RAJU @ NIRPENDRA SINGHversusTHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

                 [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1821 : 2025 INSC 392

                        Raju @ Nirpendra Singh
                                    v.
                      The State of Madhya Pradesh
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 1172 of 2014)
                                27 February 2025
                 [Vikram Nath* and Sanjay Karol, JJ.]


                             Issue for Consideration
       Prosecutrix, a minor village girl, was allegedly kidnapped on the pretext
       of securing her a job, and then gang raped by accused-appellants
       over a period of two months by holding her captive by threatening
       her life. Whether the trial court and the High Court erred in convicting
       appellants u/ss.366 and 376(2)(g) IPC.

                                    Headnotes†
       Penal Code, 1860 – ss.366 and 376(2)(g) – Village girl allegedly
       kidnapped and gang-raped by accused-appellants over a
       period of two months – Conviction of appellants by trial court
       and High Court – Propriety:
       Held: Dental examination of prosecutrix and further evidence such
       as photocopies of school register, transfer certificate, statement
       of the Principal of school, proved that prosecutrix was aged less
       than seventeen years of age at the starting date of the continuing
       offence – Guardian of the prosecutrix, PW-13, had also stated
       the age of the prosecutrix to be less than 18 years of age in
       the missing person’s report as well as in her deposition before
       the Trial Court – Once the age of the prosecutrix at the time of
       the incident is established to be that of minority, the question of
       consent per se becomes irrelevant and the act shall qualify as
       statutory rape nevertheless – Subjection to sexual intercourse
       under fear of accused persons can in no way be understood to
       mean as consent on part of the prosecutrix – Further, the reliance
       of the appellants on the medical report which suggested that the
       prosecutrix was accustomed to sexual intercourse shall not further
       their contention of the sexual act to be consensual in nature – The


* Author
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    expression as “being accustomed to sexual intercourse” is nothing
    but an archaic notion of sexual purity which intends to morally
    shame the victim and downplay the role of consent, or the lack
    thereof, in an offence of rape – Moreover, the lack of injuries on
    the body of the prosecutrix shall also not be an important factor
    in the facts of the case since the offence continued for a period
    of two months and the medical investigation was conducted much
    after the first incidence of rape was committed – The issue of
    delay shall also be inconsequential to the case since firstly, the
    normal rule of delay does not apply to rape cases and further, the
    prosecutrix was held captive by the appellants for a period of two
    months and had no means to register the FIR earlier – Further,
    the statement of the prosecutrix made in the chief-examination
    regarding sexual assaults committed by the accused persons
    remained totally unimpeached even after being subjected to
    a lengthy cross-examination – No mitigating circumstances
    in the instant case so as to reduce the punishment as lesser
    than the minimum statutory sentence prescribed in the IPC.
    [Paras 19-24]
    Rape – Gang-rape – Once age of the victim at the time of the
    incident is established to be that of minority, the question
    of consent per se becomes irrelevant – Penal Code, 1860 –
    s.376(2)(g). [Para 20]
    Rape – Gang-rape – Subjection to sexual intercourse under
    fear of accused persons is not consent on part of the victim –
    Penal Code, 1860 – s.376(2)(g). [Para 20]

                            Case Law Cited
    Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hiribhai v. State of Gujarat [1983] 3 SCR
    280 : AIR 1983 SC 753 – referred to.

                               List of Acts
    Penal Code, 1860.

                            List of Keywords
    Gang Rape; Kidnapping from lawful guardianship; Prosecutrix; Rape
    with minor; Delay in FIR; Effect of delay in rape cases; Accustomed
    to sexual intercourse; Offence against women.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                               1823

           Raju @ Nirpendra Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh


                              Case Arising From
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
      1172 of 2014
      From the Judgment and Order dated 15.05.2013 of the High Court
      of M.P. at Jabalpur of CRA No. 1850 of 2010
      With
      Criminal Appeal No(s). 1173 and 2575 of 2014

                          Appearances for Parties
      Advs. for the Appellant:
      Sidharath Dave, Siddhartha Dave, Sr. Advs., B.P.S. Parihar, B. K.
      Satija, Shree Pal Singh, Anupam Mishra, Jenis V Francis, Harikumar V.,
      Ms. Jemtiben. Ao., Nayan Dham, Rohan Trivedi.
      Advs. for the Respondent:
      V.V.V. Pattabhiram, D.A.G. Ms. Mrinal Gopal Elker, Mukesh Kumar
      Verma, Aditya Chaudhary.

                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                     Order

      Vikram Nath, J.

1.    The instant appeals have been preferred by the accused-appellants
      against the common judgment dated 15.05.2013 passed by the High
      Court of Madhya Pradesh in Criminal Appeal No. 1850 of 2010 and
      other connected matters wherein the High Court had dismissed the
      appellants’ appeals and affirmed the conviction and sentences for
      the offences under Section 366 and 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal
      Code, 1860.1
2.    The appeals arise from a common set of facts and interlinked
      offences which have been briefly stated below. The prosecution
      case is that the prosecutrix, who at the relevant point of time was
      an unmarried girl aged about 17 years, and was residing with her
      paternal aunt named Premwati since childhood in village Chowka


1    IPC
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     Sonvarsha. Indrapal (Accused No. 2, i.e. “A2”) was the Sarpanch
     of Gram Panchayat Dhoraha whereas Sheshmani (Accused No. 1,
     i.e. “A1”) was the husband of Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Chowka
     Sonvarsh. Houses belonging to A1 Sheshmani and Premwati were
     located in the same neighbourhood.
3.   It was alleged that around 4th/5th June, 2005, A1 Sheshmani assured
     the prosecutrix, who by then had studied upto Class X, of securing
     her employment in near future. Nearly 25 days later, A2 Indrapal
     and Surendra (Accused No. 5, i.e. “A5”) and two unknown persons
     who were introduced as brothers-in-law of A5 Surendra came to
     the house of the prosecutrix and she was told that A5 Surendra is
     a resident of Sidhi and posted at Bhopal, and will be able to secure
     a job for the prosecutrix.
4.   Thereafter, on 06.07.2005 at around 12 noon, A1 Sheshmani visited
     the house of Premwati and asked the prosecutrix to accompany
     him to Rewa where she has been called in by A2 Indrapal and
     A5 Surendra for the purpose of providing employment. When the
     prosecutrix wished to seek permission from Premwati, A1 Sheshmani
     insisted on not informing Premwati who was asleep at that time. As
     such, A1 Sheshmani took the prosecutrix to a house located near
     LPG godown in Rewa where A2 Indrapal and Raju (Accused No.
     3, i.e. “A3”) were already present. After a while, A5 Surendra also
     came there and all the three accused persons, i.e. A2, A3 and A5
     committed rape upon the prosecutrix. Thereafter, she was made to
     stay at that house till 10.07.2005 where she was repeatedly subjected
     to gang rape at the hands of the appellants.
5.   Subsequently, on 10.07.2005, the prosecutrix was taken by A2
     Indrapal and A3 Raju to Sidhi where Suresh (Accused No. 4, i.e.
     “A4”) was telephoned, post which he also came there and took the
     prosecutrix to Prince Hotel where she was again subjected to rape.
     Thereafter, the prosecutrix was taken to the house of one Kalli @
     Kalawati with whom she was made to reside till 14.07.2005.
6.   Then on 15.07.2005, the prosecutrix was brought back to the
     house occupied by A2 Indrapal at Rewa where he and A3 Raju
     again committed gang rape on her. On the same day, they took
     her to Malhar wherefrom they boarded a train. There was a woman
     in the same train who was previously known to A2 Indrapal and
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                        1825

        Raju @ Nirpendra Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh



     A3 Raju and the prosecutrix was handed over to the said woman
     for being taken to A5 Surendra’s place at Bhopal. However, the
     woman took the prosecutrix to an unknown destination near Delhi
     where she was made to reside with the said woman in a house
     till 10.09.2005. In the intervening period, A2 Indrapal and A3 Raju
     frequently visited that house and subjected the prosecutrix to rape
     repeatedly.
7.   It was only on 08.09.2005 that A2 Indrapal informed the prosecutrix
     about a report alleging his involvement in her kidnapping, post-which
     the woman deputed a boy to render assistance to the prosecutrix
     for boarding a train to Allahabad. The prosecutrix reached Allahabad
     on 11.09.2005 and from there, she straightaway proceeded to the
     Police Station at Laur, where upon an application made by Premwati,
     a case of missing person had already been registered. Further, in
     light of the statement of the prosecutrix, the SHO of P.S. Laur, district
     Rewa registered a case under Sections 363, 366 and 376(2)(g) of
     the IPC against the accused-appellants and others including the
     unknown woman.
8.   Subsequently, the prosecutrix was sent to GMC, Rewa where she was
     examined by Dr. Rajshri Bajaj who prepared two slides from vaginal
     smear of the prosecutrix and observed that she was accustomed to
     sexual intercourse. The prosecutrix was also examined by a Dental
     Surgeon, Dr. R.J. Sharma, who by noticing the number and position
     of teeth erupted, ascertained the age of the prosecutrix as below
     17 years.
9.   After due investigation and charge-sheet being filed, which showed
     all the accused-appellants as absconding, the case was committed
     to the Court of Session for Trial.
10. The Trial Court, after duly examining the witnesses and appreciating
    the evidence on record, held that the accused Indrapal, Suresh
    and Surendra kidnapped the prosecutrix, who was below 18 years
    of age, from lawful guardianship of her paternal aunt Premwati for
    committing illicit intercourse with her and accused Indrapal, Suresh,
    Surendra and Raju committed gang rape on prosecutrix several times
    during the period from 06.07.2005 to 12.09.2005 against her will.
    The accused persons were convicted under the following sections
    and subjected to punishment as follows:
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          Accused      Conviction                   Punishment
        A1            366 IPC         Rigorous imprisonment of ten years
        Sheshmani                     along with fine of Rs. 2,000/-; in default,
                                      further rigorous imprisonment of one year
        A2 Indrapal   363 IPC         Rigorous imprisonment of seven years
                                      along with fine of Rs. 1,000/-; in default,
                                      further rigorous imprisonment of six
                                      months
                      366 IPC         Rigorous imprisonment of ten years
                                      along with fine of Rs. 2,000/-; in default,
                                      further rigorous imprisonment of one year
                      376(2)(g) IPC   Rigorous imprisonment of ten years
                                      along with fine of Rs. 2,000/-; in default,
                                      further rigorous imprisonment of one year
        A3 Raju       376(2)(g) IPC   Rigorous imprisonment of ten years
                                      along with fine of Rs. 2,000/-; in default,
                                      further rigorous imprisonment of one year
        A4 Suresh     363 IPC         Rigorous imprisonment of seven years
                                      along with fine of Rs. 1,000/-; in default,
                                      further rigorous imprisonment of six
                                      months
                      366 IPC         Rigorous imprisonment of ten years
                                      along with fine of Rs. 2,000/-; in default,
                                      further rigorous imprisonment of one year
                      376(2)(g) IPC   Rigorous imprisonment of ten years
                                      along with fine of Rs. 2,000/-; in default,
                                      further rigorous imprisonment of one year
        A5 Surendra   363 IPC         Rigorous imprisonment of seven years
                                      along with fine of Rs. 1,000/-; in default,
                                      further rigorous imprisonment of six
                                      months
                      366 IPC         Rigorous imprisonment of ten years
                                      along with fine of Rs. 2,000/-; in default,
                                      further rigorous imprisonment of one year
                      376(2)(g) IPC   Rigorous imprisonment of ten years
                                      along with fine of Rs. 2,000/-; in default,
                                      further rigorous imprisonment of one year

    The sentence terms awarded to accused Suresh, Indrapal and
    Surendra were to run concurrently.
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                       1827

        Raju @ Nirpendra Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh


11.    All the five accused persons preferred appeals against the conviction
      before the High Court. The High Court re-examined the grounds of
      defence put forth by the accused persons as well as the contentions
      supporting the prosecution’s case and held that the ingredients of the
      offences punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376(2)(g) of the
      IPC were made out beyond all reasonable doubt. However, for want
      of charge, it was not possible to hold A3 Raju guilty of the offence of
      kidnapping. Further, double punishment awarded to A2 Indrapal, A4
      Suresh and A5 Surendra for the offences punishable under Sections
      363 and 366 was held to be in violation of Section 71 of the IPC and
      accordingly, separate sentences for the offence under Section 363
      of the IPC awarded to A2 Indrapal, A4 Suresh and A5 Surendra was
      set aside. It was also observed that A1 Sheshmani ought to have
      been charged and convicted for the offence under Section 376(2)
      (g) of the IPC. Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed and the
      convictions and the consequent sentences for the offences under
      Sections 366 and 376(2)(g) of the IPC were affirmed.
12. Aggrieved by the impugned order, all the accused persons except
    A5 Surendra had approached this Court. While granting leave in
    this matter, vide order dated 09.05.2014, suspension of sentence
    was granted to the appellants subject to them furnishing respective
    bail bonds in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- along with two sureties each
    in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court concerned.
    Consequently, since the appellant Sheshmani had since expired in
    the year 2016, his appeal stood dismissed as abated, as noted vide
    order dated 23.01.2025.
13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
    material on record.
14. The chief contention of the counsel for the appellants hinged on the
    argument that the prosecutrix had given her consent to the act. The
    appellants attempted to derive such consent from the fact that she
    had left her home with the appellants willingly without informing her
    guardian and that the prosecutrix remained in the company of the
    appellants for a period of two months and during this period, she
    visited many places like Siddhi, Rewa, Allahabad and Delhi using
    public transport where she could have easily raised call or alarm for
    help, but she did not do so, which clearly showed that prosecutrix was
    a consenting party. Further, it was submitted that the medical report
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     suggested that the prosecutrix was accustomed to sexual intercourse
     and there were no injuries on her body, thereby supplementing the
     argument that there was no forcible sexual intercourse, the prosecutrix
     had consented to the act throughout and there was no offence of
     rape as alleged.
15. It was also submitted by the appellants that there was a delay of
    about 2 months in lodging the FIR and such a delay was completely
    unjustified and unexplained. Lastly, a challenge was also raised
    as to the age of the prosecutrix, as was also done before both the
    Courts below, arguing that the prosecutrix had attained the age of
    majority at the time of the incident and therefore, on account of her
    being a consenting adult party, no offence of kidnapping or rape
    was made out.
16. On the other hand, the counsel for the respondent State submitted
    that the testimony of the prosecutrix is reliable and without any
    contradictions which inspires complete confidence of the Court.
    Since it is well settled law that conviction for the offence of rape
    could be safely recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix
    provided that her evidence does not suffer from any basic infirmity
    and probabilities factor2 and the Trial Court as well as the High Court
    had found prosecutrix testimony to be reliable without any infirmities,
    therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone.
17. Further, it was submitted that the delay in lodging the FIR was on
    account of prosecutrix being held captive/kidnapped by the accused
    persons for a period of two months. With regard to the issue of consent,
    it was submitted that even if in arguendo, it is assumed that the
    prosecutrix came with A1 Sheshmani out of her own will, considering
    that the Courts below have conclusively found the prosecutrix to be
    below 17 years of age and therefore, the accused persons would
    be liable for offences under Sections 366 and 376(2)(g) of the IPC.
18. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the statements
    of the witnesses on record and the findings of the Courts below, we
    find that the appellants have not made any good ground on the basis
    of which the concurrent findings of the two Courts below could be
    interfered with.


2   Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hiribhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 753
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                        1829

        Raju @ Nirpendra Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh


19. Firstly, the most relevant point for consideration is the age of the
    prosecutrix. The dental examination of the prosecutrix was conducted
    and the dental surgeon (PW-8) had opined the age of the prosecutrix
    to be less than seventeen years. There was further evidence produced
    to prove that the prosecutrix was minor at the relevant point of time,
    such as photocopies of school register, transfer certificate, which
    were further corroborated by the statement of the Principal of school.
    In all such documents, the date of the prosecutrix was shown as
    10.08.1988 and the date of the incident was 06.07.2005, therefore
    the prosecutrix was aged less than seventeen years of age at the
    starting date of the continuing offence. To further strengthen the
    finding of the prosecutrix’s age, it must be noted that the guardian
    of the prosecutrix, Premwati (PW-13), had also stated the age of the
    prosecutrix to be less than 18 years of age in the missing person’s
    report as well as in her deposition before the Trial Court.
20. Once the age of the prosecutrix at the time of the incident is established
    to be that of minority, the question of consent per se becomes
    irrelevant and the act shall qualify as statutory rape nevertheless.
    However, even if the argument of consent is to be considered, we
    cannot lose sight of the fact that the accused-appellants were men
    who had held the prosecutrix, who was of a tender age, captive for a
    prolonged period of time by threatening her life. It would be illogical
    to rule out the role played by constant fear that the prosecutrix
    was operating under as she was being subjected to rape by the
    accused persons over the period of two months. Such a subjection
    to sexual intercourse under fear of accused persons can in no way
    be understood to mean as consent on part of the prosecutrix.
21. Further, the reliance of the appellants on the medical report which
    suggested that the prosecutrix was accustomed to sexual intercourse
    shall not further their contention of the sexual act to be consensual
    in nature. This is simply for the reason that such an expression as
    “being accustomed to sexual intercourse” is nothing but an archaic
    notion of sexual purity which intends to morally shame the victim
    and downplay the role of consent, or the lack thereof, in an offence
    of rape. Moreover, the lack of injuries on the body of the prosecutrix
    shall also not be an important factor in the facts of the case since
    the offence continued for a period of two months and the medical
    investigation was conducted much after the first incidence of rape
    was committed.
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22. The issue of delay shall also be inconsequential to the case since
    firstly, the normal rule of delay does not apply to rape cases and
    further, the prosecutrix was held captive by the appellants for a
    period of two months and had no means to register the FIR earlier.
23. Further, we find it of utmost importance to note here that the
    statement of the prosecutrix made in the chief-examination regarding
    sexual assaults committed by the accused persons remained
    totally unimpeached even after being subjected to a lengthy cross-
    examination. It is to be noted that none of the so-called discrepancies
    in the evidence of the prosecutrix with reference to her case diary
    statement shook the veracity of the prosecution case.
24. Lastly, the counsel for the appellants had argued in favour of
    reducing the sentence awarded to the period already undergone
    considering that the accused-appellants have been enlarged on bail
    for a considerable period of time now. However, we find no mitigating
    circumstances in the instant case so as to reduce the punishment as
    lesser than the minimum statutory sentence prescribed in the IPC.
    We are in no way inclined to trivialize the misery and exploitation that
    has been suffered by the prosecutrix, a young girl from a village who
    was kidnapped on the pretext of securing her a job by men in whom
    she imposed some level of trust, and then subjected to an offence
    as heinous as gang rape for an elongated period of two months. The
    ends of justice shall be met only when the accused-appellants have
    suffered the entire period of sentence that they have been awarded
    and thereby, no leniency is merited in the facts of the case.
25. Accordingly, the appeals are dismissed and the impugned order is
    upheld. The accused-appellants, who are currently enlarged on bail,
    are hereby directed to serve the remaining period of sentence, as
    awarded by the High Court. As such, eight weeks’ time is granted to
    the appellants to surrender before the concerned Trial Court.
26. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Bibhuti Bhushan Bose