Supreme Court of India
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTIversusSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
- Citation
- 2022 INSC 1075
- Decided
- 13 October 2022
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- UDAY UMESH LALIT
Holding
The conviction was set aside because the prosecution failed to establish a complete and unambiguous chain of circumstantial evidence, as the discovery statement and extra‑judicial confessions were not admissible or reliable, and motive and false explanation could not replace proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Summary
The appellant Ramanand (alias Nandlal Bharti) was convicted and sentenced to death for allegedly murdering his wife and four children, based largely on circumstantial evidence comprising a discovery statement of the murder weapon, extra‑judicial confessions to two witnesses, alleged motive stemming from an extramarital affair, and a purported false explanation. The Supreme Court examined whether the discovery statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act was properly proved, whether the extra‑judicial confessions were voluntary and reliable, and whether motive or a false explanation could substitute for a complete chain of proof. It held that the discovery statement failed to meet the statutory requirements and could not be used to infer authorship, the extra‑judicial confessions were unreliable due to contradictory timelines and questionable witness credibility, and motive alone was insufficient. Moreover, the prosecution did not explain the injuries on the accused, and the alleged false explanation could not be treated as an additional link without a complete evidential chain. Consequently, the prosecution’s case did not establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the conviction was set aside.
Issues considered
- The admissibility and evidentiary value of a discovery statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
- The voluntariness and credibility of extra‑judicial confessions made to private individuals.
- Whether motive alone can constitute a decisive link in a case based on circumstantial evidence.
- The permissibility of using a false explanation offered by the accused as an additional link in the chain of circumstantial evidence.
- The requirement for the prosecution to explain injuries sustained by the accused and its impact on the assessment of guilt.
- Whether the chain of circumstantial evidence was complete and excluded reasonable hypotheses of innocence.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 209, s. 304, s. 313, s. 366
- Constitution of Indias. Article 39A
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 24, s. 27, s. 8
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302
- Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987s. 9
Subjects
circumstantial evidencediscovery statementSection 27 Evidence Actextra‑judicial confessionmotivefalse explanationburden of prooflegal aidfair trialdeath penaltyconviction set aside
Judgment
162 [2022]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 5 S.C.R. 162 [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI
v.
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 64-65 of 2022)
B OCTOBER 13, 2022
[UDAY UMESH LALIT, CJI, S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND
J. B. PARDIWALA, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860: s.302 – Prosecution case was that on
fateful day, appellant-accused murdered his wife and four children
C
with a sharp cutting weapon while they were sleeping – Motive
behind the murder was attributed to extra marital affair of appellant
with one married lady which was highly opposed by the deceased-
wife – Discovery statement made by appellant and consequently
recovery made – Appellant said to have made extra judicial
D confession to prosecution witness – Trial court convicted the
appellant and passed death sentence – High Court confirmed the
death sentence – Hence instant appeal – Held: Present case is based
on circumstantial evidence – Mere discovery is insufficient to infer
the authorship of concealment by the person who discovered the
weapon – The exact words of the accused person while making
E
discovery statement was not deposed by prosecution witness –
Further, the contents of panchnama were not proved – Credibility
of police witness (PW-6 and PW-7) was doubtful and evidence of
discovery was held to be unreliable – Credibility of extra judicial
confession was also doubted in view of oral evidence of prosecution
F witness – As circumstance relating to extra judicial confession and
discovery of weapon of offence were not established, the chain of
circumstantial evidence was not established fully and thus other
circumstance such as motive or the evidence of false explanation
offered by the appellant as an additional link in chain of evidence
were not considered – Further, the explanation offered by the
G
accused for injuries on his body could be said to be compatible
with the defense story – Prosecution failed to establish the case
beyond reasonable doubt and therefore the conviction is set aside.
Evidence Act, 1872: s.8 – Relevance of Motive – Circumstantial
Evidence – There cannot be straight jacket formula for appreciation
H
162
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 163
PRADESH
of circumstantial evidence – Circumstances suggesting guilt must A
be cogently and firmly established – The same must be of definite
tendency and conclusive in nature – The circumstances should form
the chain which conclusively points towards the guilt of accused in
all human probability – Circumstantial evidence must be complete
and should be devoid of any hypothesis giving room for accused’s
B
innocence but must support only one hypothesis i.e. his guilt – Motive,
though not as such an element of crime, but it assumes greater
importance in cases resting on circumstantial evidence – Absence
of motive could be a missing link of incriminating circumstances,
but once the prosecution has established the other incriminating
circumstances to its entirety, absence of motive will not give any C
benefit to the accused – Motive could be an important circumstance
but it per se does not take place as conclusive proof that the person
concerned was the author of the crime.
Evidence Act, 1872: s.27 – Discovery Statement – Information
received from the accused must result into discovery of fact for s. D
27 to apply – While making such deposition, the accused must be in
police custody – Only so much of information as relates distinctly
to the fact thereby discovered is admissible – Further mere discovery
cannot be interpreted as sufficient to infer authorship of concealment
by the person who discovered the weapon – There might be the
possibility that the person may have seen somebody concealing the E
weapon, therefore it cannot be presumed or inferred that because a
person discovered weapon, he was the person who concealed it,
least it can be presumed that he used it.
Evidence Act, 1872: Confession – Classification and Scope
– Confession can be classified as Judicial and extra-judicial – F
Former relates to those which are made before the Magistrate or
Court – Extra Judicial are made before a private individual and
which may include judicial officer in private capacity and
Magistrate not especially empowered u/s 164 CrPC or the one so
empowered but receiving confession at stage where s.164 does not G
apply.
Evidence Act, 1872: Extra Judicial Confession – Weightage
– It is a weak type of evidence since it can be easily procured
whenever direct evidence is not available – It is not open to the
Court to start with a presumption that extra-judicial confession is H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A weak type of evidence – It can be accepted and can be the basis of
a conviction if it passes the test of credibility – Credibility can be
tested by keeping in mind that it comes from an unbiased witness
who is not inimical to accused and who do not have motive for
attributing an untruthful statement to the accused etc.
B Evidence Act, 1872: Confession – Basis of Conviction –
Explained – It is well settled that conviction can be based on a
voluntarily confession but the rule of prudence requires that
wherever possible it should be corroborated by the independent
evidence – Further Extra-Judicial confession of accused need not
in all cases be corroborated – Also the confession procured under
C promise or threat or harassment is involuntary in nature and cannot
be use in evidence – Involuntary confession is not which is not the
result of free will of the maker.
Evidence Act, 1872: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 –
s.313 – False Explanation tendered by the accused – Whether forms
D additional link in circumstantial evidence – Explained – The
prosecution must stand or fall on its own legs and it cannot derive
any strength from the weakness of the defence – It is not the law
where there is any infirmity or lacunae in the prosecution case, the
same could be cured or supplied by a false defence or a false plea
E which is not accepted by a Court – Only when all the circumstantial
evidence are well established which points towards the guilt then
only false explanation or false defence tendered by accused can be
used as additional link and not otherwise.
Evidence Act, 1872: Burden of Proof – Extent and Meaning
F – In criminal trial the burden on the accused is to show the
“preponderance of probabilty” – The accused is not under burden
to prove his case beyond reasonable doubt unlike prosecution –
The meaning which the term “preponderance of probabilty” carries
is something which connotes to “more probable and rational view
of the case”, not necessarily as certain as the pleading should be –
G The high standard of proof as required for prosecution is only to
avoid wrongful conviction as the wrongful conviction leads to
greater injustice than wrongful acquittal.
Constitution of India: Art.39A – Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 – s.304 – Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 – s.9 – Legal
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RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 165
PRADESH
aid to accused – Duty of State – Explained – What is meant by the A
duty of the State to ensure a fair defence to an accused is not the
employment of a defence counsel for namesake – It has to be the
provision of a counsel who defends the accused diligently to the
best of his abilities – The presence of counsel on record means
effective, genuine and faithful presence and not a mere farcical,
B
sham or a virtual presence that is illusory, if not fraudulent –
Indigence should never be a ground for denying fair trial or equal
justice therefore, particular attention should be paid to appoint
competent advocates, equal to handling the complex cases, not
patronising gestures to raw entrants to the Bar.
Allowing the appeals, the court C
HELD: 1.1 Although there can be no straight jacket formula
for appreciation of circumstantial evidence, yet to convict an
accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence, the Court must
follow certain tests which are broadly as follows: Circumstances
from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be D
cogently and firmly established; Those circumstances must be of
a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the
accused and must be conclusive in nature; The circumstances, if
taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is
no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability E
the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and The
circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be
complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis
than that of the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent
with his innocence. In other words, the circumstances should
exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. F
[Para 46][189-G-H; 190-A-D]
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra
(1984) 4 SCC 116 : [1985] 1 SCR 88 – relied on.
1.2 The case is one of the circumstantial evidence as there G
was no eye witness of the occurrence. It is settled principle of
law that an accused can be punished if he is found guilty even in
cases of circumstantial evidence provided, the prosecution is able
to prove beyond reasonable doubt the complete chain of events
and circumstances which definitely points towards the involvement
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166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A and guilty of the suspect or accused, as the case may be. The
accused will not be entitled to acquittal merely because there is
no eye witness in the case. It is also equally true that an accused
can be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence subject
to satisfaction of the expected principles in that regard. [Para
47][190-D-F]
B
2.1 The conditions necessary for the applicability of Section
27 of the Act are broadly as : (i) Discovery of fact in consequence
of an information received from accused; (iv) Discovery of such
fact to be deposed to; (iii) The accused must be in police custody
when he gave information; and (iv) So much of information as
C relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible.
[Para 64][199-F-H]
2.2 What emerges from the evidence in the form of
panchnama is that the appellant stated before the panch witnesses
to the effect that “I will show you the weapon used in the
D commission of offence”. This is the exact statement which could
be read from the discovery panchnama and the Investigating
Officer also could not have deposed as regards the exact
statement other than what has been recorded in the panchnama.
This statement does not suggest that the appellant indicated
E anything about his involvement in concealment of the weapon.
Mere discovery cannot be interpreted as sufficient to infer
authorship of concealment by the person who discovered the
weapon. He could have derived knowledge of the existence of
that weapon at the place through some other source. He may
have even seen somebody concealing the weapon, and, therefore,
F it cannot be presumed or inferred that because a person
discovered weapon, he was the person who concealed it, least it
can be presumed that he used it. Therefore, even if discovery by
the appellant is accepted, what emerges from the panchnama of
the discovery of weapon and the evidence in this regard is that
G he disclosed that he would show the weapon used in the
commission of offence. [Para 67][201-D-G]
Murli v. State of Rajasthan (2009) 9 SCC 417 : [2009]
13 SCR 378; Mohmed Inayatullah v. The State of
Maharashtra AIR (1976) SC 483 : [1976] 1 SCR 715;
H Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka AIR (1983) SC
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 167
PRADESH
446 : [1983] 2 SCR 552; State of Uttar Pradesh v. A
Deoman Upadhyaya AIR (1960) SC 1125 : [1961] 1
SCR 14 – relied on.
Pulukuri Kottaya and Others v. Emperor AIR 1947 PC
67; Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. AIR 1981 SC
911 : [1981] 2 SCR 771; Bodhraj Alias Bodha and B
Others v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (2002) 8 SCC
45 : [2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 67; A.N. Venkatesh v. State of
Karnataka (2005) 7 SCC 714 – referred to.
3.1 Confessions may be divided into two classes, i.e. judicial
and extra judicial. Judicial confessions are those which are made C
before Magistrate or Court in the course of judicial proceedings.
Extra judicial confessions are those which are made by the party
elsewhere than before a Magistrate or Court. Extra judicial
confessions are generally those made by a party to or before a
private individual which includes even a judicial officer in his
private capacity. It also includes a Magistrate who is not especially D
empowered to record confessions under Section 164 of the CrPC
or a Magistrate so empowered but receiving the confession at a
stage when Section 164 does not apply. As to extra judicial
confessions, two questions arise: (i) were they made voluntarily?
And (ii) are they true? [Para 80][208-B-C] E
3.2 An extra judicial confession by its very nature is rather
a weak type of evidence and requires appreciation with great
deal of care and caution. Where an extra judicial confession is
surrounded by suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes
doubtful and it loses its importance like the case in hand. The F
Courts generally look for an independent reliable corroboration
before placing any reliance upon an extra judicial confession. [Para
85][212-F-G]
State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180 :
[2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 445; Madan Gopal Kakkad v. G
Naval Dubey and Another (1992) 3 SCC 204 : [1992]
2 SCR 921; Piara Singh and Others v. State of Punjab
(1977) 4 SCC 452 : [1978] 1 SCR 597 – relied on.
Sahadevan and Another v. State of Tamil Nadu (2012)
6 SCC 403 : [2012] 4 SCR 366 – referred to.
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168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A 4. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that in
a case based on circumstantial evidence, motive for committing
the crime on the part of the accused assumes greater importance.
This Court in various decisions has laid down the principles
holding that motive for commission of offence no doubt assumes
greater importance in cases resting on circumstantial evidence
B
than those in which direct evidence regarding commission of
offence is available. It is equally true that failure to prove motive
in cases resting on circumstantial evidence is not fatal by itself.
However, it is also well settled and it is trite in law that absence
of motive could be a missing link of incriminating circumstances,
C but once the prosecution has established the other incriminating
circumstances to its entirety, absence of motive will not give any
benefit to the accused. Thus, even if it is believed that the accused
appellant had a motive to commit the crime, the same may be an
important circumstance in a case based on circumstantial
evidence but cannot take the place as a conclusive proof that the
D
person concerned was the author of the crime. One could even
say that the presence of motive in the facts and circumstances of
the case creates a strong suspicion against the accused appellant
but suspicion, howsoever strong, cannot be a substitute for proof
of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. [Paras 87,
E 90][213-D-E; 215-D]
Sampath Kumar v. Inspector of Police Krishnagiri
(2012) 4 SCC 124 : [2012] 2 SCR 289 – relied on.
5.1 According to the trial court and the High Court, the
explanation offered by the accused appellant in regard to the
F injuries suffered by him on his head is established to be false. In
such circumstances, both the courts took the view that the false
explanation offered by the accused appellant is an additional link
in the chain of circumstances. It is not necessary for this court to
go into the issue of false explanation, said to have been offered
G by the accused appellant as at the most a false explanation can be
used as an additional link in the chain of evidence led by the
prosecution. This issue pales into insignificance as the various
links in the chain of evidence led by the prosecution having not
been satisfactorily proved. [Para 92 and 100][215-H; 216-A; 218-
C]
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RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 169
PRADESH
5.2 It is well settled that the prosecution must stand or fall A
on its own legs and it cannot derive any strength from the
weakness of the defence. Where various links in a chain are in
themselves complete, then a false plea or a false defence may be
called into aid only to lend assurance to the Court. In other words,
before using the additional link it must be proved that all the
B
links in the chain are complete and do not suffer from any infirmity.
It is not the law where there is any infirmity or lacunae in the
prosecution case, the same could be cured or supplied by a false
defence or a false plea which is not accepted by a Court. [Para
96][217-B-C]
C
5.3 Before a false explanation can be used as an additional
link, the following essential conditions must be satisfied: (i)
Various links in the chain of evidence led by the prosecution have
been satisfactorily proved. (ii) Such circumstances points to the
guilt of the accused as reasonable defence. (iii) The circumstance
is in proximity to the time and situation.If the aforesaid conditions D
are fulfilled only then a Court use a false explanation or a false
defence as an additional link to lend as assurance to the Court
and not otherwise. [Para 97, 98][217-D-F]
Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharashtra
(1981) 2 SCC 35 : [1981] 2 SCR 384 – relied on. E
Charles R. Cooper v. F. W. Slade (1857-59) 6 HLC 746
– referred to.
6. None of the pieces of evidence relied on as incriminating
by the courts below, can be treated as incriminating pieces of F
circumstantial evidence against the accused. Realities or truth
apart, the fundamental and basic presumption in the
administration of criminal law and justice delivery system is the
innocence of the alleged accused and till the charges are proved
beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of clear, cogent, credible
or unimpeachable evidence, the question of indicting or punishing G
an accused does not arise, merely carried away by heinous nature
of the crime or the gruesome manner in which it was found to
have been committed. [Para 116][223-F-H]
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170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A 7. It is by far now well-settled for a legal proposition that it
is the duty of the court to see and ensure that an accused put on
a criminal trial is effectively represented by a defence counsel,
and in the event on account of indigence, poverty or illiteracy or
any other disabling factor, he is not able to engage a counsel of
his choice, it becomes the duty of the court to provide him
B
appropriate and meaningful legal aid at the State expense. What
is meant by the duty of the State to ensure a fair defence to an
accused is not the employment of a defence counsel for namesake.
It has to be the provision of a counsel who defends the accused
diligently to the best of his abilities. While the quality of the
C defence or the caliber of the counsel would not militate against
the guarantee to a fair trial sanctioned by Articles 21 and 22 resply
of the Constitution, a threshold level of competence and due
diligence in the discharge of his duties as a defence counsel would
certainly be the constitutional guaranteed expectation. The
presence of counsel on record means effective, genuine and
D
faithful presence and not a mere farcical, sham or a virtual
presence that is illusory, if not fraudulent.[Para 119][224-G-H;
225-A-B]
Dhananjay Shanker Shetty v. State of Maharashtra
(2002) 6 SCC 596 : [2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 352; Mohar
E Rai and Bharath Rai v. State of Bihar AIR 1968 SC
1281 : [1968] 3 SCR 525; Lakshmi Singh and Others
v. State of Bihar (1976) 4 SCC 394; Vijay Singh and
Ors. v. State of U.P. (1990) CriLJ 1510; Ashish Batham
v. State of M.P. (2002) 7 SCC 317 : [2002] 2 Suppl.
F SCR 146; Kishore Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh
(1991) 1 SCC 286 : [1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 105; Zahira
Habibullah Sheikh (5) and Another v. State of Gujarat
and Others (2006) 3 SCC 374 : [2006] 2 SCR 1081;
Ranchod Mathur Wasawa v. State of Gujarat (1974) 3
SCC 581 : [1974 ] 2 SCR 72; Madhav Hayawadanrao
G Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra (1978) 3 SCC 544 :
[1979] 1 SCR 192; Subhash Chand v. State of
Rajasthan (2002) 1 SCC 702 : [2001] 4 Suppl. SCR
163 – referred to.
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RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 171
PRADESH
Case Law Reference A
[1985] 1 SCR 88 relied on Para 48
[2009] 13 SCR 378 relied on Para 62
[1976] 1 SCR 715 relied on Para 64
[1983] 2 SCR 552 relied on Para 64 B
[1961] 1 SCR 14 relied on Para 64
[1981] 2 SCR 771 referred to Para 69
[2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 67 referred to Para 72
C
(2005) 7 SCC 714 referred to Para 73
[2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 445 relied on Para 80
[2012] 4 SCR 366 referred to Para 83
[1992] 2 SCR 921 relied on Para 84
D
[1978] 1 SCR 597 relied on Para 84
[2012] 2 SCR 289 relied on Para 89
[1985] 1 SCR 88 referred to Para 98
[1981] 2 SCR 384 relied on Para 105
E
[2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 352 referred to Para 111
[1968] 3 SCR 525 referred to Para 112
(1976) 4 SCC 394 referred to Para 113
[2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 146 referred to Para 116 F
[1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 105 referred to Para 123
[2006] 2 SCR 1081 referred to Para 124
[1974 ] 2 SCR 72 referred to Para 125
[1979] 1 SCR 192 referred to Para 127 G
[2001] 4 Suppl. SCR 163 referred to Para 129
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
Nos. 64-65 of 2022.
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172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A From the Judgment and Order dated 09.07.2021 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Capital Sentence No.01
of 2016 and Criminal Appeal No. 1959 of 2016.
S. Niranjan Reddy, Sr. Adv., Vibhor Jain, Ms. Stuti Rai, Sahil
Raveen, Ms. Akhila Palem, Mahfooz Ahsan Nazki, Advs. for the
B Appellant.
Adarsh Upadhyay, Anurag Kishore, Amit Singh, Ajay Prajapati,
B. N. Dubey, Aman Pathak, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
C J. B. PARDIWALA, J.
1. Mark Twain, the great American writer and philosopher, once
said:
“It is like this, take a word, split it up into letters, the letters,
may individually mean nothing but when they are combined
D they will form a word pregnant with meaning. That is the way
how you have to consider the circumstantial evidence. You
have to take all the circumstances together and judge for
yourself whether the prosecution have established their case.”
2. These appeals, by special leave, arise out of the judgment and
E order dated 09.07.2021 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad, Bench at Lucknow confirming the death sentence awarded
to the accused appellant herein.
3. The accused appellant has been held guilty of the offence
punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, “the
F IPC”). The trial court (Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur Kheri) sentenced the
accused appellant to death under Section 302 of the IPC and pay fine
of Rs. 20,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further
rigorous imprisonment for one year. While the Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur
Kheri made a reference to the High Court for confirmation of death
sentence under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for
G short, “the CrPC”), the accused appellant preferred Criminal Appeal
No. 1959 of 2016 putting in issue his conviction and sentence. The High
Court dismissed the Criminal Appeal No. 1959 of 2016 filed by the accused
appellant thereby confirming the death reference under Section 366 of
the CrPC.
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RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 173
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
4. In such circumstances referred to above, the accused appellant A
is here before this Court with the present appeals.
CASE OF THE PROSECUTION
5. According to the case of the prosecution, the accused appellant
Ramanand was married to Sangeeta (deceased) for the past 12 years
before the incident in question. In the wedlock, five children were born – B
one son and four daughters, by name Gaurav Ambedkar aged 10 years,
Tulsi aged 7 years, Lakshmi aged 5 years, Kajal aged 3 years and Guddi
aged one and a half month.
6. On the fateful night of the incident i.e. the intervening night
between 21st & 22nd of January, 2010 while the wife and four children C
were sleeping in the house situated at the village Basdhiya, the accused
appellant is said to have mercilessly clobbered all the five to death with
a sharp cutting weapon called Banka. At the relevant point of time, the
son of the accused appellant was not residing with the family. The son
aged 10 years at the time of incident was residing at a different village D
with one police constable. The motive behind the crime as put forward
by the prosecution is the extra marital affair of the accused appellant
with one married lady by name Manju. According to the prosecution, the
accused appellant desperately wanted to marry Manju. Further, the wife
of the accused appellant namely, Sangeeta (deceased) was highly
opposed to the relationship of her husband with Manju. In such E
circumstances, it is the case of the prosecution that the accused appellant
decided to terminate not only his wife Sangeeta but also his four minor
daughters.
7. It all started with the First Information Report (FIR) lodged by
the PW-1, Shambhu Raidas, who happens to be the brother-in-law of F
the accused appellant (husband of the accused appellant’s sister). The
FIR came to be lodged by the PW-1, Shambhu Raidas at the Dhaurhara
Police Station, District Lakhimpur Kheri on 22.01.2010 at 9:45 A.M.
The FIR (Ext. 40) reads thus:-
“To, Station House Officer, Kotwali-Dhaurahara, District G
Kheri. Sir, It is submitted that the applicant Shambhu Raidas
son of Late Shri Shyam Lal Raidas is the resident of village –
Naamdar Purwa, Police Station – Kotwali Dhaurahara,
District Lakhimpur Kheri. Today on 22.01.2010 when I was
present at my home then at about 6.30 o’clock in the morning
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174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A my saala (brother-in-law) Ramanand Raidas son of Gobre
Raidas resident of Naamdar Purwa, Hamlet-Amethi, Police
Station Dhaurahara, Lakhimpur Kheri came and told that,
“Last night I was sleeping with my wife & children. Then at
about 1.00 o’clock in the night someone knocked at my door,
I woke up and asked who was there but none replied. Then I
B
went to the roof of my house and saw that four persons were
standing outside the house. I switched on the torch. I saw that
that one person who was resident of village- Basadiha, Police
Station Ishanaga and known to Ramanand fired on me by
gun; I escaped and jumped and came down. Then one miscreant
C hit on my head by the butt of a gun. I ran away and hid in the
fields and saw that the miscreants climbed into my home. I
saw, smoke coming out of my home. Then I ran to Behnan
Purwa and told about the incident at Crusher of Khaliq and
to the people at Ramnagar Lahbadi but none came ahead. I
came running here”. Then I alongwith my nephew Pratap
D
reached the house of Ramanand and saw that the wife of
Ramanand namely Sangita, aged about 35 years, daughters
Tulsi aged about 7 years, Laxmi aged about 5 years, Kajal
aged about 3 years and a girl child of about 1½ month had
been killed and the dead bodies were burning. Then I and
E Pratap started extinguishing the fire by pouring water with
the aid of a bucket. Behind us Ramanand too came to his
house & home, sat in the courtyard and started warming
himself in front of the fire (Aag Taapne laga). On seeing this,
both of us scolded him that, “Your wife-daughters have been
killed and you are sitting in the courtyard and warming
F
yourself before fire”.
On this Ramanand got annoyed and went outside the house.
The dead bodies are lying at the spot. I came to inform. Lodge
the case and take legal action.”
G Thumb Impression (T.I.) Shambhu Raidas, Applicant, Shambhu
Raidas son of Late Shyam Lal Raidas, Resident of village
Naamdar Purwa, Hamlet Amethi, Police Station Dhaurahara,
District Khera. Date 22.01.2010.”
[Emphasis supplied]
H
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 175
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
8. Thus, it is the case of the prosecution that after the incident the A
accused appellant went straight to the house of the PW-1, Shambhu
Raidas at about 6:30 in the morning. The accused appellant is said to
have informed the PW-1, Shambhu Raidas as to what had transpired at
around 1 o’clock in the night. PW-1, Shambhu Raidas thought fit to
inform the police and accordingly lodged the FIR as aforesaid against
B
four unidentified persons.
9. Upon registration of the FIR, the police started the investigation.
The investigating officer carried out the inquest proceedings of all the
five deceased persons. The dead bodies were sent to the Civil Hospital
for post mortem. Thereafter, the investigating officer prepared a site
plan of the crime scene (Ext. 6). The post mortem reports revealed C
that all the five deceased had suffered incised wounds mostly on the
head and the neck region. The burn injuries were certified to be post
mortem, whereas the incised wounds were certified as ante mortem
injuries. The cause of death assigned in all the post mortem reports is
shock and haemorrhage as a result of ante mortem head injuries. D
10. The accused appellant is shown to have been arrested by the
investigating officer on 24th of January, 2010. After the arrest and while
the accused appellant was in custody, he is said to have made a voluntary
statement that he would show the place where he had hidden the weapon
of offence i.e. Banka and his blood stained clothes. Accordingly, the E
discovery panchnama was drawn of the weapon of offence (Ext. 5). It
appears that in the course of investigation, the investigating officer
recorded the statements of PW-3, Baburam Hans son of Ramcharan
and PW-4, Ram Kumar son of Paanchoo before whom the accused
appellant is said to have made extra judicial confession. The investigating
officer also recorded the statement of the PW-1, Shambhu Raidas, the F
first informant and PW-2, Chhatrajpal Raidas (brother of the deceased
Sangeeta).
11. At the end of the investigation, charge sheet came to be filed
for the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The
Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions Judge, Lakhimpur G
Kheri under Section 209 of the CrPC. Upon committal, the Sessions
Trial No. 379 of 2010 came to be registered.
12. On 06.07.2010 the Additional District and Sessions Judge,
Fast Track Court, Lakhimpur Kheri framed charge against the accused
H
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A appellant. The statement of the accused appellant was recorded. The
appellant did not admit the charge and claimed to be tried.
13. The prosecution adduced the following oral evidence in
support of its case:
S. No. Oral Evidence – Witness
B
1. PW-1 Shambhu Raidas
2. PW-2 Chhatrapal Raidas
3. PW-3 Babu Ram Hans
4. PW-4 Ram Kumar
C
5. PW-5 Dr. A.K. Sharma
6. PW-6 S.I. Uma Shankar Mishra
7. PW-7 Inspector Yogendra Singh
D 8. PW-8 Dr. S.P. Singh
9. PW-9 Dr. Ankit Kumar Singh
10. PW-10 H.M. Dhani Ram Verma
14. The prosecution also adduced the following documentary
evidence:
E
S.No. Documentary Evidence
1. Tahreer /Written Complaint
[Ex. Ka-1]
F 2. Post-mortem report of deceased Laxmi
[Ex. Ka-2]
3. Post-mortem report of deceased Kajal
[Ex. Ka-3]
G 4. Post-mortem report of deceased Chhoti @ Guddi
[Ex. Ka-4]
5. Discovery memorandum of murder weapon and clothes
[Ex. Ka-5]
H
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 177
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
6. Site plan of crime scene A
[Ex. Ka-6]
7. Site plan of discovery of murder weapon
[Ex. Ka-7]
8. Charge sheet B
[Ex. Ka-8]
9. Seizure memo of ash-mixed and plain soil
[Ex. Ka-9]
C
10. Inquest Report of deceased Sangeeta Devi
[Ex. Ka-10]
11. Photo lash of deceased Sangeeta
[Ex. Ka-11]
D
12. Police Paper No. 13 of deceased Sangeeta
[Ex. Ka-12]
13. Specimen seal regarding deceased Sangeeta
[Ex. Ka-13]
E
14. Letter to Reserve Inspector regarding deceased Sangeeta
[Ex. Ka-14]
15. Letter to C.M.O. regarding deceased Sangeeta
[Ex. Ka-15] F
16. Inquest Report of deceased Km. Tulsi
[Ex. Ka-16]
17. Photo lash of deceased Km. Tulsi
[Ex. Ka-17] G
18. Specimen seal regarding deceased Km. Tulsi
[Ex. Ka-18]
19. Letter to Reserve Inspector regarding deceased Km. Tulsi
[Ex. Ka-19] H
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A 20. Letter to C.M.O. regarding deceased Km. Tulsi
[Ex. Ka-20]
21. Police Paper No. 13 of deceased Km. Tulsi
[Ex. Ka-21]
B 22. Inquest Report of deceased Km. Kajal
[Ex. Ka-22]
23. Police Paper No. 13 of deceased Km. Kajal
[Ex. Ka-23]
C
24. Photo lash of deceased Km. Kajal
[Ex. Ka-24]
25. Specimen seal regarding deceased Km. Kajal
[Ex. Ka-25]
D
26. Letter to Reserve Inspector regarding deceased Km.
Kajal
[Ex. Ka-26]
27. Letter to C.M.O. regarding deceased Km.Kajal
E
[Ex. Ka-27]
28. Inquest Report of deceased Km. Laxmi
[Ex. Ka- 28]
29. Photo lash of deceased Km. Laxmi
F
[Ex. Ka-29]
30. Police Paper No. 13 of deceased Km. Laxmi
[Ex. Ka-30]
31. Specimen seal regarding deceased Km. Laxmi
G
[Ex. Ka-31]
32. Letter to Reserve Inspector regarding deceased Km.
Laxmi
[Ex. Ka-32]
H
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 179
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
33. Letter to C.M.O. regarding deceased Km. Laxmi A
[Ex. Ka-33]
34. Inquest Report of deceased Km. Chhoti
[Ex. Ka-34]
35. Photo lash of deceased Km. Chhoti @ Guddi B
[Ex. Ka-35]
36. Police Paper No. 13 of deceased Km. Chhoti @ Guddi
[Ex. Ka-36]
C
37. Specimen seal regarding deceased Km. Chhoti @ Guddi
[Ex. Ka-37]
38. Letter to Reserve Inspector regarding deceased Km.
Chhoti @ Guddi
[Ex. Ka-38] D
39. Letter to C.M.O. regarding deceased Km. Chhoti @
Guddi
[Ex. Ka-39]
40. Chik FIR E
[Ex. Ka-40]
41. Copy of general diary
[Ex. Ka-41]
42. Post-mortem report of deceased Tulsi F
[Ex. Ka-42]
43. Post-mortem report of deceased Sangeeta
[Ex. Ka-43]
G
44. Medical examination report of the accused
[Ex. Ka-44]
15. After completion of the oral as well as documentary evidence,
the statements of the accused appellant under Section 313 of the CrPC
were recorded in which the accused appellant stated that he was innocent H
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A and had been falsely implicated in the alleged crime. The accused
appellant took the defence that few individuals of a rival party had
committed the murder of his wife and daughters as Sangeeta (deceased)
was the sole eye witness to the murder of the brother of the accused
appellant. The trial against the accused persons who had killed the brother
of the accused appellant was pending at that point of time. The rival
B
party wanted to terminate Sangeeta and for that reason, four individuals
came to his house at about 1 o’clock in the night of 22 nd of January, 2010
and mercilessly killed all his five family members and thereafter set the
bodies on fire. The trial court disbelieved such defence of the accused
appellant.
C 16. At the conclusion of the trial, the Trial Judge convicted the
accused appellant for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC and
sentenced him to death relying upon the following incriminating
circumstances:
(i) Discovery of weapon of offence and blood-stained clothes
D at the instance of the accused appellant.
(ii) Extra Judicial confession of the accused appellant before
two prosecution witnesses.
(iii) Strong motive to commit the crime.
E (iv) False explanation at the instance of the accused appellant
and his unnatural conduct.
17. The appeal filed by the accused appellant in the High Court
also failed and was ordered to be dismissed.
18. Being dissatisfied, the accused appellant has come up with
F
the present appeals.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE ACCUSED
APPELLANT
19. Mr. S. Niranjan Reddy, the learned senior counsel appearing
G for the accused appellant vehemently submitted that both, the trial court
and the High Court committed a serious error in holding the accused
appellant guilty of the offence of murder of his wife and four minor
daughters. He would submit that in the course of the trial the prosecution
failed to lead any credible evidence to connect the accused appellant
with the alleged crime. Mr. Reddy vehemently submitted that both the
H
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 181
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
Courts below ought not to have accepted the evidence of PW-3, Babu A
Ram Hans and PW-4, Ram Kumar resply so as to believe the extra
judicial confession alleged to have been made by the accused appellant
before them. Mr. Reddy submitted that both the Courts below should
have discarded the evidence of discovery of weapon and the blood-stained
clothes as the prosecution has not been able to prove the authorship of
B
concealment. He would submit that in a case of circumstantial evidence,
the prosecution is required to establish the continuity in the links of the
chain of the circumstances so as to lead to the only and inescapable
conclusion of the accused being the assailant, inconsistent or incompatible
with the possibility of any other hypothesis compatible with the innocence
of the accused. C
20. Mr. Reddy vociferously submitted that the PW-3 and PW-4
resply are ‘got up’ witnesses. The evidence in the form of extra judicial
confession is nothing but a fabricated piece of evidence at the instance
of the investigating officer just with a view to bolster up the case of the
prosecution in the absence of any direct evidence. He would submit that D
both these prosecution witnesses are absolutely unreliable.
21. Mr. Reddy submitted that in a case which is based on
circumstantial evidence, motive plays an important role. He would submit
that the prosecution has not been able to prove the motive behind the
crime. The extra marital affair of the accused appellant with Manju and E
the desire of the accused appellant to marry Manju at any cost has been
put forward as the motive behind the crime. However, there is no cogent
and credible evidence in that regard. He would submit that even
otherwise an accused cannot be convicted and sentenced to death only
on the circumstance of motive.
F
22. Mr. Reddy would submit that the prosecution has not been
able to explain the injuries suffered by the accused in any manner. He
would submit that on the contrary, it is the accused who has been able
to explain how he suffered the injuries on his head and chest while
putting forward his defence before the High Court in his statement
recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC. Having noticed that the accused G
appellant had suffered injuries on his head and was bleeding, the accused
appellant along with one police constable was sent for medical examination
at the District Hospital, District Kheri. The accused appellant was taken
to the hospital by a constable viz. Brij Mohan Singh, Dhaurhara, District
Kheri. The PW-9, Dr. Ankit Kumar Singh has issued a medical certificate H
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A Ext. 44 stating the nature of the injuries noticed on the body of the
accused appellant.
23. Mr. Reddy further submitted that once the extra judicial
confession alleged to have been made before the two prosecution
witnesses i.e. the PW-3 and PW-4 resply and the evidence of the discovery
B of the weapon of offence is discarded and eschewed from consideration,
then nothing remains in the case of the prosecution.
24. Lastly, Mr. Reddy would submit that howsoever unnatural
one may find the conduct of the accused after the alleged crime, the
same, by itself, is not sufficient to convict the accused for an offence
C like murder. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Reddy prayed
that there being merit in his appeals, those may be allowed. He prayed
that the order of conviction and death penalty be set aside and the appellant
may be acquitted of the charge of murder.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE
D 25. Mr. Adarsh Upadhyay, the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent-State of Uttar Pradesh has on the other hand vehemently
opposed the appeals. He would submit that no error, not to speak of any
error of law, could be said to have been committed by the Courts below
in holding the accused appellant guilty of the offence of murder and
E imposing death penalty upon him for the gruesome murder of five of his
family members. He would submit that there is no good reason to
disbelieve the evidence of PW-3, Babu Ram Hans and PW-4, Ram
Kumar resply before whom the accused appellant made the extra judicial
confession. He further submitted that there is no good reason to even
disbelieve the discovery of the weapon of offence at the instance of the
F accused appellant. He would submit that over and above the two
incriminating circumstances in the form of extra judicial confession and
the discovery of weapon of offence, there was a strong motive for the
accused appellant to commit the crime.
26. Mr. Upadhyay vehemently submitted that the accused appellant
G desperately wanted to get married to Manju and his wife Sangeeta
(deceased) was coming in his way. The accused appellant decided not
only to terminate his own wife but also mercilessly killed four of his
innocent minor daughters so that he may not have to take care of
them after marrying Manju. He would submit that it is one of the most
heinous and gruesome crimes committed by the accused appellant.
H
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 183
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
27. He further submitted that the prosecution is not obliged to A
explain the injuries suffered by the accused appellant as those injuries
were found to be superfluous in nature. The prosecution is obliged to
explain the injuries suffered by an accused, if any, only if such injuries
are grievous in nature which may throw a considerable doubt on the
very genesis or the origin of the case of the prosecution. He would
B
submit that the defence of the accused appellant that four unidentified
persons were the assailants stands falsified by his own unnatural conduct.
Mr. Upadhyay would submit that the accused appellant has not been
able to explain in what circumstances the smell of kerosene was coming
from his clothes as deposed by the witnesses and the doctor. He would
argue that if out of fear he had escaped from his house and ran away, C
then how he came in contact with kerosene. He would submit that the
case of the accused appellant that one of the unidentified persons fired
a shot from a firearm is also falsified as no cartridge or any pellets were
recovered from the place of occurrence.
28. Mr. Upadhyay would submit that the scope of the present D
appeals filed under Article 136 of the Constitution is very limited. It is
only in exceptional circumstances that this Court may disturb the
concurrent findings of guilt recorded by the trial court and High Court
respectively. He would submit that the view taken by the trial court and
the High Court is correct and in no manner the appreciation of evidence
could be termed as perverse. E
29. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Upadhyay prays
that there being no merit in the appeals filed by the accused appellant,
those may be dismissed.
ORAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD F
30. The PW-1, Shambhu Raidas is the first informant. He happens
to be the brother-in-law of the accused appellant i.e. husband of the
accused appellant’s sister. On 22.01.2010 while he was at his house, the
accused appellant is said to have visited him at 6:30 in the morning and
was informed that at 1 o’clock in the night four unidentified persons G
knocked at his door. The accused appellant woke up and enquired who
was it. As no one replied, the accused appellant went on the roof of his
house and saw four persons standing outside his house. The accused
appellant is said to have seen those four persons under the light of a
torch. The accused appellant informed the PW-1 that one of the persons
H
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A was from the village Basadiha. One among the four persons fired at the
accused appellant. The accused appellant is said to have jumped from
the roof top. At that point of time, one of the four hit the accused appellant
on his head with the butt of the gun. The accused appellant thereafter
ran away towards a farm. The accused appellant is said to have witnessed
those persons entering into his house from a distance. After sometime,
B
he noticed smoke coming out of his house. The accused appellant went
to Behnanpurwa, Khalikpurwa and Lahki for help but he was not able to
procure any help. PW-1 has deposed that after the accused appellant
narrated the entire incident, he himself along with one Pratap reached
the house of the accused appellant. The accused appellant also
C accompanied the PW-1, Shambhu Raidas and Pratap. When the
PW- 1 reached the house of the accused appellant, he saw the dead
bodies of Sangeeta and the four daughters burning. PW-1 with the help
of Pratap started to douse the fire with water. PW-1 has deposed that
while he himself and Pratap were trying to douse the fire, the accused
appellant took out his blood stained baniyaan (vest) and threw it in the
D
fire. The accused appellant thereafter started warming his body. On
seeing this, the PW-1 got annoyed and told the accused appellant that
how could he sit beside the fire when his wife and children had been
killed. The PW-1, Shambhu Raidas thereafter went to the Dhaurhara
Police Station and lodged the FIR. In the FIR, he named four unidentified
E persons as the suspects. The PW-1 has further deposed about the illicit
relationship of the accused appellant with Manju. He has deposed that
while the accused appellant was married to Sangeeta, he decided to get
married to Manju. The engagement ceremony of Manju with accused
appellant Ramanand was also performed. However, before the accused
appellant could get married to Manju, he came to be arrested in
F
connection with one offence registered against him under Section 307
of the IPC. He has deposed that Sangeeta (deceased) was highly opposed
to the idea of her husband Ramanand getting married to Manju. He has
further deposed that the accused appellant killed his wife and four children
in the hope that he may receive some monetary compensation from the
G Government. In his cross examination, the PW-1 has deposed that his
house is at a distance of one kilometre from the house of the accused
appellant. When the accused appellant reached his house at 6:30 in the
morning on the day of the incident, the PW-1 found the accused appellant
in lot of tension. In his cross examination, he has categorically deposed
that he was at the police station up to 2 o’clock in the night i.e. upto 23 rd
H
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 185
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
of January, 2010 at 2 A.M. He has deposed in so many words that the A
accused appellant Ramanand was also with him at the police station all
throughout. He has deposed that while he left the police station,
Ramanand – accused appellant was not allowed to leave the police station.
He has deposed that Ramanand was challaned by the police on the third
day, till then Ramanand was continuously staying at the police station.
B
31. What emerges from the evidence of the PW-1 is that after
the incident, the accused appellant visited his house at 6:30 in the morning
and narrated as to what had happened. PW-1 along with one Pratap
thereafter reached the house of the accused appellant and saw the
dead bodies of Sangeeta and four minor daughters burning. PW-1 tried
to douse the fire by pouring water on the dead bodies with the help of C
Pratap. PW-1 has deposed about the illicit relationship of the accused
appellant with Manju. However, what is important in the evidence of the
PW-1 is that from the time the PW-1 reached the police station till the
last the accused appellant was at the police station under the surveillance
of the police. D
32. The prosecution has examined the PW-2, Chhatrapal Raidas.
The PW-2 happens to be the brother of the deceased Sangeeta Devi. In
his examination in chief, he has deposed about the extra marital affair of
the accused appellant with Manju. He has also deposed that ten days
before the incident, Sangeeta had visited his house and had narrated E
about the harassment that was meted towards her by the accused
appellant. In his cross examination, he has deposed that he came to
know about the incident at 7 o’clock in the morning through Ramanand.
According to the PW-2, Ramanand had visited his house and was
informed that his wife and four children were burning in the house.
According to the PW-2, the accused appellant saying so left his house. F
The PW-2 has further deposed in his cross examination that Pratap and
PW-1, Shambhu Raidas were to be seen at the house of the accused
appellant dousing the fire with water. He has deposed that villagers
were standing outside the house of the accused appellant. He has deposed
that the clothes of Ramanand were soaked with blood. After sometime, G
the Police Inspector reached the place of incident. The PW-2 has deposed
that between 8 A.M. and 9 A.M. the police took the accused appellant
to the police station. He has deposed that within no time, it was confirmed
that none else but Ramanand- accused appellant was the assailant.
H
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A 33. What emerges from the evidence of the PW-2 is that the
accused appellant was in an extra marital relationship with Manju and
desperately wanted to get married to Manju. Because of the extra marital
affair, Sangeeta was being harassed by the accused appellant. However,
what is important to note in the evidence of the PW-2 is that Ramanand
had visited his house also at 7 o’clock in the morning. The PW-2 also
B
saw Pratap and PW-1, Shambhu Raidas at the house of the accused
appellant trying to douse the fire with water. One important feature of
the deposition of the PW-2 is that the accused appellant was taken away
by the police between 8 A.M. and 9 A.M. on the day of the incident.
34. The prosecution has examined the PW-3, Babu Ram Hans to
C prove the extra judicial confession. The PW-3 in his examination in
chief has deposed that on 23.01.2010 while he was at his house, the
accused appellant came about 9 o’clock in the morning and informed
about the incident. According to the PW-3, the accused appellant is said
to have confessed before him of having brutally killed his wife and four
D minor children. According to the PW-3, the accused appellant sought his
help as the PW-3 was a leader of the BSP ruling party at the relevant
point of time. However, the PW-3 declined to help the accused appellant
in any manner. The PW-3 has deposed that he had narrated to the police
inspector about the confession said to have been made before him by
the accused appellant and his statement was also recorded by the police.
E The PW-3 in his cross examination has deposed that his village is at the
distance of 30 to 35 kilometres from Naamdar Purwa.
35. We shall explain as to how we are not inclined to believe the
evidence of the PW-3, Babu Ram Hans a little later in our judgment.
F 36. The prosecution has examined the PW-4, Ram Kumar son of
Paanchoo. It is the case of the prosecution that even before the PW- 4,
the accused appellant had made an extra judicial confession about the
crime. The PW-4 in his examination in chief has deposed that at the
relevant time, he was the member of the District Panchayat of BSP. He
has deposed that on the very day i.e. 22.01.2010 at 6:30 in the morning
G Ramanand came to his house and informed that his wife and children
had been assaulted and set on fire. The PW-4 told the accused appellant
that he would help him provided he would tell the truth. According to the
PW-4, thereafter the accused appellant confessed before him that he
had killed his wife and children as he wanted to marry Manju and his
H wife Sangeeta was opposing him to get married. He has further deposed
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 187
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
in his examination in chief that when he reached the village of the A
accused appellant, he saw that the son of Ramanand was sitting on
Ramanand’s lap and Ramanand was crying and talking to his son saying
that he had killed his mother and sisters. In his cross examination, he
has deposed that when the accused appellant visited his house at 6:30 in
the morning, he noticed that there was blood on his shirt and pant. He
B
has further deposed in his cross examination that he had informed the
police officers that the accused appellant had visited his house at 6:30 in
the morning.
37. What emerges from the evidence of the PW-4 is that on
22.01.2010, the accused appellant had visited the house of the witness
at 6:30 in the morning and made an extra judicial confession about the C
alleged crime before him. We are not prepared to even believe the
testimony of the PW-4. We shall assign reasons a little later as to why
we are not ready to believe the PW-4, Babu Ram Hans.
38. The prosecution has examined the PW-5, Dr. A.K. Sharma
who conducted the post mortems of the deceased Lakshmi, Kajal and D
Chhoti @ Guddi resply. Dr. Sharma in his examination in chief has deposed
that on 23.01.2010, he was posted as a radiologist at the District Mahila
Chikitsalaya, Lakhimpur. On that day, three dead bodies were brought
to the hospital for post mortem. He has deposed that he had performed
the post mortems of all the three dead bodies. He has recorded the E
injuries noticed by him in the post mortem reports of each of the three
deceased persons. According to Dr. Sharma, the cause of death of all
the three deceased persons was shock and haemorrhage as a result of
the ante mortem injuries. He has deposed that he also noticed post mortem
burn injuries on all the three dead bodies. He has deposed that the injuries
could have been caused by a sharp-edged weapon like Banka. F
39. Nothing turns around so far as the evidence of the PW-5,
Dr. A.K. Sharma is concerned.
40. The prosecution has examined the PW-6, Uma Shankar
Mishra. At the relevant time, the PW-6, Uma Shankar Mishra was G
serving as the Sub-Inspector, Chowki in-charge Bahjam, Police Station
Neem Gaon, District Lakhimpur Kheri. He has deposed that on 24 th of
November, 2010, he was posted at the Dhaurhara Police Station.
According to him, the accused appellant was arrested on
24.11.2010 and was taken in custody. While in custody, the accused
H
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A appellant is said to have made a statement on his own free will and
volition to show the place where he had hidden the weapon of offence
i.e. Banka and his blood stained clothes. According to the PW-6, upon
such statement being made by the accused appellant, he along with the
investigating officer, PW-7 left for the place as led by the accused appellant.
On the way, the PW-6 is said to have picked up PW-2, Chhatrapal son of
B
Rameshwar and Pratap son of Asharfi Lal, both residents of Naamdar
Purwa to act as the panch witnesses for the purpose of drawing the
discovery panchnama. According to the PW-6, the accused appellant
led the police party to a coriander field and took out the weapon of
offence i.e. Banka and also the blood stained clothes. The discovery
C panchnama was accordingly drawn under Section 27 of the Evidence
Act, 1872. We do not propose to look into the cross examination of the
PW-6 as there is hardly anything in the cross examination and not
relevant for our purpose.
41. The prosecution has examined the PW-7, Inspector Yogendra
D Singh as the investigating officer. The PW-7 in his examination in chief
has deposed that he had recorded the statements of the PW-2, Chhatrapal
Raidas and others on 23.01.2010. He has deposed that he arrested the
accused appellant on 24.01.2010. He has deposed that he recorded the
statements of the PW-3 and PW-4 resply on 25.01.2010. Nothing turns
around in the cross examination of the PW-7, Yogendra Singh.
E
42. It is not necessary for us to discuss the evidence of the PW-8
Dr. S.P. Singh. Dr. Singh had performed the post mortems of the deceased
Tulsi and Sangeeta.
43. The prosecution has examined the PW-9, Dr. Ankit Kumar
F Singh. According to the PW-9, the accused appellant was brought at
the C.H.C. Dhaurhara on 22.01.2010 at 10:30 in the morning for medical
examination. He has deposed that on 22.01.2010 he was in-charge
Medical Officer at the C.H.C. Dhaurhara. He has deposed that the
accused appellant Ramanand was brought at the C.H.C. Dhaurhara by
Constable Brij Mohan Singh of Police Station Dhaurhara along with a
G police yadi. During the medical examination of the accused appellant,
he noticed the following injuries on the body of the accused appellant:
“1. Lacerated wound 2 cm x 0.5 cm on left side of head, 10 cm
above left ear.
H
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 189
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
2. Lacerated wound 5 cm x 0.5 cm on middle of the head; 2 cm A
away from Injury 1.
3. Lacerated wound 4.5 cm x 0.5 cm on middle of the head; 1
cm away from Injury No. 2.
4. Superficial burn injury on left side of neck in length 8 cm x 6
cm. B
5. Superficial burn injury on right side of neck in length 10 cm x 7
cm.”
44. Dr. Singh has further deposed that all the injuries were simple
in nature and fresh. During the medical examination, the clothes of the C
accused appellant were smelling of kerosene oil. In the cross examination
of Dr. Singh, he has deposed that the injuries Nos. 1, 2 and 3 resply noted
during the medical examination of the accused appellant could have
been caused with the butt of a gun. He has deposed that the injury Nos.
4 and 5 resply could have been suffered by the accused appellant while
trying to rescue. He has deposed that at the time of medical examination D
of the accused appellant, there was no fresh bleeding from the wounds.
At the time of cleaning the wounds with cotton, the blood started to
ooze. He has deposed that the injuries could not have been 12 hours old.
PRINCIPLES OF LAW RELATING TO APPRECIATION
OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE E
45. In ‘A Treatise on Judicial Evidence’, Jeremy Bentham, an
English Philosopher included a whole chapter upon what lies next when
the direct evidence does not lead to any special inference. It is called
Circumstantial Evidence. According to him, in every case, of
circumstantial evidence, there are always at least two facts to be F
considered:
a) The Factum probandum, or say, the principal fact (the fact
the existence of which is supposed or proposed to be proved; &
b) The Factum probans or the evidentiary fact (the fact from
G
the existence of which that of the factum probandumis inferred).
46. Although there can be no straight jacket formula for
appreciation of circumstantial evidence, yet to convict an accused on
the basis of circumstantial evidence, the Court must follow certain tests
which are broadly as follows:
H
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A 1. Circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought
to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established;
2. Those circumstances must be of a definite tendency
unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused and must
be conclusive in nature;
B 3. The circumstances, if taken cumulatively, should form a
chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion
that within all human probability the crime was committed
by the accused and none else; and
4. The circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction
C must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other
hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused but should
be inconsistent with his innocence. In other words, the
circumstances should exclude every possible hypothesis
except the one to be proved.
D 47. There cannot be any dispute to the fact that the case on hand
is one of the circumstantial evidence as there was no eye witness of the
occurrence. It is settled principle of law that an accused can be punished
if he is found guilty even in cases of circumstantial evidence provided,
the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the complete
E chain of events and circumstances which definitely points towards the
involvement and guilty of the suspect or accused, as the case may be.
The accused will not be entitled to acquittal merely because there is no
eye witness in the case. It is also equally true that an accused can be
convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence subject to satisfaction
of the expected principles in that regard.
F
48. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Sharad Birdhichand
Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, held as under:
“152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High
Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature,
character and essential proof required in a criminal case which
G
rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most fundamental
and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant v. State of
Madhya Pradesh [AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953
Cri LJ 129]. This case has been uniformly followed and applied
by this Court in a large number of later decisions up-to-date,
H
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 191
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
for instance, the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar A
Pradesh [(1969) 3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and
Ramgopal v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR
1972 SC 656]. It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J.
has laid down in Hanumant case [AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952
SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] :
B
It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is
of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance
be fully established, and all the facts so established should
be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive C
nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude
every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other
words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as
not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent
with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to D
show that within all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused.
153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the
following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against
an accused can be said to be fully established: E
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
circumstances concerned ‘must or should’ and not ‘may be’
established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal F
distinction between ‘may be proved’ and “must be or should
be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao
Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973
SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Cri LJ 1783] where the following
observations were made : [SCC para 19, p. 807 : SCC (Cri) G
p. 1047]
Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must
be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict
and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is
long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.”
H
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A (2) the facts so established should be consistent only
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say,
they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except
that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature
B and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except
the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as
not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
C consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show
that in all human probability the act must have been done by
the accused.
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute
the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial
D evidence.”
49. In an Essay on the Principles of Circumstantial Evidence by
William Wills by T. and J.W. Johnson and Co. 1872, it has been explained
as under:
“In matters of direct testimony, if credence be given to the
E
relators, the act of hearing and the act of belief, though really
not so, seem to be contemporaneous. But the case is very
different when we have to determine upon circumstantial
evidence, the judgment in respect of which is essentially
inferential. There is no apparent necessary connection
F between the facts and the inference; the facts may be true,
and the inference erroneous, and it is only by comparison
with the results of observation in similar or analogous
circumstances, that we acquire confidence in the accuracy of
our conclusions. ?’”
G The term PRESUMPTIVE is frequently used as synonymous
with CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; but it is not so used with
strict accuracy, The word” presumption,” ex vi termini, imports
an inference from facts; and the adjunct “presumptive,” as
applied to evidentiary facts, implies the certainty of some
relation between the facts and the inference. Circumstances
H
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 193
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
generally, but not necessarily, lead to particular inferences; A
for the facts may be indisputable, and yet their relation to the
principal fact may be only apparent, and not real; and even
when the connection is real, the deduction may be erroneous.
Circumstantial and presumptive evidence differ, therefore, as
genus and species.
B
The force and effect of circumstantial evidence depend
upon its incompatibility with, and incapability of, explanation
or solution upon any other supposition than that of the truth
of the fact which it is adduced to prove; the mode of argument
resembling the method of demonstration by the reductio ad
absurdum.” C
50. Thus, in view of the above, the Court must consider a case of
circumstantial evidence in light of the aforesaid settled legal propositions.
In a case of circumstantial evidence, the judgment remains essentially
inferential. The inference is drawn from the established facts as the
circumstances lead to particular inferences. The Court has to draw an D
inference with respect to whether the chain of circumstances is complete,
and when the circumstances therein are collectively considered, the same
must lead only to the irresistible conclusion that the accused alone is the
perpetrator of the crime in question. All the circumstances so established
must be of a conclusive nature, and consistent only with the hypothesis E
of the guilt of the accused.
ANALYSIS OF THE INCRIMINATING CIRCUMSTANCES
RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT AND THE HIGH
COURT
DISCOVERY OF WEAPON OF OFFENCE AND F
BLOOD-STAINED CLOTHES
51. It is the case of the prosecution that on 24.01.2010 the accused
appellant was picked up by the investigating officer from nearby a bus
stand and was arrested in connection with the alleged crime. After the
arrest of the accused appellant and while he being in the custody at the G
police station, he is said to have on his own free will and volition made a
statement that he would like to point out the place where he had hidden
the weapon of offence (Banka) and his blood-stained clothes after the
commission of the alleged crime. According to him, after such statement
was made by the accused appellant, he along with his subordinates set
H
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A forth for the place as led by the accused. There is something very unusual,
that we have noticed in the oral evidence of the investigating officer.
According to him while the police party along with the accused were on
their way, all of a sudden, the investigating officer realized that he should
have two independent witnesses with him for the purpose of drawing the
panchnama of discovery. In such circumstances, while on the way the
B
investigating officer picked up PW-2, Chhatarpal Raidas and Pratap to
act as the panch witnesses. According to the investigating officer the
accused led them to a coriander field and from a bush he took out the
weapon of offence (Banka) and the blood-stained clothes. The weapon
of offence and the blood-stained clothes were collected in the presence
C of the two panch witnesses and the panchnama Exh. 5 was accordingly
drawn. The weapon of offence and the blood stained clothes thereafter
were sent for the Serological Test to the Forensic Science laboratory.
We are of the view that the Courts below committed a serious error in
relying upon this piece of evidence of discovery of a fact, i.e., the weapon
& clothes at the instance of the accused as one of the incriminating
D
circumstances in the chain of other circumstances. We shall explain
here below why we are saying so.
52. Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 reads thus:
“27. How much of information received from accused may
E be proved.—Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as
discovered in consequence of information received from a
person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police
officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a
confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby
discovered, may be proved.”
F
53. If, it is say of the investigating officer that the accused appellant
while in custody on his own free will and volition made a statement that
he would lead to the place where he had hidden the weapon of offence
along with his blood stained clothes then the first thing that the investigating
officer should have done was to call for two independent witnesses at
G the police station itself. Once the two independent witnesses arrive at
the police station thereafter in their presence the accused should be asked
to make an appropriate statement as he may desire in regard to pointing
out the place where he is said to have hidden the weapon of offence.
When the accused while in custody makes such statement before the
H two independent witnesses (panch witnesses) the exact statement or
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 195
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
rather the exact words uttered by the accused should be incorporated A
in the first part of the panchnama that the investigating officer may
draw in accordance with law. This first part of the panchnama for the
purpose of Section 27 of the Evidence Act is always drawn at the
police station in the presence of the independent witnesses so as to lend
credence that a particular statement was made by the accused expressing
B
his willingness on his own free will and volition to point out the place
where the weapon of offence or any other article used in the commission
of the offence had been hidden. Once the first part of the panchnama is
completed thereafter the police party along with the accused and the
two independent witnesses (panch witnesses) would proceed to the
particular place as may be led by the accused. If from that particular C
place anything like the weapon of offence or blood stained clothes or
any other article is discovered then that part of the entire process would
form the second part of the panchnama. This is how the law expects the
investigating officer to draw the discovery panchnama as contemplated
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. If we read the entire oral evidence
D
of the investigating officer then it is clear that the same is deficient in
all the aforesaid relevant aspects of the matter.
54. The reason why we are not ready or rather reluctant to accept
the evidence of discovery is that the investigating officer in his oral
evidence has not said about the exact words uttered by the accused at
the police station. The second reason to discard the evidence of discovery E
is that the investigating officer has failed to prove the contents of the
discovery panchnama. The third reason to discard the evidence is that
even if the entire oral evidence of the investigating officer is accepted
as it is, what is lacking is the authorship of concealment. The fourth
reason to discard the evidence of the discovery is that although one of F
the panch witnesses PW-2, Chhatarpal Raidas was examined by the
prosecution in the course of the trial, yet has not said a word that he had
also acted as a panch witness for the purpose of discovery of the weapon
of offence and the blood stained clothes. The second panch witness
namely Pratap though available was not examined by the prosecution
for some reason. Therefore, we are now left with the evidence of the G
investigating officer so far as the discovery of the weapon of offence
and the blood stained clothes as one of the incriminating pieces of
circumstances is concerned. We are conscious of the position of law
that even if the independent witnesses to the discovery panchnama are
not examined or if no witness was present at the time of discovery or H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A if no person had agreed to affix his signature on the document, it is
difficult to lay down, as a proposition of law, that the document so prepared
by the police officer must be treated as tainted and the discovery evidence
unreliable. In such circumstances, the Court has to consider the evidence
of the investigating officer who deposed to the fact of discovery based
on the statement elicited from the accused on its own worth.
B
55. Applying the aforesaid principle of law, we find the evidence
of the investigating officer not only unreliable but we can go to the extent
to saying that the same does not constitute legal evidence.
56. The requirement of law that needs to be fulfilled before
C accepting the evidence of discovery is that by proving the contents of
the panchnama. The investigating officer in his deposition is obliged in
law to prove the contents of the panchnama and it is only if the investigating
officer has successfully proved the contents of the discovery panchnama
in accordance with law, then in that case the prosecution may be justified
in relying upon such evidence and the trial court may also accept the
D evidence. In the present case, what we have noticed from the oral
evidence of the investigating officer, PW-7, Yogendra Singh is that he
has not proved the contents of the discovery panchnama and all that he
has deposed is that as the accused expressed his willingness to point
out the weapon of offence the same was discovered under a panchnama.
E We have minutely gone through this part of the evidence of the
investigating officer and are convinced that by no stretch of imagination
it could be said that the investigating officer has proved the contents of
the discovery panchnama (Exh.5). There is a reason why we are laying
emphasis on proving the contents of the panchnama at the end of the
investigating officer, more particularly when the independent panch
F witnesses though examined yet have not said a word about such discovery
or turned hostile and have not supported the prosecution. In order to
enable the Court to safely rely upon the evidence of the investigating
officer, it is necessary that the exact words attributed to an accused, as
statement made by him, be brought on record and, for this purpose the
G investigating officer is obliged to depose in his evidence the exact
statement and not by merely saying that a discovery panchnama of
weapon of offence was drawn as the accused was willing to take it out
from a particular place.
H
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 197
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
57. Let us see what has been exactly stated in the discovery A
panchnama (Exh.5) drawn on 24.01.2010. We quote the relevant portion
as under:
“Today on 24.1.2010, the arrested accused Ramanand alias
Nandlal Bharti son of Late Shri Gobre, resident of- Naamdar
Purwa, Hamlet- Amethi, original resident of village- B
Basadhiya, Police Station- Isanagar, District- Lakhimpur
Kheri has been taken out of the lock-up, taken in confidence
and then interrogated by me- the Station House Officer
Yogendra Singh before Hamrah S.S.I. Shri Uma Shankar
Mishra, S.I. Shri Nand Kumar, Co. 374 Mo. Usman, Co. 598
C
Prabhu Dayal, Co. 993 Santosh Kumar Singh, Co. 394
Shrawan Kumar then he confessed the offence occurred in
the incident and weepingly said in apologizing manner that,
“I myself have committed this crime to get government grant
for being a rich man and to marry Km. Manju D/o Kanhai,
resident of Pakadiya, Police Station- Tambaur, District- Sitapur D
regarding whereof the detailed statement has been recorded
by you. The baanka used in the incident and the pant-shirt,
on which blood spilled from the bodies of deceased persons
got stained and which had been put off by me due to fear,
have been kept hidden at a secret place by me which I can
E
get recovered by going there.” In expectation of recovery of
murder weapon and blood-stained clothes, I- the Station House
Officer Yogendra Singh alongwith aforesaid Hamrahis
departed carrying accused Ramanand alias Nandlal Bharti
by official jeep UP70AG0326 alongwith driver Raj Kishor
Dixit for the destination pointed out by the accused, vide Rapat F
No.- 7 time 07.15…” [Emphasis supplied]
58. We shall now look into the oral evidence of the PW-7,
Investigating Officer wherein, in his examination in chief, he has deposed
as under:
“In January 2010 I was posted as Station House Officer, G
Kotwali Dhaurahara. On 22.1.10, I myself had taken the
investigation of aforesaid case. On that day I had copied chik,
rapat and recorded the statements of chik writer H. Constable
Dhaniram Verma and complainant of the case. After recording
the statement of complainant of the case Shambhu Raidas I H
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A inspected the occurrence spot on his pointing out and prepared
the site plan which is present on record; on which Exhibit
Ka-6 has been marked. And I had also recorded the statement
of hearsay witnesses Ahmad Hussain and Nizamuddin. On
23.1.10, I recorded the statements of witnesses Kshatrapal,
Rustam Raidas. On 24.1.10, I arrested accused Ramanand
B
and recorded his statement and when he expressed that - he
may get recovered the murder weapon used in the incident, I
recovered the murder weapon baanka before the witnesses
on his pointing out; which had been sealed-stamped at the
spot and its recovery memo had been prepared at the spot
C itself, which is present on record as Exhibit Ka-5….”
[Emphasis supplied]
59. We shall also look into the oral evidence of the PW-6, Uma
Shankar Mishra who at the relevant point of time was serving as a
Sub-Inspector Chowki In-charge Bahjam, Police Station. It appears that
D the PW-6 had also participated in the proceedings of discovery
panchnama. He has deposed in his examination in chief as under:
“On 24.11.2010, I was posted at Police Station-Dhaurahara.
That day, Ramanand S/o Gobre Rio Naamdar Purwa, Police
Station-Dhaurahara, domicile of village Basadhiya, Police
E Station- Isha Ganj, District- Kheri, the arrested accused of
Crime No. 49/10 U/S 302 State versus Ramanand alias Nandlal
Bharti, was taken out of male lock up by the then In-charge
Inspector and followers S.I. Nand Kumar, Co. Mo. Usman,
Co. Prabhu Dayal, Co. Santosh Kumar Singh and Co. Shravan
F Kumar, and interrogated by the Incharge Inspector in my
presence, during which he confessed and told that he would
get recovered the murder weapon used in the murder and his
blood stained pant-shirt which he had kept hidden at a secret
place. On this, expecting the recovery of murder weapon and
blood stained clothes, the SHO along with followers and force,
G carrying accused Ramanand with him, departed on an official
jeep ~ vide GD No. 7 time 7:15 a.m dated 24.01.2010. On
the way, he picked up public witnesses Chhatrapal S/o
Rameshwar and Pratap S/o Asharfi Lal, both residents of
Naamdar Purwa, Hamlet- Amethi for the purpose of recovery.”
H [Emphasis supplied]
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 199
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
60. From the aforesaid two things are quite evident. In the original A
panchnama (Exh.5), the statement said to have been made by the accused
appellant figures, however, in the oral evidence of the PW-7, investigating
officer & PW-6, Sub-Inspector the exact statement has not been deposed,
more particularly when it comes to the authorship of concealment. The
contents of the panchnama cannot be read into evidence as those do not
B
constitute substantive evidence.
61. Further, the examination-in-chief of the PW-6, Sub-Inspector
and PW-7, investigating officer does not indicate that they were read
over the panchnama (Exh.5) before it was exhibited, since one of the
panch witnesses was not examined and the second panch witness though
examined yet has not said a word about the proceedings of the discovery C
panchnama. Everything thereafter fell upon the oral evidence of the
investigating officer and the Sub-Inspector (PW-6).
62. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely upon the
decision of this Court in the case of Murli v. State of Rajasthan reported
in (2009) 9 SCC 417, held as under: D
“34. The contents of the panchnama are not the substantive
evidence. The law is settled on that issue. What is substantive
evidence is what has been stated by the panchas or the person
concerned in the witness box…….”
E
[Emphasis supplied]
63. One another serious infirmity which has surfaced is in regard
to the authorship of concealment by the person who is said to have
discovered the weapon.
64. The conditions necessary for the applicability of Section 27 F
of the Act are broadly as under:
(1) Discovery of fact in consequence of an information
received from accused;
(2) Discovery of such fact to be deposed to;
G
(3) The accused must be in police custody when he gave
information; and
(4) So much of information as relates distinctly to the fact
thereby discovered is admissible – Mohmed Inayatullah v.
The State of Maharashtra: AIR (1976) SC 483 H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A Two conditions for application –
(1) information must be such as has caused discovery of the
fact; and
(2) information must relate distinctly to the fact discovered -
Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka: AIR (1983) SC
B 446"
65. We may refer to and rely upon a Constitution Bench decision
of this Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman
Upadhyaya reported in AIR (1960) SC 1125, wherein, Paragraph-71
explains the position of law as regards the Section 27 of the Evidence
C Act:
“71. The law has thus made a classification of accused persons
into two: (1) those who have the danger brought home to
them by detention on a charge; and (2) those who are yet
free. In the former category are also those persons who
D surrender to the custody by words or action. The protection
given to these two classes is different. In the case of persons
belonging to the first category the law has ruled that their
statements are not admissible, and in the case of the second
category, only that portion, of the statement is admissible as
E is guaranteed by the discovery of a relevant fact unknown
before the statement to the investigating authority. That
statement may even be confessional in nature, as when the
person in custody says: “I pushed him down such and such
mineshaft”, and the body of the victim is found as a result,
and it can be proved that his death was due to injuries received
F by a fall down the mineshaft.”
[Emphasis supplied]
66. The scope and ambit of Section 27 of the Evidence Act were
illuminatingly stated in Pulukuri Kottaya and Others v. Emperor, AIR
1947 PC 67, which have become locus classicus, in the following words:
G
“10. ….It is fallacious to treat the “fact discovered” within
the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact
discovered embraces the place from which the object is
produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and
the information given must relate distinctly to this fact.
H
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 201
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object A
produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which
it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody
that “I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house”
does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were
discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the
B
fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to
his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used
in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very
relevant. But if to the statement the words be added “with
which I stabbed A” these words are inadmissible since they
do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the C
informant.”
67. What emerges from the evidence in the form of panchnama is
that the appellant stated before the panch witnesses to the effect that
“I will show you the weapon used in the commission of offence”. This
is the exact statement which we could read from the discovery panchnama D
and the Investigating Officer also could not have deposed as regards
the exact statement other than what has been recorded in the panchnama.
This statement does not suggest that the appellant indicated anything
about his involvement in concealment of the weapon. Mere discovery
cannot be interpreted as sufficient to infer authorship of concealment by
the person who discovered the weapon. He could have derived knowledge E
of the existence of that weapon at the place through some other source.
He may have even seen somebody concealing the weapon, and, therefore,
it cannot be presumed or inferred that because a person discovered
weapon, he was the person who concealed it, least it can be presumed
that he used it. Therefore, even if discovery by the appellant is accepted, F
what emerges from the panchnama of the discovery of weapon and the
evidence in this regard is that he disclosed that he would show the weapon
used in the commission of offence. In the same manner we have also
perused the panchnama Exh.32 wherein the statement said to have been
made by the accused before the panchas in exact words is “the accused
resident of Roghada village on his own free will informs to take out cash G
and other valuables”.
68. What emerges from the evidence of the investigating officer
is that the accused appellant stated before him while he was in custody,
“I may get discovered the murder weapon used in the incident”. This
H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A statement does not indicate or suggest that the accused appellant indicated
anything about his involvement in the concealment of the weapon. It is a
vague statement. Mere discovery cannot be interpreted as sufficient to
infer authorship of concealment by the person who discovered the weapon.
He could have derived knowledge of the existence of that weapon at
the place through some other source also.
B
He might have even seen somebody concealing the weapon, and,
therefore, it cannot be presumed or inferred that because a person
discovered the weapon, he was the person who had concealed it, least it
can be presumed that he used it. Therefore, even if discovery by the
appellant is accepted, what emerges from the substantive evidence as
C regards the discovery of weapon is that the appellant disclosed that he
would show the weapon used in the commission of offence.
69. In Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U. P., AIR (1981) SC 911,
this Court observed that the evidence of discovery of pistol at the instance
of the appellant cannot, by itself, prove that he who pointed out the
D weapon wielded it in the offence. The statement accompanying the
discovery was found to be vague to identify the authorship of concealment
and it was held that pointing out of the weapon may, at the best, prove
the appellant’s knowledge as to where the weapon was kept.
70. Thus, in the absence of exact words, attributed to an accused
E person, as statement made by him being deposed by the investigating
officer in his evidence, and also without proving the contents of the
panchnama (Exh.5), the trial court as well as the High Court was not
justified in placing reliance upon the circumstance of discovery of
weapon.
F 71. If it is the case of the prosecution that the PW-2, Chhatarpal
Raidas, s/o Rameshwar Raidas had acted as one of the panch witnesses
to the drawing of the discovery panchnama, then why the PW-2,
Chhatarpal Raidas in his oral evidence has not said a word about he
having acted as a panch witness and the discovery of the weapon of the
offence and blood stained clothes being made in his presence. The fact
G that he is absolutely silent in his oral evidence on the aforesaid itself
casts a doubt on the very credibility of the two police witnesses i.e.
PW-6 and PW-7 respectively.
72. In the aforesaid context, we may also refer to a decision of
this Court in the case of Bodhraj alias Bodha and Others v. State of
H Jammu and Kashmir reported in (2002) 8 SCC 45, as under:
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 203
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
“18. …..It would appear that under Section 27 as it stands in A
order to render the evidence leading to discovery of any fact
admissible, the information must come from any accused in
custody of the police. The requirement of police custody is
productive of extremely anomalous results and may lead to
the exclusion of much valuable evidence in cases where a
B
person, who is subsequently taken into custody and becomes
an accused, after committing a crime meets a police officer
or voluntarily goes to him or to the police station and states
the circumstances of the crime which lead to the discovery of
the dead body, weapon or any other material fact, in
consequence of the information thus received from him. This C
information which is otherwise admissible becomes
inadmissible under Section 27 if the information did not come
from a person in the custody of a police officer or did come
from a person not in the custody of a police officer. The
statement which is admissible under Section 27 is the one which
D
is the information leading to discovery. Thus, what is
admissible being the information, the same has to be proved
and not the opinion formed on it by the police officer. In other
words, the exact information given by the accused while in
custody which led to recovery of the articles has to be proved.
It is, therefore, necessary for the benefit of both the accused E
and the prosecution that information given should be recorded
and proved and if not so recorded, the exact information must
be adduced through evidence. The basic idea embedded in
Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation
by subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the principle
F
that if any fact is discovered as a search made on the strength
of any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery
is a guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner
is true. The information might be confessional or
non-inculpatory in nature but if it results in discovery of a
fact, it becomes a reliable information. It is now well settled G
that recovery of an object is not discovery of fact envisaged
in the section. Decision of the Privy Council in Pulukuri
Kottaya v. Emperor [AIR 1947 PC 67 : 48 Cri LJ 533 : 74 IA
65] is the most-quoted authority for supporting the
interpretation that the “fact discovered” envisaged in the
H
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A section embraces the place from which the object was produced,
the knowledge of the accused as to it, but the information
given must relate distinctly to that effect. (See State of
Maharashtra v. Damu Gopinath Shinde [(2000) 6 SCC 269 :
2000 SCC (Cri) 1088 : 2000 Cri LJ 2301].) No doubt, the
information permitted to be admitted in evidence is confined
B
to that portion of the information which “distinctly relates to
the fact thereby discovered”. But the information to get
admissibility need not be so truncated as to make it insensible
or incomprehensible. The extent of information admitted should
be consistent with understandability. Mere statement that the
C accused led the police and the witnesses to the place where
he had concealed the articles is not indicative of the
information given.”
[Emphasis supplied]
73. Mr. Upadhyay, the learned counsel for the State would submit
D that even while discarding the evidence in the form of discovery
panchnama the conduct of the appellant herein would be relevant under
Section 8 of the Evidence Act. The evidence of discovery would be
admissible as conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act quite apart
from the admissibility of the disclosure statement under Section 27 of the
E said Act, as this Court observed in A.N. Venkatesh vs. State of
Karnataka, (2005) 7 SCC 714:
“9. By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the conduct of
the accused person is relevant, if such conduct influences or
is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact. The evidence
F of the circumstance, simpliciter, that the accused pointed out
to the police officer, the place where the dead body of the
kidnapped boy was found and on their pointing out the body
was exhumed, would be admissible as conduct under Section
8 irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the
accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such
G conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 or not as held
by this Court in Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1979)
3 SCC 90 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 656 : AIR 1979 SC 400] . Even if
we hold that the disclosure statement made by the
accused-appellants (Exts. P-15 and P-16) is not admissible
H
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 205
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still it is relevant under A
Section 8…..”
[Emphasis supplied]
74. In the aforesaid context, we would like to sound a note of
caution. Although the conduct of an accused may be a relevant fact
under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, yet the same, by itself, cannot be B
a ground to convict him or hold him guilty and that too, for a serious
offence like murder. Like any other piece of evidence, the conduct of
an accused is also one of the circumstances which the court may take
into consideration along with the other evidence on record, direct or
indirect. What we are trying to convey is that the conduct of the accused C
alone, though may be relevant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act,
cannot form the basis of conviction.
75. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, we have reached to
the conclusion that the evidence of discovery of the weapon and the
blood stained clothes at the instance of the accused appellant can hardly D
be treated as legal evidence, more particularly, considering the various
legal infirmities in the same.
EXTRA JUDICIAL CONFESSION
76. It is the case of the prosecution that on 23.01.2010 the accused
appellant is said to have visited the house of the PW-3, Babu Ram E
Hans at about 9:00 o’clock in the morning and sought his help. While
seeking help from the PW-3, Babu Ram Hans, the accused appellant is
said to have made an extra judicial confession that he had brutally killed
his wife Sangeeta for not giving consent to him to marry Manju.
The accused appellant is also said to have made an extra judicial F
confession to the PW-3, Babu Ram Hans that he had also killed his four
daughters viz. Tulsi, Lakshmi, Kajal and Guddi and thereby had committed
a huge mistake. The trial court and the High Court have believed the so
called extra judicial confession said to have been made by the accused
appellant before the PW-3, Babu Ram Hans. However, the trial court
G
as well as the High Court should have put a question to themselves
before believing the extra judicial confession whether the accused
appellant was a free man on 23.01.2010 so as to reach the house of
PW-3, Babu Ram Hans at 9:00 o’clock in the morning and make an
extra judicial confession. This is one of the basic infirmities we have
noticed in the judgment of both the Courts. There is cogent evidence on H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A record to indicate that on 22.01.2010, the accused appellant first visited
the house of PW-1, Shambhu Raidas (first informant) and narrated about
the incident. The PW-1, Shambhu Raidas thereafter lodged the First
Information Report (FIR) at the police station and as deposed by him,
the accused appellant all throughout was at the police station. If on
22.01.2010 the accused is sent for medical examination along with a
B
police yadi accompanied by a police constable to the hospital then how
does it lie in the mouth of the prosecution to say that after the medical
examination the accused appellant was allowed to go home and move
around freely. The witnesses have said in their oral evidence that the
accused appellant was picked up by the police on 22.01.2010 in the
C early morning itself. This entire case put up by the prosecution that an
extra judicial confession was made by the accused appellant before the
PW-3, Babu Ram Hans on 23.01.2010 appears to be fabricated and
engineered only to bolster up the case of the prosecution.
77. It is also the case of the prosecution that similar such extra
D judicial confession was made by the accused appellant before the PW-
4, Ram Kumar, S/o Paanchoo on the very same day of the incident itself
i.e. 22.01.2010 at 06:30 in the morning. If we peruse the oral evidence
of the PW-4, Ram Kumar then according to him at the relevant point of
time he was a member of the District Panchayat. According to PW-4,
Ram Kumar, the accused appellant had visited his house at 06:30 in the
E morning and made an extra judicial confession that he had committed a
serious crime. How does the prosecution expect us to believe even the
second extra judicial confession alleged to have been made before the
PW-4, Ram Kumar? How does the prosecution expect us to believe that
the accused appellant was present at three different places on or about
F the same time. Either we believe PW-1, Shambhu Raidas (first informant)
that the accused appellant visited his house at 06:30 in morning or we
believe the PW- 2, Chhatrapal Raidas, who has deposed that the accused
appellant had visited his house at 07:00 o’clock in the morning or we
believe the PW-4, Ram Kumar that the accused appellant had visited
his house at 06:30 in the morning. How is it possible for the accused
G appellant to be present at three different places in or around between
06:30 A.M. to 07:30 A.M. One another aspect that makes the oral
evidence of the PW-4, Ram Kumar very doubtful is that his house is
situated at a distance of 6-7 kilometers from Dhaurhara and according to
the PW-4, the accused appellant visited his house all the way walking
H from his own house. The PW-4, Ram Kumar also appears to be a ‘got
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 207
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
up’ witness only for the purpose of creating evidence in the form of A
extra judicial confession. At this stage, we may once again go back to
the oral evidence of the PW-1, Shambhu Raidas (Exh.1). In his evidence,
he has said, “the inspector had not interrogated me at the police
station. The inspector had visited the place of the incident in his
vehicle. I left the police station at the 02:00 o’clock in the night. I
B
had stayed at the police station right from the time I lodged the FIR
in the morning till 02:00 o’clock in the night and Ramanand also
stayed with me at the police station. The police official had challaned
Ramanand on the third day. Till then Ramanand was continuously
staying at the police station. [Emphasis supplied]
78. The PW-2, Chhatrapal Raidas in his evidence has deposed, “I C
came to know about the incident at 07:00 o’clock in the morning. I
came to know through Ramanand. Ramanand had come to my house
at 07:00 o’clock. Ramanand was alone then. Ramanand told me
that his wife and children were burning in the house; someone had
killed and set them on fire. Saying this Ramanand left for his home. D
Thereafter, Pratap and Shambhu reached the place of Ramanand
on a bicycle and I reached walking. When I reached the house of
Ramanand, Pratap and Shambhu were dousing the fire at the house
with water. Ramanand was warming his body sitting over here and
villagers were standing outside. The clothes of Ramanand were
soaked with blood. The Inspector reached sometime thereafter. E
Thereafter, I, Shambhu and Pratap went with the inspector to the
police station in a jeep. It took half an hour for the inspector to
arrive at the spot. It was about 8-9 o’clock in the morning the police
officials took Ramanand to the police station before us.”
79. Thus, it is very difficult for us to believe that the accused F
appellant could have made extra judicial confession on 23.01.2010 before
the PW-2 and also before the PW-4 on 22.01.2010 at 06:30 A.M. i.e.
on the date of incident. We have reached to the conclusion that the
investigating officer has deliberately shown arrest of accused appellant
on 24.01.2010 and that too from a place like bus stand. As discussed G
above, the accused appellant was arrested and taken in custody in the
morning of 22.01.2010 itself. One Police Constable along with a police
yadi had taken the accused appellant to the hospital in the morning
itself for medical examination. Only with a view to show that between
22.01.2010 and 24.01.2010 the accused appellant made extra judicial
H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A confession before two witnesses, the investigating officer has shown
arrest of the accused appellant on 24.01.2010 which is just unbelievable.
80. Confessions may be divided into two classes, i.e. judicial and
extra judicial. Judicial confessions are those which are made before
Magistrate or Court in the course of judicial proceedings. Extra judicial
B confessions are those which are made by the party elsewhere than before
a Magistrate or Court. Extra judicial confessions are generally those
made by a party to or before a private individual which includes even a
judicial officer in his private capacity. It also includes a Magistrate who
is not especially empowered to record confessions under Section 164 of
the CrPC or a Magistrate so empowered but receiving the confession at
C a stage when Section 164 does not apply. As to extra judicial confessions,
two questions arise: (i) were they made voluntarily? And (ii) are they
true? As the Section enacts, a confession made by an accused person is
irrelevant in a criminal proceedings, if the making of the confession
appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or
D promise, (1) having reference to the charge against the accused person,
(2) proceeding from a person in authority, and (3) sufficient, in the opinion
of the Court to give the accused person grounds which would appear to
him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any
advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the
proceedings against him. It follows that a confession would be voluntary
E if it is made by the accused in a fit state of mind, and if it is not caused by
any inducement, threat or promise which has reference to the charge
against him, proceeding from a person in authority. It would not be
involuntary, if the inducement, (a) does not have reference to the charge
against the accused person, or (b) it does not proceed from a person in
F authority; or (c) it is not sufficient, in the opinion of the Court to give the
accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for
supposing that, by making it, he would gain any advantage or avoid any
evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him.
Whether or not the confession was voluntary would depend upon the
facts and circumstances of each case, judged in the light of Section 24
G of the Evidence Act. The law is clear that a confession cannot be used
against an accused person unless the Court is satisfied that it was
voluntary and at that stage the question whether it is true or false does
not arise. If the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of a
confession appear to cast a doubt on the veracity or voluntariness of the
H confession, the Court may refuse to act upon the confession, even if it is
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 209
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
admissible in evidence. One important question, in regard to which the A
Court has to be satisfied with is, whether when the accused made
confession, he was a free man or his movements were controlled by the
police either by themselves or through some other agency employed by
them for the purpose of securing such a confession. The question whether
a confession is voluntary or not is always a question of fact. All the
B
factors and all the circumstances of the case, including the important
factors at the time given for reflection, scope of the accused getting a
feeling of threat, inducement or promise, must be considered before
deciding whether the Court is satisfied that its opinion, the impression
caused by the inducement, threat or promise, if any, has been fully
removed. A free and voluntary confession is deserving of highest credit, C
because it is presumed to flow from the highest sense of guilt. [See R.
V. Warwickshall: (1783) Lesch 263)]. It is not to be conceived that a
man would be induced to make a free and voluntary confession of guilt,
so contrary to the feelings and principles of human nature, if the facts
confessed were not true. Deliberate and voluntary confessions of guilt,
D
if clearly proved, are among the most effectual proofs in law. An
involuntary confession is one which is not the result of the free will of
the maker of it. So, where the statement is made as a result of the
harassment and continuous interrogation for several hours after the person
is treated as an offender and accused, such statement must be regarded
as involuntary. The inducement may take the form of a promise or of E
threat, and often the inducement involves both promise and threat, a
promise of forgiveness if disclosure is made and threat of prosecution if
it is not. (See Woodroffe Evidence, 9th Edn. Page 284). A promise is
always attached to the confession, alternative while a threat is always
attached to the silence-alternative; thus, in the one case the prisoner is
F
measuring the net advantage of the promise, minus the general
undesirability of a false confession, as against the present unsatisfactory
situation; while in the other case he is measuring the net advantages of
the present satisfactory situation, minus the general undesirability of the
confession against the threatened harm. It must be borne in mind that
every inducement, threat or promise does not vitiate a confession. Since G
the object of the rule is to exclude only those confessions which are
testimonially untrustworthy, the inducement, threat or promise must be
such as is calculated to lead to an untrue confession. On the aforesaid
analysis the Court is to determine the absence or presence of inducement,
promise etc. or its sufficiency and how or in what measure it worked on
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210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A the mind of the accused. If the inducement, promise or threat is sufficient
in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds which
would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would
gain any advantage or avoid any evil, it is enough to exclude the
confession. The words ‘appear to him’ in the last part of the section
refer to the mentality of the accused. (See State of Rajasthan v. Raja
B
Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180)
81. An extra judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made
in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the Court. The confession
will have to be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as
to confession, like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the
C witness to whom it has been made. The value of the evidence as to the
confession depends on the reliability of the witness who gives the evidence.
It is not open to any Court to start with a presumption that extra judicial
confession is a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of
the circumstances, the time when the confession was made and the
D credibility of the witnesses who speak to such a confession. Such a
confession can be relied upon and conviction can be founded thereon if
the evidence about the confession comes from the mouth of witnesses
who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused,
and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate
that he may have a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the
E accused, the words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous
and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime
and nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it. After
subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone
of credibility, the extra judicial confession can be accepted and can be
F the basis of a conviction if it passes the test of credibility.
82. Extra judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence and the
court must ensure that the same inspires confidence and is corroborated
by other prosecution evidence. It is considered to be a weak piece of
evidence as it can be easily procured whenever direct evidence is not
G available. In order to accept extra judicial confession, it must be voluntary
and must inspire confidence. If the court is satisfied that the extra judicial
confession is voluntary, it can be acted upon to base the conviction.
83. Considering the admissibility and evidentiary value of extra
judicial confession, after referring to various judgments, in Sahadevan
H
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 211
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
and Another v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 6 SCC 403, this Court held A
as under:-
“15.1. In Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab [1995
Supp (4) SCC 259 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 59] this Court stated the
principle that: (SCC p. 265, para 10)
“10. An extra-judicial confession by its very nature is B
rather a weak type of evidence and requires appreciation
with a great deal of care and caution. Where an
extra-judicial confession is surrounded by suspicious
circumstances, its credibility becomes doubtful and it loses
its importance.” C
x x x x
15.4. While explaining the dimensions of the principles
governing the admissibility and evidentiary value of an
extra-judicial confession, this Court in State of Rajasthan v.
Raja Ram [(2003) 8 SCC 180 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1965] stated D
the principle that: (SCC p. 192, para 19)
“19. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true
and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the
court. The confession will have to be proved like any other
fact. The value of the evidence as to confession, like any E
other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness
to whom it has been made.”
The Court further expressed the view that: (SCC p. 192, para
19)
F
“19. … Such a confession can be relied upon and conviction
can be founded thereon if the evidence about the confession
comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be
unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and
in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend
to indicate that he may have a motive of attributing an G
untruthful statement to the accused.…”
x x x x
15.6. Accepting the admissibility of the extra-judicial
confession, the Court in Sansar Chand v. State of Rajasthan
H
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A [(2010) 10 SCC 604 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 79] held that: (SCC
p. 611, paras 29-30)
“29. There is no absolute rule that an extra-judicial
confession can never be the basis of a conviction, although
ordinarily an extra-judicial confession should be
B corroborated by some other material. [Vide Thimma and
Thimma Raju v. State of Mysore [(1970) 2 SCC 105 : 1970
SCC (Cri) 320], Mulk Raj v. State of U.P. [AIR 1959 SC
902 : 1959 Cri LJ 1219], Sivakumar v. State [(2006) 1
SCC 714 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 470] (SCC paras 40 and
41 : AIR paras 41 and 42), Shiva Karam Payaswami Tewari
C v. State of Maharashtra [(2009) 11 SCC 262 : (2009) 3
SCC (Cri) 1320] and Mohd. Azad v. State of W.B. [(2008)
15 SCC 449 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1082]]””
[Emphasis supplied]
D 84. It is well settled that conviction can be based on a voluntarily
confession but the rule of prudence requires that wherever possible it
should be corroborated by independent evidence. Extra judicial confession
of accused need not in all cases be corroborated. In Madan Gopal
Kakkad v. Naval Dubey and Another, (1992) 3 SCC 204, this Court
after referring to Piara Singh and Others v. State of Punjab, (1977) 4
E SCC 452, held that the law does not require that the evidence of an
extra judicial confession should in all cases be corroborated. The rule
of prudence does not require that each and every circumstance mentioned
in the confession must be separately and independently corroborated.
85. The sum and substance of the aforesaid is that an extra judicial
F confession by its very nature is rather a weak type of evidence and
requires appreciation with great deal of care and caution. Where an
extra judicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, its
credibility becomes doubtful and it loses its importance like the case in
hand. The Courts generally look for an independent reliable corroboration
G before placing any reliance upon an extra judicial confession.
MOTIVE
86. The Courts below have relied upon the strong motive for the
accused appellant to commit the crime as one of the incriminating
circumstances. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused appellant
H desperately wanted to get married to Manju. Manju herself at the
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 213
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
relevant point of time was a married lady. It appears from the evidence A
on record that the accused appellant had even got engaged with Manju
during the subsistence of his marriage with the deceased Sangeeta. It
also appears that the engagement ceremony was celebrated with pomp
and show. However, before the accused appellant could get married to
Manju, he got arrested in one offence under Section 307 of the IPC.
B
According to the prosecution thereafter, although the accused appellant
tried his best to get married to Manju, more particularly, after being
released on bail yet as there was lot of opposition at the end of his wife
deceased Sangeeta, he was not able to marry her. In such circumstances,
it is the case of the prosecution that the accused appellant decided to
terminate his wife Sangeeta as well his four minor daughters on the C
fateful night of the incident.
87. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that in a case
based on circumstantial evidence, motive for committing the crime on
the part of the accused assumes greater importance. This Court in various
decisions has laid down the principles holding that motive for commission D
of offence no doubt assumes greater importance in cases resting on
circumstantial evidence than those in which direct evidence regarding
commission of offence is available. It is equally true that failure to prove
motive in cases resting on circumstantial evidence is not fatal by itself.
However, it is also well settled and it is trite in law that absence of
motive could be a missing link of incriminating circumstances, but once E
the prosecution has established the other incriminating circumstances to
its entirety, absence of motive will not give any benefit to the accused.
88. Having regard to the nature of the evidence on record, there is
something to indicate that the accused appellant had illicit relationship
with Manju and wanted to settle in life marrying Manju. As noted above, F
in the past accused appellant had got engaged with Manju and was on
the verge of getting married. At the relevant point of time when the
accused appellant got engaged with Manju, it appears that one and all
including the deceased Sangeeta were consenting parties. There is nothing
on record to indicate that at the time of engagement of accused appellant G
with Manju, the deceased Sangeeta had raised hue and cry or had opposed
such decision of her husband. Of course, this is something which is
very personal. If at all we believe the illicit relationship of the accused
appellant with Manju, then it is possible that the deceased Sangeeta might
be an absolutely helpless lady and could not have done anything in that
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214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A regard. However, the moot question is should this motive by alone be
held sufficient to convict the accused appellant for the alleged crime and
sentence him to death.
89. In the case of Sampath Kumar v. Inspector of Police
Krishnagiri, (2012) 4 SCC 124, decided on 02.03.2012, this Court held
B as under:
“29. In N.J. Suraj v. State [(2004) 11 SCC 346 : 2004 SCC
(Cri) Supp 85] the prosecution case was based entirely upon
circumstantial evidence and a motive. Having discussed the
circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, this Court
C rejected the motive which was the only remaining circumstance
relied upon by the prosecution stating that the presence of a
motive was not enough for supporting a conviction, for it is
well settled that the chain of circumstances should be such as
to lead to an irresistible conclusion, that is incompatible with
the innocence of the accused.
D
30. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Santosh
Kumar Singh v. State [(2010) 9 SCC 747 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri)
1469] and Rukia Begum v. State of Karnataka [(2011) 4 SCC
779 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 488 : AIR 2011 SC 1585] where this
Court held that motive alone in the absence of any other
E circumstantial evidence would not be sufficient to convict the
appellant. Reference may also be made to the decision of this
Court in Sunil Rai v. UT, Chandigarh [(2011) 12 SCC 258 :
(2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 543 : AIR 2011 SC 2545] . This Court
explained the legal position as follows: (Sunil Rai case [(2011)
F 12 SCC 258 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 543 : AIR 2011 SC 2545] ,
SCC p. 266, paras 31-32)
“31. … In any event, motive alone can hardly be a
ground for conviction.
32. On the materials on record, there may be some
G suspicion against the accused, but as is often said, suspicion,
howsoever strong, cannot take the place of proof.”
31. Suffice it to say although, according to the appellants the
question of the appellant Velu having the motive to harm the
deceased Senthil for falling in love with his sister, Usha did
H not survive once the family had decided to offer Usha in
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 215
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
matrimony to the deceased Senthil. Yet even assuming that A
the appellant Velu had not reconciled to the idea of Usha
getting married to the deceased Senthil, all that can be said
was that the appellant Velu had a motive for physically harming
the deceased. That may be an important circumstance in a
case based on circumstantial evidence but cannot take the
B
place of conclusive proof that the person concerned was the
author of the crime. One could even say that the presence of
motive in the facts and circumstances of the case creates a
strong suspicion against the appellant but suspicion,
howsoever strong, also cannot be a substitute for proof of
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.” C
[Emphasis supplied]
90. Thus, even if it is believed that the accused appellant had a
motive to commit the crime, the same may be an important circumstance
in a case based on circumstantial evidence but cannot take the place as
a conclusive proof that the person concerned was the author of the D
crime. One could even say that the presence of motive in the facts and
circumstances of the case creates a strong suspicion against the accused
appellant but suspicion, howsoever strong, cannot be a substitute for
proof of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
91. The fact that we have ruled out the circumstances relating to E
the making of an extra judicial confession and the discovery of the weapon
of offence as not having been established, the chain of circumstantial
evidence snaps so badly that to consider any other circumstance, even
like motive, would not be necessary.
FALSE EXPLANATION OFFERED BY THE ACCUSED F
APPELLANT AS AN ADDITIONAL LINK
92. It is the case of the prosecution all throughout that the accused
appellant offered false explanation in his defence. To put it in other words,
according to the courts below the say of the accused appellant that on
the fateful night of the incident four unidentified persons killed his wife G
and daughters mercilessly and thereafter, set their dead bodies on fire
stood falsified, in view of the incriminating circumstances pointing
towards the guilt of the accused. According to the trial court and the
High Court, the explanation offered by the accused appellant in regard to
the injuries suffered by him on his head is established to be false. In such
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216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A circumstances, both the courts took the view that the false explanation
offered by the accused appellant is an additional link in the chain of
circumstances.
93. It appears from the materials on record that in all, three further
statements of the accused appellant were recorded by the trial court
B under Section 313 of the CrPC. This is one another unusual feature of
this matter. Ordinarily and more particularly having regard to the language
of Section 313 of the CrPC, the further statement of an accused is to be
recorded once the prosecution closes its evidence and before the accused
enters his defence. In the case on hand, it appears that on 19.07.2013, in
all eight prosecution witnesses were examined. At the end of the day,
C the trial court recorded the further statement of the accused appellant.
The Question No. 12 reads thus:
“Question 12: - Do you want to submit anything else?
Answer: - Manua alias Ramakant, Kamlkant and Ramakant
D had killed my elder brother Siyaram, & for that I had lodged
F.I.R. My wife Sangita and Siyaram’s daughter Gudiya were
the eye witnesses of this case. The accused persons, with
intention to erase evidence, had assaulted me and my wife
Sangita, and burnt her by pouring kerosene oil. They wanted to
kill me too. That’s why they poured kerosene oil on me as
E well. The daughter of Siyaram died of sickness. This incident
had been caused by Ramakant, Kamlakant and Ramakant.”
94. On 14.11.2013, the second further statement of the accused
appellant was recorded by the trial court wherein the Question No. 8
reads thus:
F
“Question 8:- Do you want to submit anything else?
Answer:- I am innocent. I may be acquitted.”
95. On 21.07.2016, the third further statement of the accused
appellant came to be recorded by the trial court wherein the Question
G No. 4 reads thus:
“Question 4:- Do you want to submit anything else?
Answer:- I and my brother Siyaram were living at village
Basadiya, Police Station- Dhaurhara. The brahmins of
Basadiya had committed murder of my brother Siyaram. I was
H
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 217
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
complainant in that case. Due to their fear, I started living at A
Naamdar Purwa. My wife and the daughter of Siyaram were
witnesses of his murder. His daughter had died. The accused
persons of the murder of Siyaram had killed my wife and family
for erasing the evidence. They intended to kill me as well due
to which I sustained injuries.”
B
96. It is well settled that the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own legs and it cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the
defence. Where various links in a chain are in themselves complete,
then a false plea or a false defence may be called into aid only to lend
assurance to the Court. In other words, before using the additional link it
must be proved that all the links in the chain are complete and do not C
suffer from any infirmity. It is not the law where there is any infirmity or
lacunae in the prosecution case, the same could be cured or supplied
by a false defence or a false plea which is not accepted by a Court.
97. Before a false explanation can be used as an additional link,
the following essential conditions must be satisfied: D
(i) Various links in the chain of evidence led by the prosecution
have been satisfactorily proved.
(ii) Such circumstances points to the guilt of the accused as
reasonable defence. E
(iii) The circumstance is in proximity to the time and situation.
98. If the aforesaid conditions are fulfilled only then a Court use
a false explanation or a false defence as an additional link to lend as
assurance to the Court and not otherwise. [see Sharad Biridhichand
Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1984) SC 1622] F
99. It is sufficient if the accused person succeeds in proving a
preponderance of probability in favour of his case. It is not necessary
for the accused person to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt or
in default to incur a verdict of guilty. The onus of proof lying upon the
accused person is to prove his case by a preponderance of probability. G
In the American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edition, Vol. 30, the expression
“preponderance of evidence” has been defined in Article 1164. In
America the term means “the weight, credit and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side, and is usually considered to be synonymous
with the term greater weight of the evidence”, or “greater weight of
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218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A the credible evidence”. It is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. To be satisfied, certain, or convinced is a much
higher test than the test of “preponderance of evidence”. The phrase
“preponderance of probability” appears to have been taken from
Charles R. Cooper v. F. W. Slade, (1857-59) 6 HLC 746. The
observations made therein make it clear that what “preponderance of
B
probability” means “more probable and rational view of the case”, not
necessarily as certain as the pleading should be.
100. Again, at the cost of repetition, we may state that it is not
necessary for us to go into the issue of false explanation, said to have
been offered by the accused appellant as at the most a false explanation
C can be used as an additional link in the chain of evidence led by the
prosecution. This issue pales into insignificance as the various links in
the chain of evidence led by the prosecution having not been satisfactorily
proved.
101. The inalienable interface of presumption of innocence and
D the burden of proof in a criminal case on the prosecution has been
succinctly expounded in the following passage from the treatise “The
Law of Evidence” fifth edition by Ian Dennis at page 445:
“The presumption of innocence states that a person is
presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. In one sense this
E simply restates in different language the rule that the burden
of proof in a criminal case is on the prosecution to prove the
defendant’s guilt. As explained above, the burden of proof
rule has a number of functions, one of which is to provide a
rule of decision for the fact-finder in a situation of uncertainty.
F Another function is to allocate the risk of mis- decision in
criminal trials. Because the outcome of wrongful conviction
is regarded as a significantly worse harm than wrongful
acquittal the rule is constructed so as to minimise the risk of
the former. The burden of overcoming a presumption that the
defendant is innocent therefore requires the state to prove the
G defendant’s guilt.”
[Emphasis supplied]
102. The above quote thus seemingly concedes a preference to
wrongful acquittal compared to the risk of wrongful conviction. Such is
H
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 219
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
the abiding jurisprudential concern to eschew even the remotest possibility A
of unmerited conviction.
103. This applies with full force particularly in fact situations like
the one on hand where the charge is sought to be established by
circumstantial evidence. These enunciations are so well entrenched that
we do not wish to burden the present narration by referring to the decisions B
of this Court in this regard.
104. Addressing this aspect, however, is the following extract also
from the same treatise “The Law of Evidence” fifth edition by Ian Dennis
at page 483:
“Where the case against the accused depends wholly or partly C
on inferences from circumstantial evidence, fact-finders cannot
logically convict unless they are sure that inferences of guilt
are the only ones that can reasonably be drawn. If they think
that there are possible innocent explanations for circumstantial
evidence that are not “merely fanciful”, it must follow that D
there is a reasonable doubt about guilt. There is no rule,
however, that judges must direct juries in terms not to convict
unless they are sure that the evidence bears no other
explanation than guilt. It is sufficient to direct simply that the
burden on the prosecution is to satisfy the jury beyond
reasonable doubt, or so that they are sure. E
The very high standard of proof required in criminal cases
minimises the risk of a wrongful conviction. It means that
someone whom, on the evidence, the fact-finder believes is
“probably” guilty, or “likely” to be guilty will be acquitted,
since these judgments of probability necessarily admit that F
the fact-finder is not “sure”. It is generally accepted that some
at least of these acquittals will be of persons who are in fact
guilty of the offences charged, and who would be convicted
if the standard of proof were the lower civil standard of the
balance of probabilities. Such acquittals are the price paid G
for the safeguard provided by the “beyond reasonable doubt”
standard against wrongful conviction.”
[Emphasis supplied]
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220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A 105. We must remind ourselves of what this Court observed in
the case of Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharashtra
reported in (1981) 2 SCC 35. We quote as under:
“32. …..But, while formulating its own view the High Court,
with respect, fell into an error in stating the true legal position
B by saying that what the court has to consider is whether the
cumulative effect of the circumstances establishes the guilt of
the accused beyond the “shadow of doubt”. In the first place,
“shadow of doubt”, even in cases which depend on direct
evidence is shadow of “reasonable” doubt. Secondly, in its
practical application, the test which requires the exclusion of
C other alternative hypotheses is far more rigorous than the
test of proof beyond reasonable doubt.”
[Emphasis supplied]
INJURIES ON THE BODY OF THE ACCUSED
D APPELLANT
106. It appears from the materials on record that the accused
appellant was forwarded to the Community Health Centre (CHC)
Dhaurhara, accompanied by the police constable Brij Mohan Singh for
the purpose of medical examination on the date of the incident itself, i.e.,
E 22.01.2010. PW-9, Dr. Ankit Kumar Singh had examined the accused
appellant and in the medical certificate issued by him Exh. 44, he noted
five injuries in or around the head and the neck region. The first three
injuries noted are in the form of lacerated wounds, whereas the other
two injuries as superfluous burn injuries. It was argued before us by the
learned counsel appearing for the State that the injuries found on the
F body of the accused appellant points towards his complicity in the crime.
It was also sought to be argued that the explanation offered by the
accused appellant in regard to the injuries suffered by him is falsified by
the circumstantial evidence on record. On the other hand, the defence
also argued that the non-explanation of the injuries suffered by the accused
G appellant at the end of the prosecution is fatal. Thus, both the sides want
to make the most of the injuries which were found on the body of the
accused appellant.
107. We are of the view that both the sides are wrong in their
own way. The settled law is that if there are serious injuries or grievous
injuries found on the body of the accused then the prosecution owes a
H
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 221
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
duty to explain such injuries and the failure on the part of the prosecution A
to explain may point towards the innocence of the accused. At the same
time, the well-settled law is that if the injuries are superfluous or minor in
nature then the prosecution need not explain such injuries. In the case on
hand, the accused appellant has offered some explanation which could
be said to be compatible with the defence he has put forward. As
B
explained earlier, the accused has to establish his defence on
preponderance of probability and not beyond reasonable doubt. The
accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC has
said that he suffered the head injuries as one of the assailants out of the
four had hit him on his head with the butt of the gun. PW-9, Dr. Ankit
Kumar Singh in his evidence has said that the injurie Nos. 1, 2 and 3 C
resply could have been caused by the butt of the gun. PW-9, Dr. Ankit
Kumar Singh has not said that the injuries suffered by the accused
appellant were self-inflicted injuries.
108. The prosecution wants us to accept the other side of the
story. What the prosecution wants to convey is that the accused appellant D
suffered the injuries while committing the crime. This is suggestive of
the fact that the accused appellant might have suffered the injuries only
if one of the deceased persons had retaliated in defence at the time of
the assault. Such is not even the case of the prosecution. We rule out this
theory of counter defence at the end of any of the deceased persons
because out of five deceased persons four were minor children. E
109. If anyone could have offered any resistance, then it could
have been the deceased Sangeeta. However, having regard to the nature
of the injuries suffered by the deceased Sangeeta, it is difficult to even
say that she might have realised for even a second as to what was
happening. F
110. We see it from a different perspective. For the time being,
we proceed on the footing or the assumption that the accused appellant
wanted to do away with his wife and children. We fail to understand
what could be the good reason for the accused appellant after the
assault to cut the bodies into pieces. We find some merit in the submission G
of Mr. S. Niranjan Reddy, the learned senior counsel for the accused
appellant that it could be a sign of grave warning from the other side
who belong to the upper-caste (Brahmins) as to how revengeful and
venomous they could be.
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222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A 111. In Dhananjay Shanker Shetty v. State of Maharashtra,
(2002) 6 SCC 596, in paragraph 10 in reference to the circumstantial
evidence, in the case of murder, the non-explanation of injuries on
accused by prosecution was held to be significant when there are
circumstances which makes prosecution case doubtful. For the relevant
purpose, the relevant extract of paragraph 10 is extracted as below:
B
“10. ....But non-explanation of injuries assumes significance
when there are material circumstances which make the
prosecution case doubtful. Reference in this connection may
be made to recent decisions of this Court in the cases of
Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing [(2001) 6
C SCC 145 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1070] and Kashiram v. State of
M.P. [(2002) 1 SCC 71 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 68]. In the present
case, non-explanation of injuries on the appellant by the
prosecution assumes significance as there are circumstances
which make the prosecution case, showing the complicity of
D the appellant with the crime, highly doubtful.”
[Emphasis supplied]
112. In Mohar Rai and Bharath Rai v. State of Bihar, AIR
1968 SC 1281, it was observed:
“6. …..In our judgment the failure of the prosecution to offer
E any explanation in that regard shows that evidence of the
prosecution witnesses relating to the incident is not true or
at any rate not wholly true. Further those injuries probabilise
the plea taken by the appellants.”
[Emphasis supplied]
F
113. In another important case Lakshmi Singh and Others v.
State of Bihar, (1976) 4 SCC 394, after referring to the ratio laid down in
Mohar Rai (supra), this Court observed:
“12. …..where the prosecution fails to explain the injuries on
the accused, two results follow: (1) that the evidence of the
G prosecution witnesses is untrue; and (2) that the injuries
probabilise the plea taken by the appellants…..”
114. It was further observed that:
“12. …..in a murder case, the non-explanation of the injuries
sustained by the accused at about the time of the occurrence
H
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 223
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
or in the course of altercation is a very important circumstance A
from which the court can draw the following inferences:
(1) that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and the
origin of the occurrence and has thus not presented the true
version;
(2) that the witnesses who have denied the presence of the B
injuries on the person of the accused are lying on a most
material point and therefore their evidence is unreliable;
(3) that in case there is a defence version which explains the
injuries on the person of the accused it is rendered probable
so as to throw doubt on the prosecution case…..” C
115. In Mohar Rai (supra) it is made clear that failure of the
prosecution to offer any explanation regarding the injuries found on the
accused may show that the evidence related to the incident is not true,
or at any rate, not wholly true. Likewise in Lakshmi Singh (supra) it is
observed that any non-explanation of the injuries on the accused by the D
prosecution may affect the prosecution case. But such a non-explanation
may assume greater importance where the defence gives a version
which competes in probability with that of the prosecution. But where
the evidence is clear, cogent and creditworthy and where the court can
distinguish the truth from falsehood, the mere fact that the injuries are
E
not explained by the prosecution cannot itself be a sole basis to reject
such evidence, and consequently the whole case. Much depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case. These aspects were highlighted
by this Court in Vijay Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P., (1990) CriLJ
1510.
CONCLUSION F
116. Thus, none of the pieces of evidence relied on as incriminating
by the courts below, can be treated as incriminating pieces of
circumstantial evidence against the accused. Realities or truth apart, the
fundamental and basic presumption in the administration of criminal law
and justice delivery system is the innocence of the alleged accused and G
till the charges are proved beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of clear,
cogent, credible or unimpeachable evidence, the question of indicting or
punishing an accused does not arise, merely carried away by heinous
nature of the crime or the gruesome manner in which it was found to
have been committed. Though the offence is gruesome and revolts the H
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A human conscience but an accused can be convicted only on legal evidence
and if only a chain of circumstantial evidence has been so forged as to
rule out the possibility of any other reasonable hypothesis excepting the
guilt of the accused. In Shankarlal Gyarasilal (supra), this Court
cautioned - “human nature is too willing, when faced with brutal
crimes, to spin stories out of strong suspicions”. This Court has held
B
time and again that between “may be true” and “must be true” there is
a long distance to travel which must be covered by clear, cogent and
unimpeachable evidence by the prosecution before an accused is
condemned a convict. [See Ashish Batham v. State of M.P., (2002) 7
SCC 31].
C 117. Before parting with the case, we would like to place on record
an observation of ours, touching an important aspect of the case. Without
any hesitation and with disappointment, we state that the case on hand is
one of most perfunctory investigation. It appears that the accused herein
was provided with a legal aid. He might not have been able to afford a
D good and experienced trial side lawyer to defend himself. We have noticed
that the cross-examination of each and every witness is below average.
Questions, which the defence counsel was not supposed to put to the
prosecution witnesses were put without realising or understanding the
legal implications of the answers to such questions, more particularly,
when they were not necessary. The defence counsel remained oblivious
E of the position of law that suggestions made to the witnesses by the
defence the answers to those are binding to the accused.
118. Any defence counsel with a reasonable standing at the Bar
is expected to know that cross-examination is not the only method of
discrediting a witness. If the oral testimony of certain witnesses is
F contrary to the proved facts and if their testimony is on the face of it
unacceptable, their evidence might well be discarded on that ground
alone.
119. It is by far now well-settled for a legal proposition that it is
the duty of the court to see and ensure that an accused put on a criminal
G trial is effectively represented by a defence counsel, and in the event
on account of indigence, poverty or illiteracy or any other disabling factor,
he is not able to engage a counsel of his choice, it becomes the duty of
the court to provide him appropriate and meaningful legal aid at the
State expense. What is meant by the duty of the State to ensure a fair
H defence to an accused is not the employment of a defence counsel for
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 225
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
namesake. It has to be the provision of a counsel who defends the accused A
diligently to the best of his abilities. While the quality of the defence or
the caliber of the counsel would not militate against the guarantee to a
fair trial sanctioned by Articles 21 and 22 resply of the Constitution, a
threshold level of competence and due diligence in the discharge of his
duties as a defence counsel would certainly be the constitutional
B
guaranteed expectation. The presence of counsel on record means
effective, genuine and faithful presence and not a mere farcical, sham
or a virtual presence that is illusory, if not fraudulent.
120. Article 39A of the Constitution speaks about free legal aid
which reads thus:
C
“39A. Equal justice and free legal aid.—The State shall secure
that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on a
basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide
free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in any
other way, to ensure that opportunities for securing justice
are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other D
disabilities.”
121. Section 304 of the CrPC refers to legal aid to the accused at
State expenses in certain cases which reads thus:
“304. Legal aid to accused at State expense in certain cases.— E
(1)Where, in a trial before the Court of Session, the accused
is not represented by a pleader, and where it appears to the
Court that the accused has not sufficient means to engage a
pleader, the Court shall assign a pleader for his defence at
the expense of the State.
F
(2) The High Court may, with the previous approval of the
State Government, make rule providing for—
(a) the mode of selecting pleaders for defence under sub-
section (1);
(b) the facilities to be allowed to such pleaders by the Courts; G
(c) the fee payable to such pleaders by the Government,
and generally, for carrying out the purposes of sub- section
(1).
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226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A (3) The State Government may, by notification, direct that, as
from such date as may be specified in the notification the
provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply in relation
to any class of trials before other Courts in the State as they
apply in relation to trials before the Courts of Session.”
B 122. Under Section 9 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987,
the District Legal Services Authorities are constituted for every District
in the State to exercise powers and perform functions conferred on, or
assigned to, the District Authority under the said Act.
123. This Court in para 13 of the judgment reported in Kishore
C Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1991) 1 SCC 286, held thus:
“13. Though Article 39-A of the Constitution provides
fundamental rights to equal justice and free legal aid and
though the State provides amicus curiae to defend the indigent
accused, he would be meted out with unequal defence if, as
D is common knowledge the youngster from the bar who has
either a little experience or no experience is assigned to defend
him. It is high time that senior counsel practising in the court
concerned, volunteer to defend such indigent accused as a
part of their professional duty. If these remedial steps are taken
and an honest and objective investigation is done, it will
E enhance a sense of confidence of the public in the investigating
agency.”
124. This Court, in the case of Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5)
and Another v. State of Gujarat and Others, reported in (2006) 3 SCC
374, has observed in paragraphs 30, 35, 38 and 39 as under:
F
“30. Right from the inception of the judicial system it has
been accepted that discovery, vindication and establishment
of truth are the main purposes underlying existence of the
courts of justice. The operative principles for a fair trial
permeate the common law in both civil and criminal contexts.
G Application of these principles involves a delicate judicial
balancing of competing interests in a criminal trial: the interests
of the accused and the public and to a great extent that of the
victim have to be weighed not losing sight of the public interest
involved in the prosecution of persons who commit offences.
H x x x x
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 227
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
35. This Court has often emphasised that in a criminal case A
the fate of the proceedings cannot always be left entirely in
the hands of the parties, crime being public wrong in breach
and violation of public rights and duties, which affects the
whole community as a community and is harmful to the society
in general. The concept of fair trial entails familiar
B
triangulation of interests of the accused, the victim and the
society and it is the community that acts through the State and
prosecuting agencies. Interest of society is not to be treated
completely with disdain and as persona non grata. The courts
have always been considered to have an overriding duty to
maintain public confidence in the administration of C
justice-often referred to as the duty to vindicate and uphold
the “majesty of the law”. Due administration of justice has
always been viewed as a continuous process, not confined to
determination of the particular case, protecting its ability to
function as a court of law in the future as in the case before
D
it. If a criminal court is to be an effective instrument in
dispensing justice, the Presiding Judge must cease to be a
spectator and a mere recording machine by becoming a
participant in the trial evincing intelligence, active interest
and elicit all relevant materials necessary for reaching the
correct conclusion, to find out the truth, and administer justice E
with fairness and impartiality both to the parties and to the
community it serves. The courts administering criminal justice
cannot turn a blind eye to vexatious or oppressive conduct
that has occurred in relation to proceedings, even if a fair
trial is still possible, except at the risk of undermining the
F
fair name and standing of the judges as impartial and
independent adjudicators.
x x x x
38. Failure to accord fair hearing either to the accused or
the prosecution violates even minimum standards of due G
process of law. It is inherent in the concept of due process of
law, that condemnation should be rendered only after the
trial in which the hearing is a real one, not sham or a mere
farce and pretence. Since the fair hearing requires an
opportunity to preserve the process, it may be vitiated and
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228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A violated by an over hasty stage-managed, tailored and partisan
trial.
39. The fair trial for a criminal offence consists not only in
technical observance of the frame, and forms of law, but
also in recognition and just application of its principles in
B substance, to find out the truth and prevent miscarriage of
justice.”
125. In Ranchod Mathur Wasawa v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 3
SCC 581, it is observed that, the Sessions Judge should view with sufficient
seriousness the need to appoint State Counsel for undefended accused
C in grave cases. Indigence should never be a ground for denying fair trial
or equal justice. Therefore, particular attention should be paid to appoint
competent advocates, equal to handling the complex cases, not patronising
gestures to raw entrants to the Bar. Sufficient time and complete papers
should also be made available to the advocate chosen so that he may
serve the cause of justice with all the ability at his command, and the
D accused also may feel confident that his counsel chosen by the court
has had adequate time and material to defend him properly.
126. This case provides us an opportunity to remind the learned
District and Sessions Judges across the country conducting sessions
trials, more particularly relating to serious offences involving severe
E sentences, to appoint experienced lawyers who had conducted such cases
in the past. It is desirable that in such cases senior advocate practising in
the trial court shall be requested to conduct the case himself or herself
on behalf of the undefended accused or at least provide good guidance
to the advocate who is appointed as amicus curiae or an advocate from
F the legal aid panel to defend the case of the accused persons. Then only
the effective and meaningful legal aid would be said to have been provided
to the accused.
127. This Court, in the case of Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot
v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1978) 3 SCC 544, had emphasized
G upon the need of securing the competent and efficient legal services for
a prisoner who is standing trial in a criminal case or for the commission
of alleged offence. This Court, in paragraphs 14,15 and 18 of the above
judgment, held as under:
“14. The other ingredient of fair procedure to a prisoner, who
has to seek his liberation through the court process is lawyer’s
H
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 229
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
services. Judicial justice, with procedural intricacies, legal A
submissions and critical examination of evidence, leans upon
professional expertise; and a failure of equal justice under
the law is on the cards where such supportive skill is absent
for one side. Our judicature, moulded by Anglo-American
models and our judicial process, engineered by kindred legal
B
technology, compel the collaboration of lawyer-power for
steering the wheels of equal justice under the law. Free legal
services to the needy is part of the English criminal justice
system. And the American jurist, Prof. Vance of Yale, sounded
sense for India too when he said:
What does it profit a poor and ignorant man that he C
is equal to his strong antagonist before the law if there is
no one to inform him what the law is? Or that the courts
are open to him on the same terms as to all other persons
when he has not the wherewithal to pay the admission fee?
15. Gideon’s trumpet has been heard across the Atlantic. Black, D
J. there observed:
Not only those precedents but also reason and
reflection require us to recognise that in our adversary
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair E
trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to
be an obvious truth. Governments, both State and Federal,
quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish
machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to
prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the F
public’s interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are
few defendants charged with crime who fail to hire the
best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their
defences. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are
the strongest indications of the widespread belief that G
lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The
right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trial in some
countries, but is in ours. From the very beginning, our state
and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis H
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 5 S.C.R.
A on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to
assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every
defendant stands equal before the law. This noble idea
cannot be realised if the poor man charged with crime has
to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.
B x x x x
18. The American Bar Association has upheld the fundamental
premise that counsel should be provided in the criminal
proceedings for offences punishable by loss of liberty, except
those types of offences for which such punishment is not likely
C to be imposed. Thus, in America, strengthened by the Powell,
Gideon and Hamlin cases, counsel for the accused in the
more serious class of cases which threaten a person with
imprisonment is regarded as an essential component of the
administration of criminal justice and as part of procedural
fair-play. This is so without regard to the sixth amendment
D because lawyer participation is ordinarily an assurance that
deprivation of liberty will not be in violation of procedure
established by law. In short, it is the warp and woof of fair
procedure in a sophisticated, legalistic system plus lay illiterate
indigents aplenty. The Indian socio-legal milieu makes free
E legal service, at trial and higher levels, an imperative
processual piece of criminal justice where deprivation of life
or personal liberty hangs in the judicial balance.”
128. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to the National Legal
Services Authority (Free and Competent Legal Services) Regulations,
F 2010, more particularly, the Regulation-15, which reads thus:
“15. Special engagement of senior advocates in appropriate
cases.-
(1) If the Monitoring and Mentoring Committee or Executive
Chairman or Chairman of the Legal Services Institution is of
G the opinion that services of senior advocate, though not
included in the approved panel of lawyers, has to be provided
in any particular case the Legal Services Institution may
engage such senior advocate.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the State regulations,
H the Executive Chairman or Chairman of the Legal Services
RAMANAND @ NANDLAL BHARTI v. STATE OF UTTAR 231
PRADESH [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]
Institution may decide the honorarium of such senior A
advocate.”
129. This Court in Subhash Chand v. State of Rajasthan
reported in (2002) 1 SCC 702 in para 26, while allowing the appeal and
acquitting the accused appellant therein under Sections 302 and 376(2)(f)
of the IPC, observed as under: B
“26. Before parting with the case we would like to place on
record, an observation of ours, touching an aspect of the
case. There are clueless crimes committed. The factum of a
cognizable crime having been committed is known but neither
the identity of the accused is disclosed nor is there any C
indication available of the witnesses who would be able to
furnish useful and relevant evidence. Such offences put to
test the wits of an investigating officer. A vigilant investigating
officer, well versed with the techniques of the job, is in a
position to collect the threads of evidence finding out the
path which leads to the culprit. The ends, which the D
administration of criminal justice serves, are not achieved
merely by catching hold of the culprit. The accusation has to
be proved to the hilt in a court of law. The evidence of the
investigating officer given in the court should have a rhythm
explaining step by step how the investigation proceeded E
leading to detection of the offender and collection of evidence
against him. This is necessary to exclude the likelihood of
any innocent having been picked up and branded as a culprit
and then the gravity of the offence arousing human sympathy
persuading the mind to be carried away by doubtful or
dubious circumstances treating them as of “beyond doubt” F
evidentiary value.”
[Emphasis supplied]
130. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The conviction of the
accused appellant under Section 302 of the IPC is set aside. He is acquitted G
of the charge framed against him. He shall be set at liberty forthwith if
not required to be detained in connection with any other offences.
131. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.
Devika Gujral Appeals allowed. H
(Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)
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