RAJA KHANversusSTATE OF CHHATTISGARH
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 167
- Decided
- 6 February 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- SANJAY KAROL
Holding
The prosecution failed to prove the chain of circumstances beyond reasonable doubt, and the conviction under Sections 302 and 201 IPC is set aside.
Summary
The appellant Raja Khan was convicted for murder and concealment of evidence based on circumstantial evidence, including a weapon and gold chains recovered after his alleged disclosure under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The prosecution relied on the recovery of a stone, a gandasa, and gold chains, as well as testimony that the deceased was last seen with the appellant. The Supreme Court examined whether the chain of circumstances satisfied the five golden principles for circumstantial evidence and whether the Section 27 statement and seizure memos were admissible. It found serious inconsistencies in the recovery process, the preparation of seizure memos, and the lack of corroboration for the 'last seen' testimony. Consequently, the Court held that the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC was set aside and the appellant was released.
Issues considered
- Whether the prosecution established a complete chain of circumstantial evidence satisfying the five golden principles.
- Whether the statement recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is admissible and sufficient to support the recovery of the weapon and gold chains.
- Whether the recovery and seizure memos relating to the weapon and gold chains are reliable evidence.
- Whether the 'last seen' testimony is adequately corroborated to prove the appellant's involvement.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161, s. 313
- Evidence Act, 1872s. 25, s. 26, s. 27
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302
Subjects
Judgment
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 461 : 2025 INSC 167
Raja Khan
v.
State of Chhattisgarh
(Criminal Appeal No. 70 of 2025)
07 February 2025
[Sanjay Karol and Manmohan,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the prosecution failed to prove the chain of circumstances
leading to the guilt of the appellant-accused, beyond reasonable
doubt.
Headnotes†
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27 – Case based on circumstantial
evidence – Prosecution relied on recovery of weapon of assault
(stone, gandasa) and gold chains belonging to the deceased,
on the basis of statement given by the appellant in custody –
Conviction of the appellant u/ss.302 and 201, IPC, if justified:
Held: No – The entire case of the prosecution rests on circumstantial
evidence – Where the case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence,
the chain of evidence must be so far complete, such that every
hypothesis is excluded but the one proposed to be proved and
such circumstances must show that the act has been done by the
accused within all human probability – In the present case, the
testimonies of the panch witnesses raised serious doubts regarding
the version of the prosecution w.r.t the alleged disclosure made by
the appellant and the recoveries pursuant thereto – Courts below
not justified in disregarding the glaring inconsistencies w.r.t the
recoveries made by the police pursuant to the alleged disclosure
made by the appellant – The manner of recovery and preparation
of seizure memos also raised grave doubts about the version of
disclosure and recovery put forth by the prosecution – Also, the
testimony of PW-23 was not corroborated by the testimonies
of PW-2, PW-3 & PW-5, thus there is doubt w.r.t to the ‘last
seen’ circumstance too – Prosecution failed to prove the chain
of circumstances leading to the guilt of the accused, beyond
* Author
462 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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reasonable doubt – Appellant given benefit of doubt, conviction
u/ss.302 and 201 set aside. [Paras 16, 22, 30-33]
Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.25-27 – s.27, an exception to ss.25
and 26:
Held: ss.25 and 26 stipulate that confession made to a police
officer is not admissible – However, s.27 is an exception to ss.25
and 26 and serves as a proviso to both these sections – s.27 lifts
the ban, though partially, to the admissibility of confessions – The
removal of the ban is not of such an extent so as to absolutely undo
the object of s.26 – As such the statement whether confessional
or not is allowed to be given in evidence but that portion only
which distinctly relates to discovery of the fact is admissible – A
discovery of a fact includes the object found, the place from which
it is produced and the knowledge of the Appellant-accused as to
its existence. [Paras 18, 19]
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27 – Ingredients – Discussed. [Para 20]
Case Law Cited
Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1952] 1 SCR 1091 :
(1952) 2 SCC 71); Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Delhi Administration v. Bal
Krishan & Ors., (1972) 4 SCC 659; Udai Bhan v. State of Uttar
Pradesh [1962] Supp. 2 SCR 830 : AIR 1962 SC 1116; Bodhraj
Alias Bodha & Ors. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir [2002] Supp.
2 SCR 67 : (2002) 8 SCC 45; Varun Chaudhary v. State of
Rajasthan [2010] 13 SCR 296 : (2011) 12 SCC 545; Mustkeem
alias Sirajudeen v. State of Rajasthan [2011] 9 SCR 101 : (2011)
11 SCC 724 – referred to.
List of Acts
Evidence Act, 1872; Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973.
List of Keywords
Circumstantial evidence; Murder; Iron pipe; Battleaxe (Gandasa);
Stone; Gold chains; Pond; Stone quarry; Recovery of weapon of
assault; Alleged disclosure made by the appellant; Recoveries;
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 463
Raja Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh
Discovery and seizure; Seizure and recovery memo; Benefit of
Doubt; Doubts about the version of disclosure and recovery;
Confession; Section 27 of Evidence Act, 1872; Chain of
Circumstances; Not proved beyond reasonable doubt; Chain
of Evidence; Last seen; Testimonies of the panch witnesses;
Inconsistencies; TIP; Glaring inconsistencies.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
70 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 04.07.2023 of the High Court
of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in CRA No. 855 of 2014
Appearances for Parties
Ashutosh Dubey, Santosh Chauriha, Saubhagya Chauriha,
Ms. Rajshri A. Dubey, Abhishek Chauhan, H.B. Dubey, Shohaib
Alvi, Ms. Ruchika Sharma, Amit P Shahi, Amit Kumar, Advs. for
the Appellant.
Prafful Bharat, Sr. Adv., Mrs. Prerna Dhall, Gopinath MR,
Rajyavardhan Mall, Prashant Singh, Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Manmohan, J.
1. Present Appeal has been filed challenging the judgment and order
dated 4th July, 2023 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh
at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No. CRA/855/2014, whereby the
appeal filed by the Appellant-accused was dismissed and the
judgment and order dated 12th August, 2014 passed in Sessions
Trial No.42/2014 by the third Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur,
Chhattisgarh (hereinafter referred to as “the Trial Court”) convicting
and sentencing the Appellant-accused was affirmed. It is pertinent to
mention that the Appellant-accused has been convicted for committing
offences under Sections 302 and 201 of Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) and has been sentenced to undergo
life imprisonment with a fine of Rs.500/- (Rupees Five Hundred) for
464 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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committing the offence under Section 302 of IPC and to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for 5 (five) years with fine of Rs.200/- (Rupees
Two Hundred) for committing the offence under Section 201 of IPC
along with default stipulations.
FACTS
2. The facts leading to the present appeal are as under:
2.1. The case of the prosecution is that Neeraj Yadav (hereinafter
referred to as “deceased”) left his house on 29th November,
2013 but did not return home and a Missing Report was
lodged by the father of the deceased, Premlal Yadav (PW-
5), on 30th November, 2013. Chandrashekhar Verma (PW-1)
informed the police on 1st December, 2013 that a dead body
had been found floating in the pond of a stone quarry at Village
Dondekala Matia and upon receiving the information, police
personnel of P.S Vidhan Sabha reached the spot. Thereafter,
a MERG Intimation being MERG No. 62/2013 (Ex. P-17) was
registered on 2nd December, 2013 and the body of the deceased
was sent for post-mortem examination, and it was concluded
that the death was homicidal in nature. Subsequently, a First
Information Report (hereinafter referred to as “FIR”) dated 3rd
December, 2013 bearing no. 228/2013 was registered at P.S.
Vidhan Sabha, District Raipur. The dead body of the deceased
was identified by Balram Yadav (PW-21) who was the cousin
brother of the deceased.
2.2. During the course of the investigation, it was found that the
Appellant-accused had borrowed money from the deceased
and a dispute had arisen between them with respect to refund
of the borrowed amount.
2.3. It is the case of prosecution that the Appellant-accused along
with co-accused Tarachand Verma (who has been acquitted by
the Trial Court) had taken the deceased on the intervening day
in an auto to the place of incident and assaulted the deceased
with an iron pipe and battleaxe (Gandasa) and thereby committed
his murder and with intent to cause disappearance of evidence
smashed his head with stone and after removing his full pant
tied a rope around his waist and thrown the body in the water
of quarry no. 1.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 465
Raja Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh
2.4. The dead body of the deceased was sent for Post-Mortem
Examination which was conducted by Dr. Nitin Shaymrao
Barmate (PW-10) and as per the Post-Mortem Report (Ex.
P-13), the injuries were caused by a sharp-edged weapon
and some of the injuries were as a result of a hard and blunt
impact. It was also stated that the cause of death was “Head
Injury” and the death was homicidal in nature.
2.5. A Memorandum of Statement (Ex. P-23) of the Appellant-
accused under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(herein referred to as “Evidence Act”) was recorded which led
to the discovery and seizure of the iron blade (Gandasa) and
a stone covered in blood from Kachna Pond. Further, recovery
and seizure of two gold chains of the deceased was also made
from the rooftop of the house of the Appellant-accused. The
seized articles i.e. blood-stained soil, mobile cover, iron pellet and
stones were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory (hereinafter
referred to as “FSL”) and its report (Ex. P-39) stated that the
presence of human blood stain was found on the stone seized
by the Investigating Agency.
2.6. The prosecution, to prove that the deceased was last seen
with the Appellant-accused, had examined Bhagwat Prasad
Sahu (PW-23) and Balram Yadav (PW-21) who had deposed
that the deceased was seen travelling with the Appellant-
accused in an auto on 29th November, 2013 between 5:00 PM
and 6:00 PM.
2.7. Statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred
to as “Cr.P.C.”) and after the investigation was complete, a
chargesheet was filed against the Appellant-accused and co-
accused Tarachand for committing the offences punishable under
Section 302 read with Section 34 and Section 201 of IPC which
was then committed to the Court of Sessions and charges were
framed against the Appellant-accused and Tarachand Verma.
2.8. In order to substantiate the charges levelled against the
Appellant-accused and Tarachand Verma, the prosecution
examined 26 (twenty-six) witnesses and exhibited 39 (thirty-
nine) documents and on the other hand no defense witness
was examined.
466 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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2.9. The Appellant-accused was examined under Section 313 of
Cr.P.C. wherein the Appellant-accused denied all the allegations
and charges and pleaded innocence.
3. The Trial Court heard arguments on behalf of the Appellant-accused
and after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record,
acquitted the co-accused Tarachand Verma from all charges but
convicted the Appellant-accused vide its judgment and order dated
12th August, 2014 for the offences under Sections 302 and 201 of IPC.
4. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, the present Appellant-accused
preferred a criminal appeal before the High Court challenging the
order of conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court. The
High Court vide the impugned judgment dismissed the appeal and
affirmed the conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court.
The High Court held that the stone which was stained with human
blood was seized at the instance of the Appellant-accused and the
two gold chains were found from the house of the Appellant-accused
regarding which the Appellant-accused had failed to provide any
explanation.
5. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal has been preferred by
the Appellant-accused.
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT-ACCUSED
6. Mr. Saubhagya Chauriha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the Appellant-accused stated that there were grave inconsistencies
in the seizure made by the investigating authority. He stated that
the Courts below had failed to appreciate that the Memorandum
of Statement of the Appellant-accused under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act was recorded by the Investigating Officer (hereinafter
referred to as “IO”) in the presence of one Tirath Dhruv (PW-22) and
Bhupender Dhruv, however, Bhupender Dhruv was not examined by
the Investigating Agency.
7. He emphasised that a perusal of the testimony of PW-22 reveals
that the said witness had not seen the Memorandum Statement and
property seizure memo as put forth by the Investigating Agency. He
further stated that PW-22’s testimony discloses that he and Bhupender
Dhruv had signed a number of documents pertaining to seizure of
articles, before leaving the police station and had not signed any
documents after seizure was made by the IO.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 467
Raja Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh
8. He stated that a perusal of the testimonies of PW-22 and PW-26
reveal that Ex. P-25 articles such as stone and the gandasa were
recovered by PW-26 from the bottom of Kachna Pond at the instance
of the police officer and not of the Appellant-accused.
9. He stated that the Test Identification Parade (hereinafter referred to as
“TIP”) of the two gold chains, purportedly belonging to the deceased
was questionable as the place of recovery i.e. rooftop of the house of
the Appellant-accused, was an open space accessible to public from
outside and the same was evidenced from the fact that the recovery
was made by climbing onto the rooftop from outside the house.
10. According to him, the recovery of the gold chains was fabricated as
the witnesses i.e. Tirath Dhruv (PW-22) and Bhupender Dhruv never
saw the police officers recovering the same from the house of the
Appellant-accused. Further, neither the testimony of the witnesses
nor the IO mentioned that the Appellant-accused was accompanying
the recovery team or the recovery was made at the instance of the
Appellant-accused.
11. He contended that the last seen theory does not help the case of the
prosecution in view of the marked variance and material contradictions
as to the place and time of last seen. He further stated that since
the testimony of PW-23 is not corroborated by the testimonies of
PW-2, PW-3 & PW-5.
12. He stated that the prosecution had failed to establish motive on
the part of the Appellant-accused to commit the offence as there
was no evidence or record to show the amount of money that the
Appellant-accused had borrowed from the deceased. According to
him, prosecution had failed to produce any other evidence to prove
the inimical relationship between the deceased and the Appellant-
accused except the testimony of PW-2, who vaguely deposed before
the Trial Court that the deceased had many enemies, but did not
mention the name of the Appellant-accused as one of them and the
testimony of PW-15 pertaining to earlier scuffle of the deceased with
the Appellant-accused was not reliable as she failed to state the
same to police in her statement (Ex. D/2).
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT-STATE
13. Per contra, Mr. Prafful Bharat, learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of the Respondent-State stated that the recovery of the
468 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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stone which was used for commission of crime had been made at
the instance of the Appellant-accused. According to the disclosure
statement (Ex. P-23) of the Appellant-accused, the stone was thrown
by him in the Kachna pond and PW-22, who is the witness to the
memorandum statement and seizure memo (Ex. P-25), had duly
supported the same. As per the FSL Report (Ex. P-39), human blood
was found on the seized stone.
14. He further stated that on the basis of the disclosure statement of the
Appellant-accused, two gold chains belonging to the deceased were
also seized at the instance of the Appellant-accused from the roof of
the house of the Appellant-accused, which had been duly proved by
PW-22. Additionally, he pointed out that the seized gold chains were
identified by PW-2 vide memo of identification (Ex. P-10) which had
been duly proved by Gopi Sahu (PW-6).
15. He stated that it was evident from the testimony of PW-23 that
the deceased was last seen together with the Appellant-accused
before he went missing and his dead body was found on 2nd
December, 2013 floating in the pond of stone quarry at Village
Dondekala Matia. He pointed out that the statement of PW-23
was corroborated by the statement of PW-21 to whom PW-23 had
informed on 30th November, 2013 regarding last seen and missing
of the deceased.
REASONING
16. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, the entire case of the
prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence, as there is neither
any eye-witness nor any judicially admissible confession. It is well
settled law that where the case rests entirely on circumstantial
evidence, the chain of evidence must be so far complete, such
that every hypothesis is excluded but the one proposed to be
proved and such circumstances must show that the act has been
done by the Appellant-accused within all human probability (See
Hanumant vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1952) 2 SCC 71). In
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984)
4 SCC 116, this Court outlined five essential principles, often
referred to as five golden principles, which must be satisfied for
circumstantial evidence to conclusively establish the guilt of the
Appellant-accused:
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 469
Raja Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh
“(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
is to be drawn should be fully established……
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say,
they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis
except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature
and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except
the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as
not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused.”
17. To prove the charges, the prosecution has laid emphasis on recovery
of weapon of assault (stone as well as the gandasa) and gold chains
belonging to the deceased, on the basis of statement (Ex. P-23)
given by the Appellant-accused while in custody.
18. Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act stipulate that confession
made to a police officer is not admissible. However, Section 27 is
an exception to Sections 25 and 26 and serves as a proviso to both
these sections [Delhi Administration vs. Bal Krishan & Ors.,
(1972) 4 SCC 659].
19. This Court is of the view that Section 27 lifts the ban, though partially,
to the admissibility of confessions. The removal of the ban is not of
such an extent so as to absolutely undo the object of Section 26.
As such the statement whether confessional or not is allowed to be
given in evidence but that portion only which distinctly relates to
discovery of the fact is admissible. A discovery of a fact includes the
object found, the place from which it is produced and the knowledge
of the Appellant-accused as to its existence (Udai Bhan Vs. State
of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1116).
20. The essential ingredients of Section 27 of the Evidence Act are
three-fold:
470 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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i. The information given by the accused must led to the discovery
of the fact which is the direct outcome of such information.
ii. Only such portion of the information given as is distinctly
connected with the said recovery is admissible against the
accused.
iii. The discovery of the facts must relate to the commission of
such offence.
21. The question as to whether evidence relating to recovery is sufficient
to fasten guilt on the accused was considered by this Court in Bodhraj
Alias Bodha & Ors. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, (2002) 8 SCC
45, wherein it has been held as under:-
“18… Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in
short “Evidence Act”) is by way of proviso to Sections
25 to 26 and a statement even by way of confession
made in police custody which distinctly relates to the
fact discovered is admissible in evidence against the
accused. This position was succinctly dealt with by this
Court in Delhi Admn v. Balakrishan [(1972) 4 SCC 659]
and Mohd. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra [(1976) 1
SCC 828]. The words “so much of such information” as
relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, are very
important and the whole force of the section concentrates
on them. Clearly the extent of the information admissible
must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered
to which such information is required to relate. The ban
as imposed by the preceding sections was presumably
inspired by the fear of the Legislature that a person
under police influence might be induced to confess by the
exercise of undue pressure. If all that is required to lift
the ban be the inclusion in the confession of information
relating to an object subsequently produced, it seems
reasonable to suppose that the persuasive powers of
the police will prove equal to the occasion, and that
in practice the ban will lose its effect. The object of
the provision i.e. Section 27 was to provide for the
admission of evidence which but for the existence of
the section could not in consequence of the preceding
sections, be admitted in evidence. It would appear that
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 471
Raja Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh
under Section 27 as it stands in order to render the
evidence leading to discovery of any fact admissible,
the information must come from any accused in
custody of the police. The requirement of police custody
is productive of extremely anomalous results and may
lead to the exclusion of much valuable evidence in cases
where a person, who is subsequently taken in to custody
and becomes an accused, after committing a crime meets
a police officer or voluntarily goes to him or to the police
station and states the circumstances of the crime which
lead to the discovery of the dead body, weapon or any
other material fact, in consequence of the information thus
received from him. This information which is otherwise
admissible becomes inadmissible under Section 27 if the
information did not come from a person in the custody of a
police officer or did come from a person not in the custody
of a police officer. The statement which is admissible
under Section 27 is the one which is the information
leading to discovery. Thus, what is admissible being
the information, the same has to be proved and not the
opinion formed on it by the police officer. In other words,
the exact information given by the accused while in
custody which led to recovery of the articles has to
be proved. It is, therefore, necessary for the benefit of
both the accused and prosecution that information given
should be recorded and proved and if not so recorded,
the exact information must be adduced through evidence.
The basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the Evidence
Act is the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events.
The doctrine is founded on the principle that if any fact
is discovered as a search made on the strength of any
information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is
a guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner
is true. The information might be confessional or non-
inculpatory in nature but if it results in discovery of a fact,
it becomes a reliable information. It is now well settled that
recovery of an object is not discovery of fact envisaged in
the section. Decision of Privy Council in Palukuri Kotayya
v. Emperor [AIR (1947) PC 67], is the most quoted
authority of supporting the interpretation that the “fact
472 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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discovered” envisaged in the section embraces the place
from which the object was produced, the knowledge of
the accused as to it, but the information given must relate
distinctly to that effect. [See State of Maharashtra v. Dam
Gopinath Shirde and Ors, (2000) 6 SCC 269]. No doubt,
the information permitted to be admitted in evidence is
confined to that portion of the information which “distinctly
relates to the fact thereby discovered”. But the information
to get admissibility need not be so truncated as to make it
insensible or incomprehensible. The extent of information
admitted should be consistent with understandability.
Mere statement that the accused led the police and
the witnesses to the place where he had concealed
the articles is not indicative of the information given.
(emphasis supplied)
22. In the present case, the prosecution has produced Tirath Dhruv (PW-
22) and Bhuvan Dhimar (PW-26) as the panch witnesses to prove the
recovery pursuant to the disclosure made by the Appellant-accused.
A bare perusal of the testimonies of the said witnesses raises serious
doubts regarding the version of the prosecution with respect to the
alleged disclosure made by the Appellant-accused herein and the
recoveries pursuant to such alleged disclosure.
23. Tirath Dhruv (PW-22) has deposed that when the Appellant-accused
was questioned in his presence, the Appellant-accused stated that
he could recover the stone, axe and the pipe. However, during his
cross-examination, Tirath Dhruv (PW-22) admits that he along with
another witness (not produced during trial) stayed in police station for
about 5 (five) minutes during which period, the police made them sign
many papers. The said witness further admits that the Memoradum
of Statement (Ex.P-23) of the Appellant-accused had been taken
and he signed the same on the instructions of the police, without
reading or understanding the contents of the said document. He
admits that none of the seizure memos were prepared or signed at
the spot. He states that the same were prepared and signed at the
police station. Therefore, from the testimony of Tirath Dhruv (PW-
22), there is grave doubt as to whether the Appellant-accused had
made any disclosure in front of the said witness or that any alleged
recovery had in fact been witnessed by Tirath Dhruv (PW-22).
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 473
Raja Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh
24. Ex. P-25, i.e., the seizure memo for the stone and gandasa states that
the said items were taken out at the behest of the Appellant-accused.
Similarly, in Ex. P-29, it has been stated that the chains were taken out
by the Appellant-accused. However, Tirath Dhruv (PW-22) nowhere
states that the Appellant-accused was present along with the said
witness and the police during the seizure proceedings (i.e. when Ex.
P-25 to Ex. P-31 were prepared). In fact, none of the seizure memos
apart from Ex. P-29 and Ex. P-25 state that the recoveries therein were
at the instance of the Appellant-accused or the acquitted co-accused.
25. Further, a perusal of the disclosure statement made by the Appellant-
accused indicates that the Appellant-accused had allegedly hidden the
gold chains allegedly belonging to the deceased by wrapping them in
a red wrapper and then hiding them at the terrace of his house behind
a green-coloured container. However, the seizure memo being Ex.
P-29 states that the chains were recovered from a green-coloured
blanket on the roof of the house. The said seizure memo further
states that the police took possession of the articles after they were
taken out by the Appellant-accused in presence of the witnesses.
On the other hand, the IO–G.S. Singh (PW-25), states that at the
time of seizure proceedings of Ex. P-29, he himself had not gone
to the roof and the Appellant-accused and the witness had gone to
the roof. Pertinently, Tirath Dhruv (PW-22) in his deposition, without
making any reference to the presence of the Appellant-accused,
states that a policeman had climbed the roof of the house of the
Appellant-accused from the outside and, thereafter, he along with
Bhupender Dhruv climbed on the said roof from which the recovery
of chains was made. Therefore, there are glaring inconsistencies
with respect to the manner in which gold chains were recovered from
the house of the Appellant-accused and further, the presence of the
Appellant-accused at the time of the said recovery is itself doubtful.
26. Similarly, Bhuvan Dhimar (PW-26), i.e., the diver who allegedly
recovered the stone and the gandasa from the Kachna pond, in his
testimony admits that he recovered the said items upon the instruction
from the police and from the place told by the police without making
any reference to the presence of the Appellant-accused or the fact
that the said items were recovered upon being pointed out by the
Appellant-accused. The fact that the items from Kachna pond were
seized upon the instructions from the police is corroborated by the
statement of Tirath Dhruv (PW-22), who unequivocally states that
474 [2025] 2 S.C.R.
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it was the police who instructed the divers to go into the pond and
take out the items.
27. This Court, in Varun Chaudhary vs. State of Rajasthan, (2011) 12
SCC 545 and Mustkeem alias Sirajudeen vs. State of Rajasthan,
(2011) 11 SCC 724, has held that if the recovery memos have been
prepared in the police station itself or signed by the panch witnesses
in the police station, the same would lose their sanctity and cannot
be relied upon by the Court to support the conviction.
28. There are also glaring inconsistencies in the TIP of the gold chains
rendering the proceedings unreliable and inadmissible, as Anwar
Hussain (PW-20) (who identified the two gold chains) has consistently
denied that Purnima Yadav (PW-2) (wife of the deceased) identified
the two gold chains and that the said gold chains belonged to the
deceased. He further denied that six more similar chains were placed
alongside the said two gold chains. This fact has been corroborated
by the testimonies of Gopi Sahu (PW-6) and Yugal Kishore Verma
(PW-7), wherein they have stated that only two gold chains were
placed for identification.
29. Further, the testimonies of witnesses reveal that the two gold chains
do not bear any distinguishable mark or properties and no identification
mark or properties were disclosed by Purnima Yadav (PW-2) prior
to identification proceedings. Purnima Yadav (PW-2) states in her
testimony that the two gold chains were handed over to her at the
police station on 10th December, 2013 in exchange for receipts/bills/
invoices, a day prior to the conduct of the TIP of the gold chains.
30. This Court is of the view that the Courts below were not justified in
disregarding the glaring inconsistencies with respect to the recoveries
made by the police pursuant to the alleged disclosure made by
the Appellant-accused. Consequently, the manner of recovery and
preparation of seizure memos raises grave doubts about the version
of disclosure and recovery put forth by the prosecution.
31. Also, as the testimony of PW-23 is not corroborated by the testimonies
of PW-2, PW-3 & PW-5, this Court has doubt with respect to the
‘last seen’ circumstance too.
32. Keeping in view the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that the
prosecution has failed to prove the chain of circumstances leading
to the guilt of the accused, beyond reasonable doubt.
[2025] 2 S.C.R. 475
Raja Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh
CONCLUSION
33. Consequently, this Court is of the view that the Appellant-accused is
entitled to the benefit of doubt. Accordingly, the impugned judgments
and the conviction of the Appellant-accused under Sections 302 and
201 of IPC are hereby set aside and the appeal is allowed. The
Respondents are directed to release the Appellant-accused forthwith
unless and until he is in detention in another matter.
34. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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