Holding

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in refusing to quash the FIR and that, in the facts, the proceedings were quashable under Section 482 CrPC/Article 226.

Summary

Manoj Sharma was charged in an FIR for offences including cheating, forgery and fraud under Sections 420, 468, 471, 34 and 120‑B IPC. The complainant and the accused later reached an amicable settlement and the complainant withdrew the allegations. The Delhi High Court refused to quash the FIR, prompting an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court examined whether non‑compoundable offences could be quashed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or Article 226 of the Constitution when the parties have compromised. It held that the High Court’s discretion under these provisions is not limited by Section 320 CrPC and may be exercised to prevent abuse of process and to secure the ends of justice. Since continuation of the proceedings would be futile, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order and quashed the criminal proceedings.

Issues considered

Whether an FIR and criminal proceedings for offences that are non‑compoundable under Section 320 CrPC can be quashed under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution when the parties have reached a compromise.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 320, s. 482
Constitution of Indias. Article 226
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120-B, s. 34, s. 420, s. 468, s. 471

Subjects

quashFIRSection 482 CrPCArticle 226compromisenon‑compoundable offencesjudicial discretioncriminal procedure

Judgment

[2008] 14 S.C.R. 539

-- I
MANOJ SHARMA A
\/.
STATE & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1619 of 2008)
OCTOBER 16, 2008
B
[ALTAMAS KABIR AND MARKANDEY KATJU, JJ.]
--+, Constitution of India, 1950; Article 226:
Quashing of criminal proceeding!Fl.R. by High Court -
In exercise of power/discretion under s.482 Cr.P CJArticle 226 c
of the Constitution, when parties entering into settlement!
compromise - Held: Exercise of such power by the High Court
in no way limited by provisions uls.320 Cr.PC. - Power under
s.482 Cr.PC./Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary in
nature and to be exercised on facts of each case - On facts, D
continuing with the criminal proceedings would be an exer-
.
, '(
cise in futility, hence, quashed - Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 - Ss. 320 and 482.
Doctrines:
E
Doctrine of 'Judicial restraint' and 'Judicial activism' -
Applicability of.
The question which arose for determination before
this Court was as to whether a First Information Report
lodged against accused for committing the offences un- F
,..___..._
der Ss. 471, 467, 420, 120-8 and s.34 IPC could be
quashed either under s.482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, wh~n the accused and the com-
plainant have compromised and settled the matter be-
tween themselves. G
Respondent-State submitted that having regard to
4 the specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure
regarding compounding of offences, and indicating what
539 H
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A offences may be compromised either with or without the
)-------
leave of the Court, possibly the decision rendered in B. S. I

Joshi's case required a second look.
-
Allowing the appeal, the Court

B HELD (Per Altamas Kabir, J.):
1.1 The ultimate exercise of discretion under Section
482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution is with .J.- -
the Court which has to exercise such jurisdiction in the
facts of each case. It has been explained in B. S. Joshi's r
c case that the said power is in no way limited by the provi-
sions of Section 320 CrPC. This Court is unable to dis-
agree with such statement of law. (Para - 6) [547-A & B]
8. S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana 2003(4) SCC
675 JT 2003(3) SC 277 =AIR 2003 SC 1386 - relied on.
D
1.2 In view of the nature of the offences set out in the
complaint, the High Court did not consider it an appropri- 7'

ate case for exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of J ),.-

the Constitution for quashing the same. The High Court's
E refusal to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution for quashing the criminal proceedings can-
not be supported. The First Information Report, which had
been lodged by the complainant indicates a dispute be-
tween the complainant and the accused is of a private
F nature. It is no doubt true that the First Information Re-
port was the basis of the investigation by the Police au-
thorities, but the dispute between the parties remained ~ '
...
one of a personal nature. Once the complainant decided
not to pursue the matter further, the High Court could have
G
taken a more pragmatic view of the matter. The matter
could have been considered by the High Court with
greater pragmatism in the facts of the case. (Paras -- 7 &
8) [547- C-G] I.
+ ~

'
1. In the facts of this case, continuing with the criminal
H proceedings would be an exercise in futility. Hence, the or-
MANOJ SHARMA v. STATE & ORS. 541

--) der of the High Court is set aside and the criminal proceed- A
ings pending before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Mag-
istrate is quashed. (Paras - 9 & ·10) [547-G-H; 548-A]
Per Markandey Katju, J. (Concurring):
1.1 A perusal o.f Section 320 Cr.P.C. shows that of- B
fences under Section 46.8, 471, 34 and 120-B IPC, as men-
~ tioned in the FIR in question, cannot even be com-
pounded with the permission of the Court. In fact, Sec-
tion 320(9) Cr.P.C. expressly states that no offence shall
be compounded except as provided by this Section. The
offences mentioned in the FIR were not compoundable
c
except in relation to the allegations about Section 420 IPC.
There are other provisions in the IPC which apparently
cannot be compounded even with the permission ot the
Court in view of Section 320 (9) Cr.P.C. However, this was
creating a lot of difficulty and hardship to the public and D
hence a way out was found by this Court in B. S. Joshi and
)' Others vs. State of Haryana. (Paras -10, 11 & 12) [550-F,G,H;
551-A&B]
B. S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana 2003(4) SCC
E
675 JT 2003(3) SC 277 =AIR 2003 SC 1386 - referred to.
1.2. This Court relying on its own decision in the case
of State of Karanataka vs. L. Muniswamy 1977 (2) SCC 699
observed that the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P;C.
}
can quash the criminal proceedings if it comes to the con- F
..-!< clusion that the ends of justice so requires e.g. where
there would almost be no chance of conviction. (Para --
13) [551-D&E]
B. S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana 2003 (4) SCC
675 = JT 2003(3) SC 277 = AIR 2003 SC 1386; State of G
Karanataka vs. L. Muniswamy 1977 (2) SCC 699; Madhavrao
4 Jiwajirao Scindia vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre 1988
1 SCC 692; G V. Rao vs. L.H. V Prasad (2000) 3 SCC 693
and Nikhil Merchant vs. Central Bureau of Investigation &Anr.
JT 2008 (9) SC 192 - relied on. H
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A 1.3 Since Section 320 Cr.P.C. has clearly stated which )--
offences are compoundable and which are not, the High
Court or even this Court would not ordinarily be justified
.'
in doing something indirectly which could not be done
directly. Even otherwise, it ordinarily would not be a le-
B gitimate exercise of judicial power under Article 226 of the
Constitution or under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to direct doing
something which the Cr.P.C. has expressly prohibited. ~
(Para - 17) [552-E & F] I
i"-
1.4 Section 320 Cr.P.C. cannot be read in isolation. It
c has to be read along with the other provisions in the Cr.P.C. 1"
including Section 482 Cr.P.C. The words "Nothing in this f
Code" used in Section 482 is a non obstante clause, and
gives it overriding effect over other provisions in the t-
Cr.P.C. The words "or otherwise to secure the ends of jus-
D tice" in Section 482 implies that to secure the interest of
justice sometimes (though only in very rare cases) the
High Court can pass an order in violation of a provision y
in the Cr.P.C. (Paras - 18 & 19) [552-G; 553-B&C]
1.5 It is well settled that judgments of a Court cannot
E be read mechanically and like a Euclid's theorem. In rare
and exceptional cases a departure can be made from the
principle so laid down by the Court in various decisions
regarding exercise of power under s.482 Cr.P.C. (Para -
21) [553-E&F]
F 1,

Mosst. Simrikhia vs. Dolley Mukherjee AIR 1990 SC ~ '
1605 {paras 2 & 4); R.P Kapur vs. State of Punjab AIR 1960
SC 866 (para 6); Sooraj Devi vs. Pyare Lal & another AIR
1981 SC 736 (para 5); Dr. Rajbir Singh Dalal vs. Chaudhari
Devi Lal University 2008(8) JT 621; Bharat Petroleum Cor-
G
poration Ltd. & another vs. N.R. Vairamani and another AIR
2004 SC 4778 and Nikhil Merchant vs. Central Bureau of In-
-t-
vestigation & Anr. JT 2008 (9) SC 192 - relied on.
1.6 Even in the judgment of this Court in the case of
H Divisional Manager Araval/i Golf Club, where emphasis has ~
i.
.f
MANOJ SHARMA v. STATE & ORS. 543

---i been laid on judicial restraint it has been mentioned that A
sometimes judicial activism can be resorted to by the
Court where the situation forcefully requires it in the in-
terest of the country or society. (Para - 21) [553-G&H]
Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Club & another vs.
Chander Hass & Anr. JT 2008(3) SC 221 and Government of 8
Andhra Pradesh & Ors. vs. Smt. P Laxmi Deviji (2008) 2 SC
639 - relied on.
Brown vs. Board of Education 341 U.S. 483; Miranda vs.
Arizona 384 U.S. 436; Roe vs. Wade 410 U.S. 113 - referred c
to.
2.1 There can be no doubt that a case under Section
302 IPC or other serious offences like those under Sec-
tions 395, 307 or 3048 cannot be compounded and hence
proceedings in those provisions cannot be quashed by D
the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482
Cr.P.C. or in writ jurisdiction on the basis of compromise.
However, in some other cases, (like those akin to a civil
nature) the proceedings can be quashed by the High
Court if the parties have come to an amicable settlement E
even though the provisions are not compoundable. (Para
- 23) [554-D&E]
2.2 While in the present case, the criminal proceed.;
ings deserve to be quashed, the question may have to be
decided in some subsequent decision or decisions (pref- F
erably by a larger Bench) as to which non-compoundable
cases can be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Ar-
ticle 226 of the Constitution on the basis that the parties
have entered into a compromise. (Para - 22) [554-B&C]
2.3 The decision in the case of B. S. Joshi should not G
be understood to have meant that Judges can quash any
kind of criminal case merely because there has been a
compromise between the parties. After all, a crime is an
offence against society, and not merely against a private
H
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

•\.. .
A individual. (Para - 24) [554-H; 555-:Al ·r~.
B. S. Joshi & Ors. vs. State of Haryana_ (2003) 4 S.CC 67'.$_.:
- referred to.
CASE LAW REFER~NCE .
B 2003(4) sec 675 = ..
Referred·to Para -12
..

JT 2003(3) SC 277 = ... . : ·.)t-_
AIR 2003 SC 1386 .. ; '

2003 (4). sec 675=. Relied on ·. . Para·,; 12
.c JT 2003(3) SC 277 = ...
"
AIR 2003 SC 1386
1977 (2) sec 699 Relied on P~ra -13

D
1988 1 sec 692
(2000) 3 sec 693.
Relied on
Relied on
. .
Para .. 13
Para - 13
JT 2008 (9) SC 192 Relied on Para -14 y: .,
..
AfR 1990 SC"1605 Rel.ied on Para - 20
E AIR 1960 SC 866 Relied on Para"' 20
AIR 1981 SC 736 Relied on Para - 20
2008(8) JT 621 Relied on Para - 21
AIR 2004 SC 4778 Relied on Para - 21
F JT 2008 (9) SC 192 Relied on Para -14
\_.
JT 2008(3) SC 221 Relied on Para - 16
347 U.S. 483 Referred ·to Para - 21
.384 U.S. 436 Referred to Para - 21
G 410 U.S. 113 Referred to Para - 21
JT 2008 (2) SC 639 Relied on Para - 16
~
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1619 of 2008·
H
MANOJ SHARMA v. STATE & ORS. 545

--l
\. ·From the final Judgment and Order dated 17.8.2007 of A
the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in W.P. (Crl.) No. 1075 of
2007
H.K. Chaturvedi for the Ap.pellant.
. B.B. Singh, Savitri Pandey and D;S. Mahra for the Re- B
spondent.
-----+.,
The Judgment of the·Courtwas delivered by
.· ALTAMAS KABIR, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. The question whether a First Information Report under c
· Sections 420/468/471/34/120-B IPC can be quashed either
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or under
.Article 226 ofthe Constitution, when the accused and the com-
plalnant have compromised and settled the matter between
themselves, is the question which arises for decision. in ·this D
,., appeal.
3. The identical question fell for the consideration of this
Court in the case of B.S. Joshi vs. State of Haryana,[2003 (4)
sec 675] wherein also the question arose as towhether crimi- E
nal proceedings or a First Information Report cir complaint filed
under Seetion 498-A and 406 IPC by the wife could be quashed
under Section 482 CrPC on account of the fact that the offences
.. complained of were not compoundable under Section· 320 of
the Code. The objection taken in the said case has also been
___; · raised by Mr. B.B. Singh, learned advocate for the respondent F
State.
4. In B.S. Joshi's case, this Court drew a distinction be-
tween compounding an offence as permitted under Section 320
CrPC and quashing of the complaint or c_riminal proceedings G
under Section 482 CrPC as also Article 226 of the Constitu-
~ tion. Pointing out that the appellant in the said case had not
prayed for compounding the offence as the same was not com-
poundable, this Court observed with reference to the earlier
decision in Pepsi Food Limited vs. Special Judicial Magistrate, H
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A [1998 (5) SCC 749], that where the Court will exercise jurisdic- }--
tion under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or
rigid formulae to be followed by the Courts could not be laid
down. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts
and circumstances of each case but with the sole object of pre-
B venting abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise to se-
cure the ends of justice. It was also observed that it is well settled
that these powers have no bar, but the same was required to be
exercised with utmost care and caution. Accordingly, the learned
Judges held that the power of the High Court under Section
c 482 of the Code to quash Criminal proceedings or FIR or com-
plaint were not circumscribed by Section 320 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
5. While the appellant herein strongly relied on the deci-
sion in B.S. Joshi's case. Mr. B.B. Singh, learned counsel ap-
D pea ring for ,the respondent-State urged that having regard to
the specific provision in the Code regarding compounding of
offences, and indicating what offences may be compromised
either with or without the leave of the Court, possibly the deci-
sion rendered in B.S. Joshi's case required a second look.
E Relying on the decision of this Court in Inspector of Police, CBI
vs. Rajagopal, [2002 (9) SCC 533], K.G. Prem Shankar vs. In-
spector of Police and Anr. [JT 2002 (7) SC 30] and also Textile
Labour Association and Anr. Vs. Official Liquidator and Anr. [JT
2004 (suppl.1) SC 1], Mr. Singh submitted that in S.S. Josh i's
F case there was a departure from the view taken in the first of
the two aforesaid cases.
6. We have carefully considered the submissions made
on behalf of the respective parties and the facts involved in this
case, and we are not inclined to accept Mr. Singh's contention
G that the decision in B.S. Joshi's case requires reconsideration,
at least not in the facts of this case. What was decided in B.S.
Joshi's case was the power and authority of the High Court to
exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC or under Article
226 of the Constitution to quash offences which are not com-
H poundable. The law stated in the said case simply indicates the
MANOJ SHARMA v. STATE & ORS. 547
[ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]

--~ powers of the High Court to quash any criminal proceeding or A
First Information Report or complaint whether it be compound-
able or not. The ultimate exercise of discretion under Section
482 CrPC or under Article 226 of the Constitution is with the
Court which has to exercise such jurisdiction in the facts of each
case. It has been explained that the said power is in no way B
limited by the provisions of Section 320 CrPC. We are unable
- -1 to disagree with such statement of law. In any event, in this case,
we are only required to consider whether the High Court had
exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. legally and
oo~~Y C
7. In view of the nature of the offences set out in the com-
plaint, the High Court did not consider it an appropriate case
for exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitu-
tion for quashing the same.
D
8. In our view, the High Court's refusal to exercise its juris-
diction under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the crimi-
nal proceedings cannot be supported. The First Information Re-
port, which had been lodged by the complainant indicates a dis-
pute between the complainant and the accused which is of a pri-
vate nature. It is no doubt true that the First Information Report E
was the basis of the investigation by the Police authorities, but
the dispute between the parties remained one of a personal na-
ture. Once the complainant decided not to pursue the matter fur-
ther, the High Court could have taken a more pragmatic view of
the matter. We do not suggest that while exercising its powers F
under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court could not have
refused to quash the First Information Report, but what we do say
is that the matter could have been considered by the High Court
with greater pragmatism in the facts of the case. As we have
indicated herein before, the exercise of power under Section 482 G
Cr.P.C. or Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary to be
exercised in the facts of each case.

9. In the facts of this case we are of the view that continuing
with the criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility.
H
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R. .....

A 10. We, accordingly, allow the appeal and set aside the ~-
!
order of the High Court and quash the criminal proceedings
pending before the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Mag-
istrate, Karkardooma Court, Delhi, in FIR No.50 of 1997 dated
31st January, 1997 P.S. Vivek Vihar (East Delhi).
B MARKANDEY KATJU, J. 1. I have read the judgment of
my learned brother Hon. Kabir, J. and I respectfully agree with .
his conclusion that the appeal should be allowed and the judg .. ~
ment of the High Court as weil as the criminal proceedings pend- ~

ing before the Additio·nal Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
c Karkardooma Court, Delhi in FIR No. 50 of 1997 dated. 31s1
January, 1997 P.O. Vivek Vihar (East Delhi) against the appel-
lant should be quashed.
2. However, I wish to give a separate concurring judgment
in view of the importance of the issue involved in this case.
D
3. The question involved in this case is whether an FIR
y
under Section 420/468/471/34/120-8 IPC can be quashed un-
der Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 226 of the Constitution when
the accused and the complainant have compromised and settled ·..
E th·e·matter between themselves.· · ·
I ~ ~-,, i:;;·· '

!Ci .4'.The allegations in the FIR are as follows:
. i 1· .
"Statement of Sanjay Pal S/o Mahendra singh Pal Rio .
, : <.House No. A-25, Jhilmil Colony, Vivek Vihar, Delhi, stated·
F ~~~:Jhat I reside at the above mentioned address with my ,.__ __
:~::\, f~mily. I got financed a Maruti Van bearing No. DL-1 CB-
\

.,:·.. 4065 from Shri Manoj Kumar Sharma - Vijay Lakshmi
...:, ,. Finance & Investment Company before two years back
· ·~ for a consideration amount of Rs. 30,000/- and I paid Rs.
G 3954/- as first installment. After that Shri Man Mohan •
Sharma R/o D-131, Jhilmil Colony, came and told me that
your finance is fabricated one, that is why your vehide has
+-
(
not been financed by me from Real Auto Deals which is ' ..
run by my brother-in-law. I have received the payment given
by you and your file. He asked me to give return the first
H
MANOJ SHARMA v. STATE & ORS. 549
[MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
----~ RC. He gave me the new RC .. I returned him the old RC. A
He suggested me that now the financer of your vehicle is
Real Auto Deals. I was shocked that how the vehicle got
transferred without signing any form and paper. Man
Mohan Sharma used to receive the installments in cash
every month from me. The receipts issued to me put up B
with neither rubber stamp nor used, the letter head of Real
--1 Auto Deals. The cheques received from me, encashed

- him in different-different names instead depositing in the
. account of Real Auto Deals. When it has come to my
notice that he is playing fraud with me, then visited the c
bank and got stopped the payment of the cheques. He
came to me when the cheque was dishonoured and asked
me why you stop the payment. I explained him that I have
already sent you a notice. stating that I will make the
payments of the installments in the name of· f3_eal Auto
D
Deals but you are not doing so, therefore, I got stopped
..., the payments. Thereafter, on 27.12.1995 at about 10
O'clock he came to me in Jhilmil along with an unknown
person, I can recognize him if he comes to me, took my
said Maruti Van with his help without my consent by
showing me a paper duly stamped by the police. Vijay E
Lakshmi Finance; Real Auto Deals and Man Mohan
Sharma, have sold my. vehicle to some other place by
making my forged signatures and by playing fraud with me, .
in connivanc;e of each other._The appropriate legal.action
~___.,.{
may kindly be taken against all these persons. Statement F
'\ heard which is correct. Sd/- English. Sanjay Pal 31.1.97
Attested Sd/- Snglish Satya Narayan ASI 31.1.97" .
...
5. A perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations against
the appellant were that he forged documents in respect of a
vehicle and thereafter indulged in cheating and deposited the
G
cheques received from the complainant against financing of the
::\
vehicle in different accounts. It is also alleged in the FIR that the
appellant sold the vehicle of the complainant to some other party
by making forged signature and by playing fraud with him.
H
'
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R. -
,,.___

A 6. On the basis of the above FIR charges were framed ~---
against the appellant and co-accused Man Mohan Sharma.
7. The appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court
for quashing the FIR on the ground that the matter had been
compromised between the complainant and the accused. In that
B writ petition an affidavit was filed by the complainant stating that
in view of the settlement between the parties he is withdrawing
the allegations against both the writ petitioners and he is also 'r--
withdrawing the FIR. As per the amicable settlement a sum of ~
Rs. 45,000/- would be paid to the appellant Manoj Sharma and
,,
c a further sum of Rs. 45,000/- would be paid to the co-accused
Man Mohan Sharma.
8. However, the Delhi High Court by the impugned judgment
dated 17.8.2007 rejected the writ petition and hence this appeal.
D 9. It may be mentioned that under Section 320(1) Cr.P.C.
certain offences in the IPC can be compounded by the persons
y
mentioned in the 3rd column of the table in that provision. Also, r'
in view of Section 320(2) certain other offences can be com-
pounded with the permission of the Court. However, Section
E 320 (9) specifically states:
"No offence shall be compounded except as provided by
this Section".
10. A perusal of Section 320 shows that offences under
F Section 468, 471, 34 and 120-B IPC (with are mentioned in the
}-.._~
FIR in question) cannot even be compounded with the permis-
sion of the Court. In fact, Section 320(9) Cr.P.C. expressly states
that no offence shall be compounded except as provided by
this Section. It apparently follows, therefore, that except for Sec-
tion 420 IPC, which can be compounded with the permission of
G
the Court in view of Section 320(2), the other provisions men-
tioned in the FIR in question could hot be compounded even I-
with the permission of the Court. It, prima facie, seems to follow
that the offences mentioned in the FIR were not compoundable
except in relation to the allegations about Section 420 IPC.
H
MANOJ SHARMA v. STATE & ORS. 551
[MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
------.. r

11. There are other provisions in the IPC e.g. Section 498A A
which apparently cannot be compounded even with the perm is-
sion of the Court in view of Section 320 (9) Cr.P.C.
12. However, this was creating a lot of difficulty and hard-
ship to the public and hence a way out was found by this Court
in B.S. Joshi and others vs. State of Haryana 2003.(4) SCC B
675 [= JT 2003(3) SC 277 =AIR 2003 SC 1386]. In that deci-
--i
sion this Court referred to its own earlier decision in Madhu
Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra 1977 (4) SCC 551 in which it
~

was held (vide para 8) that the power under Section 482 should
not be exercised when there is an express bar in some other c
~
provision of the Code. The Court in B.S. Joshi's case (supra)
also referred to the decision in Surendra Nath Mohanty vs.
State of Orissa AIR 1999 SC 2181 which held that since the
offence under Section 326 IPC is not compoundable the High
Court cannot compound the offence. D
'"'( 13. Despite the above decisions this Court in B.S. Joshi's
case (supra) relying on its own decision in State of Karanataka
vs. L. Muniswamy 1977 (2) SCC 699 observed that the High
Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can quash the criminal proceed-
ings if it comes to the conclusion that the ends of justice so re- E
quires e.g. where there would almost be no chance of conviction.
In a case under Section 498A IPC if the parties enter into a com-
promise the chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak, and
hence no useful purpose would be served by allowing the crimi-
~ ..,,.J nal proceedings to continue. They should, therefore, be quashed F
by exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Court also
relied on the decisions in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia vs.
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre 1988 1 SCC 692, G V Rao
vs. L. H. V Prasad (2000) 3 SCC 693 for taking the same view.
G
14. In B.S. Joshi's case (supra) this Court devised a ere-
~ ative solution to the problem and quashed the proceedings in
exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C .. The said deci-
sion was followed by this Court in Nikhil Merchant vs. Central
Bureau of Investigation & another JT 2008 (9) SC 192.
H
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R. ·

A 15. Shri B.B. Singh, learned counsel for the respondent
submitted that the High Court or even this Court would not be ..
justified in giving directions to quash a. criminal proceedin·g in
view of the compromise between th'e.parties when the offence
has been expressly made non-compoundable by· Section 320
B · Cr.P.C. He urged that the Court cannot ignore. any substantive
,statutory provision dealing with the subject and cannot.issue ~
writ or a direction in violation of the statute. · · · · · · · · ·'}--.:.-
.. I

. 16. Ordinarily we would have agreed with Mr. B.B. Singh:.. ·
The doctrine of judicial restraint whrch has qeen emphasized
C repeatedly by this Court e.g. in Divisiona/Manager,Ar;avalFGolf .
Club & another vs. Chander Hass & another JT ·20:08(3) sc·. . t

221, Government of Andhra Pradesh & othf!r$ vs. Smt.'P.
Laxmi Devi JT 2008 (2) SC 639 restricts the.power of the -Go.urt ·
and does not permit the Court to ordinarily·encroach into ttie
D legislative or executive ·domain. As observed by this (;curt in
the above decisions, there is a broad $eparation .of powers in
the Constitution and it would not be proper for..one organ of the
State to encroach
.
into the. domain 'of anqther
. organ.;
.
1i Since Section 320 Cr.P.C. has clearly stated which
E offences.are compoundable arid which are not;'theHigh Court
or even this Court would not ordinarily-be justified ill doing s·ome.,
thing indirectly which could not b'e done qfreetiy. · Even other-· .·
wise, itordinarily would .not be a legitJmate- exer9ise of Jt.i,didal
· power underArtlcle ·226 ofthe Constitution or under section \ ...
F 482 Cr:P.C: to direct doing someHhing which the Cr.P.C. has ~:"-

expressly prohibited. Section 320(9) Cr.P.c·. expressly states
that no offence shall be compounded except as provided by
.that Sectio.n. Hence, in my opinion, it would ordinarily not be a
legitimate exercise of judicial power to direct compounding bf
G a non-compoundable offence. ·
18. However, it has to be pointed out that Section 320
Cr.PC. cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read along with
the other provisions in the Cr.P.C. One such other provision is
Section 482 Cr.P.C. which reads:
H
MANOJ SHARMA v. STATE & ORS. 553
[MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
....--, · ;,_S~ving of inherent power of High Court. :... Nothing in this A
Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the.inherent powers
o.f the J-ligh C_oqrt to make such ord~rs as may be
· necessar-Y t~ give effect .to any order under this Code, or
to prevent abuse of the process of any· Court or otherwise
to secure the ends ·ofjustice.''. B
: ..

. · 19. The words."Nothing in this Code" used in Section 482
- ~ is a non obstant$ clause, and gives it overriding effect over
other provisions in the Cr.P.C. The words "or otherwise to se-
cure the ends of justice'' in Section 482 implies that to secure
the interest of justice sometimes (though-only.in very rare cases) c
the High Court can: pass an order in violation ·of a provision in
the Cr.P.C~
.. 20. It is true that in certain decisions of this Court it has
been observed that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can-
D
not be exercised to do something which is expressly barred
"---( under the Code vide Mosst. Simrikhia vs. Dolley Mukherjee
AIR 1990 SC 1605 (vide paras 2 & 4), R.P Kapur vs. State of
Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 (vide para 6), Sooraj Devi vs. Pyare
Lal & another AIR 1981 SC 736 (vide para 5) etc.
E
21. However, in my opinion these judgments cannot be
read as a Euclid's formula since it is well settled that judgments
of a Court cannot be read mechanically and like a Euclid's theo-
rem vide Or. Rajbir Singh Dalal vs. Chaudhari Devi Lal Uni-
versify 2008(8) JT 621 , Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & F
-~ another vs. N.R. Vairamani and another AIR 2004 SC 4778. In
rare and exceptional cases a departure can be made from the
principle laid down in the decisions referred to in para 20, as
observed in B.S. Joshi's case (supra), which has also been
followed in other decisions e.g. Nikhil Merchant's case (supra).
G
Even in the judgment of this Court in Divisional Manager Aravalli
~
Golf Club (supra) where emphasis has been laid on judicial ·
restraint it has been mentioned that sometimes judicial activ-
ism can be resorted to by the Court where the situation force-
fully requires it in the interest of the country or society (vide para
H
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C':R--._
' ~

A 39 of the said judgment). Judicial activism was rightly resorted
to by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown vs. Board of Education
~-
347 U.S. 483, Miranda vs. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, Roe vs. Wade
410 U.S. 113, etc. and by Lord Denning in England in several of
his decisions.
B 22. While in the present case I respectfully agree with 'my
learned brother Hon'ble Kabir J. that the criminal proceedings
deserve to be quashed, the question may have to be decided ~--

in some subsequent decision or decisions (preferably by a
larger Bench) as to which non-compoundable cases can be ''
c quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 226 of the ~on-
stitution on the basis that the parties have entered into a .com-
promise.
23. There can be no doubt that a case under Section 302
IPC or other serious offences like those under Sections 395,
D
307 or 3048 cannot be compounded and hence proceedings
in those provisions cannot be quashed by the High Court in ex- 'r
ercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or in writjurisdic-
}

tion on the basis of compromise. However, in some other cases,
(like those akin to a civil nature) the proceedings can be quashed
E by the High Court if the parties have come to an amicable settle-
r--
•4c=
"
ment even though the provisions are not compoundable. Where ..
a line is to be drawn will have to be decided in some later deci-
sions of this Court, preferably by a larger bench (so as to make
it more authoritative). Some guidelines will have to be evolved
F in this connection and the matter cannot be left at the sole un-
guided discretion of Judges, otherwise there may be conflict-
k-
ing decisions and judicial anarchy. A judicial discretion has to
be exercised on some objective guic:ling principles and criteria,
and not on the whims and fancies of individual Judges. Discre-
G tion, after all, cannot be the Chancellor's foot.
24. I am expressing this opinion because Shri B.B. Singh,
learned counsel for the respondent has rightly expressed his
\c"
concern that the decision in B.S. Joshi's case (supra) should • >
not be understood to have meant that Judges can quash any
H
MANOJ SHARMA v. STATE & ORS. 555
[MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]

kind of criminal case merely because there has been a com- A
promise between the parties. After all, a crime is an offence
against society, and not merely against a private individual.
25. With these observations, I respectfully agree with my
learned brother Hon'ble Kabir J. that this appeal is to be al-
lowed and the criminal proceedings in question are to be 8
quashed. Appeal allowed. No costs.
S.K.S. Appeal allowed .

•
t