Supreme Court of India
NAK ENGINEERING COMPANY PVT. LTD.versusTARUN KESHRICHAND SHAH AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 8
- Decided
- 5 January 2026
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- PANKAJ MITHAL
Holding
The appellant is neither a necessary nor a proper party to the suit, and the High Court's order setting aside its impleadment is affirmed.
Summary
The suit was filed by the heirs of a property owner to recover service charges from a sub-tenant, respondent No.3, who failed to appear, leading to an ex‑parte decree. The appellant, NAK Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd., later sought to be impleaded, claiming it was the successor of respondent No.3 under the Companies Act, 1956. The trial court allowed the impleadment, but the High Court, exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, set aside that order, holding the appellant was neither a necessary nor a proper party. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the criteria for necessary and proper parties, the evidentiary requirement to prove successorship, and the effect of the appellant’s nine‑year delay in seeking impleadment. It concluded that the appellant had not established a direct legal interest in the controversy and that the suit could proceed without it. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed that the decree would not be enforced against the appellant.
Issues considered
- Whether the appellant is a necessary party to the suit for recovery of service charges.
- Whether the appellant is a proper party to be impleaded despite not being a necessary party.
- Whether the Certificate of Incorporation under the Companies Act, 1956, establishes the appellant as the successor of respondent No.3.
- Whether the High Court had jurisdiction under Article 227 to set aside the trial court's order of impleadment.
- Whether the appellant's delay of nine years in seeking impleadment bars its inclusion.
Legislation cited
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Under challenge in these appeals is the judgment and order of the High Court dated 21.02.2022 setting aside the order of the court of first instance permitting impleadment of the appellant as one of the defendants to the suit. Headnotes† Suit – charges – A suit was instituted by respondent nos.1 and 2 against respondent no.3 for the recovery of service charges – Notice was served upon sole defendant i.e., respondent no.3 but no one appeared – The Court proceeded ex-parte – Thereafter, the appellant filed an
Subjects
Dominus LitisNecessary PartyProper PartyPrivity of ContractSuccessor-in-InterestImpleadmentInordinate DelayEx-Parte
Judgment
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 504 : 2026 INSC 8
NAK Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd.
v.
Tarun Keshrichand Shah and Ors.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 46-47 of 2026)
05 January 2026
[Pankaj Mithal* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Under challenge in these appeals is the judgment and order of the
High Court dated 21.02.2022 setting aside the order of the court
of first instance permitting impleadment of the appellant as one
of the defendants to the suit.
Headnotes†
Suit – Recovery of service charges – A suit was instituted
by respondent nos.1 and 2 against respondent no.3 for the
recovery of service charges – Notice was served upon sole
defendant i.e., respondent no.3 but no one appeared – The
Court proceeded ex-parte – Thereafter, the appellant filed an
application for being impleaded as the defendant in this suit
contending that it is a successor of respondent no.3 – The
court of first instance vide order dated 05.10.2018 allowed
the motion to add the appellant as one of the defendants –
However, the impleadment of the appellant was revoked by
the High Court on the ground that it is not a proper or a
necessary party to the suit – Correctness:
Held: The appellant has relied upon the Certificate of Incorporation
dated 22.02.1988 to claim that it has succeeded the respondent
no.3 – Its incorporation or its Certificate of Incorporation in no way
conclusively proves that it has come into existence as a successor
of respondent no.3 – In such circumstances, appellant cannot be
accepted to be the successor of respondent no.3 so as to permit it
to be impleaded and to defend the suit for the recovery of service
charges – The appellant has nowhere established its independent
right to be impleaded to defend the suit except for claiming to be
the successor of respondent no.3 which, in opinion of this Court,
* Author
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 505
NAK Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v.
Tarun Keshrichand Shah and Ors.
has no legs to stand – In the case at hand, the respondent nos.1
and 2 are not claiming any relief against the appellant – There is
no iota of material to indicate that the relief, as claimed in the suit
against respondent no.3, if granted, would be implemented against
the appellant – Therefore, the appellant is not a necessary party
to the suit – The appellant cannot also be construed as a proper
party once it has failed to establish that it is a successor to the
respondent no.3 – In the absence of any evidence to prove that
respondent no.3 has ceased to exist or cannot be represented in the
suit on its own to contest it on merits – This apart, the respondent
nos.1 and 2 who have instituted the suit are dominus litis and it
is for them to choose their adversaries – If they do not array the
proper and necessary parties to the suit, they do it at their own
risk – They cannot be compelled to add a party to defend a suit –
Besides, the summons issued in the suit meant to be served upon
respondent no.3, were served in the year 2008 – The seal and
signatures on the acknowledgement on the said summons is of the
appellant – However, the appellant kept silent – The impleadment
application was filed almost after nine years of the knowledge –
Thus, the impleadment has been rightly refused to the appellant
by the High Court. [Paras 30, 31, 37, 38, 39, 42]
Case Law Cited
Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of
Greater Bombay [1992] 2 SCR 1 : (1992) 2 SCC 524; Kasturi v.
Iyyamperumal [2005] 3 SCR 864 : (2005) 6 SCC 733; Mumbai
International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre &
Hotels (P) Ltd. [2010] 7 SCR 790 : (2010) 7 SCC 417; Vidur
Impex & Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P) Ltd. [2012] 10
SCR 307 : (2012) 8 SCC 384; Kanaklata Das v. Naba Kumar Das
[2018] 1 SCR 806 : (2018) 2 SCC 352 – relied on.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Companies Act, 1956.
List of Keywords
Dominus Litis; Necessary Party; Proper Party; Privity of
Contract; Successor-in-Interest; Impleadment; Inordinate Delay;
Ex-Parte.
506 [2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 46-47 of
2026
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.02.2022 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in WP Nos. 3455 and 3456 of 2019
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Chander Uday Singh, Sr. Adv., Amarjit Singh Bedi, Ms. Surekha
Raman, Harshit Singh, Sidharth Nair, Shreyash Kumar, M/s K J
John And Co.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Abhinav Chandrachud, Surjendu Sankar Das, Ms. Annie Mittal,
Janay Jain, Ms. Yugandhara Pawar Jha, Siddharth Dharmadhikari,
Aaditya Aniruddha Pande.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Pankaj Mithal, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. We have heard Shri Chander Uday Singh, senior counsel assisted
by Shri Amarjit Singh Bedi, Advocate-on-Record for the appellant-
NAK Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd.1 and Dr. Abhinav Chandrachud,
learned counsel assisted by Shri Surjendu Sankar Das, Advocate-
on-Record for the respondent No.1- Tarun Keshrichand Shah2.
3. Respondent No.2- Priyalata Keshrichand Shah3 is reported to be
dead and her interest is represented by respondent No.1.
4. Respondent No.3- M/s Kishore Engineering Company4 has not
appeared. It had not even appeared in the Trial Court or the High
1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘appellant’
2 Hereinafter referred to as ‘respondent No.1’
3 Hereinafter referred to as ‘respondent No.2’
4 Hereinafter referred to as ‘respondent No.3’
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 507
NAK Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v.
Tarun Keshrichand Shah and Ors.
Court. It has not even filed any written statement, despite service
of notice.
5. In a Suit No.6117 of 2007 filed by respondent No.1 and respondent
No.2 against respondent No.3, a Notice of Motion No.1346 of 2018
was moved to add the appellant as the party defendant to participate
and contest the aforesaid suit. Earlier, a Notice of Motion No. 1925
of 2017 was also moved by the appellant seeking to set aside the
order to proceed in the said suit ex-parte. Both the said motions
were allowed by the court of first instance vide a common Order
dated 05.10.2018. However, the said order was set aside by the
High Court by the impugned judgment and order dated 21.02.2022
in exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
6. Under challenge in these appeals is thus the above judgment and
order of the High Court dated 21.02.2022 setting aside the order of
the court of first instance permitting impleadment of the appellant as
one of the defendants to the suit meaning thereby that the motion
of addition of the appellant as one of the defendants to the suit
stands rejected.
7. One Keshrichand Shah was the original owner of the commercial
premises admeasuring 1700 sq. feet existing on the third floor of
the Churchgate House, Mumbai. He was the sole proprietor of M/s
Union Commercial Corporation. The aforesaid Keshrichand Shah
through its proprietorship firm M/s Union Commercial Corporation
let out an area of 525 square feet of the above premises having five
cabins to one M/s Modern Products Pvt. Ltd. The said M/s Modern
Products Pvt. Ltd. licensed or sublet the same to the respondent
no.3. In addition to the rent of Rs.400/- per month payable to M/s
Modern Products Pvt. Ltd., the respondent No.3 also used to pay
service charges at the rate of Rs.2,100/- per month for the use of
furniture and fixtures therein to the owner, Keshrichand Shah. On
the death of Kesharichand Shah, the said service charges were
realized by his heirs, i.e., respondent nos.1 and 2.
8. The respondent Nos.1 and 2 instituted a Suit No.3319 of 2007 on
the original civil side of the Bombay High Court but on account of
pecuniary jurisdiction it was later transferred to the Bombay City Civil
Court and re-numbered as Suit No.6117 of 2017.
508 [2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
9. The aforesaid suit was instituted by respondent Nos.1 and 2 against
respondent No.3 for the recovery of service charges at the rate
of Rs.2,100/- per month, amounting to Rs.75,600/- for the period
November 2004 to October 2007.
10. In the aforesaid suit, notice was served upon sole defendant i.e.,
respondent no.3 but no one appeared on its behalf and filed any
written statement. Thus, after closing the evidence on 11.02.2014, the
court vide order dated 12.11.2014 proceeded ex-parte in the matter.
11. It was much thereafter on 02.04.2018 that the appellant filed
an application for being impleaded as the defendant in this suit
contending that it is a successor of respondent No.3 under Part IX
of the Companies Act, 1956. The appellant is actually running the
business of respondent No.3. Therefore, it is a necessary party to
the suit.
12. The appellant contended that it had acquired knowledge of the suit
only on 02.10.2012 and that it has proceeded ex-parte against the
respondent No.3. There was no proper service of the notice upon
the respondent No.3 or upon the appellant. It was contended that the
appellant has drawn separate proceedings for getting the ex-parte
order set aside. The appellant had no knowledge of the transfer of
the suit from the Bombay High Court to the City Civil Court as no
notice in this regard was received or served upon it.
13. It may be not out of context to mention here that the respondent
Nos.1 and 2 apart from instituting the above suit had also filed a
suit for the eviction of the respondent No.3 and the appellant and its
Directors from the premises in dispute in the Small Causes Court.
This apart, a criminal complaint was also lodged against the appellant
and its Director–Himanshu Patwa on account of dishonour of two
cheques of Rs.2,100/- and Rs.400/- issued by them in respect of
the monthly service charges and the rent respectively in connection
with the demised premises.
14. It is in the above background that the court of first instance vide
order dated 05.10.2018 allowed the motion to add the appellant as
one of the defendants to the suit observing that there is no dispute
to the fact that the appellant is in occupation of the suit premises.
The suit premises was initially let out to the respondent No.3 and
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 509
NAK Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v.
Tarun Keshrichand Shah and Ors.
is now in possession of appellant, who claims to be the successor
company that has taken over the business of respondent No.3.
The certificate of incorporation relied upon by the appellant along
with the Memorandum of Association prima facie reveals that the
appellant has taken over and acquired the business interest of the
respondent No.3. The court accepted the said certificate issued by
the Registrar of the companies opining that it lacked jurisdiction to
rule on the validity of the said certificate.
15. The aforesaid order of the court of first instance on being taken up
before the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution has been
reversed and the impleadment of the appellant has been revoked
on the ground that it is not a proper or a necessary party to the suit.
The suit will not fail for want of its presence.
16. The High Court proceeded to pass the impugned order on the
premise that no relationship of tenant and landlord existed between
the parties and that the appellant is the unauthorized occupant that
need not be joined as a defendant to the suit.
17. The High Court further held that the issue of recovery of arrears of
service charges can be decided even in the absence of the appellant
as the respondent No.3 had no legal sanctity of law to authorize the
use of furniture and fixtures to a third party.
18. It is alleged that the High Court completely ignored the fact that the
appellant is the successor company of the tenant– respondent No.3
whose complete business has been taken over by it. The appellant has
stepped into the shoes of respondent No.3 and was in possession of
the premises in that capacity and was not an unauthorized occupant.
19. It is in this background that we have been called upon to consider
to decide whether the appellant is a necessary and proper party to
be impleaded in the suit No.6117 of 2007 for the recovery of service
charges in respect of the premises in dispute which was admittedly
sublet to the respondent No.3 to whose business the appellant
happens to be a successor.
20. The first and the foremost argument of Shri Chander Uday Singh,
senior counsel appearing for the appellant is that the High Court
exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution in
setting aside the judgment and order of the court of first instance
510 [2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
as if it is sitting in appeal. The order of the Trial Court allowing the
impleadment was an interlocutory order which required no interference
by the High Court in exercise of its supervisory power. The High Court
incorrectly concluded that the appellant is not a necessary party
to the suit, completely ignoring the fact that the respondent Nos.1
and 2 themselves had arrayed it as one of the defendants in a suit
for eviction from the premises filed before the Small Causes Court.
The High Court also erred in not appreciating that the appellant is
a successor to respondent No.3 under the Companies Act and that
the validity of the certificate of registration issued by the Registrar of
Companies in favour of the appellant could not have been adjudicated
while exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution.
21. It is further contended that the appellant has been paying service
charges through cheque since 1991 and the respondent nos.1 and 2
were aware of it. Rather, the service charges from 2004 were received
by the respondent Nos.1 and 2, implying an admission on their part that
the appellant is the person liable to pay the same. Even the furniture
and telephone lines in the premises, which existed, have been used
by the appellant since 1991 with the knowledge of the respondent
No.1. Therefore, the High Court was not right in holding that since
there is no relationship of tenant and landlord between the parties,
the appellant is not a necessary party. The relationship of tenant and
landlord in the matter was not relevant and material, as it was not a
suit for eviction rather a suit for recovery of service charges.
22. He further argued that, in fact, any decree that may be passed in
the suit in question against the respondent No.3 that is practically
defunct, would lead to execution of the decree against the appellant
and as such the appellant is a necessary and proper party to the suit.
23. Dr. Abhinav Chandrachud, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent No.1 in defense submits that the appellant has not come
up before the court with clean hands rather with an ulterior motive
to legitimize its illegal occupation over the premises in dispute. The
summons in the suit were served upon the respondent No.3 way
back in the year 2008. The acknowledgement bears the signature
and the stamp of the appellant which clearly proves that the appellant
was aware of the institution of the suit but even then, remained silent
for over nine years before seeking impleadment. The appellant is
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 511
NAK Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v.
Tarun Keshrichand Shah and Ors.
an unauthorized occupant of the premises in dispute and therefore,
in the suit for eviction, was made one of the defendants so that the
eviction decree if any may be effectively executed. However, this
does not mean that it is also a necessary and proper party to the
present suit for the recovery of arrears of service charges.
24. Further, the certificate of incorporation of the appellant is not a proof
of successorship to the respondent No.3 and that the certificate
annexed with the appeal is a new and different document which was
not part of the record before the courts below. The respondent No.3
still continues to be a registered company and is still in existence
and therefore, the appellant cannot be accepted to be its successor
more particularly when it is only a firm and not even a company.
25. Lastly, it has been submitted that the respondent Nos.1 and 2 who
instituted the suit are dominus litis in the matter and cannot be
compelled to add a defendant against their wishes if they do not
desire to seek any relief against such a person.
26. Undisputedly, the suit in question has been filed by the owners of the
property to recover service charges for the use of furniture and fixtures
from the respondent No.3 that was inducted as a sub-tenant in the
premises in dispute by M/s Modern Products Pvt. Ltd. The dispute
is not regarding recovery of rent or arrears of rent. Therefore, the
relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is completely
alien to the controversy in question.
27. The dispute is essentially with regard to payment of service charges
between the owners of the property and its user i.e. respondent No.3.
Therefore, no other person has any right to be impleaded so as to
defend the suit regarding payment of service charges.
28. The appellant claims to be the successor of respondent No.3 and as
such, wants to defend the suit on its behalf or as its representative.
29. The respondent No.3, though stated to be a private limited company,
is only a partnership firm having only four members. There is no
authentic proof on record that the above partnership firm was ever
converted into a company. The conversion of a partnership firm into a
company as under Part IX of Companies Act, 1956 requires fulfilment
of strict conditions such as having at least seven partners/members
and execution of certain deeds. The respondent No.3 was having
512 [2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
only four partners and as such was ineligible for conversion under the
relevant law. Further, there is nothing on record to indicate that the
aforesaid firm respondent No.3 has ceased to exist or has become
extinct. The extract of respondent No.3 firm dated 20.09.2016 from
the office of the Registrar of Firms reveals that respondent No.3
continues to exist as a partnership firm even though appellant may
have been incorporated as a new company.
30. The appellant has relied upon the Certificate of Incorporation dated
22.02.1988 to claim that it has succeeded the respondent No.3. No
doubt, a company comes into existence as a body corporate from the
date of its incorporation having perpetual succession and a common
seal. However, its incorporation or its Certificate of Incorporation
in no way conclusively proves that it has come into existence as
a successor of respondent No.3. In such circumstances, appellant
cannot be accepted to be the successor of respondent No.3 so as
to permit it to be impleaded and to defend the suit for the recovery
of service charges.
31. The appellant has nowhere established its independent right to be
impleaded to defend the suit except for claiming to be the successor
of respondent No.3 which, in our opinion, has no legs to stand.
32. The above discussion takes us to another aspect of the matter as to
whether the appellant is a necessary or a proper party to be impleaded.
The governing principles and law in this regard are well-settled.
33. The fundamental distinction between a “necessary party” and a
“proper party” was succinctly explained in Ramesh Hirachand
Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay5, wherein
this Court held:
“6… A necessary party is one without whom no order can
be made effectively. A proper party is one in whose absence
an effective order can be made but whose presence is
necessary for a complete and final decision on the question
involved in the proceeding.”
5 (1992) 2 SCC 524
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 513
NAK Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v.
Tarun Keshrichand Shah and Ors.
34. In Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal 6, this Court crystallized the twin tests
for a necessary party:
“…the question of jurisdiction of the court to invoke Order 1
Rule 10 CPC to add a party who is not made a party in the
suit by the plaintiff shall not arise unless a party proposed
to be added has direct and legal interest in the controversy
involved in the suit. … two tests are to be satisfied for
determining the question as to who is a necessary party.
The tests are: (1) there must be a right to some relief
against such party in respect of the controversies involved
in the proceedings; (2) no effective decree can be passed
in the absence of such party.”
35. This principle has been consistently reiterated. In Mumbai
International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre &
Hotels (P) Ltd.7, this Court reiterated:
“15. A “necessary party” is a person who ought to have been
joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree
could be passed at all by the court. If a “necessary party”
is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed.
A “proper party” is a party who, though not a necessary
party, is a person whose presence would enable the court
to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon
all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a
person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be
made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary
party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against
the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely
to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit
is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person
a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific
performance.”
36. Thereafter, in Vidur Impex & Traders (P) Ltd. v. Tosh Apartments (P)
Ltd.8, the broad principles governing impleadment were summarized:
6 (2005) 6 SCC 733
7 (2010) 7 SCC 417
8 (2012) 8 SCC 384
514 [2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“41.2. A necessary party is the person who ought to be
joined as party to the suit and in whose absence an effective
decree cannot be passed by the court.
41.3. A proper party is a person whose presence would
enable the court to completely, effectively and properly
adjudicate upon all matters and issues, though he may
not be a person in favour of or against whom a decree
is to be made.
41.4. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary
party, the court does not have the jurisdiction to order his
impleadment against the wishes of the plaintiff.”
37. In the case at hand, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 are not claiming any
relief against the appellant. There is no iota of material to indicate
that the relief, as claimed in the suit against respondent No.3, if
granted, would be implemented against the appellant. Therefore,
the appellant is not a necessary party to the suit.
38. The appellant cannot also be construed as a proper party once it
has failed to establish that it is a successor to the respondent No.3.
In the absence of any evidence to prove that respondent No.3 has
ceased to exist or cannot be represented in the suit on its own to
contest it on merits, we are of the opinion that the appellant is not
even a proper party to provide any assistance to the court in the suit.
39. This apart, the respondent Nos.1 and 2 who have instituted the suit
are dominus litis and it is for them to choose their adversaries. If they
do not array the proper and necessary parties to the suit, they do it
at their own risk. However, they cannot be compelled to add a party
to defend a suit against their wishes. The decree, if any, passed in
the suit would be binding only between the parties to the suit and
would not infringe upon any right of a third party, much less of the
appellant that is not a party to the suit.
40. This conclusion is reinforced by the fundamental principle laid down
in Kanaklata Das v. Naba Kumar Das9, wherein this Court has
observed:
9 (2018) 2 SCC 352
[2026] 1 S.C.R. 515
NAK Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. v.
Tarun Keshrichand Shah and Ors.
“11.4. …the plaintiff being a dominus litis cannot be
compelled to make any third person a party to the suit, be
that a plaintiff or the defendant, against his wish unless
such person is able to prove that he is a necessary party to
the suit and without his presence, the suit cannot proceed
and nor can be decided effectively. In other words, no
person can compel the plaintiff to allow such person to
become the co-plaintiff or defendant in the suit. It is more
so when such person is unable to show as to how he is a
necessary or proper party to the suit and how without his
presence, the suit can neither proceed and nor it can be
decided or how his presence is necessary for the effective
decision of the suit.
11.5. … a necessary party is one without whom, no order
can be made effectively, a proper party is one in whose
absence an effective order can be made but whose
presence is necessary for a complete and final decision
on the question involved in the proceeding.”
41. In the above facts and circumstances, if the High Court, for one
reason or the other, has set aside the order of impleadment passed
by the court of first instance, we do not consider it to be illegal so
as to set it aside and restore the order of the Trial Court.
42. There is one another reason for not interfering with the impugned
judgment and order of the High Court. The summons issued in the
suit meant to be served upon respondent No.3, were served in
the year 2008. The seal and signatures on the acknowledgement
on the said summons is of the appellant which clearly indicates
that the appellant had acquired knowledge of the suit in the year
2008. However, the appellant kept silent and moved the motion for
impleadment only after the evidence was closed in the year 2014
and the court had directed to proceed ex-parte in the matter. The
impleadment application was filed almost after nine years of the
knowledge of the pendency of the suit. Thus, the impleadment has
been rightly refused to the appellant by the High Court.
43. We are conscious of the fact that the jurisdiction of the High Court
under Article 227 is simply supervisory in nature and that the High
516 [2026] 1 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Court ought not to have intervened in the matter. However, once
the order has been interfered with, and rightly so, we do not wish
to commit another illegality by restoring an incorrect order passed
by the court of first instance.
44. In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the
appeals lack merit and are dismissed but with the direction that the
decree passed in the suit would not be used against the appellant
and would not be implemented against it.
45. The appeals are dismissed with no order as to cost.
46. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
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