Supreme Court of India
RAM CHARAN & ORS.versusSUKHRAM & ORS.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 865
- Decided
- 17 July 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- SANJAY KAROL
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the legal heirs of the tribal woman are entitled to an equal share in the ancestral property, and the lower courts' dismissal was set aside.
Summary
The appellants, who are the legal heirs of Dhaiya, a Scheduled Tribe woman, filed a suit for partition of land that belonged to their maternal grandfather, claiming that their mother was entitled to an equal share. The trial court and the High Court dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove any custom granting daughters inheritance rights and that the Hindu Succession Act did not apply to Scheduled Tribes. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether, in the absence of a specific custom, the principles of justice, equity and good conscience under the Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875 could be invoked, and whether such denial violated Article 14's guarantee of equality. The Court held that the repeal of the 1875 Act did not affect accrued rights and that, with no proven exclusionary custom, denying the female heir would be arbitrary and discriminatory. Consequently, the Court set aside the lower courts' judgments and awarded the appellants an equal share in the ancestral property.
Issues considered
- Whether a tribal woman or her legal heirs are entitled to an equal share in ancestral property.
- Whether any custom of the Gond tribe confers or excludes inheritance rights on daughters.
- Whether the principle of justice, equity and good conscience under the Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875 applies despite its repeal.
- Whether the denial of inheritance to a female heir violates Article 14 of the Constitution.
- Whether the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 applies to members of Scheduled Tribes.
Legislation cited
- Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875s. 4, s. 6
- Constitution of Indias. Article 14, s. Article 15(1)
- Hindu Succession Act, 1956s. Section 2(2)
- Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005
Subjects
tribal women right in ancestral propertyconstitutional goal of equalityequality between successors of common ancestorfemale heir entitled to propertycustomsabsence of customprinciples of justice, equity and good conscienceexclusionary custompatriarchal pre-dispositioninheritance in customreasonable classificationArticle 14gender equalitygender division and discriminationright to equalitysuccessionlegal heirs of woman belonging to Scheduled Tribeestablish right over such property by way of custom
Judgment
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 272 : 2025 INSC 865
Ram Charan & Ors.
v.
Sukhram & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 9537 of 2025)
17 July 2025
[Sanjay Karol* and Joymalya Bagchi, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether a tribal woman or her legal heirs would be
entitled to an equal share in her ancestral property or not.
Headnotes†
Succession – Right of inheritance of tribal woman to ancestral
property – Legal heirs of a woman belonging to a Scheduled
Tribe, sought declaration of title and partition of a property,
belonging to their maternal grandfather – Suit dismissed by
the courts below holding that the legal heirs failed to establish
their right over such property by way of custom, showing that
female heir entitled thereto – Correctness:
Held: Keeping with the principles of justice, equity and good
conscience, read along with the overarching effect of Art.14, the
legal heirs of the deceased mother belonging to a Scheduled Tribe
entitled to their equal share in the property – Denying the female
heir a right in the property only exacerbates gender division and
discrimination, which the law should ensure to weed out – No
such custom of female succession could be established by the
legal heirs, but nonetheless a custom to the contrary also could
not be shown in the slightest, much less proved – Denying legal
heirs deceased mother her share in her father’s property, when
the custom is silent, would violate her right to equality vis-à-vis
her brothers or those of her legal heirs vis-à-vis their cousin –
Also, Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which excludes the Scheduled
Tribes from its application, not applicable – Neither any particular
law of a community nor custom could be brought into application
by either side – Customs too, like the law, cannot remain stuck
in time and others cannot be allowed to take refuge in customs
to deprive others of their right – Furthermore, the principle of
* Author
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 273
Ram Charan & Ors. v. Sukhram & Ors.
justice, equity, and good conscience find statutory recognition in
the Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875, the High Court held that
the same has been repealed and, thus, cannot be applied, is a
mistaken position – Effect of s. 4 of the Repealed Act, is clear that
no right having been accrued prior to the repeal of the Act shall be
affected thereby – Parties to the instant lis are neither governed by
Hindu nor Muslim laws and, thus, would be covered by s.6 of the
1875 Act – Rights of the mother had crystallized upon the death
of her father, 30 years before the filing of the plaint, would not be
affected by the fact that the Act was no longer in the statute book –
Furthermore, there appears to be no rational nexus or reasonable
classification for only males to be granted succession over the
property of their forebears and not women, more so in the case
where no prohibition to such effect can be shown to be prevalent
as per law – Thus, the impugned judgment set aside – Central
Provinces Laws Act, 1875 – ss.4, 6 – Constitution of India – Art.14.
[Paras 12, 13, 15-20, 27-29]
Doctrines/Principles – Principles of ‘justice, equity and good
conscience – Meaning of:
Held: Principle of ‘justice, equity and good conscience can be
applied only when there is a void or, in other words, in the absence
of any law governing that aspect – Since no custom to the effect
that women were entitled to the property, the application thereof
would be consistent with this position – When applying the principle
of justice, equity and good conscience, the Courts have to be
mindful. [Paras 18, 19]
Case Law Cited
Salekh Chand v. Satya Gupta and Ors. [2008] 3 SCR 833 :
(2008) 13 SCC 119; Ratanlal v. Sundarabai Govardhandas
Samsuka [2017] 11 SCR 28 : (2018) 11 SCC 119; Aliyathammuda
Beethathebiyyappura Pookoya v. Pattakal Cheriyakoya [2019] 10
SCR 961 : (2019) 16 SCC 1; Daduram and Others v. Bhuri Bai
& Ors., SA No.270 of 2023; Tirith Kumar v. Daduram [2024] 12
SCR 665 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3810; Niemla Textile Finishing
Mills Ltd. v. 2nd Punjab Tribunal [1957] 1 SCR 335 : 1957 SCC
OnLine SC 64; Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal
Affairs v. Corpn. of Calcutta [1967] SCR 170 : 1966 SCC OnLine
SC 42; M. Siddiq v. Suresh Das [2019] 18 SCR 1 : (2020) 1 SCC 1;
274 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Western U.P. Electric Power and Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P.
[1968] 3 SCR 312 : (1969) 1 SCC 817; Air India v. Nergesh Meerza
[1982] 1 SCR 438 : (1981) 4 SCC 335; Maneka Gandhi v. Union
of India [1978] 2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248; State of J&K v.
Triloki Nath Khosa [1974] 1 SCR 771 : (1974) 1 SCC 19; Vijay
Lakshmi v. Punjab University [2003] Supp. 3 SCR 1034 : (2003)
8 SCC 440; Shayara Bano v. Union of India [2017] 9 SCR 797 :
(2017) 9 SCC 1 – referred to.
Mst. Sarwango and others v. Mst. Urchamahin and Others, 2013
SCC OnLine Chh 5 – referred to.
List of Acts
Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875; Constitution of India; Hindu
Succession Act, 1956; Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005.
List of Keywords
Tribal women right in ancestral property; Constitutional goal of
equality; Equality between successors of common ancestor; Female
heir entitled to property; Customs; Absence of custom; Principles
of justice, equity and good conscience; Exclusionary custom;
Patriarchal pre-disposition; Inheritance in custom; Reasonable
classification; Article 14; Gender equality; Gender division and
discrimination; Right to equality; Succession; Legal heirs of woman
belonging to Scheduled Tribe; Establish right over such property
by way of custom.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9537 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 01.07.2022 of the High Court
of Chhatisgarh at Bilaspur in SA No. 465 of 2009
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Padmesh Mishra, Ms. Vastvikta Bhardwaj, Nikunj Goyal, Aditya,
Vijant, Ms. Neelam Singh.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Bipin Bihari Singh, Ashok Anand, Anand Kumar Singh, Ajay Gupta,
Mukul Dev Mishra, Sumeer Sodhi.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 275
Ram Charan & Ors. v. Sukhram & Ors.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sanjay Karol, J.
Leave Granted
2. The instant appeal is preferred against the judgment dated 1st July
2022 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur, in Second
Appeal No.465 of 2009, whereby it affirmed the judgment and decree
dated 21st April 2009 passed by the Second Additional District Judge
(FTC)1, Surajpur, District Sarguja (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No.1A/08
and the judgment and decree dated 29th February 2008 passed by
the Second Civil Judge, Class-2, Surajpur, Sarguja (C.G.)2 in Civil
Suit No.21A/08, dismissing the suit of partition filed by the appellant-
plaintiffs.
3. The short question involved in this appeal is whether a tribal woman
(or her legal heirs) would be entitled to an equal share in her ancestral
property or not. One would think that in this day and age, where
great strides have been made in realizing the constitutional goal of
equality, this Court would not need to intervene for equality between
the successors of a common ancestor and the same should be a
given, irrespective of their biological differences, but it is not so.
4. The facts lie in a narrow compass. The appellants-plaintiffs are
the legal heirs of one Dhaiya, a woman belonging to a Scheduled
Tribe. They sought partition of a property belonging to their maternal
grandfather, Bhajju alias Bhanjan Gond. Their mother was one of the
six children - five sons and one daughter, stating that their mother is
entitled to an equal share in the scheduled property. The cause of
action arose in October 1992 when defendant Nos.6 to 16 refused to
make a partition. The appellant-plaintiffs approached the Trial Court
seeking a declaration of title and partition of the suit property.
5. By judgment dated 29th February 2008, the suit was dismissed
holding as follows :
1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘First Appellate Court’
2 Hereinafter referred to as ‘Trial Court’
276 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“11. From the contentions of the above three Plaintiff
Witness it is clear that they have stated the fact of the right
of the Bua and her sons i.e. the rights of the daughters
on the land of the father. The judicial review Heera Lal
Gond Vs Sukhbariya Bai M.P. V. No.1993 (Part-2) 143 has
been presented on behalf of the plaintiffs, wherein it has
held that as per the custom of parties of the Gond Caste
that on proving the succession of the widow and daughter
they shall get the succession. This Judicial Review is not
applied in this case, because the plaintiffs have not certified
their caste customs. They have only stated to be claimed
the rights of the daughters to get into the properties of
their father, but who can say that in their knowledge such
right has been given to any specific person. In this regard
a judicial review Bihari Vs. Yashwantin 1973 R.N.. 64 has
been presented on behalf of the defendants, wherein the
Hon’ble High Court has opined that the peoples of the
Gond Caste are not governed by the Hindu custom, but
they shall be governed by their specific tradition in their all
cases including succession. In regard to the certification
of tradition, the opinion of the Hon’ble Court is that the
statement being tradition is not sufficient, they should be
presented the real events.
12. Thus, from the analysis of the above evidence it is
made clear that the plaintiff has not made the statement of
even any witness for providing their custom. Apart from this,
they have also not made the claim of the fact of governing
their custom from the caste tradition in their contentions.
They are telling themselves Hindu and claiming that they
are governed under the Hindu Succession Act, which is a
specific provision in sub-section 2 of section 2 of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 that the member of the Scheduled
Tribe shall not be governed by this Act. Accordingly, the
plaintiffs have failed to prove suit issues No.1 to 3 in
their favor. Resultantly, their conclusion is made in the
‘not certified’.”
(Emphasis supplied)
6. The First Appellate Court, by its judgment dated 21st April 2009
concurred with the findings of the Trial Court that the mother of the
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 277
Ram Charan & Ors. v. Sukhram & Ors.
appellant-plaintiffs had no right in the property of her father. It is
held so for the reason that no evidence had been led to show that
children of a female heir are also entitled to property.
7. An appeal under Section 100 Code of Civil Procedure, 19083 has
been admitted on the following substantial question of law :
“(l) Whether both the Courts below were justified in
dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs by recording a finding
which is perverse and contrary to the record?”
8. The High Court, having considered the contentions of the parties qua
the first argument of custom, held that the finding of the Trial Court is
in consonance with the judgments of this Court in Salekh Chand v.
Satya Gupta and Ors.4; Ratanlal v. Sundarabai Govardhandas
Samsuka5; and Aliyathammuda Beethathebiyyappura Pookoya v.
Pattakal Cheriyakoya6. It was held that the appellant-plaintiffs
seeking partition of property had failed to establish their right over
such property by way of custom, showing that a female heir is also
entitled thereto.
9. The second argument of the counsel for the appellant-plaintiffs is
that in the absence of custom, justice, equity and good conscience
must prevail, in accordance with Daduram and Others v. Bhuri Bai
& Ors.7, the judgment of a coordinate Bench of the said Court. This
argument was rejected on the ground that the coordinate Bench of
the High Court was not informed that the 1875 Act stood repealed
on 30th March 2018. It is the latter order from which the judgment
of this Court in Tirith Kumar v. Daduram8 arose.
10. In so far as the argument of the appellant-plaintiffs that they had
adopted Hindu traditions, it was held that since there was no evidence
to that effect brought on record, the Trial Court as well as the First
Appellate Court had rightly rejected this contention. In terms of the
above, the substantial question of law was answered in the negative.
3 Hereinafter ‘CPC’
4 (2008) 13 SCC 119
5 (2018) 11 SCC 119
6 (2019) 16 SCC 1
7 SA No.270 of 2023
8 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3810
278 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
11. In that view of the matter, the appellant-plaintiffs are before us. We
have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused
their written submissions.
12. At the outset of our consideration, it is clarified that the question
of the parties having adopted Hindu customs and way of life is no
longer in play. That apart, we may also notice Section 2(2) of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which unequivocally excludes from its
application, Scheduled Tribes. It reads :
“Section 2(2): Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
section (1), nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the
members of any Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of
clause (25) of article 366 of the Constitution unless the
Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette,
otherwise directs.”
13. Since the Hindu Law has no application, the next possibility to be
considered is that of the application of the custom. For the application
of a custom to be shown, it has to be proved, but it was not in the
present case. In fact, the Courts below proceeded, in our view, with
an assumption in mind and that assumption was misplaced. The point
of inception regarding the discussion of customs was at the exclusion
stage, meaning thereby that they assumed there to be an exclusionary
custom in a place where the daughters would not be entitled to any
inheritance and expected the appellant-plaintiffs to prove otherwise.
An alternate scenario was also possible where not exclusion, but
inclusion could have been presumed and the defendants then could
have been asked to show that women were not entitled to inherit
property. This patriarchal predisposition appears to be an inference
from Hindu law, which has no place in the present case.
14. The Chhattisgarh High Court in Mst. Sarwango and others v. Mst.
Urchamahin and others9 has observed :
“10. In the present case, both the parties have failed to
prove any law of inheritance or custom prevailing in their
Gond caste i.e. member of Scheduled Caste whom Hindu
law or other law governing inheritance is not applicable.
In absence of any law of inheritance or custom prevailing
9 2013 SCC OnLine Chh 5
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 279
Ram Charan & Ors. v. Sukhram & Ors.
in their caste governing the inheritance the Courts are
required to decide the rights according to justice, equity and
good conscience in term of Section 6 of the Act. Plaintiffs
Sawango and Jaituniya are daughters of Jhangal, nearest
relative rather the respondents, who were daughter-in-law
of brother of Jhangal and legitimate or illegitimate son of
Balam Singh, son of Dakhal.
11. In these circumstances, plaintiffs Sawango and
Jaituniya would be the persons’ best entitlement to inherit
the property left by their father. The Courts below ought to
have decreed the suit for partition to the extent of share
of Jhangal, but the Court below i.e. the lower appellate
Court has allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit in
absence of any law or custom for inheritance for a member
of Schedule Tribe. The Courts below are required to
decide their rights of inheritance in accordance with the
provisions of Section 6 of the Act applicable to the State
of Chhattisgarh and undivided State of Madhya Pradesh”
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Given the above situation that neither any particular law of a
community nor custom could be brought into application by either
side, we now proceed to examine the argument advanced before the
High Court that is the principle of justice, equity, and good conscience.
These principles find statutory recognition in the Central Provinces
Laws Act, 1875, Section 6 whereof is extracted herein below :
“6. In cases not provided for by section five, or by Rule in
cases any other law for the time being in force, the Courts
shall act according to justice, equity and good conscience.”
16. At the outset, it is observed that regarding the 1875 law, the
impugned judgment notes that the same has been repealed as of
March 2018 and, therefore, cannot be applied. We find this position
to be mistaken. The Repeal Act No.4 of 2018 provides for a saving
clause, which reads as under :
“4. Savings.— The repeal by this Act of any enactment
shall not affect any other enactment in which the repealed
enactment has been applied, incorporated or referred to;
280 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity, effect or
consequences of anything already done or suffered, or any
right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or
incurred, or any remedy or proceeding in respect thereof,
or any release or discharge of or from any debt, penalty,
obligation, liability, claim or demand, or any indemnity
already granted, or the proof of any past act or thing;
nor shall this Act affect any principle or rule of law, or
established jurisdiction, form or course of pleading,
practice or procedure, or existing usage, custom,
privilege, restriction, exemption, office or appointment,
notwithstanding that the same respectively may have been
in any manner affirmed or recognised or derived by, in or
from any enactment hereby repealed;
nor shall the repeal by this Act of any enactment revive or
restore any jurisdiction, office, custom, liability, right, title,
privilege, restriction, exemption, usage, practice, procedure
or other matter or thing not now existing or in force.”
(Emphasis supplied)
17. The effect of Section 4 is clear that no right having been accrued
prior to the repeal of the Act shall be affected thereby. As we have
already observed, the parties to the instant lis are neither governed by
Hindu nor Muslim laws and, therefore, would be covered by Section
6 of the 1875 Act. So, the right having been accrued in favour of
the appellant-plaintiffs’ mother upon the death of her father, which
was approximately 30 years before the filing of the plaint became
crystallized and would not be affected by the fact that the Act was no
longer in the statute book. This Act, therefore, necessarily had to be
applied by the High Court. At this juncture, it is pertinent to consider
the meaning of ‘justice, equity and good conscience’.
18. It is trite in law that this principle can be applied only when there is
a void or, in other words, in the absence of any law governing that
aspect. Since no custom to the effect that women were entitled to
the property, the application thereof would be consistent with this
position. What exactly this phrase ‘justice, equity and good conscience’
entails has been considered by this Court on a few occasions. We
may refer to certain instances :
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 281
Ram Charan & Ors. v. Sukhram & Ors.
(a) In Niemla Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. v. 2nd Punjab Tribunal10,
it was held by a Constitution Bench of this Court that this principle
can be applied even in the context of labour disputes, so long
as the law on the question in consideration is not codified for
there are many situations that arise in everyday function, which,
it is not possible for a legislature to foresee and account for in
the principal legislation.
(b) The principle of ‘justice, equity and good conscience’ is not of
recent application. As J.C. Shah, J. demonstrated the Courts,
which functioned in the former British Indian territory, were also
equipped to apply the said principle. See Superintendent and
Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Corpn. of Calcutta11.
(c) This principle found an extensive discussion in the decision
of a Constitution Bench of this Court in M. Siddiq v. Suresh
Das12 (Ram Janmabhoomi Temple), relevant extracts whereof
are as follows :
“Justice, Equity and Good Conscience today
1019. With the development of statutory law
and judicial precedent, including the progressive
codification of customs in the Hindu Code and in
the Shariat Act, 1937, the need to place reliance
on justice, equity and good conscience gradually
reduced. There is (at least in theory) a reduced
scope for the application of justice, equity and good
conscience when doctrinal positions established
under a statute cover factual situations or where the
principles underlying the system of personal law in
question can be definitively ascertained. But even
then, it would do disservice to judicial craft to adopt a
theory which excludes the application of justice, equity
and good conscience to areas of law governed by
statute. For the law develops interstitially, as Judges
work themselves in tandem with statute law to arrive
10 1957 SCC OnLine SC 64
11 1966 SCC OnLine SC 42
12 (2020) 1 SCC 1
282 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
at just outcomes. Where the rights of the parties are
not governed by a particular personal law, or where
the personal law is silent or incapable of being
ascertained by a court, where a code has a lacuna,
or where the source of law fails or requires to be
supplemented, justice, equity and good conscience
may properly be referred to.
…
1022. The common underlying thread is that justice,
good conscience and equity plays a supplementary
role in enabling courts to mould the relief to suit
the circumstances that present themselves before
courts with the principal purpose of ensuring a just
outcome. Where the existing statutory framework
is inadequate for courts to adjudicate upon the
dispute before them, or no settled judicial doctrine
or custom can be availed of, courts may legitimately
take recourse to the principles of justice, equity and
good conscience to effectively and fairly dispose of
the case. A court cannot abdicate its responsibility
to decide a dispute over legal rights merely because
the facts of a case do not readily submit themselves
to the application of the letter of the existing law.
Courts in India have long availed of the principles of
justice, good conscience and equity to supplement
the incompleteness or inapplicability of the letter of
the law with the ground realities of legal disputes to
do justice between the parties. Equity, as an essential
component of justice, formed the final step in the just
adjudication of disputes. After taking recourse to legal
principles from varied legal systems, scholarly written
work on the subject, and the experience of the Bar
and Bench, if no decisive or just outcome could be
reached, a Judge may apply the principles of equity
between the parties to ensure that justice is done.
This has often found form in the power of the court to
craft reliefs that are both legally sustainable and just.”
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 283
Ram Charan & Ors. v. Sukhram & Ors.
(d) In Tirith Kumar (supra), which was also an appeal arising
from a judgment of the High Court of Chhattisgarh, this Court
speaking through one of us (Sanjay Karol J.) had the occasion to
consider the application of this principle and in accordance with
it, the order of the High Court granting right over the property
to the female heirs was confirmed.
19. When applying the principle of justice, equity and good conscience,
the Courts have to be mindful of the above and apply this otherwise
open-ended principle contextually. In the present case, a woman or
her successors, if the views of the lower Court are upheld, would be
denied a right to property on the basis of the absence of a positive
assertion to such inheritance in custom. However, customs too, like the
law, cannot remain stuck in time and others cannot be allowed to take
refuge in customs or hide behind them to deprive others of their right.
20. Apart from the application of this general principle, we also find this
to be a question of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
There appears to be no rational nexus or reasonable classification
for only males to be granted succession over the property of their
forebears and not women, more so in the case where no prohibition
to such effect can be shown to be prevalent as per law. Article 15(1)
states that the State shall not discriminate against any person on
grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. This, along with
Articles 38 and 46, points to the collective ethos of the Constitution
in ensuring that there is no discrimination against women.
21. In Western U.P. Electric Power and Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of
U.P.13, it was observed :
“7. Article 14 of the Constitution ensures equality among
equals; its aim is to protect persons similarly placed
against discriminatory treatment. It does not, however,
operate against rational classification. A person setting
up a grievance of denial of equal treatment by law must
establish that between persons similarly circumstanced,
some were treated to their prejudice and the differential
treatment had no reasonable relation to the object sought
to be achieved by the law...”
13 (1969) 1 SCC 817
284 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
22. This Court in the seminal case of Air India v. Nergesh Meerza14,
laid down the following propositions, among others, in regard to
Article 14 :
“39. Thus, from a detailed analysis and close examination
of the cases of this Court starting from 1952 till today, the
following propositions emerge:
…
(2) Article 14 forbids hostile discrimination but not
reasonable classification. Thus, where persons belonging
to a particular class in view of their special attributes,
qualities, mode of recruitment and the like, are differently
treated in public interest to advance and boost members
belonging to backward classes, such a classification would
not amount to discrimination having a close nexus with
the objects sought to be achieved so that in such cases
Article 14 will be completely out of the way.
(3) Article 14 certainly applies where equals are treated
differently without any reasonable basis.
(4) Where equals and unequals are treated differently,
Article 14 would have no application.…”
23. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India15, it was observed :
“7. Now, the question immediately arises as to what is
the requirement of Article 14 : what is the content and
reach of the great equalising principle enunciated in this
article? There can be no doubt that it is a founding faith
of the Constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which rests
securely the foundation of our democratic republic. And,
therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow, pedantic
or lexicographic approach. No attempt should be made to
truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do
so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a
dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and
it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire
14 (1981) 4 SCC 335
15 (1978) 1 SCC 248
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 285
Ram Charan & Ors. v. Sukhram & Ors.
limits. We must reiterate here what was pointed out by the
majority in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu [(1974) 4
SCC 3 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 165 : (1974) 2 SCR 348]
namely, that “from a positivistic point of view, equality is
antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness
are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a
republic, while the other, to the whim and caprice of an
absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit
in it that it is unequal both according to political logic
and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article
14”. Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and
ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle
of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically,
is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness
pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and
the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer
the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity
with Article 14. It must be “right and just and fair” and not
arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it .would be no
procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would
not be satisfied…”
(Emphasis supplied)
24. While relying on State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa16, this Court
in Vijay Lakshmi v. Punjab University17, observed as follows :
“8. …
It was also observed that discrimination is the essence
of classification and does violence to the constitutional
guarantee of equality only if it rests on an unreasonable
basis and it was for the respondents to establish that
classification was unreasonable and bore no rational
nexus with its purported object. Further, dealing with the
right to equality, the Court (in paras 29 & 30) held thus:
(SCC p. 33)
16 (1974) 1 SCC 19
17 (2003) 8 SCC 440
286 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“But the concept of equality has an inherent limitation
arising from the very nature of the constitutional guarantee.
Equality is for equals. That is to say that those who are
similarly circumstanced are entitled to an equal treatment.
....”
25. A Constitution Bench in Shayara Bano v. Union of India18, while
dealing with the issue of triple talaq, referred to Article 14 in the
following terms :
“62. Article 14 of the Constitution of India is a facet of
equality of status and opportunity spoken of in the Preamble
to the Constitution. The Article naturally divides itself into
two parts—(1) equality before the law, and (2) the equal
protection of the law. Judgments of this Court have referred
to the fact that the equality before law concept has been
derived from the law in the UK, and the equal protection
of the laws has been borrowed from the 14th Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States of America. In a
revealing judgment, Subba Rao, J., dissenting, in State
of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya [State of U.P. v. Deoman
Upadhyaya, (1961) 1 SCR 14 : AIR 1960 SC 1125 : 1960 Cri
LJ 1504] , AIR p. 1134 para 26 : SCR at p. 34 further went
on to state that whereas equality before law is a negative
concept, the equal protection of the law has positive
content. The early judgments of this Court referred to the
“discrimination” aspect of Article 14, and evolved a rule
by which subjects could be classified. If the classification
was “intelligible” having regard to the object sought to be
achieved, it would pass muster under Article 14’s anti-
discrimination aspect. Again, Subba Rao, J., dissenting,
in Lachhman Dass v. State of Punjab [Lachhman Dass v.
State of Punjab, (1963) 2 SCR 353 : AIR 1963 SC 222] ,
SCR at p. 395, warned that: (AIR p. 240, para 50)
“50. … Overemphasis on the doctrine of
classification or an anxious and sustained
attempt to discover some basis for classification
18 (2017) 9 SCC 1
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 287
Ram Charan & Ors. v. Sukhram & Ors.
may gradually and imperceptibly deprive the
Article of its glorious content…”
(Emphasis supplied)
26. This discussion on equality under Article 14, which, needless to state,
includes the aspect of gender equality within its fold will be, in our
view, incomplete without reference to the first and most commendable
step taken under the Hindu Law by way of the Hindu Succession
(Amendment) Act, 2005 which made daughters the coparceners in
joint family property. The object and reasons as stated in the Bill
are instructive in the general sense and we reproduce the same
with profit :
“…The law by excluding the daughter from participating
in the coparcenary ownership not only contributes to her
discrimination on the ground of gender but also has led
to oppression and negation of her fundamental right of
equality guaranteed by the Constitution. having regard to
the need to render social justice to women, the States of
Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Maharashtra
have made necessary changes in the law giving equal right
to daughters in Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary property.
The Kerala Legislature has enacted the Kerala Joint Hindu
Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975...”
(Emphasis supplied)
27. Similarly, we are of the view that, unless otherwise prescribed in
law, denying the female heir a right in the property only exacerbates
gender division and discrimination, which the law should ensure to
weed out.
28. Granted that no such custom of female succession could be
established by the appellant-plaintiffs, but nonetheless it is also
equally true that a custom to the contrary also could not be shown
in the slightest, much less proved. That being the case, denying
Dhaiya her share in her father’s property, when the custom is silent,
would violate her right to equality vis-à-vis her brothers or those of
her legal heirs vis-à-vis their cousin.
29. In view of the above discussion, we are of the firm view that in
keeping with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience,
288 [2025] 8 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
read along with the overarching effect of Article 14 of the Constitution,
the appellant-plaintiffs, being Dhaiya’s legal heirs, are entitled to
their equal share in the property. The judgments of the Courts below
are accordingly set aside to that extent. The civil appeal is allowed
accordingly.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
30. No costs.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "tribal women right in ancestral property"Sign in to search