Holding

The Supreme Court held that the High Court may re‑examine the Disciplinary Committee’s findings, that the misconduct charge was proved, and that dismissal was disproportionate, warranting substitution with compulsory retirement.

Summary

The case concerned a senior judicial officer, R.R. Parekh, who was dismissed from service after two disciplinary inquiries found him guilty of misconduct for awarding sentences below the statutory minimum under Section 135 of the Customs Act, allegedly motivated by corrupt or oblique motives. The High Court had revisited the findings of the Disciplinary Committee despite the Committee’s earlier exoneration, and imposed dismissal. Parekh challenged the findings and the severity of the penalty before the Supreme Court, arguing that the Full Court could not revisit the Committee’s decision and that dismissal was disproportionate. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s Full Court is not bound by the Disciplinary Committee’s report and may re‑examine it, that the charge of misconduct in Inquiry 15 of 2000 was established on a pre‑ponderance of probabilities, and that dismissal was not a proportionate punishment. Consequently, the Court substituted dismissal with compulsory retirement while upholding the finding of misconduct.

Issues considered

The Full Court of the High Court can revisit a Disciplinary Committee's earlier decision under Article 235.
Whether the charge of misconduct in Inquiry 15 of 2000 is proved on the standard of pre‑ponderance of probabilities.
The appropriate quantum of punishment for the established misconduct – dismissal versus compulsory retirement.
The scope of the Supreme Court's review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India of disciplinary findings.
The applicable standard of proof and evidentiary rules in disciplinary proceedings of judicial officers.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 226, s. Article 235
Customs Act, 1962s. 135
Factories Act, 1948
Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeals) Rules, 1971s. Rule 6
Imports & Exports (Control) Act, 1947
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act

Subjects

service lawdisciplinary proceedingsjudicial officermisconductdismissalcompulsory retirementproportionalityArticle 235Article 226evidence standardpreponderance of probabilitiesCustoms Actcorruptionoblique motive

Judgment

[2016] 5 S.C.R. 906

A R.R. PAREKH
v.
HlGH.COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 6116-6117of2016)
B JULY 12, 2016
[T.S. THAKUR, CJI AND DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.)
Service Law:
Dismissal of service - Of judicial officer - Charges of
c misconduct. alleging that while trying two cases involving offence
u/s. 135 of Customs Act, the manner and mode in which awarded
sentence show that the decisions rendered were actuated by corrupt
practice or oblique motive - Held: The delinquent had no convincing
explanation for the alleged conduct - The charge of misconduct
was thus established - However, punishment of 'dismissal' is not
D
proportionate to the misconduct - Hence, it is substituted to
'compulsory retirement' - Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and
Appeals) Rules, 1971 - Rule 6.
Judiciary - Judicial officer - Misdemeanour alleged -
Disciplinary proceedings - Held: Cases involving misdemeanour
E
of judicial officer have to be dealt with sensitivity and care - A·
charge of misconduct against a judicial officer must be distinguished
from a purely erroneous decision whether on ·/aw or on fact - The
circumstances let into evidence to establish misconduct have to be
sifted and evaluated with caution - Service Lam
F Constitution of India:.
Art.235 - Disciplinary jurisdiction of High Courr- Scope of
- Held: In exercise of its disciplinary jurisdiciion, conferred u/Art.
235, ~the High Court has an obligation to apply its 1~ind to a report
submitted by the Disciplinary Committee as regards its· acceptance
G - The Court is not bound by the .decision of Disciplinary Committee.
Art.226 - Jurisdiction under - Scope. of~ While determining
the correctness of charge of misconduct - Held: The High Court
should not exercise its jurisdiction u/Art.226 unless the findings
are found to be perverse or it is a case of no evidence - The
H
906
R.R. PAREKH v. HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 907

sufficiency of evidence would notfall for re-appreciation or re- A
evaluation before the High Court.
Evidence - Standard qf proof - Jn disciplinary inquiry - Held:
A charge of misconduct in a disciplinary proceeding has to be
established on a preponderance of probabilities - Disciplinary
proceeding is not governed by the strict rules of evidence which B
govern a criminal trial.
Disciplinary inquiries (Disciplinary Inquiry No. 15 of 2000
and 6 of2001) were initiated against the appellant-a judicial officer.
Disciplinary Inquiry No. 15 of 2000 the appellant was on the
charge of misconduct alleging that while trying two cases c
involving offence u/s. 135 of Customs Act, the appellant awarded
sentence to the accused persons less than the minimum
prescribed and that the decisions rendered were actuated by
corrupt practice or oblique motive. In Inquiry No. 6 of 2001, the
appellant was charged with dereliction of duty and with acting in
a manner unbecoming of a judicial officer. Inquiry Officer came D
to the conclusion that the charges could 11£.t be proved.
Disciplinary Committee as regards the charges in Inquiry No. 15
was of the view that acts of the appellant were not totally bonafide,
but the appellant should be exonerated. As regards the Inquiry
No. 6, Disciplinary Committee upheld the Inquiry Report. Full E
Court of High Court, in chamber meeting resolved to remand
the matter to the Disciplinary Committee. On remand Disciplinary
Committee upheld the finding ofln,quiry Officer. Full Court then
resolved to reconstitute the Disciplinary Committee and called
upon to look into the matter again. The reconstituted Disciplinary
Commi'ttee d~greed with the report of the Inquiry Officer and F
concluded that t,he appellant w.~,iliable to be dismissed from
service. Report of I}i_~rjplinary Co.m_mittee was adopted by Full
Court and 'consequently t!ie appellant was dismissed from service.
The appellant filed writ p£tition .u/Art. 226 of the Constitution
assailing the fi~dings of Uis_ciP.ti'ltar-Y Com_mit·tee and the order of G
dismissal. High Court held that•the C~l!,l,ige in Inquiry No. 6 of
2001 was not established. Ho~ever, it upheld the views of
Disciplinary Committee and Full ~Q.uqt in Inquiry No. 15 of 2000
and upheld the order 'of dismissal of appellant.
(-.,,.. "'
H
908 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R.

A In appeal to this court it was interalia contended by the
appellant that once the Disciplinary Committee had decided in
favour of the appellant, the Full Court, in the chamber meeting
had no jurisdiction to revisit that decision.

Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
B
HELD: 1. It is not correct to say that the Full Court was
bound by the decision of Disciplinary Committee initially taken
by it. Under Article 235 of the Constitution, the High Court
exercises control over the district judiciary. The exercise of
disciplinary control is a manffestation of that power, The High
c Court, in order to streamline the process governing the exercise
of its disciplinary jurisdiction, may make procedural provisions
regulating its exercise. The procedural provisions, regulating its
disciplinary jurisdiction, have been enunciated by the Gurjarat
High Court resolved by the Full Court in the meetings held on
D 2nd March, 2004 and 26th December, 1998. As per the procedure,
the recommendation which is submitted by the Disciplinary
Committee on whether or not to accept the Report of an Inquiry
Officer is not binding on the High Court. The Full Court has an
obligation to apply its mind to a report which has been submitted
by the Disciplinary Committee and to determine whether it should
E or should not be accepted. [Para 13) [917-G-H; 918-A-B, F-G]

2.1 Cases involving misdemeanours of a judicial officer have
to be dealt with sensitivity and care. A robust common sense
must guide the disciplinary authority. At one end of the spectrum
are those cases where direct evidence of a misdemeanour is
F available. Yet in other cases, direct evidence of a decision being
actuated by a corrupt motive may not be available. [Para 15] [919-
E-F)
2.2 The issue of whether a judicial officer has been actuated
by an oblique motive or corrupt practice has to be determined
G
upon a careful appraisal of the material on the record. The issue
which arises in such cases is whether there are circumstances
from which an inference that extraneous considerations have
actuated a judicial officer can legitimately be drawn. Such an
inference cannot obviously be drawn merely from a hypothesis
H that a decision is erroneous. A wrong decision can yet be a bona
R.R. PAREKH v. HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 909

fide error of judgment. Inadvertence is consistent with an honest A
error of judgment. A charge of misconduct against a judicial officer
must be distinguished from a purely erroneous decision whether
on law or on fact. The legality of a judicial determination is· subject
to such remedies as are provided in law for testing the correctness
of the determination. It is not the correctness of the verdict but
B
the conduct of the officer which is in question. The disciplinary
authorify has to determine whether there has emerged from the
record one or more circumstances that indicate that the decision
which forms the basis of the charge of misconduct was not an
honest exercise of judicial power. The circumstances let into
evidence to establish misconduct have to be sifted and evaluated c
with caution. [Para 15] [919-C, F-H; 920-A-B]
2.3 In the present case, the two criminal cases which were
tried by the appellant involved offences under Section 135 of the
Customs Act, 1962. The Appellant paid no heed whatsoever to
the provisions of Section 135 under which the sentence of D
imprisonment shall not be less than three years, in the absence
of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be recorded in
the judgment of the Court. Most significant is the fact that the
Appellant imposed a sentence in the case of each accused in such
a manner that after the order was passed no accused would remain
in jail any longer. Two of the accused were handed down E
sentences of.five months and three months in such a manner that
after taking account of the set-off of the period during which they
had remained as under-trial prisoners, they would be released
fro!ll jail. The Appellant had absolutely no convincing explanation
for this course of conduct. As a judicial officer who was in service F
for over fourteen years, the appellant could not have been
unmindful of an'd was duty bound to have read the governing
provisions of the statute under which the offence was sought to
be established. It is inconceivable that a judicial officer would do
so in two successive trials without apprising himself of the law or
the punishment provided by the legislature. [Paras 16, 17 and G
18] [920-D; 921-G-H; 922-A, C-D]
3. A disciplinary inquiry, is not governed by the strict rules
of evidence which govern a criminal trial. A charge of misconduct
in a disciplinary proceeding has to be established on a
H
910 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2016] 5 S.C.R.

A preponderance of probabilities. The High Court while exercising
its power of judicial review under Article 226 has to determine
as to whether the charge of misconduct stands established with
reference to some legally acceptable evidence. The High Court
would not interfere unless the findings are found to be perverse.
Unless it is a case of no evidence, the High Court would not
B
exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226. If there is some legal
evidence to hold that a charge of misconduct is proved, the
sufficiency of the evidence would not fall for re-appreciation or
re-evaluation before the High Court. Applying these tests, it is
not possible to fault the decision of the Division Bench of the
c High Court on the charge of misconduct. The charge of
misconduct was established in disciplinary Inquiry 15 of 2000.
[Para 19] (922-E-G]

4. Rule 6 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and
Appeals) Rules 1971 enunciates disciplinary penalties. Among
D them is (i) compulsory retirement; (ii) removal from service which
shall not be a disqualification for future employment under
Government; (iii) dismissal from service which shall ordinarily
be a disqualification for future employment under Government.
The punishment must be proportionate to the misconduct·
established. Having due regard to the nature of the misconduct
E
which has been found to be established and the totality of
circumstances, the punishment of dismissal should stand
substituted by an order of compulsory retirement. The Appellant
has attained the age of superannuation and would be entitled to
his retirement benefits on that basis. [Para 20] [923-A-C]
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 6116-
6117 of2016.

From the Judgment and Order dated 22-23.02.2012 of the High
Court of Gujarat atAhmedabad in Special Civil Application No. 10760
G of2009.

D. N. Ray, Lokesh K. Choudhary, Mrs. Sumita Ray, Advs. for the
Appellant.

Aniruddha P. Mayee, A. Selvin Raja, Advs. for the Respondents.
H
R.R. PAREKH v. HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 911

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, J 1. Leave granted.
2. These proceedings arise from a judgment of the High Court of
Gujarat dated 23 February 2012 in an application filed by the Appellant
challenging the punishment of dismissal imposed upon him upon a
discip,inary inquiry. The Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court found B
that the charges against the Appellant have been established in one (but
not the second) of two disciplinary inquiries in respect of his conduct as
ajudicial officer in the districtjudiciary. In view of its findings, the High
Court declined to interfere with the punishment of dismissal. That has
given rise to these proceedings. c
3. The Appellant was recruited as a Civil Judge (Junior Division)
and Judicial Magistrate in 1981 in the judicial service ofthe State of
Gujarat. He was promoted as a Civil Judge (Senior Division) in 1996.
The charges which emanated against him from a chargesheet dated 31
August 2001 related to his work as a judicial officer when he was posted D
as Chief Judicial Magistrate at Bhuj from 6 May 1996 to 15 June 1998.
Two criminal cases involving offences punishable under Section 135 of
the Customs Act 1962 and the Imports & Exports (Control) Act 1947
were tried by him.
4. In Criminal Case 1293 of! 995, the Appellant delivered a judgment E
on 22 January 1997 convicting the accused, but awarded a sentence of
imprisonment less than the minimum prescribed by Section 135.
Moreover, the sentence of imprisonment was so structured that after
allowing the benefit of a set-off, the accused was not required to remain
in jail for a further period. In the second criminal case, Criminal Case
675of1994, the trial involved offences inter a/ia under Section 135 of F
the Customs Act 1962. Fourteen accused were alleged to be involved in
the smuggling of275 siJ.er slabs of a value of 5,86,50,620/-. The trial
of two of the accused who are absconding was separated from the rest.
.By a judgment dated 11 March 1997 the Appellant held the twelve
accused who were brought to trial to be guilty of the charges. However, G
save and except for five of the accused persons, the Appellant awarded
less than the minimum punishment prescribed under Section 135. All the
accused were granted a set-off. Details of the sentences awarded are
contained in the following table:

H
912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20 I 6] 5 S.C.R.

A SI. AccLECC Nameofthe Pe1iod of Annunt lndefuult Set ct'fis
NJ NJ. accused senterce offine of fine, allwed
flt· ther
senterce
I I Sw-encl·a 2 Yearn 10.0001· I Year Yes
Gurud:epsiri1

B
2 2 Bhtperrlra 2 Yearn 10.0001- I Year Yes
Pvarelal
3 4 NathaSamat 2 Yearn 10.0001- I Year Yes
4 5 Jivan Devdan 2 Yews 10.0001- 1 Year Yes
5 13 Kana 2 Yearn 10.0001· I Ye<rr Yes
Mal1adeva
c 6
7
3
6
Gu lam Oiisti
Iqbal Husam
4 Yews
4 Yearn
15.0001-
15.0001·
I Year
I Ye'1f
Yes
Yes
8 7 Jakab Bava 4 Yearn 15.0001- I Year Yes
9 IO Ismail Sale 3 Yews 10,0001- I Year Yes
10 II Nw-mamd 5 10.0001· 1 mmth Yes
Yakub morthi
II 14 J1van Madeva 3 10.0001- I mmtl1 Yes
morth;
12 12 O;manAmir 5 Yews 25.0001- 1 Yem· Helias
D not
remitted
fine

5. This formed the subject matter of departmental Inquiry I 5 of
2000 in which a chargesheet was issued on 3 I August 2001. It was
E alleged that the Appellant who was a senior judicial officer was aware
of the provisions of Section 135 which prescribe the award of at least a
minimum sentence. The case involved smuggling of a huge quantity of
contraband articles. The Appellant, it was alleged, was aware ofjudicial
decisions mandating that a liberal view should not be taken in the award
of sentences in such cases. Yet, with the intention of favouring the
F accused, the Appellant was alleged to have awarded less than the
minimum sentence without recording special or adequate reasons.
Moreover, it was alleged that:
"Though, it was a case of a huge quantity of contraband
articles i.e. 275 Silver Slabs worth Rs. 5,86,50,6201-, you
G mvarded the sentence to each of the accused, keeping in mind,
the period undergone by each of the accused as under trial
prisoner and granted benefit of set off so that none of the
accused had to remain in custody for any further period. "
Consequently, the allegations against the Appellant were that:
H
R.R. PAREKH v. HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 913
[OR. 0. Y. CHANDRACHUDJ

"Thus, the manner and mode in which you awarded the A
sentence in Cr!. Case Nos. 675194 & 1293195, clearly show
that the accused had managed with you for showing favour
in awarding sentence and accordingly, you awarded the
punishment fixing the term of sentence in such a way that the
accused need not have to remain in custody for any longer
8
period and thereby:
(a) You are guilty of indulging in Corrupt-practice.
{b) You are guilty of dereliction in discharging your judicial
functions.
(c) You acted in a manner unbecoming of a Judicial Officer. c
These acts ofyours, would amount to acts of grave misconduct
and tantamount to conduct unbecoming of a Judicial Officer,
violating the provisions contained in Rule 3 of the Gujarat
Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971. "
D
6. The Appellant denied the charges in his reply to the chargesheet.
An Inquiry Officer was appointed. During the course of the inquiry,
witnesses were examined in support of the charges, among them being
the Special government prosecutor and Superintendent of Customs. The
Inquiry Officer in his report dated 28 January 2004 came to the conclusion
that there was no independent evidence to establish that the Appellant E
had engaged in a corrupt practice. The charges were held not to have
been established. The report of the Inquiry Officer was placed before a
Disciplinary Committee of the High Court consisting of two judges. The
Disciplinary Committee did not agree with the reasons adduced by the
Inquiry Officer but nonetheless was of the view that the Appellant should F
be exonerated. In the view of the Committee, a huge quantity of
contraband was involved and the Appellant ought not to have taken a
lenient view, contrary to settled principles of law. The Disciplinary
Committee held that though there was an absence of sufficient evidence
to establish an oblique motive or an allegation 'ofcon-uption, an element
of doubt existed from the manner in which the Appellant had sentenced G
each of the accused, bearing in mind the period of custody as under-trial
prisoners. The Committee was of the view that the acts of the Appellant
were not totally bona fide and proposed that this should be considered
when the case of the Appellant for promotion arose in future.
H
914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R.

A 7. The report of the Disciplinary Committee was considered at a
Chamber meeting of the Full Court on 26 September 2005 when it was
resolved to remand the matter to the same Disciplinary Committee for
reconsideration. The Disciplinary Committee considered the matter again.
The Disciplinary Committee took a fresh decision on 4April 2006 to the
effect that there being no evidence about corruption, the finding of the
B
inquiry officer was correct. The Committee, however, reiterated that
the conduct of the Appellant should be borne in mind when his case for
promotion came up for consideration. When the report of the Disciplinary
Committee came up before the Full Court at a Chamber meeting held on
5 March 2007, a reconstituted Disciplinary Committee was called upon
c to look into the matter again and to issue a notice to show cause to the
Appellant. Upon the resolution of the Full Court, the Disciplinary
Committee recorded tentative reasons to disagree with the report of the
Inquiry Officer and called upon the Appellant to show cause why he
should not be held guilty of the charges levelled and be dismissed from
the service. The Appellant responded to the notice to show cause and
D
was granted a personal hearing. The Disciplinary Committee arrived at
a decision on I July 2009 holding the Appellant guilty of the charges of
misconduct. The Committee held that as a seasoned judicial officer who
was in service since 1981, the Appellant would be aware about the basic
principles of sentencing. The Committee rejected the explanation of the
E Appellant that even if an error was committed by him in awarding less
than the prescribed sentence, this was of a bona fide nature. In the
view of the Committee, the Appellant ought to have seen the provisions
of the Customs Act 1962, and having held the accused guilty, he ought to
have considered the provisions for punishment laid down in the statute.
The Committee found it difficult to accept that as a judicial officer, the
F
Appellant had passed an order of conviction and sentence without looking
at the provisions. The Committee held that an inference could be drawn
on the basis of material with regard to the existence of an oblique motive
since neither a sufficient nor reasonable explanation was provided by
the Appellant. Alternatively, the Committee held that even assuming that
G there was no oblique motive, the established facts reflected gross
negligence and a dereliction of duty on the part of the Appellant. The
Committee found the charge of misconduct was established and came
to the conclusion that the Appellant should be dismissed from service
under Rule 6 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules
1971. The report of the Disciplinary Committee was adopted by the Full
H
R.R. PAREKH v. HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 915
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD]

Court. The State Government by a notification dated 14 July 2009 A
dismissed the Appellant from service.
8. The conduct of the Appellant as a judicial officer formed the
subject matter of another disciplinary inquiry (Inquiry 6 of200 I) in which
a chargesheet was issued on 5 November 2001. The charges against
the Appellant were that despite his transferon 23 April 1993, the Appellant B
had with an oblique motive requested the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Mehsana to transfer 26 out of several part-heard cases selectively,
pertaining to offences under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
The allegation was that these cases were indicated as being part-heard
though no material evidence had been recorded. The second charge
was that in 68 cases involving offences punishable under the Factories c
Act 1948 the Appellant had imposed negligible punishments of fine ranging
from 1 I 00 to 1 500, contrary to the decisions of the High Court and had
indulged in a corrupt practice. The Appellant was charged with a
dereliction of duty and of acting in a manner unbecoming of a judicial
officer. The Inquiry Officer exonerated the Appellant. D
9. The Disciplinary Committee of the High Court came to the
conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to hold the Appellant
guilty of an oblique motive or corrupt practice. At its Chamber meeting
on 26 September 2005, the Full Court remanded the proceedings to the
Disciplinary Committee. The Disciplinary Committee took a fresh E
decision and reiterated its earlier view. When a Full Court considered
the view of the Disciplinary Committee on 5 March 2007 a fresh
Disciplinary Committee was assigned tu relook into the matter and to
issue a show cause notice to the Appellant. The Disciplinary Committee
recorded its tentative disagreement with the report of the Inquiry Officer
and issue a notice to the show cause to the Appel !ant. Upon considering F
the reply submitted by the Appellant the Disciplinary Committee in its
decision rendered on 1 July 2009 held the charges to be proved and took
the view that the Appellant was liable to be dismissed from service. The
Full Court of the High Court resolved that the charges against the
Appellant were proved and decided to dismiss the Appellant from service. G
The State Government acting on the decision of the High Court issue an
order of dismissal on 14 July 2009.
10. The Appellant initiated proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution in order to assail the findings which were arrived at in the
disciplinary proceedings and the punishment of dismissal. By its judgment H
916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R.

A and order dated 23 February 2012 the Division Bench held that the charge
of misconduct in Disciplinary Inquiry 6 of200 I was not established. The
High Court, after adverting to the report of the Disciplinary Committee
noted that there was no evidence in regard to which cases under the
Prevention ofFood Adulteration Act were part-heard before the Appellant.
This conclusion of the Disciplinary Committee was held to belie the
8
charge that the Appellant was being selective about retaining part-heard
cases. On the second charge, the Division Bench observed that the
Disciplinary Committee had expressly concluded that there was
insufficient evidence to hold the Appellant guilty of an oblique motive or
corrupt practice in the award of punishments in the cases under the
c Factories Act 1948. Yet, the final conclusion of the Committee was that
all the charges including the-charge of corrupt practice stood proved.
The High Court noted that this was a clear error. The Disciplinary
Committee having come to the conclusion of the absence of an oblique
motive or corrupt practice, the High Court held that it was not open to
convert the charge into one of gross negligence. For these reasons, the
D
findings and conclusion of the Disciplinary Committee in Inquiry 6 of
2001 were held not to be sustainable.
11. The High Court, however, held that the charge of misconduct
in Disciplinary Inquiry 15 of2000 was based on evidence and it could
not be held that the conclusions of the Disciplinary Committee, which
E were adopted by the Full Court, were based on no evidence. The High
Court noted that the Appellant was a judicial officer since 1982, and had
worked for nearly fourteen years as a Judge. While dealing with offences
under the Customs Act 1962, he was expected to refer to the penal
provisions under which punishment was being handed down after
F recording a conviction. The High Court noted that the stand of the
Appellant appeared to be that he awarded the sentence without being
aware of the statutory provisions. The High Court observed that the
criminal case with which the Appellant was dealing was not the first
case involving an offence under Section 135. The High Court noted that
despite the minimum punishment prescribed under Section 135, the
G Appellant awarded less than the minimum in the case of several accused.
No reasons appeared from the judgment for the grant of differential
treatment to some of the accused. More significantly, the punishments
awarded to all the accused were structured in such a manner that none
of the accused would have to serve any further sentence, after accounting
H
R.R. PAREKH v. HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 917
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD]

for the set-off for the period spent in jail as under- trial prisoner. The A
High Court noted that since the value of the goods in the case exceeded
rupees one lakh, Section 135 provided for imprisonment for a term which
may extend to seven years and with fine. Moreover, in the absence of
special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be recorded in the
judgment of the Court, the imprisonment was not to be for less than
B
three years. Section 135 (3) also specifies what shall not be considered
as special and adequate reasons. The High Court upheld the view of the
Disciplinary Committee (which were accepted by the Full Court) that
an inference of oblique motive would have to be drawn from the record,
having due regard to the fact that (i) the Appellant had recorded no
special or adequate reasons for awarding less than the minimum c
sentence; and (ii) the sentences which were awarded to the accused
were such that none of them would have to undergo any further term of
imprisonment after taking into account the period undergone as an under-
trial. In the view of the High Court, the conclusions of the Committee
which were accepted by the Full Court cannot be held to have been
D
based on no evidence; there were strong circumstances indicating that
the Appellant imposed punishments in serious offences under the Customs
Act 1962 contrary to statutory mandate; his explanation that he was not
aware of the statutory provision (having been recently promoted as CJM)
was not acceptable; there were glaring discrepancies in the award of
punishments to various accused; and, most significantly, the sentence E
imposed on each accused was such that none of them would remain in
jail any longer. The High Court held that the punishment of dismissal
was not disproportionate to the charge of misconduct which has been
found to be established.
12. The first submission which has been urged on behalf of the F
Appellant is that there was no warrant for the Full Court to require a
reconsideration of the decision initially taken by the Disciplinary
Committee on 27 October 2004. The submission is that once the
Disciplinary Committee concluded that the Appellant should be
exonerated by accepting the report of the Inquiry Officer, the Full Court
in the Chamber meeting had no jurisdiction to revisit that decision. G

13. The submission suffers from a fundamental fallacy. Under
Article 235 of the Constitution, the High Court exercises control over
the district judiciary. The exercise of disciplinary control is a manifestation
of that power. Exercise of disciplinary control over the district judiciary
H
918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016 J 5 S.C.R.

A is vested in the High Court in pursuance of the provisions of Article 235.
The High Court, in order to streamline the process governing the exercise
of its disciplinary jurisdiction, may make - as High Courts in fact do
make- procedural provisions regulating its exercise. The High Court of
Gujarat in a meeting of a Full Court held on 2 March 2004 resolved that
matters listed in annexure 'A' to the resolution should be dealt with and
B
decided by the High Court as a whole.Action to be taken against judicial
officers in the exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction was one of those
matters. However, having due regard to the multitude of administrative
matters over which the Full Court exercises jurisdiction, the High Court
assigns and distributes its administrative functions to constituent
c committees. This is imperative for the efficient exercise of the control
of the High Court over the district judiciary under Article 235. Distribution
of work to a Committee of the High Court does not efface the jurisdiction
that vests in the High Court. By a resolution that was passed in a Chamber
meeting of the High Court held on 26 December 1998 a detailed
procedure was enunciated for the conduct of disciplinary inquiries against
D
judicial officers of the district judiciary. The procedure envisages that
after an Inquiry Officer submits a report, the report together with
underlying material on the record would be examined by a Disciplinary
Committee consisting of two judges. The Disciplinary Committee would
submit its provisional conclusions in a report which would laid before the
E High Court and this would become a decision of the Court after a
stipulated period. The second stage for the Disciplinary Committee to
prepare and submit its report would be after issuing a notice to show
cause to the officer and granting him a.personal hearing after which the
Disciplinary Committee would prepare a report containing its reasoned
conclusions regarding the punishment. Once again the report would be
F
tabled before High Court and would become a decision of the Court
after passage of a stipulated period. The recommendation which is
submitted by the Disciplinary Committee on whether or not to accept
the Report of an Inquiry Officer is not binding on the High Court. The
Full Court has an obligation to apply its mind to a report which has been
G submitted by the Disciplinary Committee and to. determine whether it
should or should not be accepted. Hence, there is no merit in the
submission that the Full Court was bound by the decision of its Disciplinary
Committee. ·
14. The second submission relates to the merits of the charges
H
R.R. PAREKH v. HJGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 919
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD]

against the Appellant which have been found to be established. The A
submission of the Appellant is that his judgment at the conclusion of the
trial involving offences inter alia under Section 135 of the Customs Act
1962 was a judicial decision. The bas.is of the decision is contained in the
reasons adduced by the Appellant. Even if the Appellant had erred in the
matter of awarding the sentence under Section 135, that - it was urged
B
- cannot form the subject of a disciplinary inquiry. Moreover, on the
basis of the decision rendered by the Appellant in the two criminal cases,
it was sought to be urged that the Appellant had indicated reasons for
arriving at a finding of the guilt and on the award of the sentence.
15. The issue of whether a judicial officer has been actuated by an
oblique motive or corrupt practice has to be determined upon a careful
c
appraisal of the material on the record. Direct evidence of corruption
may not always be forthcoming in every case involving a misconduct of
this nature. A wanton breach of the governing principles of law or
procedure may well be indicative in a given case of a motivated, if not
reckless disregard oflegal principle. In the absence ofa cogent explanation D
to the contrary, it is for the disciplinary authority to determine whether a
pattern has emerged on the basis of which an inference that the judicial
officer was actuated by extraneous considerations can be drawn. Cases
involving misdemeanours of a judicial officer have to be dealt with
sensitivity and care. A robust common sense must guide the disciplinary
authority. At one end of the spectrum are those cases where direct E
evidence of a misdemeanour is available. Evidence in regard to the
existence of an inoriminating trail must be carefully scrutinized to
determine whether an act of misconduct is established on the basis of
legally acceptable evidence. Yet in other cases, direct evidence of a
decision being actuated by a corrupt motive may not be availabie. The . F
issue which arises in such cases is whether there are circumstances
from which an inference that extraneous considerations have actuated
a judicial officer can legitimately be drawn. Such an inference cannot
obviously be drawn merely from a hypothesis that a decision is erroneous.
A wrong decision can yet be a bona fide error ofjudgment. Inadvertence
is consistent with an honest error of judgment. A charge of misconduct G
against a judicial officer must be distinguished from a purely erroneous
decision whetheron law or on fact. The legality ofajudicial determination
is subject to such remedies as are provided in law for testing the
correctness of the determination. It is not the correctness of the verdict
H
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R.

but the conduct of the officer which is in question. The disciplinary
authority has to determine whether there has emerged from the record
one or more circumstances that indicate that the decision which forms
the basis of the charge of misconduct was not an honest exercise of
judicial power. The circumstances let into evidence to establish
misconduct have to be sifted and evaluated with caution. The threat of
B
disciplinary proceedings must not demotivate the honest and independent
officer. Yet on the other hand, there is a vital element of accountability to
society involved in dealing with cases of misconduct. There is on the
one hand a genuine public interest in protecting fearless and honest officers
of the district judiciary from motivated criticism and attack. Equally there
c is a genuine public interest in holding a person who is guilty of wrong
doing responsible for his or his actions. Neither aspect of public interest
can be ignored. Both are vital to the preservation of the integrity of the
administration ofjustice.
16. In the present case, it must be emphasised that the charges
D against the Appellant involved rendering of decisions actuated by corrupt
practice or by oblique motives. The two criminal cases which were tried
by the Appellant involved offences under Section 135 of the Customs
Act, 1962. Section 135 is as follows:
"Section 135-
( I) Without prejudice to any action that may be taken under this
E
Act, if any person-
a. is in relation to any goods in any way knowingly concerned in
any fraudulent evasion or attempt at evasion of any duty
chargeable thereon or of any prohibition for the time being
imposed under this Act or any other law for the time being in
F force with respect to such goods, or
b. acquires possession of or is in any way concerned in carrying,
removing depositing, harbouring, keeping, concealing, selling
or purchasing or in any other manner dealing with any goods
which he knows or has reasons to believe are liable to
confiscation under Section 111, he shall be punishable, -
G
c. in the case of an offence relating to any of the goods to which
Section 123 applies and the market price whereof exceeds
one lakh of rupees, with imprisonment for term which may
extend to seven years and with fine :
Provided that in the absence of special and adequate reasons to
H
R.R. PAREKH v. HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 921
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD]

the contrary to be recorded in the judgment of the court, such A
imprisonment shall not be for less than three years;
(ii) in any other case, with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
(2) **********
(3) For the purpose of sub-sections (1) and (2), the following shall
B
not be considered as special and adequate reasons for awarding
a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than one year,
namely, -
(i) the fact that the accused has been convicted for the first
time for an offence under this Act;
(ii) the fact that in any proceedings under this Act, other than a c
prosecution, the accused has been ordered to pay a penalty or
the goods which are the subject-matter of such proceedings
have been ordered to be confiscated or any other action has
been taken against him for the same act which constitutes the
offence;
D
(iii) the fact that the accused was not the principal offender
and was acting merely as a carrier of goods or otherwise was
a secondary party to the commission to the offence;
(iv) the age of the accused."
17. It is not in dispute that the cases in question related to goods to
which Section 123 applied and the market price whereof exceeded rupees E
one lakh. The offences were punishable with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to seven years and with fine. The proviso spells out
that in the absence of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be
recorded in the judgment of the Court, such imprisonment shall not be
for less than three years. Sub-section 3 of Section 123 provides what F
would not be considered as special and adequate reasons for awarding
a sentence of imprisonment for a term ofless than one year. The Appellant
was evaluating, in Criminal Case 675of1994, a situation involving the
smuggling of275 silver slabs worth' .5,86,50,620/-. The explanation of
the Appellant that he was recently promoted to th.e cadre of CJM and
was not aware of the provisions of Section 135 was not accepted by the G
Disciplinary Committee (or by the Full Court). As a judicial officer who
was in service for over fourteen years, the Appellant could not_ have
been unmindful of and was duty bound to have read the governing
provisions of the statute under which the offence was sought to be
H
922 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 5 S.C.R.

A established. It is inconceivable that a judicial officer would do so in two
successive trials without apprising himself of the law or the punishment
provided by the legislature. The Appellant awarded sentences ranging
from three months to five years of imprisonment to different accused.
No reasons appear from the record of the judgment, for awarding less
than the minimum sentence prescribed.
B
18. We have duly perused the judgments rendered by the Appellant
and find merit in the finding of the High Court that the Appellant paid no
heed whatsoever to the provisions of Section 135 under which the
sentence ofimprisonment shall not be less than three years, in the absence
of special and adequate reasons to the contrary to be recorded in the
c judgment of the Court. Most significant is the fact that the Appellant
imposed a sentence in the case of each accused in such a manner that
after the order was passed no accused would remain in jail any longer.
Two of the accused were handed down sentences of five months and
three months in such a manner that after taking account of the set-off of
D the period during which they had remained as under-trial prisoners, they
would be released from jail. The Appellant had absolutely no convincing
explanation for this course of conduct.
19. A disciplinary inquiry, it is well settled, is not gO\ ..:med by the
strict rules of evidence which govern a criminal trial. A charge of
E misconduct in a disciplinary proceeding has to be established on a
preponderance of probabilities. The High Court while exercising its power
of judicial review under Article 226 has to determine as to whether the
charge of misconduct stands established with reference to some legally
acceptable evidence. The High Court would not interfere unless the
.findings are found to be perverse. Unless it is a case of no· evidence, the
F High Court would not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226. If there
is some legal evidence to hold that a charge of misconduct is proved, the
sufficiency of the evidence would not fall for re-appreciation or re-
evaluation before the High Court. Applying these tests, it is not possible
to fault the decision of the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court on
G the charge of misconduct. The charge of misconduct was established in
disciplinary Inquiry 15 of2000.
· 20. That leads us to the issue of the punishment which has been
imposed on the Appellant. The Appellant has been dismissed from service.
The submission of the Appellant is that having regard to the fact that he
H has an unblemished record of service, the imposition of the punishment
R.R. PAREKH v. HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT & ANR. 923
[DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD]

of dismissal would be disproportionate to the misconduct which has been A
found to be established. Rule 6 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline
and Appeals) Rules 197 f enunciates disciplinary penalties. Among them
is (i) compulsory retirement; (ii) removal from service which shall not be
a disqualification for future employment under Government; (iii) dismissal
from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future
B
employment under Government. The punishment must be proportionate
to the misconduct established. Having due regard to the nature of the
misconduct which has been found to be established and the totality of
circumstances we are of the view that the punishment of dismissal should
stand substituted by an order of compulsory retirement. The Appellant
has attained the age of superannuation and would be entitled to his c
retirement benefits on that basis.
• 21. We accordingly allow the Appeals in part. We confirm the
judgment of the High Court in so far as it rejects the challenge by the
Appellant to the finding of misconduct. However, for the reasons which
we have indicated above we direct that the order of dismissal from D
service shall stand substituted with an order of compulsory retirement
which shall take effect from 14 July 2009, the date on which the final
order of penalty was imposed upon the Appellant.
22. The Civil Appeals are disposed of accordingly. No costs.
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals partly allowed. E