Holding

The Pune complaint lacks essential facts to constitute offences under Sections 295A or 500 IPC and is quashed, whereas the Nasik complaint is not quashed and may proceed to trial.

Summary

The appellant, Shatrughna Prasad Sinha, was charged after an interview published in Stardust magazine allegedly outraged the religious feelings of the Marwari community and defamed them as a class. Complaints were filed in the magistrate courts of Pune and Nasik. The High Court held that the Pune complaint did not disclose an offence under Section 295A but did prima facie disclose defamation under Section 500, while the Nasik complaint was not quashed. The Supreme Court examined whether the complaints contained the essential ingredients of offences under Sections 295A and 500 of the IPC. It held that the Pune complaint lacked the necessary factual particulars for either offence and therefore quashed it. However, the Court found no ground to quash the Nasik complaint, leaving it to the magistrate to determine the defamation issue at trial. The appeal was allowed in part.

Issues considered

Whether the complaint discloses an offence punishable under Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code.
Whether the complaint discloses an offence punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code (defamation) read with Section 34.
Whether the magistrate was justified in taking cognizance of the complaints and issuing process.

Legislation cited

Criminal Procedure Code, 1908s. 190(1)(a), s. 200
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 295-A, s. 34, s. 499, s. 500

Subjects

defamationreligious insultIPC 295AIPC 500criminal complaintmagistrate cognizancefreedom of speech

Judgment

SHATRUGHNA PRASAD SINHA A
v.
RAJBHAU SURAJMAL RATHI AND ORS.

SEPTEMBER 10, 1996

[K. RAMASWAMY, FAIZAN UDDIN AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.) B

Indian Penal Code, 1860 :

Sections 295-A, 499, 500 r/w. 34-Defa111ation-lnte1view _to a film
magazine-Appellant making statements against a pa1ticular community-Al- C
leged to be deliberate, malicious and outraging the religious feel ings of that
commw1ity-Co111plaint-Magistrate taking cognizance and issuing notice to
appellant-C/1allenge before High Cowt which held that no offence 1111der
S.295A made 011t b11t the allegations constitllle prima facie offence triable by
Magistrate under S.500--011 appeal held the allegations do not contain
essential facts constitllting offence under S.295A-The complaint filed before D
the !11dicial Magistrate Pune does not contain allegations to constitllte 011
offence of defamation punishable under S.50()-f{ence that complaint
q11ashed-Co111plaint filed before the Judicial Magistrate Nasik-High Cowt
was right in refusing to quash the complaint under S.500.
E
CRIMINAL APPELLATL JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1696 of 1996.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.1.91 of the Bombay High
Court in Cr!. W.P. No. 1545 of 1990.
F
Indrajeet Roy, P.N. Misra for the Appellant.

Sushi! Kumar Jain, (A.C.) and Ms. Pratibha Jain for the Respon-
dents.

- The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Leave granted.
G

Though the respondents were duly served and on an occasion ap-
peared in person, subsequently they did not appear. Resultantly, we re-
quested Shri Sushi! Kumar Jain, Advocate of the Bar to assist the Court H
771
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A as amicus cwiae. We place on record our deep appreciation for the
valuable assistance rendered by him.

This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment and order of
the High Court of Bombay made on January 21, 1991 in Cr!. Writ Petition
No. 1545 of 1990. The facts relevant for the purpose of this case and we
B proceed on the basis thereof are that allegations were made in the com-
plaint filed by the respondents in the Courts of Magistrate at Pune and
Nasik; we deal with those allegations as they constitute offence for which
the judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, could take cognizance. In paragraph 2 it
is narrated that the complainant-respondent was a social activist belonging
c to the Marwari Community, and that the respondent- second accused
respectively is the editor and publisher of Stardust, Film Magazine. An
interview she had with the appellant in June 1989, came to be published at
page 82 of that magazine. During the course of the interview, the appellant
was alleged to have made statements outraging the religious feeling of the
D Marwari community and also defamed the members of Marwari com-
munity as a class. In the complaint filed at Pune, what he has stated is as
under:

"The Complainant submits that in June 89 thr. Accused No. 1 has
with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the re1.igious
E feelings of Marwari Community made the said statement. By the
statement of the ;}ccused No.1, the structure of National Integrity
is being paralysed. The feelings of Marwari Community also being
hurt by the Statement made by the Accused No. 1. The Statement
of Accused No. 1 goes to show that Marwari Community is not a
Class belonging to India and they have not faith and love towards
F
India, their ,mother land. It is implied from the said statement that
Marwaris are traitors and enemies of India. So also accused No.
2 has also printed and published the said statement in 'Star Dust'
Magazine of 1989 with deliberate and malicious intention of outc
raging the religious feelings of Marwari Community."
G
The rest of the paragraphs are only the consequential narration of
the allegations in paragraph 3. According to the respondents, these allega-
tions constitute offence punishable under Section 295-A and Section 500
read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC, for short). The
H Magistrate had taken cognizance and issued notice to the appellant for
S.P. SINHAv. R.S. RATHI 773
'
appearance. When it was challenged in the writ petition, the learned single A
Judge of the High Court had held that on a reading of the complaint as a
whole, no offence under Sectiou 295A could be made out; however, the
· ·allegations constitute prim a f acie offence triable by the Magistrate under
Section 500, IPC. Thus, these appeals by special leave.

. Section 295A of the IPC envisages the essential ingredients of the B
punishment and provides that whoever, with deliberate and malicious
intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens of India,
by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations
or otherwise, insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs
of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for c
a term which may extend to three years, or w:th fine, or with both. The
quoted para does not contain essential facts constituting the offeo,ce.

Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908 (Cr. P.C., for
short) in Chapter XV provides as under :
D
"A magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall
examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if
any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to
writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses,
and also by the Magistrate provided that when the complaint is
E
made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant
and the witnesses."

The High Court may take cognizance of any offence under Section
190(1)(a) upon receiving a complaint containing facts which constitute such
offence.· It is a matter of discretion. Criminal proceedings are initiated by F
a Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. Taking cognizance of the
offence would include the intention of the Magistrate of initiating judicial
proceedings against the offendor in respect of that offence or taking steps
to see whether there is any basis for initiating judicial proceedings or for
other purpose.
G
It would thus be seen that when a private complaint is made to the
Magistrate, before the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence on the
complaint so as to take the other steps, the complaint shall contain all the
necessary facts constituting the offence for which the complaint was laid,
so that the Magistrate can proceed further in taking further steps after H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] 9UPP. 5 S.C.R.

A cognizance of the offence is taken by issuing the process etc. It is seen from
reading of para 3 of the complaint, which is the foundation to taking
cognizance of the offence, that the complainant-respondent has con-
centrated mainly on the offence punishable under Section 295A of IPC; ...
the High Court had quashed the said complaint and no appeal has been
filed in this Court.
B
The next question is: whether the learned Judge was right in holding
that the complaint discloses offence punishable .under Section 500 IPC?
Section 499 defines 'defamation' thus :

c "Whoever by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by
signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputa-
tion concerning any persons intending to harm, or knowing or
having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputa-
tion of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter ex-
cepted, to defame that person".
D
Explanation 2 to the said section envisages that it may amount to
defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association
or collection of persons as such.

Explanation 4 provides that no imputation is said to harm a person's
E reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation
of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or
lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling,
or lowers the credit of that person, or causes it to be believed that the body
of that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state generally considered
F as disgraceful.

A reading of the complaint does not contain any of the allegations
constituting the offence of defamation punishable under Section 500, IPC.
The contents of the magazine are alleged to be defamatory against the
G Marwari Community, lowering them in the estimate of the public or their
reputations is lowered in the society. But we do not find any allegation
made in the complaint. Accordingly, we hold that the complaint filed in
-,.
the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class in Court No. 4 at Pune
does not contain any of the allegations so as to constitute the offence of
defamation defined in Section 499 and punishable under Section 500.
H Consequently, the Magistrate was not justified in issuing the process
S.P. SINHA v. R.S. RATH! 775

against the appellant. The complaint is accordingly quashed. A
As regards the ailegations made against the appellant in the com-
plaint filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, at Nasik, on a
reading of the complaint we do not think tha_t we will be justified at this
stage to quash that complaint. It is not the province of this Court to
appreciate at this stage the evidence or scope of and meaning of the B
statement. Certain allegations came to be made but whether these allega-
tions do constitute defamation of the Marwari ·community as a business
class and whether the appellant had intention to cite as an instance of
general feeling among the community and whether the context in which the
said statement came to be made, as is sought to be argued by the learned C
senior counsel for the appellant, are all matters to be considered by the
learned Magistrate at a later stage. At this stage, we cannot embark upon
weighing the evidence and come to any conclusion to hold, whether or not
the allegations made in the complaint constitute an offence punishable
under Section 500. It is the settled legal position that a Court has to read
the complaint as a whole and find our whether allegations disclosed D
constitute an offence under Section 499 triable by the Magistrate. The
Magistrate prima f acie came to the conclusion that the allegations might
come within the definition of 'defamation' under Section 499 IPC and could
be taken cognizance of. But these are the facts to be established at the trial.
The case set up by the appellant are either defences open to be taken or E
other steps of framing a charge at the trial at whatever stage known to
law. P1ima f acie we think that at this stage it is not a case warranting
quashing of the complaint filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, 1st
Class at Nasik. To that extent, the High Court was right in refusing to quash
the complaint under Section 500, IPC.
F
The appeal is accordingly allowed in part.

G.N. Appeal allowed in part.