Holding

The trial against the appellants would be an abuse of the process of the court as no criminal offence under Section 415 IPC or any other provision is made out against them, and the petition to quash the chargesheet must be allowed.

Summary

The appellants, parents of a man who had a relationship with a woman, sought to quash the chargesheet filed against them under Section 482 of the CrPC, alleging that the High Court erred in rejecting their petition. The complainant claimed the parents had assured her of marriage to their son, leading to an intimate relationship, but later the son married someone else. The Supreme Court examined whether the parents' conduct amounted to an offence under Section 415 IPC or any other provision. It held that the complaint contained no allegation of illegal or criminal conduct by the parents, and the main accusation was against the son, whose case could proceed independently. Consequently, the Court found that trying the parents would be an abuse of process and set aside the High Court's order, quashing the proceedings against the appellants while leaving the son's case untouched.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the petition under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the chargesheet against the appellants.
Whether the conduct of the appellants' parents, as alleged in the complaint, constitutes an offence under Section 415 IPC or any other criminal provision.
Whether proceeding against the appellants would amount to an abuse of the process of the court.
Whether the High Court can make observations affecting a third party (the appellants' son) who was not before it.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 109, s. 415, s. 417

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the petition seeking quashing of the chargesheet in the criminal case qua the appellants-parents. Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Prosecution case that complainant in a relationship with the son of the appellants and established physical relations with him only on the assurance that he would marry her – On one occasion, the son of the appellants had taken her to meet them where they also agreed to accept her as their daughter in-law, but later, the

Subjects

Petition under Section 482 CrPCQuashing of chargesheetAbuse of process of courtIntimate relationsHigh Court observation against third partyNotice and opportunityDeletion of judicial extract

Judgment

[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1674 : 2025 INSC 163

Marippan & Anr.
v.
State Represented by the Inspector of Police & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 367 of 2025)
24 January 2025
[Ahsanuddin Amanullah* and K. V. Viswanathan,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the petition
seeking quashing of the chargesheet in the criminal case qua the
appellants-parents.

Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Prosecution case
that complainant alleged that she was in a relationship with
the son of the appellants and established physical relations
with him only on the assurance that he would marry her –
On one occasion, the son of the appellants had taken her
to meet them where they also agreed to accept her as their
daughter in-law, but later, the son informed her that the
appellants had fixed his marriage with someone else – Case
of cheating against the appellants- parents and his son by
the complainant – Petition u/s.482 by the appellants seeking
quashing of the chargesheet in the criminal case qua them –
High Court dismissed the petition – Correctness:
Held: Trial against the appellants would be an abuse of the
process of the court – From the allegations in the complaint itself,
no act or conduct on the part of the appellants can be termed to
be illegal per se, much less criminal in nature – No ingredients
of any offence under the IPC appear to be forthcoming, as such,
no offence under the ambit of s.415 IPC made out against the
appellants – Submission that the appellants’ statement/conduct led
the complainant to develop intimate relations with the son cannot
be accepted, looking to the complainant’s age and educational
qualification – From a bare perusal of the complaint, it is evincible
that the main allegations are against the appellants’ son – Son

* Author
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1675

Marippan & Anr. v. State Represented
by the Inspector of Police & Anr.

had filed a petition u/s.482, which was later withdrawn – Grant
of relief to the appellants would not adversely impact the case
against the appellants’ son – Thus, the impugned judgment is
set aside – Proceedings insofar as they relate to the appellants
quashed. [Paras 9, 10, 12]
Judicial deprecation – High Court making observation against
third party who is not before it – In a petition u/s.482 CrPC for
quashing the chargesheet in a criminal case, the High Court
made unnecessary observation that if this petition is allowed,
the petitioners’ son will spoil women of marriageable age in
the same manner, is disapproved – High Court, should have
been cognisant that the petitoners’ son was not party before
it – Observation was made without any notice/opportunity to
the petitioners’ son and without the benefit of having his say/
version before it – Said observation/extract in the impugned
judgment deleted from the High Court’s records. [Paras 15-17]

Case Law Cited
Vishnu Kumar Shukla v State of Uttar Pradesh [2023] 13 SCR
1071 : (2023) 15 SCC 502; Anu Kumar v State (UT Administration),
2021 SCC OnLine SC 3454 – referred to.

List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.

List of Keywords
Petition u/s.482 CrPC; Quashing of the chargesheet in the criminal
case; Abuse of the process of the court; Intimate relations; Adverse
impact; High Court making observation against third party; Notice/
opportunity; Deletion of extract from the High Court’s records.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
367 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.11.2022 of the Madurai
Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in CRLOP (MD)
No. 15448 of 2022
1676 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Appearances for Parties
Avinash Wadhwani, G. Balaji, Neeleshwar Pavani, Advs. for the
Appellants.
Amit Anand Tiwari, Sr. A.A.G., Sabarish Subramanian, Devyani
Gupta, Ms. Arjoo Rawat, Vishnu Unnikrishnan, Danish Saifi,
A. Renganath, R. Ayyam Perumal, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Order

Ahsanuddin Amanullah & K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.

Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. Leave granted.

BACKGROUND:
3. The appellants have moved this Court against the Judgment1 passed
by a learned Single Judge of the High Court2, whereby their prayer
for quashing the Chargesheet in the criminal case3 qua them has
been rejected, by dismissal of their petition under Section 4824 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19735.
4. As per the prosecution story, the complainant alleges that she was in
a relationship with the son of the appellants and established physical
relations with the son, only on the assurance that he would marry
her. On one occasion, the son of the appellants had taken her to
meet them where they also agreed to accept her as their daughter
in-law. But later, the son informed her that the appellants had fixed
his marriage with someone else.

1 Final Judgment and Order dated 25.11.2022 in Criminal Original Petition (MD) No.15448/2022.
2 The High Court of Judicature at Madras, Bench at Madurai.
3 P.R.C. No.16/2022 before the Additional Mahila Court, Theni, arising from Crime No.13/2022, All Women
Police Station, Theni.
4 ‘482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect
the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any
order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice.’
5 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Code’.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1677

Marippan & Anr. v. State Represented
by the Inspector of Police & Anr.

SUBMISSIONS:
5. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that nowhere in the
entire complaint there is any allegation that the parents had instigated
or had misrepresented to the complainant that they would get her
married to their son6 and that was the basis for the complainant to
have developed physical relation(s) with the appellants’ son. Further,
there is also no allegation that the appellants forced the son to
marry another girl and that they had any knowledge of the intimate
relationship of their son with the complainant.
6. Learned counsel for the complainant, per contra, submitted that the
role of the appellants is crucial since they were the parents and only
upon their assurance, the complainant had agreed to a physical
relationship. It was stated that, suddenly, she was left in the lurch.
It was contended that the son of the appellants had duped her and
married another girl.
7. Learned senior counsel appearing for the State, in fairness, submitted
that on the facts of the present case and the pleadings, it appears
that the appellants cannot be held liable, much less, held criminally
liable under Sections 4177 and 1098 of the Indian Penal Code, 18609.

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
8. We may gainfully extract Section 415 of the IPC before traversing
further:

6 Accused No.1 in the Chargesheet.
7 ‘417. Punishment for cheating.—Whoever cheats shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.’
8 ‘109. Punishment of abetment if the act abetted is committed in consequence and where no express
provision is made for its punishment.—Whoever abets any offence shall, if the act abetted is committed
in consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is made by this Code for the punishment of
such abetment, be punished with the punishment provided for the offence.
Explanation.—An act or offence is said to be committed in consequence of abetment, when it is
committed in consequence of the instigation, or in pursuance of the conspiracy, or with the aid which
constitutes the abetment.
Illustrations
(a) A offers a bribe to B, a public servant, as a reward for showing A some favour in the exercise of B’s
official functions. B accepts the bribe. A has abetted the offence defined in S. 161.
(b) A instigates B to give false evidence. B, in consequence of the instigation, commits that offence. A is
guilty of abetting that offence, and is liable to the same punishment as B.
(c) A and B conspire to poison Z. A, in pursuance of the conspiracy, procures the poison and delivers it to
B in order that he may administer it to Z. B, in pursuance of the conspiracy, administers the poison to Z in
A’s absence and thereby causes Z’s death. Here B is guilty of murder. A is guilty of abetting that offence
by conspiracy, and is liable to the punishment for murder.’
9 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’.
1678 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

‘415. Cheating.—Whoever, by deceiving any person,
fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived
to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any
person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces
the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which
he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and
which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage
or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property,
is said to “cheat”.
Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a
deception within the meaning of this section.
Illustrations
(a) A, by falsely pretending to be in the Civil Service,
intentionally deceives Z, and thus dishonestly induces
Z to let him have on credit goods for which he does not
mean to pay. A cheats.
(b) A, by putting a counterfeit mark on an article, intentionally
deceives Z into a belief that this article was made by a
certain celebrated manufacturer, and thus dishonestly
induces Z to buy and pay for the article. A cheats.
(c) A, by exhibiting to Z a false sample of an article,
intentionally deceives Z into believing that the article
corresponds with the sample, and thereby dishonestly
induces Z to buy and pay for the article. A cheats.
(d) A, by tendering in payment for an article a bill on a house
with which A keeps no money, and by which A expects
that the bill will be dishonoured, intentionally deceives Z,
and thereby dishonestly induces Z to deliver the article,
intending not to pay for it. A cheats.
(e) A, by pledging as diamonds articles which he knows
are not diamonds, intentionally deceives Z, and thereby
dishonestly induces Z to lend money. A cheats.
(f) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means
to repay any money that Z may lend to him and thereby
dishonestly induces Z to lend him money, A not intending
to repay it. A cheats.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1679

Marippan & Anr. v. State Represented
by the Inspector of Police & Anr.

(g) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to
deliver to Z a certain quantity of indigo plant which he does
not intend to deliver, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to
advance money upon the faith of such delivery, A cheats;
but if A, at the time of obtaining the money, intends to
deliver the indigo plant, and afterwards breaks his contract
and does not deliver it, he does not cheat, but is liable
only to a civil action for breach of contract.
(h) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A has
performed A’s part of a contract made with Z, which he
has not performed, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to
pay money. A cheats.
(i) A sells and conveys an estate to B. A, knowing that in
consequence of such sale he has no right to the property,
sells or mortgages the same to Z, without disclosing the
fact of the previous sale and conveyance to B, and receives
the purchase or mortgage money from Z. A cheats.’
9. Having considered the matter, we find substance in the submissions
of the learned counsel for the appellants. From the entire reading of
the complaint itself, it is clear that the only reference by/reason of the
complainant against the appellants was that they were the parents
of the boy who was in a relationship with her, and on one occasion,
she had also met the appellants with their son. In the complaint itself,
it is stated that the son of the appellants did not want the appellants
to stay there for some time, and immediately they were sent away.
To our minds, this is also indicative of the fact that the appellants
themselves were totally ignorant of what, if anything, was happening
between their son and the complainant. Even otherwise, from what
is alleged in the complaint itself, we do not find that there is any act
or conduct on the part of the appellants which can be termed to be
illegal per se, much less criminal in nature. No ingredients of any
offence under the IPC appear to be forthcoming. As such, we are
unable to hold that any offence under the ambit of Section 415 of
the IPC is made out against the instant appellants.
10. Further, the age of the complainant, when she made the complaint,
was 29 years. The appellants’ son, at that time, was aged 32 years.
The complainant is stated to be a post-graduate, and after working in
the appellants’ textile showroom had, subsequently, set up her own
1680 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

cosmetics shop. Arguendo, the appellants’ statement/conduct led the
complainant to develop intimate relations with the son, looking to the
complainant’s age and educational qualification, we are not inclined to
accept the same. In any event, from a bare perusal of the complaint,
it is evincible that the main allegations are against the appellants’
son. As noted in the Impugned Judgment, the son had filed a petition
under Section 482 of the Code, which was later withdrawn. Grant
of relief, therefore, to the appellants would not adversely impact the
case against the appellants’ son, inasmuch as the appellants’ son
can independently be proceeded against in P.R.C. No.16/2022.
11. In Vishnu Kumar Shukla v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 15 SCC
502, the Court stated:
‘22. On a careful conspectus of the legal spectrum,
juxtaposed with our view on the facts and merits expressed
hereinbefore, we are satisfied that there is no suspicion,
much less strong or grave suspicion that the appellants
are guilty of the offence alleged. It would be unjustified
to make the appellants face a full-fledged criminal trial in
this backdrop. In an appeal dealing with the refusal of the
High Court to quash an FIR under Section 482CrPC albeit,
this Court, while setting aside the judgment [Pushpendra
Mishra v. State of M.P., 2019 SCC OnLine MP 7164]
impugned therein and quashing that FIR, took the view
that: (Priyanka Mishra case [Priyanka Mishra v. State of
M.P., (2023) 15 SCC 480] , SCC para 24)
‘24. … the Appellants are to be protected against
vexatious and unwarranted criminal prosecution,
and from unnecessarily being put through the
rigours of an eventual trial.’ [Priyanka Mishra v.
State of M.P., (2023) 15 SCC 480]
The protection against vexatious and unwanted prosecution
and from being unnecessarily dragged through a trial by
melting a criminal proceeding into oblivion, either through
quashing an FIR/complaint or by allowing an appeal
against an order rejecting discharge or by any other legally
permissible route, as the circumstances may be, in the
deserving case, is a duty cast on the High Courts. The
High Court should have intervened and discharged the
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1681

Marippan & Anr. v. State Represented
by the Inspector of Police & Anr.

appellants. But this Court will intervene, being the sentinel
on the qui vive.’
(emphasis supplied)

12. In view of the aforesaid, we find that trial against the appellants
would be an abuse of the process of the Court and the same needs
to be nipped in the bud. For the reasons afore-stated, the appeal is
allowed. The Impugned Judgment is set aside. Proceedings in P.R.C.
No.16/2022 insofar as they relate to the appellants stand quashed.
They are discharged from the liabilities of their bail bonds and sureties.
13. Our observations shall not, in any manner, prejudice the State or the
complainant in proceedings against the appellants’ son.
14. I.A.10 Nos.73962/2023 [Exemption from filing Certified Copy of the
Impugned Judgment] and 73963/2023 [Exemption from filing Official
Translation(s)] are formally allowed.

PARTING NOTE:
15. Having dealt with the matter on merits, we must deal now with a
slightly disturbing aspect. The parties before the High Court were:
(i) the appellants (original petitioners); (ii) the State, and; (iii) the
complainant. This being the position, it was plainly unnecessary for
the observation infra to be made by the High Court in the Impugned
Judgment, towards which we express our disapproval:
‘10. … If this Petition is allowed, the Petitioners’ son will
spoil women of marriageable age in the same manner…’
16. The High Court, we would have expected, should have been cognisant
that the appellants’ son was not before it. A somewhat similar situation
had arisen in Anu Kumar v State (UT Administration), 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 3454. The Court held:
‘4. The core issue before us is whether the High Court
in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code in the petition for quashing filed by the
accused named in the case can proceed to issue such
direction and make observations against a third party (the

10 Abbreviation for Interlocutory Application.
1682 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

appellant), who was not before the Court nor given any
opportunity before passing of the impugned judgment much
less without referring to any specific material forming part
of the chargesheet which could indicate his complicity in
the commission of the alleged crime.
5. In our opinion, the answer is an emphatic NO. The High
Court should not have ventured into an area which would
adversely affect a third party to the proceedings and more
so without referring to any credible material warranting
such intervention of the High Court.
6. It is a different matter if the High Court was to merely
observe that if the Trial Court after recording of the
evidence finds that some more persons were involved
in the commission of the subject crime, must proceed
against them by invoking Section 319 of the Criminal
Procedure Code. Suffice it to observe that the impugned
judgment issuing direction to proceed against the appellant
in connection with stated crime and recording disparaging
observations against him cannot be countenanced. The
same stands effaced from the record.’
(emphasis supplied)

17. The High Court has said what it did, without any notice/opportunity to
the appellants’ son and without the benefit of having his say/version
before it. In the circumstances, we propose to adopt a course of
action similar to Anu Kumar (supra). Accordingly, the extract from
Para 10 of the Impugned Judgment quoted supra shall stand deleted
from the High Court’s records. Our intervention on this score does
not water down the dicta in Para 11 of this Order.
18. A copy of this Order be despatched to the Registrar (Judicial), Madurai
Bench, Madras High Court.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain,