Holding

The Supreme Court held that the FIR does not disclose any criminal offence as the essential ingredients of Sections 405/406 and 420 IPC are absent, and therefore the criminal proceedings must be quashed.

Summary

The appellants, owners of a Bangalore property, entered into an Agreement to Sell (ATS) with the complainant, who later alleged they cheated him and filed a private complaint that led to an FIR charging them under multiple IPC sections. The High Court dismissed the appellants' petition to quash the FIR, but the Supreme Court examined whether the factual allegations disclosed any criminal offence and whether civil and criminal suits could proceed concurrently. The Court held that the appellants were not entrusted with the property, so sections 405/406 (criminal breach of trust) did not apply, and the elements of cheating under section 420 were absent because possession was never transferred as alleged. Consequently, the FIR and all subsequent criminal proceedings against the appellants were quashed as an abuse of process, while noting that simultaneous civil proceedings are permissible only when a criminal element is present. The appeal was allowed, costs awarded, and the matter was referred to pending SLP proceedings concerning the BDA.

Issues considered

Whether the factual allegations disclose a cognizable offence under Sections 405, 406, 415, 420, etc., of the IPC to justify continuation of the criminal proceedings.
Whether a civil suit and a criminal proceeding based on the same set of facts and parties can simultaneously proceed, and under what circumstances the criminal case must be quashed.
Whether the procedural requirements laid down in Priyanka Srivastava (affidavit filing) were complied with in the registration of the FIR.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 156(3), s. 200, s. 482
Constitution of Indias. Article 136, s. Article 142
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 34, s. 384, s. 405, s. 406, s. 415, s. 417, s. 418, s. 420, s. 504, s. 506

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether any criminal offence in the background of the factual position is made out to justify criminal proceedings against the the same should proceed; whether on the same cause of action, based on the facts, both civil and criminal proceedings can simultaneously go on. Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing – Civil suit filed by the complainant against the appellants

Subjects

QuashingCivil and criminal proceedings simultaneouslyAbuse of process of courtSection 405 IPCSection 406 IPCSection 420 IPCPriyanka Srivastava guidelinesArticle 136 ConstitutionArticle 142 ConstitutionSpecific performance of agreement to sell

Judgment

[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1928 : 2025 INSC 917

S.N. Vijaylakshmi & Ors.
A1: S.N. Vijaylakshmi
A2: V.S. Sridevi
A3: V.S. Srilekha
A4: K.V. Krishnaprasad
v.
State of Karnataka & Anr.
R1: State of Karnataka
R2: Keerthiraj Shetty
(Criminal Appeal No. 3302 of 2025)
31 July 2025
[Sudhanshu Dhulia and
Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether any criminal offence in the background of the factual
position is made out to justify criminal proceedings against the
appellants and whether the same should proceed; whether on the
same cause of action, based on the facts, both civil and criminal
proceedings can simultaneously go on.

Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing – Civil
suit filed by the complainant against the appellants seeking
specific performance of the Agreement to Sell; soon thereafter
an FIR was also filed inter alia u/ss.405, 406, 415, 417, 418,
420, IPC – Appellants filed petition seeking quashing of the
FIR, dismissed by High Court – Propriety:
Held: The same person cannot be simultaneously charged
for offences punishable u/s.406 and 420 w.r.t one particular
transaction – Under s.405, criminal breach of trust would arise
only in a situation where the accused in any manner has been
entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property and
dishonestly misappropriates or converts the same to his own use,
or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property – In the present
case, accused were not entrusted with the subject property as
they had title over the subject property – Thus, s.406 cannot be
* Author
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1929

S.N. Vijaylakshmi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

invoked – Further, it is not found that by deceiving the complainant,
the appellants had fraudulently or dishonestly induced him to deliver
the property to them or to any other person or to consent that any
person shall retain any property or intentionally induced the person
so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do
or omit if he were not so deceived – Even the pleadings of the
complainant himself show that possession of the subject property
was never given to the complainant and rather, stipulation was
made for such possession being handed over after execution of
Sale Deed – s.420 is also not attracted – No criminal aspect in
the allegations ex-facie – Moreover, the complainant has filed a
civil suit for reliefs – In the absence of the element of criminality,
continuation of both civil and criminal cases, will be abuse of the
process of Court – FIR and all consequential orders including
the chargesheet and the cognizance order are quashed qua the
appellants as well as co-accused-‘VVS’ (the daughter of appellant
no.1, who is not in appeal). [Paras 34, 37, 39-42, 47, 48]

Abuse of Process of Law – Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 – s.482 – Quashing – Civil proceedings already instituted
with regard to the same issue, element of criminality absent –
Criminal proceedings ought to be quashed:
Held: Stricto sensu, is that there is no bar to simultaneous civil
and criminal proceedings and both can be maintained on the very
same set of allegations qua the same person(s) – If the element
of criminality is there, a civil case can co-exist with a criminal case
on the same facts – The fact that a civil remedy has already been
availed of by a complainant, ipso facto, is not sufficient ground
to quash an FIR – The obvious caveat being that the allegations,
even if having a civil flavour to them, must prima facie disclose
an overwhelming element of criminality – In the absence of the
element of criminality, if both civil and criminal cases are allowed
to continue, it will amount to abuse of the process of the Court
and any such criminal proceeding ought to be stopped, where civil
proceedings have already been instituted with regard to the same
issue, and the element of criminality is absent. [Para 42]

Directions by Supreme Court issued in Priyanka Srivastava
case – Nature and operation:
Held: Directions issued in Priyanka Srivastava case are mandatory –
Guidelines laid therein operate prospectively – Non-filing of the
1930 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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supporting affidavit is a curable defect, but must be cured before
the Magistrate passes any substantive order on the complaint/
application – If the Magistrate proceeds without the requisite affidavit,
such order/any consequential orders/proceedings can be quashed
on the sole ground of non-compliance with Priyanka Srivastava – In
the present case, the impugned judgment does not militate against
the law laid down in Priyanka Srivastava. [Paras 45, 46]

Case Law Cited
Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2015] 4 SCR 108 :
(2015) 6 SCC 287; Onkar Nath Mishra v. State of NCT Delhi [2007]
13 SCR 716 : (2008) 2 SCC 561; Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited v.
State of Uttar Pradesh [2024] 8 SCR 670 : 2024 SCC Online SC
2248; G Sagar Suri v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2000] 1 SCR 417 :
(2000) 2 SCC 636; V P Shrivastava v. Indian Explosives Ltd. [2010]
11 SCR 788 : (2010) 10 SCC 361; Neeharika Infrastructure Private
Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [2021] 4 SCR 1044 : (2021) 19 SCC
401; Siddharth Mukesh Bhandari v. State of Gujarat [2022] 6 SCR
853 : (2022) 10 SCC 525; V D Raveesha v. State of Karnataka,
2024 INSC 1060 : [2024] 10 SCR 2265; P Swaroopa Rani v.
M Hari Narayana [2008] 3 SCR 900 : (2008) 5 SCC 765; Syed
Aksari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admn.) [2009]
3 SCR 1017 : (2009) 5 SCC 528; Paramjeet Batra v. State of
Uttarakhand (2013) 11 SCC 673; Usha Chakraborty v. State of
West Bengal (2023) 15 SCC 135; Babu Venkatesh v. State of
Karnataka (2022) 5 SCC 639; Ramesh Kumar Bung v. State of
Telangana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 264; Kanishk Sinha v. State
of West Bengal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 443; State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 735 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335;
Vesa Holdings Private Limited v. State of Kerala [2015] 4 SCR 27 :
(2015) 8 SCC 293; Gulam Mustafa v. State of Karnataka [2023] 5
SCR 354 : (2023) 18 SCC 265; Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana
[2003] Supp. 1 SCR 710 : (2003) 11 SCC 241; Javed Shaukat Ali
Qureshi v. State of Gujarat [2023] 12 SCR 220 : (2023) 9 SCC
164; M Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple 5J) v. Suresh Das [2019]
18 SCR 1 : (2020) 1 SCC 1; Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India
[Election Commissions Appointments] [2023] 9 SCR 1 : (2023) 6
SCC 161; Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Srinivasan [2023] 5 SCR 165 :
(2023) 14 SCC 23 – referred to.
Sachin Chamoli v. State of Uttarakhand, 2016 (3) NCC 68;
Baidyanath Mishra v. State of Bihar, 2019 SCC OnLine Pat
662 – referred to.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1931

S.N. Vijaylakshmi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Constitution
of India.

List of Keywords
Quashing; Civil and criminal proceedings simultaneously; Civil
proceedings already instituted on same issue; Element of criminality
absent; Same cause of action; Abuse of the process of Court;
Same set of allegations qua the same person; Sections 405, 406,
415 and 420 of the IPC; Criminal proceedings quashed; Civil suit;
Specific performance of the Agreement to Sell; One particular
transaction; Criminal breach of trust; Accused not entrusted with
property; Possession of the subject property not given; Increase in
the market value of the property; No inducement at the inception;
No dishonest intention at the time of making the promise;
Section 420 of the IPC not attracted; No criminal aspect in the
allegations; FIR quashed; Parity; Interest of justice; Directions
issued in Priyanka Srivastava case; Criminal proceedings of a co-
accused not before the Court, quashed; Identical facts; Guidelines
laid down in Priyanka Srivastava; Non-filing of the supporting
affidavit; Curable defect; Article 142 of the Constitution of India;
Judicial propriety; Complete justice; Acquisition by the Bangalore
Development Authority (BDA); Misuse of the law by statutory
authorities; Collusive litigation.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
3302 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.06.2024 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLP No. 12452 of 2023

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Shoeb Alam, Sr. Advs., Anil C Nishani,
Amit Bhandari, P Prasanna Kumar, Meenesh Dubey, Krishna M
Singh, Vishwesh R Murnal, M/s. Krishna & Nishani Law Chambers.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Dushyant Dave, Siddharth Dave, Sr. Advs,. Mahesh Thakur, Mrs.
Geetanjali Bedi, Ranvijay Singh Chandel, Rupraj Banerjee, Ms.
Ayushi Gaur, D. L. Chidananda.
1932 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

Leave granted
2. I.A. Nos.141246/2024 and 215072/2024 are allowed; exemptions
from filing Official Translation(s) are granted. I.A. No.215071 of
2024 is closed.
3. The respondent no. 2/complainant (Keerthiraj Shetty) had filed Private
Complaint Report No.12357/2022 dated 20.07.2022 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘PCR’), under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CrPC’) before the
learned IIIrd Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘ACMM’). The PCR was referred to the
Sanjay Nagar Police Station for investigation under Section 156(3) of
the CrPC vide Order dated 21.07.2023. After the referral order, First
Information Report bearing Crime No.260/2023 (hereinafter referred
to as the ‘FIR’) came to be registered on 05.10.2023 against the four
appellants and the other accused 1 for offences punishable under
Sections 405, 406, 415, 417, 418, 420, 504, 506, 384 and 120B
read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred
to as the ‘IPC’).
4. The present appeal impugns the Final Judgment and Order dated
03.06.2024 in Criminal Petition No.12452 of 2023 (hereinafter referred
to as the ‘Impugned Judgment’) passed by a learned Single Judge of
the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘High Court’), whereby the appellants’ petition seeking quashing
of the FIR was dismissed.

FACTUAL SETTING:
5. The case has a chequered history and it would be necessary to
advert, in some detail, to the relevant factual backdrop amidst which
the FIR came to be lodged, as can be culled out from the Impugned
Judgment and pleadings. The complainant has alleged that the

1 Reference to the accused in this judgment is as per their position in the FIR
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1933

S.N. Vijaylakshmi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

accused no.1-K. V. Jayalakshmamma (in some cases/records, this
is spelt as ‘Jayalakshmamma’ but reference is to the one and same
person) along with K. V. Srinivasa Murthy and K. V. Prabhakar (these
three have passed away – the accused appellants are their family
members) were joint owners of the properties in Sy. No.20 measuring
3 acres 33 guntas and in Sy. No.21 to an extent of 2 acres 32 guntas
in Bhoopasandra Village, Bangalore North Taluk (these properties
are hereinafter collectively referred to as the ‘subject property’). One
D. Muniswamy executed Sale Deed dated 19.10.1967 in respect of the
said land of Sy. No.20 to one Lakshminarasimhaiah, who purchased
the same in trust for K. V. Shrinivas Murthy and K. V. Prabhakar.
Later, K. V. Shrinivas Murthy and K. V. Prabhakar filed a suit viz.
O. S. No.907/1975 for declaration and permanent injunction against
the said Lakshminarasimhaiah. The said suit came to be decreed
on 28.11.1975/19.02.1976. In respect of Sy. No.21 land, occupancy
rights for 3 acres in Bhoopasandra Village was conferred vide Order
dated 22.06.1994 in proceedings being LRF-924, 941 of 1974-1975
by the Land Tribunal. Accordingly, Form No.10 was issued in favour
of K. V. Jayalakshmamma and K. V. Shrinivas Murthy.
6. Meanwhile, the Bangalore Development Authority (hereinafter referred
to as the ‘BDA’) came into the picture. The BDA was set up by an Act
of the Karnataka State Legislature on 06.01.1976. It sought to acquire
the subject property and Preliminary Notification dated 19.01.1978
and Final Notification dated 28.12.1982 was issued. Pursuant to
the acquisition, the lands in the subject property were allotted to
other persons. In 1988, there was a dispute as to the ownership of
the subject property between Syed Bashid and others on one side
and K. V. Jayalakshmamma along with K. V. Srinivasa Murthy and
K. V. Prabhakar on the other side. The subject property was in the
possession of Syed Bashid. Later, the Government de-notified the
subject property by Notification dated 27.08.1992. Since the BDA had
already allotted the sites, the allottees filed Writ Petitions No.37719-
25/1992, 3216-17/1993, 11001/1993, 23205/1993, 32221/1993,
15718/1996 and 2154/1996 challenging the de-notification before
the High Court. During the pendency of these petitions in the High
Court, both parties referred above, entered into a Mutual Agreement
dated 06.09.1996, which was arbitrated by Ravishankara Shetty. The
possession of the subject property was purportedly handed over to
Ravishankara Shetty and, it is claimed, he has been in possession
1934 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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since then. Thereafter, the writ petitions filed by the allottees came
to be allowed and the order of de-notification came to be quashed
by a learned Single Judge of the High Court vide Order dated
23.09.1996. It is around then that the accused sought the help of
Ravishankara Shetty to fight the litigations on the pretext that once
the title becomes marketable, they would sell the subject property
to him. The order of the learned Single Judge dated 23.09.1996 in
the writ petitions adverted to above was sought to be reviewed by
filing Writ Petitions No.9517/1999 and 10875-92/1999 which were
dismissed by another learned Single Judge on 03.12.2001. The Order
dated 03.12.2001 was subjected to an intra-Court challenge in Writ
Appeals No.679/2002 and 3479-96/2002 connected with 680/2002
and 3497-3514/2002, which were dismissed by a learned Division
Bench on 26.03.2004. Civil Appeal No.6220/2009, with analogous
cases, filed before this Court, emanating from the Writ Appeals, were
finally dismissed on 18.11.2015. It is the complainant’s case that
based on the false assurances by the accused, Ravishankara Shetty
spent a lot of time, money and energy fighting the litigation(s) and
on his insistence, and after much reluctance, the accused agreed to
enter into an Agreement to Sell (hereinafter referred to as the ‘ATS’).
Ravishankara Shetty permitted his nominee (the complainant) to
enter into the ATS on his behalf.
7. Accordingly, on 30.11.2015, the accused executed an ATS with the
complainant for a sale consideration of Rs.3,50,00,000/- (Rupees
Three Crores Fifty Lakhs) in respect of the subject property. All the
accused signed the ATS and K. V. Krishna Prasad (appellant no.4)
signed as a consenting witness. On even date, the accused also
executed a General Power of Attorney (hereinafter referred to as
‘GPA’) in favour of the complainant, which included the power to sell
the subject property. Further, it is alleged that appellant no.4 requested
the complainant not to include a time-stipulation clause in the ATS
as they were not aware when they would get the alienable title to
the subject property. A sum of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs)
was paid to the appellant no.4 with the consent of the other accused.
8. Writ Petitions No.53124-53126/2015 were filed by K. V.
Jayalakshmamma, seeking to declare the land acquisition as
lapsed in respect of the subject property as the BDA had failed to
implement the concerned scheme. The said writ petitions came
to be allowed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court vide
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1935

S.N. Vijaylakshmi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

Order dated 05.02.2016. The subsequent appeals bearing Writ
Appeals No.547-548 and 1483/2016 filed by BDA were dismissed
as withdrawn vide Order dated 07.06.2016. The allottees of the
sites had also filed Writ Appeals No.550-551/2016 and 611/2016,
which were disposed of by Order dated 05.12.2016, with liberty
to initiate independent proceedings before the BDA. Thereafter, a
Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter referred to as ‘MoU’)
dated 10.12.2016 was entered into between one M/s Legacy
Global Realty i.e., developers with the family of the accused i.e.,
the appellants and a sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees Two Crores)
was paid into the account of K.V. Prabhakar, who in turn remitted
a sum of Rs.1,00,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore) into the account of
appellant no.4 for himself and the rest of the accused, who are his
family members.
9. On 22.04.2020, the Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore City issued a
conversion order in respect of the subject property. After the title of
the subject property became marketable, the complainant went to
the accused for making further payment, but the accused refused
to honour the ATS. On 12.05.2022, the complainant approached
appellant no.4, who extended death threats to him. Aggrieved, the
complainant lodged a complaint by approaching the jurisdictional
Sanjay Nagar police, who issued an acknowledgment but refused
to register an FIR. On 06.06.2022, the complainant learnt that the
accused had revoked the GPA executed by them in his favour. The
complainant issued Legal Notice dated 14.06.2022 to execute the
Sale Deed and calling upon the accused to receive the balance sale
consideration of Rs.1,48,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore Forty-Eight
Lakhs). The appellants no.1-3 along with accused no.3 executed a
registered Release Deed dated 27.06.2022 in favour of accused no.1
with regard to the subject property. On the same day, accused no.1
executed a GPA in favour of the appellant no.4. Subsequently, vide
a registered Gift Deed dated 12.07.2022, accused no.1 conveyed
the subject property in favour of appellant no.4. Pursuant to this, the
complainant filed PCR No.12357/2022 on 20.07.2022 with the ACMM,
setting up the case that he had invested a huge sum of money, but
the accused with a clear intention had cheated him.
10. On 22.07.2022, the complainant filed O.S. No.4780/2022 against the
appellants before the learned Principal City Civil Judge at Bengaluru
City (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Civil Court’) seeking to declare
1936 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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the Release Deed and GPA dated 27.06.2022 as not binding and
for directing the defendants therein to perform their part of the ATS.
This suit is still pending adjudication. Meanwhile, on 19.12.2022,
the complainant approached the Deputy Commissioner of Police by
filing a complaint under Section 154(3) of the CrPC. Subsequently,
on 21.07.2023, the ACMM referred the complaint to the Sanjay
Nagar Police Station, which registered the FIR. Aggrieved by the
registration of the FIR, the appellants who are accused nos.2, 4, 5,
and 6 in the complaint, approached the High Court by filing Criminal
Petition No.12452/2023 under Section 482 of the CrPC praying to
quash the FIR, which has been rejected by way of the Impugned
Judgment.

APPELLANTS’ SUBMISSIONS:
11. At the outset, learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted
that this Court in Priyanka Srivastava v State of Uttar Pradesh,
(2015) 6 SCC 287 mandated following of a certain procedure before
invoking the provisions of Section 200 of the CrPC However, in the
present matter, the complainant did not comply with the requirements
as provided under Section 154(1) and Section 154(3) of the CrPC,
and the Impugned Judgment erred in observing that the said was
a curable defect.
12. On merits, it was submitted that the essential ingredients of Sections
415 and 420 of the IPC are conspicuously absent in the FIR. There is
no mention of any inducement by the appellants of the complainant
from the inception nor of any dishonest intention at the time of making
of the promise in question. Reliance was placed on Onkar Nath
Mishra v State of NCT Delhi, (2008) 2 SCC 561 to argue that the
essential ingredients of Section 406 of the IPC pertaining to criminal
breach of trust i.e., entrustment, misappropriation, conversion etc.
are completely missing from the FIR. Thus, the sine qua non for
maintaining an FIR under the said provisions of the IPC is missing
and the FIR ought to be quashed on this count alone.
13. In contrast, it was pointed out, it is alleged in the FIR by the
complainant himself that ‘after the increase in the market value of
the said property, the accused started cheating the complainant.’
Thus, the complainant’s own statement militates against any claim
of inducement at the inception or harbouring of a dishonest intention
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1937

S.N. Vijaylakshmi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

at the time of making the promise. This statement by itself, it was
urged, is fatal to any FIR alleging cheating.
14. Learned senior counsel relied on the decision in Delhi Race Club
(1940) Limited v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 SCC Online SC 2248
and argued that it is now settled law that an FIR cannot be maintained
under both Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC as the ingredients of
both Sections are mutually exclusive and cannot co-exist.
15. Reference was made to the decision in G Sagar Suri v State of Uttar
Pradesh, (2000) 2 SCC 636 to contend that the dispute inter-se the
parties is purely of a civil nature, which is maliciously being given a
colour of criminality and the averments in the FIR do not constitute
any offence whatsoever. Further, the averments are substantially the
very basis for the reliefs claimed in the pending civil suit.
16. It was pointed out by the learned senior counsel that in terms
of the ATS, the complainant was required to resolve problems/
litigations concerning the title of the subject property, ensuring it
became saleable within three months of the resolution of litigation.
Clearances were obtained in the year 2016 following the filing of
writ petitions related to the acquisition of the subject property by the
BDA. However, no further action occurred nor were any steps taken
for several years thereafter.
17. Therefore, in 2022, the appellants were constrained to take protective
steps like relinquishing the property to their mother-in-law etc., only
after issuing prior Legal Notice to the complainant dated 06.06.2022
and a Public Notice as well. The Power of Attorney executed in the
complainant’s favour was cancelled only after duly intimating him.
18. It was submitted that the High Court primarily focused on the law
relating to registration of FIRs and private complaints, with no
discussion on whether the ingredients of the alleged offences were
made out and there was absolutely no inquiry on the absence of
essential ingredients of the Sections invoked in the FIR.
19. It was further submitted that a sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees Two
Crores) was paid to one K. V. Prabhakar, who has since passed away,
through a separate MoU executed by a different entity, namely, M/s
Legacy Global Realty. Consequently, funds were never received by
the appellants. The MoU was only restricted to the development of
the subject property.
1938 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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20. Learned senior counsel contended that the statements recorded in
favour of the complainant is of Mrs. Achalavidya, daughter of Late
K. V. Prabhakar, with whom the complainant had entered into a
compromise in the civil suit filed by them. The said compromise has
been rejected by the Civil Court. These two facts establish that the
statement of P. Nagalakshmi (Defendant No.6) and Mrs. Achalavidya
(Defendant No.7) cannot be given any credence since they are not
independent, and are evidently siding with the complainant against
the appellants.
21. Learned senior counsel relied on V P Shrivastava v Indian
Explosives Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 361 to argue that it is settled law
that subsequent failure to not honour a promise cannot form basis of
initiating criminal actions alleging cheating or criminal breach of trust.
On the basis of these submissions, learned counsel submitted that
the High Court has erred in not quashing the FIR. It was advanced
that the appeal be allowed and the FIR be quashed by this Court.

RESPONDENT NO.2-COMPLAINANT’S SUBMISSIONS:
22. At the outset, learned senior counsel for the respondent no.2-
complainant submitted that it is well-settled that at the stage of an
FIR, the Court does not interfere if the complaint on the face of it
discloses the commission of offences, as alleged. At this stage, only
the complaint has to be looked into and nothing else. The High Court
has, therefore, rightly declined to interfere and this Court, under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘Constitution’), ought not interfere now. Reliance was placed
on the decisions of this Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Private
Ltd. v State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401 and Siddharth
Mukesh Bhandari v State of Gujarat, (2022) 10 SCC 525.
23. It was submitted that during the pendency of the complaint with the
ACMM, in order to comply with the requirement of law laid down in
Priyanka Srivastava (supra), the complainant also filed a complaint
before the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bengaluru on 19.12.2022.
The complainant filed an affidavit before the ACMM on 12.01.2023.
After compliance of the mandate of law, the ACMM, acting under
Section 156(3) of the CrPC, referred the case to the jurisdictional
police to register FIR, conduct investigation and submit report. It was
reiterated that the affidavit as per Priyanka Srivastava (supra) was
filed before the referral order by the ACMM was passed.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1939

S.N. Vijaylakshmi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

24. It was submitted that the ATS was arrived at between the parties
on account of the fact that the vendors had realised that they had
lost their land in the acquisition proceedings. The consideration for
sale was fixed at Rs.3,50,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crores and Fifty
Lakhs), out of which Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) in cash was
paid immediately and the balance sale consideration was payable
on the execution and registration of the deed of conveyance. Along
with the ATS, the accused/vendors executed GPA dated 30.11.2015
acknowledging the execution of the ATS and conferring upon the
complainant all powers, including the power to sell the subject
property. All these facts are evident from the provisions of the ATS.
25. It was submitted that it is an admitted position that the complainant
took diverse steps over a long period of time to make the land saleable.
Learned senior counsel took us through the steps so taken in this
regard and submitted that the title of the subject property is still not
clear as Writ Petitions No.16093/2021 [Smt K V Jayalakshamma
and Anr. v The Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike and Ors.]
and 16179/2020 [Smt K V Jayalakshamma and Anr. v The Bruhat
Bangalore Mahanagara Palike and Ors.] are still pending before
the High Court, on account of resistance by the Bruhat Bengaluru
Mahanagara Palike (hereinafter referred to as the ‘BBMP’) to Katha
registration. It was further submitted that time was clearly not the
essence of the ATS and therefore the stage has yet not been reached
to execute the Sale Deed.
26. The appellants, being clearly aware of this position, decided to defraud
and cheat the Complainant by first cancelling the GPA followed by
execution of release deed dated 27.06.2022 by Accused Nos.2 to 5
in favour of Accused No.1, coupled with execution of GPA in favour of
Accused No.6-K. V. Krishna Prasad by Accused No.1 on 27.06.2022
and execution of Gift deeds on 12.07.2022 in favour of Mr. K. V.
Krishnaprasad by Jayalakshmamma. All these actions have been
taken with a view to cheat the complainant of his valuable right to
the property in question and misappropriate the said property which
was categorically promised to be sold to the complainant.
27. It was submitted that all these facts need to be investigated by the
police and therefore the ACMM has rightly passed the order for
investigation which was completed and subsequently Chargesheet
dated 28.08.2024 has been filed and cognizance taken on 30.08.2024.
1940 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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28. Moreover, it was contended that the accused first received Rs.
2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) and subsequently received
Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees Two Crores) through the complainant’s
efforts from M/s Legacy Global Realty. This fact has been corroborated
by the manager Shri Sanjay C. of M/s Legacy Global Realty, the
statement of Smt. P. Nagalakshmi w/o Mr. K. V. Prabhakar and the
statement of Achalavidya D/o of Mr. K. V. Prabhakar.
29. On the basis of the above, it was submitted that this is not a fit case
for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution, as the appellants
neither have a case on merits nor does the law support them. Prayer
was made to dismiss the appeal. It was thereafter submitted that in
case this Court was inclined to allow the appeal, in the interest of
justice and equity, it would be necessary to prevent the appellants
from creating third-party rights with respect to the subject property.
Hence, alternative prayer was made to direct the appellants not to
create third-party rights in respect of the subject property.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT-STATE:
30. Learned counsel for the State of Karnataka submitted that offences
under Sections 406, 420, 120B, 34 of the IPC are made out against
the appellants based on the evidence collected during investigation.
In this regard, attention was drawn to the fact that the Chargesheet
was filed on 28.08.2024 before the ACMM and cognizance thereupon
has been taken on 30.08.2024.
31. It was found during investigation that the appellants had dishonest
intention from the inception and that they never intended to honour
the agreement. In this regard, R. M. Chandran, a witness to the ATS
and GPA dated 30.11.2015, has stated that the accused had no
intention of honouring the agreement and that the accused induced
Ravishankara Shetty and the complainant to enter into the ATS only
with the intention of taking their help to clear the pending litigation.
Further, Nagalakshmi and Achalavidya, wife and daughter of Late
Mr. K. V. Prabhakar, respectively who was one of the executants of
the ATS and the GPA, have given a statement about the execution
of the ATS and the GPA on 30.11.2015 and receipt of sum of
Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees Two Crores) and Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees
Two Lakhs). Hence, the execution of the ATS and GPA dated
30.11.2015 is clearly established by the said statements.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1941

S.N. Vijaylakshmi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

32. It was submitted that investigation revealed that the complainant has
been fraudulently and dishonestly induced to enter in to the ATS and
has been deceived. It was urged that there is sufficient material on
record to proceed against all the appellants. In these circumstances,
prayer was made to dismiss the appeal.

ANALYSIS, REASONING & CONCLUSION:
33. Having heard learned senior counsel for the parties and after going
through the material on record, the issue that emerges is as to
whether the criminal case against the appellants should proceed.
This has to be examined from two angles. Firstly, as to whether any
criminal offence in the background of the factual position is made
out to justify criminal proceedings against the appellants? Secondly,
whether on the same cause of action, based on the afore-noted
facts, both civil and criminal proceedings can simultaneously go on?
34. On the first question, the admitted position is that the appellants have
title over the subject property. They are said to have entered into
an ATS with the complainant, who was himself the nominee of one
Ravishankara Shetty. The ATS stipulated that the complainant’s side
would help to get the legal issues which had cropped up with regard
to the ownership of the subject property resolved in favour of the
appellants and upon the same being done, the appellants agreed to
sell the subject property to the complainant for a total consideration
of Rs.3,50,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crores Fifty Lakhs). The ATS
was entered on 30.11.2015. Pursuant thereto, the appellants also
executed a GPA in favour of the complainant on the same day, which
authorised him to take all necessary steps for getting the title of the
appellants clear and marketable and also for selling the property
on their behalf. Writ Petitions No.53124-53126/2015 were filed by
Jayalakshmamma, through the GPA-holder, seeking to declare
the land acquisition as lapsed in respect of the subject property,
contending that the BDA failed to implement the concerned scheme.
These writ petitions were allowed in the favour of the appellants by
the learned Single Judge on 05.02.2016. Though, the same was
challenged by BDA, the writ appeal(s) was later on withdrawn. The
appeals filed by the allottees were also disposed of with liberty to
initiate proceedings before the BDA. After all this, the appellants
are said to have taken Rs.2,02,00,000/- (Rupees Two Crores Two
Lakhs) from one M/s Legacy Global Realty for transferring the subject
1942 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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property. Thereafter, the accused revoked the GPA executed in
favour of the complainant and executed another GPA and registered
Gift Deed by which the subject property was conveyed in favour of
appellant no.4. This prompted the complainant to institute a civil suit
to declare the subsequent GPA and Release Deed as not binding
and also seeking specific performance of the ATS, taking the stand
that he proposed to pay the remaining Rs.1,48,00,000 (Rupees One
Crore Forty-Eight Lakhs) which the appellants refused and were
also not ready to transfer the subject property. The complainant,
having filed the civil suit, soon thereafter filed the FIR. Chargesheet
stands submitted and cognizance has been taken. Challenge to the
same having failed before the High Court, the Impugned Judgment
is under challenge before us.
35. In this background, the Court needs to consider as to whether the
accusations of criminal nature levelled in the FIR are sustainable
to permit the continuance of the criminal proceedings or not.
Cognizance has finally been taken under Sections 120B, 406 and
420 of the IPC. For convenience, the said provisions are reproduced
hereinbelow:
‘120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.- (1) Whoever
is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence
punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous
imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall,
where no express provision is made in this Code for the
punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same
manner as if he had abetted such offence.
(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than
a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as
aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term not exceeding six months, or with
fine or with both.
xxx
406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.- Whoever
commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
xxx
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1943

S.N. Vijaylakshmi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of
property.- Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly
induces the person deceived to deliver any property to
any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any
part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or
sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a
valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to seven
years, and shall also be liable to fine.’
36. It would be useful, in addition, to set out the relevant definitional
Sections from the IPC:
‘120-A. Definition of criminal conspiracy.—When two
or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,—
(1) an illegal act, or
(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an
agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to
commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy
unless some act besides the agreement is done by one
or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.
Explanation.—It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the
ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental
to that object.
xxx
405. Criminal breach of trust.—Whoever, being in any
manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over
property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his
own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of
that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing
the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of
any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made
touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any
other person so to do, commits “criminal breach of trust”.
Explanation 1.—A person, being an employer of an
establishment whether exempted under Section 17 of
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the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), or not] who deducts
the employee’s contribution from the wages payable to
the employee for credit to a Provident Fund or Family
Pension Fund established by any law for the time being
in force, shall be deemed to have been entrusted with the
amount of the contribution so deducted by him and if he
makes default in the payment of such contribution to the
said fund in violation of the said law, shall be deemed to
have dishonestly used the amount of the said contribution
in violation of a direction of law as aforesaid.
Explanation 2.—A person, being an employer, who deducts
the employees’ contribution from the wages payable to
the employee for credit to the Employees’ State Insurance
Fund held and administered by the Employees’ State
Insurance Corporation established under the Employees’
State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), shall be deemed
to have been entrusted with the amount of the contribution
so deducted by him and if he makes default in the payment
of such contribution to the said Fund in violation of the
said Act, shall be deemed to have dishonestly used the
amount of the said contribution in violation of a direction
of law as aforesaid.
Illustrations
(a) A, being executor to the will of a deceased person,
dishonestly disobeys the law which directs him to divide
the effects according to the will, and appropriates them
to his own use. A has committed criminal breach of trust.
(b) A is a warehouse-keeper. Z, going on a journey,
entrusts his furniture to A, under a contract that it shall be
returned on payment of a stipulated sum for warehouse
room. A dishonestly sells the goods. A has committed
criminal breach of trust.
(c) A, residing in Calcutta, is agent for Z, residing at Delhi.
There is an express or implied contract between A and Z,
that all sums remitted by Z to A shall be invested by A,
according to Z’s direction. Z remits a lakh of rupees to A,
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1945

S.N. Vijaylakshmi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

with directions to A to invest the same in Company’s
paper. A dishonestly disobeys the directions and employs
the money in his own business. A has committed criminal
breach of trust.
(d) But if A, in the last illustration, not dishonestly but in
good faith, believing that it will be more for Z’s advantage to
hold shares in the Bank of Bengal, disobeys Z’s directions,
and buys shares in the Bank of Bengal, for Z, instead of
buying Company’s paper, here, though Z should suffer loss,
and should be entitled to bring a civil action against A, on
account of that loss, yet A, not having acted dishonestly,
has not committed criminal breach of trust.
(e) A, a revenue officer, is entrusted with public money and
is either directed by law, or bound by a contract, express
or implied, with the Government, to pay into a certain
treasury all the public money which he holds. A dishonestly
appropriates the money. A has committed criminal breach
of trust.
(f) A, a carrier, is entrusted by Z with property to be carried
by land or by water. A dishonestly misappropriates the
property. A has committed criminal breach of trust.
xxx
415. Cheating.—Whoever, by deceiving any person,
fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived
to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any
person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces
the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which
he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and
which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage
or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property,
is said to “cheat”.
Explanation.—A dishonest concealment of facts is a
deception within the meaning of this section.
Illustrations
(a) A, by falsely pretending to be in the Civil Service,
intentionally deceives Z, and thus dishonestly induces Z to
1946 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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let him have on credit goods for which he does not mean
to pay. A cheats.
(b) A, by putting a counterfeit mark on an article, intentionally
deceives Z into a belief that this article was made by a
certain celebrated manufacturer, and thus dishonestly
induces Z to buy and pay for the article. A cheats.
(c) A, by exhibiting to Z a false sample of an article,
intentionally deceives Z into believing that the article
corresponds with the sample, and thereby dishonestly
induces Z to buy and pay for the article. A cheats.
(d) A, by tendering in payment for an article a bill on a house
with which A keeps no money, and by which A expects
that the bill will be dishonoured, intentionally deceives Z,
and thereby dishonestly induces Z to deliver the article,
intending not to pay for it. A cheats.
(e) A, by pledging as diamonds articles which he knows
are not diamonds, intentionally deceives Z, and thereby
dishonestly induces Z to lend money. A cheats.
(f) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means
to repay any money that Z may lend to him and thereby
dishonestly induces Z to lend him money, A not intending
to repay it. A cheats.
(g) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to
deliver to Z a certain quantity of indigo plant which he does
not intend to deliver, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to
advance money upon the faith of such delivery, A cheats;
but if A, at the time of obtaining the money, intends to
deliver the indigo plant, and afterwards breaks his contract
and does not deliver it, he does not cheat, but is liable
only to a civil action for breach of contract.
(h) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A has
performed A’s part of a contract made with Z, which he
has not performed, and thereby dishonestly induces Z to
pay money. A cheats.
(i) A sells and conveys an estate to B. A, knowing that in
consequence of such sale he has no right to the property,
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1947

S.N. Vijaylakshmi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

sells or mortgages the same to Z, without disclosing the
fact of the previous sale and conveyance to B, and receives
the purchase or mortgage money from Z. A cheats.’
37. Purely from a legal lens, it is now settled that the same person cannot
be simultaneously charged for offences punishable under Sections
406 and 420 of the IPC with regard to one particular transaction,
as per the decision rendered in Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited
(supra). In this regard, reference may also be made to a subsequent
decision by us in V D Raveesha v State of Karnataka, 2024
INSC 1060 (penned by Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.), which noticed
the exposition in Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited (supra). In V D
Raveesha (supra), the distinction between Sections 406 and 420
of the IPC was duly taken note of, but charges under Sections 406
and 420 of the IPC against the same person were upheld, not being
part of a single transaction and committed against different persons.
The relevant passage from V D Raveesha (supra) reads thus:
‘21. Though, having regard to the afore-enumerated
position of law, on an overall conspectus of the factual
aspects juxtaposed with the evidence on record, as regards
fulfilment of the ingredients of Sections 406 and 420 of the
IPC, at first sight, it may appear that the petitioner cannot
be convicted both under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC,
but, in the present case, on a proper consideration of the
issue in its entirety, there is a fine distinction inasmuch as,
there are two different persons against whom the petitioner
has committed the respective offences under the Sections
supra: first, the Company and second, Mallikarjuna (PW4
and husband of purchaser Savithramma). Thus, in the
facts and circumstances of the present case, evidently
the petitioner is guilty of offence committed against the
Company punishable under Section 406 of the IPC and
also, of offence committed against Mallikarjuna (PW4 and
husband of purchaser Savithramma) punishable under
Section 420 of the IPC.’
(emphasis supplied)

38. Section 406 deals with punishment for criminal breach of trust, which
itself has been defined under Section 405 of the IPC. Section 420
1948 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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of the IPC deals with cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of
property, the substantive offence of cheating has been defined in
Section 415 of the IPC. We now apply the ingredients to the factual
position.
39. From a bare reading of Section 405 of the IPC, criminal breach of
trust would arise only in a situation where the accused in any manner
has been entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property
and dishonestly misappropriates or converts the same to his own
use, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property. Here, it is not
a case where the accused were entrusted with the subject property.
The subject property belongs to them and they had rights over it as
owners with title. Thus, the very foundation for invoking Section 406
of the IPC falls to the ground.
40. Coming to Section 415 of the IPC, it is required that the person
charged, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly
induces him to deliver any property to any person, or to consent
that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the
person so deceived to do or not to do anything which he would not
do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission
causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body,
mind, reputation or property. In the present case, we do not find
that by deceiving the complainant, the appellants had fraudulently
or dishonestly induced him to deliver the property to them or to
any other person or to consent that any person shall retain any
property or intentionally induced the person so deceived to do or
omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not
so deceived. From the case set up by the complainant himself, as
averred, the ATS was entered into between the appellants and the
complainant on 30.11.2015. However, the subject property is said
to have been handed over to Ravishankara Shetty on 06.09.1996.
Thus, if the same was correct, then there is no explanation as to
why possession of the subject property, being prime land, would
be handed over to any other person without any other agreement
or safeguard, for if the version of the complainant is to be taken as
correct, then it appears that Ravishankara Shetty got possession
of the subject property way back on 06.09.1996, but the ATS with
the complainant, albeit as a nominee of Ravishankara Shetty, was
only executed much later on 30.11.2015. However, on a reading
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1949

S.N. Vijaylakshmi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

of the recitals in the ATS, it is seen that possession was with the
appellants and in fact, Clause 6 of the ATS concerning possession,
it has been postulated that possession of the subject property
would be handed over in ready condition upon execution of the
Sale Deed by the vendors. This version of events, put forth by the
complainant, falsifies the claim of Ravishankara Shetty to have
taken over possession of the subject property on 06.09.1996, for
the simple reason that he himself is a witness cited in the FIR
filed at the instance of the complainant. Thus, when from the own
pleadings of the complainant, it emerges that possession of the
subject property was never given to the complainant and rather,
stipulation was made for such possession being handed over
after execution of Sale Deed, Section 420 of the IPC would not
be attracted, regard being had to the definition in Section 415 of
the IPC.
41. Thus, we do not find any criminal aspect in the allegations ex-facie.
Moreover, be it noted, the complainant has filed a civil suit for reliefs
already enumerated above.
42. Coming to the second question i.e., whether civil and criminal
proceedings both can be maintained on the very same set of
allegations qua the same person(s), the answer stricto sensu, is
that there is no bar to simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings.
If the element of criminality is there, a civil case can co-exist with
a criminal case on the same facts. The fact that a civil remedy has
already been availed of by a complainant, ipso facto, is not sufficient
ground to quash an FIR, as pointed out, inter alia, in P Swaroopa
Rani v M Hari Narayana, (2008) 5 SCC 765 and Syed Aksari Hadi
Ali Augustine Imam v State (Delhi Admn.), (2009) 5 SCC 528.
The obvious caveat being that the allegations, even if having a civil
flavour to them, must prima facie disclose an overwhelming element
of criminality. In the absence of the element of criminality, if both civil
and criminal cases are allowed to continue, it will definitely amount
to abuse of the process of the Court, which the Courts have always
tried to prevent by putting a stop to any such criminal proceeding,
where civil proceedings have already been instituted with regard to the
same issue, and the element of criminality is absent. If such element
is absent, the prosecution in question would have to be quashed. In
this connection, Paramjeet Batra v State of Uttarakhand, (2013)
11 SCC 673 can be referred to:
1950 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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‘12. … Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence
or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein.
Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are
present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A
complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a
criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a
dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak
of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy
is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in
this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash
the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of
the court.’
(emphasis supplied)

43. In Usha Chakraborty v State of West Bengal, (2023) 15 SCC
135, while quashing the FIR therein and further proceedings based
thereon, it was observed ‘…the factual position thus would reveal that
the genesis as also the purpose of criminal proceedings are nothing
but the aforesaid incident and further that the dispute involved is
essentially of civil nature.’
44. A further contention urged by the appellants is that the procedure
laid down in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) has not been followed
by the complainant before filing the PCR. As per the guidelines
prescribed in Priyanka Srivastava (supra), any person aggrieved
by non-registration of an FIR by the police is required to approach
the concerned Superintendent of Police and on his failure to take
action, can move before the Magistrate concerned under Section
200 of the CrPC by filing a private complaint. In this case, the
complainant approached the police on 12.05.2022 which refused to
register an FIR. Thereafter, the complainant approached the ACMM
by filing the PCR on 20.07.2022, and while such private complaint
was pending on the file of the ACMM, the complainant approached
the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bangalore City. On nothing
being done even then, faced with such inaction, the complainant
finally filed the requisite affidavit before the ACMM. Subsequently on
21.07.2023, the ACMM referred the PCR to the police, culminating
into the underlying FIR.
45. The High Court has taken a view that this is a curable defect since
before the referral order on the PCR by the ACMM for registering an
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1951

S.N. Vijaylakshmi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

FIR under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, the required formalities were
done. In our considered opinion, this approach cannot be labelled
erroneous. The requirement under Priyanka Srivastava (supra) is to
safeguard the rights of the citizenry and to put a stop to unjust criminal
action and filing of vexatious applications to settle personal scores.
Thus, such requirement could not be said to be a mere formality. One
of us (Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.) as a Single Judge of the Uttarakhand
High Court, in Sachin Chamoli v State of Uttarakhand, 2016 (3)
NCC 68, where no affidavit had been filed, held that filing of affidavit
was a mandatory requirement as per Priyanka Srivastava (supra).
In Babu Venkatesh v State of Karnataka, (2022) 5 SCC 639, this
Court held that the Magistrate concerned should not have entertained
the complaint/application under Section 156(3) of the CrPC therein,
as it was not supported by an affidavit. In the case at hand, before
the ACMM passed the referral order, the complaint was backed by
an affidavit. In Ramesh Kumar Bung v State of Telangana, 2024
SCC OnLine SC 264, the Court, while stating that the directions in
Priyanka Srivastava (supra) are mandatory, declined to interfere
with the order(s) impugned therein, but noted that the informant
had filed the affidavit belatedly. To complete the discussion on this
aspect of the law, we may also refer to our judgment in Kanishk
Sinha v State of West Bengal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 443 where,
speaking through Sudhanshu Dhulia, J., this Court upheld an order
of the Calcutta High Court, to the effect that the direction in Priyanka
Srivastava (supra) to file the affidavit, was prospective in nature.
Therefore, if after the filing of the complaint/application but before
any order thereon is passed, such requirement is allowed to be
fulfilled/complied with by the complainant, it would not, in our view,
run counter to the law exposited in Priyanka Srivastava (supra).
We sum up our conclusions on this score as follows: (i) Directions
issued in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) are mandatory; (ii) Guidelines
laid down in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) operate prospectively; (iii)
Non-filing of the supporting affidavit is a curable defect, but must be
cured before the Magistrate passes any substantive order on the
complaint/application, and; (iv) If the Magistrate proceeds without the
requisite affidavit, such order/any consequential orders/proceedings
can be quashed on the sole ground of non-compliance with Priyanka
Srivastava (supra).
46. In the above view, the Impugned Judgment does not militate against
the law laid down in Priyanka Srivastava (supra). That said, and as
1952 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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reasoned above, our interference with the Impugned Judgment is
necessitated as the ingredients of offences apropos which cognizance
was taken by the ACMM are not made out. The dicta in State of
Haryana v Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Vesa Holdings
Private Limited v State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293, and; Gulam
Mustafa v State of Karnataka, (2023) 18 SCC 265 also impel this
Court to intervene.
47. Accordingly, for the reasons aforesaid, FIR Crime No.260/2023
along with all consequential orders including the Chargesheet dated
28.08.2024 and the cognizance order dated 30.08.2024 stand
quashed qua the appellants.
48. It is required to be clarified that though co-accused Vidyasree V. S., the
daughter of appellant no.1 is not in appeal, for reasons unbeknownst
to us, yet, as all the accused stand on the same footing and we
have already quashed the proceedings against the appellants, in
the interest of justice, the benefit of the quashing supra will enure to
the benefit of Vidyasree V. S. also. Parity would so demand, in the
facts and circumstances, as also to serve the cause of justice. In
Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana, (2003) 11 SCC 241 and Javed
Shaukat Ali Qureshi v State of Gujarat, (2023) 9 SCC 164, this
Court exercised suo motu powers to deliver justice to affected parties
not before it. In like circumstances, albeit in jurisdiction under Section
482 of the CrPC, one of us (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.), as a Single
Judge of the Patna High Court, quashed criminal proceedings of a
co-accused not before the Court as the facts of the case against that
accused and the one before the Court were identical, in Baidyanath
Mishra v State of Bihar, 2019 SCC OnLine Pat 662.
49. The appeal is allowed. Costs made easy.
50. Though the Court has allowed the present appeal but the judicial
conscience of the Court is ill at ease, inasmuch as from the entire
story emerging, it appears that the interest of the common citizens,
especially of Bengaluru, has been compromised due to various
extraneous considerations, including by acts of omission and
commission by statutory bodies.
51. The subject property is said to have been acquired by issuing the
Notification by the BDA, which process was initiated in the year 1978
and culminated in issuance of the final Notification in the year 1982.
After that, there is no allegation from any quarter that no compensation
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1953

S.N. Vijaylakshmi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

was paid for the land acquired and thus, it is deemed that the same
was paid over to and received by the appellants/their predecessors-
in-interest. This presumption is also fortified by the fact that the
acquisition in the year 1978/1982 was, for the first time, challenged
by and/or on behalf of the appellants only in the year 2015 before the
High Court, that is after a gap of about 33 years. In the meantime,
certain developments took place, which are required to be taken note
of. BDA, after acquisition, had allotted the lands (out of the subject
property) in favour of various persons. However, it appears that in
the year 1992 i.e., after 10 years of the acquisition proceedings
having been completed, the BDA de-notified the acquisition, which
was challenged by the concerned beneficiaries/allottees before the
High Court, to whom lands from the subject property were allotted.
The challenge was allowed by a learned Single Judge and the de-
notification by the BDA was quashed. The matter travelled up to this
Court, which dismissed the appeal on 18.11.2015 and the order of the
learned Single Judge was upheld. Thus, the matter attained finality.
52. It is vital to record that all this happened prior to the appellants/their
representatives moving the High Court for declaring acquisition of the
subject property as lapsed. Thus, the presumption operative would be
that all legal formalities required, had been considered in the earlier
round of litigation, and reached conclusion. The writ petition(s) filed
by the appellants was allowed and the acquisition was declared as
lapsed in respect of the subject property. This is where things take
an interesting turn. The BDA surprisingly (nay, shockingly) having
filed intra-court appeal(s) against the order, withdrew the same later.
Though many issues were argued before us, but for the present,
we refrain from delving into the same and restrict ourselves only to
the admitted position.
53. It is further noted that in the writ proceedings before the learned Single
Judge, a purchaser of a site in Sy. No.20 (part of the subject property)
from an allottee had filed an application for intervention/impleadment
and prayed for time to bring on record relevant facts, but the High
Court did not afford any such opportunity. This was the first phase
where, in our view, a miscarriage of justice occurred. Thereafter, the
action of the BDA in not pursuing the appeal(s) filed by itself, is the
second phase where the course of justice was thwarted. The fact that
the subject property had been utilised by the BDA is prima facie clear
for the reason that beneficiaries/allottees of the lands of the subject
1954 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

property had sought impleadment, which would lend credence that
the scheme was implemented, or at the very least, a significant chunk
thereof, as the case may be, had been implemented.
54. Common citizens who were the beneficiaries of the acquisition by
the BDA have been denied the benefits thereof, and we have no
hesitation in saying so, what could only be termed as collusive
litigation between the BDA and the appellants. The obvious reasons
are writ large on the facts and circumstances of the case. This Court
cannot, and would not, turn a blind eye to such blatant misuse of
the law and acts of omissions/commissions, especially by statutory
authorities. As such, we do not propose to leave the matter as is.
55. Thus, we were of the perspective that this is a fit case where the
Court should exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution,
for doing complete justice, which reads as under:
‘142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme
Court and orders as to discovery, etc.—(1) The Supreme
Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such
decree or make such order as is necessary for doing
complete justice in any cause or matter pending before
it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall
be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such
manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made
by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made,
in such manner as the President may by order prescribe.
(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf
by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects
the whole of the territory of India, have all and every
power to make any order for the purpose of securing the
attendance of any person, the discovery or production of
any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any
contempt of itself.’
(emphasis supplied)

56. Exercise of such power has been examined in, amongst others, M
Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple 5J) v Suresh Das, (2020) 1
SCC 1; Anoop Baranwal v Union of India [Election Commissions
Appointments], (2023) 6 SCC 161, and; Shilpa Sailesh v Varun
Srinivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 1955

S.N. Vijaylakshmi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

57. However, since what the Court decides eventually would obviously
result in drastic consequences for the parties concerned, including
those not before us, we were proposing to (i) take suo motu
cognizance, and (ii) direct the Registry to institute a petition under
Article 32 of the Constitution assailing the Orders passed by the
learned Single Judge dated 05.02.2016 [2016:KHC:4079] in Writ
Petitions No.53124-53126/2015 as well as of the learned Division
Bench dated 07.06.2016 [2016:KHC:14898-DB] in W.A. Nos.547-
548/2016 and 1483/2016 (withdrawn by BDA) and dated 05.12.2016
[2016:KHC:32666-DB] in W.A. Nos.550-551/2016 and 611/2016
(proposed impleaders’ appeals disposed of by a short order). On
09.01.2025, the BDA woke up from slumber and filed I.A.s 01/2025
(condonation of delay in filing recall application) and 02/2025 (to
recall the Order dated 07.06.2016 of the Division Bench) in the
High Court. These I.A.s were dismissed on 03.02.2025 by a Division
Bench holding that no acceptable reason was available to condone
the delay of 2392 days in filing the recall application.
58. At this stage, we take note of the fact that BDA has filed SLP (C)
Nos.10134-10135/2025 against the Order dated 03.02.2025, wherein
a Coordinate Bench has issued notice on 02.05.2025. That being
the position, though a deeper scrutiny into the saga, as has unfolded
above, is warranted; however, to maintain judicial propriety, in our
considered opinion, the present issue should be left to be gone into
in the above-mentioned case filed by the BDA before this Court.
59. Accordingly, the Registry is directed to place a copy of this Judgment
on the record of SLP (C) Nos.10134-10135/2025.
60. Further, for securing the ends of justice, till such time, the Court takes
a view on the matter in SLP (C) Nos.10134-10135/2025, no third-
party rights will be created or given effect to in the subject property
by the appellants. The civil suit filed by the complainant can also
proceed in the interregnum, subject to orders as may be passed in
SLP (C) Nos.10134-10135/2025.

Result of the case: Appeals allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey