Holding

Defence material cannot ordinarily be considered at the charge‑framing stage, and the civil‑suit evidence did not render the prosecution case absurd; therefore the criminal trial against Ranjit Satardekar must proceed, while the case against Vijaya Satardekar lacks a prima facie charge and is rightly quashed.

Summary

The appellant Rukmini Narvekar filed a criminal complaint alleging that advocate Ranjit Satardekar fraudulently obtained her signature on a Power of Attorney and used it to sell her property to his wife Vijaya Satardekar. The High Court quashed the criminal proceedings against both accused, relying on evidence from a related civil suit. The Supreme Court examined whether defence material, such as the civil‑suit evidence, could be considered at the stage of framing charges under s.227 CrPC and whether the High Court could quash the case on that basis. The Court held that ordinarily only prosecution material may be considered at charge‑framing, and defence material may be looked at only in rare cases where it shows the prosecution case to be wholly absurd, which was not satisfied here. Consequently, the criminal proceedings against Ranjit Satardekar must continue, while the proceedings against Vijaya Satardekar were rightly quashed due to lack of a prima facie case. The appeal was allowed in part and dismissed in part.

Issues considered

The scope of s.227 CrPC regarding consideration of defence material at the charge‑framing stage
Whether evidence from a civil suit can be used to quash criminal proceedings
Whether the High Court could quash the criminal case against Ranjit Satardekar under s.482 CrPC/Art.226
Whether a prima facie case existed against Vijaya Satardekar

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 227, s. 228, s. 482
Constitution of Indias. Article 226
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 409, s. 420, s. 423

Subjects

Criminal ProcedureSection 227 CrPCSection 482 CrPCQuashing of criminal proceedingsDefence evidencePrima facie caseFraudPower of AttorneyLawyer‑client fiduciary relationshipCivil suit evidence

Judgment

[2008] 14 S.C.R. 271

tr' ' RUKMINl NARVEKAR A
v.
VIJAYA SATARDEKAR & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 1576-1577 of 2008)
OCTOBER 3,. 2008
B
[MARKANDEY KAT JU AND ALTAMAS KABIR, JJ.]
----~"

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973- ss.227, 482 - Con-
stitution of India, 1950 - ArticltJ 226 - Framing of charges -
Evidence to be considered by the Court while framing of c
charges and taking cognizance of offence - Per Katju, J: Held:
Ordinarily defence material cannot be looked into by the Court
while framing of the charge - However, in very rare and ex-
ceptional cases when some defence material when shown to
the trial court would convincingly demonstrate that prosecu-
D
tion version was totally absurd or preposterous then the Court
"'
..___,, can look into it - Per Kabir, J: There is no scope for the ac-
cused to produce any evidence in support of his defence at
the stage of framing of charge and only such material as are
indicated in s.227 CrP.C. can be taken into consideration by
Magistrate at that stage - However, in a proceeding taken there- E
~ from under s.482 CrP.C., Court is free to consider material
that may be produced on behalf of the accused - In the in-
,,. stant case, there is a/legation of fraud - By the Court: Prima r
,;, facie case is made out against accused no. 1 - Not a fit case
--1
for quashing proceedings - As against the accused no. 2, no F
material to show that she was involved in the fraud committed
by accused no. 1- Hence prima facie case not made out
against her - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 409, 420.
The complainant-appellant lodged an FIR under
G
_... _, ss.409 and 420 IPC, alleging that 'RS', the accused No.1
who was an advocate took signatures of complainant on
a Power of Attorney falsely representing that it was meant
for enabling him to appear in court case in respect of cer-
271 H
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A tain properties. The Power of Attorney was used by ac-
("I
cused for selling the property to his wife, 'VS' the other
accused. The said property belonged to the complainant.
Charge sheet was filed against both the accused. There-
after, cognizance was taken of the offence alleged in the
B charge sheet and process was issued.
Accused-respondents filed revision which was dis- -~
missed. Against that order a writ petition was filed. High
Court allowed the writ petition relying upon the evidence
of one 'ON' in a Civil Suit.
c
In the instant appeal, it was contended for the appel-
lant that High Court ought not have relied on the evidence
in the Civil Suit for quashing the criminal case; that at the
time of framing of the charges only the material produced
by the prosecution side could be looked into by the Court
D
and the material produced by the defence cannot be Y.·
looked into. \,-..--

Respondent contended that the said evidence could
have been relied upon on the facts of the instant case for
E quashing the criminal proceedings.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: Per Katju, J.: ..
1. The allegations in the FIR if treated to be correct I'
F prima facie made out an offence against the respondent, '
'RS'. [Para 12] [279,C] t--
2. The evidence of 'ON' in the Civil Suit was a very
detailed one and some contradictory statements ap-
G peared to have been given by him e.g. that the amount
was paid by 'RS' as a loan, and this contradicted the ver-
sion that the money was paid as a sale consideration. In ~

the judgment of the Civil S~it, it was h~ld that undue influ-
ence could not. be ,ruled out. In these circumstances it
cannot be said that at this stage the proceedings in the
H
RUKMINI NARVEKAR v. VIJAYA SATARDEKAR 273
ILlf & ORS.
_,
)> i
criminal case were totally ma/a fide and with ulterior mo- A
tive. [Para 14] [279,H; 280,A-B]
3. The pleas which the respondent 'RS' took before
the High court could be taken by him at the time of the
trial, and it would not be proper to pre-empt the criminal
proceeding at this stage. Serious allegations were made B
against him in the FIR. The r~lation of a lawyer and his
-._, client is like a fiduciary relationship, and the lawyer has
to act in the interest of his client. However, it was alleged
in the FIR that 'RS' deceived the complainant and her hus-
band. These are matters which the trial court in the crimi- c
nal case should look into. However, this was not a fit case
for quashing of the criminal proceedings against 'RS' in
exercise of the powers under s.482 Cr.P.C. or Article 226
of the Constitution. [Para 15] [280,C-E]
D
Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah and
--..,;
Anr. (2005) 4 SCC 370; K. G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Po-
lice and Anr. (2002) 8 SCC 87; State of Haryana and Ors. v.
Bhajan Lal and Ors. (1992)Supp. 1 SCC 335; Pepsi Foods
Ltd. and Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors. (1998) 5
SCC 749; Minu Kumari and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Ors. E
(2006) 4 SCC 359 and *State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi
(2005) 1 sec 568 - referred to.
4. It is well settled that a judgment of the Court has
,\_
not to be treated as a Euclid formula. The observations of F
--! Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's formula nor as
provisions of the statute. Thus while it is true that ordi-
narily defence material cannot be looked into by the Court
while framing of the charge in view of *Debendra Nath Padhi
case, there may be some very rare and exceptional cases
G
where some defence material when shown to the ·trial
court would convincingly demonstrate that the prosecu-
tion version is totally absurd or preposterous, and in such
very rare cases the defence material can be looked into
by the Court at the time of framing of the charges or tak-
H
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.
n

A ing cognizance. However, in the instant case, it cannot f-"'
be said that the evidence in the Civil Suit which was pro~
duced by the defence before the trial court established
convincingly that the prosecution case is totally absurd
or preposterous. This is a matter which has to be looked
B into by the trial Court. The judgment of the High Court in
respect of 'RS' is set ·aside and the criminal proceedings
against him would go on-in the trial Court. As regards the
other criminal appeal in which Smt. 'VS', wife of 'RS', was
t-.~ [
the respondent, there was no material whatsoever either
mentioned in the FIR or produced by the prosecution to
c show that she was in any way involved in the alleged
criminal offence committed by her husband 'RS'. The only
allegation against her was that the sale deed was in her
favour. This would not prima facie make out any offence.
Therefore, the criminal proceeding against 'VS' was rightly
D quashed by the High Court. [Paras 17-19, 21-22] (281,C-
E; 282,A-B; 282,E-G] ..
\..---'
Dr. Rajbir Singh Dalal v. Chaudhari.Devi Lal University,
Sirsa and Anr. JT (2008) 8 SC 621 ; Bharat Petroleum Corpo-
ration Ltd. and Anr. v. N. R. Vairamani and Anr. AIR (2004) SC
E 4778 - relied on.
Or. Monica Kumar and Anr. v. State of U. P and Ors. (2008)
9 Scale 166 - referred to.
Per Kabir, J.: (Concurring with the interpretation of
F the provisions of s.227 Cr.P.C. and expressing his own ~
f.
views in the matter) 'r-
HELD: 1. There is no scope for the accused to pro-
duce any evidence in his support at the stage of framing
of charge and only such material as are indicated in s.227
G Cr.P.C. can be taken into consideration by the Magistrate
at that stage. However, in a proceeding taken therefrom
under s.482 Cr.P.C. the Court is free to consider material ~
that may be produced on behalf of the accused to arrive
at a decision whether the charge as framed could be main-
H tained. This appears to be the intention of the legislature I'
RUKMINI NARVEKAR v. VIJAYA SATARDEKAR 275
& ORS.
.- \
in wording ss. 227 and 228 the way in which they have A
been worded and as explained in *Debendra Nath Padhi's
case by the larger Bench to which the very same ques-
tion had been referred. [Para 9] [286,E-G]
*State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi (2005) 1 SCC
568; Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration (1996) 9 SCC 766; B
- -) State Anti-Corruption Bureau v. P. Suryaprakasan (1999) SCC
Crl. 373 - referred to.
2. The complaint made does make out a prima facie
case against accused 'RS' and the cognizance taken by c
the Magistrate cannot be faulted. However, even prima fa-
cie, none of the offences referred to in the charge-sheet
can be made out against accused 'VS'. and she has been
roped in only with the aid of s.1208 which is also not sub-
stantiated. [Para 10] [286,G-H; 287,A]
D
... i CASE LAW REFERENCE
'--;
(2005) 4 sec 370 referred to Para 10
(2002) 8 sec a1 referred to Para 10
(1992) Supp. 1 sec 335 referred to Para 11 E
(1998) 5 sec 749 referred to Para 11
c2oos) 4 sec 359 referred to Para 11
c2005) 1 sec 568 referred to Para 16
..\.
JT (2008) 8 SC 621 referred to Para 17 F
AIR (2004) SC 4778 relied on Para 17
(2008) 9 Scale 166 referred to Para 20
(2005) 1 sec 568 referred to Para 3
G
(1996) 9 sec 766 referred to Para 3
,A-,,....!
(1999) sec Crl. 373 referred to Para 6
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
Nos. 1576-1577 of 2008
H
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A From the Judgment and final Order dated 3/8/2007 of the t- '4

High Court of Bombay, Bench at Goa in Criminal·Writ Petition
Nos. 7 and 8 2007
Mukul Rohatgi, Dhruv Mehta, Harshvardhan Jha, Yashraj
Singh Deora and T.S. Sabarish (for M/s. K.L. Mehta & Co.) for
B ~
the Appellant. i-
U.U. Lalit, P.V. Shetty, Davedatt Kamat, Rauf Rahim and
~-
Amarjit Singh Bexi for the Respondents.
;

The Judgments of the Court were delivered by
c
MARKANDEY KATJU, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals have been filed ·against the common
judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court
(at Goa) dated 3.8~2007 in Criminal Writ Petition Nos ..7/2007
D and 8/2007.
3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the \__:
record.
4. Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 in both these appeals are hus-
E band and wife, being Ranjit Satardekar and his wife Vijaya
Satardekar. An FIR dated 25.2.2002 was filed against these
respondents by one Rukmini Narvekar (the appellant herein)
under various provisions of the IPC including Sections 409, 420,
423, etc. A true copy of this FIR is annexed as P6 in this appeal.
F The gist of this FIR is that the complainant is an illiterate person I-

and so was her husband Raghunath Narvekar. It is alleged that
the respondent Ranjit Satardekar, who is an advocate, fraudu-
r-
lentty and dishonestly induced the complainant and her de-
ceased husband to place their signatures and thumb impres-
G sion on some papers in the office of the Executive Magistrate
at Sawantwadi without explaining the contents thereof, and
falsely misrepresenting. that the same was necessary to give '
f-...../'-..
him necessary authority to represent them in the court in Goa in
Inventory Proceedings on the death of Andre Andrade which
were going on pertaining to the estate left by him. It may be
H
RUKMINf NARVEKAR v. VIJAYA SATARDEKAR 277
& ORS. [MARKANDEY KAT JU, J.]
.
' mentioned that Andre Andrade had several children including A
one daughterwho was married to Raghunath Narvekar but their
marriage was dissolved on 16.2.1973 and thereafter Raghunath
Narvekar married the complainant. Under the Goa law,
Raghunath Narvekar and the complainant inherited 10% share
in the estate left by the deceased Andre Andrade and the re- B
maining 10% went to Vijaya Andrade who had been married to
- -<
\
Raghunath Narvekar and was being represented by Ranjit
Satardekar, advocate, in the Inventory Proceedings.

5. The allegation in the FIR was that Ranjit Satardekar had
falsely misrepresented to.the complainant and her husband that c
the document which was being executed by them was for en-
abling Ranjit to represent them in the Inventory Proceedings in
progress on the death of Andre Andrade, although what was
actually executed by them was a Power of Attorney. This Power
of Attorney was used by the accused for executing a sale deed D
.... i in favour of his wife Vijaya Satardekar and Sadiq Sheikh in the
--r
year 1991, but the said sale deed was presented for registra-
tion only in the year ~001. It is alleged that the complainant came
to know only in August 2001 for the first time about the execu-
tion of the sale deed in 1991. Thus it is alleged that the property E
of the complainant was purported to have been sold away by
Ranjit Satardekar, advocate by deceit and misrepresentation
for which he deserved to be punished under Sections 409, 420
and other provisions of the IPC.
~'
---.; 6. On the basis of the aforesaid FIR, the police investi- F
gated the case and filed a chargesheet against both Ranjit
Satardekar and Smt.Vijaya Satardekar as well as two others.
Thereafter, cognizance was taken of the offence alleged in the
chargesheet and process was issued by the Judicial Magis-
trate, First Class, Panaji under Sections 468/471/420/120-B G
./,.--\ read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code .

7. Against the order taking cognizance and issuing pro-
cess against the accused, they filed a Criminal Revision before
the Sessions Judge, Panaji, which was dismissed by his judg-
H
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

t~ _.
A ment dated 19.6.2007. Against that order a writ petition was
filed which was allowed by the impugned judgment of the learned
Single Judge of the High Court dated 3.8.2007. Hence this ap-
peal.
8. We .have heard detailed arguments on both sides and
B we are of the opinion that judgment of the High Court cannot be
sustained so far as it has quashed the complaint and proceed- ,,
'-~-- '"'
ings against Ranjit Satardekar, but it has to be sustained so far
as it relates to Vijaya Satardekar.

c . 9. Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned senior counsel for the ap-
pellant has submitted that in the impugned judgment the learned \
\ >-
Single Judge of the High Court largely relied on the evidence ....._
proceedings in Civil Suit (No.97 of 2004, New No.101 of 2004).
The complainant was the plaintiff No.1 in the said Civil Suit which
has been decreed on 30.12.2006. Shri Rohatgi has submitted
D
that the High Court should not have relied on the evidence in the I-
aforesaid Civil Suit for the purpose of quashing the criminal case. y
On the other hand Shri U. U. Lant, learned senior counsel for the
respondent has submitted that the said evidence could have
been relied upon on the facts of this case for quashing the crimi-
E nal proceedings.

10. Before dealing with these submissions we may point
out that while there were certain rulings of two-Judge Benches
of this Court, which had held that the findings in a Civil Suit are
F binding in a criminal case on the same facts but not vice versa,
this view appears to have been watered down somewhat in the ':
subsequent decisions of the larger Benches of this Court e.g.
the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal
Singh Marwah and Anr. vs. Meenakshi Marwah and Anr.
2005(4) SCC 370 (vide para 32) [JT 2005(3)SC 195] as well
G
as the decision of the three-Judge Bench in K. G Premshanker
vs. Inspector of Police and Anr. 2002(8) SCC 87 (vide para 30 1"--A...
to 33).
11. The \aw as to when criminal proceedings can be
H quashed by the High Court in exercise of powers under Section
RUKMINI NARVEKAR v. VIJAYA SATARDEKAR 279
& ORS. [MARKANDEY KATJU, J.]
,. - \
482 Cr. P. C or Article 226 of the Constitution has been laid down A
by this Court in State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and
Ors. 1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335 (vide para 102 and 103) [JT
1990(4) SC 650]. This decision has been followed subsequently
by a series of decisions e.g. Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Anr. vs.
Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors. 1998(5) SCC 749 [JT B
1997 (8) SC 705], Minu Kumari and Anr. vs. State of Bihar
and Ors. 2006(4) SCC 359 [JT 2006(4) SC 569], etc.
12. Shri Rohatgi submitted that on a perusal of the FIR in
this case it cannot be said that treating the allegations therein
to be correct no prima facie offence is made out against Ranjit c
Satardekar. We have carefully perused the FIR and we agree
with the submission of Shri Rohatgi. The allegations .in the FIR
if treated to be correct prima facie make out an offence against
the respondent, Ranjit Sataredkar. Shri Lalit, learned counsel
for Ranjit Satardekar, however, submitted that in Bhajan Lat's D
... case (supra) itself the seventh ground given therein in para 102
~. of the said decision applies to the facts of this case. The sev-
enth ground which entitles the High Court to quash the criminal
proceedings is stated in Bhanjan Lat's case (supra) as follows:
"Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with E
mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge."
-\ F
'
-; 13. Shri Lalit submitted that the proceedings against Ranjit
Satardekar were mala fide as is evident from the evidence of
Dhananjay Narvekar in the Civil Suit where he has stated that
he has received some money from Ranjit Satardekar. Accord-
ing to Shri Lalit this proves that the sale deed of 1991 was in
G
the knowledge of the complainant throughout.
j ,,J.
14. We have perused the evidence of Dhananjay Narvekar
in the Civil Suit and we have also perused the judgment in the
Civil Suit, against which we are informed an appeal is pending.
The evidence of Dhananjay Narvekar is a very detailed one and H
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C .R.

i.~-4,
A some contradictory statements appear to have been be given
1
by him e.g. that the amount was paid by Ranjit Satardekar as a
loan, and this contradicts the version that the money was paid
as a sale consideration. In the judgment of the Civil Court it has
been held that undue influence cannot be ruled out. In these cir-
B cumstances it cannot be said that at this stage the proceedings
in the criminal case were totally mala fide and with ulterior mo-
tive.
15. It may be mentioned that the pleas which the respon-
dent Ranjit Satardekar took before the High Court could be taken
C by him at the time of the·trial, and it would not be proper to pre-
empt the criminal proceeding at this stage. Serious allegations
have been made against him in the FIR The relation of a lawyer
and his client is like a fiduciary relationship; and the lawyer has
to act in the interest of his client. However, it is alleged in the
D FIR that Ranjit Satardekar deceived the complainant and her
husband in the manner aforesaid. These are matters which the
trial court in the criminal case should look into, and we are not
expressing any opinion either way on this question. However,
w~ are of the opinion that this was not a fit case for quashing of
E the criminal proceedings Ranjit Satardekar in exercise of the
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C or Article 226 of the Consti-
tution.
16. Shri Mukul Rohatgi submitted that at the time of the
framing of the charges only the material protjuced by the pros-
F ecution side can be looked into by the Court but the material
produced by the defence cannot be looked into. He has placed
reliance on several decisions of this Court in this connection
e.g. State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi 2005(1) SCC
568 .
G
17. We have carefully perused the decision of this Court
in the State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi (supra). Though
the observations in paragraph 16 of the said decision seems
to support the view canvassed by by Shri Rohatgi , it may be
also pointed ourthat in 'paragraph 29 of the same decision it
H
RUKMINI NARVEKAR v. VIJAYA SATARDEKAR 281
& ORS. [MARKANDEY KATJU, J.]
;.. ·--y
has been observed that the width of the powers of the High Court A
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and Article 226 of the Constitution
is unlimited whereunder in the interests of justice the High Court
can make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse
of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice within the parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal's case B
- .. -l
(supra). Thus we have to reconcile paragraphs 16 and 23 of the
decision in State of"Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi (supra).
We should also keep in mind that it is well settled that a judg-
ment of the Court has not to be treated as a Euclid formula vide
Dr. Rajbir Singh Dalal vs. Chaudhari Devi Lal University, Sirsa c
& Anr. JT 2008(8) SC 621. As observed by this Court in Bharat
Petroleum Corporation Ltd. & Anr. vs. N. R. Vairamani & Anr
AIR 2004 SC 4778, observations of Courts are neither to be
read as Euclid's formula nor as provisions of the statute. Thus
in our opinion while it is true that ordinarily defence material D
~.
~
cannot be looked into by the Court while framing of the charge
in view of D.N. Padhi's case (supra), there may be some very
rare and exceptional cases where some defence material when
shown to the trjal court would convincingly demonstrate that the
prosecution version is totally absurd· or preposterous, and in E
such very rare cases the defence material can be looked into
by the Court at the time of framing of the charges or taking cog-
nizance.

.!.. ! . 18. In our opinion, therefore, it cannot be said as an abso-
F
--; lute proposition that under no circumstances can the Court look
into the material produced by the defence at the time of framing
of the charges, though this should be done in very rare cases,
i.e. where the defence produces some material which convinc-
ingly demonstrates that the whole prosecution case is totally
G
absurd or totally concocted. We agree with Shri Lal it that in some
_.;.... ~
very rare cases the Court is justified in looking into the material
produced by the defence at the time of framing of the charges,
if such material convincingly establishes that the whole pros-
ecution version is totally absurd, preposterous or concocted.
H
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A 19. However, in this case it cannot be said that the. evi- y--"
dence in the Civil Suit which was produced by the defence be-
fore the trial court established convincingly that the prosecution
case is totally absurd or preposterous. In our opinion this is a
matter which has to be looked into by the trial Court.
B
20. In Dr. Monica Kumar & Anr. vs. State of UP & Ors.
2008(9) Scale 166 this Court referred to various decisions on
the point of quashing the criminal proceedings against the ac-
cused. In this decision this Court quashed the criminal proceed-
C ings against the accused, though on the allegations in the F.l.R.
prima facie an offence was made out. Thus quashing of the
criminal case was done considering all the facts and circum-
stances of the case. No doubt, in this decision the Court has
relied on Article 142 of the Constitution, but in our opinion the
result would have been the same irrespective of Article 142. ·
0
21. Thus we allow the criminal appeal in which Ranjit
Satardekar is the respondent and we set aside the judgment of
the High Court in respect of Ranjit Sataredkar and direct.that
the criminal proceedings against him yvill go on in the trial Court .
E However, the trial Court will not be influenced by any observa-
tions made in this judgment.

22. As regards the other criminal appeal in which Smt.
Vijaya Satardekar, wife of Ranjit Satardekar, is the respondent,
F we are of the opinion that there is no material whatsoever either
mentioned in the FIR or produced by the prosecution to show
that Vijaya Satardekar was in any way involved in the alleged
criminal offence committed by her husband Ranjit Satardekar.
The only allegation against her is that the sale deed was in her
G favour. In our opinion this does not prima facie make out any
offence. In our opinion, therefore; the criminal proceeding against
Vijaya Satardekar was rightly quashed by the High Court and
the criminal appeal in which Vijaya Satardekar is respondent is
dismissed.
H 23: There shall be no order as to costs.
RUKMINI NARVEKAR v. VIJAYA SATARDEKAR 283
& ORS. [ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]

ALTAMAS KABIR, J. 1. I have carefully gone through the A
draft judgment prepared by my learned Brother and though I
agree with his interpretation of the provisions of Section 227 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter referred to as
"Cr.P.C." and wish to express my own views in the matter. Sec-
tion 227 Cr.P.C., which is in Chapter XVIII of the Code, which B
deals with trials before a Court of Sessions, relates to the open-
ing stages of a trial at the time of framing of charge against the
accused which is done under Section 228. Section 227 which
is relevant for our purpose provides as follows:
· "227. Discharge- If, upon consideration of the record of C
the case and the documents submitted therewith, and the
prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there
is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused,
he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons
for so doing." D
2. The aforesaid provision has fallen for consideration of
this Court in several cases on the question as to whether at the
stage of framing of charge, the Court in seisin session of the
matter is required to consider any material, other than that ind.i-
cated in the Section. E

3. In the three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in State
ofOrissa vs Debendra Nath Padhi [(2005) 1SCC568], to which
my learned Brother has also referred, it has been mentioned as
\ to how the matter came to be referred to the larger Bench. Till F
:1 1996, the consistent view which had been taken by this Court is
that at the time of framing of charge the trial court can consider
only such material as are placed by the investigating agency
having regard to the very language of Section 227. At that stage,
the defence could only be heard but could not be given an op- G
portunity to produce evidence for the consideration of the Court.
-""' ..J However, a different view was expressed by a two-Judge Bench
ofthis Court in Satish Mehra vs. Delhi Administration {(1996) 9
SCC 766. The learned Judges observed that if the accused
were able to produce any reliable material at the stage of tak- H
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R. "
7-., '.
I
A ing cognizance or framing of charge which might fatally affect
the very su$tainability of the case, it is unjust to suggest that no
such material should be looked into by the Court at that stage. It
was, therefore, held that the trial court would be within its power
to consider even material which the accused may produce at
B the stage contemplated in Section 227 of the Code. It was be-
cause of a discordant note being struck to an otherwise estab- ~
~
l
lished principle in the Satish Mehra case (supra) that in
Debendra Nath Padhi's case (supra) an order was passed re-
r
.,- r-
ferring the said question to a larger Bench and the same was
c taken up for consideration in the said case itself by a three-
Judge Bench.
4. While referring to Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C. relat-
ing to Sessions triable cases, the three-Judge Bench also con-
' •,'-
sidered the provisions of Sections 239 and 240 Cr.P.C. relat-
D ing to trial of warrant cases by Magistrates, which are almost t
identical to Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C. The decision ren- G
dered in Debendra Nath Padhi's case (supra) makes it very
clear that the dominant issue being dealt with in the case was
with regard to the right enjoyed by an accused to produce evi- .
!

E dence for the consideration of the Court at the stage of framing
of charge.
5. Interpreting the expression "the record of the case" and
the word "case" used in Section 227 of the Code, the learned
Judges held that the said expressions clearly meant the records ' .~

F and the documents or articles produced with it, as indicated in -y-
Section 227 Cr.P.C. It was observed that no provision in the t
Code gives the accused the right to file any material or docu-
ment at the stage of framing of charge. The right is only granted
at the stage of the trial.
G
6. The learned Judge then went on to examine the earlier ..__,.....,.,_
cases where the common view taken was that at the stage of
Sections 227 and 228 of the Code all that the Court is required
to see is whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the
accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. The
H
.
RUKMINI NARVEKAR v. VIJAYA SATARDEKAR 285
& ORS. [AlTAMAS KABIR, J.]

learned Judge while considering the other decision also referred A
to the decision of this Court in State Anti-Corruption Bureau vs.
P. Suryaprakasan {(1999) SCC(Cri)373], wherein it was ex-
plained that at the time of framing of charge, the trial court is
required to and can only consider the Police report referred to
in Section 173 of the Code and the documents sent with it. It B
) was emphasised that the only right available to the accused at
--i
that stage was that of being heard and nothing beyond that.
7. In order to identify the parameters of the questions re-
ferred to it, the larger Bench observed that in the case before it
the question involved was not about the jurisdiction under Sec- C
tion 482 of the Code where along with the petition the accused
may file unimpeachable evidence of sterling quality and on that
basis seek quashing, but it is about the right' claimed by the
accused to produce material at the stage of framing charge.
The larger Bench was, therefore, fully conscious of the limits D
within which it was required to confine its views and the judg-
ment was rendered in that context. The same will be evident
from the opening paragraph of the judgment. While deciding
the questions referred to it, the larger Bench made a conscious
distinction between a proceeding under Section 227 Cr.P.C. E
before the trial court and a proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
and made a reference to the Court's power to consider mate-
rial other than those produced by the prosecution in a proceed-
ing under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is in that context that while hold-
ing that the decision rendered in Satish Mehra's case (supra) F
was erroneous, the larger Bench held that if the submission that
the accused would be entitled to produce materials and docu-
ments in proof of his innocence at the stage of framing of charge,
was to be accepted, it would be unsettling a law well settled
over a hundred years. It is in that light that the provisions of Sec- · G
tion 227 Cr.P.C. would have to be understood and that it only
means hearing the submissions of the accused on the records
of the case filed by the prosecution and documents submitted
therewith and nothing more. The larger Bench arrived ata defi-
nite conclusion that the expression "hearing the submissions of H
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A the accused" cannot me~n an opportunity to file material to be
(---
granted to the accused and thereby changing the settled law. At
the stage of framing of charge hearing the submissions of the
accused has to be confined to the material produced by the
I-
police.
B 8. The larger Bench did not leave any scope for a different
interpretation of the provisions of Section 227 as is now being
~
made. Incidentally, the very same arguments which have been
advanced by Mr. Lalit before us on behalf of the accused, were
also advanced by learned counsel before the larger Bench and
c the same were negated as far as Section 227 Cr.P.C. is con-
cerned. However, in paragraphs 21 and 29 of the judgment the
larger Bench did indicate that the width of the powers of the
High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Article 226 of the
Constitution is unlimited whereunder in the interest of justice
D the High Court could make such order as may be required to
secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process
(_,'.:, ~
of any court.
9. In my view, therefore, there is no scope for the accused
to produce any evidence in support of the submissions made
E on his behalf at the stage of framing of charge and only such
material as are indicated in Section 227 Cr.P.C. can be taken
into consideration by the learned magistrate at that stage. How-
ever, in a proceeding taken therefrom under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
the Court is free to consider material that may be produced on ,...
F behalf of the accused to arrive at a decision whether the charge \ l-
\ t
as framed could be maintained. This, in my view, appears to be '
the intention of the legislature in wording Sections 227 and 228 ..r·
the way in Which they have been worded and as explained in
'l
Debendra Nath Padhrs case (supra) by the larger Bench to
G which the very same question had been referred.
•
10. However, as indicated by my learned Brother, the com- "'-""'
plaint made does make out a prima facie case against accused
Ranjit Satardekar and the cognizance taken by the learned
magistrate cannot be faulted and the appeal as far as he is
H
RUKMINI NARVEKAR v. VIJAYA SATARDEKAR 287
& ORS. [AlTAMAS KABIR, J.)

concerned, must be allowed. However, even prima facie, none A
of the offences referred to in the charge-sheet can be made out
against accused Vijaya Satardekar and she has been roped in
only with the aid of Section 1208 which is also not substanti-
ated. The appeal as far as she is concerned, must be dismissed.
11. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. B

D.G. Appeals disposed of.