Supreme Court of India
RAJENDRA SINGH AND ORS.versusSTATE OF UTTARANCHAL ETC.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1193
- Decided
- 7 October 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- PANKAJ MITHAL
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the appellants were not positively identified as the assailants and the High Court erred in overturning the trial court’s acquittal, setting aside the conviction.
Summary
The appellants, a father, son and son‑in‑law, were accused of murdering Pushpendra Singh and were acquitted by the trial court but later convicted by the High Court on the basis of alleged ocular testimony and the recovery of swords and a kanta. The Supreme Court examined whether the appellants could be positively identified as the assailants through the eyewitness accounts of a housewife and two chance witnesses, and whether the recovered weapons linked them to the crime. It found that the housewife could not name the accused, the other witnesses were not present at the time of the assault and their statements were contradictory, and no forensic link between the weapons and the victim’s blood was established. The Court also held that the accused’s statements leading to the discovery of the weapons are admissible only to the extent they disclose the fact of discovery, not as a confession to the crime, per Sections 25, 26 and 27 of the Evidence Act. Consequently, the High Court’s reversal of the trial court’s acquittal was erroneous, and the appellants were acquitted on the benefit of doubt.
Issues considered
- The correctness of the High Court's conviction of the appellants under Section 302 IPC.
- Whether the identity of the appellants as the perpetrators was established beyond reasonable doubt through ocular evidence.
- Whether the recovery of the weapons of crime, based on the accused’s statements, can be used to prove their participation in the murder.
- Whether the trial court's acquittal could be interfered with by the appellate court absent perverse or erroneous findings.
Legislation cited
- Evidence Act, 1872s. 25, s. 26, s. 27
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Issue arose as regards the correctness of the order passed by the High Court convicting the appellants u/s.302 IPC; and whether the appellants are the real persons who chased the deceased and killed him. Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – s.302 – Murder Altercation between the parties over a land dispute – Few hours later, the appellants armed with swords and sharp edged weapon inflicted blows upon the son of the complainant resulting in his death – Acquittal by the trial court, however, conviction of the appellants-father, son
Subjects
MurderBenefit of doubtAltercation between the partiesSwords and sharp edged weaponAcquittalLife imprisonmentWeaponsOcular evidence
Judgment
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 342 : 2025 INSC 1193
Rajendra Singh and Ors.
v.
State of Uttaranchal Etc.
(Criminal Appeal No(s). 476-477 of 2013)
07 October 2025
[Pankaj Mithal* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as regards the correctness of the order passed by
the High Court convicting the appellants u/s.302 IPC; and whether
the appellants are the real persons who chased the deceased
and killed him.
Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – s.302 – Murder – Benefit of doubt –
Altercation between the parties over a land dispute – Few
hours later, the appellants armed with swords and sharp
edged weapon inflicted blows upon the son of the complainant
resulting in his death – Acquittal by the trial court, however,
conviction of the appellants-father, son and son-in-law
u/s.302 with life imprisonment and fine by the High Court –
Correctness:
Held: Statement of the appellants that the weapons recovered
were the weapons of crime cannot be read against them in view
of ss.25 and 26 rw s.27 of the 1872 Act – Only that part of the
statement which leads the police to the recovery of the weapons
is admissible, and not the part which alleges that the weapons
recovered were actually the weapons of crime – Ocular evidence
of prosecution witnesses, if read together, not sufficient to identify
the appellants as the persons who attacked and assaulted the
deceased resulting in his death – Their presence at the scene of
crime becomes doubtful – Information leading to the recovery of
the weapons of crime is admissible, but not the information that the
crime was actually committed by the said weapons – Identity of the
appellants as the persons involved in the offence not established
* Author
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 343
Rajendra Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal Etc.
either by any ocular evidence or from the recovery of the weapons
of crime – Order of acquittal passed by the trial court not open to
interference by the first appellate court until and unless the findings
recorded by the trial court were per se perverse or erroneous – It
is safer and more appropriate to rely upon the findings of the trial
court which has seen the demeanor of the witnesses rather than
to rely upon the findings of the first appellate court – High Court
erred in reversing the finding of the trial court without coming to the
conclusion that the findings of the trial court were perverse – High
Court manifestly erred in interfering with the findings of acquittal
recorded by the trial court and reversing the judgment so as to
convict the appellants – Doubtful whether the offence has been
committed by the appellants – Conviction of the appellants set
aside – Appellants acquitted of the alleged offence by granting
them the benefit of doubt – Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.25 and 26
rw s.27. [Paras 33-36]
Case Law Cited
Manjunath and Ors. v. State of Karnataka [2023] 14 SCR 727 :
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1421 – referred to.
Pulukuri Kottaya and Ors. v. The King Emperor, 1947 MWN
CR 45 – referred to.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872.
List of Keywords
Murder; Benefit of doubt; Altercation between the parties; Swords
and sharp edged weapon; Acquittal; Life imprisonment; Weapons;
Ocular evidence.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No(s).
476-477 of 2013
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.01.2013 of the High Court
of Uttarakhand at Nainital in GA No. 347 of 2007 and CRLR No.
164 of 2003
344 [2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Vivek Singh, Ms. Mary Mitzy, Ms. Saumya Saraswat, Ayush Gupta,
Abhishek Gupta, Vishwajeet Singh Bhati.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Kuldeep Parihar, D.A.G., Akshat Kumar, Ms. Anubha Dhulia, Ms.
Ikshita Parihar, Amit Pawan.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Pankaj Mithal, J.
1. All the three appellants, father, son and son-in-law are accused in
Session Trial No.215 of 2000 for the murder of Pushpendra Singh,
son of Diler Singh.
2. They were acquitted by the Trial Court but have been convicted
under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) with life
imprisonment and a fine of Rs.10,000/- each by the High Court vide
the judgment and order dated 02.01.2013 passed in Government
Appeal No.347 of 2007 (State of Uttaranchal vs. Rajendra Singh
and Ors.).
3. All the three accused have challenged the aforesaid judgment and
order of their conviction and sentence by means of this appeal.
4. The prosecution story in brief is that on the morning of 03.06.2000,
the appellant no.1 – Rajendra Singh and his son appellant no.2 –
Bhupender Singh started digging the field of Diler Singh, the father
of the deceased, for laying down plinth. Due to the aforesaid action
of the appellants, an altercation took place between them and Diler
Singh.
5. On the same day at about 1.30 p.m. when the deceased – Pushpendra
Singh was sitting at the Jogither diversion (Tiraha), his father –
Diler Singh who had gone to the flour mill of Kakka Singh, while
returning accompanied by his brother-in-law - Papender Singh, saw
the appellants coming on the motorcycle driven by the appellant
no.3 – Ranjeet Singh at the said spot. They parked their vehicle
and exhorted the deceased who started running followed by all the
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 345
Rajendra Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal Etc.
three accused persons armed with swords and carrying a kanta
(a sharp edged weapon).
6. The deceased ran for some time towards the northern fields raising
an alarm. Witnessing the same, Diler Singh, Papender Singh and
some other persons including Jwala Singh started running behind the
accused persons to save the deceased. The deceased, attempting
to save his life, entered into the house of one Mukhtyar Singh. The
appellants also entered the said premises and inflicted blows with
swords and Kanta upon the deceased who ultimately died on the
spot. The father of the deceased Diler Singh (PW-1) on the same
day lodged an FIR at 02.50 p.m. at Police Station, Nanak Matta
under Section 302 of IPC (Section 103(1) BNS). The panchnama
was prepared, statement of the witnesses were recorded, site plan
was also prepared and the dead body was sent for post-mortem,
which was conducted the next day.
7. The appellant nos.1 and 3 were arrested on 05.06.2000 and one
sword and the Kanta, the alleged weapons of crime, were recovered
as per the disclosure made by the appellants.
8. The appellant no.2 was arrested on 07.06.2000 and the sword used
by him in the commission of the offence was recovered based on
his disclosure.
9. Upon completion of investigation, the police submitted the chargesheet
on 14.06.2000 charging all the three accused for an offence under
Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
10. We had heard Shri Rajul Bhargava, senior advocate and Shri
Siddharth Agarwal, senior advocate along with Shri Vivek Singh,
advocate-on-record from the side of the appellants and Shri Kuldeep
Parihar, D.A.G and Ms. Anubha Dhulia, advocate for the State of
Uttarakhand.
11. The primary submission on behalf of the appellants is that they have
been falsely implicated. There is no reliable evidence to establish
the identity of the appellants as the alleged assailants. There is no
eyewitness to the incident, except the lady of the house into which the
deceased had entered to save his life. There are large contradictions
in the statements of the witnesses and that the discovery of the
weapons of crime is false and otherwise also has no relevance to
establish the identity of the accused with that of the assailants.
346 [2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
12. The State counsel has stoutly opposed the submissions advanced
from the side of the appellants and has submitted that all the three
accused were seen by the witnesses chasing the deceased, who
had entered the house of Mukhtyar Singh, and assaulted him with
the swords and the kanta which fact was witnessed by the lady
of the house, Amarjeet Kaur (PW-7). The clothes of PW-7 which
had blood stains were sealed by the police and the FSL report
confirmed the presence of blood on the clothes. On the disclosure
of the appellants, the weapons of crime were recovered, and they
admitted to having committed the crime with the same. The above
evidence leaves no scope for doubt about the commission of the
offence at the hands of the appellants. Therefore, the High Court
rightly reversed the decision of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court,
so as to convict the appellants for the offence under Section 302 of
IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment.
13. There is no dispute to the fact that on the morning of the fateful day,
appellant nos.1 and 2 had a quarrel with the father of the deceased –
Diler Singh, as they were stopped from digging the field for laying the
plinth. The aforesaid altercation between the two groups may be a
motive to attack and kill the son of Diler Singh, but that by itself would
not be sufficient to rope in the appellants unless their involvement in
the offence is established by cogent evidence. Therefore, the primary
issue which arises for our consideration is, whether the appellants
are the real persons who chased the deceased and killed him. This
has to be ascertained on the basis of the ocular evidence.
14. In this connection, the primary evidence is of the lady of the house
Amarjeet Kaur (PW-7). The said witness, who is the wife of Mukhtyar
Singh, the owner of the house, clearly deposed that the three accused
persons killed the boy in the house. They entered carrying swords
and other weapons in their hands. She tried to refrain them from
assaulting the boy, and in that process, her kurta received blood
stains. The victim fell down on the dewan after sustaining injuries.
Nobody inflicted any injury after the victim fell on the dewan. The
victim’s father and other people came there within half an hour of
the departure of the assailants. The police took her blood-stained
kurta and even the bedsheet in their possession, which she identified
as Exhibit-1 and Exhibit-2. She categorically stated that she did not
know the name of the accused persons.
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 347
Rajendra Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal Etc.
15. The aforesaid testimony of PW-7 clearly reflects that she had seen
three unknown persons, assaulting the deceased with weapons like
swords and that the deceased fell down on the dewan, whereafter
the assailants left without inflicting further injuries upon him. The
father of the deceased and other persons came there only after
about half an hour. A careful reading of the testimony of PW-7, as
a whole, would indicate that she did not know the names of the
accused persons and thus, could not disclose their identity. She had
only seen three persons attacking and assaulting the boy but could
not identify those persons.
16. No identification parade was carried out and PW-7 was not even
asked to confirm whether the appellants were the accused persons.
The police failed to get the appellants identified by her. Therefore, it
is doubtful whether the persons who assaulted the deceased were
actually the appellants.
17. The prosecution sought to establish the identity of the accused
persons with the help of testimony of Diler Singh (PW-1) and Jwala
Singh (PW-2).
18. A close look at the testimony of PW-1 would reveal that on 03.06.2000
at about 1.30 p.m., on returning from the flour mill of Kakka Singh,
he saw his deceased son sitting at Jogither diversion on a bench,
when all the three appellants came on motorcycle carrying naked
swords. They parked the motorcycle and threatened/provoked his
son, whereupon his son started running towards the fields. The
appellants chased him with swords and kanta. His son kept crying
“Save Me, Save Me”. Thereupon, on hearing the scream, he and
his brother-in-law - Papender Singh, ran after the accused persons
to save the deceased. They were followed by Jwala Singh, Bachan
Singh and Bhagat Singh. The deceased entered the house of
Mukhtyar Singh to save himself. The appellants also went inside.
He saw the appellants striking his son with weapons. His son fell on
the dewan and died due to the injuries. The appellants, thereafter,
fled from the scene.
19. In his cross-examination, he admitted that the Jogither diversion is
about 1.5 kms. away from his house and that there are three to four
shops at the diversion itself. The house of Mukhtyar Singh is also
at a distance of 1.25 kms. At the time of the incident, people were
working in the fields and they also saw the appellants chasing his
348 [2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
son. He also stated that he chased the appellants for about 10-15
minutes towards the house of Mukhtyar Singh and was about 40 to
50 steps behind them when his son entered the house of Mukhtyar
Singh. The appellants attacked his son with swords and Kanta even
after he fell down on the dewan. They kept hitting him, mainly on the
head, for about a minute. Amarjeet Kaur (PW-7) had tried to save
his son and, in the process, her clothes got blood stains. Thereafter,
he hugged his son due to which his clothes also got blood stains.
He went to the police station in those very clothes, but the clothes
were neither taken nor seized by the police.
20. If the testimony of PW-1 is seen in the light of the testimony of
PW-7, there are striking contradictions in the statements of the two
witnesses. The testimony of PW-7 is quite trustworthy and natural.
She is an independent witness and therefore, it is safer to rely upon
her statement. She has categorically stated that the father of the
deceased and other persons had arrived at her house about half
an hour after the incident or after the accused had left the place.
The testimony of PW-7 is apparently quite trustworthy as there is
no reason to disbelieve it. It is clear from her statement that PW-1
had reached the place of incident after half an hour of the incident.
He is, therefore, not actually an eyewitness who was present at
the time when the appellants allegedly attacked the deceased. He
had come there after about half an hour and as such cannot be an
eyewitness to the incident of attack. Secondly, PW-1 categorically
stated that when his son fell down on the dewan, he hugged him
and, in the process, his clothes were stained with blood. He never
offered his blood-stained clothes to the police for investigation, nor
did the police seized the same, despite the fact that he had gone to
the police station wearing them. Rather, he stated that he washed
them and wore them again. This is quite unnatural and an indicator
to the fact that the PW-1 was not actually present when the incident
of assault took place in the house of Mukhtyar Singh, and that the
story of hugging the deceased is concocted.
21. It is also very unnatural for PW-1 to go to the Jogither diversion while
returning from the flour mill of Kakka Singh as admittedly the said
diversion is not on the way back to his home. He is, therefore, a chance
witness and probably may not have seen the appellants coming on
the bike or even chasing the deceased. In these circumstances,
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 349
Rajendra Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal Etc.
PW-1 cannot be treated as a trustworthy witness and his evidence
cannot be relied upon to identify the appellants as the persons who
have attacked and assaulted the deceased.
22. PW-2 - Jwala Singh also appears to be a chance witness. He was
going to Jogither Diversion to purchase a soap but when he found
the PW-1 chasing the appellants, he also ran behind him in order
to help him and save the life of the deceased. He categorically
stated that he was 60-70 steps behind PW-1. Naturally, his entry
in the house of Mukhtyar Singh would have been only after PW-1,
who had entered the house as per the ocular evidence of PW-7,
about half an hour after the incident. In the above situation, PW-1
could not have been an actual eyewitness of the incident of assault
or the person who would have seen the appellants well enough to
recognize them as the real assailants. Therefore, his evidence also
could not have established the identity of the appellants.
23. Furthermore, no independent person of the area, the shopkeepers or
the labourers working in the fields, who allegedly saw the appellants
chasing the deceased, were called upon to enter the witness box to
corroborate the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2.
24. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the ocular evidence
of PW-7, PW-1 and PW-2, if read together, is not sufficient to
identify the appellants as the persons who attacked and assaulted
the deceased resulting in his death. It may be pertinent to mention
here that even PW-4 - Kakka Singh, to whose flour mill PW-1 had
allegedly gone and was said to be returning from there also did
not support the statement of PW-1. He has nowhere stated that
PW-1 had been to his flour mill, as alleged by him. Therefore, the
presence of PW-1 at the scene of crime becomes doubtful. Once
his presence is doubtful, the presence of PW-2 also stands belied,
because he categorically stated that he was following PW-1 and
was 60-70 steps behind him.
25. The prosecution did not ask any of these witnesses to identify the
accused persons.
26. This Court, in several decisions, while considering the evidentiary
value of a chance witness, has held that the deposition of a chance
witness whose presence at the place of incident is doubtful should
be discarded, or at least be treated with great caution and close
350 [2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
scrutiny. Such a chance witness must adequately explain his presence
at the place of incident, which has not been satisfactorily done in
the instant case.
27. Now, what remains before us is the recovery of the weapons of crime
to establish the identity of the appellants as the persons involved
in the crime. On the basis of the recovery of the said weapons, we
have to determine if the said recoveries are good enough to connect
the appellants with the crime.
28. Undoubtedly, the recovery of one of the swords was made from a
garage, and the recovery of another sword and the Kanta was made
from bushes in sugarcane field, which was an open space. The
weapons were no doubt recovered allegedly on the pointing out of
the appellants. However, no effort was made to match the blood on
the said weapons with that of the deceased. The weapons were sent
for forensic examination but no report of the forensic laboratory was
produced to establish that the weapons so recovered were smeared
with the blood of the deceased to prove that they were actually used
in the murder of the deceased.
29. We are afraid that the submission of the State counsel, that as the
appellants themselves stated that they took the police to the place
where they hid the weapons, by which they committed the offence
indicates that the appellants admitted to have committed the offence
with the above weapons, cannot be accepted. The statement of the
appellants that the weapons recovered were the weapons of crime
cannot be read against them in view of Sections 25 and 26 read
with Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Only that part of
the statement which leads the police to the recovery of the weapons
is admissible, and not the part which alleges that the weapons
recovered were actually the weapons of crime.
30. The above three provisions of the Evidence Act are beneficial to
bring home the point. They read as under:
“25. Confession to police officer not to be proved.––No
confession made to a police officer, shall be proved as
against a person accused of any offence.
26. Confession by accused while in custody of police
not to be proved against him.––No confession made
by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 351
Rajendra Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal Etc.
officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a
Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person.
Explanation.––In this section “Magistrate” does not include
the head of a village discharging magisterial functions in
the Presidency of Fort St. George or elsewhere, unless
such headman is a Magistrate exercising the powers of a
Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882
(10 of 1882)
27. How much of information received from accused
may be proved.––Provided that, when any fact is deposed
to as discovered in consequence of information received
from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of
a police officer, so much of such information, whether it
amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the
fact thereby discovered, may be proved.”
31. A simple reading of all the three provisions conjointly reveals that
the first two provisions are substantive, whereas Section 27 is in the
nature of an exception. Sections 25 and 26, at one hand, provide
that no confession made to a police officer or to any person while in
custody of the police, shall be admissible against a person accused
of any offence, on the other hand, Section 27 provides an exception
to the above provisions. It states that so much of the information,
received from an accused person in custody of the police, whether
in the nature of confession or otherwise, as related distinctly to the
fact thereby discovered, may be admissible. This means that not all
information disclosed by a person in police custody is required to be
proved as against the accused person; only that part which distinctly
relates to the discovery of a fact is admissible and can be proved.
32. In Pulukuri Kottaya and Ors. vs. The King Emperor1, the Privy
Council while analysing the aforesaid three provisions of the Evidence
Act, held that the fact of discovery, on information supplied by the
accused is a relevant fact except in a case in which the possession
or concealment of an object constitute the gist of the offence charged.
Information supplied by a person in custody such as “I will produce a
knife concealed in the roof of my house”, only leads to the discovery
1 1947 MWN CR 45
352 [2025] 10 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of the knife concealed in the house of the informant, but whether the
knife is proved to have been used in the commission of an offence
is another question. So if the above information is followed by the
words, “with which I stabbed A”, those words would be inadmissible
since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife from the house
of the informant, but are rather independent in nature, amounting to
confession of the crime which cannot be used against the person
making it i.e. the accused, in view of prohibition contained under
Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act.
33. The aforesaid decision has recently been followed with approval by
the Division Bench of this Court in Manjunath and Ors. vs. State
of Karnataka2 wherein it has been said that only “so much of the
information” as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is
admissible, and the rest of the information stands excluded. In
other words, the information leading to the recovery of the weapons
of crime is admissible, but not the information that the crime was
actually committed by the said weapons.
34. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the identity of
the appellants as the persons involved in the offence has not been
established either by any ocular evidence or from the recovery of
the weapons of crime.
35. It is important to note that the order of acquittal passed by the Trial
Court was not open to interference by the First Appellate Court until
and unless the findings recorded by the Trial Court were per se
perverse or erroneous. It is safer and more appropriate to rely upon
the findings of the Trial Court which has seen the demeanor of the
witnesses rather than to rely upon the findings of the First Appellate
Court. In our opinion, the High Court erred in reversing the finding
of the Trial Court without coming to the conclusion that the findings
of the Trial Court were perverse.
36. Thus, in the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, we are
of the view that High Court manifestly erred in interfering with the
findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court and reversing the
judgment so as to convict the appellants. It is doubtful whether the
offence has been committed by the appellants. The conviction of
2 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1421
[2025] 10 S.C.R. 353
Rajendra Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal Etc.
the appellants is accordingly set aside. The appeals are allowed,
and the appellants are acquitted of the alleged offence by granting
them the benefit of doubt.
37. The appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds stand discharged.
Result of the case: Appeals allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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