Holding

Life imprisonment means incarceration for the convict's natural life and cannot be reduced below a mandatory 14‑year term except by the President or Governor.

Summary

Ramraj, convicted under IPC sections 302 and 201 for murdering his wife, was sentenced to life imprisonment. The High Court upheld the conviction, and the petitioner sought release after serving 14 years, arguing that remission had effectively reduced his term to about 17 years. The Supreme Court examined the statutory meaning of "life imprisonment" under IPC sections 45, 47 and CrPC sections 432, 433, 433A, and held that it denotes imprisonment for the convict's natural life, with a mandatory minimum of 14 years that cannot be waived except by the President (Art. 72) or Governor (Art. 161). The Court rejected the petitioner's claim for premature release, directing that any consideration for release should arise only after completing 20 years, including remission. Consequently, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed, leaving the life sentence intact.

Issues considered

Whether a sentence of life imprisonment can be deemed satisfied after the convict has served 14 years with remission
Interpretation of "life imprisonment" under IPC sections 45 and 47 in relation to CrPC sections 432, 433, 433A
Scope of the powers of remission and commutation under sections 432 and 433 of the CrPC
Whether the President (Art. 72) or Governor (Art. 161) can reduce a life sentence below the statutory 14‑year minimum

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 432, s. 433, s. 433A
Constitution of Indias. Article 161, s. Article 72
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302, s. 45, s. 47, s. 57

Subjects

life imprisonmentremissionsection 433AIPCdeath penaltypremature releasecriminal procedure

Judgment

- [2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 367

RAMRAJ @ NANHOO @ BIHNU
v.
A

STATE OF CHHATIISGARH
(SLP (Criminal) No. 4614 of 2006)
DECEMBER 10, 2009
8
[ALTAMAS KABIR AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860- ss. 302 and 201- Prosecution under
, "' - Circumstantial evidence - Victim was with the accused at
the time of her death -Accused tried to hide the·· evidence - C
He buried the dead body of the victim without informing the
police - Cause of death found to be homicidal on post
mortem, after the body was exhumed at the instance of PW
1 - Conviction by courts below - On appeal, conviction
upheld. D
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 432, 433 and
--f.. 433A - Life imprisonment - Award of, by courts below - Plea
for release, on the basis of period of 14 years sentence
already undergone - Held: Life imprisonment means E
imprisonment for the natural life term of a convict - It can be
reduced on account of remission ulss. 432 and 433 - But
except under Articles 72 and 161 of Constitution, a sentence
of life imprisonment, by virtue of non-obstante clause of s.
433A, cannot be reduced below 14 years - On facts, since
• accused was fortunate to have escaped death penalty, he F
should not be released on completion of 14 years
imprisonment - His case for premature release may be taken
up by authorities concerned, after he completes 20 years of
lmprisOnment - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 45 and 47 -
Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 72 and 161 - Sentence/ G
Sentencing.

Words ·and Phrases - 'f..ife i;nprisonment' and

367 H
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 'Imprisonment for life' - Meaning of, in the context of /PC and ... ,,
Cr.P.C.

Petitioner-accused was convicted u/ss. 302 and 201
IPC and was sentenced to life imprisonment by trial court.
High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence.
B
In the Special Leave Petition, appellant interalia
contended on the question of sentence that the accused
having already undergone 14 years of sentence of actual ). ,
imprisonment, which with remission would amount to 17
c years, he should be released on the basis of the period
of sentence already undergone.

Dismissing the Special Leave Petition, the Court

HELD: 1. The High Court noted the fact that there was
D no direct and ocular evidence in the case, but the fact
that the deceased was found dead and !he petitioner ~.

informed the villagers that she had died of pain in her
stomach, confirms the fact that he was with her at the time
of her death. Furthermore, the conduct of the petitioner
E in not reporting the matter to the petitioner and, on the
other hand, burying the body of the victim in an attempt
to shield himself of the offence, does not enure to the
benefit of the petitioner. Had it not been for the insistence
of PW-1, such evidence may have gone completely
F unnoticed. It is only on account of his insistence that the •
body of the victim was exhumed, and, thereafter,
subjected to post mortem examination which, ultimately,
revealed the fact that it was not simply a stomach pain
which caused the death of the victim but the several
G injuries which had been caused to her. The very fact that
he tried to hide the evidence, resulted in his conviction
also under Section 201 IPC. In such circumstances, there
is no reason to interfere with the judgment and order of ~ -
the High Court as far as conviction and sentence is
H concerned. (Paras 3 and 4) [372-0-G)
RAMRAJ @ NANHOO @ BIHNU v. STATE OF 369
CHHATIISGARH
2.1. Life imprisonment is not to be interpreted as A
being imprisonment for the whole of a convict's natural
life within the scope of Section 45 of IPC. On a conjoint
reading of Sections 45 and 47 IPC and Sections 432, 433
and 433A Cr.P.C., it is well established that a convict
awarded life sentence has to undergo imprisonment for B
at least 14 years. While Sections 432 and 433 empower
the appropriate Government to suspend, remit or
commute sentences, including a sentence of death and
life imprisonment, a fetter has been imposed by the
legislature on such powers by the introduction of Section c
433A into Cr.P.C. by the Amending Act of 1978. [Paras 15
and 16] [379-A, E-F]

2.2. By virtue of the non-obstante clause used in
Section 433A Cr.P.C., the minimum term of imprisonment
in respect of an offence where death is one of the D
punishments provided by laws or where a death
sentence has been commuted to life sentence, has been
prescribed as 14 years. In the various decisions,
'iimprisonment for life" has been repeatedly held to mean
imprisonment for the natural life term of a convict, though E
the actual period of imprisonment may stand reduced on
account of remissions earned. But in no case, with the
possible exception of the powers vested in the President
under Article 72 Qf the Constitution and the power vested
in the Governor 'under Article 161 of the Constitution, F
even with remissions earned, can a sentence of
imprisonment for life be reduced to below 14 years. It is
thereafter lt:lft to the discretion of the concerned
authorities to determine the actual length of
imprisonment having regard to the gravity and intensity G
of the offence. [Para 16] [379-F-H; 380-A-C]

2.3. In the present case, as the petitioner was
fortunate to have escaped the death penalty, it is not a
fit case where he should be released on completion of
·. H
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
,.._ . '

A 14 years imprisonment. The petitioner's case for
premature release may be taken up by the authorities
concerned, after he completes 20 years imprisonment,
including remissions earned. [Para 17) [380-E-G]

Maru Ram vs. Union of India and Ors. 1981 (1) SCC 10,
8
followed.

Dalbir Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab 1979 (3) SCC
,. ,
745; Rajendra Prasad vs. State of U.P. 1979 (3) SCC 646;
State of Punjab and Ors. vs. Joginder Singh and Ors. 1990
c (2) SCC 661; Ashok Kumar vs. Union of India 1991 (3) SCC
498; Laxman Naskar vs. Union of India 2000 (2) SCC 595;
Subash Chander vs. Krishan Lal and Ors. 2001 (4) SCC 458;
Shri Bhagwan vs. State of Rajasthan 2001 (6) SCC 296;
Mohd. Munna vs. Union of India 2005 (7) SCC 417, relied
D on. ; -
Swamy Shraddananda vs. State of Kamataka 2008 (13)
sec 767, distinguished.
Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.
E 1961 (3) SCR 440, referred to.
Case Law Reference:
1961 (3) SCR 440 Referred to. Para 5 ,, -
F 1979 (3) sec 745 Relied on. Para 6
1979 (3) sec 646 Relied on. Para 6
1990 (2) sec 661 Relied on. Para 7
1981 (1) sec 101 followed. Para 8
G
1991 (3) sec 498 Relied on. Para 9 '~
2000 (2) sec 595 Relied on. Para 10
2001 (4) sec 458 Relied on. Para 11
H
RAMRAJ@ NANHOO@ BIHNU v. STATE OF 371
CHHATTISGARH
2001 (6) SCC 296 Relied on. Para 12 A
2oos (7) sec 417 Relied on. Para 13

2oos (13) sec 767 Distinguished. Para 14

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : SLP (Criminal) B
No. 4614 of 2006.

From the Judgment & Order dated 8.12.2005 of the High
t A Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur in Crl. Appeal No. 361 of 1995.

Abinash Coomar (A.C.) for the Petitioner.
c
Dharmendra Kumar Sinha, Atul Jha for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ALTAMAS KABIR, J. 1. This Jail Petition at the instance
of Ramraj @ Nanhoo @ Bihnu, since numbered as D
SLP(Crl.)No.4614 of 2006, is directed against the judgment
and order dated 8th December, 2005, passed by the Division
Bench of the Chhattisgarh High Court at Bilaspur in Criminal
Appeal No.361 of 1995, affirming the judgment of conviction
and sentence under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal E
Code of the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Ambikapur,
in Sessions Trial No.27 of 1994.

2. From the judgment impugned in the Special Leave
Petition, it appears that Bigani Bai was married to the accused/ F
petitioner Ramraj from 6-7 years prior to the date of the
incident, namely, the intervening night of 28th and 29th October,
1993. According to the prosecution, Bigani Bai (the victim) and
the accused-petitioner had quarrelled in the evening and in the
night on hearing the cries of the child, when Ramraj tried to
wake up Bigani Bai and she did not wake up, Ramraj assaulted G
Bigani Bai with a stick causing severe internal and external
injuries as a result of which Bigani Bai died. It was also the
prosecution case that the petitioner informed the villagers that
Bigani Bai had died on account of pain in her stomach.
.... Information was accordingly sent to the parents of the H
t•

372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

,., . 1'11
A deceased and on receiving the same, the father of the
deceased, Somarsai (PW-1), came and saw that the face of
the deceased was in swollen condition and clotted blood was
present on her mouth. Somarsai is alleged to have asked the
petitioner to report the matter to the police before burying the
B dead body. However, in disregard of such direction, the
petitioner buried the body of the deceased. Since this gave rise
to suspicion, the body of the deceased was exhumed on the
report of Somarsai and on post-mortem examination thereof, ~ ,
it was found that the mandible bone was fractured and on
c opening the body, the liver was also found ruptured. According
to the doctor, the cause of death was internal haemorrhage due
to rupture of the liver which is homicidal in nature. Incidentally,
the weapon of assault is also said to have been recovered at
the instance of the petitioner.
D 3. The High Court noted the fact that there was no direct
and ocular evidence in the case, but the fact that the deceased +-
was found dead and the petitioner informed the villagers that
she had died of pain in her stomach, confirms the fact that he
was with her at the time of her death. Furthermore, the conduct
E of the petitioner in not reporting the matter to the petitioner and,
on the other hand, burying the body of the victim in an attempt
to shield himself of the offence, does enure to the benefit of the
petitioner. Had it not been for the insistence of PW-1 Somarsai
such evidence may have gone completely unnoticed. It is only
F on account of his insistence that the body of the victim was
.., '

exhumed, and, thereafter, subjected to post mortem examination
which, ultimately, revealed the fact that it was not simply a
stomach pain which caused the death of the victim but the
several injuries which had been caused to her. The very fact
G that he tried to hide the evidence, resulted in his conviction also
under Section 201 IPC.
),..,
4. In such circumstances, we see no reason to interfere
with the judgment and order of the High Court as far as
conviction and sentence is concerned. However, during the ~
H hearing of the Special Leave Petition, learned counsel for the ,.,.
RAMRAJ @ NANHOO @ BIHNU v. STATE OF 373
CHHATIISGARH [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
~~ ..... 'I State very fairly pointed out that the petitioner had already A
undergone 14 years of actual imprisonment, which with
remission would amount to about 17 years. This information has
caused us to consider the petitioner's release on the basis of
the period of sentence already undergone by him, despite
having confirmed the conviction and sentence of the petitioner, B
on the basis of the view taken by this Court in interpreting the
meaning of the expression "life imprisonment" and
"imprisonment for life" used both in the Criminal Procedure
' )
Code and in the Indian Penal Code in various cases.

__, 5. The aforesaid question came up for consideration
c
before this Court as far back as in 1960 in a writ petition filed
by one Gopa/ Vinayak Godse under Article 32 of the
Constitution, Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. State of Maharashtra
& Ors. [1961 (3) SCR 440], wherein while considering the
question as to whether the petitioner, who had been convicted D
- ..j in 1949 and sentenced to transportation for life, would, having
earned remission of 2893 days and adding the same to the
term of imprisonment actually served by him, so as to exceed
20 years, be entitled to be released immediately. According
to the petitioner therein, his further detention in jail was illegal E
and he was entitled to be set at liberty immediately. Rejecting
the petitioner's contention, Subba Rao, J. (as His Lordship then
was) speaking for the Constitution Bench, observed that the
petitioner had not yet acquired any right to be released since
a sentence of transportation for life had to be undergone by a F
prisoner by way of rigorous imprisonment for life in a
'- designated prison in India. It was further observed that Section
53A IPC, introduced by the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Amendment) Act, 1955, provided that any person sentenced
to transportation for life before the Amendment Act, would be G
/
treated as sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life. The
prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment was bound to serve the
llitr -~ remainder of sentence in pr[son unless the sentence was
commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority. Such a
sentence could not be equated with any fixed term. Regarding H
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A remissions which a person was entitled to earn in accordance -,. ·~
with the Rules framed under the Prison Act, it was observed
that the same could normally be taken into account only towards
the end of the term and the said question was exclusively within
the province of the appropriate Government. In the said case,
B although certainremissions were made, the entire sentence had
not been remitted.

6. In Dalbir Singh and others vs. State of Punjab [(1979)
3 SCC 745], three Judges of this Court had occasion to ' '
consider the awarding of death penalty. Following the decision
c in the case of Rajendra Prasad vs. State of U.P. ((1979) 3 SCC ,-
646], V.R. Krishna Iyer and D.A. Desai, JJ, observed that life
imprisonment strictly means imprisonment for the whole of the
man's life, but in practice amounts to incarceration for a period
between 10 and 14 years which may, at the option of the
D convicting court, be subject to the condition that the sentence
of imprisonment shall last as long as life lasts where there are ,. .
exceptional indications of murderous recidivism and the .,
community cannot run the risk of the convict being at large.

E 7. In State of Punjab and others vs. Joginder Singh and
others ((1990) 2 sec 661], which was heard along with three
other matters, this Court was called upon to consider the
relevant provisions of the Manual for Superintendence and
Management of Jails in Punjab. Considering the grant of
F remissions and commutations granted in exercise of power
..
under Sections 432 and 433 Cr.P.C., this Court held that such
schemes have been introduced to ensure prison discipline and
good behaviour and not to upset sentences. If the sentence i~
of imprisonment for life, ordinarily the convict has to pa~:> the
remainder of his life in person, but for remissic,n and
G
commutations granted in exercise of the aforesaid powers.
Even in such cases, Section 433-A ot the Code or the
execube instructions of 1976 do not insist that the convict pass
\. ,.
the remainder of his life in prison but merely insists that he shall
have served time for at least 14 years.
H
RAMRAJ @ NANHOO @ BIHNU v. STATE OF 375
CHHATIISGARH [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]

8. The next decision to which we may refer in this regard A
is that of the Constitution Bench in the celebrated case of Maru
Ram vs. Union of India & Ors. {(1981) 1 SCC 107}, which was
a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution and was
heard along with several other writ petitions on the same issue,
namely, the length of imprisonment of d convict in respect of B
an offence carrying a life sentence, in view of the amended
provisions of Section 433-A Cr.P.C., which was introduced into
, , the Code by the Amendment Act of 1978. By the said
Amendment, a full 14 year term of imprisonment was made
mandatory for prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment and c
those who were sentenced to death, but the sentence was
commuted to life imprisonment under Section 433 Cr.P.C. The
Constitution Bench held that Section 302 IPC or other like
offence fixes the sentence to be life ir.iprisonment and 14
years' imprisonment under Section 433A is never heavier than
0
the life term. Remission vests no right to release when sentence
-.~ is life imprisonment. No greater punishment is inflicted by
Section 433A than the law applicable to the crime. Nor is there
any vested right to remission cancelled by compulsory 14 year
jail life since a life sentence is a sentence for life. The
Constitution Bench repelled the challenge to the vires of Section E
433A and, ir;iter alia, affirmed its supremacy over the remission
rules and short sentencing statement made by the various
States. Following Godse's case (supra), the Constitution Bench
.... held that imprisonment for life lasts until the last breath and
whatever the length of remissions earned, the prisoner can F
claim release only if the remaining sentence is remitted by the
Government. One other important observation that was made
is that Section 433A does not forbid parole or other release
within the 14 year span.
G
9. In the case of Ashok Kumar vs. Union of India [(1991)
3 SCC 498), together with the interpretation of Section 433-A
•• of the Code, a Three Judge Bench of this Court also had
occasion to consider the provisions of Sections 45 and 57 of
the Indian Penal Code. The Hon'ble Judges were of the view H
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A that the provisions of Section 57 were to be reckoned as 20
years only for the purpose of working out the fraction of the
temis of imprisonment the convict had already undergone. Their
Lordships also held that the expression "imprisonment for life"
would have to be read in the context of Section 45 IPC. Read
B in the light of Section 45, the aforesaid expression would
ordinarily mean imprisonment for the full or complete span of
life. In that context it was mentioned in Godse's case (supra)
that Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code has no real bearing
on the question raised and only for the purpose of calculating
, '
C fractions of terms of punishment, the Section provides that
transportation for life shall be for 20 years for all purposes.

10. The question of premature release cropped up in the
case of Laxman Naskar vs. Union of India [(2000) 2 sec
595], which was heard with several other writ petitions. It was
D held that although there was no right of premature release in
the convict when rules or guidelines have been framed in that ~ .
behalf, the convict has a right to have his case put up before
the prison authorities for considering the same in exercise of
powers under Article 161 in accordance with those rules,
E schemes or guidelines. In that case, Their Lordships were
dealing with a situation where all the "life convicts" were
claiming premature release under the relevant provisions of the
West Bengal Jail Code. Their Lordships were not only dealing
with Articles 161, 21 and 32 of the Constitution, but even the
F provisions of paragraphs 591 (4) and 591 (2) of the West Bengal •·
Jail Code. Applying the provisions of the West Bengal Jail Code
relating to grant of premature release, this Court was of the view
that all the life convicts in the said case had cor:.pleted
continued detention of 20 years including remission earned. On
G receipt of the said report, it was observed that life sentence is
nothing less than life-long imprisonment and by earning
remissions a life convict could not pray for premature release
before completing 20 years of imprisonment, including
remission earned. Having held as above, this Court went on
. '

H further to hold that if according to the Government policy/
RAMRAJ @ NANHOO @ BIHNU v. STATE OF 377
CHHATTISGARH [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
;. 'f instructions in force at the relevant time the life convict had A
already undergone the sentence for the period mentioned in the
policy/instructions, then the only right which a life convict could
be said to have acquired is the right to have his case put up
by the prison authorities in time before the authorities concerned
for exercise of power under Article 161 of the Constitution. That 8
will have to be done consistent with the legal position and the
Government policies/instructions prevalent at that time.

11. In the case of Subash Chander vs. f<rishan Lal and
others [(2001) 4 sec 458), along with the awarding of the
death sentence, the period of imprisonment in case of a life C
sentence or a death sentence commuted to a life sentence also
came to be considered. It was observed that when two views
were possible about the quantum of sentence, the view which
favoured the grant of life in comparison with death is generally
accepted for the exercise of the powers by the High Court in D
--~ commuting the death sentence. It was further observed that a
"life imprisonment" means imprisonment for whole of the
remaining period of the convicted person's natural life, unless
the appropriate Government chose to exercise its discretion to
remit either the whole or a part of the sentence under Section E
401 Cr.P.C. .

12. A slightly different view was expressed by this Court
in the case of Shri Bhagwan vs. State of Rajasthan [(2001) 6
·• sec 296). This Court, after considering the facts and F
circumstances of the case, reiterated that ordinarily
"imprisonment for life" means sentence of imprisonment for
whole of the remaining period of the convicted person's natural
life and that the rules framed under the Prisons Rules do noi
substitute a lesser sentence for a sentence for life.
G
13. The debate as to what would cbnstitute "life
,._• imprisonment" once again surfaced in the case in the case of
Mohd. Munna vs. Union of India [(2005) 7 SCC 417], which
was disposed of along with another writ petition filed by one
Kartick Biswas, where it was reiterated that life imprisonment H
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 16 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A was not equivalent to imprisonment for 14 years or 20 years.
Life imprisonment means imprisonment for the whole of the
remaining period of the convicted person's natural life. This
Court observed that there was no provision either in the Indian
Penal Code or in the Criminal Procedure Code, whereby life
B imprisonment could be treated as either 14 years or 20 years
without there being a formal remission by the appropriate
Government. The contention that having regard to the provisions
of Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a prisoner I t
was entitled to be released on completing 20 years of
C imprisonment under the West Bengal Correctional Services
Act, 1992, and the West Bengal Jail Code, was rejected
following the decision in Godse's case (supra).

14. In a more recent case, Swamy Shraddananda vs.
State of Kamataka [(2008) 13 SCC 767), this Court was called
D upon to consider as to what would constitute "life imprisonment"
in a case where death sentence was commuted to life >-
sentence. Swamy Shraddananda was convicted under Section
302 and 201 IPC and was sentenced to death for the offence
under Section 302 IPC. In appeal the High Court affirmed the
E conviction and the death sentence awarded to the appellant by
the learned 25th City Sessions Judge, Bangalore City and
accepted the reference made by the trial Court without any
modification. in the conviction or sentence. The matter then
travelled to this Court and again came up for disposal before
F a Bench of three Judges. While one of the learned Judges took •·
the view that the appellant deserved nothing but death, the
others made it clear that life imprisonment, rather than death,
would serve the ends of justice. But the Hon'ble Judges also
made it clear that the appellant would not be released from
G prison till the end of his life. Having examined various decisions
on the point which have also been referred to hereinabove, the
Hon'ble Judges substituted the death sentence given to the
appellant by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court
..
with imprisonment for life with a direction that the convict would
H not be released from prison for the rest of his life.
RAMRAJ @ NANHOO @ BIHNU v. STATE OF 379
CHHATIISGARH [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]

#' "'
15. What ultimately emerges from all the aforesaid A
decisions is that life imprisonment is not to be interpreted as
being imprisonment for the whole of a convict's natural life
within the scope of Section 45 of the aforesaid Code. The
decision in Swamy Shraddananda's case (supra) was taken
in the special facts of that case where on account of a very brutal B
murder, the appellant had been sentenced to death by the Trial
Court and the reference had been accepted by the High Court.
However, while agreeing with the conviction and confirming the
I
• same, the Hon'ble Judges were of the view that however
heinous the crime may have been, it did not come within the c
definition of "rarest of rare cases" so as to merit a death
sentence. Nevertheless, having regard to the nature of the
offence, Their Lordships were of the view that in the facts of
the case the claim of the petitioner for premature release after
a minimum incarceration for a period of 14 years, as envisaged D
under Section 433-A Cr.P.C., could not be acceded to, since
- ~ the sentence of death had been stepped down to that of life
imprisonment .. which was a lesser punishment.
16. On a conjoint reading of Sections 45 and 47 of the
Indian Penal Code and Sections 432, 433 and 433A Cr.P.C., E
it is now well established that a convict awarded life sentence
has to undergo imprisonment for at least 14 years. While
Sections 432 and 433 empower the appropriate Government
to suspend, remit or commute sentences, including a sentence
-1
of death and life imprisonment, a fetter has been imposed by F
the legislature on such powers by the introduction of Section
433A into the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Amending
Act of 1978, which came into effect on and from 18th
December, 1978. By virtue of the non- obstante clause used
in Section 433A, the minimum term of imprisonment in respect G
of an offence where death is one of the punishments provided
by laws or where a death sentence has been commuted to life
. .)
sentence, has been prescribed as 14 years. In the various
decisions rendered after the decision in Godse's case (supra),
"imprisonment for life" has been repeatedly held to mean H
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 16 {ADDL.) S.C.R.

A imprisonment for the natural life term of a convict, though the ... ,..
actual period of imprisonment may stand reduced on account
of remissions earned. But in no case, with the possible
exception of the powers vested in the President under Article
72 of the Constitution and the power vested in the Governor
B under Article 161 of the Constitution, even with remissions
earned, can a sentence of imprisonment for life be reduced to
below 14 years. It is thereafter left to the discretion of the
concerned authorities to determine the actual length of
imprisonment having regard to the gravity and intensity of the
• '
c offence. Section 433A Cr. P. C., which is relevant for the purpose
of this case, reads as follows :-

"433A. Restriction on powers of remission or
commutation in certain cases.- Notwithstanding anything
contained in section 432, where a sentence of
D imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a person
for an offence for which death is one of the punishment "-
provided by laws or where a sentence of death imposed
on a person has been commuted under section 433 into
one of imprisonment for life, such person shall not be
E released from prison unless he had served at least fourteen
years of imprisonment."

17. In the present case, the facts are such that the petitioner
is fortunate to have escaped the death penalty. We do not think
t·
F that this is a fit case where the petitioner should be released
on completion of 14 years imprisonment. The petitioner's case
for premature release may be taken up by the concerned
authorities after he completes 20 years imprisonment, including
remissions earned.
G 18. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

K.K.T. Special Leave Petition dismissed. ·- ~