Supreme Court of India
SATISH CHANDER SHARMA & ORS.versusSTATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 491
- Decided
- 15 April 2025
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- SURYA KANT
Holding
A Supreme Court judgment rendered under Article 136 is not amenable to challenge by a writ under Article 32, and the decision in State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood upholding the 02‑12‑2004 cut‑off date is binding and not per incuriam.
Summary
The petitioners, retired officers of the Himachal Pradesh State Forest Development Corporation, challenged the denial of pension benefits under the 1999 corporate sector pension scheme, arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood, which upheld a cut‑off date of 02‑12‑2004, was per incuriam and should be collaterally attacked under Article 32. The Court examined whether the Sood judgment ignored binding precedents, whether it was binding on the petitioners, and whether a writ under Article 32 could be used to reopen a Supreme Court judgment rendered under Article 136. It held that the Sood decision was not per incuriam, correctly applied the State’s authority to set a cut‑off date based on financial viability, and affirmed that Supreme Court judgments are not amenable to direct or collateral challenge via Article 32 writs. Consequently, the petition was dismissed without costs, emphasizing the principle of finality of adjudication.
Issues considered
- Whether the decision in State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood is per incuriam
- Whether the Sood decision is binding on the petitioners
- Whether a writ petition under Article 32 can directly or collaterally challenge a Supreme Court judgment passed under Article 136
- Whether the cut‑off date of 02‑12‑2004 for pension benefits is arbitrary or violative of Article 14
- Whether the principle of per incuriam applies to the Sood judgment
Legislation cited
Subjects
Writ PetitionArticle 32 of the Constitution of IndiaJudgment of Supreme Court not amenable to judicial reviewDirect or collateral challenge to Supreme Court judgmentRajesh Chander Sood caseNot per incuriamBinding precedentsFinality of lisPrinciple of finality of adjudication processReview PetitionCurative PetitionHimachal Pradesh State Forest Development Corporation LimitedHimachal Pradesh Corporate Sector Employees (Pension, Family Pension, Commutation of Pension and Gratuity) Scheme, 1999Denial of Pensionary BenefitsAdministration of justiceFinality of an order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 217 : 2025 INSC 491
Satish Chander Sharma & Ors.
v.
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 179 of 2018)
16 April 2025
[Surya Kant, Dipankar Datta and Ujjal Bhuyan,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as to whether the decision in State of H.P. v. Rajesh
Chander Sood, upholding the cut-off date of 02.12.2004, is
per incuriam; whether the aforesaid decision is binding on the
petitioners; whether a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution
is maintainable to directly or collaterally challenge a judgment of
the Supreme Court.
Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Article 32 – Judgment/Order of Supreme
Court passed u/Article 136, not amenable to judicial review
u/Article 32 – In a matter, High Court allowed the writ petitions
filed by another group of petitioners directing the State to
provide pension to the retired employees of the Himachal
Pradesh State Forest Development Corporation Limited
(Corporation) in terms of the Himachal Pradesh Corporate
Sector Employees (Pension, Family Pension, Commutation
of Pension and Gratuity) Scheme, 1999 – Said decision was
reversed by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in State of H.P. v.
Rajesh Chander Sood – Present petition u/Article 32 filed by the
petitioners, retired officers of the Corporation challenging the
decision in Rajesh Chander Sood as per incuriam, aggrieved
by denial of pensionary benefits to them in terms of the 1999
Scheme discontinued vide the notification dated 02.12.2004,
which carved out an exception for those who had opted for
the scheme and had superannuated prior to 02.12.2004:
Held: In Rajesh Chander Sood, this Court held that the State
Government was justified in postulating a cut-off date by which
some of the employees governed by the 1999 Scheme (those who
had retired prior to 02.12.2004 were entitled to draw pension under
the 1999 Scheme whereas those who had not retired by the time
* Author
218 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the repeal notification was issued on 02.12.2004 were denied such
benefit) – It was held that the State Government had the competence
to repeal the 1999 Scheme and by doing so, it did not curtail the
right of the employees to receive pension rather they would continue
to receive pension under the erstwhile pension scheme however,
would not get the additional benefits under the 1999 Scheme – This
Court had given elaborate reasons while allowing the civil appeal and
upholding the cut-off date of 02.12.2004 – Rajesh Chander Sood did
not ignore any binding precedent and is not per incuriam – When
this Court had set aside the judgment of the High Court, the claim of
not only those petitioners but similarly situated employees (like the
present petitioners) were also negatived – Rajesh Chander Sood is
thus, binding on the petitioners – Furthermore, Judgment and order
of this Court passed u/Article 136 of the Constitution of India is not
amenable to judicial review u/Article 32 of the Constitution – Thus,
there cannot be any challenge either directly or collaterally to the
decision of this Court in Rajesh Chander Sood in a proceeding u/
Article 32 – Present writ petition is misconceived. [Paras 21.5, 22,
23, 28, 32]
Administration of justice – Adjudication process – Principle
of finality – Finality of lis, core facet of judicial system –
Emphasized:
Held: Litigation which had concluded or had reached finality
cannot be reopened – A litigant who is aggrieved by a decision
rendered by Supreme Court in a special leave petition or in a civil
appeal arising therefrom can seek its review by invoking the review
jurisdiction and thereafter through a curative petition – But such
a decision cannot be assailed in a writ proceeding u/Article 32 of
the Constitution of India – If this is permitted, then there will be no
finality and no end to litigation creating chaos in the administration
of justice – Constitution of India – Article 32. [Para 30]
Case Law Cited
State of H.P. v. Rajesh Chander Sood [2016] 6 SCR 851 : (2016)
10 SCC 77 – held not per incuriam.
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra [1966] 3 SCR
744 : AIR 1967 SC 1 – followed.
Sub-Inspector Sadhan Kumar Goswami v. Union of India [1996]
Supp. 7 SCR 814 : (1997) 2 SCC 225; Indian Council for
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 219
Satish Chander Sharma & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India [2011] 9 SCR 146 : (2011) 8
SCC 161; Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Registrar General, Supreme
Court of India [1995] Supp. 6 SCR 190 : (1996) 3 SCC 114 –
relied on.
R.R. Verma v. Union of India [1980] 3 SCR 478 : (1980) 3 SCC
402; BALCO Employees’ Union v. Union of India [2001] Supp.
5 SCR 511 : (2002) 2 SCC 333; D.S. Nakara v. Union of India
[1983] 2 SCR 165 : (1983) 1 SCC 305; Rupa Ashok Hurra v.
Ashok Hurra [2002] 2 SCR 1006 : (2002) 4 SCC 388; A.R.
Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [1988] Supp. 1 SCR 1 : (1988) 2 SCC
602; Omprakash Verma v. State of Andhra Pradesh [2010] 15
SCR 302 : (2010) 13 SCC 158; Green View Tea & Industries
v. Collector (2002) 1 SCC 109; Indian Council for Enviro-Legal
Action v. Union of India (2011) 8 SCC 161 – referred to.
P.D. Nanda v. State of H.P., 2013 SCC Online HP 5151 –
referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Himachal Pradesh Corporate Sector
Employees (Pension, Family Pension, Commutation of Pension and
Gratuity) Scheme, 1999; Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules,
1972; Central Civil Services (Commutation of Pension) Rules, 1981.
List of Keywords
Writ Petition; Article 32 of the Constitution of India; Judgment of
Supreme Court not amenable to judicial review under Article 32;
Direct or collateral challenge to the judgment of the Supreme
Court; Rajesh Chander Sood case; Not per incuriam; Binding
precedents; Finality of lis; Principle of finality of an adjudication
process; Review Petition; Curative Petition; Himachal Pradesh
State Forest Development Corporation Limited; Himachal
Pradesh Corporate Sector Employees (Pension, Family Pension,
Commutation of Pension and Gratuity) Scheme, 1999; Denial of
Pensionary Benefits; Administration of justice; Finality of an order
of the Supreme Court.
Case Arising From
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No.
179 of 2018
(Under Article 32 of The Constitution of India)
220 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioners:
Gopal Sankarnarayan, Sr. Adv., Anand Varma, Ms. Adyasha Nanda,
Ms. Aditi Gupta.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Devadatt Kamat, Sr. Adv., Anubhav Sharma, Gaurav Prakash
Pathak, Nishant Kumar, Rajesh Inamdar, Ajay Desai, Revanta
Solanki, Abhyudaya Bajpai, Gopal Prasad, Ms. Shalya Agarwal.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Ujjal Bhuyan, J.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. This is a petition filed by three petitioners under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India. Petitioners are retired officers of Himachal
Pradesh State Forest Development Corporation Limited (briefly ‘the
Corporation’ hereinafter). They are aggrieved by denial of pensionary
benefits to them in terms of the Himachal Pradesh Corporate Sector
Employees (Pension, Family Pension, Commutation of Pension and
Gratuity) Scheme, 1999 discontinued vide the notification dated
02.12.2004, which though carved out an exception for those who had
opted for the scheme and had superannuated prior to 02.12.2004.
Hence, they seek a direction to the respondents for payment of
pension to them upon their superannuation in terms of the said
scheme at par with similarly situated employees who had retired
prior to 02.12.2004, by counting their pensionable service from the
date of joining till the date of their superannuation.
3. This issue was earlier raised by a group of petitioners before the
Himachal Pradesh High Court (‘High Court’ hereinafter) by filing
writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the lead
case being P.D. Nanda Vs. State of H.P.,1 CWP No. 4425 of 2009.
The High Court had allowed the writ petitions vide the judgment and
order dated 19.12.2013 by directing the State to provide pension to
1 2013 SCC Online HP 5151
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 221
Satish Chander Sharma & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
the retired employees of the Corporation in terms of the aforesaid
scheme. This decision was reversed by a two-Judge Bench of this
Court in State of H.P. Vs. Rajesh Chander Sood.2
4. Thereafter, the present writ petition came to be filed before this
Court seeking the same relief. Various contentions have been raised
including the one that the decision in Rajesh Chander Sood (supra)
has ignored several binding precedents of this Court and is, therefore,
a decision rendered per incuriam.
5. This Court issued notice vide the order dated 20.03.2018. In the
said order, a two-Judge Bench of this Court, after observing that
since correctness of this Court’s judgment in Rajesh Chander Sood
(supra) has been questioned, requested the learned Chief Justice to
place the matter before a three-Judge Bench. This is how the matter
has been placed before the present Bench and heard accordingly.
6. Though learned senior counsel for the respondent-State has raised a
preliminary objection as to maintainability of the present writ petition,
we are of the view that such an objection may be considered while
considering the stand of the respondents.
7. At the outset, it would be apposite to advert to the relevant facts.
8. The Corporation was incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956
pursuant to a notification dated 26.03.1974 issued by the Government
of Himachal Pradesh. It is completely owned and controlled by the
State Government inasmuch as 100% of the share capital of the
Corporation is owned by the State of Himachal Pradesh.
9. Petitioner No. 1 was appointed as a Clerk in the Corporation
on 29.10.1975. On 27.03.1981, he was promoted to the post of
Junior Assistant. He was further promoted to the post of Senior
Assistant(Senior Accountant) on 07.11.1984. He was promoted to
the post of Office Manager(Junior) on 03.04.1989 and, thereafter, to
the post of Office Manager (Senior) on 17.11.2011. Petitioner No. 1
superannuated from service on 31.01.2013.
9.1. Petitioner No. 2 was appointed as a Clerk in the Corporation
on 15.02.1988. He was promoted to the post of Senior Clerk
on 15.02.1993 and, thereafter, to the post of Junior Assistant
2 (2016) 10 SCC 77
222 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
on 01.01.1996. He was further promoted to the post of Senior
Assistant on 07.09.2009 whereafter he was promoted to the post
of Office Manager (Junior) from which post he superannuated
on 30.09.2016.
9.2. Petitioner No. 3 was appointed to the post of Clerk in the
Corporation on 05.12.1981. He was promoted to the post of
Senior Clerk on 24.05.1985 and, thereafter, to the post of Junior
Assistant on 25.04.1992. He was further promoted to the post
of Senior Assistant on 24.12.1993. On 08.11.2013, petitioner
No. 3 was promoted to the post of Office Manager (Junior)
whereafter he superannuated on 30.11.2014.
10. It is stated that following the revision of pay scales of government
employees by the State Government, the Corporation also allowed
such revision of pay scales.
11. Since the employees of government corporations like the Corporation
enjoyed parity with employees of the State Government qua all
conditions of service, such as, pay scales, allowances etc., the
State Government issued a notification dated 29.10.1999 whereby
employees of government corporations i.e. state public sector
undertakings like the Corporation were extended parity even as
regards pensionary benefits. This scheme was called the Himachal
Pradesh Corporate Sector Employees (Pension, Family Pension,
Commutation of Pension and Gratuity) Scheme, 1999 (referred
to hereinafter as ‘the 1999 Scheme’) and came into effect on and
from 01.04.1999. It was mentioned that all pensionary benefits of
the employees of the corporate sector were to be determined in
accordance with the provisions laid down in the Central Civil Services
(Pension) Rules, 1972 and the Central Civil Services (Commutation
of Pension) Rules, 1981, as amended, and adopted by the Himachal
Pradesh Government for the state government employees. The 1999
Scheme contemplated exercise of option by the employees of the
corporate sector as to whether he or she would be governed under
the existing statutory provisions or be governed under the 1999
Scheme which contemplated creation of a pension fund. The entire
amount of contribution of the concerned public sector undertaking
including interest thereon to the Contributory Provident Fund (CPF)
upto 31.03.1999 were to be transferred to the corpus fund (pension
fund) to be administered and maintained by the Government of
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 223
Satish Chander Sharma & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
Himachal Pradesh in the Finance Department. It was clarified that
the existing employees who had opted for the 1999 Scheme would
automatically forfeit their claim to the employers’ share of CPF
including interest thereon to the State Government upto 31.03.1999.
However, the amount of their subscriptions alongwith interest would
be transferred to the General Provident Fund (GPF) account, to be
allotted and maintained by the concerned public sector undertaking.
12. It is stated that the Corporation had amended its byelaws in order
to implement the 1999 Scheme. The three petitioners had exercised
their option in favour of the 1999 Scheme since this scheme provided
for higher pensionary benefits.
13. It appears that reservations were expressed regarding the financial
stability of the 1999 Scheme. In the above backdrop, the State
Government constituted a High Level Committee (‘Committee’
hereinafter) in 2003 (21.01.2003) to review the financial viability
of the 1999 Scheme. After a detailed analysis, the Committee
submitted a report on 28.10.2003. The Committee was of the view
that the 1999 Scheme was not viable on a self-sustaining basis for
the following reasons:
i) uncertainty in the rate of interest regime;
ii) declining recruitment in the corporate sector would
deplete the size of the corpus to be created and it
would be difficult to honour liabilities accruing after
10-12 years;
iii) the pension plan envisages payment of pension to
corporate sector employees as is being paid to the
government employees. Government employees at
present are entitled to pension @ 50% of the basic pay
last drawn with linkage to their dearness allowance.
This return does not appear to be possible from the
pension fund proposed to be created for corporate
sector employees.
14. After considering the aforesaid report, Government of Himachal
Pradesh in the Finance Department issued a notification dated
02.12.2004 whereby the 1999 Scheme was repealed with immediate
effect. It was clarified that consequent upon the repeal, barring the
employees who had retired from service w.e.f. 01.04.1999 till the date
224 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of notification i.e. 02.12.2004, other employees would continue to be
covered under those provisions which were applicable to them as on
31.03.1999. While clarifying that the public sector undertakings would
be the pension sanctioning/ disbursing authority, the employers’ share
of CPF including interest thereon was transferred to the respective
public sector undertakings who were required to form a pension
fund. In so far those employees of the public sector undertakings
who had retired from service during the period w.e.f. 01.04.1999 till
the date of publication of the notification i.e. 02.12.2004, the repeal
notification stated as follows:
Notwithstanding such repeal, the employees of Himachal
Pradesh corporate sector who retired from service w.e.f.
01.04.1999 till the date of publication of this notification
shall continue to be governed under the provisions of the
scheme so repealed; provided such retired employees
had opted for such scheme and had otherwise become
eligible for pension under the scheme.
15. A large number of writ petitions were filed before the High Court
assailing the notification dated 02.12.2004 and seeking a direction
that pension of the retired employees of the Corporation should be
paid as per the 1999 Scheme. High Court vide the judgment and
order dated 19.12.2013 allowed all the writ petitions. The cut-off
date 02.12.2004 was declared ultra vires but instead of declaring
the notification dated 02.12.2004 as unconstitutional, the same was
read down by including the writ petitioners and similarly situated
employees who had become members of the 1999 Scheme and
had retired after 02.12.2004 as well as those employees who were
already in service when the 1999 Scheme was notified and had
become members of that scheme and would retire henceforth as
eligible for pension under the 1999 Scheme.
16. The aforesaid decision of the High Court was assailed by the State
before this Court in Rajesh Chander Sood (supra). A two-Judge
Bench of this Court held that it was well within the authority of the
State Government in exercise of its administrative powers which
it had exercised by issuing the impugned repeal notification dated
02.12.2004 to fix a cut-off date for continuing the right to receive
pension for some and denying the same to others. The Bench further
held that the government was free to alter its earlier administrative
decision and policy though it should be in consonance with all legal
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 225
Satish Chander Sharma & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
and statutory obligations. The Bench noted that it was not a case
where the rights which had accrued to the employees under the
Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme, 1995 under which the employees
were covered prior to their opting for the 1999 Scheme, had in
any manner been altered to their disadvantage. All that the repeal
notification dated 02.12.2004 says is that the concerned employees
would be entitled to all the rights which had accrued to them under
the Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme, 1995 and not under the
1999 Scheme. In so far the bona fides of the State Government
were concerned, the Bench observed that the State Government
as a welfare measure had ventured to honestly extend some
post-retiral benefits to the employees of independent legal entities like
the Corporation on the mistaken belief, arising out of a miscalculation,
that the same could be catered out of the available resources. This
measure was adopted by the State Government not in its capacity as
the employer of the respondent-employees but as a welfare measure.
When it became apparent that the welfare measure extended by the
State Government could not be sustained as originally understood,
the same was withdrawn. Thus, the action of the State Government
was bona fide. State Government had taken a conscious decision and
the classification made by the State Government by fixing 02.12.2004
as the cut-off date was reasonable and justifiable in law; it also had
a nexus to the object sought to be achieved. In the circumstances,
the decision of the High Court was interfered with.
17. Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayan, learned senior counsel for the petitioners
submits that the present proceeding is concerned with the pensionary
rights and entitlement of the petitioners. This is also concerned
with the correctness of the judgment rendered in Rajesh Chander
Sood (supra). This Court while issuing notice vide the order dated
20.03.2018, prima facie, agreed with the contention of the petitioners
that the judgment in Rajesh Chander Sood (supra) required re-
consideration by a three-Judge Bench.
17.1. Learned senior counsel submits that the judgment in Rajesh
Chander Sood (supra) is not good law and is per incuriam
as it fails to consider binding precedents of coordinate and
larger benches of this Court. Further, in the said judgment,
the Bench contradicted itself by acknowledging the vested
right of the employees under the 1999 Scheme but denying
the benefits accruing therefrom to them.
226 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
17.2. Learned senior counsel has referred to paragraphs 69,
70, 71 and 72 of the judgment in Rajesh Chander Sood
(supra) and submits that the Bench had recorded a finding
that having exercised their option for the 1999 Scheme and
having forgone all their rights under the Employees Provident
Fund Scheme, 1995, the employees concerned would be
covered by the 1999 Scheme. As soon as they came to be
covered by the 1999 Scheme, a contingent right came to be
vested in them. As a matter of fact, the Bench had rejected
the contention of the State that the rights of the employees
under the 1999 Scheme would be vested only upon attaining
the age of superannuation and accepted the contention
advanced by the employees that any employee governed
by a pension scheme, would be entitled to the benefits
therefrom on attaining the qualifying service immediately on
his enrolment in the said scheme, particularly, when they had
expressly chosen to forgo their rights under the Employees’
Provident Fund Scheme, 1995.
17.3. Adverting to clause 1(2) of the 1999 Scheme, it is submitted
by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that the
terms of clause 1(2) are clear and unambiguous. By way
of incorporation, the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules,
1972 and the Central Civil Services (Commutation of Pension)
Rules, 1981, stood applicable to the employees upon their
opting for the 1999 Scheme.
17.4. In Rajesh Chander Sood (supra), after acknowledging the
vested right of the pensioners, this Court considered the
issue of cut-off date. He submits that while this Court has
upheld fixation of a cut-off date for extending better and higher
pensionary benefits, there are no precedents whereby a cut-off
date for discontinuing the right to receive pension, inter se,
a homogeneous class has been sustained. He submits that
reliance placed on the decisions of this Court in R.R. Verma
Vs. Union of India3 and BALCO Employees’ Union Vs. Union
of India,4 was wholly misplaced as those two decisions were
rendered in different contexts.
3 (1980) 3 SCC 402
4 (2002) 2 SCC 333
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 227
Satish Chander Sharma & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
17.5. He further submitted that the judgment in Rajesh Chander
Sood (supra) sustaining the retrospective withdrawal of the
02.12.2004 notification whereby and whereunder pensionary
rights of only those who had superannuated between
01.04.1999 and 02.12.2004 were saved as opposed to
saving such rights of all those employees who were in service
between 01.04.1999 and 02.12.2004 was explicitly contrary
to the principles laid down by this Court in a large number of
judgments. If the 1999 Scheme had to be repealed due to the
purported object i.e. financial burden on the State, repealing of
the same by not saving the rights of all those already covered
under the 1999 Scheme would be violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India.
17.6. Learned senior counsel submits that the cut-off date postulated
by the notification dated 02.12.2004 providing that benefits
under the 1999 Scheme would be available to those who
had retired between 01.04.1999 and 02.12.2004 (date of the
notification) thereby dividing a homogeneous class without
having any reasonable nexus with the object sought to be
achieved would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of
India. In this connection, he has referred to and relied upon the
Constitution Bench decision of this Court in D.S. Nakara Vs.
Union of India.5 He submits that prior judgments of this Court
wherein similar cut-off dates based on the date of retirement
were struck down by this Court were not considered in Rajesh
Chander Sood (supra).
17.7. Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayan, learned senior counsel submits
that the right to receive pension is a vested right and once the
petitioners had opted for the 1999 Scheme, the same could
not have been withdrawn, that too, unilaterally on the ground
that the State did not have the financial means to support the
scheme. Right to receive pension is not dependent upon the
finances of the State. It was improper for the State Government
to shrug away its responsibility post-introduction of the 1999
Scheme by labelling it as a self-financing pension fund created
under the 1999 Scheme. This critical aspect was over-looked
in Rajesh Chander Sood (supra).
5 (1983) 1 SCC 305
228 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
17.8. He further submits that contention of the employees based on
Article 300A of the Constitution of India was also summarily
rejected by the Bench without any independent analysis. When
this Court had recognized that the 1999 Scheme created
a vested right on the employees, such a statutory right to
receive pension would be in terms of the Central Civil Services
(Pension) Rules, 1972. Such a statutory right therefore has
to be construed as a property right under Article 300A of the
Constitution of India.
17.9. He, therefore, submits that Rajesh Chander Sood (supra) is
not a good law and is per incuriam. The present writ petition
seeking pensionary rights of the petitioners as per the 1999
Scheme may, thus, kindly be allowed by this Court.
18. Per contra, Mr. Devadatt Kamat, learned senior counsel representing
the State of Himachal Pradesh submits that the present writ petition
filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India is totally misconceived
inasmuch as the issue raised in the writ petition i.e. entitlement of the
petitioners to pension under the 1999 Scheme at par with similarly
situated employees of the Corporation who had retired between
01.04.1999 and 02.12.2004 has already been decided by this Court
in Rajesh Chander Sood (supra) . On this ground alone, the writ
petition is liable to be dismissed.
18.1. Thereafter, learned senior counsel has adverted to the facts
of the present case and submits that all the issues raised in
the present proceeding were raised in Rajesh Chander Sood
(supra) and adjudicated by this Court.
18.2. Learned senior counsel submits that the High Court had allowed
the earlier batch of writ petitions vide the judgment and order
dated 19.12.2013. This was challenged by the State before
this Court in Rajesh Chander Sood (supra) which came to be
decided on 28.09.2016. Though the present petitioners had
superannuated before that, they did not join the aforesaid
proceedings. As a matter of fact, they did not also participate
in the proceedings before the High Court. Much after their
superannuation, they filed the present writ petition. There
is, thus, considerable delay and laches on the part of the
petitioners in approaching this Court which would, therefore,
disentitle them to any relief.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 229
Satish Chander Sharma & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
18.3. Learned senior counsel vehemently argues that the present
writ petition is nothing but a collateral challenge to a binding
judgment of this Court in Rajesh Chander Sood (supra). It is not
open to the petitioners to raise the same set of grounds urged
in Rajesh Chander Sood (supra) which were rejected by this
Court. A writ petition cannot be filed to doubt the correctness
of a decision of this Court, he submits.
18.4. Learned senior counsel submits that the principle of per incuriam
is not at all attracted to the facts of the present case. There
is no glaring omission of law and precedent to constitute per
incuriam.
18.5. On the merits of the case, learned senior counsel submits that
financial viability or non-viability was a valid consideration taken
into account by the State while issuing the repeal notification.
The High Level Committee had examined the issue threadbare
and, thereafter, submitted report. Based on the report of the
High Level Committee, the repeal notification was issued.
18.6. Learned senior counsel submits that petitioners were not
employees of the State Government and, therefore, they
cannot seek service benefits including retiral benefits at par
with State Government employees. State Government had
introduced the 1999 Scheme as a welfare measure for the
employees of public sector undertakings like the Corporation
as a welfare State and not as an employer. But when it was
found that available resources were inadequate for funding the
1999 Scheme, the same was withdrawn. However, the interest
of those employees who had opted for the 1999 Scheme and
had retired before issuance of the repeal notification were
protected inasmuch as they were held to be entitled to the
benefits under the 1999 Scheme. The intention was not to
deprive the employees who had retired during the subsistence
of the 1999 Scheme.
18.7. Therefore, he submits that fixation of the date of issuance of
the repeal notification as the cut off date for allowing those
employees who had retired prior thereto to be entitled to the
benefits under the 1999 Scheme, cannot be said to be arbitrary
and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
230 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
18.8. Learned senior counsel asserts that the 1999 Scheme was
an outcome of a policy decision of the State Government.
Withdrawal of the same is also within the realm of policy
making. There is no arbitrariness in such withdrawal. Principle
of natural justice cannot be extended to such a situation. In
the circumstances, learned senior counsel Mr. Kamat submits
that there is no merit at all in the writ petition, besides being
not maintainable. He, therefore, seeks dismissal of the writ
petition.
19. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have received
the due consideration of the Court. A large number of decisions have
been cited at the Bar by both the sides. Those have been considered.
However, reference would be made to only those decisions found
relevant and necessary.
20. At the outset, let us examine as to how the High Court had dealt
with the issue. In P.D. Nanda (supra), High Court held that the
moment the employees became members of the 1999 Scheme,
they had acquired a vested right and therefore they were required
to be heard before they were taken out of the ambit of the 1999
Scheme. High Court observed that when the 1999 Scheme was
framed and notified on 29.10.1999 having effect from 01.04.1999,
the State Government was aware of all the legal implications but
there was remissness on the part of the State Government as well
as the public sector undertakings towards implementation of the 1999
Scheme. The public sector undertakings were required to immediately
transfer the funds at their disposal towards creation of the corpus
fund. When the employees had opted for the 1999 Scheme, they
automatically ceased to be members of the previous 1995 Scheme.
Therefore, withdrawal of the 1999 Scheme was improper. Though
the High Court found the notification dated 02.12.2004 to be bad
in law, it expressed the view that to effectuate the purport of the
1999 Scheme, the said notification was required to be read down by
including those employees who became members of the scheme and
had retired before 02.12.2004 as entitled to the benefits under the
1999 Scheme, instead of declaring the same to be unconstitutional.
High Court also rejected the contention of the State Government
that the 1999 Scheme could not be implemented due to financial
crunch. While allowing the writ petitions, High Court declared the
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 231
Satish Chander Sharma & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
cut-off date of 02.12.2004 to be ultra vires. The repeal notification
dated 02.12.2004 was read down by including those writ petitioners
and similarly situated employees for the purpose of pensionary
benefits. High Court held as follows:
80. Accordingly, in view of the analysis and discussion
made hereinabove, all the writ petitions are allowed.
The cut-off date 02.12.2004 is declared ultra vires.
Notification dated 02.12.2004 is read down to save it
from unconstitutionality, irrationality, arbitrariness or
unreasonableness by including the petitioners and
similarly situated employees also, who had become
members of the scheme notified on 29.10.1999 and
have retired after 02.12.2004 and those employees who
were already in service when the pension scheme was
notified on 29.10.1999 and had become members of
that scheme and shall retire hereinafter, for the purpose
of pensionary benefits after applying the principle of
severability. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner,
Shimla is directed to transfer the entire amount of the
CPF to a corpus fund to be administered and maintained
by the Government of Himachal Pradesh in the Finance
Department including upto date interest, within a period of
two weeks. Thereafter, the Pension Sanctioning Authority
is directed to sanction the pension/gratuity/commutation
of pension after proper scrutiny of the cases forwarded
by the concerned Public Sector Undertaking and issue
pension payment order to the Pension Disbursing
Authority strictly as per para 6 of the scheme notified
on 29.10.1999 with interest @ 9% per annum, within a
period of 12 weeks from today. Pending application(s),
if any, also stand disposed. No costs.
21. This decision of the High Court was challenged by the State
Government before this Court in Rajesh Chander Sood (supra). This
Court first posed the question as to whether a vested right came to be
created in the employees of the corporate bodies when they came to
be governed by the 1999 Scheme. On due consideration, this Court
expressed the view that such employees who had exercised their
option to be governed by the 1999 Scheme came to be regulated by
the said scheme immediately on their having submitted their option.
232 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
In addition, all those employees who did not exercise any option
were automatically deemed to have opted for the 1999 Scheme. As
soon as the concerned employees came to be governed by the 1999
Scheme, a contingent right stood vested in them. On the question as
to whether such a contingent right was binding and irrevocable, this
Court held that the same was not binding on the State Government.
Before dealing with the said issue, this Court examined the question
as to whether the State Government was justified in postulating a
cut-off date by which some of the employees governed by the 1999
Scheme (those who had retired prior to 02.12.2004 were entitled to
draw pension under the 1999 Scheme whereas those who had not
retired by the time the repeal notification was issued on 02.12.2004
were denied such benefit), the above question was answered by
this Court in the following manner:
75. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the issue
canvassed, and having gone through the judgments
cited, we are of the considered view that this Court has
repeatedly upheld a cut-off date, for extending better and
higher pensionary benefits, based on the financial health of
the employer. A cut-off date can, therefore, legitimately be
prescribed for extending pensionary benefits, if the funds
available cannot assuage the liability, to all the existing
pensioners. We are, therefore, satisfied to conclude that
it is well within the authority of the State Government, in
exercise of its administrative powers (which it exercised,
by issuing the impugned Repeal Notification dated 02-
12-2004) to fix a cut-off date, for continuing the right to
receive pension in some, and depriving some others of
the same. This right was unquestionably exercised by
the State Government, as determined by this Court, in
R.R. Verma case [R.R. Verma v. Union of India, (1980)
3 SCC 402: 1980 SCC (L&S) 423] , wherein this Court
held that the Government was vested with the inherent
power to review. And that the Government was free
to alter its earlier administrative decisions and policy.
Surely, this is what the State Government has done in the
present controversy. But this Court in the abovementioned
judgment, placed a rider on the exercise of such power
by the Government. In that, the exercise of such power
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 233
Satish Chander Sharma & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
should be in consonance with all legal and statutory
obligations.
21.1. A contention was raised on behalf of the employees that by
application of the principle of estoppel/ promissory estoppel,
the State should not have gone back on the 1999 Scheme by
issuing the repeal notification dated 02.12.2004. This Court
repelled the above contention as under:
79. We are of the considered view that the principle
of estoppel/promissory estoppel cannot be invoked
at the hands of the respondent employees, in the
facts and circumstances of this case. It is not as
if the rights which had accrued to the respondent
employees under the Employees› Provident Fund
Scheme, 1995 (under which the respondent
employees were governed, prior to their being
governed by the 1999 Scheme) have in any
manner been altered to their disadvantage. All that
was taken away, and given up by the respondent
employees by way of foregoing the employer›s
contribution up to 31-3-1999 (including the accrued
interest thereon), by way of transfer to the corpus
fund, was restored to the respondent employees.
All the respondent employees, who have been
deprived of their pensionary claims by the Repeal
Notification dated 02-12-2004, would be entitled
to all the rights which had accrued to them, under
the Employees› Provident Fund Scheme, 1995.
It is, therefore, not possible for us to accept that
the respondent employees can be stated to have
been made to irretrievably alter their position, to
their detriment. Furthermore, all the corporate
bodies (with which the respondent employees, are
engaged) are independent juristic entities, as held in
State of Assam v. Barak Upatyaka D.U. Karmachari
Sanstha [State of Assam v. Barak Upatyaka D.U.
Karmachari Sanstha, (2009) 5 SCC 694 : (2009) 2
SCC (L&S) 109] . The mere fact that the corporate
bodies under reference, are fully controlled by the
234 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
State Government, and the State Government is
the ultimate authority to determine their conditions
of service, under their articles of association, is
inconsequential. Undoubtedly, the respondent
employees are not government employees. The
State Government, as a welfare measure, had
ventured to honestly extend some post-retiral
benefits to employees of such independent legal
entities, on the mistaken belief, arising out of a
miscalculation, that the same can be catered to, out
of available resources. This measure was adopted
by the State Government, not in its capacity as
the employer of the respondent employees, but
as a welfare measure. When it became apparent
that the welfare measure extended by the State
Government, could not be sustained as originally
understood, the same was sought to be withdrawn.
21.2. Therefore, this Court held that it was not possible in law to
apply the principle of estoppel/ promissory estoppel to the
facts of the present controversy.
21.3. As regards the financial viability of the 1999 Scheme, this
Court held thus:
84. Moving to the next contention. A serious dispute
has been raised before us, in respect of the financial
viability of the 1999 Scheme. Insofar as the appellant
State is concerned, it was asserted on its behalf,
that a High-Level Committee was constituted by the
Finance Department of the State Government on 21-
1-2003. The said committee comprised of Managing
Directors of the public sector undertakings and
corporations concerned. The task of the High-Level
Committee was to examine the financial viability of
the 1999 Scheme. The said committee submitted a
report dated 28-10-2003, returning a finding that the
1999 Scheme was not financially viable, and would
not be self-sustaining. It is, therefore, that a tentative
decision was taken by the State Government, to
withdraw the 1999 Scheme.
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 235
Satish Chander Sharma & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
85. To determine the modalities for withdrawing the
1999 Scheme, on the basis of the above report,
the matter was jointly examined by the Finance
Department and the Law Department of the State
Government, wherein, in consonance with the advice
tendered by the Law Department it was decided
that the 1999 Scheme should not be withdrawn
retrospectively. Based on the advice of the Law
Department, it was finally decided that those who
had commenced to draw pensionary benefits
under the 1999 Scheme, would not be deprived of
the same. And that, the 1999 Scheme should be
withdrawn prospectively, for those whose right to
receive pensionary benefits had not arisen, as they
had not yet retired from service. In the above view of
the matter, it was contended on behalf of the State
Government that the action of the State Government
in issuing the Repeal Notification dated 2-12-2004,
was certainly not an arbitrary exercise of the power
of administrative review. It was submitted that the
same was based on two factors. Firstly, the financial
unviability of the scheme. And secondly, those who
had already commenced to draw pensionary benefits
under the 1999 Scheme, were not to be affected.
It was, therefore, pointed out that the classification
made by the State Government was reasonable and
justifiable in law, and it also had a nexus to the object
sought to be achieved.
86. It is in the above scenario that the legality and
justiciability of the 1999 Scheme, will have to be
examined. The submission advanced at the behest
of the respondent employees was that it was not
permissible for the State Government to advance any
such plea, because the State Government must be
deemed to have examined the financial viability of the
Scheme, before the 1999 Scheme was given effect
to. And that, it does not lie in the mouth of the State
Government, after giving effect to the 1999 Scheme,
to assert that the 1999 Scheme was not financially
236 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
viable. It was insisted that even if data pertaining to
the financial viability of the Scheme, as was sought
to be relied upon was correct, financial deficiencies,
if any, could be catered to by the State Government,
from the vast financial resources available to it.
And further, that the 1999 Scheme in terms of the
determination rendered by the High Court, even if
permitted to be repealed, should not impact the rights
of the respondent employees, towards pensionary
benefits.
87. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the
above contention. It is not possible for us to accept
the instant contention, advanced on behalf of the
respondent employees. The calculations projected at
the behest of the State Government, to demonstrate
the financial unviability of the Scheme, have not been
disputed. The same have been detailed in paras 10
and 11 above. The basis thereof, projected by the
High-Level Committee, admittedly constitutes the
rationale for issuing the Repeal Notification dated
02-12-2004. We are of the view that the consideration
at the hands of the State Government was conscious
and pointed, and was supported by facts and figures.
It is apparent that out of 17 corporations/boards who
were invited to express their views on the issue,
only 7 had actually done so. It is not the case of the
respondent employees that any one of those who
had expressed their views, contested the fact that
the pension scheme was not self-financing. Those
who expressed their views affirmed that the pension
scheme could be salvaged only with government
support. Those who did not express their views,
obviously had no comments to offer. The position
projected by the State Government, therefore,
cannot be considered to have been effectively
rebutted. Certain facts and figures, have indeed been
projected, on behalf of the respondent employees.
These have been recorded by us in paras 60 and 61.
Financial calculations cannot be made casually, on a
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 237
Satish Chander Sharma & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
generalised basis. In the absence of any authenticity,
and that too with reference to all the 20 corporate
entities specified in Schedule I of the 1999 Scheme,
the projections made on behalf of the respondent
employees, cannot be accepted, as constituting a
legitimate basis, for a favourable legal determination.
Since the respondent employees have not been
able to demonstrate that the foundational basis for
withdrawing the 1999 Scheme, was not premised
on any arbitrary consideration, or alternatively, was
not founded on any irrelevant consideration, it is
not possible for us to accept the contention that the
withdrawal of the 1999 Scheme, was not based on
due consideration, or that, it was irrational or arbitrary
or unreasonable. We are also satisfied that the
action of the State Government, in allowing those
who had already started earning pensionary benefits
under the 1999 Scheme, was based on a legitimate
classification, acceptable in law. In the above view of
the matter, the action of the State Government cannot
be described as arbitrary, and as such, violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. We are also
satisfied in concluding that the understanding of the
State Government (which had resulted in introducing
the 1999 Scheme) on being found to be based on an
incorrect calculation, with reference to the viability of
the corpus fund (to operate the 1999 Scheme), had
to be administratively reviewed. And that the State
Government›s determination in exercising its power
of review, was well founded.
21.4. Having held so, this Court accepted the contention canvassed
on behalf of the State that budgetary allocations are a matter
of policy decision and that the High Court should not have
transferred the financial liability of the Corporation to run the
1999 Scheme to the State Government. This Court held as
follows:
88. It is also not possible for us to accept that
any court has the jurisdiction to fasten a monetary
liability on the State Government, as is the natural
238 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
consequence, of the impugned order passed by
the High Court, unless it emerges from the rights
and liabilities canvassed in the lis itself. Budgetary
allocations, are a matter of policy decisions. The
State Government while promoting the 1999
Scheme, felt that the same would be self-financing.
The State Government never intended to allocate
financial resources out of State funds, to run
the pension scheme. The State Government, in
the instant view of the matter, could not have
been burdened with the liability, which it never
contemplated, in the first place. Moreover, it is the
case of the respondent employees themselves,
that a similar pension scheme, floated for civil
servants in the State of Himachal Pradesh, has
also been withdrawn. The State Government
has demonstrated its incapacity, to provide the
required financial resources. We are, therefore,
of the view that the High Court should not (as it
could not) have transferred the financial liability to
run the 1999 Scheme, to the State Government.
Similar suggestions made by the corporate bodies
concerned, cannot constitute a basis for fastening
the residuary liability on the Government.
21.5. This Court rejected the contention of the employees that
they should be treated similarly like government employees.
Claim for parity with government employees was held to be
wholly misconceived. Thereafter, this Court held that the State
Government had the competence to repeal the 1999 Scheme.
By doing so, the State Government had not curtailed the right
of the employees to receive pension; they would continue
to receive pension under the erstwhile pension scheme but
would not get the additional benefits under the 1999 Scheme.
22. Though learned senior counsel for the petitioners had argued that
the judgment in Rajesh Chander Sood (supra) is per incuriam, we
are unable to hold so. This Court had given elaborate reasons while
allowing the civil appeal of the State thereby reversing the judgment
of the High Court, including upholding the cut-off date of 02.12.2004.
Merely because according to the petitioners the reasons given in
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 239
Satish Chander Sharma & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
the judgment while accepting the stand of the State may not be in
sync with previous decisions, it cannot be said to be a judgment
rendered per incuriam. The concept of per incuriam is too well
settled to warrant a detailed analysis here. The judgment rendered
in Rajesh Chandra Sood (supra) by no stretch can be said to have
ignored any binding precedent. Hence, the same cannot be said to
be a judgment rendered per incuriam.
23. From the above, it is evident that the contentions that are being
raised now were all advanced before this Court in Rajesh Chander
Sood (supra) and those were all adjudicated. It is not open for the
petitioners to once again seek the same reliefs as was sought in
the earlier round of litigation which were negatived by this Court.
High Court had allowed the claim of the employees (petitioners
of the previous round and similarly situated employees like the
present petitioners). When this Court had set aside the judgment
of the High Court, it is evident that the claim of not only those
petitioners but similarly situated employees (like the present
petitioners) were also negatived. Therefore, there cannot be any
challenge either directly or collaterally to the decision of this Court
in Rajesh Chander Sood (supra) in a proceeding under Article 32
of the Constitution of India.
24. In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar Vs. State of Maharashtra,6 a nine-Judge
Bench of this Court considered the question as to whether a judicial
order passed by the High Court prohibiting publication in newspapers
of evidence given by witnesses pending the hearing of the suit was
amenable to be corrected by a writ of certiorari under Article 32(2)
of the Constitution of India. Other issues were also gone into by this
Court but that may not be relevant for the purpose of the present
discourse. After deliberating on the facts and law, this Court opined
that validity or propriety of such an order passed by the High Court
could not be raised in writ proceedings taken out for the issuance of
a writ of certiorari under Article 32. This Court declared that it was
impossible to accept the argument of the petitioners that judicial
orders passed by the High Courts in or in relation to proceedings
pending before them are amenable to be corrected by this Court
under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
6 AIR 1967 SC 1
240 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
25. This Court in Sub-Inspector Sadhan Kumar Goswami Vs. Union
of India,7 considered a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India seeking to reopen a judgment of this Court
rendered under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. After an
analysis of the facts, this Court declared that merely because the
petitioners were not parties to the previous decision, they could not
file a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. In fact,
this Court took serious exception to the filing of such writ petitions.
26. Rupa Ashok Hurra Vs. Ashok Hurra8 was a case where a Constitution
Bench of this Court considered the question as to whether a writ
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India can be maintained
to question the validity of a judgment of this Court after the petition
for review of the said judgment was dismissed. While deliberating
upon the said question, this Court referred to its previous decision
in A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak9 where a seven-Judge Bench of this
Court held that an order of this Court was not amenable to correction
by issuance of a writ of certiorari under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India. Rupa Ashok Hurra (supra), of course, went on to hold that
to prevent abuse of its process and to cure gross miscarriage of
justice, this Court may reconsider its judgment(s) in exercise of its
inherent power. For that, this Court provided for a curative jurisdiction
post-dismissal of review petition by filing curative petition. In the
present proceedings, we are not required to delve into the contours
of curative jurisdiction.
27. This Court in Omprakash Verma Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh10
reiterated the well-settled principle that a judgment of the Supreme
Court cannot be collaterally challenged on the ground that certain
points had not been considered.
28. Again, in the case of Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action Vs. Union
of India,11 this Court held that a writ petition filed under Article 32
of the Constitution of India assailing the correctness of a decision
of the Supreme Court on merits or seeking reconsideration is not
7 (1997) 2 SCC 225
8 (2002) 4 SCC 388
9 (1988) 2 SCC 602
10 (2010) 13 SCC 158
11 (2011) 8 SCC 161
[2025] 5 S.C.R. 241
Satish Chander Sharma & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.
maintainable. Referring to its earlier decision in Khoday Distilleries
Ltd. Vs. Registrar General, Supreme Court of India, 12 the Court
held that reconsideration of the final decision of the Supreme
Court after review petition is dismissed by way of a writ petition
under Article 32 of the Constitution of India cannot be sustained.
Judgment and order of this Court passed under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India is not amenable to judicial review under Article
32 of the Constitution.
29. Thus, law is well settled that a decision rendered by this Court, be
it at the stage of special leave petition or post grant of leave while
exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India,
cannot be assailed directly or collaterally under Article 32. Remedy
of an aggrieved litigant is to file for review. If the grievance persists
even thereafter, he may invoke the curative jurisdiction subject to
compliance of the requirements of such jurisdiction. But certainly
it is not open for him to file a writ petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India seeking the same relief.
30. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the present writ petition is thoroughly
misconceived and is liable to be dismissed. However, before parting
with the record, we would like to emphasize and reiterate the principle
of finality of an adjudication process. Finality of a lis is a core facet of a
sound judicial system. Litigation which had concluded or had reached
finality cannot be reopened. A litigant who is aggrieved by a decision
rendered by this Court in a special leave petition or in a civil appeal
arising therefrom can seek its review by invoking the review jurisdiction
and thereafter through a curative petition. But such a decision cannot
be assailed in a writ proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India. If this is permitted, then there will be no finality and no end
to litigation. There will be chaos in the administration of justice.
31. In Green View Tea & Industries Vs. Collector, 13 this Court expressed
the view that finality of an order of the Supreme Court should not
lightly be unsettled. This salutary principle was reiterated by this
Court in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action Vs. Union of India.14
12 (1996) 3 SCC 114
13 (2002) 1 SCC 109
14 (2011) 8 SCC 161
242 [2025] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
32. Thus, having regard to the discussions made above, we are of the
unhesitant view that the present writ petition filed under Article 32
of the Constitution of India is wholly misconceived. The decision
of this Court in Rajesh Chander Sood (supra) is clearly binding on
the petitioners. That being the position, there is no merit in the writ
petition which is accordingly dismissed.
33. Considering the fact that petitioners are retired employees and senior
citizens, we refrain from imposing any cost.
Result of the case: Writ Petition dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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