police station in an
autorickshaw alleging that someone shot him in the foot and that he was
going to the District Hospital for treatment. He gave the information to
PW-29 Gauri Shankar Chadar. PW-30 along with Constable Dinesh (who
was not examined) went to the District Hospital. A dehatinalsi was
B
prepared (Ex. P103). Later PW-30 went back to the police station to
register the FIR (Ex. P107). PW-26 Dr Mukesh Bachawat (Medical
Officer in the Dist. Hospital) examined Rahul at around 22:40 hrs, and
prepared medical report (Ex. P97), before referring Rahul to MY Hospital.
Constable Dinesh accompanied Rahul to MY Hospital for his treatment.
C During the early hours of 20.06.2011, PW-32 Dr Nilesh Guru examined
Rahul and removed the bullet from his right foot. It was deposited in the
MLC Section of the hospital (Ex. P113). PW-30 stated that he took the
sealed packet from MY Hospital on 23.06.2011 which contained the
bullet extracted from Rahul @ Govind’s foot. Shivraj Singh Raghuwanshi
(not examined) prepared the seizure memo which was exhibited as Ex.
D
P108 (Article Z-7) and PW-22 witnessed it. In the cross examination,
PW-30 was questioned about the condition of the bullet, whether it had
traces of blood, etc.
124. The appellants argued that the prosecution failed to establish
that the bullet in fact was extracted from Rahul’s right foot and it was
E the one sent to the ballistic expert. The case made out was that the boy
examined by PW-26 and PW-32 was not Rahul at all. However, on that
score, there cannot be any doubt because PW-29 G.S. Chadar, who
recorded the de hatinalsi identified Rahul in the court as Govind, who
had reported that he was shot on the foot by an unknown person and
F reported the matter to PS Annapurna. Furthermore, the signatures of
the complainant on the de hatinalsi (Ex-P103) are identical to the
signatures of the appellant Rahul in his statement under Section 313
CrPC. The doubt sought to be raised with respect to the manner of
seizure of bullet in this Court’s opinion, is not merited. The identification
of Rahul by PW-29, the deposition of PW-30 and PW-31 (IO) show that
G the doctor who extracted the bullet initially kept it in safe custody with
the hospital itself in the MLC Section, which was later retrieved by PW-
30 on 23.06.2011 and the seizure made on the same day in the MIG
Police Station. PW-22 Bharat Singh Thakur was in fact a witness to the
seizure memo (Ex. P78, seized as Ex. P108 by PS MIG Police Station).
H Thus, an overall reading of the testimonies and articles seized, in the
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 523
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

opinion of the Court, lends credence to the fact that Rahul suffered a A
bullet injury on 19.06.2011, and proves the circumstances surrounding it,
as presented by the prosecution.
125. The Ballistics Report (Ex. P52) was prepared by PW-16
Bheem Bahadur, Head Constable at DRP Line, Indore. It described the
nature of the firearm seized, and cartridges recovered. The Examination B
Report prepared by the State Forensic Science Laboratory (Ex. 120)
stated that on chemical examination of blood found on a piece of bandage
(swab of gunshot wound of deceased), it was not found positive for
nitrate, copper or lead. However, the report stated that two bullets were
compatible to the certified bulled of 7.65 mm calibre cartridge, and Bullet
C
TB-A1 were found similar. Three pieces of skin, found copper positive.
Importantly, according to the report, two bullets (EB2 and EB1) recovered
from the body of Megha, the deceased, and Rahul’s right foot respectively,
were fired from pistol Ex. A1. The report also stated that the bullet fired
at the right shoe (seized on 22.06.2011 under seizure memo Ex. P-75,
which was proved by PW-20) was caused by a copper jacketed bullet. D
Ex. P120, which was exhibited by the IO (PW-31), also listed inter alia,
several articles such as Article A-5 (containing two fired empty shells of
7.65 mm calibre cartridge which were marked as EC-l & EC-2); Article
A-6 (containing live 7.65 mm calibre pistol cartridge which was marked
as LR-l); Article A-10 (containing blood-stained Vicks bottle); Article
E
B-5 (containing three small pieces of skin jointly marked SK-l); Article
B-6 (containing one piece of bandage cloth with substance thereon);
Article F-1 (a country made pistol A-1); Article F-6, (containing one
right leg shoe) and Article F-7 (a bullet marked as EB-1). The Ballistics
Report, dated 14.07.2011, stated that PW-16 Bhim Bahadur, ballistics
expert test fired from the pistol received from the MIG Police in a sealed F
packet. The ballistic report stated inter alia, that
“These are empty shells of used cartridge of 7.65 mm caliber
pistol and on whose head stamp ‘’KF’’ is marked. They have
mark of firing pin/ breach face. On comparison through
microscope both are found alike as well as like test fire G
cartridge TC-Al. The photo-micrograph has been taken for
alike situation of Ex. ECl&TC-Al wherein the points of
similarity have been marked.”
PW-16 who prepared the report, stated in his deposition that he:
H
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A “..had checked operating firing pin, magazine catch and these
were found in serviceable condition. fire opened by, this
country-made pistol could cause loss of life for the people.”
126. The IO deposed that all seized articles were sent for chemical
and ballistic examination on 13.07.2011 by letter Ex. P115, to which the
B acknowledgement receipt was Ex. P116 to P118. The ballistic expert
PW-16 was not cross examined. There is nothing on record that discredits
the ballistics examination or conclusions drawn by the expert PW-16,
and this circumstance is therefore, proved.
XI. DNA Evidence and the DNA expert’s report
C 127. A sample of blood found on the floor of the incident where
the body of deceased Megha was lying, was collected on a cotton swab,
marked as A-1 and put in a paper envelope. Similarly, a sample of blood
found near deceased Rohini, was marked as A-2 and sample of blood
near deceased Ashlesha, was marked as A-3. A sample of plain cotton
D was also placed in a paper envelope and marked as A-4, as per seizure
memo (Ex.P27) prepared by the IO at the crime scene.The seizure of
these samples/articles (among others) from the crime scene is
corroborated by the testimony of PW-5 and PW-9 who are also witnesses
to Ex. P27. PW-17 Satyanarayan Patel (crime scene photographer) had
photographed the crime scene (Ex. P61 to Ex. P65). These photos show
E blood stains as well as the position, and direction of the bodies.The clothes
(B1, C1, D1), vaginal swabs (B2, C2, D2) and pubic hairs (B3, C3, D3)
were also taken from each of the deceased -Megha, Rohini and Ashlesha,
respectively.
128. The clothes from which DNA material was obtained from
F the accused, were recovered pursuant to disclosure statements (Ex.
P28, Ex. P31, and Ex. P34) made on 23.06.2011. Seizures of the relevant
clothing articles (Ex. P29, Ex. P32, and Ex. P35) were drawn in the
presence of PW-7 Sandeep Narulkar and Prakash Ichke (who was not
examined by the prosecution), which as discussed at length earlier -
G throws some doubt on the recoveries made on 23.06.2011. In addition to
their clothes, the prosecution submitted that DNA material was also
extracted from the knife seized from Manoj on 22.06.2011 (Ex. P14),
and the iron knife from Rahul on 23.06.2011 (Ex. P29).
129. The deposition of PW-35 Dr. Pankaj Srivastava, Scientific
Officer, DNA fingerprint unit FSL Sagar, read with the DNA Report
H
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 525
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

dated 10.08.2011 (Ex. P122) prepared by him, provide details of the A
DNA analysis.This witness stated that the department received 19
exhibits concerning this case on 14.07.2011, in a sealed condition, which
as per his cross, he examined on 18.07.2011. The expert’s report reveals
that DNA was extracted through the Automated DNA Extraction System
12 GC and Organic extraction. 16 desired genetic markers were taken
B
from DNA to be tested by Amplification Multiple PCR Technique. Thus,
genotyping profile was obtained along with Automated DNA sequencer
of amplified DNA, AmfF/STR Identifier kit, AmpF/STR Y Filer kit. The
analysis of the results was done by gene mapping software v3.5. PW-35
clarified that ‘physical substance’ mentioned in the report is meant to be
blood. C
130. All of the articles obtained in connection to Megha (cotton
swab of blood near her body A1, clothes B1, vaginal smear slide B2,
bullet seized from her body B4) were compared and uniform female
DNA profile was found. Similarly, a uniform female DNA profile was
found in the case of articles in connection to Rohini (A2, C1, C2) and D
Ashlesha (A3, D1, D3). These DNA profiles were then compared with
the DNA material extracted from the clothes of the three accused, and
the two knives recovered from Rahul and Manoj, which form a part of
the DNA report. The conclusions of the DNA matches and consequent
opinion of PW-35 in the report, are summarised in the below table:
E

F

G
131. DNA material found on the bloodstained bedsheet seized
from the scene of the crime (Ex. A9) indicated presence of mixed DNA
profile of the deceased, i.e. DNA material of more than one individual.
There is no mention of DNA material on the articles matching Rohini’s
DNA profile. As is evident from the above table, the DNA material
H
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A which the prosecution relies on, is that of the victims which according to
the prosecution, was found on articles recovered from the possession of
the accused. It is not a case of having found DNA material of the accused,
at the crime scene or on the bodies of the deceased. Hence, the fingernail
clippings (Ex. P18, P19 and P20) taken from the accused at the time of
arrest, seem to have not been considered/used.
B
132. During cross-examination what was put to PW-35, was
whether: (a) the time period between seizure/incident and examination
would have any bearing on the DNA analysis, (b) there was a cut mark
in Manoj’s clothes (G3), (c) the articles were in sealed condition, (d) the
clothes had to be kept in a particular condition, and if blood could mix
C when clothes kept together - the answers to which are satisfactory.
However, the typographical error of mentioning ID 3074 as ID 3078
raises concern and was pressed upon by counsel for the appellants.
133. Before this court, the appellants have raised concerns
regarding the unexplained delay in sending the articles seized on
D 23.06.2011 only 20 days later on 13.07.2011 (Ex. P115) and the condition
in which they were preserved, the lack of statistical analysis, and that
the observation sheet on which PW-35 deposed to have made notings
on, was not placed on the record. Serologist Reports prepared by Dr.
M.P. Singh (Ex. P123 and P124) are also on the record which reveal
E that blood was present on one bullet (B4), but blood quantitywas not
enough to run tests. This naturally raises a question on whether it was
possible to extract DNA, at all. The other articles mentioned in the
serologist’s report were A10 (Vicks bottle), F2 (Rahul’s left shoe), F3
(Rahul’s nails), F6 (Rahul’s right shoe), F7 (bullet recovered from Rahul’s
right foot), G2 (Manoj’s nails), G4 (Manoj’s shoes), H1 (Neha’s nails)
F and H3 (Neha’s sandals). However, the blood stains were too disintegrated
or the quantity of blood on the articles, was not sufficient to run
classification tests.
134. During the hearing, an article published by the Central
Forensic Science Laboratory, Kolkata40 was relied upon. The relevant
G extracts of the article are reproduced below:
“Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA} is genetic material present in
the nuclei of cells of living organisms. An average human

40
DNA profiling in Justice Delivery System, Central Forensic Science Laboratory,
H Directorate of Forensic Science, Kolkata (2007).
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 527
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

body is composed of about 100 trillion of cells. DNA is present A
in the nucleus of cell as double helix, supercoiled to form
chromosomes along with Intercalated proteins. Twenty- three
pairs of chromosomes present In each nucleated cells and an
individual Inherits 23 chromosomes from mother and 23 from
father transmitted through the ova and sperm respectively. At
B
the time of each cell division, chromosomes replicate and one
set goes to each daughter cell. All Information about Internal
organisation, physical characteristics, and physiological
functions of the body is encoded in DNA molecules in a
language (sequence) of alphabets of four nucleotides or
bases: Adenine (A), Guanine (G}, Thymine (T} and Cytosine C
(C) along with sugar- phosphate backbone. A human haploid
cell contains 3 billion bases approx. All cells of the body have
exactly same DNA but it varies from individual to Individual
in the sequence of nucleotides. Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA}
found in large number of copies in the mitochondria is circular,
D
double stranded, 16,569 base pair in length and shows
maternal inheritance. It is particularly useful in the study of
people related through the maternal line. Also being in large
number of copies than nuclear DNA, it can be used in the
analysis of degraded samples. Similarly, the Y chromosome
shows paternal inheritance and is employed to trace the male E
lineage and resolve DNA from males in sexual assault mixtures.
Only 0.1 % of DNA (about 3 million bases} differs from one
person to another. Forensic DNA Scientists analyse only few
variable regions to generate a DNA profile of an individual
to compare with biological clue materials or control samples. F
…………………………………………
DNA Profiling Methodology
DNA profile is generated from the body fluids, stains, and
other biological specimen recovered from evidence and the G
results are compared with the results obtained from reference
samples. Thus, a link among victim(s) and/or suspect(s) with
one another or with crime scene can be established. DNA
Profiling Is a complex process of analyses of some highly
variable regions of DNA. The variable areas of DNA are
termed Genetic Markers. The current genetic markers of H
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A choice for forensic purposes are Short Tandem Repeats (STRs).
Analysis of a set of 15 STRs employing Automated DNA
Sequencer gives a DNA Profile unique to an Individual (except
monozygotic twin). Similarly, STRs present on Y chromosome
(Y- STR) can also be used in sexual assault cases or
determining paternal lineage. In cases of sexual assaults, Y-
B
STRs are helpful in detection of male profile even in the
presence of high level of female portion or in case of
azoo11permic or vasectomized” male. Cases In which DNA
had undergone
environmental stress and biochemical degradation, min lSTRs
C can be used for over routine STR because of shorter amplicon
size.
DNA Profiling is a complicated process and each sequential
step involved in generating a profile can vary depending on
the facilities available In the laboratory. The analysis
D principles, however, remain similar, which include:
1. isolation, purification & quantitation of DNA
2. amplification of selected genetic markers
3. visualising the fragments and genotyping
E
4. statistical analysis & interpretation.
In mtDNA analysis, variations in Hypervariable Region I &
II (HVR I & II) are detected by sequencing and comparing
results with control samples:….
F Statistical Analysis
Atypical DNA case involves comparison of evidence samples,
such as semen from a rape, and known or reference samples,
such as a blood sample from a suspect. Generally, there are
three possible outcomes of profile comparison:
G 1) Match: If the DNA profiles obtained from the two samples
are indistinguishable, they are said to have matched.
2) Exclusion: If the comparison of profiles shows differences,
it can only be explained by the two samples originating from
different sources.
H
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 529
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

3) Inconclusive: The data does not support a conclusion Of A
the three possible outcomes, only the “match” between samples
needs to be supported by statistical calculation. Statistics
attempt to provide meaning to the match. The match statistics
are usually provided as an estimate of the Random Match
Probability (RMP) or in other words, the frequency of the
B
particular DNA profile in a population.
In case of paternity/maternity testing, exclusion at more than
two loci is considered exclusion. An allowance of 1 or 2 loci
possible mutations should be taken Into consideration while
reporting a match. Paternity of Maternity Indices and
Likelihood Ratios are calculated further to support the match. C

Collection and Preservation of Evidence
If DNA evidence is not properly documented, collected,
packaged, and preserved, It will not meet the legal and
scientific requirements for admissibility in. a court of law. D
Because extremely small samples of DNA can be used as
evidence, greater attention to contamination issues is
necessary while locating, collecting, and preserving DNA
evidence can be contaminated when DNA from another source
gets mixed with DNA relevant to the case. This can happen
when someone sneezes or coughs over the evidence or touches E
his/her mouth, nose, or other part of the face and then touches
area that may contain the DNA to be tested. The exhibits having
biological specimen, which can establish link among victim(s),
suspect(s), scene of crime for solving the case should be
Identified, preserved, packed and sent for DNA Profiling.” F
135. In anearlier judgment, R v Dohoney & Adams41 the UK
Court of Appeal laid down the following guidelines concerning the
procedure for introducing DNA evidence in trials: (1) the scientist should
adduce the evidence of the DNA comparisons together with his
calculations of the random occurrence ratio; (2) whenever such G
evidence is to be adduced, the Crown (prosecution) should serve upon
the defence details as to how the calculations have been carried out,
which are sufficient for the defence to scrutinise the basis of the
calculations; (3) the Forensic Science Service should make available
41
1997 (1) Crl App Rep 369
H
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A to a defence expert, if requested, the databases upon which the
calculations have been based.
136. The Law Commission of India in its report42, observed as
follows:
“DNA evidence involves comparison between genetic material
B thought to come from the person whose identity is in issue
and a sample of genetic material from a known person. If the
samples do not ‘match’, then this will prove a lack of identity
between the known person and the person from whom the
unknown sample originated. If the samples match, that does
C not mean the identity is conclusively proved. Rather, an expert
will be able to derive from a database of DNA samples, an
approximate number reflecting how often a similar DNA
“profile” or “fingerprint” is found. It may be, for example,
that the relevant profile is found in 1 person in every 100,000:
This is described as the ‘random occurrence ratio’ (Phipson
D 1999).
Thus, DNA may be more useful for purposes of investigation
but not for raising any presumption of identity in a court of
law.”

E 137. In Dharam Deo Yadav v. State of UP43 this court discussed
the reliability of DNA evidence in a criminal trial, and held as follows:
“The DNA stands for deoxyribonucleic acid, which is the
biological blueprint of every life. DNA is made-up of a double
standard structure consisting of a deoxyribose sugar and
F phosphate backbone, cross-linked with two types of nucleic
acids referred to as adenine and guanine, purines and thymine
and cytosine pyrimidines…..DNA usually can be obtained from
any biological material such as blood, semen, saliva, hair,
skin, bones, etc. The question as to whether DNA tests are
virtually infallible may be a moot question, but the fact remains
G that such test has come to stay and is being used extensively
in the investigation of crimes and the Court often accepts the
views of the experts, especially when cases rest on

42
185th Report, on Review of the Indian Evidence Act, 2003
43
(2015) 5 SCC 509
H
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 531
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

circumstantial evidence. More than half a century, samples A
of human DNA began to be used in the criminal justice system.
Of course, debate lingers over the safeguards that should be
required in testing samples and in presenting the evidence in
Court. DNA profile, however, is consistently held to be valid
and reliable, but of course, it depends on the quality control
B
and quality assurance procedures in the laboratory.”
138. The US Supreme Court, in District Attorney’s Office for
the Third Judicial District v. Osborne,44 dealt with a post-conviction
claim to access evidence, at the behest of the convict, who wished to
prove his innocence, through new DNA techniques. It was observed, in
the context of the facts, that C

“Modern DNA testing can provide powerful new evidence
unlike anything known before. Since its first use in criminal
investigations in the mid-1980s, there have been several major
advances in DNA technology, culminating in STR technology.
It is now often possible to determine whether a biological D
tissue matches a suspect with near certainty. While of course
many criminal trials proceed without any forensic and scientific
testing at all, there is no technology comparable to DNA
testing for matching tissues when such evidence is at issue.
DNA testing has exonerated wrongly convicted people, and E
has confirmed the convictions of many others.”
139. Several decisions of this court- Pantangi Balarama Venkata
Ganesh v. State of Andhra Pradesh45, Santosh Kumar Singh v. State
Through CBI46, Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu v. John David 47,
Krishan Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana48, Surendra Koli v. State F
of Uttar Pradesh &Ors49, and Sandeep v. State of Uttar Pradesh50,
Rajkumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh51 and Mukesh & Ors. v. State
for NCT of Delhi & Ors.52 have dealt with the increasing importance
44
557 U.S. 52 (2009)
45
(2009) 14 SCC 607 G
46
(2010) 9 SCC 747
47
(2011) 5 SCC 509
48
(2011) 7 SCC 130
49
(2011) 4 SCC 80
50
(2012) 6 SCC 107
51
(2014) 5 SCC 353
52
(2017) 6 SCC 1 H
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A of DNA evidence. This court has also emphasized the need for assuring
quality control, about the samples, as well as the technique for testing- in
Anil v. State of Maharashtra53
“7. Deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes
the genetic information in all living organisms. DNA genotype
B can be obtained from any biological material such as bone,
blood, semen, saliva, hair, skin, etc. Now, for several years,
DNA profile has also shown a tremendous impact on forensic
investigation. Generally, when DNA profile of a sample found
at the scene of crime matches with DNA profile of the suspect,
it can generally be concluded that both samples have the same
C biological origin. DNA profile is valid and reliable, but
variance in a particular result depends on the quality control
and quality procedure in the laboratory.”
140. This court, in one of its recent decisions –Pattu Rajanv. The
State of Tamil Nadu54, considered the value and weight to be attached
D to a DNA report:
“33. Like all other opinion evidence, the probative value
accorded to DNA evidence also varies from case to case,
depending on facts and circumstances and the weight
accorded to other evidence on record, whether contrary or
E corroborative. This is all the more important to remember, given
that even though the accuracy of DNA evidence may be
increasing with the advancement of science and technology
with every passing day, thereby making it more and more
reliable, we have not yet reached a juncture where it may be
said to be infallible. Thus, it cannot be said that the absence
F of DNA evidence would lead to an adverse inference against
a party, especially in the presence of other cogent and reliable
evidence on record in favour of such party.”
141. This court, therefore, has relied on DNA reports, in the past,
where the guilt of an accused was sought to be established. Notably, the
G reliance, was to corroborate. This court highlighted the need to ensure
quality in the testing and eliminate the possibility of contamination of
evidence; it also held that being an opinion, the probative value of such
evidence has to vary from case to case.
53
(2014) 4 SCC 69
54
H (2019) 4 SCC 771
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 533
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

142. In the present case, what is apparent, is that PW-35 has A
virtually echoed the DNA analysis in his chief examination, and not chosen
to elaborate on the random occurrence ratio, i.e., the probability of the
accused’s samples matching with those allegedly found at the crime
scene. This court has already discussed whether the recoveries of
23.06.2011 pursuant to disclosures made that day can be accepted and
B
held that they are suspect and need to be discarded. This leaves the
report, to the extent it says that samples lifted from recoveries made at
the crime scene matched what was seized on 22.06.2011 (knives, and
other articles), to be inconclusive.
143. It is noteworthy that seizure Memo Ex-27, in terms of which C
Article A-9 (ID 3063) is said to have been seized, does not record that
as a matter of fact, a bed-sheet was seized. If one keeps in mind that
source H2 (ID 3078) in relation to Neha was seized on 23.04.2011, and
from an open area, the likelihood of its contamination- even if arguendo
the genuineness of its recovery might have been accepted- carried some
degree of probability. For these reasons, it is held that the DNA report in D
the present case cannot have a clinching, or high degree of probative
value.
XII.Evidence relating to footprints
144. The Inspection Report (Ex. P77) prepared by PW-21 Dr. E
Sudhir Sharma described the scene of the crime. It mentioned that three
types of blooded partial shoe prints were found in the following areas:
(a)near the table at the crime scene; (b) in the pool of blood near the
body of Ashlesha; and (c) on the floor near the almirahs.
145. PW-21 did not, in his cross-examination remember the number F
of partial shoe prints found at the incident (which he later says were at
2-3 places), but states that there were three kinds of prints. He also
mentioned that no dust was present, and therefore barefoot prints were
not possible. In his chief examination, PW-21 mentioned that at his
instruction, PW-17 (crime scene photographer) took scaled photographs G
of the blood-smeared partial shoe prints found at the place of the incident
(which are Ex. P66 to Ex. P74). This is not mentioned in the chief
examinationof PW-17; who only later in his cross, states that he had
taken 8x12 scaled photos of the footprints and locations with blood stains,
which were Ex. P66 to Ex. P74.
H
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A 146. As already elaborated earlier, Manoj’s shoes were seized at
his behest (Ex. P31, Ex. P32) and sandals from Neha based on her
disclosure (Ex. P34, Ex. P35) on 23.06.2011. Rahul’s right shoe was
seized by Annapurna PS on 22.06.2011 which is corroborated by the
testimony of PW-20 Harbhajan Singh (independent witness), who stated
that Abhay Tiwari (not examined) had spotted the blood-stained shoe in
B
his garden and reported it to the police, and that both of them were
witnesses to the seizure memo (Ex. P75). The left shoe was seized (Ex.
P21) pursuant to disclosure made by Rahul to the IO.
147. In furtherance of Ex. P115 letter dated 13.07.2011 sent by
the IO to the State Forensic Laboratory, Examination Report of shoe
C prints dated 13.09.2011 was prepared. This report stated that, the exhibits
were received by the Ballistics Branch on 02.08.2011 in sealed condition.
For comparative examination, sample prints of soles of shoes of Ex. F2,
F6, and G4 and sandals of Ex. H3 were made (photographs 10, 11, 12,
13 and 14). The shoeprints found were merely mentioned together – it is
D unclear as to which photograph (#10, 11, etc.) is the sample of which
shoe (F2, F5, etc.).
148. This court is of the opinion that much weight cannot be
attached to the footprint evidence in this case. The report explicitly notes
that shoeprints are incomplete and unclear, and that specific and clear
E opinion could not be given. Yet, the expert proceeded to give his opinion
about the matching of the prints. In State of Bihar v Kapil Singh55 this
Court had held that evidence of an expert relating to presence of a
footprint, at the best is of a weak nature. This view was also shared by
Mohd. Aman v. State of Rajasthan 56 and Balbir Singh v State of
Punjab57. The prosecution, in the opinion of this court, has not proved
F this circumstance.
Principles applicable to appreciation of evidence in cases
involving circumstantial evidence
149. In one of its earlier decisions this court had in Hanumant v.
G The State of Madhya Pradesh58 indicated that the correct approach of
courts trying criminal cases involving circumstantial evidence should be

55
1968 (3) SCR 310
56
(1997) 10 SCC 44
57
1996 (6) SCALE 72
58
H AIR 1953 SC 343
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 535
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

that the circumstances alleged, be fully established; all the facts so A
established should be consistent only with hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused; circumstances should be conclusive and of such tendency that
they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed
to be proved.This view was followed later in Tufail v. State of Uttar
Pradesh59 and Ram Gopal v. State of Maharashtra60. All these and
B
other decisions were revisited in the three-judge bench decision in Sharad
Birdi Chand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra61 and the court enunciated
a set of principles that every court trying criminal cases entirely based
on circumstantial evidence had to follow.
150. The conclusions recorded by this court in Sarda were listed
in Para 152 (which were characterised in Para 153 as “five golden C
principles”). They are extracted below:
“(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is
to be drawn should be fully established.It may be noted here
that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned
‘must or should’ and not ‘may be’ established. There is not D
only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may be
proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’ as was held by this
Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr v State of
Maharashtrawhere the following observations were made:
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be E
and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and
the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long
and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.”
(2) The facts so established should be consistent only with
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say. they F
should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except
that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency.
G
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the
one to be proved, and

59
(1969) 3 SCC 198
60
AIR 1972 SC 656
61
(1984) 4 SCC 116 H
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to
leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent
with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all
human probability the act must have been done by the
accused.
B These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the
panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial
evidence.”
151. These principles have stood the test of time, and the evidence
in all criminal cases, have been evaluated in their light, throughout the
C country. In light of these binding principles this court would now examine
whether the circumstances supported by evidence, i.e., those accepted
by this court in the previous part of the judgement, was of such conclusion
as to stand the test of the five golden principles enunciated in Sarda
(supra).

D Summation of proof of circumstances
152. The prosecution relied upon several circumstances which
were accepted concurrently by the Courts below.These were the
depositions of PW-10 the chance witness who claimed to have witnessed
all three accused fleeing the spot around 5:45 or 6:00 PM on the day of
E the incident;the recovery of articles from the crime scene (fired cartridge,
live bullet, sunglasses, black beads, etc.) and lifting of the fingerprints
(testified by PW-24 and corroborated by witnesses PW-5 and PW-9);
and seizure of stolen articles pursuant to disclosure by the accused.PW-
1 who recorded his statement a day after the incident (on 21.06.2011),
specifically reported the loss of jewellery items such as four pairs of
F bangles, mangalsutra, ATM cards, etc. These were later recovered at
the direction of the accused, whichthe prosecution claimed to be a
breakthrough.
153. It was found by the courts below that Neha was arrested in
the morning of 22.06.2011 after she was found suspiciously loitering by
G PW-28. The arrest occurred after she was searched and later questioned.
The arrest was witnessed PW-3 and PW-6 who also deposed to
witnessing the police recording Neha’s disclosure statement. Recoveries
of valuables and articles, such as two pairs of golden bangles, part of a
broken mangalsutra, other valuables and an ATM card, which belong to
Megha were from her house. Neha’s disclosure statement about the
H
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 537
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

involvement of other accused (Rahul and Manoj) led to their arrest and A
disclosure statements on the same day – all of which was witnessed by
PW-3 and PW-6. Again, gold jewellery items were recovered from
Rahul’s premises as also a country-made pistol, and subsequently, a knife.
In addition, a photograph with him wearing sunglasses was seized from
his house. Manoj was likewise arrested and his disclosure statement led
B
to the recovery of a knife, a pair of golden bangles, part of a broken
mangalsutra, etc. Later during the same day on 22.06.2011, a right
shoe was recovered by another police station (Annapurna PS). It was
seized; which was witnessed by PW-20. At that time, its connection
with the murders was unknown. The prosecution also relied on a
disclosure statement said to have been recorded on 23.06.2011 leading C
to the recovery of clothes at the behest of Neha, Rahul and Manoj from
various open sites. Further, at Neha’s behest a Scooty with a service
book was recovered and seized, and at Manoj’s behest, amotorcycle
reportedly stolen was found. These recoveries were witnessed by PW-
7 an independent witness. The prosecution relied upon two sets of TIP
D
proceedings, which sought to identify on the one hand, Manoj and Rahul,
and on the other, Neha. It also relied upon the TIP proceedings in which
PW-1 identified the stolen articles which he had reported loss of, on
21.06.2011 itself. The prosecution had relied upon other evidence such
as the match of fingerprints, in terms of the expert’s report (Ex. P84, by
PW-24) upon the reports of the ballistic expert (PW-16),and of the DNA E
expert (PW-35). It also sought to rely upon the report of another expert
who spoke about the probability of shoe print match.
154. In the preceding discussion of the evidence in the earlier part
of this judgement, this court has held that though the prosecution version
of how Neha was arrested had to be disbelieved, it did not taint her F
subsequent disclosure, which led to the seizure and recovery of stolen
articles from her premises - four stolen pieces of jewellery, and an ATM
card which belonged to Megha, the deceased (proved by PW-27, bank
official). The previous discussion of the evidence relating to the other
accused led this court to infer that the prosecution was able to prove the
recovery of articles seized on 22.06.2011 from the premises of Rahul G
and Manoj i.e., golden bangles, parts of a broken mangalsutra, each
from the houses of the accused, a country made pistol and a knife, from
Rahul’s house at his behest. This court also concluded that the TIP
proceedings conducted in respect of the stolen articles was validly proved
by the prosecution. The report of the ballistic expert PW-16, has been H
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A held to have established that the seized bullets (from the crime scene),
matched with the test fired bullet from the pistol seized from Rahul’s
house at his behest. The recovery of a right shoe with a bullet hole on
22.06.2011, likewise was proved by the prosecution. The other
circumstance which the prosecution relied upon in this context, pointing
to Rahul’s involvement was his treatment by PW-32. Rahul had late in
B
the evening of 19.06.2011, reported to PS Annapurna, that he was shot
on the right foot, by some unknown assailants which was recorded by
PW-29, who also identified him in the court. PW-29 further deposed that
Rahul first went to a District hospital and was treated by PW-26, who
then referred him to MY hospital. Later in the early hours of 20.06.2011
C Rahul was operated upon by PW-32 who extracted the bullet, sealed it
and kept it with the MLC cell. This bullet was seized by the police and
sent to the ballistic expert (PW-24) who in his report supported the
prosecution’s version that the bullet was fired from the same weapon
which had discharged the bullet that was extracted from the deceased
Megha’s body.
D
155. This court has disbelieved the prosecution allegation with
respect to the circumstances surrounding Neha’s arrest, principally
because of the evidence of DW-1. It is quite clear that DW-1 Deepika
Shinde was involved to an extent during the initial stages of the
investigation and according to the police records, was responsible for
E the breakthrough which led among others, to her out-of-turn promotion,
swiftly. This court has also disbelieved the story of the prosecution with
respect to the recoveries alleged to have been made on 23.06.2011,
mainly on the ground that when according to the official version the
accused were nabbed and had made the disclosure statements the
F previous day, nothing prevented the police from recording the entirety of
it and proceeding to recover articles which were supposedly hidden in
open spaces. Further, the court has not accepted the prosecution’s story
with respect to the chance witnesses, PW-10 and his identification of
the accused in TIP proceedings.
G 156. During the hearing, the appellants’ counsel had urged that
the findings of the trial court are unsustainable, because they overlooked
several lacunae which cumulatively tended to undermine the
prosecution’s case. The omission to examine certain witnesses (such as
PW-1’s driver, Nandakumar; Abhay Tiwari, who along with PW-20 found
the right shoe with a bullet hole; Amit Soni, who went to the TIP of
H
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 539
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

articles, with some jewellery items; Prakash Ichke, who witnessed the A
recoveries and seizures on 23.06.2011, Constable Dinesh, who
accompanied Rahul to MY hospital, etc.). It was also emphasized that
the silence of certain witnesses (such as PW-4, in regard to whether she
witnessed the arrest, and search of Neha; of PW-19, who was silent
about receiving a report from PW-28 regarding Neha’s suspicious
B
activities in the morning of 22-06-2011; silence by prosecution witnesses
about DW-1’s role), too, cast grave doubts about the prosecution version.
Furthermore, it was contended that the seizure, sealing, transmission of
articles found at the crime scene and recovered from the accused’s
premises, as well as open areas, as well as their chain of custody was
not proved. C

157. This court has previously discussed the probative value of
the evidence relied on by the prosecution, and rejected the way in which
Neha was apprehended, the recoveries made on 23.06.2011, the TIP of
the accused, the deposition of PW-10 and of PW-8, and the DNA and
shoeprint analysis. The first question is whether having regard to the D
rejection of some of the prosecution evidence, the case against the
accused, as a whole, stands disproved. This aspect has been considered
in earlier decisions of this court where defects in investigation, or lapses
in the recollection during testimonies of witnesses, were involved. In
State of U.P. v. Anil Singh62, this court observed as follows: E
“17. It is also our experience that invariably the witnesses
add embroidery to prosecution story, perhaps for the fear of
being disbelieved. But that is no ground to throw the case
overboard, if true, in the main. If there is a ring of truth in the
main, the case should not be rejected. It is the duty of the F
court to cull out the nuggets of truth from the evidence unless
there is reason to believe that the inconsistencies or falsehood
are so glaring as utterly to destroy confidence in the witnesses.
It is necessary to remember that a Judge does not preside
over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is G
punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does
not escape. One is as important as the other. Both are public
duties which the Judge has to perform.”

62
(1988) Supp SCC 686
H
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A In C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu63 it was held that:
“The defect in the investigation by itself cannot be a ground
for acquittal. If primacy is given to such designed or negligent
investigations or to the omissions or lapses by perfunctory
investigation, the faith and confidence of the people in the
B criminal justice administration would be eroded. Where there
has been negligence on the part of the investigating agency
or omissions, etc. which resulted in defective investigation,
there is a legal obligation on the part of the court to examine
the prosecution evidence dehors such lapses, carefully, to find
out whether the said evidence is reliable or not and to what
C extent it is reliable and as to whether such lapses affected the
object of finding out the truth.
A similar approach was adopted in Surajit Sarkar v. State of
West Bengal64 and Shanker & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh65. In
Harijana Thirupala and Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of
D A.P., Hyderabad66 this court said that:
“…The case of the prosecution must be judged as a whole
having regard to the totality of the evidence.
In appreciating the evidence, the approach of the court must
be integrated not truncated or isolated. In other words, the
E impact of evidence in totality on the prosecution case or
innocence of Accused has to be kept in mind in coming the
conclusion as to the guilt or otherwise of the accused. In
reaching a conclusion about the guilt of the accused, the court
has to appreciate, analyse and assess the evidence placed
F before it by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic value
and the animus of witnesses.”
158. This court has further emphasized that if discrepancies in
the depositions are minor, or that witness contradict themselves during
their testimonies (as opposed to their previous police statements) what
is important is the nature of contradictions. In Rammi @ Rameshwar v.
G
State of Madhya Pradesh67, this Court held that:
63
(2010) 9 SCC 567
64
(2013) 2 SCC 146
65
(2018) 15 SCC 725
66
(2002) 6 SCC 470
H 67
(1999 ) 8 SCC 649
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 541
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

“24….Courts should bear in mind that it is only when A
discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible
with the credibility of his version that the Court is justified in
jettisoning his evidence. But too serious a view to be adopted
on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident
(either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between
B
two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach
for judicial scrutiny.”
In Appabhai and Anr. v. State of Gujarat68, it was ruled that
“The Court while appreciating the evidence must not attach undue
importance to minor discrepancies. The discrepancies which do not
C
shake the basic version of the prosecution case may be discarded”.
In a similar vein, it was observed, in Vinod Kumar v. State of Haryana69
that
“Only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so
incompatible with the credibility of his version that it would
D
be justified in jettisoning his evidence.”
159. The omission of some of the prosecution witnesses to mention
a particular fact, or corroborate something, which is deposed to by other
witnesses, therefore, does not ipso facto favour an accused. What is
important, however, is whether the omission to depose about a fact is so
fundamental that the prosecution version becomes shaky and incredulous. E
In the present case, the omission to depose about certain facts, by PW-
4, or PW-19, or any other witness cannot inure to the accused’s benefit.
Each of the facts they omitted, was supported by one or more witnesses.
Likewise, the failure to examine certain persons, like Anil Soni, Prakash
Ichke, Abhay Tiwari, or Nandakumar, cannot inure to the accused’s F
benefit. Anil Soni was present during the TIP of seized articles, when
other similar articles brought by him, for comparison and identification
by PW-1. The latter witness was able to identify the articles which had
been seized from the accused; this was deposed to by PW-12, whose
testimony cannot be doubted. The failure to examine Anil Soni therefore,
G
was a lapse, but not a fatal one, as far as the TIP itself went. Likewise,
the failure to examine Prakash Ichke is of no consequence, because the
recoveries made on 23.06.2011 have not been accepted. The omission

68
1988 Supp (1) SCC 241
69
(2015) 3 SCC 138 H
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A to examine Nandakumar is also inconsequential, given the sequence of
reporting of the crime, and the rapidity of the events which developed
after it. No doubt, Abhay Tiwari noticed the right shoe with a bullet hole,
first; however, PW-20 was also with him; he deposed to the fact of its
discovery and seizure. Similarly, the failure to examine constable Dinesh
is also not fatal, given the testimony of PW-29 and PW-30.
B
160. In Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra70 ,
this court held that even where a case hangs on the evidence of one eye
witness, it may be enough to sustain the conviction given sterling testimony
of a competent, honest man although as a rule of prudence courts call
for corroboration; it was observed that
C
“It is a platitude to say that witnesses have to be weighed and
not counted since quality matters more than quantity in human
affairs.”
Kartike Malhar v. State of Bihar71 referred to previous decisions,
D and stated:
“On a conspectus of these decisions, it clearly comes out that
there has been no departure from the principles laid down in
Vadivelu Thevar case and, therefore, conviction can be
recorded on the basis of the statement of a single eye witness
E provided his credibility is not shaken by any adverse
circumstance appearing on the record against him and the
court, at the same time, is convinced that he is a truthful
witness.”
161. Therefore, unless it is shown that the omission to examine a
F witness, who had previously participated during the investigation and
whose statement was recorded by the police, undermines the prosecution
case, or impacts on it significantly, the foundation of the fact or facts
which are sought to be proved, remains unshaken as long as that fact is
deposed to or spoken about by other witnesses, whose testimonies are
to be seen in their own terms. Therefore, the omission to examine the
G individuals left out, but who the prosecution claimed, had participated
during the investigation, did not affect its case, as far as the circumstances
held to have been established by it, are concerned. Having dealt with

70
(1973) 2 SCC 793
71
H (1996) 1 SCC 614
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 543
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

contentions of the accused, and also discussed circumstances that could A
be established (and what was not established) this court proceeds to
summarize its findings.
162. As against Neha, this court has held that the circumstances
proved are, firstly, recovery of articles including two golden bangles, a
broken mangalsutra, 3 guriyas, a gold pendant, an ATM Card which B
belonged to Megha on 22.06.2011. The loss of these articles was reported
by PW-1, on 21.06.2011, i.e. one day before Neha’s arrest. The second
circumstance proved by the prosecution is the TIP of these articles by
PW-1 who was able to correctly identify them (as also corroborated by
PW-12 during the trial). Linked with this circumstance is the deposition
of PW-27, a Bank of India, Ujjain official who deposed to issuing a letter C
to the SHO, (Ex. P98), containing the ATM card numbers. The ATM
card (5264959108034023) which belonged to Megha, recovered on
22.06.2011 pursuant to Neha’s disclosure statement, from her house,
was issued by that bank.The third circumstance proved by the prosecution
against Neha is her fingerprint. PW-24 KK Dwivedi, the fingerprint D
expert, deposed to searching the crime scene for possibility of lifting
impressions of fingerprints. A set of five fingerprints (i.e. Ex P80 chance
fingerprints) were lifted by him which was witnessed by two witnesses
(PW-5 and PW-9) who corroborated the fact. This court has held,
previously that the possibility of others’ presence at the crime scene,
and its contamination could be ruled out, because of the deposition of E
these two witnesses, as well as other depositions. PW-17 obtained the
fingerprint samples of Neha (Ex. P43), which he deposed to during the
trial. The deficiencies alleged by the appellants, in the opinion of this
court, about the procedural lapses in the collection of such evidence, are
not convincing. The evidence of PW-24, as well as his report (Ex. P84) F
prove that a chance fingerprint (sample E, collected from the crime
scene) matched with the sample obtained from her, by PW-17 during
the investigation. The fourth circumstance, against Neha, which was
established during the trial - and a vital one, is her knowledge of the
crime. Her disclosure statement, led to arrests of Rahul and Manoj, and
recovery of stolen and other articles from their possession. The G
circumstances surrounding the manner of Neha’s apprehension have
been disbelieved by this court, as well as the testimony of PW-10 and
the TIP proceedings, during which he identified her.
163. As against Rahul, this court has held that firstly, the
circumstances relating to his arrest (witnessed by PW-3 and PW-6), on H
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A 22.06.2011 was proved by the prosecution. The second circumstance
proved is that his disclosure statement led to recovery and seizure of
stolen articles and other articles connected with the crime (Ex. P14),
including two bent golden bangles, part of broken mangalsutra, a country
made pistol, a knife measuring 35.5 cm, and a photograph showing Rahul
wearing black diamond-like beaded bracelet. The third circumstance is
B
that, like with Neha, PW-1 identified the gold jewellery recovered from
Rahul’s possession, during the TIP (further corroborated by PW-12).
The fourth circumstance proved is that PW-24 the fingerprint expert,
deposed that he found that prints A and B lifted from the crime scene
(as corroborated by PW-5 and PW-9) matched with the index and middle
C finger prints respectively of Rahul’s right hand, in the sample (Ex. P41)
collected from him by PW-17. The fifth circumstance proved during the
trial is that Rahul had reported late in the evening of 19.06.2011, that he
was shot on the right foot, by unknown persons. This was recorded in
the form of a dehatinalisi against unknown persons; later an FIR (Ex.
P107) was registered by PW-30 for offences punishable under Sections
D
294, 307 and 34, IPC. Rahul was initially taken to the District hospital
(proved by the treatment card Ex.P97 dated 19.06.2011). Rahul was
however, referred to MY hospital, and examined by PW-32, who operated
upon him. Ex.P113 is the discharge cardof MY hospital signed by PW-
32 (who also deposed about it) on 20.06.2011. PW-29who recorded the
E initial report dehatinalisi, also identified Rahul as the boy who had
reported the incident. The bullet extracted from his footwas deposited
(under memo Ex. P113) in the medico legal cell of the hospital, and later
seized (under memo Ex. P108) on 23.06.2011. The FIR relating to this
case was later closed. The other fact proved is the seizure of a right
shoe (Ex. P75) under jurisdiction of Annapurna PS (proved by PW-20),
F
whichthe trial court observed had a bullet hole at the top. The sixth
circumstance proved against Rahul, which is material, is the ballistic
report which stated that the two bullets (found at the crime scene) were
compatible to the certified bullet of 7.65 mm calibre cartridge; Bullet
TB-A1 was found similar. Three pieces of skin were found copper
G positive.Importantly, according to the report, two bullets, EB2 and EB1
(recovered from the body of Megha, the deceased, and Rahul’s right
foot respectively) were fired from pistol Ex-A1, seized from Rahul’s
house. The report also stated that the gun-shot fired at the seized right
shoe (mentioned above) was caused by a copper jacketed bullet. All this
was proved by the ballistics report (Ex. P120) that had analysed each of
H
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 545
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

these items.The report also revealed that the ballistics expert (PW-16) A
had test fired from the pistol sent to FSL,and had found that the pistol
had signs that the two spent cartridges, were fired from it.
164. As against Manoj, this court has held several circumstances
to have been proved. The first circumstance proved against him, is his
arrest and subsequent disclosure statement, at 10:05 AM on 22.06.2011 B
(proved by PW-3 and PW-6). The second circumstance is the recovery
and seizure of articles, at Manoj’s behest, and from his possession,
including - two golden bangles, portion of a broken mangalsutra, a knife
and a photograph with Manoj in sunglasses (Ex. P17, also proved by
same witnesses). The third circumstance proved against Manoj is that
PW-1 identified the golden jewellery recovered from his possession, C
during the TIP (corroborated by PW-12).
165. This court is of the opinion that all the circumstances and the
link connecting them, was sufficiently established by the prosecution
and proved beyond reasonable doubt. Similarly, every hypothesis
suggesting the innocence of the appellants is ruled out by such evidence, D
and the irresistible inference which follows, is their guilt.
166. In the opinion of this court, the proof of the circumstances
against the appellants clearly points to their guilt, and involvement in the
crime. It appears that the appellants had informed themselves about the
deceased and their movement. Perhaps they kept a watch over the area. E
Their common intention clearly was to rob the deceased, who had newly
shifted to Indore and into the locality, on 19.06.2011. Though the exact
time of occurrence is unknown, the post-mortem report reflected the
duration of death within 12 to 36 hours from the time procedure started,
which was after 11 AM on 20.06.2011. It is reasonable to infer, therefore, F
that death occurred sometime during the day, on 19.06.2011. Though the
evidence of PW-10 has been disbelieved, the evidence of PW-5, PW-9
and PW-2, shows that the crime was noticed in the evening of 19.06.2011
when the bodies were discovered, and the police reached the scene.
167. The nature and description of the injuries on the deceased G
show that they had apparently put up a fight- which perhaps the appellants
had not expected. The intention to rob the deceased, and coerce them
into handing over their valuables, soon turned violent, due to the
unexpected fight put up against the accused. There are several sharp-
edged injuries, and one bullet injury which fatally wounded Megha. As a
result, it is evident that to subdue the three deceased women, the accused H
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A resorted to frenzied knife attacks. The persistent resistance given by the
deceased, coupled with the nature of injuries with sharp weapons (the
two knives) were fatal to both Rohini and Ashlesha. The fact that the
accused had to repeatedly stab them, reveals that the said appellants
were not familiar with wielding such a weapon. Weapons (2 knives and
1 pistol) have specifically been recovered from the possession of Manoj
B
and Rahul, and in these circumstances, their conviction for the offences
with which they were charged, is justified.
168. Information as to how these attacks occurred within the house
of the deceased and the distinct roles played by the accused, are in the
special knowledge of only the accused; but no such information was
C forthcoming through the course of the trial or appellate stage. This court72
has held that common intention requires prior meeting of mind, which
can also be developed in the spur of the moment, provided there is
premeditated concert. The circumstances reflect that there was a clear
common intention among the three accused, to rob the house, and upon
D facing resistance - to complete the job and leave undetected, by all means
necessary. While no weapon has been recovered from Neha, it is clear
that she was involved in the offences, and was present at the scene of
the crime. This is evidenced by firstly,the fingerprint expert’s testimony
and report, which clearly reflects that her fingerprint was lifted from the
crime scene; secondly, the recovery of stolen articles (gold jewellery,
E Megha’s ATM card, etc.) from her possession; and thirdly, the fact that
Manoj and Rahul are only arrested pursuant to her disclosure of their
participation - all of which, cumulatively, clearly establishher involvement.
The lack of an overt or specific act of violence attributable to Neha does
not exonerate her, given that the prosecution has been able to prove her
F presence at the crime scene and participation in the commission of the
offences, and that there was common object.
169. For the above reasons, all three accused are held guilty of
the offences under Section 397/34, 449/34 and 302/34 IPC. Additionally,
Manoj and Rahul’s conviction under Section 25(1-B)(B) of the Arms
G Act, and Rahul’s conviction under Section 27 of the Arms Act, is upheld.
170. Before proceeding to consideration of the question of
sentence, this court finds it necessary to briefly highlight the role of the
public prosecutor and trial court in a criminal trial, so as to safeguard the

72
H Ramashish Yadav v. State of Bihar (1999) 8 SCC 555
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 547
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

rights of the accused. The concealment of DW-1’s role in this case’s A
investigation (her analyzing of call detail records of the deceased and in
connection to Neha – which was not produced in trial; tip-off allegedly
received regarding Neha’s whereabouts and what she would be wearing;
participating in Neha’s arrest, and subsequent involvement on 23.06.2011
in recoveries of articles) points to concerning gaps in the manner of
B
investigation carried out initially, or at the very least, anuntruthful
recollection and presentation of it, for the purposes of trial. As elaborated
earlier, these facts prompted this court to draw adverse inferences against
the prosecution’s version of Neha’s arrest. Other circumstances have
been proved sufficiently to conclude their guilt and result in conviction.
However, it is appropriate to also point out that concealment of DW-1’s C
role and failure to include the call detail records, could have severely
prejudiced the accused, had these other circumstances not been made
out. Therefore, at this juncture, it is pertinent to note and reiterate the
role of the public prosecutor, and trial court, in arriving at the truth by
way of fair disclosure and scrutiny byinquiry, respectively.
D
171. A public prosecutor (appointed under Section 24 CrPC)
occupies a statutory office of high regard. Rather than a part of the
investigating agency, they are instead, an independent statutory authority73
who serve as officers to the court74. The role of the public prosecutor is
intrinsically dedicated to conducting a fair trial, and not for a “thirst to
reach the case in conviction”. This court in Shiv Kumar v. Hukam E
Chand75 further held that
“….if an accused is entitled to any legitimate benefit during
trial the Public Prosecutor should not scuttle/conceal it. On
the contrary, it is the duty of the Public Prosecutor to winch it
to the force and make it available to the accused…”. F

In Siddharth Vasisht @ Manu Sharma v. State of NCT Delhi76
(hereafter ‘Manu Sharma’) it was concluded that
“187. Therefore, a Public Prosecutor has wider set of duties
than to merely ensure that the accused is punished, the duties G
of ensuring fair play in the proceedings, all relevant facts

73
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra (1994) 4 SCC 602
74
Deepak Aggarwal v. Keshav Kaushik, (2013) 5 SCC 277
75
(1999) 7 SCC 467
76
(2010) 6 SCC 1 H
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A are brought before the court in order for the determination of
truth and justice for all the parties including the victims. It
must be noted that these duties do not allow the Prosecutor to
be lax in any of his duties as against the accused.”
172. In Manu Sharma, the appellants in question had argued that
B the right to fair trial included a wide duty of disclosure on the public
prosecutor, such that non-disclosure of any evidence – whether or not
relied upon by the prosecution – must be made available to the defence.
This court considered Section 207 and 208 CrPC, Rule 1677 of the Bar
Council of India Rules (which is limited to evidence on which prosecutor
proposes to rely on), and English law. The common law position culled
C out was that subject to exceptions like sensitive information and public
interest immunity, the prosecution should disclose any material which
might be exculpatory to the defense. Such a position, however, was not
accepted by this court, in its totality. It was held that such obligations are
on a different footing in India, given the fundamental canons of our
D criminal jurisprudence founded on Articles 20 and 21 of the Constitution,
which require not just the investigating agency, but also courts in their
own independent field, to ensure that investigation is fair and does not
hamper the individual’s freedom, except in accordance with law, i.e.,
ensure adherence to the rule of law. Relevant extracts that merit repetition:
E “199. It is not only the responsibility of the investigating
agency but as well as that of the courts to ensure that
investigation is fair and does not in any way hamper the
freedom of an individual except in accordance with law.
Equally enforceable canon of the criminal law is that the high
responsibility lies upon the investigating agency not to conduct
F an investigation in tainted and unfair manner. The
investigation should not prima facie be indicative of a biased
mind and every effort should be made to bring the guilty to
law as nobody stands above law dehors his position and
influence in the society.
G ****

77
Rule 16 of the Chapter II, Part VI of the Bar Council of India Rules under the
Advocates Act, 1961: “16. An advocate appearing for the prosecution in a criminal
trial shall so conduct the prosecution that it does not lead to conviction of the innocent.
The suppression of material capable of establishing the innocence of the accused shall
H be scrupulously avoided.”
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 549
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

201. Historically but consistently the view of this Court has A
been that an investigation must be fair and effective, must
proceed in proper direction in consonance with the ingredients
of the offence and not in haphazard manner. In some cases
besides investigation being effective the accused may have to
prove miscarriage of justice but once it is shown the accused
would be entitled to definite benefit in accordance with law. B
The investigation should be conducted in a manner so as to
draw a just balance between citizen’s right under Articles 19
and 21 and expansive power of the police to make investigation.
These well-established principles have been stated by this Court
in Sasi Thomas v. State [(2006) 12 SCC 421 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) C
72] , State (Inspector of Police) v. Surya Sankaram Karri [(2006)
7 SCC 172 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 225] and T.T. Antony v. State of
Kerala [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] .
202. In Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab [(2009) 1
SCC 441 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 523] this Court specifically stated
that a concept of fair investigation and fair trial are D
concomitant to preservation of the fundamental right of the
accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. We
have referred to this concept of judicious and fair
investigation as the right of the accused to fair defence
emerges from this concept itself. The accused is not subjected E
to harassment, his right to defence is not unduly hampered
and what he is entitled to receive in accordance with law is
not denied to him contrary to law.”
173. The scheme of the CrPC under Chapter XII (information to
police and powers to investigate) is clear – the police have the power to
F
investigate freely and fairly; in the course of which, it is mandatory to
maintain a diary where the day-to-day proceedings are to be recorded
with specific mention of time of events, places visited, departure and
reporting back, statements recorded, etc. While the criminal court is
empowered to summon these diaries under Section 172(2) for the purpose
of inquiry or trial (and not as evidence), Section 173(3) makes it clear G
that the accused cannot claim any right to peruse them, unless the police
themselves, rely on it (to refresh their memory) or if the court uses it for
contradicting the testimony of the police officers.78
78
Mukund Lal v. Union of India 1989 Supp (1) SCC 622, Malkiat Singh v. State of
Punjab (1991) 4 SCC 341. H
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A 174. In Manu Sharma, in the context of policy diaries, this court
noted that “the purpose and the object seems to be quite clear that
there should be fairness in investigation, transparency and a record
should be maintained to ensure a proper investigation”. This object
is rendered entirely meaningless if the police fail to maintain the police
diary accurately. Failure to meticulously note down the steps taken during
B
investigation, and the resulting lack of transparency, undermines the
accused’s right to fair investigation; it is up to the trial court that must
take an active role in scrutinizing the record extensively, rather than
accept the prosecution side willingly, so as to bare such hidden or
concealed actions taken during the course of investigation.79
C 175. In the present case, the trial court ought to have inquired
more deeply into the role of DW-1, given that by her own deposition she
had admitted to analyzing call detail records and involvement in Neha’s
arrest – all of which had been suppressed by the prosecution side, for
reasons best known to them. In this context, a reading of Section 91 and
D 243 CrPC as done in Manu Sharma, is important to refer to:
“217. ..Section 91 empowers the court to summon
production of any document or thing which the court considers
necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation,
inquiry, trial or another proceeding under the provisions of
E the Code. Where Section 91 read with Section 243 says that if
the accused is called upon to enter his defence and produce
his evidence there he has also been given the right to apply
to the court for issuance of process for compelling the
attendance of any witness for the purpose of examination,
cross-examination or the production of any document or other
F thing for which the court has to pass a reasoned order.”
176. The court went on to elaborate on the due process protection
afforded to the accused, and its effect on fair disclosure responsibilities
of the public prosecutor, as follows:

G “218. The liberty of an accused cannot be interfered with
except under due process of law. The expression “due process
of law” shall deem to include fairness in trial. The court
(sic Code) gives a right to the accused to receive all documents

79
Role of the courts in a criminal trial has been discussed in Zahira HabibullaH.Shiek
H v. State of Gujarat (2004) 4 SCC 158.
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 551
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

and statements as well as to move an application for A
production of any record or witness in support of his case.
This constitutional mandate and statutory rights given to the
accused place an implied obligation upon the prosecution
(prosecution and the Prosecutor) to make fair disclosure. The
concept of fair disclosure would take in its ambit furnishing B
of a document which the prosecution relies upon whether filed
in court or not. That document should essentially be furnished
to the accused and even in the cases where during
investigation a document is bona fide obtained by the
investigating agency and in the opinion of the Prosecutor is
relevant and would help in arriving at the truth, that document C
should also be disclosed to the accused.
219. The role and obligation of the Prosecutor particularly
in relation to disclosure cannot be equated under our law to
that prevalent under the English system as aforereferred to.
But at the same time, the demand for a fair trial cannot be D
ignored. It may be of different consequences where a document
which has been obtained suspiciously, fraudulently or by
causing undue advantage to the accused during investigation
such document could be denied in the discretion of the
Prosecutor to the accused whether the prosecution relies or E
not upon such documents, however in other cases the
obligation to disclose would be more certain. As already
noticed the provisions of Section 207 have a material bearing
on this subject and make an interesting reading. This provision
not only require or mandate that the court without delay and
free of cost should furnish to the accused copies of the police F
report, first information report, statements, confessional
statements of the persons recorded under Section 161 whom
the prosecution wishes to examine as witnesses, of course,
excluding any part of a statement or document as contemplated
under Section 173(6) of the Code, any other document or G
relevant extract thereof which has been submitted to the
Magistrate by the police under sub-section (5) of Section 173.
In contradistinction to the provisions of Section 173, where
the legislature has used the expression “documents on which
the prosecution relies” are not used under Section 207 of the
H
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A Code. Therefore, the provisions of Section 207 of the Code
will have to be given liberal and relevant meaning so as to
achieve its object. Not only this, the documents submitted to
the Magistrate along with the report under Section 173(5)
would deem to include the documents which have to be sent
to the Magistrate during the course of investigation as per
B
the requirement of Section 170(2) of the Code.
220. The right of the accused with regard to disclosure of
documents is a limited right but is codified and is the very
foundation of a fair investigation and trial. On such matters,
the accused cannot claim an indefeasible legal right to claim
C
every document of the police file or even the portions which
are permitted to be excluded from the documents annexed to
the report under Section 173(2) as per orders of the court.
But certain rights of the accused flow both from the codified
law as well as from equitable concepts of the constitutional
D jurisdiction, as substantial variation to such procedure would
frustrate the very basis of a fair trial. To claim documents
within the purview of scope of Sections 207, 243 read with
the provisions of Section 173 in its entirety and power of the
court under Section 91 of the Code to summon documents
E signifies and provides precepts which will govern the right of
the accused to claim copies of the statement and documents
which the prosecution has collected during investigation and
upon which they rely.
221. It will be difficult for the Court to say that the accused
F has no right to claim copies of the documents or request the
Court for production of a document which is part of the general
diary subject to satisfying the basic ingredients of law stated
therein. A document which has been obtained bona fide and
has bearing on the case of the prosecution and in the opinion
of the Public Prosecutor, the same should be disclosed to the
G accused in the interest of justice and fair investigation and
trial should be furnished to the accused. Then that document
should be disclosed to the accused giving him chance of fair
defence, particularly when non-production or disclosure of
such a document would affect administration of criminal
H justice and the defence of the accused prejudicially.
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 553
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

222. The concept of disclosure and duties of the Prosecutor A
under the English system cannot, in our opinion, be made
applicable to the Indian criminal jurisprudence strictosensu
at this stage. However, we are of the considered view that the
doctrine of disclosure would have to be given somewhat
expanded application. As far as the present case is concerned,
B
we have already noticed that no prejudice had been caused
to the right of the accused to fair trial and non-furnishing of
the copy of one of the ballistic reports had not hampered the
ends of justice. Some shadow of doubt upon veracity of the
document had also been created by the prosecution and the
prosecution opted not to rely upon this document. In these C
circumstances, the right of the accused to disclosure has not
received any setback in the facts and circumstances of the
case. The accused even did not raise this issue seriously
before the trial court.
(emphasis supplied) D
177. In this manner, the public prosecutor, and then the trial court’s
scrutiny, both play an essential role in safeguarding the accused’s right
to fairinvestigation, when faced with the might of the state’s police
machinery.
178. This view was endorsed in a recent three judge decision of E
this court in Criminal trials guidelines regarding Inadequacies and
Deficiencies, in re v. State of Andhra Pradesh 80. This court has
highlighted the inadequacy mentioned above, which would impede a fair
trial, and inter alia, required the framing of rules by all states and High
Courts, in this regard, compelling disclosure of a list containing mention F
of all materials seized and taken in, during investigation- to the accused.
The relevant draft guideline, approved by this court, for adoption by all
states is as follows:
“4. SUPPLY OF DOCUMENTS UNDER SECTIONS 173, 207
AND 208 CR.PC G
Every Accused shall be supplied with statements of witness
recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.PC and a list of
documents, material objects and exhibits seized during

80
(2021) 10 SCC 598 H
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A investigation and relied upon by the Investigating Officer (I.O)
in accordance with Sections 207 and 208, Cr. PC.
Explanation: The list of statements, documents, material
objects and exhibits shall specify statements, documents,
material objects and exhibits that are not relied upon by the
B Investigating Officer.”
179. In view of the above discussion, this court holds that the
prosecution, in the interests of fairness, should as a matter of rule, in all
criminal trials, comply with the above rule, and furnish the list of statements,
documents, material objects and exhibits which are not relied upon by
C the investigating officer. The presiding officers of courts in criminal trials
shall ensure compliance with such rules.
On Sentence
180. The hearing of this case was adjourned for sentencing on a
subsequent date, before which the learned counsels submitted material
D
regarding the lives of the accused – both before the incident and post-
conviction by the trial court, jail reports and other materialcalled for by
this court were received from the State, and written submissions were
filed by both sides.
181. In the course of arguments, the learned AAG maintained
E
that there were no mitigating circumstances and the cruelty evident from
the nature of the crime, warrants nothing less than the capital punishment,
which according to it was correctly imposed, concurrently. It was
submitted that it is in cases like the present one, where the “rarest of
rare” doctrine needs to be invoked as a deterrent.
F
182. On the other hand the counsels for the accused laid emphasis
on the fact that neither of the courts below had even considered the
possibility of reform of the accused who were all of young age and
barring Manoj (who had been involved in a petty offence in the past) the
others did not have any criminal antecedents. Counsel also argued that
G an overall look at the circumstances, at best, could lead the court to
conclude that the extensive injuries inflicted upon the deceased were in
all probability on account of the plans of the accused going awry, upon
their encountering the victims’ resistance. It was submitted besides that
the potential of each convict to be reformed – both having regard to
their previous backgrounds, as well as conduct in jail during pendency of
H
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 555
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

trial and confirmation, was not considered. This amounted to an infraction A
of the rule in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab81. Counsels relied on
numerous judgments relating to the importance of considering mitigating
circumstances, the state’s role in demonstrating the accused is beyond
reformation, mitigating circumstances such as age and socio-economic
background, pre-sentence hearing – its scope and the court’s obligation,
B
etc.
183. Capital punishment is prescribed in numerous IPC offences,
including murder, kidnapping for ransom, rape and injury causing death
or leaving a woman in a vegetative state, rape or gang rape of a child
below 12 years old, dacoity with murder, among other offences. In
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab82 (hereafter, ‘Bachan Singh’), this C
court had upheld the imposition of death penalty as an alternate punishment
under Section 302 IPC on the strength of the 35th Report of the Law
Commission of India (1967), the judgment in Jagmohan Singh v. State
of Uttar Pradesh83 (which had also noted that the 35th Report advocated
for retention) and in several subsequent cases decided by this court, in D
which the death penalty was recognised to be a deterrent. It laid emphasis
on the then recently added S. 253(2) and 354(3) CrPC which provide
for bifurcated pre-sentence hearing and sentencing procedure on
conviction of capital offences, to conclude that this form of punishment
continued to have legislative backing and thereby, represented the will
of the people. E

184. It is undeniable that there have been shifts in how punishment
in capital offences are dealt with. This is apparent when developments
are looked at holistically, or at a macro level: the amendments to the
CrPC by Parliament, the 35th and 262nd Law Commission Reports which
stand over 30 years apart, and the precedents of this court, across the F
decades. Initially, the law imposed a requirement of written reasons for
not imposing death penalty, which was removed in 1955. In 1973, through
further amendment to the CrPC and insertion of Section 354(3) - life
imprisonment became the norm and imposition of death penalty required
‘special reasons’; and through Section 253(2) – sentencing required G
separate consideration from the question of conviction. In both phases,
i.e., post-1955 and post-1973, capital punishment was upheld to be
81
(1980) 2 SCC 684
82
(1980) 2 SCC 684
83
(1973) 1 SCC 20
H
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A constitutional by 5-judge benches of this court in Jagmohan Singh and
Bachan Singh, respectively.
185. The 262nd Law Commission Report on Death Penalty (2015)
(hereafter, ‘262nd Report’), is a result of this court’s references in
primarily two cases. Firstly, in Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar
B v. State of Maharashtra84 (hereafter ‘Santosh Bariyar’) where, after
taking note of the UN General Assembly Resolution 62/14985 it was
pointed out that credible research was required to shape an informed
discussion and debate, on the contentious issue of death sentence.
Secondly, the judgment in Shankar Kisanrao Khade v. State of
Maharashtra86 tasked the Law Commission to resolve the issue of
C whether death penalty is a deterrent punishment, is retributive justice, or
serves an incapacitative goal; and to study the difference in approach
adopted by the judiciary (rarest of rare) and the executive (what was
termed as unknown) while granting commutation. In attempting to fulfil
this mandate, the Commission discerned an urgent need for re-examination
D of its own earlier recommendations on the death penalty (in its 35th Report,
1967), given the drastic change in social, economic, and cultural contexts
of the country since the 35th Report, and arbitrariness which has remained
a major concern in the adjudication of death penalty cases since Bachan
Singh laid down the foundational principle of ‘rarest of rare’.
E 186. Reflective of changed circumstances and evolving discourse,
the report marks a shift in the approach towards the death penalty in
India, going so far as to recommend abolition in all offences, except
those relating to terrorism. A large part of the report focusses on courts’
discretion and judicial reasoning when it comes to sentencing. It
concludes that death penalty sentencing in India has been based on an
F arbitrary application of the Bachan Singh principle, and has become
judge-centric, based on the personal predilection of judges – a concern
which was alluded to even by this court in Swamy Shraddananda (2)
@ Mural Manohar Mishra v. State of Karnataka 87 and analysed
extensively again in Santosh Bariyar, followed by Sangeet & Anr. v.
G State of Haryana88, Mohd. Farooq Abdul Gafur & Anr. v. State of

84
(2009) 6 SCC 498 (para 112).
85
Adopted on 18.12.2007.
86
(2013) 5 SCC 546 (para 148-149).
87
(2008) 13 SCC 767
88
H (2013) 2 SCC 452
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 557
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

Maharashtra89, and more recently in Chhannu Lal Verma v. State of A
Chattisgarh90 (hereafter ‘Chhannu Lal Verma’).
The death penalty framework and how to apply it for
‘principled sentencing’
187. This court in Bachan Singh while upholding the
constitutionality of capital punishment, categorically ruled that the new B
CrPC of 1973 marked a shift as it bifurcated the criminal trial to include
a pre-sentence hearing (under S. 235(2)), and further mandated the
sentencing court to outline the “special reasons” (under S. 354(3)) or
absence of them, by considering circumstances both of the crime and
the criminal. The court also noted that while broad guidelines or indicators C
may be given, they cannot be put into water-tight compartments that
curb discretion of any judge to do justice in a given individual case:
“163. ….Now, Section 235(2) provides for a bifurcated trial
and specifically gives the accused person a right of pre-
sentence hearing, at which stage, he can bring on record D
material or evidence, which may not be strictly relevant to or
connected with the particular crime under inquiry, but
nevertheless, have, consistently with the policy underlined in
Section 354(3), a bearing on the choice of sentence. The
present legislative policy discernible from Section 235(2) read
with Section 354(3) is that in fixing the degree of punishment E
or making the choice of sentence for various offences,
including one under Section 302 of the Penal Code, the court
should not confine its consideration “principally” or merely to
the circumstances connected with the particular crime, but
also give due consideration to the circumstances of F
the criminal.
***
201. …As we read Sections 354(3) and 235(2) and other
related provisions of the Code of 1973, it is quite clear to us
that for making the choice of punishment or for ascertaining G
the existence or absence of “special reasons” in that context,
the court must pay due regard both to the crime and the

89
(2010) 14 SCC 641
90
(2019) 12 SCC 438 H
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A criminal. What is the relative weight to be given to the
aggravating and mitigating factors, depends on the facts and
circumstances of the particular case. More often than not,
these two aspects are so intertwined that it is difficult to give
a separate treatment to each of them. This is so because “style
is the man”. In many cases, the extremely cruel or beastly
B
manner of the commission of murder is itself a demonstrated
index of the depraved character of the perpetrator. That is
why, it is not desirable to consider the circumstances of the
crime and the circumstances of the criminal in two separate
watertight compartments. In a sense, to kill is to be cruel and
C therefore all murders are cruel. But such cruelty may vary in
its degree of culpability. And it is only when the culpability
assumes the proportion of extreme depravity that “special
reasons” can legitimately be said to exist.”
The court also accepted a list of helpful factors of aggravating
D and mitigating circumstances.91 However, cautioning the court from
treating them to be exhaustive, the court further clarified that they were
merely indicative and that the mitigating circumstances had to be read
in a “liberal and expansive” manner, accounting for the dignity of human
life:
E “209. There are numerous other circumstances justifying the
passing of the lighter sentence; as there are countervailing
circumstances of aggravation. “We cannot obviously feed into
a judicial computer all such situations since they are
astrological imponderables in an imperfect and undulating
society.” Nonetheless, it cannot be over-emphasised that the
F scope and concept of mitigating factors in the area of death
penalty must receive a liberal and expansive construction by
the courts in accord with the sentencing policy writ large in
Section 354(3). Judges should never be bloodthirsty. Hanging
of murderers has never been too good for them. Facts and
G Figures, albeit incomplete, furnished by the Union of India,
show that in the past, courts have inflicted the extreme penalty
with extreme infrequency — a fact which attests to the caution
and compassion which they have always brought to bear on
the exercise of their sentencing discretion in so grave a matter.
91
H Bachan Singh (para 202 and 206).
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 559
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

It is, therefore, imperative to voice the concern that courts, A
aided by the broad illustrative guide-lines indicated by us,
will discharge the onerous function with evermore scrupulous
care and humane concern, directed along the highroad of
legislative policy outlined in Section 354(3) viz. that for
persons convicted of murder, life imprisonment is the rule and
B
death sentence an exception. A real and abiding concern for
the dignity of human life postulates resistance to taking a life
through law’s instrumentality. That ought not to be done save
in the rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is
unquestionably foreclosed.”
188. In Macchi Singh, this court extrapolated the principles from C
Bachhan Singh, and merit repetition:
“38. In this background the guidelines indicated in Bachan
Singh case [(1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580 : AIR
1980 SC 898 : 1980 Cri LJ 636] will have to be culled out
and applied to the facts of each individual case where the D
question of imposing of death sentence arises. The following
propositions emerge from Bachan Singh case [(1980) 2 SCC
684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580 : AIR 1980 SC 898 : 1980 Cri LJ
636] :
“(i) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted except E
in gravest cases of extreme culpability.
(ii) Before opting for the death penalty the circumstances of
the ‘offender’ also require to be taken into consideration along
with the circumstances of the ‘crime’.
F
(iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an
exception. In other words death sentence must be imposed
only when life imprisonment appears to be an altogether
inadequate punishment having regard to the relevant
circumstances of the crime, and provided, and only provided,
the option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot G
be conscientiously exercised having regard to the nature and
circumstances of the crime and all the relevant circumstances.
(iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so the
mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full weightage H
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A and a just balance has to be struck between the aggravating
and the mitigating circumstances before the option is exercised.
39. In order to apply these guidelines inter alia the following
questions may be asked and answered:
(a) Is there something uncommon about the crime which
B renders sentence of imprisonment for life inadequate and calls
for a death sentence?
(b) Are the circumstances of the crime such that there is no
alternative but to impose death sentence even after according
maximum weightage to the mitigating circumstances which
C speak in favour of the offender?
40. If upon taking an overall global view of all the
circumstances in the light of the aforesaid proposition and
taking into account the answers to the questions posed
hereinabove, the circumstances of the case are such that death
D sentence is warranted, the court would proceed to do so.”
189. In Machhi Singh92, this courtalso attempted to categorise
cases under broadly five heads (i.e.,manner of commission of murder,
motive, anti-social or socially abhorrent nature of the crime, magnitude
of crime, and personality of victim), by strongly analysing the aggravating
E circumstances of the crime. A formalistic reliance on these categories
however, has the potential of leading any court awry as it has the
unintended effect of drawing attention away from the criminal, and
focussing disproportionately on the crime – the dangers of this
standardisation was also noted by this court in Swamy Shraddananda
F (2)93, Sangeet94 and more recently in Justice Sanjiv Khanna’s dissenting
opinion in Manoharan v. State by Inspector of Police95.
190. This court in Bachan Singh had warned against categorising
96
cases. Rejecting the contention that standards and guidelines should
be laid down, it was noted in Bachan Singh that degree of culpability
G 92
Machhi Singh (para 32-37).
93
Swamy Shraddananda (2) @ Mural Manohar Mishra v. State of Karnataka (2008)
13 SCC 767
94
Sangeet &Anr. v. State of Haryana (2013) 2 SCC 452
95
Manoharan v. State by Inspector of Police, Variety Hall Police Station, (2019) 7 SCC
716
96
H para 169-175, 192-195.
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 561
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

cannot be measured, and aggravating and mitigating circumstances could A
not be rigidly enumerated so as to exclude “all free play of discretion”.
Reiterating that criminal cases cannot be categorised as there were
infinite, unpredictable and unforeseen variations, it was held that by such
categorization, the sentencing process would cease to be judicial, and
such standardisation or sentencing discretion is beyond the court’s
B
function. Therefore, it would be befitting if reliance were placed not
solely on those five categories of crimes (which lays undue emphasis on
aggravating circumstances) enumerated in Machhi Singh, and instead
on the two question-test, and the four guiding principles of Bachan Singh
that were succinctly culled out in Machhi Singh.
C
191. The decades that followed, has witnessed a line of judgments
in which this court has continually taken judicial notice of the incongruence
in application of the ‘rarest of rare’ test enunciated in Bachan Singh,
and therefore, tried to restrict imposition of the death penalty, in an attempt
to strengthen a principled application of the same.
D
192. This aspect was dealt with extensively in Santosh Bariyar
where the court articulated the test to be a two-step process to determine
whether a case deserves the death sentence – firstly, that the case belongs
to the ‘rarest of rare’ category, and secondly, that the option of life
imprisonment would simply not suffice. For the first step, the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances would have to be identified and considered E
equally. For the second test, the court had to consider whether the
alternative of life imprisonment was unquestionable foreclosed as the
sentencing aim of reformation was unachievable, for which the State
must provide material.
193. About four years later, in Sangeet97, this court lamented the F
continuing lack of attention given to circumstances of the criminal,
reiterated that balancing of aggravating-mitigating circumstances and
failure to apply the Bachan Singh sentencing framework uniformly,
was leading to judge-centric and inconsistent jurisprudence in death
penalty matters. G
98
194. In Shankar Kisanrao Khade this court developed yet
another framework of the ‘crime test’, criminal test’ and ‘rarest of

97
Sangeet &Anr. v. State of Haryana (2013) 2 SCC 452
98
Shankar KisanraoKhade v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 5 SCC 546 H
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A rare test’ (which, was held to be distinct from the ‘balance test’ that
was discouraged in Santosh Bariyar and subsequently, in Sangeet as
well):
“52. …. In my considered view, the tests that we have to apply,
while awarding death sentence are “crime test”, “criminal
B test” and the “R-R test” and not the “balancing test”. To award
death sentence, the “crime test” has to be fully satisfied, that
is, 100% and “criminal test” 0%, that is, no mitigating
circumstance favouring the accused. If there is any
circumstance favouring the accused, like lack of intention to
commit the crime, possibility of reformation, young age of the
C accused, not a menace to the society, no previous track record,
etc. the “criminal test” may favour the accused to avoid the
capital punishment. Even if both the tests are satisfied, that
is, the aggravating circumstances to the fullest extent and no
mitigating circumstances favouring the accused, still we have
D to apply finally the rarest of the rare case test (R-R test). R-R
test depends upon the perception of the society that is
“society-centric” and not “Judge-centric”, that is, whether
the society will approve the awarding of death sentence to
certain types of crimes or not. While applying that test, the
court has to look into variety of factors like society’s
E abhorrence, extreme indignation and antipathy to certain types
of crimes like sexual assault and murder of intellectually
challenged minor girls, suffering from physical disability, old
and infirm women with those disabilities, etc. Examples are
only illustrative and not exhaustive. The courts award death
F sentence since situation demands so, due to constitutional
compulsion, reflected by the will of the people and not the
will of the Judges.”
195. Recently, while considering a review petition, this court in
Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra 99 held that
G Bachan Singh had intended the test to be ‘probability’ and not
improbability, possibility or impossibility of reformation and rehabilitation
as a mandate of Section 354(4) CrPC.100 The court analysed numerous
earlier precedents, noting that evidence by the state on this has been

99
(2019) 12 SCC 460
H 100
Ibid (para 45)
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 563
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

sparse and limited, but was essential for the courts to measure the A
probability of reform, rehabilitation and reintegration. The court located
this requirement in the right of the accused, who regardless of being
ruthless, was entitled to a life of dignity, notwithstanding his crime.101
While this process is not easy, it was noted that the neither is the process
of rehabilitation since it involves reintegration into society. When this is
B
found to be not possible in certain cases, a longer duration of imprisonment
was instead permissible.
Uneven application of this framework and (in)consistency in
sentencing
196. An overall analysis of capital punishment cases decided by C
this court will perhaps reflect that that there is in fact, no pattern. While
there are real and valid concerns in the non-uniform application of the
Bachan Singh framework, discretion in sentencing, in itself – is not
worrisome, and the concern needs to be dispelled.While generally judges
may look to precedents for the comfort of numbers, that process only
gives an indication of how similar instances have been dealt with and D
has a limited role when it comes to sentencing. The discretion afforded
to the court in sentencing, is not for it to be judge-centric or result in
disparate rulings, but in fact to enable the court with the flexibility of
considering the case-specific factors relating to the crime and criminal,
without falling into pre-determined patterns. Sentencing is not a E
mathematical equation and ought not be seen as one. This has been
recognized in numerous cases starting from Bachan Singh itself. In
Santosh Bariyar, analyzing the equality principle, due process and
proportionality requirement in capital sentencing, it was held that rather
than applying strict classification of the type of offences that warrant
death sentence, the court must focus on equally considering the F
aggravating and mitigating circumstances (in which commonality is to
be drawn across cases), and arrive at individualized sentencing outcomes
on a case-to-case basis.102 It was noted:
“132. ….The imprecision of the identification of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances has to be minimised. It is to be G
noted that the mandate of equality clause applies to the
sentencing process rather than the outcome. The comparative

101
Ibid (para 47)
102
Santosh Bariyar (para 172) H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A review must be undertaken not to channel the sentencing
discretion available to the courts but to bring in consistency
in identification of various relevant circumstances. The
aggravating and mitigating circumstances have to be
separately identified under a rigorous measure.
B 133. Bachan Singh [(1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580]
when mandates principled precedent-based sentencing,
compels careful scrutiny of mitigating circumstances and
aggravating circumstances and then factoring in a process
by which aggravating and mitigating circumstances appearing
from the pool of comparable cases can be compared. The
C weight which is accorded by the court to particular
aggravating and mitigating circumstances may vary from case
to case in the name of individualised sentencing, but at the
same time reasons for apportionment of weights shall be
forthcoming. Such a comparison may point out excessiveness
D as also will help repel arbitrariness objections in future. A
sentencing hearing, comparative review of cases and similarly
aggravating and mitigating circumstances analysis can only
be given a go-by if the sentencing court opts for life
imprisonment.”
E (emphasis supplied)
197. The strength of ‘precedent’ and ‘consistency’ is perhaps,
therefore, lowest when it comes to matters of sentencing, as long as it is
within the confines of legality and resulting in ‘principled sentencing’. In
other words, the judicial incongruence when it relates to sentencing,
F would in fact be a positive indicator, rather than a negative one, provided
it is still within the well-defined contours of ‘principled’ sentencing. For
sentencing in capital offences, discretion to arrive at individualised
sentences is encouraged, but must be constrained by the ‘rarest of rare’
principle, wherein the court considers aggravating circumstances of the
crime, and mitigating circumstances of the criminal (a ‘liberal and
G expansive’ construction of the latter), which in turn must inform their
consideration of whether the option of life imprisonment is unquestionably
foreclosed owing to an impossibility103 to reform.

103
held to be ‘probability’ and not ‘impossibility’ in Rajendra PralhadraoWasnik v.
H State of Maharashtra, (2019) 12 SCC 460.
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 565
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

198. Deviation from this principle, i.e., unguided discretion on A
the other hand, would quite obviously lead to bad law. For instance,
Ravji v. State of Haryana 104 (hereafter‘Ravji’), in complete
contravention of this court’s earlier constitution bench decision of Bachan
Singh (which focussed on both the crime, and criminal), held that “… it
is the nature and gravity of the crime but not the criminal, which
B
are germane for consideration of appropriate punishment in a
criminal trial”. A line of cases105, further relied on this (in this court’s
considered opinion, incorrect) decision in Ravji case, and concluded that
the nature and gravity of the crime (i.e., its brutality or heinousness),
were sufficient to impose capital punishment, without considering
mitigating circumstances of the criminal. Subsequently, the decision in C
Ravji was - quite correctly- declared to be per incuriam by another
bench of this court in Santosh Bariyar, for non-consideration of
circumstances of the criminal. Other cases that have focussed on brutality
of the crime, as negating or washing away the need to consider mitigating
circumstances, similarly serve as bad precedent. D
106
199. This court in Rajesh Kumar v. State again reiterated that
brutality in itself, was not enough to impose death sentence – the accused
was convicted for murder of two children who offered no provocation
or resistance to the brutal and inhuman fashion in which the accused
committed the crime, however, it was held that due consideration to the
E
mitigating circumstances of the criminal still had to be given. Evidence
had to be placed on record by the State, demonstrating that he was
beyond reform or rehabilitation, the absence of which was a mitigating
circumstance in itself. The High Court had merely noted that he was a
first-time offender and had a family to take care of – which this court
noted was a very narrow and myopic view on the mitigating F
circumstances.
200. Therefore, ‘individualised, principled sentencing’ – based on
both the crime and criminal, with consideration of whether reform or

104
(1996) SCC 2 175.
G
105
Surja Ram v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 6 SCC 271; Dayanidhi Bisoi v. State of Orissa
(2003) 9 SCC 310; Mohan Anna Chavan v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 7 SCC 561;
Bantu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 11 SCC 113; Shivaji v. State of Maharashtra,
(2008) 15 SCC 268; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sattan @ Satyendra and Ors. (2009) 4
SCC 736; etc.
106
Rajesh Kumar v. State, (2011) 13 SCC 706 (para 74) H
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A rehabilitation is achievable (held to be ‘probable’ in Rajendra
PralhadraoWasnik), and consequently whether the option of life
imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed – should be the only factor of
‘commonality’ that must be discernible from decisions relating to capital
offences. With the creation of a new sentencing threshold in Swamy
Shraddananda (2)107, and later affirmed by a constitution bench in
B
Union of India v. V Sriharan108, of life imprisonment without statutory
remission (i.e., Article 72 and 161 of the Constitution are still applicable),
yet another option exists, before imposition of death sentence. However,
serious concern has been raised against this concept, as it was upheld
by a narrow majority, and is left to be considered at an appropriate time.
C Theories of punishment
201. The 262nd Report, speaks extensively to the penological
justification of the death penalty. It finds that there is inconclusive evidence
that this form of punishment has more of a deterrent effect, in comparison
to life imprisonment. Dismissing the retributive theory of punishment on
D the ground that it suffers from lack of guidance on quantifying the
punishment that would be appropriate to impose, it categorically states
that:
“Capital punishment fails to achieve any constitutionally valid
penological goals….In focusing on death penalty as the
E ultimate measure of justice to victims, the restorative and
rehabilitative aspects of justice are lost sight of. Reliance on
the death penalty diverts attention from other problems ailing
the criminal justice system such as poor investigation, crime
prevention and rights of victims of crime.”
F 202. While the 262nd Report recommends abolition of the death
penalty on this ground, in addition to sentencing having become judge-
centric or arbitrary, it has not prompted Parliamentary intervention.
Whether the death penalty deserves a relook (as recommended by J.
Kurian Joseph (dissenting) in Chhannu Lal Verma), in light of the 262nd
G Law Commission Report, evolving jurisprudence, public discourse and
international standards of human rights, is outside the purview of this
court’s jurisdiction given the constitutional bench decision in Bachan
Singh, and a question best left for the legislature to critically consider.

107
Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767
H 108
(2016) 7 SCC 1
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 567
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

In this backdrop, what this court can do, is try and bolster the existing A
sentencing framework. This is possible only by giving true meaning to
the existing guidelines (without falling into the trap of ‘categorising’ crimes
that automatically warrant death penalty). To do so, this court finds it
necessary to lay out certain practical guidelines (elaborated below) that
can facilitate consideration of mitigating circumstances as recognised in
B
Bachan Singh, and consequently ensure uniform application of this
framework.
203. The 262nd Report recognised the paradigm shift, in policy
and discourse, towards a reformative and rehabilitative response to
crime,and the development of jurisprudence such that adjudging a case
to be ‘rarest of rare’ was not sufficient, and special emphasis had to be C
placed in considering whether the offender is amenable to reform. Implicit
in this shift is the understanding that the criminal is not a product of only
their own decisions, but also a product of the state and society’s failing,
which is what entitles the accused to a chance of reformation. Thus,
making life imprisonment the norm, and death penalty the exception. In, D
Lehna v. State of Haryana109 while deciding whether the facts in that
case were appropriate for death penalty, traced this shift in approach:
“14. ..Section 302 IPC prescribes death or life imprisonment
as the penalty for murder. While doing so, the Code instructs
the court as to its application. The changes which the Code E
has undergone in the last three decades clearly indicate that
Parliament is taking note of contemporary criminological
thought and movement. It is not difficult to discern that in the
Code, there is a definite swing towards life imprisonment.
Death sentence is ordinarily ruled out and can only be
imposed for “special reasons”, as provided in Section 354(3). F
There is another provision in the Code which also uses the
significant expression “special reason”. It is Section 361.
Section 360 of the 1973 Code re-enacts, in substance, Section
562 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (in short “the old
Code”). Section 361 which is a new provision in the Code G
makes it mandatory for the court to record “special reasons”
for not applying the provisions of Section 360. Section 361
thus casts a duty upon the court to apply the provisions of
Section 360 wherever it is possible to do so and to state
109
(2002) 3 SCC 76 H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A “special reasons” if it does not do so. In the context of Section
360, the “special reasons” contemplated by Section 361 must
be such as to compel the court to hold that it is impossible to
reform and rehabilitate the offender after examining the matter
with due regard to the age, character and antecedents of the
offender and the circumstances in which the offence was
B
committed. This is some indication by the legislature that
reformation and rehabilitation of offenders and not mere
deterrence, are now among the foremost objects of the
administration of criminal justice in our country. Section 361
and Section 354(3) have both entered the statute-book at the
C same time and they are part of the emerging picture of
acceptance by the legislature of the new trends in criminology.
It would not, therefore, be wrong to assume that the personality
of the offender as revealed by his age, character, antecedents
and other circumstances and the tractability of the offender
to reform must necessarily play the most prominent role in
D
determining the sentence to be awarded. Special reasons must
have some relation to these factors. Criminal justice deals
with complex human problems and diverse human beings. A
Judge has to balance the personality of the offender with the
circumstances, situations and the reactions and choose the
E appropriate sentence to be imposed.
(emphasis supplied)
204. Mitigating factors in general, rather than excuse or validate
the crime committed, seek to explain the surrounding circumstances of
the criminal to enable the judge to decide between the death penalty or
F life imprisonment. An illustrative list of indicators first recognised in
Bachan Singh110 itself:
“Mitigating circumstances.—In the exercise of its discretion
in the above cases, the court shall take into account the
following circumstances:
G
(1) That the offence was committed under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(2) The age of the accused. If the accused is young or old, he
shall not be sentenced to death.
110
H Para 206
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 569
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

(3) The probability that the accused would not commit criminal A
acts of violence as would constitute a continuing threat to
society.
(4) The probability that the accused can be reformed and
rehabilitated. The State shall by evidence prove that the
accused does not satisfy the conditions (3) and (4) above. B
(5) That in the facts and circumstances of the case the accused
believed that he was morally justified in committing the offence.
(6) That the accused acted under the duress or domination of
another person.
C
(7) That the condition of the accused showed that he was
mentally defective and that the said defect impaired his
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.”
These are hardly exhaustive; subsequently, this court in several
judgments has recognised, and considered commutation to life D
imprisonment, on grounds such as young age 111, socio-economic
conditions 112, mental illness113, criminal antecedents114, as relevant
indicators on the questions of sentence. Many of these factors reflect
demonstrable ability or merely the possibility even, of the accused to
reform (i.e. (3) and (4) of the Bachan Singh list), which make them
important indicators when it comes to sentencing. E
Pre-sentence hearing – opportunity and obligation to provide
material on the accused
205. This court in Bachan Singh held that the introduction of
pre-sentencing hearing to the accused in 1973 through Section 235(2)
F
CrPC altered the Jagmohan Singh principle that the court is primarily
concerned with the circumstances connected with crime. Therefore,
now due consideration has to be given to the circumstances of the
criminal as well, when adjudicating whether the case falls within ‘rarest
of rare’ and if the option of life imprisonment as an alternative, is
G
111
Mahesh Dhanaji Shinde v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 4 SCC 292, Gurvail Singh
v. State of Punjab (2013) 2 SCC 713, etc.
112
Mulla &Anr. v. State of U.P. (2010) 3 SCC 508; Kamleshwar Paswan v. UT Chandigarh
(2011) 11 SCC 564; Sunil Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 1 SCC 129.
113
Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014) 3 SCC 1
114
DilipPremnarayan Tiwari v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 1 SCC 775 H
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A unquestionably foreclosed. In Bachan Singh, this court categorically
stated that, “the probability that the accused would not commit
criminal acts of violence as would constitute a continuing threat to
the society”, is a relevant circumstance, that must be given great weight
in the determination of sentence. The sentencing hearing contemplated
under Section 235(2), is not confined merely to oral hearing but intended
B
to afford a real opportunity to the prosecution as well as the accused, to
place on record facts and material relating to various factors on the
question of sentence and if interested by either side, to have evidence
adduced to show mitigating circumstances to impose a lesser sentence
or aggravating grounds to impose death penalty.115
C 206. In the absence of an individual’s capacity to effectively bring
forth mitigating factors, this court in Bachan Singh placed the burden
of eliciting mitigating circumstances on the court, which has to consider
them liberally and expansively, whereas the responsibility of providing
material to show that the accused is beyond the scope of reform or
D rehabilitation, thereby unquestionably foreclosing the option of life
imprisonment and making it is a fit case for imposition of death penalty,
is one which falls squarely on the State. This has been reiterated and
further spelt out by this court in Santosh Bariyar, Rajesh Kumar,
Chhannu Lal Verma, and other decisions116. In Santosh Bariyar, making
observations on nature of information to be collected at the pre-sentencing
E stage, this court further observed that
“56. At this stage, Bachan Singh [(1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980
SCC (Cri) 580] informs the content of the sentencing hearing.
The court must play a proactive role to record all relevant
information at this stage. Some of the information relating to
F crime can be culled out from the phase prior to sentencing
hearing. This information would include aspects relating to
the nature, motive and impact of crime, culpability of convict,
etc. Quality of evidence adduced is also a relevant factor.
For instance, extent of reliance on circumstantial evidence
G or child witness plays an important role in the sentencing
analysis. But what is sorely lacking, in most capital sentencing
cases, is information relating to characteristics and socio-
115
Malkiat Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab (1991) 4 SCC 341.
116
Muniappan v. State of T.N. (1981) 3 SCC 11; Anil @ Anthony Arikswamy Joseph
H v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 4 SCC 69, etc.
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 571
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

economic background of the offender. This issue was also A
raised in the 48th Report of the Law Commission.”
(emphasis supplied)
207. The state’s duty is heightened in importance even more so,
in the Indian context where a majority of the accused have a poor or
rudimentary level of legal representation. The importance of collecting B
socio-economic factors in the context of our criminal justice system was
critically noted by the 262nd Report as follows:
“7.1.6 Numerous committee reports as well as judgments of
the Supreme Court have recognised that the administration
of criminal justice in the country is in deep crisis. Lack of C
resources, outdated modes of investigation, over-stretched
police force, ineffective prosecution, and poor legal aid are
some of the problems besetting the system. Death penalty
operates within this context and therefore suffers from the
same structural and systemic impediments. The administration D
of capital punishment thus remains fallible and vulnerable to
misapplication. The vagaries of the system also operate
disproportionately against the socially and economically
marginalised who may lack the resources to effectively
advocate their rights within an adversarial criminal justice
system.” E

208. However, despite over four decades since Bachan Singh
there has been little to no policy-driven change, towards formulating a
scheme or system that elaborates how mitigating circumstances are to
be collected, for the court’s consideration. Scarce information about the
accused at the time of sentencing, severely disadvantages the process F
of considering mitigating circumstances. It is clarified that mere mention
of these circumstances by counsel, serve no purpose – rather, they must
be connected to the possibility of reformation and assist principled judicial
reasoning (as required under S. 235(2) CrPC). Constrained by this lack
of assistance, this court (as mentioned above) in Rajesh Kumar has G
even gone so far as to hold that the very fact that the state had not given
any evidence to show that the convict was beyond reform and
rehabilitation was a mitigating circumstance, in itself.
209. The lack of forthcoming information has led to attempts by
the courts, to look backwards – sometimes many years after the crime
H
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A has been committed – to evaluate on the one hand, circumstances that
could not have been paused in time, and on the other those which can be
captured, but for which there exists no frame of reference from the
past, for comparison. This inconsistency in some courts calling for reports,
while others fail to – further contributes to our patchwork jurisprudence
on capital sentencing, and in turn undermines the equality principle and
B
due process protection that Santosh Bariyar recognises as existing, in
favour of death row convicts.
210. The move to call for a Probation Officer’s Report117 (as
done by this court even in this case), is in fact a desperate attempt by the
courts at the appellate stage, to obtain information on the accused – at
C present. Good conduct of the accused at the post-conviction stage in
prison (through a jail report), and psychiatric evaluation to evaluate
possibility of reform (albeit at the appellate sentencing stage), were
considered recently in Chhannu Lal Verma as necessary indicators for
considering mitigating circumstances:
D “15. …Since the appellant has been in jail, we wanted to
know whether there was any attempt on his part for
reformation. The Superintendent of the jail has given a
certificate that his conduct in jail has been good. Thus, there
is a clear indication that despite having lost all hope, yet no
E frustration has set on the appellant. On the contrary, there
was a conscious effort on his part to lead a good life for the
remaining period. A convict is sent to jail with the hope and
expectation that he would make amends and get reformed.
That there is such a positive change on a death row convict,
in our view, should also weigh with the Court while taking a
F decision as to whether the alternative option is unquestionably
foreclosed. As held by the Constitution Bench in Bachan
Singh [Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 :
1980 SCC (Cri) 580] it was the duty of the State to prove by
evidence that the convict cannot be reformed or rehabilitated.
G That information not having been furnished by the State at
the relevant time, the information now furnished by the State

117
Birju v. State of M.P., (2014) 3 SCC 421; Anil @ Anthony Arikswamy Joseph v.
State Of Maharashtra, (2014) 4 SCC 69; Bharat Singh vs. State (NCT of Delhi), Order
H dated 17.04.2014, DSR No. 1/2014.
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 573
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

becomes all the more relevant. The standard set by the “rarest A
of rare” test in Bachan Singh [Bachan Singh v. State of
Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] is a high
standard. The conduct of the convict in prison cannot be lost
sight of. The fact that the prisoner has displayed good
behaviour in prison certainly goes on to show that he is not
B
beyond reform.
16. In the matter of probability and possibility of reform of a
criminal, we do not find that a proper psychological/
psychiatric evaluation is done. Without the assistance of such
a psychological/psychiatric assessment and evaluation it
would not be proper to hold that there is no possibility or C
probability of reform. The State has to bear in mind this
important aspect while proving by evidence that the convict
cannot be reformed or rehabilitated”
(emphasis supplied)
D
211. However, this too, is too little, too late and only offers a peek
into the circumstances of the accused after conviction. The unfortunate
reality is that in the absence of well-documented mitigating circumstances
at the trial level, the aggravating circumstances seem far more compelling,
or overwhelming, rendering the sentencing court prone to imposing the
death penalty, on the basis of an incomplete, and hence, incorrect E
application of the Bachan Singh test.
212. The goal of reformation is ideal, and what society must strive
towards – there are many references to it peppered in this court’s
jurisprudence across the decades – but what is lacking is a concrete
framework that can measure and evaluate it. Unfortunately, this is mirrored F
by the failure to implement prison reforms of a meaningful kind, which
has left the process of incarceration and prisons in general, to be a space
of limited potential for systemic reformation. The goal of reformative
punishment requires systems that actively enable reformation and
rehabilitation, as a result of nuanced policy making. As a small step to G
correct these skewed results and facilitate better evaluation of whether
there is a possibility for the accused to be reformed (beyond vague
references to conduct, family background, etc.), this court deems it
necessary to frame practical guidelines for the courts to adopt and
implement, till the legislature and executive, formulate a coherent
framework through legislation. These guidelines may also offer guidance H
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A or ideas, that such a legislative framework could benefit from, to
systematically collect and evaluate information on mitigating
circumstances.
Practical guidelines to collect mitigating circumstances
213. There is urgent need to ensure that mitigating circumstances
B are considered at the trial stage, to avoid slipping into a retributive
response to the brutality of the crime, as is noticeably the situation in a
majority of cases reaching the appellate stage.
214. To do this, the trial court must elicit information from the
accused and the state, both. The state, must - for an offence carrying
C capital punishment - at the appropriate stage, produce material which is
preferably collected beforehand, before the Sessions Court disclosing
psychiatric and psychological evaluation of the accused. This will help
establish proximity (in terms of timeline), to the accused person’s frame
of mind (or mental illness, if any) at the time of committing the crime and
D offer guidance on mitigating factors (1), (5), (6) and (7) spelled out in
Bachan Singh. Even for the other factors of (3) and (4) - an onus
placed squarely on the state – conducting this form of psychiatric and
psychological evaluation close on the heels of commission of the offence,
will provide a baseline for the appellate courts to use for comparison,
i.e., to evaluate the progress of the accused towards reformation, achieved
E during the incarceration period.
215. Next, the State, must in a time-bound manner, collect additional
information pertaining to the accused. An illustrative, but not exhaustive
list is as follows:

F a) Age
b) Early family background (siblings, protection of parents, any
history of violence or neglect)
c) Present family background (surviving family members,
whether married, has children, etc.)
G d) Type and level of education
e) Socio-economic background (including conditions of poverty
or deprivation, if any)
f) Criminal antecedents (details of offence and whether
H convicted, sentence served, if any)
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 575
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

g) Income and the kind of employment (whether none, or A
temporary or permanent etc);
h) Other factors such as history of unstable social behaviour,
or mental or psychological ailment(s), alienation of the
individual (with reasons, if any) etc.
This information should mandatorily be available to the trial court, B
at the sentencing stage. The accused too, should be given the same
opportunity to produce evidence in rebuttal, towards establishing all
mitigating circumstances.
216. Lastly, information regarding the accused’s jail conduct and
behaviour, work done (if any), activities the accused has involved C
themselves in, and other related details should be called for in the form
of a report from the relevant jail authorities (i.e., probation and welfare
officer, superintendent of jail, etc.). If the appeal is heard after a long
hiatus from the trial court’s conviction, or High Court’s confirmation, as
the case may be – a fresh report (rather than the one used by the previous D
court) from the jail authorities is recommended, for an more exact and
complete understanding of the contemporaneous progress made by the
accused, in the time elapsed. The jail authorities must also include a
fresh psychiatric and psychological report which will further evidence
the reformative progress, and reveal post-conviction mental illness, if
any. E

217. It is pertinent to point out that this court, in Anil v. State of
Maharashtra118 has in fact directed criminal courts, to call for additional
material:
“Many a times, while determining the sentence, the courts F
take it for granted, looking into the facts of a particular case,
that the accused would be a menace to the society and there
is no possibility of reformation and rehabilitation, while it is
the duty of the court to ascertain those factors, and the State
is obliged to furnish materials for and against the possibility
of reformation and rehabilitation of the accused. The facts, G
which the courts deal with, in a given case, cannot be the
foundation for reaching such a conclusion, which, as already
stated, calls for additional materials. We, therefore, direct that

118
(2014) 4 SCC 69 H
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A the criminal courts, while dealing with the offences like
Section 302 IPC, after conviction, may, in appropriate cases,
call for a report to determine, whether the accused could be
reformed or rehabilitated, which depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case.”
B (emphasis supplied)
We hereby fully endorse and direct that this should be implemented
uniformly, as further elaborated above, for conviction of offences that
carry the possibility of death sentence.
Sentencing of present accused
C
218. This court is of the opinion, that there can no doubt that the
crime committed by the three accused was brutal, and grotesque. The
three defenceless victims were women of different age groups (22, 46,
76 years) who were caught off-guard and severely physically assaulted,
resulting in their death, in the safety and comfort of their own home. To
D have killed three generations of women from the family of PW-1, is
without a doubt, grotesque. The manner of the offence was also vicious
and pitiless – Ashlesha and Rohini, were stabbed repeatedly to their
death, while Megha was shot point blank in the face. The post-mortem
(Ex. P44) reflects that the stab wounds were extensive – ranging across
E the bodies of the victim. The extensive bleeding at the crime scene further
reflects cruel and inhumane manner of attack, against the three women.
The crime in itself, could no doubt be characterised as “extremely brutal,
grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly manner so as to arouse
intense and extreme indignation of the community”119 as defined in
Machhi Singh. These are the aggravating circumstances.
F
219. On an application of the Bachan Singh test (as clarified and
explained, in numerous decisions elaborated above), however, the
mitigating circumstances need to be considered (and that too, liberally
and expansively). Prior to the hearing on sentencing before this court, a
direction was issued the State to (on the basis of personal interviews
G and prison records) file for each of the accused – a Psychological
Evaluation Report, a Probation Officer’s Report, and Prison Report
including material on their conduct and work done. Furthermore, each
of the accused has placed material on record before this court, to

119
H Macchi Singh (para 32)
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 577
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

demonstrate circumstances of the criminal. Given that in this case there A
are three accused – this court cannot baldly consider their circumstances
collectively, and instead find that an individualised approach is necessary.
(i) Manoj
220. The material states that Manoj’s conduct appears to be
disciplined, correctional in nature and overall satisfactory, barring one B
physical altercation during an earlier confinement period. He has a wife
and two young children with whom he has repaired relations and is
regularly in touch with. He makes special effort to be a part of his growing
children’s lives, demonstrating strong continued family ties. While in prison,
owing to his interest in cricket, he has also taken up the responsibility of C
being the Captain of the Jail Block team. The probation officer concludes
that he seems remorseful, and keen to reintegrate into society with his
family.
(ii) Rahul
221. The report received from the Superintendent of Jail indicates D
that he too was involved in an altercation with another inmate in his
previous confinement period, but his overall conduct appears to be normal,
and correctional in nature. He has been voluntarily working as a health
worker (based on his request) since 05.01.2021 wherein he helps
transports sick inmates to the Jail Hospital. While in prison, he has E
completed 12th standard education, and proceeded to pursue B. Com
from IGNOU, New Delhi (in his final year). He actively participates in
cultural and spiritual programmes conducted in the prison. His family
consists of his ailing father, mother, and three married sisters. He
expressed concern for his old parents and wished to help them financially
by rejoining society. F
(iii) Neha
222. Her prison record reflects that she had, on a few occasions,
got into fights and exchanged abuses with the other female inmates, and
lady guard officers in the jail. After counselling, however, her conduct
G
has improved and was found to be disciplined and corrective in nature.
While in prison, she actively participates in cultural programmes, has
undergone training for embroidery, knitting and lamination. In 2017, she
received a national award for Jardosi work in Indore District Court and
has received numerous other accolades for her participation in activities.
In prison, she teaches children of other female inmates. Before detention, H
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A she was pursuing her B. Com degree, which she completed in prison.
Her family consists of her parents and two married brothers (of which
one, is paralysed), who she is regularly in touch with.
Conclusion on sentence of the three accused
223. It is unfortunate to note that both the trial Court, and High
B Court, failed to provide an effective sentencing hearing to the accused,
at the relevant stage, which is a right under Section 235(2) CrPC
recognised by this court in several cases.120 In fact, it was argued by the
accused that the trial court in contravention of this court’s judgments 121,
had proceeded to hear on sentencing almost immediately, depriving the
C accused of the opportunity to put forth their case for a less stringent
sentence. The trial court order on sentencing, records in passing - the
plea of ‘young age’ and ‘socio-economic factors’ as mitigating
circumstances, but reflects, at best, a mechanical consideration of the
same. Swayed by the brutality of the crime and “shock of the collective
and judicial conscience”, the High Court affirmed imposition of the death
D penalty solely on the basis of the aggravating circumstances of the crime,
with negligible consideration of mitigating circumstances of the criminal.
This is in direct contravention of Bachan Singh.
224. The crime that the appellants have been held guilty of, is
heinous; its execution was vicious and cruel, by any stretch of imagination.
E The deception practised by the appellants, in entering the flat, and, when
encountering resistance, attacking the three women, was calculated and
ruthless. The repeated stabbings of two of the deceased, almost in a
frenzy, on the one hand, and the defenceless state of the victims, on the
other, highlights that the accused were willing to go ahead with their
F plans (of robbing) after eliminating the women of three generations. No
doubt, two of the victims appear to have put up resistance, if one looks

120
Bachan Singh (para 152), Md. Mannan @ Abdul Mannam v. State of Bihar (2019) 16
SCC 584 (para 39), Allaudin Mian v. State of Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 5 (para 10),
RameshbhaiChandubhai Rathod v. State of Gujarat (2009) 5 SCC 740 (para 106),
G Rajesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2011) 13 SCC 706 (para 52), Mukesh vv. State
(NCT of Delhi) (2017) 3 SCC 717 (para 9), Chhannulal Verma v. State of Chhattisgarh
(2019) 12 SCC 438 (para 17).
121
Santa Singh v. State of Punjab (1967) 4 SCC 190 (para 3, 4, 5, 7); Allaudin Mian v.
State of Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 5 (para 10); Rajesh Kumar v. State (2011) 13 SCC 706
(para 52); Ajay Pandit @ Jagdish v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 8 SCC 43 (para 38,
H 47).
MANOJ & ORS. v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 579
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

at the stab wounds inflicted all over their bodies, including on their arms A
and faces. Yet, they were unarmed and weak.
225. At the same time, the young age of the accused at the time
of the incident (35, 20, 22 respectively) and lack of criminal antecedents
(except in the case of Manoj, who was allegedlyinvolvedin a case of
petty theft) cannot be lost sight of. Further, the prosecution case is silent B
on any real motive that may have instigated or moved the three accused
to have pre-planned for the commission of murder – other than robbery,
itself. This coupled with the fact that Rahul was shot in his leg during the
commission of the crime, indicates that perhaps it is reasonable to assume
that they were amateurs in a robbing-gone-wrong situation, who were
C
not intent on taking the lives of these three women. One can surmise
that having ventured to rob, perhaps they did not contemplate the kind of
resistance that was put up by the victims, which led them to act the way
they did, to continue with their plan, and ensure that the victims did not
survive to tell the tale.
D
226. The reports received from the Superintendent of Jail reflect
that each of the three accused, have a record of overall good conduct in
prison and display inclination to reform. It is evident that they have already,
while in prison, taken steps towards bettering their lives and of those
around them, which coupled with their young age122 unequivocally
demonstrates that there is in fact, a probability of reform. On E
consideration of all the circumstances overall, we find that the option of
life imprisonment is certainly not foreclosed.
227. While there is no doubt that this case captured the attention
and indignation of the society in Indore, and perhaps the state of Madhya
Pradesh, as a cruel crime that raised alarm regarding safety within the F
community – it must be remembered that public opinion has categorically
been held to be neither an objective circumstance relating to crime, nor
the criminal, and the courts must exercise judicial restraint and play a
balancing role.123
G
122
Gurvail Singh &Anr v. State of Punjab (2013) 2 SCC 713 (para 13, 19); Amit v. State
of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 4 SCC 107 (para 22); Shyam Singh @ Bhima v. State of
Maharashtra (2017) 11 SCC 265 (para 8) and Ramnaresh&Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh
(2012) 4 SCC 257 (para 88).
123
Chhannu Lal Verma (para 25), Santosh Bariyar (para 80-89), M.A Antony @ Antappan
v. State of Kerala, (2020) 17 SCC 751, Bachan Singh (para 126). H
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 9 S.C.R.

A 228. In view of the totality of facts and circumstances, and for
the above stated reasons, this court finds that imposition of death sentence
would be unwarranted in the present case. It would be appropriate and
in the overall interests of justice to commute the death sentence of all
three accused, to life imprisonment for a minimum term of 25 years.
B The appeals are partly allowed in the above terms.

Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeals partly allowed.
(Assisted by : Neha Sharma, LCRA)

C

D

E

F

G

H