MOHAMMEDFAIZAN @ VALAA MOHAMMEDAIYUB SHAIKH THROUGH FIZA MOHAMMAD FAIZAN SHAIKHversusCOMMISSIONER OF POLICE
- Disposal
- 38-RULE ABSOLUTE/ALLOWED @ FH
Holding
The preventive detention order is illegal and is quashed, releasing the detainee.
Summary
Mohammedfaizan @ Valaa Mohammedaiyub Shaikh challenged a preventive detention order dated 04‑12‑2025 issued by the Ahmedabad Police Commissioner under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti‑social Activities Act, 1985, alleging he was a "dangerous person". The petitioner argued that no material showed any disturbance to public health, order or tranquility and that the order was passed mechanically. The State contended that the detainee was a habitual offender whose past offences threatened public order. The Court examined the three criminal cases cited (IPC §§303(2), 54, 309(4)) and found they did not demonstrate a threat to public order, especially since bail had been granted. Relying on Supreme Court precedents emphasizing the extraordinary nature of preventive detention, the Court held the material insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement. Consequently, the detention order was quashed and the petitioner was ordered to be released.
Issues considered
- Whether the detention order under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti‑social Activities Act, 1985, is valid in the absence of material showing a threat to public order.
- Whether the State can rely on past criminal cases and bail status to justify preventive detention.
Legislation cited
- Arms Act, 1959s. V
- Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985s. 2(c)
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 303(2), s. 309(4), s. 54
Subjects
Judgment
R/SCR.A/17187/2025 ORDER DATED: 19/01/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO. 17187 of 2025
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MOHAMMEDFAIZAN @ VALAA MOHAMMEDAIYUB SHAIKH THROUGH
FIZA MOHAMMAD FAIZAN SHAIKH
Versus
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR. MOHD.ABRAR A. SAIYED(16369) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR. ROHAN SHAH, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 2
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI
Date : 19/01/2026
ORAL ORDER
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ILESH J. VORA)
[1] The detenue herein, namely Mohammedfaizan @ Valaa
Mohammedaiyub Shaikh, came to be preventively detained vide
detention order dated 04.12.2025 passed by the Police
Commissioner, Ahmedabad City, as a “dangerous person” as
deBned under Section 2(c) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-
social Activities Act, 1985 (herein after referred as ‘the Act of
1985).
[2] By way of this petition through his wife Fiza Mohammad
Faizan Shaikh, the detenue has challenged the legality and
validity of the aforesaid order.
[3] This Court has heard learned advocate for the petitioner
and learned APP for the respondent-State Authorities.
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R/SCR.A/17187/2025 ORDER DATED: 19/01/2026
[4] Learned advocate for the petitioner vehemently argued
that there was no material available with the detention authority
to indicate as to how public health, public order or public
tranquility was disturbed in any manner. Thus, in the absence
of any such material on record, the order of detention ought not
have been passed. It is further submitted by learned advocate
for the petitioner that the impugned order has been passed
without application of mind and prima facie, the order appears
to have been passed mechanically.
[4.1] Learned advocate for the petitioner further submitted that
the impugned order was executed upon the petitioner and
presently he is detained in the Central Jail, Bhuj.
[5] On the other hand, learned APP, opposing the present
petition contended that the detenue is habitual oKender and his
activities have aKected society at large. Hence, the Detaining
Authority, considering the antecedents and past activities of the
detenue, has passed the impugned order with a view to
preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order in the area of Ahmedabad and
lastly prayed to dismiss the present petition.
[6] Having considered the facts as well as the submissions
made by the learned advocates appearing for the respective
parties, the core issue that arises is whether the order of
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R/SCR.A/17187/2025 ORDER DATED: 19/01/2026
detention passed by the Detaining Authority in exercise of its
powers under the provisions of the Act of 1985 is sustainable in
law or not?
[7] We have carefully gone through the order passed by the
concerned authority. It appears that the impugned order was
executed upon the detenue and presently he is detained in
Central Jail, Bhuj. In the grounds of detention, reference of
three criminal cases for the oKences punishable under Sections
303(2), 54 and 309(4) of the BNS registered with various police
stations against the detenue from 21.01.2025 to 04.10.2025 is
made out.
[7.1] In the impugned order, it is alleged that the activities of
the detenue, as a “dangerous person”, aKect adversely or are
likely to aKect adversely the maintenance of public order as
explained under the provisions of the the Act of 1985.
Undisputedly, in the aforesaid alleged oKences, the detenue was
granted bail by the concerned court.
[8] Considering the impugned order, it appears that the
provisions of Section 2(c) of the Act of 1985 is referred by the
concerned authorities. Hence, the same is required to be
reproduced. The same reads as under:-
“(c) "dangerous person" means a person, who either by himself
or as a member or leader of a gang, during a period of three
successive years, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or
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R/SCR.A/17187/2025 ORDER DATED: 19/01/2026
abets the commission of any of the o"ences punishable under
Chapter XVI or Chapter VIII or Chapter XVI (except section
354, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D, 376, 376A, 376B, 3376C, 376D,
or 377) or Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal
Code or any of the o"ences punishable under chapter V of the
Arms Act, 1959;”
[9] After consideration of the available material, we are of the
considered view that on the basis of three cases, the authority
has wrongly arrived at the subjective satisfaction that the
activities of the detenue could be termed as acting in a manner
‘prejudicial to the maintenance of public order’. In our
considered opinion, the said oKences do not have any bearing
on the maintenance of public order. In this regard, we would
like to refer the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Dhaya
M. v. State of Kerala and others reported in AIR 2025 Sc
2868. In para-9 and para-21 of the said decision, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has observed as under:-
“9. It is well settled that the provision for preventive detention
is an extraordinary power in the hands of the State that must
be used sparingly. It curtails the liberty of an individual in
anticipation of the commission of further o"ence(s), and
therefore, must not be used in the ordinary course of nature.
The power of preventive detention 5nds recognition in the
Constitution itself, under Article 22(3)(b). However, this Court
has emphasized in Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu3 that the
power of preventive detention is an exception to Article 21 and,
therefore, must be applied as such, as an exception to the main
rule and only in rare cases.”
…..
“21. This Court in SK. Nazneen (supra), had observed that the
State should move for cancellation of bail of the detenu, instead
of placing him under the law of preventive detention, which is
not the appropriate remedy. Similarly, in Ameena Begum v.
State of Telengana9 , this Court observed :
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R/SCR.A/17187/2025 ORDER DATED: 19/01/2026
“59. … It is pertinent to note that in the three criminal
proceedings where the detenu had been released on bail, no
applications for cancellation of bail had been moved by the
State. In the light of the same, the provisions of the Act, which
is an extraordinary statute, should not have been resorted to
when ordinary criminal law provided su"icient means to
address the apprehensions leading to the impugned detention
order. There may have existed su"icient grounds to appeal
against the bail orders, but the circumstances did not warrant
the circumvention of ordinary criminal procedure to resort to
an extraordinary measure of the law of preventive detention.”
60. In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar [Vijay Narain Singh
v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 361] ,
Hon'ble E.S. Venkataramiah, J. (as the Chief Justice then was)
observed : (SCC pp. 35-36, para 32)
32. … It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a
hard law and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care
should be taken that the liberty of a person is not jeopardised
unless his case falls squarely within the four corners of the
relevant law. The law of preventive detention should not be
used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a
criminal prosecution. It is not intended for the purpose of
keeping a man under detention when under ordinary criminal
law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail,
unless the material available is such as would satisfy the
requirements of the legal provisions authorising such
detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent
criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising
the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based
on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal
court.” (Emphasis supplied)”
[10] For the reasons recorded above, we are of the considered
opinion that, the material on record is not suKicient to hold that
the alleged activities of the detenue have either aKected
adversely or are likely to aKect adversely the maintenance of
public order, and therefore, the subjective satisfaction arrived
at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid
and in accordance with law.
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R/SCR.A/17187/2025 ORDER DATED: 19/01/2026
[11] Accordingly, this petition stands allowed. The impugned
order dated 04.12.2025 passed by the respondent authority is
hereby quashed. We direct the detenue to be set at liberty
forthwith, if he is not required in any other case. Rule is made
absolute accordingly. Direct service permitted.
(ILESH J. VORA, J.)
(R. T. VACHHANI, J.)
DHARMENDRA KUMAR
Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judges.
Digitally signed by: KUMAR DHARMENDRA(HC01071), GOV, at High Court of Gujarat on 19/01/2026 17:03:27
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