Holding

A dying declaration recorded by a competent officer is admissible without a medical fitness certificate, and the appellant’s continuous harassment and threats constitute abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC, justifying the conviction.

Summary

The appellant, previously acquitted of kidnapping and rape offences, repeatedly threatened and teased the victim, a teenage girl, leading her to set herself ablaze and die. The victim’s dying declaration, recorded by a Head Constable in the presence of a doctor, implicated the appellant as the sole cause of her death. The trial court dismissed the declaration, citing the absence of a medical fitness certificate and the victim’s severe burns, and acquitted the appellant. The High Court reappraised the evidence, accepted the dying declaration and corroborative testimony, and convicted the appellant under Section 306 IPC, sentencing him to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment. The Supreme Court held that a dying declaration is admissible without a medical fitness certificate if the declarant was fit, and that the appellant’s continuous harassment amounted to abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC, thereby upholding the conviction.

Issues considered

The admissibility of a dying declaration without a medical fitness certificate.
Whether the dying declaration can form the sole basis for conviction under Section 306 IPC.
Whether the appellant's conduct constitutes abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC, interpreting Sections 107 and 306 of the IPC.
Whether the High Court can overturn an acquittal on reappraisal of evidence in a criminal appeal.
The impact of the lack of a written complaint to the Gram Panchayat on the credibility of the parents' testimony.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 15, s. Article 21
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 32
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 107, s. 306, s. 363, s. 366, s. 376

Subjects

abetment of suicidedying declarationSection 306 IPCeve‑teasingpsychological harassmentevidentiary admissibilityappellate reviewmental fitnesswomen's constitutional rights

Judgment

[2017] 3 S.C.R. 458

A PAWAN KUMAR
v.
STATE OF H.P.
(Criminal Appeal No, 775of2017)
B APRIL 28, 2017
[DIPAK MISRA, A.M. KHANWILKAR AND
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, JJ.I
Penal Code, 1860:
C s. 306 - Abetment of suicide - Conviction and sentence under
- Correctness of - On facts, accused after acquittal in a cc.se u/ss.
363, 366 aand 376 IPC, used to threaten the informant's daughter
that he would kidnap her and had be_en constantly teasing her -
Girl committed suicide by setting herself ablaze - Recording of
victim's dying declaration by Head Constable and thereafte1; victim
D succumbed to her i1y'uries - Acquittal by the trial court, however,
the High Court convicted the accused uls. 306 and sentenced
accordingly - Held: Certificate of jltness is not the requirement of
law, thus, in absence of the same, there was no reason to disregard
the dying declaration - Head Constable recorded dying declaration
E as narrated by the deceased and the deceased wrote that accused
alone was responsible for her death - Same was recorded in
presence of the doctor who had appended his signature - Trial
court was swayed away by the burn injuries, whereas there cannot
be ar. absolute rule that a person who suffered 80% burn injuries
cannot give a dying declaration - Further, the dying declaration
F was corroborated by other witnesses - Testimony of the parents in
entirety, was unimpeachable and deserve credence - Accused had
by his active acts and by his continuous course of conduct created
such a situation which compelled the girl to commit suicide - No
material found that the victim was hypersensitive - Accused played
G active role in tarnishing the self-esteem and self-respect of the victim
which drove her to commit suicide - Thus, the High Court was correct
in reversing the acquittal and sentencing accordingly~- Evidence -
Dying declaration.
s. 306 - Abetment of suicide - When attracted - Explained.
H
458
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF H.P. 459

Evidence - Dying Declaration - Certificate of fitness of A
declarant by doctor - Requirement of - Held: Certificate of fitness
by the doctor is not the requirement of law.
Eve Teasing - Practice of eve teasing of women deprecated
by the Court - Eve teasing causes harassment to women - It ajfects
right of women under Art. 14, 15 and 2 l' - Constitution of India - B
· Arts. 14, 15 and 21.
Words and phrases:
Word 'abetment' - Meaning of. in the context of ss. 306, 107
Penal Code, 1860.
Word 'instigate' and 'urge forward' - Meaning of c
Dismissing the app,eal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 On a careful scrutiny of the original record-dying
declaration Ex.PW-10/A, it is found that the Head Constable had
written what the deceased had spoken and thereafter the D
deceased had written that the accused alone was responsible for
her death. The dying declaration, as has been recorded ,by the
Head Constable, eloquently states about the constant teasing of
the victim by the accused. The same has been recorded in
presence of the doctor, PW-10, who had appended his signature.
PW-10 has stood firm in his testimony that the victim was in a fit E
condition to speak. Despite the roving cross-examination he has
not paved the path of tergiversation. The trial court disregarded
, the testimony of PW-10 on the ground that there is no certificate
of fitness. There is no reason to disregard the dying declaration.
A certificate of fitness is not the requirement of law. The trial F
court was swayed away by the burn injuries. There cannot be an
absolute rule that a person who has suffered 80% burn injuries
cannot give a dying declaration. Her dying declaration received
support from the other witnesses. In view of the corroborative
evidence, the High Court correctly relied upon this aspect an<l
reversed the finding of the trial court. [Paras 24, 27, 281(474-E- G
F; 477-A-B, H; 478-A]
Gulzari Lal v. State of Haryana (2016) 4 SCC 583;
Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710;
Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi (2010) 9 SCR
993: (2010) 9 SCC 1 - relied on. H
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A 1.2 As far as reliability of evidence of PW-1 and PW-9, the
parents of the victim are concerned, the reasons for not treating
their version as reliable is based on the fact that they had not
reported the incident in writing to the Gram Panchayat. On a
perusal of the evidence in entirety, it is found that the High Court
appropriately dislodged the analysis made by the trial court. The
B
evidence has to be appreciated regard being had to various
circumstances. It is to be noted that the accused had been
acquitted in the earlier offence and he had become a constant
nuisance for the victim. In such a situation, the poor parents had
no other option but to make a complaint to the Gram Panchayat.
C To hold that their evidence is reproachable as the complaint was
not given in writing manifestation of perverse approach. On a
perusal of the evidence in entirety, it is found that the testimonies
of the parents are absolutely unimpeachable and deserve
credence. [Para 29][478-B-DI
D 1.3 The word 'abetment' has not been explained in Section
306 IPC. In this context, the definition of abetment as provided
under Section 107 is pertinent. Section 306 seeks to punish those
who abet the commission of suicide of other. Whether the person
has abetted the commission of suicide of another or not is to be
gathered from facts and circumstances of each case and to be
E found out by continuous conduct of the accused, involvin·g his
mental element. Such a requirement can be perceived from the
reading of Section 107 IPC. "Abetment", thus, means certain
amount of active suggestion or support to do the act. The word
"instigate" literally means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite
F or encourage to do an act. A person is said to instigate another
person when he actively suggests or stimulates him to an act by
any means or language, direct or indirect, whether it takes the
form of express solicitation or of hints, insinuation or
encouragement. Instigation may be in (express) words or may
be by (implied) conduct. The word "urge forwards" mzans to
G advise or try hard to persuade somebody to do something, to
make a person to move more quickly in the particular direction,
specially by pushing or forcing such person. Therefore, a person
instigating another has to "goad" or "urge forward" the latter
with the intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of
H
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF H.P. 461

an act with a latter. In order to prove abetment, it must be shown A
that the accused kept on urging or annoying the deceased by
words, taunts until the deceased reacted. A casual remark or
something said in routine or usual conversation should not be
construed or misunderstood as "abetment". [Paras 32, 35)(478-
G-H; 480-D-E, F-G; 479-FI
B
Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Government of NCT
of Delhi) [2009) 13 SCR 230 : (2009) 16 sec 605;
Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh [20011 4 Suppl.
SCR 247 : (2001) 9 SCC 618; Randhir Singh and
another v. State of Punjab [2004) 5 Suppl. SCR 351 :
(2004) 13 SCC 129; Praveen Pradhan v. State of c
Uttaranchal & another [20121 8 SCR 1129 : (2012) 9
SCC 734; Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu v. State of West
Bengal [2009) 15 SCR 836 : (2010) 1 SCC 707;
Kishori Lal v. State of M.P. [2007] 7 SCR 1051 : (2007)
10 SCC 797; Kishangiri Mangalgiri Goswami v. State D
of Gujarat [200911 SCR 672 : (2009) 4 SCC 52; Netai
Dutta v. State of W.B. (2005) 2 SCC 659 - referred to.
1.4 Mere allegation of harassment without any positive
action in proximity to the time of occurrence on the part of the
accused that led a person to commit suicide, a conviction in terms E
of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable. A casual remark that is
likely to cause harassment in ordinary course of things will not
come w!thin the purview of instigation. A mere reprimand or a
word in a fit of anger will not earn the status of abetment. There
has to be positive action that creates a situation for the victim to
put an end to life. [Para 411[484-C-DI F
'
1.5 In the instant case, the accused had by his acts and by
his continuous course of conduct created such a situation as a
consequence of which the deceased was left with no other option
except to commit suicide. The active acts of the accused led the
deceased to put an end to her life. That apart, no material is found G
on record which compels the court to conclude that the victim
committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance,
discord and difference in domestic life quite common to the
society to which the victim belonged. On the other hand, Jhe
accused played active role in tarnishing the self-esteem and self- H
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

_A respect of the victim which drove the victim girl to commit
suicide. The cruelty meted out to her in fact, induced her to
extinguish her life-spark. [Para 42] [484-E-F]
1.6 The High Court did not reverse the judgment of
acquittal solely on the basis of dying declaration. It placed reliance
B on the evidence of the parents and also other witnesses. It also
treated the version of the Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat as
credible. All these witnesses deposed that the accused after his
acquittal engaged himself in threatening and teasing the girl. He
did not allow her to live in peace. [Para 43]f 484-G]
c 1.7 The harassment caused to her had become intolerable
and unbearable. The father had deposed that the girl had told
him on number of occasions and he had complained to the Pradhan.
All these amount to active part played by the accused. It is not a
situation where someone feels humiliated on a singular act. It is
a different situation altogether. The young girl living in a village
D was threatened and teased constantly. She could not bear it any
longer. There is evidence that the parents belong to tht poor
strata of the society. As the materials on record would r,~flect,
the father could not afford her treatment when case of his daughter
was referred to other hospital. It is evident from the materials on
E recor-0 that the conduct of the accused was absolutely proactive.
[Para 44][484-H; 485-A-CI
1.8 The instant case eminently projects a case of
psychological harassment. This Court is at pains to state that in a
civilized sociefy eve-teasing is causing harassment to women in
F educational instit1,1tions, public places, parks, railways stations
and other public places which only go t1t show that requisite sense
of respect for women has not been socially cultivated. A woman
has her own space as a man has. She enjoys as much equality
under Article 14 o( the Constitution as a man does. The right to
live with dignity as guaranteed under Article 21 cannot be violated
G by indulging in obnoxi.ous act of eve-teasing. It affects the
fundamental concept of ·g~nder sensitivity and justice and the
rights of a woman under Article 14. That apart it creates an
incurable dent in the right of a woman which she has under Article
15. One is compelled to think and constrained to deliberate why
H the women in this country cannot be allowed to live in peace and
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF H.P. 463

lead a life that is empowered with a dignity and freedom. It has to A
be kept in mind that she has a right to life and entitled to love
according to her choice. She has the absolute right to reject. She .
has an individual choice which has been legally recognized. It
has to be socially respected. [Para 45)(485-E-H; 486-A]
1.9 In a civilized society male chauvinism has no room. The B
Constitution of India confers the affirmative rights on women and
the said rights are perceptible from Article 15 of the Constitution.
When the right is conferred under the Constitution, it has to be
understood that there is no condescendation. A man should not
put his ego or, for that matter, masculinity on a pedestal and
abandon the concept of civility. Egoism must succumb to law. C
Equality has to be regarded as the s11mm11m bon11m of the
constitu~ional principle in this context. The instant case portrays
the deplorable depravity of the accused that led to a heart breaking
situation for a young girl who has been compelled to put an end
to her life. Therefore, the High Court was correct in reversing D
the judgment of acquittal and imposed the sentence. It appositely
exercised the jurisdiction and the same is concurred with. [Para
46)(486-B-CI
Deputy Inspector General of Police and another v. S.
Samuthiram [2012) 11 SCR 174 : (2013) 1 SCC 598; E
Jadunath Singh and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh
(1971) 3 SCC 577; Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State
of Maharashtra [19741 1 SCR 489 : (1973) 2 SCC
793; State of Karnataka v. K. Gopalakrishna (2005) 9
SCC 291; Girja Prasad (dead) by LRs. v. State of MP.
[2007) 9 SCR 483 : (2007) 7 SCC 625; State of Uttar F
Pradesh v. Ajai Kumar [20081 2 SCR 552 : (2008) 3
SCC 351; State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal [2004] 1
Suppl. SCR 480 : (2004) 5 SCC 573; Chandrappa and
others v. State of Kamataka [20071 2 SCR 630 : (2007)
4 SCC 415; Vijay Pal v. State (Government of NCT of G
Delhi) [2015] 3 SCR 394 : (2015) 4 SCC 749 - referred
to.
Case Law Reference
(1971) 3 sec 577 referred to Para 9
[1974] 1 SCR 489 referred to Para 10 H
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A (2005) 9 sec 291 referred to Para 11
(2007) 9 SCR 483 referred to Para 12
(2008) 2 SCR 552 referred to Para 13 ·
(2004) l Suppl. SCR 480 referred to Para 13
·s [2007) 2 SCR 630 referred to Para 14
(2016) 4 sec 583 relied on Para 21
c2002) 6 sec 110 relied on Para 24
(20l0] 9 SCR 993 relied on Para 25
c. (2015) 3 SCR 394 referred to Para 27
'
[2009) 13 SCR 230 referred to Para 33
[2001) 4 Suppl. SCR 247 referred to Para 33
[ 20041 5 Suppl. SCR 351 referred to Para 36
D
[2012) 8 SCR 1129 referred to Para 37
[ 20091 15 SCR 836 referred to Para 38
[2007) 7 SCR 1051 referred to Para 38
[2009) 1 SCR 672 referred to Para 38
E
(2005) 2 sec 659 referred to Para 39
[2012) 11 SCR 174 referred to Para 45
CRlMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
775of2017.
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.06.2016 and 07.07.2016
of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla in Criminal Appeal No.
568of2010.
Sanchar Anand, Apoorv Singhal, Anant K. Vatsya, N;mingh N.
Rai, Dr. Sushi! Balwada, Advs. for the Appellant.
G
D. K. Thakur, AAG,. Varinder Kumar Sh~rma, Adv. for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

H
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF H.P. 465

DIPAK MISRA, J. I. The present appeal, by special leave, A
·depicts the sorrowful story of a young girl, in the middle of her teens,
falling in love with the accused-appellant and driven by the highest degree
of youthful fixation, elopes with him, definitely in complete trnst, and
after the accused is booked for the offences punishable under Sections
363, 366 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code (lPC), she stands behind him B
like a colossus determined to support which consequently leads to his
acquittal. In all possibility, she might have realized that the accused
should not be punished, for she was also equally at fault. Be that as it
may, as per the prosecution version, he was extended the benefit of
acquittal.
2. The sad story gets into a new and different beginning. The C
accused feels that he has been prosecuted due to the prosecutrix and
, gets obsessed with idea of threatening the girl and that continues and
eventually eve-teasing becomes a matter of routine. Here, as the
exposition of the prosecution uncurtains, a situation is created by the
accused which becomes insufferable, where the young girl feels D
unassured and realizes that she could no more live in peace. The feeling
gets embedded and the helpless situation compels her to think that the
life is not worth living. Resultantly, she pours kerosene on her body and
puts herself ablaze but death does not visit instantly and that is.how she
was taken to a nearby hospital, where in due course of investigation, her
dying declaration is recorded, but she ultimately succumbs to her injuries E
· and the "prana" leaves the body and she becomes a "body" - a dead
one.
3. The question that is required to be answered is whether the
accused can be convicted under Section 306 IPC. The case of the
prosecution as projected is that deceased was the daughter of the F
informant, PW-1, Sukh Dev, and after acquittal in the case under Sections
363, 366 and 376 IPC, the accused-appellant used to threaten the girl
that he would kidnap her, and had been constantly teasing her. It is the
case of the prosecution that on 18.07.2008 at 9.00 p.m., appellant came
to the house of infomiant and threatened him that he would forcibly take G
her. As the narration further unfolds on 19.07.2008 about 10.00 a.m.
when the informant alongwith his wife was working outside in the field,
the deceased poured kerosene oil on her and set herself ablaze which
was extinguished by the father, and immediately Pradhan of Gram
Panchayat was informed. The injured girl was taken to the private hospital
at Daulatpur where she was referred to Chandigarh for further medical H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A treatment but the informant could not take her to Chandigarh due to
paucity of money and in the evening Pradhan of the village visited the
house of the informant and the deceased gave one written document to
the Pradhan stating that the accused-appellant was responsible for her
conditionwhereafter police was informed and statement of the informant
B was recorded and the victim was medically examined. On 24.07.2008,
the dying declaration of the girl was recorded by the Head Constable in
the presence of Medical Officer and after the victim expired the post-
mortem was conducted and an FIR was registered. After the criminal
law was set in motion, the investigating agency after completing the
invesrigation laid the charge sheet before the competent court which, in
C turn, committed the case to the Court of Session.
4. The accused abjured his guilt and pleaded false implication.
The prosecution in order to establish the charge examined 14 witnesses.
The defence chose not to examine any witness. The learned Sessions
Judge, after hearing the arguments, posed the following question:
D "Whether the prosecution has successfully proved the liability of
accused under Section 306 of IPC beyond the scope of all
reasonable doubts?";
and answered the question in the negative and consequently
acquitted the accused-appellant vide judgment and order dated J6tl1 July,
E 2010.
5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the State preferred
the appeal before the High Court. The Division Bench of the High
Court, after reappreciating the evidence, reversed the judgment of
acquittal rendered by the trial court and convicted the accused-appellant
F under Section 306 IPC and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment
for seven years and to pay fine of Rs. 10,000/-and in default of payment
of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one
year.
6. We have heard Mr. Sanchar Anand, learned counsel for the
G appellant and Mr. D.K. Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General
for the respondent-State.
7. It is submitted by Mr. Anand, learned counsel for the appellant
that the judgment rendered by the learned trial Judge is absolutely flawless
since he has analysed the evidence in great detail and appreciated them
H
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF H.P. 467
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]

in correct perspective. It is his further submission that the trial court A
scrutinizing the medical evidence and the bum injuries sustained by the
victim has appositely discarded the dying declaration, Ex.PW-10/A. It
is further put forth that when cogent reasons have been ascribed by the
trial court for not placing reliance upon the dying declaration and the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the High Court, in such a fact B
situation, should have been well advised not to interfere with the judgment
of acquittal. It is also canvassed by him that when the appreciation of
evidence by the trial court is not perverse and the view expressed by it
is aplausible one, the High Court should not have interfered witl1 the
judgment of acquittal.
8. Mr. D.K. Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General C
appearing for the respondent-State, in support of the impugned judgment,
would contend that the High Court has reappreciated the evidence and
on such reappraisal has found the conclusion pertaining to medical
condition of the victim is wholly incorrect and accordingly opined that
the acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge is unsupportable and, D
therefore, this Court should give the stamp of approval to the same.
9. First we shall deal with the nature ofjurisdiction the High Court
exercises when it reverses a judgment of acquittal to that of conviction
in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. It is put forth by the learned Additional
Advocate General that the prosecution has been able to establish the
E
active role played by the accused by adducing cogent evidence and
hence, the reversal of the judgment of acquittal by the High Court is
absolutely flawless. In Jadunath Singh and others v. State of Uttar
Pradesh 1, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has opined:-
•
"22. This Court has consistently taken the view that in an appeal
against acquittal the High Court has full power to review at large F
all the evidence and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence
the order of acquittal should be reversed. This power of the
appellate court in an appeal against acquittal was formulated by
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Shea Swarup v.
King Emperor and Nur Mohammad v. Emperor3. These two G
decisions have been consistently referred to in the judgments of
this Court as laying down the true scope of the power of an
appellate court in hearing criminal appeals (see Surajpal Singh
1
(1971)3 sec 577
2 AIR 1934 PC 227

3
AIR 1945 PC 151 H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A v. State 4 and Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan 5 )."

10. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra 6 , the
Court has ruled that there are no fetters on the plenary power of the
appellate Court to review the whole evidence on which the order of
acquittal is founded and, indeed, it has a duty to scrutinise the probative
B material de novo, informed, however, by the weighty thought that the
rebuttable innocence attributed to the accused having been converted
into an acquittal, the homage the jurisprudence owes to individual liberty
constrains the higher court not to upset the finding without very convincing
reasons and comprehensive consideration.
c 11. In State of Karnataka v. K. Gopalakrishna 7 , it has been
held that where the findings of the court below are fully unreasonable or
perverse and not based on the evidence on record or suffer from serious
illegality and include ignorance and misreading of record, the appellate
court will be justified in setting aside such an order of acquittal.
D 12. In Girja Prasad (dead) by LRs. v. State ofM.P. 8, it has been
observed that in an appeal against acquittal the appellate court has every
power to reappreciate, review and reconsider the evidence as a whole
before it. The Court further stated that it is, no doubt, true that there is
a presumption ofinnocence in favour of the accused and that presumption
is reinforced by an order of acquittal recorded by the trial court, but that
E
is not the end of the matter, for it is for the appellate court to keep in
view the relevant principles of law, to reappreciate and reweigh the
evidence as a whole and to come to its own conclusion in accord with
the principles of criminal jurisprudence..
•
F 13. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ajai Kumar9 , the principles
stated in State of Rajasthan v. Solian La/10 were reiterated. It is worth
noting that in Sohan Lal (supra), it has been stated thus:-

;_AIR 1952 SC 52
G 'AIR l 96I SC 715
. • (I973) 2 sec 793
'(200S) 9 sec 291
• (2007) 1 sec 625
• (ZOOS) 3 sec 351
10
(2004) 5 sec 573
H
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF H.P. 469
[DlPAK MISRA, J.]

"3 .... This Court has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate A
court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal,
was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be
reappreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only
the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of
the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could B
take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where
the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is
concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in
dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against
conviction or the other against an acquittal."
14. In Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka 11 , this C
Court culled out the general principles regarding powers of the appellate
court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal. The
said principles are enumerated below:-
"(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and
reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is D
founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate
court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion,
both on questions of fact and oflaw. E
(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling
reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong
circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc.
are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court
in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the F
nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasise the reluctance of
an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the
power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of G
acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.
.Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the
fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person
11 (2007) 4 sec 415
H
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a
competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured
his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the
B evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding
of acquittal recorded by the trial court."
15. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade (supra), taking note of the
contemporary context, the Court held:-
" ....The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of
c doubt at the expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment
that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the
victim and the community, demand especial emphasis in the
contemporary context of escalating crime and escape. The judicial
instrument has a public accountability. The cherished principles
D or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs
through the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to
embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The
excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty
men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false
dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise
E any practical system of justice will then break down and lose
credibility with the community. The evil ofacquitting a guilty person
light heartedly as a leamedAuthor 12 has sapiently observed, goes
much beyond the simple fact that just one guilty person has gone
unpunished. lfunmerited acquittals become general, they tend to
F lead to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in tum leads to a
public demand for harsher legal presumptions against indicted
"persons" and more severe punishment of those who are found
guilty. Thus, too frequent acquittals of the guilty may lead to a
ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial protection of
the guiltless. For all these reasons it is true to say, with Viscount
G Simon, that "a miscarriage ofjustice may arise from the acquittal
of the guilty no less than from the conviction of the innocent .... "
In short. our jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence

12 Glanville Williams in 'Proof of Guilt'.
H
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF H.P. 471
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]

must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal jcstice A
potent and realistic."
[emphasis supplied]
16. Keeping in view the principles laid down in the aforesaid
authorities, we shall scan the approach of the learned trial Judge and
scrutinize the correctness of deliberation of the High Court and adjudge B
the ultimate reversal of the judgment of the trial court.
17. On a careful examination and close study of the judgment of
the trial court, it is perceivable that the learned trial Judge, after
enumerating the facts, has analysed the evidence and come to the
conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the culpability of the C
accused under Section 306 lPC. He has disbelieved the evidence of
PW-I, Sukh Dev, the father of the deceased, on the principal ground
that though after acquittal of the accused in the criminal case instituted
for offence under Sections 363/364/376 lPC, teased his daughter, yet he
only made an oral complaint to the Gram Panchayat and did not file a D
written complaint before it. That apart, the learned trial Judge has noted
that though PW-I had stated in the FIR that the accused had threatened
to forcibly take away his daughter, he had not so stated in his deposition.
The dying declaration, that is, Ex. PW-101A, has not been given credence
to on the ground that the victim was not in a position to speak and had
sustained 80% burn injuries and further as her both hands were burnt, E
she could not have written what has been alleged to have written by her
in the said document.On that ground, the learned trial Judge arrived at
the conclusion that it would not be safe to rely on the said dying declaration.·
Be it noted, Ex. PW-10/A was written by the deceased on 24.07.2008.
He has also disbelieved the testimony of the material witnesses on the F
same ground. ·
18. As is evincible, the learned trial Judge has also not found Ex.
PW-101 A, which had been recorded on 24.07 .2008 by the investigating
officer, PW-13, as reliable as the victim was under treatment and the
· medical officer PW-10, Dr. Sanjay, who had deposed that he had G
appended his endorsement in PW-10/B, but not issued any certificate
that the victim was mentally fit to give her statement. Leaned trial
Judge has observed that barring the aforesaid evidence, there is no 0ther
evidence on record to connect the accused with the crime. lt is worthy
to note that he has referred to the post- mortem report which recorded
H
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A that the victim had suffered burn injuries and finally arrived at the
conclusion that there is no specific evidence to record a conviction against
the accused.
·· 19. The High Court, as is noticeable, has taken note of the fact
that PW-1 has testified that the accused had earlier faced trial for the
B offences under Sections 363, 366 and 376 IPC and remained in jail for
eleven months and, therefore, he threatened the victim that he, would
again kidnap her. That apart, PW-1, Sukh Dev, father of the deceased,
had also deposed that the accused used to tease her daughter by gestures
and his daughter used to narrate these facts to him and his wife. He had
also stated that that he had made an oral complaint to the Pre8ident of
C the Gram Panchayat, Bathra who, in his turn, had admonished the accused
and told him to mend his ways. The High Court further took note of the
fact that PW-1 has vividly described the bum injuries sustained by his
. daughter and the reason for the same.
20. PW-2, Jai Singh, as his evidence would show, which has also
D been taken note of by the High Court, is the Pradhan of the village. He
has testified about the conduct of the accused and how he had asked
him to understand the situation. He has also deposed about the victim
being taken to the hospital and the nature of treatment administered to
him. The High Court has also dealt with the evidence of PW-3, Dr.
E Kulbhushan Sood, who had issued MLC, Ex. PW-3/B and admitted that
the victim had suffered 80% bum injuries and opined that the same is
sufficient to affect the mental capability of the patient. The High Court
has also analysed the evidence of PW~9, Sawarna Devi, mother of the
deceased, who has deposed about the whole incident. PW-10, Dr..Sanjay, ·
on whom the High Court has placed heavy reliance, was posted as Senior
F Resident in the Department of Surgery ir:i RPGMC, Tanda. The police
had orally requested him to accompany them as the statement of the
victim was to be recorded and 24.07.2008 and he went to the ward
where the victim was and the statement of the injured was recorded by
the police, Ex. PW-10/A, in his presence. The High Court has also
G appreciated the fact that in the cross-examination, treating doctor-had
admitted that he had not issued any certificate that the victim was mentally
fit to make a statement. It is pertinent to mention that the said witness
has denied the suggestion that the victim was not fit to make statement
and Ex. PW-10/A was not her statement. ·

H
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF H.P. 473
[DIPAK MISRA, J.] ·

2 I. After analyzing the evidence, the High Court has found that A
the trial court has acquitted the accused on the ground that the deceased
was not fit to write Ex. PW-10/AandPW-10, Dr. Sanjay, had not issued
the certificate that the deceased was in a fit mentaJcondition to givs: the
statement on 24.07.2008. The High Court has observed that it had perused ,.
Ex. PW-IO/A wherefrom it was reflectible that the victim had written
that the accused would be responsible for her death. The analysis of the B
High Court is as follows:-
"lt is evident from the hand\.vriting that Shalu was in tremendous
pain and agony when she was writing that accuse_d would be
responsible for her death. Thi_s was written on I9.7.2008. It is
also written in Ext. PW-2/A by the Pradhan that Shalu had C
received bum injuries and she told him that accused used to tease -
her. Thus she has taken this extreme step. It has come in the
statement ofPW-I Sukh Dev and his wife (PW-9) Sawama Devi
that the accused used to tease their daughter even after his acquittal
in criminal case. They had informed this fact to the Pradhan of D
Gram Panchayat, PW-2 Jai Singh. Jai Singh (PW-2) has also
admitted that complaint was lodged with him and-he has told the
accused to mend his way."
Andagain:-
"PW-I3 SI Surjeet Singh has recorded the statement of deceased E
vide Ext.PW-IO/Aon 24.7.2008. PW-W Dr. Sanjay has deposed ·
that the police had recorded the statement ofShalu in his presence.
He attested the same vi de endorsement Ext.PW-I O/B. Police has ·
·written the same version in Ext. PW-IO/A, which was told by -
Sahlu. Statement Ext. PW~IO/A would constitute a dying F
declaration under Section 32 of the Evidence Act. Merely that
the Doctor has not issued certificate that Shalu was fit to make
statement would not in any way affect the dying declaration made
by deceased on 24.07.2008, that too in the presence of PW-10 dr.
Sanjay. It is duly proved by the prosecution that the accused alone
was responsible for abetting suicide committed by the deceased. G
She received 80-85% superficial ante-mortem bums. She might
have received 80-85% burns but still she had sufficient strength
to write Ext. PW-2/A."
The High Court has relied on the decision in Gulzari Lal v. State
H
474 SUPREME COURT RFPn:us [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A of Haryana 13 , and come to hold that a valid dying declaration may be
made without obtaining a certificate fitness of the declarant by medical
officer.
22. It is demonstrable that the trial court has acquitted the accused
by disregarding the version of parents of the deceased and other witnesses
B and treating the dying declaration as invalid and the High Court, on the
contrary, has placed reliance on the testimony of the parents of the
deceased, and the evidence of the village Pradhan and also given
credence to the dying declaration.
23. As is seen, the non-reliance on the dying declaration by the
c learned trial Judge is founded on the reason that the deceased was not in
a position to speak and there was no medical certificate appended as
regards her fitness. That apart, the learned trial Judge has regarded the
dying declaration as unacceptable and unreliable on the base that the
deceased had sustained 80% burn injuries. The High Court has found
the said approach to be absolutely erroneous.
D
24. The hub of the matter is whether the dying declaration Ex.
Pw-101A is to be treated as realiable not. To appreciate the validity of
the dying declaration, we have requisitioned the original record and had
pernsed the same. On a careful scrntiny of the same, we find that the
Head Constable had written what the deceased had spoken and thereafter
E the deceased had written that the accused alone was responsible for her
death. The dying declaration, as has been recorded by the Head
Constable, eloquently states about the constant teasing of the victim by
the accused. PW-10, Dr. Sanjay, has stood firm in his testimony that the
victim was in a fit condition to speak. Despite the roving cross-examination
F he has not paved the path oftergiversation. The trial court, as mentioned
earlier, has disregarded the testimony of PW-I 0 on the ground that there
is no certificate of fitness. In this context, reference to the Constitution
Bench decision in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra 14 would be
absolutely seemly. In the said case, the larger Bench, while stating the
law relating to the dying declaration, has succinctly held:-
G
"3 .... A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and any
adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs
or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and
" (20 J6) 4 sec 583
" (2002) 6 sec 11 o
H
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF KP. 475
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]

definite. In most cases, however, such statements are made orally A
before death ensues and is reduced to writing by someone like a
Magistrate or a doctor or a police officer. When it is recorded, no
oath is necessary nor is the presence of a Magistrate absolutely
necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual to call a
Magistrate, if available for recording the statement of a man about B
to die. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration
must necessarily be made to a Magistrate and when such
statement is recorded by a Magistrate there is no specified
statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential
value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily
depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. C
What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying
declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state
of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate
that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without
. examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon D
provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and
truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution
and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration
can be established otherwise."
25. In Atbir v. Government of NCT of Dellti 15 , the Court, after
noting earlier judgments, has laid the following guidelines with regard to E
admissibility of the dying declaration:-
"22. The analysis of the above decisions clearly shows that:
(i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires
the full confidence of the court. F
(ii) The court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit
state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was
not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination.
(iii) Where the court is satisfied that the declaration. is true and
voluntary, it can base its conviction. without any further G
corroboration.
(iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the
dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless
1
' (2010) 9 sec 1
476 SUPREME .COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A it is corroborated. The rnle requiring corroboration is merely a
rule of prudence.
(v) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be
acted upon without c9rroborative evidence.
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity such as the
B deceased was unconscious and could never make any statement
cannot form the basis of conviction.
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the
details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected.
c (viii) Even ifit is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded.
(ix) When the eyewitness affirms that the deceased was.not in a
fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical
opinion cannot prevail.
(x) Ifafter careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is tme and
D free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false
· statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no
legal impediment to make it the ba~is of conviction, even .if th~re
is no corroboration."
26. Recently, in Gu/zari Lal (supra), the Court confirmed the
E conviction by placing reliance on the statement made by the deceased
and recorded by the Head Constable on the basis of the principles stated
in Laxman (supra). The analysis in the said case is as follows:~
"23. In reference to the position of law laid down by this Court,
we find no reason to question the reliability of the dying declaration
F of the deceased for the reason that at the time of recording his
statement by the Head Constable Manphool Singh (PW 7), he
was found to be mentally fit to give his statement regarding the
occurrence. Further, evidence of Head Constable Manphhol Singh
(PW 7) was shown to be trustworthy and has been accepted by
the courts below. The view taken. by the High Court does not
G suffer from any infirmity and the same is in order.
24. The conviction by the High Court was based not only on the
statements made by Maha Singh (deceased) but also on the
unshattered testimony of the eyewitness Dari ya Singh (PW 1)
and the statement of the independent witness Rajinder Singh (PW
H 11)."
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF H.P. 477
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]

27. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid authorities, we find that A
there is no reason to disregard the dying declaration. The Head Constable
·has recorded it as narrated by the deceased and the deceased has also
written few words about the accused. The same has been recorded in
presence of the doctor, PW-10, who had appended his signature. A
certificate of fitness is not the requirement of law. The trial court has B
been swayed away by the bum injuries. It is worthy to note that there
cannot be an absolute rule that a person who has suffered 80% bum
injuries cannot give a dying declaration. In Vijay Pal v. State
(Government of NCT of Delhi)1 6 , the Court repelled the submission ,
with regard to dying declaration made by the deceased who had sustained
100% bum injuries stating that:- C
"22. Thus, the law is quite clear that if the dying declaration is
absolutely credible and nothing is brought on record that the
deceased was in such a condition, he or she could not have made
a dying declaration to a witness, there is no justification io discard
the same. In the instant case, PW l had immediately rushed to D
the house of the deceased and she had told him that her husband
had poured kerosene on her. The plea taken by the appellant that
he has been falsely implicated because his money was deposited
with the in-laws and they were not inclined to return; does not
also really breathe the truth, for there is even no suggestion to
· that effect. E

23. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that
when the deceased sustained 100% bum injuries, she could.not
have made any statement to her brother. In this regard, we may
profitably refer to the decision in Mafabhai Nagarbhai Raval v.
State ofGujarat17 wherein it has been held that a person suffering F
99% bum injuries could be deemed capable enough for the purpose,
of making a dying declaration. The Comi in the said case opined
that unless there existed some inherent and apparent defect, the
trial court should not have substituted its opinion for that of the
docfor. In the light of the facts of the case, the dying decfaration G
was found to be worthy ofreliance."
28. Quite apart from the above, her dying declaration has received

"' (2015) 4 sec 749
17
(1992)4SCC69
H·
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A support from the other witnesses. In view of the corroborative evidence,
we are of the considered opinion that the High Court has correctly relied
uponthis aspect and has reversed the finding of the trial court.
29. As far as reliability of evidence of PW-I and PW-9, the parents
of the victim are concerned, the reasons for not treating their version as
B reliable is based on the fact that they had not reported the incident in
writing to the Gram Panchayat. On a perusal of the evidence in entirety,
we find that the High Court has appropriately dislodged the analysis
made by the trial court. The evidence has to be appreciated regard being
had to various circumstances. It is to be noted that the accused has been
acquitted in the earlier offence and he has become a constant nuisance
C for the victim. In such a situation, the poor parents had no other option
but'to make a complaint to the Gram Panchayat. To hold that their
evidence is reproachable as the complaint was not given in writing
manifestation of perverse approach. On a perusal of the evidence in
entirety, we find that the testimonies of the parents are absolutely
D unimpeachable and deserve credence.
30. The next aspect which is required to be addressed is ·.vhether
Section 306 IPC gets attracted. Submission of the learned counsel for
the appellant is that even assuming the allegation is accepted to have
been proved, it would not come within the ambit and scope of Section
E 306 IPC as there is no abetment.
31. Section 306 IPC reads as under:-
"Section 306. Abetinent of suicide.-If any person commits
suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
F may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
32. The word 'abetment' has not been explained in Section 306
IPC. In this context, the definition of abetment as provided under Section
107 JPC is pertinent. Section 306 IPC seeks to punish those who abet
the commission of suicide of other. Whether the person has abetted the
G commission of suicide of another or not is to be gathered from facts and
circumstances of each case and to be found out by continuous conduct
of the accused, involving his mental element. Such a requirement can
be perceived from the reading of Section I 07 IPC. Section I 07 IPC
reads as under:-
H
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF H.P. 479
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]

"Section 107. Abetment of a thing.-A person abets the doing A
of a thing, who--
First. - Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly. -Engages with one or more other person or persons
in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal
omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order B
to the doing of that thing; or
Thirdly. - Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the
.doing of that thing.
Explanation 1.-A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or C
by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to
dis-close, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or
procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that
thing.
illustration-A, a public officer, is authorized by a \Varrant from D
a Court of Justice to apprehend Z. B, knowing that fact and also
that C is not Z, wilfully represents to A that C is Z, and thereby
intentionally causes A to apprehend C. Here B abets by instigation
the apprehension of C.
Explanation 2.-Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the
E
commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the
commission of that act, and thereby facilitate the commission
thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act."
"Abetment", thus, means certain amount of active suggestion or
support to do the act.
F
33. Analysing the concept of"abetment" as found in Section 107
IPC, a two-Judge Bench in Chitresll Kumar Chopra i•. State
(Government ofNCT of Delhi)" has held:-
" 13. As per the section, a person can be said to have abetted in
doing a thing, if he,.firstly, instigates any person to do that thing; G
or secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in
any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission
takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the
doing of that thing; or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or
"(2009) 16 sec 605 H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation to Section 107
states that any wilful misrepresentation or wilful concealment of
material fact which he is bound to disclose, may also come within
the contours of"abetment". It is manifest that under all the three
situations, direct involvement of the person or persons concerned
in the commission of offence of suicide is essential to bring home
B
the offence under Section 306 IPC.
x x x x x
15: As per clause Firstly in the said section, a person can be said
to have abetted in doing of a thing, who "instigates" any person to
c do that thing. The word "instigate" is not defined in IPC. The
· meaning of the said word was considered by this Court in Ramesh
Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh 19 ."
In the said authority, the learned Judges have referred to the
pronouncement in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh.
D 34. The word "instigate" literally means to goad, urge forward,
provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. A person is said to i.:stigate
another person when he actively suggests or stimulates him to ar. act by
any means or language, direct or indirect, whether it takes the form of
express solicitation or of hints, insinuation or encouragement. Instigation
E may be in (express) words or may be by (implied) conduct.
35. The word "urge forward" means to advise or try hard to
persuade somebody to do ·something, to make a person to move more
quickly in the particular direction, specially by pushing or forcing such
person. Therefore, a person instigating another has to "goad" or "urge
F forward" the latter with the intention to provoke, incite or encourage the
doing of an act with a latter. In order to prove abetment, it must be
shown that the accused kept on urging or annoyitrg ihe deceased by
words, taunts until the deceased reacted. A casual remark or something
said in routine or usual conversation should not be construed or
misunderstood as "abetment".
G
36. Analysing further, in Randhir Singh and another v. State of
Punjab2°, the Court has observed thus:-
"12. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person
"(2001)9SCC618
H 20
(2004J 13 sec 129
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF H.P. 481
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]

or intentionally aiding that person in doing of a thing. ln cases of A
conspiracy also it would involve that mental process of entering
into conspiracy for the doing of that thing. More active role which
can be described as instigating or aiding the doing of a thing is
required before a person can be said to be abetting the commission
of offence under Section 306 IPC."
B
[emphasis supplied]
37. In Praveen Pradhan v. State of Uttarancha/ & another2 1, it
has been ruled:-
" 18. In fact, from the above discussion it is apparent that instigation
has to be gathered from the circumstances of a particular case. C
No straitjacket formula can be laid down to find out as to whether
in a particular case there has been instigation which forced the
person to commit suicide. In a particular case, there may not be
direct evidence in regard to instigation which may have direct
nexus to suicide. Therefore, in such a case, an inference has to D
be drawn from the circumstances and it is to be determined
whether circumstances had been such which in fact had created
the situation that a person felt totally frustrated and committed
suicide .... "
[emphasis is ours] E
38. In Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu v. State of West BengafZ,
the Court, after refeITing to the authorities in Randhir Singh (supra),
Kishori Lal v. State of M.P. 23 and Kishangiri Mangalgiri Goswami v.
State of Gujaraf-4, has held:-
"12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before F
holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC,
the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances
of the case and also assess. Jhe evidence adduced before it in
order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to
the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put G
an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of

21(2012) 9 sec 734
22
(2010) 1 sec 101 ,
" (2007) 1o sec 191
" (2009) 4 sec s2 H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 3 S.C.R.

A alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect
acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the
allegation of harassment without there being any positive action
proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused
which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction
in terms o( Section 306 IPC is not sustainable."
B
39. A two-Judge Bench in Netai Dutta v. State of W.B. 25 , while
dwelling the concept of abetment under Section l 07 IPC especially in
the context of suicide note, observed:-
"6. In the suicide note, except referring to the name of the appellant
c at two places, there is no reference of any act or incidence whereby
the appellant herein is alleged to have committed any wilful act or
omission or intentionally aided or instigated the deceased Pranab
Kumar Nag in committing the act of suicide. There is no case
that the appellant has played any part or any role in any conspiracy,
which ultimately instigated or resulted in the commission of suicide
D by deceased Pranab Kumar Nag.
7. Apart from the suicide note, there is no allegation made by the
complainant that the appellant herein in any way was harassing
his brother, Pranab Kumar Nag. The case registered against the
appellant is without any factual foundation. The contents of the
E alleged suicide note do not in anyway make out the offence against
the appellant. The prosecution initiated against the appellant would
only result in sheer harassment to the appellant without any fruitful
result. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge seriously erred in
holding that the first information report against the appellant
F disclosed the elements of a cognizable offence. There was
absolutely no ground to proceed against the appellant herein. We
find that this is a fit case where the extraordinary power under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to be invoked.
We quash the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant
and accordingly allow the appeal."
G
40. At this juncture, we think it appropriate to reproduce two
paragraphs from Chitresh Kumar Chopra (supra). They are:-
"16. Speaking for the three-Judge Bench in Ramesh Kumar case
(supra), R.C. Lahoti, J. (as His Lordship then was) said that
H " (2005) 2 sec 659
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF H.P. 483
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]

instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage A
to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of"instigation'', though
it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or
what constitutes "instigation" must necessarily and specifically
be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to
incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where
8
the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued
course of conduct, created such circumstances that the
deceased was /eji with no other option except to commit
suicide, in whid1 case, an "instigation" may have to be
inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without
intending the consequences to actually follow, cannot be said to C
be instigation.
x x x x x
19. As observed in Ramesh Kumar (supra), where the accused
by his acts or by a continued course of conduct creates such
circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option D
except to commit suicide, an "instigation" may be inferred. In
other words, in order to prove that the accused abetted commission
of suicide by a person, it has to be established that:
(i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by
words, deeds or wilful omission or conduct which may even E
be a wilful silence until the deceased reacted or pushed or
forced the deceased by his .deeds, words or wilful omission or
conduct to make the deceased move forward more quickly in
a forward direction; and
(ii) that the accused had the intention to provoke, urge or F
encourage the deceased to commit suicide while acting in the
manner noted above. Undoubtedly, presence of mens rea is
the necessary concomitant of instigation."
This Court again observed:-
G
"20 .... The question as to what is the cause of a suicide has no
easy answers because suicidal ideation and behaviours in human
beings are complex and multifaceted. Different individuals in the
same situation react and behave differently because of the personal
meaning they add to each event, thus accounting for individual
H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A vulnerability to suicide. Each individual's suicidability pattern
depends on his inner subjective experience of mental pain, fear
and loss of self-respect. Each of these factors are cmcial and
exacerbating contributor to an individual's vulnerability to end his
own life, which may either be an attempt for selfprotection or
an escapism from intolerable self."
B
41. Keeping in view the aforesaid legal position, we are required
to address whether there has been abetment in committing suicide. Be it
clearly stated that mere allegation of harassment without any positive
action in proximity to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused
C that led a person to commit suicide, a conviction in terms of Section 306
IPC is not sustainable. A casual remark that is likely to cause harassment
in ordinary course of things will not come within the purview of instigation.
A mere reprimand or a word in a fit of anger will not earn the status of
abetment. There has to be positive action that creates a situation for the
victim to put an end to life.
D
42. In the instant case, the accused had by his acts and by his
continuous course of conduct created such a situation as a consequence
of which the deceased was left with no other option except to commit
suicide. The active acts of the accused have led the deceased to put an
end to her life. That apart, we do not find any material on record which
E compels the Court to conclude that the victim committing suicide was
hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and difference in domestic
life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged. On the
other hand, the accused has played active role in tarnishing the self-
esteem and self-respect of the victim which drove the victim girl to
commit suicjde. The cmelty meted out to her has, in fact, induced her to
F
extinguish her life-spark.
43. As is demonstrable, the High Court has not reversed the
·judgment of acquittal solely on the basis of dying declaration. It has
placed reliance on the evidence of the parents and also other witnesses.
G It has also treated the version. of the Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat
· as credible. All these witnesses have deposed that the accused after his
acquittal engaged himself in threatening and teasing the girl. He did not
allow her to live in peace.
44. The harassment caused to her had become intolerable and
H
PAWAN KUMAR v. STATE OF H.P. 485
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]

unbearable. The father had deposed that the girl had told him on number A
of occasions and he had complained to the Pradhan. All these amount
to active part played by the accused. It is not a situation where a person
is insulted on being asked to pay back a loan. It is not a situation where
someone (eels humiliated on a singular act. It is a different situation
altogether. The young girl living in a village was threatened and teased B
constantly. She could not bear it any longer. There is evidence that the
parents belong to the poor strata of the society. As the materials on
record would reflect, the father could not afford her treatment when
case of his daughter was referred to the hospital at Chandigarh. The
impecuniosity of the family is manifest. It is clearly evident from.the
materials brought on record that the conduct of the accused was C
absolutely proactive.
45. Eve-teasing, as has been stated in Deputy Inspector General
of Police and an.other v. S. Samuthiram 26 , has become a pernicious,
horrid and disgusting practice. The Court therein has referred to the
Indian Journal of Criminology and Criminalistics (January-June 1995 Edn.) D
W:hich has categorized eve-teasing into five heads, viz. (1) verbal eve-
teasing; (2) physical eve-teasing; (3) psychological harassment; (4) sexual
harassment; and (5) harassment through some objects. The present
case eminently projects a case of psychological harassment. We are at
pains to state that in a civilized society eve-teasing is causing harassment . E
to women in educational institutions, public places, parks, railways stations
and other public places which only go to show th'at requisite sense of
respect for women has not been socially cultivated. A woman has her
own space as a man has. She enjoys as much equality under Article 14
of the Constitution as a man does. The right to live with dignity as
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be violated by F
indulging in obnoxious act of eve-teasing. It affects the fundamental
concept of gender sensitivity and justice and the rights ofa woman under
Article 14 of the Constitution. That apart it creates an incurable dent in
the right of a woman which she has under Article 15 of the Constitution.
One is compelled to think and constrained to deliberate why the women
G
in this country cannot be allowed to live in peace and lead a life that is
empowered with a dignity and freedom. It has to be kept in mind· that
she has a right to life and entitled to love according to her choice. She
has an individual choice which has been legally recognized. It has to be
" (2013 > 1 sec 598
H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 3 S.C.R.

A socially respected. No one can compel a woman to love. She has the
absolute right to reject.
46. In a civilized society male chauvinism has no room. The
Constitution of India confers the affomative rights on women and the
said rights are perceptible from Article 15 of the Constitution. When the
B right is conferred under the Constitution, it has to be understood that
there is no condescendation. A man should not put his ego or, for that
matter, masculinity on a pedestal and abandon the concept of civility.
Egoism must succumb to law. Equality has to be regarded as the summum
bonum of the constitutional principle in this context. The instant case
C portrays the deplorable depravity of the appellant that has led to a heart
breaking situation for a young girl who has been compelled to put an end
to her life. Therefore, the High Court has absolutely correctly reversed
the judgment of acquittal and imposed the sentence. It has appositely
exercised the jurisdiction and we concur with the same.
47. Consequently, the appeal, being devoid ofliny merit, stands
D dismissed.

Nidhi Jain Appeal dismissed.