Holding

The High Court erred; a child’s silence cannot be equated with an adult’s, and where medical and circumstantial evidence establish guilt, the conviction must stand.

Summary

In 1986 a minor girl (referred to as V) was found unconscious and bleeding after the accused Chatra allegedly raped her. The trial court convicted Chatra under Section 376 IPC based on medical evidence, circumstantial evidence and the testimony of a key eyewitness, Gulab Chand, despite the victim’s silence. The High Court reversed the conviction, holding that the child’s silence indicated innocence and that contradictions between the FIR and the witness’s statement created reasonable doubt. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that a child’s silence cannot be equated with that of an adult prosecutrix and that medical and circumstantial evidence sufficiently established guilt. The Court also ruled that discrepancies in the FIR were not material enough to overturn the prosecution’s case. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the acquittal, restored the trial court’s conviction, and ordered the respondent to surrender. The judgment reaffirms the principles governing the competency and credibility of child witnesses in sexual assault cases.

Issues considered

The conviction for rape of a minor can be sustained without the victim’s direct testimony.
Whether a child’s silence can be treated as evidence of innocence.
Whether contradictions between the FIR and a witness’s deposition are material to the prosecution case.
The adequacy of medical and circumstantial evidence to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The proper assessment of competency and credibility of child witnesses.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 376

Subjects

RapeChild victimChild witnessEvidence of a child witnessSexual assaultInjury to private partsSexual intercourseAbsence of evidence of the prosecutrixInjury on genital organMinor femaleForceful intercourseSilenceCircumstantial evidenceChain of circumstancesAbsence of the testimony of the prosecutrix

Judgment

[2025] 4 S.C.R. 95 : 2025 INSC 360

State of Rajasthan
v.
Chatra
(Criminal Appeal No. 586 of 2017)
18 March 2025
[Vikram Nath and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court erred in reversing the conviction of the
respondent-accused under Section 376, Penal Code, 1860 for the
rape of a minor girl and acquitting him.

Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – s.376 – Evidence of a child witness-victim –
Appreciation of – Rape of minor girl – High Court reversed
the conviction of the respondent-accused inter alia holding
that the victim-child witness was indifferent/silent about the
incident which was unlikely if the incident would have been
true, and acquitted him – Challenge to:
Held: There is no hard and fast rule qua testing the competency of a
child witness to testify at trial – In the present case, though the child
witness-victim (‘V’) did not depose anything about the commission
of the offence against her however, her silence cannot accrue to the
benefit of the respondent – Her silence cannot be equated with the
silence of a fully realised adult prosecutrix – There is no hard and
fast rule that in the absence of the testimony of the prosecutrix, a
conviction cannot stand, particularly when other evidence, medical
and circumstantial, is available pointing to such a conclusion – The
absence of evidence of the prosecutrix is, not in all cases, a negative
to be accounted for in the prosecution case – PW-14, the Doctor stated
that the cause of injury to ‘V’ can be through sexual intercourse – This
along with the finding of injury on the genital organ of the accused
being possible only due to forceful intercourse with a minor female,
leads to a circumstance pointing to the respondent having committed
the offense against ‘V’ – Acquittal of the respondent is set aside,
conviction restored – Circumstantial evidence. [Paras 14, 17, 20-22]
Evidence – Testimony of a child witness – Principles –
Discussed. [Para 14]

* Author
96 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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Case Law Cited
Hemudan Nanbha Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat [2018] 12 SCR 672 :
(2019) 17 SCC 523 – relied on.
Atley v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807; Geeta Devi v. State of
U.P [2022] 1 SCR 428; Bhupinder Sharma v. State of H.P. [2003]
Supp. 4 SCR 792 : (2003) 8 SCC 551; State of Karnataka v.
Puttaraja [2003] Supp. 6 SCR 274: (2004) 1 SCC 475; Dinesh v.
State of Rajasthan [2006] 2 SCR 793 : (2006) 3 SCC 771; Nipun
Saxena v. Union of India [2018] 14 SCR 755 : (2019) 2 SCC 703;
State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash [2002] 3 SCR 753 : (2002) 5
SCC 745; Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra (1997)
5 SCC 341; Hari Om v. State of U.P. [2021] 13 SCR 49 : (2021) 4
SCC 345; Suryanarayana v. State of Karnataka [2001] 1 SCR 1:
(2001) 9 SCC 129; State of H.P. v. Sanjay Kumar [2016] 9 SCR
237 : (2017) 2 SCC 51; Pradeep v. State of Haryana, 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 777; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025
INSC 261: 2025 SCC OnLine 390; State of M.P v. Ramesh [2011] 5
SCR 1 : (2011) 4 SCC 786; Panchhi v. State of U.P. [1998] Supp. 1
SCR 40 : (1998) 7 SCC 177; State of U.P. v. Ashok Dixit [2000] 1
SCR 855 : (2000) 3 SCC 70; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State
of Maharashtra [1985] SCR 88: (1984) 4 SCC 116; Ramakant
Rai v. Madan Rai [2003] Supp. 4 SCR 17 : (2003) 12 SCC 395;
K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. [1979] 2 SCR 363 : (1979) 1 SCC
355; State of Maharashtra v. Bandu alias Daulat (2018) 11 SCC
163; Patan Jamal Vali v. State of A.P [2021] 3 SCR 470 : (2021)
16 SCC 225; Mange v. State of Haryana (1979) 4 SCC 349; State
of Punjab v. Kartar Singh [1994] 2 SCR 375 : (1994) 3 SCC 569;
Sanjeev Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P [2015] 5 SCR 122 : (2015)
11 SCC 69 – referred to.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860.

List of Keywords
Rape; Child victim; Child witness; Evidence of a child witness;
Sexual assault; Injury to private parts; Sexual intercourse; Absence
of evidence of the prosecutrix; Injury on genital organ; Minor female;
Forceful intercourse; Silence; Circumstantial evidence; Chain of
circumstances; Absence of the testimony of the prosecutrix.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 97

State of Rajasthan v. Chatra

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
586 of 2017
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.07.2013 of the High Court
of Rajasthan at Jaipur in SBCRA No. 503 of 1987

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Ms. Sansriti Pathak, A.A.G., Milind Kumar.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Ranbir Singh Yadav, Prateek Yadav, Puran Mal Saini, Ms. Anzu
K. Varkey.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Sanjay Karol, J.

1. Nearly forty years ago, on 3rd March 1986 happened an incident,
that forever altered the trajectory of a minor girl’s life, who for the
purposes of this judgment, shall be referred to as ‘V’1. She was
discovered unconscious and bleeding from her private parts, by one
Gulab Chand, after the respondent-accused had allegedly subjected
her to sexual assault. The said Gulab Chand filed a report with the
concerned police station on 4th March, 19862 - and now by way of
this judgment, the matter shall be finally laid to rest. It is a matter of
great sadness that this minor girl and her family have to go through
nearly four decades of life, waiting to close this horrific chapter of
her/their lives.
2. The State is before us, being aggrieved by the finding of acquittal
recorded by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature
for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur3, vide judgment dated 12th July

1 Identity concealed
2 Crime No. 31/86
3 In S.B Criminal Appeal No. 503/1987
98 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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2013 which set aside the finding of conviction entered by learned
Sessions Judge, Tonk4 vide judgment dated 19th November 1987.
3. The FIR recorded the occurrence of incident in the following terms:-
“To,
The S.H.O.
Uniyara.
Sir,
Subject : With regard to the rape with ‘V’ D/o ‘X’5.
It is respectfully submitted that it is incident of about 1:30
hours that I had gone to handle well on hut of Khadda in
village Sureli, and as soon as I reached near the house
of Chhatra S/o Sukhdeva Jat then I heard sound of cry of
a little girl, where upon I entered into the house then the
dhoti of accused was in open condition and he ran outside
seeing me. I saw that ‘V’ who is daughter of ‘X’ was lying
unconscious and blood was oozing from her private part,
at that time Prabhu Kumhar came there on camel Lattha
from the side of Banatha, as such I sit with girl over the
Lattha of camel and brought her to house because neither
Mother of her was present in house and nor ‘X’. After some
time Savitri mother of ‘V’ came to our village but since any
means of conveyance was not available for going to police
station therefore report was not lodged. Primary treatment
was provided by calling nurse of Sureli and Private Sindhi
Doctor Siwad and thereafter today after coming from there
I had lodged report in police station.
Applicant – Gulab Chand
S/o Sunder Lal Caste Mahajan
R/o Sureli
Sd/-
Gulab Chand Gupta
Date 4.3.86”

4 Sessions Trial 26/86
5 Name of the father of the victim is also redacted for the purpose of protection of identity
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 99

State of Rajasthan v. Chatra

4. After completion of the investigation, the challan was presented to the
Court for trial. To prove its version of events, the prosecution examined
15 witnesses and exhibited 19 documents. The respondent-accused
termed it to be a false case that Gulab Chand had concocted since
he wanted the father of ‘V’ to vacate the house of the respondent-
accused. He put forth 2 witnesses and four documents in his defence.

TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT
5. The sole issue before the Trial Court was whether the respondent-
accused had sexually assaulted ‘V’ or not. A perusal of the judgments
reveals that the complainant, Gulab Chand who was examined as
PW-2 has been greatly relied on, supported by the deposition of
PW-14, Dr. Vasudev. Regarding the commission of sexual assault
against ‘V’, the finding is as under :
“39. In such situation when we again believe on deposition
of PW-2 Gulabchand then his such evidence that accused
committed forcible rape with PW-1 ‘V’ becomes believable
and in this regard deposition of PW-2 Gulabchand stands
corroborated from deposition of PW-14 Vasudev that what
injury in vagina of PW-1 ‘V’ was caused, that was caused
by forcible sexual intercourse and that sexual intercourse
was forcibly committed by accused with PW-1. PW-14 Dr.
Vasudev has stated even to the extent that the hymen of
PW-1 ‘V’ was completely fresh ruptured and her forshite
and posterior commissions ruptured and doctor has also
stated that if there was slight more penetration then the
penis would have reached in stomach of girl after rupturing
uterus and by which death of girl might have caused.
Thus from the evidence of this doctor it is clear that what
penetration was done by accused in vagina of PW-1 that
was grievous and from doing such whatever ingredients
in section 375 IPC are told are fulfilled.”
There was an issue of motive raised by the counsel for the accused.
However, neither that nor the possibility that the injury sustained by
‘V’ was as a result of injury by a nail found favour with the Court.
There was also the aspect of the FIR being lodged on the next
day. On this issue, the Trial Court held that given P.S. Uniyara,
was situated 14 kms. away from the village where the incident took
100 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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place, i.e., Sureli, and that the injuries sustained by ‘V’ were quite
severe, the delay was held to be justified. It was finally held that the
respondent-accused had indeed committed the offence punishable
under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 18606, and he was,
vide order of sentencing dated 19th November 1987 sentenced to
7 years rigorous imprisonment instead of 10 years given that he
was a first-time offender and at the relevant time of the offence he
was aged only 21 years. He was further sentenced to pay a fine of
Rs.500/- in default and one month of simple imprisonment.

IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
6. The respondent-accused aggrieved by the sentence awarded to
him, carried the matter in appeal to the High Court. By way of a
judgment running into all of 6 pages, the findings of guilt returned
by the Trial Court were upturned and the respondent-accused was
acquitted of the charges against him. Suffice it to say that we are
surprised with the manner in which this matter was dealt with by the
High Court. As the First Appellate Court, the High Court is expected
to independently assess the evidence before it before confirming
or disturbing the findings of the Court below. This is the settled
position of law. [See: Atley v. State of U.P.;7 and Geeta Devi v.
State of U.P. etc.8 ]. Clearly, the same has not been followed. The
discussion on merits of the matter by the High Court is reproduced
herein below :
“The statement of PW-2 Gulab Chand, the central witness
of the prosecution, as recorded in Ex.D-1, assumes
importance. A bare perusal of that document reveals that he
is stated to have witnessed the appellant to be engaged in
the act of forcible sexual intercourse with the victim, when
he entered the room. This runs counter to the narration
made in his written report on which the investigation
was initiated as well as his deposition at the trial. PW-10
Prabhu also has not supported him in full. His statement
that his attention was drawn by the cries of the victim is

6 Hereafter ‘IPC’
7 AIR 1955 SC 807
8 Criminal Appeal No.78 of 2022
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 101

State of Rajasthan v. Chatra

belied by her statement that she was found unconscious
and unable to speak.
Though the victim, ‘V’9 was a child at the time of her
examination in Court, it is unlikely that if the incident
would have been true she would have been so indifferent
and inert as she happened to be when asked about the
same. It seems that no attempt as well had been made
to brief her in this regard. Though keeping her age in
mind, the incident even if had occurred in the manner as
projected by the prosecution, could have been forgotten
by her, it is not acceptable that if true, the parents or her
relations would have made no attempt to have at least the
skeletal facts narrated in court through her. This assumes
importance in view of the consistent stand taken on behalf
of the defence that the appellant had been framed due
to subsisting dispute between him and the father of the
victim. Though the medical evidence proves injury on her
private parts, the Forensic Science Laboratory report does
not show the presence of semen in the frock of the victim,
the lungi on which she was laid by Gulab Chand (PW-2)
and also the blood smeared soil by the police. The varying
versions of Gulab Chand is also a factor which strikes at
the trustworthiness of the prosecution case.
On a cumulative consideration of all the above, I am thus
of the view that the prosecution has not been able to prove
the charge beyond all reasonable doubt, and that, the
appellant is entitled to the benefit thereof. The impugned
judgment and order is set aside. The appeal is allowed.
The appellant stands discharged from his bail bonds.
While acknowledging the assistance rendered by
Mr. Raunak Singhvi, learned amicus curiae, this Court
directs payment of his professional fee of Rs.5000/- to be
borne by the State Government.”
7. We note with some surprise that the High Court has referred to the
victim by name throughout. This Court in judgments, going at least

9 Name redacted
102 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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a decade further back from the date of the impugned judgment,
has highlighted the importance of abiding by such a restriction,
preserving the privacy of the unfortunate victim, even though the
restriction does not expressly apply to the High Court or this Court.
[See: Bhupinder Sharma v. State of H.P.;10 State of Karnataka v.
Puttaraja;11 and Dinesh v. State of Rajasthan12 ] We have redacted
the name of the child victim. The record as it is before us, does not
conceal the name of the prosecutrix, however, considering the fact
that the directions in Nipun Saxena v. Union of India13 were issued
in the pendency of this appeal, her name stands redacted even in
the portion quoted from the record.
8. In ordinary circumstances, given the fleeting consideration bestowed
on the merits of the matter, an order of remand to the High Court for
consideration afresh, could have been a permissible view, however
as already noted supra the genesis of this case is 40 years old, and,
therefore, justice would not be served by adopting this approach,
especially taking note of the fact that an appeal of the year 1987 was
disposed of by the impugned judgment in the year 2013. In other
words, it took twenty-six years for the criminal appeal to be disposed
of. As such, we now proceed to examine the evidence on record.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
9. The mainstay of the reasoning of the High Court are the statements
of PW-1, ‘V’, PW-2, and PW-10.
The relevant extract of the statement of the victim (PW -1) is as
follows :

“Question : Are you studying.
Ans : Yes I am studying.

Question : In which standard are you studying.
Ans : I am studying in 1st standard.

10 (2003) 8 SCC 551
11 (2004) 1 SCC 475
12 (2006) 3 SCC 771
13 (2019) 2 SCC 703
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 103

State of Rajasthan v. Chatra

Question : Do you know meaning of smell.
Ans : Yes.

Question : Should speak lie or should speak truth?
Ans : Should speak truth.
Note :- The witness knows meaning of truth, although has
small age. The mother of witness is present in the court
with the witness. The learned counsel for the accused has
objection that mother of witness will have to go outside the
court as she is also witness in the matter. As the mother
of the witness is not eye-witness of the occurrence and
is a witness of facts after the occurrence and witness has
small age and not capable in standing in the court room
in absence of mother, therefore, on the prayer of P.P.,
the permission of presence of mother in the court room
granted and instructed not to suggest any answer to the
witness to the questions asked to the witness.

Question : Do you know the accused?
Ans: Said yes by nodding neck

Question: Do you know the name of the accused?
Ans: Witness is not giving answers on aking repeatedly
and keeps silent.

Question: What happens with you and when?
Ans: The learned P.P., her mother and Court repeatedly
explained to give answer, but witness keeps mum and
not speak a single word. Tears were flowing from eyes
on much pressure, but not speak from mouth”

PW-2 Gulab Chand :
“…when I open the door I have seen that accused Chatra,
he was present in the court was seating upon her on that
time. When accused saw me he ran away from the room
accused dhoti was open and lying on there. When I sent
to support her at that time she was in a unconscious
104 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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condition and the blood was oozing from her private part,
on back side of her body one white cloth was lying down
on which blood stain was there …
... On Exhibit B-1 there is no mentioing about the accused
seating upon the girl ‘V’, How they cannot remember to
write about this on their report I don’t know. On Exhibit
D-1 about this nothing is mentioned, I told to the police
about this. On Exhibit B-1, they did not wrote on a report
about the piece of cloth choke inside the mouth of ‘V’,
so that she cannot shout at that time, when I opened
the door accused saw me and ran away at that time.
Therefore, I cannot say that at that time when accused
was above [‘V’] at that time accused arms was open
or not.”

PW-10 Prabhu14 :
“… I came near the hut of Khadda to find that X’s daughter
was unconscious at the ‘Bayana Chabootri’. I then went
to drop off the load I was carrying on the cart, and then
proceeded towards Sureli, and then stopped of at the
house of PW-2 Gulabchand. There was no other male
with me, in the cart at that time. The child was in a bad
state and her clothes were soiled with blood. There was
blood oozing out from her private parts. I did not see the
accused at the spot of the crime.
…
The police did not question me. It is wrong to say that
when I reached Khadda’s hut, at that time the accused
Vatar/Chatra was running away from the scene catching
a hold of his dhoti, towards the riverbank.”
10. At this stage, let us consider the other witnesses relevant to the
prosecution case. PW-14, the doctor, testified as follows:
“....I medically examine the accused Chatra on 13.03.86,
On his penis top, scratch spot was found and on his penis

14 Translated from the original record
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 105

State of Rajasthan v. Chatra

swelling was found, and scratch was also found. These
type of wound can only be found by forcefully inter-course
with minor girl.....
.....
“....At the time of examination there was no blood oozing
from the private part of ‘V’ but the blood spot was found
all round the private part. In ‘V’ private inside by seeing
from microscope I did not find spermatozoa. In 3 years
old child the distance between the private part inside inner
kennel and uterus, are very less the if the penetration
will be more, then the pennies will torn the uterus and
penetrate till the stomach of the girl due to which the girl
can die. There was injury in inner kennel but there is no
injury in uterus….”
11. PW-3, Savitri, the mother of ‘V’ testified that she had to go to
a neighbouring village since someone there had passed away.
When she left her village, she had entrusted the care of ‘V’ to the
respondent accused. When she returned from having attended the
funeral procession in the neighbouring village, she was informed
by the women of her village that ‘V’ had been injured and taken
to Sureli. She also went there subsequently and found that ‘V’
was unconscious. She has positively identified the clothes worn
by the victim. The nurse at the hospital informed her that ‘V’ had
been raped.
DW-1 is the brother of the respondent-accused. He testified that ‘X’
was a tenant of theirs and had been asked to vacate said dwelling,
but he refused to do so. He further testified that PW-2 Gulab Chand
had bribed the doctor with Rs.4,000/-, for him to say in the report that
‘V’ had been sexually assaulted. Further, it was said that the doctor
asked him to pay Rs.7,000/- and if paid, so the report was to say
that ‘V’ was not raped. He did not pay the money and instead lodged
complaints which fell on deaf ears. He denies that Savitri, PW-3 had
left ‘V’ in the care of the accused and that he had committed sexual
assault against her.
12. Let us now consider pronouncements of this Court in cases involving
a child victim of sexual assault.
106 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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In State of Rajasthan v. Om Prakash15 this Court sounded a
warning against offences of sexual nature against children, in the
following terms:
“19. Child rape cases are cases of perverse lust for sex
where even innocent children are not spared in pursuit of
sexual pleasure. There cannot be anything more obscene
than this. It is a crime against humanity. Many such cases
are not even brought to light because of the social stigma
attached thereto. According to some surveys, there has
been a steep rise in child rape cases. Children need special
care and protection. In such cases, responsibility on the
shoulders of the courts is more onerous so as to provide
proper legal protection to these children. Their physical
and mental immobility call for such protection. Children are
the natural resource of our country. They are the country›s
future. Hope of tomorrow rests on them. In our country,
a girl child is in a very vulnerable position and one of the
modes of her exploitation is rape besides other modes
of sexual abuse. These factors point towards a different
approach required to be adopted…”
In numerous cases, this Court as well as others, have discussed
the applicability of the statement of a child witness to a case. We
may notice a few of them:
In Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra16 this Court held :
“5….A child witness if found competent to depose to the
facts and reliable one such evidence could be the basis
of conviction. In other words even in the absence of oath
the evidence of a child witness can be considered under
Section 118 of the Evidence Act provided that such witness
is able to understand the questions and able to give rational
answers thereof. The evidence of a child witness and
credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances
of each case. The only precaution which the court should
bear in mind while assessing the evidence of a child

15 (2002) 7 SCC 745
16 (1997) 5 SCC 341
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 107

State of Rajasthan v. Chatra

witness is that the witness must be a reliable one and his/
her demeanour must be like any other competent witness
and there is no likelihood of being tutored…”
In Hari Om v. State of U.P.,17 a three-Judge Bench reiterated
the caution observed by this Court in Suryanarayana v. State of
Karnataka,18 that “corroboration of the testimony of a child witness
is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence”. It was further
observed therein :
“6. This Court in Panchhi v. State of U.P. [Panchhi v. State
of U.P., (1998) 7 SCC 177 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1561] held
that the evidence of the child witness must be evaluated
more carefully and with greater circumspection because a
child is susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him
and thus an easy prey to tutoring. The evidence of the
child witness must find adequate corroboration before it
is relied upon, as the rule of corroboration is of practical
wisdom than of law (vide Prakash v. State of M.P. [Prakash
v. State of M.P., (1992) 4 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 853];
Baby Kandayanathil v. State of Kerala [Baby Kandayanathil
v. State of Kerala, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 667 : 1993 SCC
(Cri) 1084]; Raja Ram Yadav v. State of Bihar [Raja Ram
Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1996) 9 SCC 287 : 1996 SCC (Cri)
1004] and Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra
[Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra, (1997)
5 SCC 341 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 685]).
7. To the same effect is the judgment in State of U.P. v.
Ashok Dixit [State of U.P. v. Ashok Dixit, (2000) 3 SCC
70 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 579] .”
13. The rule regarding child witnesses was laid down by the US Supreme
Court as far back as 189519 in the following terms :
“5. … While no one would think of calling as a witness
an infant only two or three years old, there is no precise
age which determines the question of competency. This

17 (2021) 4 SCC 345
18 (2001) 9 SCC 129
19 Wheeler v. United States, 1895 SCC OnLine US SC 220
108 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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depends on the capacity and intelligence of the child,
his appreciation of the difference between truth and
falsehood, as well as of his duty to tell the former. The
decision of this question rests primarily with the trial
Judge, who sees the proposed witness, notices his
manner, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence,
and may resort to any examination which will tend to
disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his
understanding of the obligations of an oath. As many of
these matters cannot be photographed into the record
the decision of the trial Judge will not be disturbed on
review unless from that which is preserved it is clear
that it was erroneous.”
In interpreting the evidence given by a child victim of sexual assault,
this Court in State of H.P. v. Sanjay Kumar,20 held that social realities
have to be given due attention. It was observed by Sikri J., writing
for the Court that :
“30. By no means, it is suggested that whenever such
charge of rape is made, where the victim is a child, it has
to be treated as a gospel truth and the accused person
has to be convicted. We have already discussed above
the manner in which the testimony of the prosecutrix
is to be examined and analysed in order to find out
the truth therein and to ensure that deposition of the
victim is trustworthy. At the same time, after taking all
due precautions which are necessary, when it is found
that the prosecution version is worth believing, the case
is to be dealt with all sensitivity that is needed in such
cases. In such a situation one has to take stock of the
realities of life as well. Various studies show that in
more than 80% cases of such abuses, perpetrators have
acquaintance with the victims who are not strangers.
The danger is more within than outside. Most of the
time, acquaintance rapes, when the culprit is a family
member, are not even reported for various reasons, not
difficult to fathom. The strongest among those is the

20 (2017) 2 SCC 51
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 109

State of Rajasthan v. Chatra

fear of attracting social stigma. Another deterring factor
which many times prevents such victims or their families
to lodge a complaint is that they find whole process of
criminal justice system extremely intimidating coupled with
absence of victim protection mechanism. Therefore, time
is ripe to bring about significant reforms in the criminal
justice system as well. Equally, there is also a dire need
to have a survivor-centric approach towards victims of
sexual violence, particularly, the children, keeping in
view the traumatic long-lasting effects on such victims.”
In Pradeep v. State of Haryana,21 it was held that the role of the trial
Judge, when a case involves a child witness, becomes heightened.
The Court recorded :
“10. Before recording evidence of a minor, it is the duty
of a Judicial Officer to ask preliminary questions to him
with a view to ascertain whether the minor can understand
the questions put to him and is in a position to give
rational answers. The Judge must be satisfied that the
minor is able to understand the questions and respond
to them and understands the importance of speaking
the truth. Therefore, the role of the Judge who records
the evidence is very crucial. He has to make a proper
preliminary examination of the minor by putting appropriate
questions to ascertain whether the minor is capable of
understanding the questions put to him and is able to give
rational answers. It is advisable to record the preliminary
questions and answers so that the Appellate Court can
go into the correctness of the opinion of the Trial Court.”
In Sooryanarayana v. State of Karnataka22 referred to by a Bench
of three Judges in Hari Om v. State of U.P.,23 it has been held thus :
“5. Admittedly, Bhavya (PW 2), who at the time of
occurrence was about four years of age, is the only
solitary eyewitness who was rightly not given the oath.

21 2023 SCC OnLine SC 777
22 (2001) 9 SCC 129
23 (2021) 4 SCC 345
110 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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The time and place of the occurrence and the attending
circumstances of the case suggest no possibility of there
being any other person as an eyewitness. The evidence
of the child witness cannot be rejected per se, but the
court, as a rule of prudence, is required to consider such
evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced
about the quality of the statements and its reliability,
base conviction by accepting the statement of the child
witness. The evidence of PW 2 cannot be discarded
only on the ground of her being of tender age. The fact
of PW 2 being a child witness would require the court to
scrutinise her evidence with care and caution. If she is
shown to have stood the test of cross-examination and
there is no infirmity in her evidence, the prosecution can
rightly claim a conviction based upon her testimony alone.
Corroboration of the testimony of a child witness is not
a rule but a measure of caution and prudence. Some
discrepancies in the statement of a child witness cannot be
made the basis for discarding the testimony. Discrepancies
in the deposition, if not in material particulars, would lend
credence to the testimony of a child witness who, under
the normal circumstances, would like to mix-up what the
witness saw with what he or she is likely to imagine to
have seen. While appreciating the evidence of the child
witness, the courts are required to rule out the possibility
of the child being tutored. In the absence of any allegation
regarding tutoring or using the child witness for ulterior
purposes of the prosecution, the courts have no option
but to rely upon the confidence inspiring testimony of
such witness for the purposes of holding the accused
guilty or not.”
Recently, a coordinate Bench of this Court in State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Balveer Singh24 speaking through J.B. Pardiwala, J.,
considered a large number of prior decisions of this Court to lay down
guidelines for the appreciation of the evidence of a child witness.
We have perused through the same.

24 2025 SCC OnLine 390; 2025 INSC 261
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 111

State of Rajasthan v. Chatra

Reference can also be made to other judgments in State of M.P v.
Ramesh;25 Panchhi v. State of U.P.;26 and State of U.P. v. Ashok
Dixit,27 etc.
14. The principles that can be adduced from an overview of the aforesaid
decisions, are:
a. No hard and fast rule can be laid down qua testing the
competency of a child witness to testify at trial.
b. Whether or not a given child witness will testify is a matter of
the Trial Judge being satisfied as to the ability and competence
of said witness. To determine the same the Judge is to look
to the manner of the witness, intelligence, or lack thereof, as
may be apparent; an understanding of the distinction between
truth and falsehood etc.
c. The non-administration of oath to a child witness will not render
their testimony doubtful or unusable.
d. The trial Judge must be alive to the possibility of the child witness
being swayed, influenced and tutored, for in their innocence,
such matters are of ease for those who may wish to influence
the outcome of the trial, in one direction or another.
e. Seeking corroboration, therefore, of the testimony of a child
witness, is well-placed practical wisdom.
f. There is no bar to cross-examination of a child witness. If said
witness has withstood the cross-examination, the prosecution
would be entirely within their rights to seek conviction even
solely relying thereon.
15. This case rests also on circumstantial evidence. The law on that
count is crystal clear. When a conviction is based on circumstantial
evidence, the chain of circumstances must be so complete that it
rules out all other possible hypotheses other than the guilt of the
accused. The most well-recognized judgment is Sharad Birdhichand

25 (2011) 4 SCC 786
26 (1998) 7 SCC 177
27 (2000) 3 SCC 70
112 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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Sarda v. State of Maharashtra28 wherein S. Murtaza Fazal Ali J.,
laid down the following Panchsheel Principles :
“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that
the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case
against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may
be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a
legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be
or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC
793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where
the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC
(Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the
accused must be and not merely may be guilty
before a court can convict and the mental
distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is
long and divides vague conjectures from sure
conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say,
they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis
except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature
and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except
the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as
not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and must

28 (1984) 4 SCC 116
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 113

State of Rajasthan v. Chatra

show that in all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused.”
16. Also important to consider is the degree of certainty required, in a
given set of facts and circumstances, before a person can be either
convicted or acquitted of a crime. This question engaged the Court
in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai,29 wherein it was observed :
“23. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be
convicted of an offence which is not established by the
evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Though this standard is a higher standard, there is,
however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability
amounts to “proof” is an exercise particular to each case.
Referring to (sic) of probability amounts to “proof” is
an exercise, the interdependence of evidence and the
confirmation of one piece of evidence by another, as
learned author says : [see The Mathematics of Proof II :
Glanville Williams, Criminal Law Review, 1979, by Sweet
and Maxwell, p. 340 (342)]
“The simple multiplication rule does not apply if
the separate pieces of evidence are dependent.
Two events are dependent when they tend
to occur together, and the evidence of such
events may also be said to be dependent. In
a criminal case, different pieces of evidence
directed to establishing that the defendant did
the prohibited act with the specified state of
mind are generally dependent. A juror may feel
doubt whether to credit an alleged confession,
and doubt whether to infer guilt from the fact
that the defendant fled from justice. But since
it is generally guilty rather than innocent people
who make confessions, and guilty rather than
innocent people who run away, the two doubts
are not to be multiplied together. The one piece
of evidence may confirm the other.”

29 (2003) 12 SCC 395
114 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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24. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free
from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford
any favourite other than the truth. To constitute reasonable
doubt, it must be free from an over emotional response.
Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt
of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from
the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions.
A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely
possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and
common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the
case.
25. The concepts of probability, and the degrees of it,
cannot obviously be expressed in terms of units to be
mathematically enumerated as to how many of such
units constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. There
is an unmistakable subjective element in the evaluation
of the degrees of probability and the quantum of proof.
Forensic probability must, in the last analysis, rest on
a robust common sense and, ultimately, on the trained
intuitions of the judge. While the protection given by the
criminal process to the accused persons is not to be
eroded, at the same time, uninformed legitimisation of
trivialities would make a mockery of the administration of
criminal justice. This position was illuminatingly stated by
Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then was) in State
of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal [(1988) 4 SCC 302 : 1988 SCC
(Cri) 928 : AIR 1988 SC 2154].”
16.1 Observations by O. Chinappa Reddy J., in K. Gopal Reddy v.
State of A.P.30 are also instructive. He observed :
“9. … “A reasonable doubt”, it has been remarked, “does
not mean some light, airy, insubstantial doubt that may
flit through the minds of any of us about almost anything
at some time or other; it does not mean a doubt begotten
by sympathy out of reluctance to convict; it means a real
doubt, a doubt founded upon reasons [ Salmon, J. in his
charge to the jury in R. v. Fantle reported in 1959 Criminal

30 (1979) 1 SCC 355
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 115

State of Rajasthan v. Chatra

Law Review 584] . As observed by Lord Denning in Miller v.
Minister of Pensions [(1947) 2 All ER 372] “Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond a shadow
of a doubt. The law would fail to protect the community
if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of
justice. If the evidence is so strong against a man as to
leave only a remote possibility in his favour, which can
be dismissed with the sentence “of course it is possible
but not in the least probable”, the case is proved beyond
reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that will suffice.”
In Khem Karan v. State of U.P. [(1974) 4 SCC 603 : 1974
SCC (Cri) 689 : AIR 1974 SC 1567] this Court observed:
“Neither mere possibilities nor remote possibilities
nor mere doubts which are not reasonable can,
without danger to the administration of justice,
be the foundation of the acquittal of an accused
person, if there is otherwise fairly credible
testimony.”
17. Having considered the principles of law as above, let us now proceed
further. We have independently examined the evidence of the witness,
by placing reliance on whom the Trial Court recorded the conviction of
respondent-accused, which was erroneously appreciated by the High
Court, the same was reversed by the High Court. The child witness
(victim), it is true, has not deposed anything about the commission
of the offence against her. When asked about the incident, the trial
Judge records that ‘V’ was silent, and upon being further asked, only
shed silent tears and nothing more. Nothing could be elicited from the
testimony regarding the commission of the offence. This, in our view,
cannot be used as a factor in favour of the respondent. The tears
of ‘V’, have to be understood for what they are worth. This silence
cannot accrue to the benefit of the respondent. The silence here is
that of a child. It cannot be equated with the silence of a fully realised
adult prosecutrix, which again would have to be weighed in its own
circumstances. It has been held in Hemudan Nanbha Gadhvi v. State
of Gujarat,31 that a nine-year-old prosecutrix turning hostile would
not be a fatal blow to the prosecution case when other evidence can

31 (2019) 17 SCC 523
116 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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establish the guilt of the accused. In these facts, ‘V’ has not turned
hostile. Trauma has engulfed her in silence. It would be unfair to
burden her young shoulders with the weight of the entire prosecution.
A child traumatized at a tender age by this ghastly imposition upon
her has to be relieved of being the basis on which her offender can
be put behind bars. In almost all other cases, the testimony of the
prosecutrix is present and forms an essential part of the conviction
of an accused, but at the same time, there is no hard and fast rule
that in the absence of such a statement a conviction cannot stand,
particularly when other evidence, medical and circumstantial, is
available pointing to such a conclusion. Reference can be made
to State of Maharashtra v. Bandu alias Daulat,32 wherein the
prosecutrix was “deaf and dumb and mentally retarded”. The Court
held that even in the absence of her being examined as a witness,
other evidence on record was sufficient to record conviction of the
accused. The principle of law, therefore, is that if the prosecutrix is
unable to testify, or for some justifiable reason remains unexamined,
the possibility of conviction is automatically excluded. At this stage, it
is important to record that we should not for a moment be understood
saying that a person with a disability is by definition an incompetent
witness. This Court in Patan Jamal Vali v. State of A.P.33 frowned
upon an earlier observation made by this Court in Mange v. State
of Haryana,34 wherein the Court observed “apart from being a child
witness, she was also deaf and dumb and no useful purpose would
have been served by examining her.” It was held in para 48 as under :
“48. This kind of a judicial attitude stems from and
perpetuates the underlying bias and stereotypes against
persons with disabilities. We are of the view that the
testimony of a prosecutrix with a disability, or of a disabled
witness for that matter, cannot be considered weak or
inferior, only because such an individual interacts with
the world in a different manner, vis-à-vis their able-bodied
counterparts. As long as the testimony of such a witness
otherwise meets the criteria for inspiring judicial confidence,
it is entitled to full legal weight. It goes without saying

32 (2018) 11 SCC 163
33 (2021) 16 SCC 225
34 (1979) 4 SCC 349
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 117

State of Rajasthan v. Chatra

that the court appreciating such testimony needs to be
attentive to the fact that the witness’ disability can have
the consequence of the testimony being rendered in a
different form, relative to that of an able-bodied witness.
In the case at hand, for instance, PW 2’s blindness meant
that she had no visual contact with the world. Her primary
mode of identifying those around her, therefore, is by the
sound of their voice. And so PW 2’s testimony is entitled
to equal weight as that of a prosecutrix who would have
been able to visually identify the appellant.”
(Emphasis supplied)

We fully endorse this view. The upshot of the discussion is that the
absence of evidence of the prosecutrix is, not in all cases, a negative
to be accounted for in the prosecution case.
18. Therefore, we move to the statement of the other witnesses. The
ground adopted by the High Court in disbelieving the statement
of PW-2 is that there was a material contradiction between his
statement which formed part of the FIR, and his deposition before
the Court. The FIR, as reproduced supra, states that when PW-2
reached the spot of the offence, the garment worn by the accused
(Dhoti) was in loose, open condition and he ran out upon seeing the
deponent. Whereas, in the deposition made before the Court, also
reproduced supra, the statement is to the effect that when he saw
the accused, he was bent down and ‘seated’ upon the victim, which
he had allegedly mentioned to the authorities, and they neglected
to mention the same in the report. At this juncture, it is important to
note the testimony of PW-2 does not reveal whether he is able to
read/write, it does not speak to the factum of who wrote the report,
and neither is it clear that if someone else, that is a scribe, wrote
the report, as to whether he was examined or not.
19. The question that arises for consideration is whether this contradiction
in the FIR versus the statement made in Court is material, in as
much as, to discredit his statement, thereby landing a fatal blow to
the prosecution case. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of
Punjab v. Kartar Singh35 speaking through Pandian J., held that the

35 (1994) 3 SCC 569
118 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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purpose of cross-examination is to discredit the witness/elicit facts
from such person, which may favour the other party, etc. Having gone
through the cross-examination of this witness, we find none of these
criteria to have been met. Even this discrepancy was not put to him
so as to get an answer from the witness in this regard. That apart,
we may also take note of what has been held in Sanjeev Kumar
Gupta v. State of U.P.36. In the said case, a coordinate Bench of
this Court was confronted with a similar situation while deciding an
appeal arising from the High Court of Uttarakhand. There was a
discrepancy in the statement made in the FIR and the deposition
in Court. It was held that whether the discrepancy is material or not
so, is a determination to be made in the facts and circumstances
of the case. It was held that since evidence of other nature, such
as the medical evidence, supports the prosecution case, then the
contradiction is to be judged in that light, as was done in that case.
20. We have examined the evidence of PW-14. The version suggested
by the defence that the injury caused to the private part of ‘V’ could
not have been caused by a nail or an all-pin. Further attempt to
discredit the evidence of the Doctor by suggesting that he had, in fact,
given his findings, influenced by a bribe, is only a mere allegation/
statement, as the same is entirely unsubstantiated by the record.
Even on being queried by the Court, the witness answered that
the cause of injury to ‘V’ can be through sexual intercourse, or an
accident. That, coupled with the finding of injury on the genital organ
of the accused being possible only due to forceful intercourse with
a minor female, leads to a circumstance pointing to the respondent-
accused having committed the offense against ‘V’.
21. The possibility of animosity between the accused and the father of ‘V’
has not been established to the point that it would represent a crack
in the wall of the prosecution case, giving rise to reasonable doubt.
22. As a consequence of the above discussion, the appeal is allowed.
The judgment of acquittal entered by the learned Single Judge of
the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur,
in S.B Criminal Appeal No.503/1987 is set aside, and the judgment
of conviction returned by the Sessions Judge, Tonk, by judgment
dated 19th November 1987 in Sessions Trial No.26/86 is restored. The

36 (2015) 11 SCC 69
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 119

State of Rajasthan v. Chatra

respondent-accused is directed to surrender before the competent
authority within four weeks from the date of this judgment, to serve
out the sentence as awarded by the learned Trial Court, if not
already served.
Pending Application(s) if any, shall stand closed.
Original records of the case be sent back to the concerned Court.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey