STATE OF RAJASTHANversusSURENDRA SINGH RATHORE

                 [2025] 3 S.C.R. 193 : 2025 INSC 248

                           State of Rajasthan
                                    v.
                         Surendra Singh Rathore
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 847 of 2025)
                               19 February 2025
           [Sanjay Karol* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Issue arose as to whether the registration of the subsequent FIR
       is legally permissible and whether the High Court was correct in
       exercising its inherent powers in quashing the same.

                                   Headnotes†
       FIR – Second FIR – Registration of – Permissibility – When – FIR
       registered against the respondent-Chief Executive Officer-cum-
       Project Director, Bio-fuel Authority, for allegedly demanding
       bribe for the sale of bio-diesel and for renewal of the license of
       the complainant, u/s.7 and 7A of the P.C. Act – Subsequently,
       second FIR registered against the respondent for taking bribes
       to grant licenses to run bio-fuel pumps – Middlemen, put on
       surveillance and details of the alleged conspiracy recorded
       in detail – Respondent sought quashing of the second FIR –
       Allowed by the High Court – Justification:
       Held: Registration of second FIR permissible when it is counter-
       complaint or presents a rival version of a set of facts, in reference
       to which an earlier FIR already stands registered; when the ambit
       of the two FIRs is different even though they may arise from
       the same set of circumstances; when investigation and/or other
       avenues reveal the earlier FIR or set of facts to be part of a larger
       conspiracy; when investigation and/or persons related to the incident
       bring to the light hitherto unknown facts or circumstances; and
       where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different –
       On facts, the High Court found that the two FIRs were indeed in
       regard to the same offence and, thus, not maintainable, however,
       the scope of the two FIRs, are distinct – FIR prior in point of
       time refers to a particular incident and the action taken therein is


* Author
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       limited – Second FIR pertains to the larger issue of widespread
       corruption in the concerned department and, thus, is much larger
       in its scope than the previous FIR – Quashing of the FIR would
       stop the investigation into such corruption which would be against
       the interest of society – Thus, the impugned judgment set aside
       and the second FIR restored on the file and ordered continuation
       of investigation. [Paras 9-12]

                               Case Law Cited
       Babu Bhai v. State of Gujarat [2010] 10 SCR 651 : (2010) 12 SCC
       254; T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala [2001] 3 SCR 942 : (2001) 6
       SCC 181; Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P. [2012] 13 SCR 901 :
       (2013) 6 SCC 384; Kari Choudhary v. Sita Devi [2001] Supp. 5
       SCR 588 : (2002) 1 SCC 714; Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash (2004)
       13 SCC 292; Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab [2008]
       14 SCR 1049 : (2009) 1 SCC 441; Ram Lal Narang v. State
       (Delhi Admn.) [1979] 2 SCR 923 : (1979) 2 SCC 322; Surender
       Kaushik v. State of U.P. [2013] 1 SCR 1053 : (2013) 5 SCC 148;
       P. Sreekumar v. State of Kerala [2018] 3 SCR 665 : (2018) 4 SCC
       579 – referred to.

                                 List of Acts
       Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018; Penal Code,
       1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

                              List of Keywords
       FIR; Second FIR; Maintainability of second FIR; Widespread
       corruption; Inherent powers of the High Court to quash; Quashing
       of second FIR; Anti-Corruption Bureau; Demand of Bribe; Bio-fuel
       authority; Abuse of process of law; Chief Executive Officer-cum-
       Project Director of Bio-fuel Authority; Demand of bribe for sale
       of bio-diesel; Renewal of license of bio-diesel; Continuation of
       investigation; Larger conspiracy.

                             Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       847 of 2025
       From the Judgment and Order dated 09.09.2022 of the High Court
       of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in SBCRM No. 4366 of 2022
[2025] 3 S.C.R.                                                          195

                       State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore


                                 Appearances for Parties
       Shiv Mangal Sharma, A.A.G., Ms. Saubhagya Sundriyal, Rustam
       Singh Chauhan, Ms. Nidhi Jaswal, Advs. for the Appellant.
       Maninder Singh, Sr. Adv., Anand Varma, Ayush Gupta, Ranga
       Sharan, Advs. for the Respondent.

                         Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                       Judgment

       Sanjay Karol, J.

       Leave granted.
2.     This appeal arises out of final judgment and order dated 9th September,
       2022 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan Bench
       at Jaipur in S.B.Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No.4366 of 2022,
       whereby the respondent’s prayer for quashing of FIR No.131 of
       2022 dated 14th April 2022 registered at District Bikaner with Police
       Station Pradhan Arakshi Kendra, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Jaipur,
       for the offences punishable under Sections 7, 7A, 8 and 12 of the
       Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 20181 and Section 120-B
       of the Indian Penal Code, 1860,2 was allowed. The State, aggrieved
       by the quashing of FIR, is before us.
3.     The brief facts giving rise to the present lis are as under: -
       3.1. Three persons, namely, Vipin Parihar, Chief Marketing Officer,
            Fern Bio-fuel Private Limited, his business partner Deven Shah
            and Satya Narayan Saini S.D. of Kusum Petro Chemicals,
            lodged a complaint with the Anti-Corruption Bureau to the
            effect that the respondent, who is employed as Chief Executive
            Officer-cum-Project Director, Bio-fuel Authority, Government of
            Rajasthan, allegedly demanded a bribe @ Rs.2/- per litre for
            the sale of bio-diesel, i.e., Rs.15 lakhs per month with a further
            Rs.5 lakhs for renewal of the license of the complainant. This
            FIR is numbered as 123 of 2022 under Sections 7 and 7A of
            the P.C. Act. This demand took place on 4th April 2022.


1    P.C. Act
2    ‘IPC’ for short
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       3.2. A second FIR was lodged on 14th April 2022 for the incidents
            which took place between 30th September 2021 to 12th April
            2022 when one Mr. Shyam Prakash, Constable with the Anti-
            Corruption Bureau, brought information to the notice of Mr.
            Parsamal, DSP, that amongst other persons the respondent
            is indulging in taking bribes to grant licenses to run bio-fuel
            pumps. One Nimba Ram and Ashish were the middlemen,
            who were put on surveillance after due permission from the
            competent authority.
       3.3. This FIR running into nearly 30 pages, details the alleged
            conspiracy of which the respondent was a part and records in
            considerable detail the calls received and made by the various
            persons involved in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy.
4.     The respondent aggrieved by the registration of the second FIR,
       preferred a petition under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code
       1973.3 Grounds for seeking quashing inter alia are as follows :-
       (a)     No fresh incident is disclosed by the second FIR. If fresh
               information comes to light, it is submitted even after the final
               report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. has been submitted, the course
               to be adopted is not a fresh FIR but further investigation after
               due permission and then the filing of a supplementary report.
       (b)     The filing of a second FIR in respect of the allegations that
               are connected to previous allegations, for which an FIR
               already stands registered, would be irregular and deserves
               to be quashed. Reliance is placed on Babu Bhai v. State of
               Gujarat.4 In this judgment, it is submitted that if there are two
               FIRs in respect of the same transaction, they would have to
               pass the “test of sameness”. Further reference is made to T.T.
               Antony v. State of Kerala,5 which records that a second FIR
               in a case which is not a cross-case, violates Article 21 of the
               Constitution of India.
       (c)     The allegations of the second FIR, it was submitted are an
               attempt to blow up the allegations of the first FIR.


3    Cr.P.C for short
4    (2010) 12 SCC 254

5    (2001) 6 SCC 181
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              State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore


     (d)   No sanction stands taken under the Prevention of Corruption
           Act for proceeding against the respondent.
     (e)   The FIR and the consequent investigation, are both against the
           edict of the Legislature and deserve to be quashed.
5.   The arguments of the respondent found favour with the High Court.
     In the impugned judgment, the High Court recorded as under :
           “15. In the case on hand, the prosecution case is that
           the petitioner was trapped while accepting bribe through
           his agent on 7.4.2022 for showing some favour to Mr.
           Vipin Parihar in discharge of his official duties, the second
           FIR relates to an incident dated 21.1.2022 wherein the
           petitioner allegedly accepted bribe from some Shekhawatji
           for showing him some favour in official capacity. Both are
           the offences are identical in nature and committed within
           a very short span of time. The second incident which war
           earlier to the subject matter of the first FIR could have
           been investigate in the first FIR itself as one trial of two
           charges was permissible under the law.”
     Having recorded thus, it was held that the second FIR was an
     abuse of the process of law. On the aspect of prior permission being
     required to proceed against the respondent, it was found that prior
     permission was a must and without the same, the impugned FIR
     could not have been investigated. It was with this understanding that
     the High Court quashed the second FIR in the exercise of powers
     under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
6.   We have heard learned counsel of the parties and perused the
     written submissions filed. The sole question for our consideration is
     whether the registration of the subsequent FIR is legally permissible
     and whether the High Court was correct in exercising its inherent
     powers in quashing the same.
7.   We find that a judgment of this court titled T.T. Antony (supra)
     records the position that a second FIR is not maintainable. The
     relevant extract is as under :
           “27. A just balance between the fundamental rights of the
           citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the
           expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable
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             offence has to be struck by the court. There cannot be
             any controversy that sub-section (8) of Section 173 CrPC
             empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain
             further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward
             a further report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narang
             case [(1979) 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] it was,
             however, observed that it would be appropriate to conduct
             further investigation with the permission of the court.
             However, the sweeping power of investigation does not
             warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation
             by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise
             to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon
             filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the
             final report under Section 173(2) CrPC. It would clearly be
             beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156 CrPC, nay, a
             case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a
             given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based
             on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter-
             case, filed in connection with the same or connected
             cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the
             course of the same transaction and in respect of which
             pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under way
             or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded
             to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power
             under Section 482 CrPC or under Articles 226/227 of the
             Constitution.”
                                                   (Emphasis supplied)

8.     This Rule, however, over the years through judicial pronouncements,
       has lent some flexibility. Reference may be made to:
       8.1. In Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P.,6 this Court dealt with the
            concept of a second FIR at length. We may reproduce with
            profit certain observations as under :
                    “14. On the plain construction of the language and
                    scheme of Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the Code, it
                    cannot be construed or suggested that there can be


6    (2013) 6 SCC 384
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              State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore


                more than one FIR about an occurrence. However,
                the opening words of Section 154 suggest that every
                information relating to commission of a cognizable
                offence shall be reduced into writing by the officer-
                in-charge of a police station. This implies that there
                has to be the first information report about an incident
                which constitutes a cognizable offence. The purpose
                of registering an FIR is to set the machinery of criminal
                investigation into motion, which culminates with filing
                of the police report in terms of Section 173(2) of the
                Code. It will, thus, be appropriate to follow the settled
                principle that there cannot be two FIRs registered
                for the same offence. However, where the incident
                is separate; offences are similar or different, or even
                where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude
                that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of
                the FIR recorded first, then a second FIR could be
                registered. The most important aspect is to examine
                the inbuilt safeguards provided by the legislature in
                the very language of Section 154 of the Code. These
                safeguards can be safely deduced from the principle
                akin to double jeopardy, rule of fair investigation and
                further to prevent abuse of power by the investigating
                authority of the police. Therefore, second FIR for
                the same incident cannot be registered. Of course,
                the investigating agency has no determinative right.
                It is only a right to investigate in accordance with
                the provisions of the Code. The filing of report upon
                completion of investigation, either for cancellation or
                alleging commission of an offence, is a matter which
                once filed before the court of competent jurisdiction
                attains a kind of finality as far as police is concerned,
                may be in a given case, subject to the right of further
                investigation but wherever the investigation has
                been completed and a person is found to be prima
                facie guilty of committing an offence or otherwise,
                re-examination by the investigating agency on its
                own should not be permitted merely by registering
                another FIR with regard to the same offence. If such
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                   protection is not given to a suspect, then possibility
                   of abuse of investigating powers by the police cannot
                   be ruled out. It is with this intention in mind that such
                   interpretation should be given to Section 154 of the
                   Code, as it would not only further the object of law
                   but even that of just and fair investigation. More so,
                   in the backdrop of the settled canons of criminal
                   jurisprudence, reinvestigation or de novo investigation
                   is beyond the competence of not only the investigating
                   agency but even that of the learned Magistrate. The
                   courts have taken this view primarily for the reason
                   that it would be opposed to the scheme of the Code
                   and more particularly Section 167(2) of the Code.
                   (Ref. Reeta Nag v. State of W.B. [(2009) 9 SCC 129
                   : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1051] and Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad
                   Ali [(2013) 5 SCC 762] of the same date.)”
                                                     (Emphasis supplied)

       8.2. In Kari Choudhary v. Sita Devi7 this Court held :
                   “11. Learned counsel adopted an alternative
                   contention that once the proceedings initiated under
                   FIR No. 135 ended in a final report the police had
                   no authority to register a second FIR and number it
                   as FIR No. 208. Of course the legal position is that
                   there cannot be two FIRs against the same accused
                   in respect of the same case. But when there are rival
                   versions in respect of the same episode, they would
                   normally take the shape of two different FIRs and
                   investigation can be carried on under both of them
                   by the same investigating agency. Even that apart,
                   the report submitted to the court styling it as FIR No.
                   208 of 1998 need be considered as an information
                   submitted to the court regarding the new discovery
                   made by the police during investigation that persons
                   not named in FIR No. 135 are the real culprits. To
                   quash the said proceedings merely on the ground


7   (2002) 1 SCC 714
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                State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore


                   that final report had been laid in FIR No. 135 is, to
                   say the least, too technical. The ultimate object of
                   every investigation is to find out whether the offences
                   alleged have been committed and, if so, who have
                   committed it.”
                                                     (Emphasis supplied)

     8.3. The position regarding the second FIR has been clarified by
          a Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Upkar Singh v. Ved
          Prakash.8 The relevant discussion made in the judgment is
          extracted herein below for ready reference :
                   “21. From the above it is clear that even in regard
                   to a complaint arising out of a complaint on further
                   investigation if it was found that there was a larger
                   conspiracy than the one referred to in the previous
                   complaint then a further investigation under the court
                   culminating in another complaint is permissible.
                   22. A perusal of the judgment of this Court in Ram
                   Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1979) 2 SCC
                   322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] also shows that even in
                   cases where a prior complaint is already registered,
                   a counter-complaint is permissible but it goes further
                   and holds that even in cases where a first complaint
                   is registered and investigation initiated, it is possible
                   to file a further complaint by the same complainant
                   based on the material gathered during the course of
                   investigation. Of course, this larger proposition of law
                   laid down in Ram Lal Narang case [(1979) 2 SCC
                   322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] is not necessary to be
                   relied on by us in the present case. Suffice it to say
                   that the discussion in Ram Lal Narang case [(1979)
                   2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] is in the same line
                   as found in the judgments in Kari Choudhary [(2002)
                   1 SCC 714 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 269] and State of Bihar
                   v. J.A.C. Saldanha [(1980) 1 SCC 554 : 1980 SCC
                   (Cri) 272 : AIR 1980 SC 326] . However, it must be


8   (2004) 13 SCC 292
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                 noticed that in T.T. Antony case [(2001) 6 SCC 181 :
                 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] , Ram Lal Narang case [(1979)
                 2 SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] was noticed but
                 the Court did not express any opinion either way.
                 23. Be that as it may, if the law laid down by this
                 Court in T.T. Antony case [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001
                 SCC (Cri) 1048] is to be accepted as holding that
                 a second complaint in regard to the same incident
                 filed as a counter-complaint is prohibited under the
                 Code then, in our opinion, such conclusion would
                 lead to serious consequences. This will be clear from
                 the hypothetical example given hereinbelow i.e. if in
                 regard to a crime committed by the real accused he
                 takes the first opportunity to lodge a false complaint
                 and the same is registered by the jurisdictional
                 police then the aggrieved victim of such crime will
                 be precluded from lodging a complaint giving his
                 version of the incident in question, consequently he
                 will be deprived of his legitimated right to bring the
                 real accused to book. This cannot be the purport of
                 the Code.
                 24. We have already noticed that in T.T. Antony
                 case [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048]
                 this Court did not consider the legal right of an
                 aggrieved person to file counterclaim, on the contrary
                 from the observations found in the said judgment it
                 clearly indicates that filing a counter-complaint is
                 permissible.”
                                                 (Emphasis supplied)

       8.4. In Babubhai (supra), it was observed that :
                 “21. In such a case the court has to examine the
                 facts and circumstances giving rise to both the FIRs
                 and the test of sameness is to be applied to find out
                 whether both the FIRs relate to the same incident
                 in respect of the same occurrence or are in regard
                 to the incidents which are two or more parts of the
                 same transaction. If the answer is in the affirmative,
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                 State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore


                    the second FIR is liable to be quashed. However, in
                    case, the contrary is proved, where the version in
                    the second FIR is different and they are in respect of
                    the two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is
                    permissible. In case in respect of the same incident
                    the accused in the first FIR comes forward with a
                    different version or counterclaim, investigation on
                    both the FIRs has to be conducted.”
                                                     (Emphasis supplied)

      8.5. In Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab9 this Court held,
           in the following terms that when a new discovery is made, the
           second FIR would be maintainable. It was said as follows :
                    “67. The second FIR, in our opinion, would be
                    maintainable not only because there were different
                    versions but when new discovery is made on factual
                    foundations. Discoveries may be made by the police
                    authorities at a subsequent stage. Discovery about
                    a larger conspiracy can also surface in another
                    proceeding, as for example, in a case of this
                    nature. If the police authorities did not make a fair
                    investigation and left out conspiracy aspect of the
                    matter from the purview of its investigation, in our
                    opinion, as and when the same surfaced, it was
                    open to the State and/or the High Court to direct
                    investigation in respect of an offence which is distinct
                    and separate from the one for which the FIR had
                    already been lodged.”
                                                     (Emphasis supplied)

      8.6. Apart from these judgments, reference can also be made to
           Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.);10 Surender Kaushik
           v. State of U.P.;11 and P. Sreekumar v. State of Kerala.12


9    (2009) 1 SCC 441
10   (1979) 2 SCC 322
11   (2013) 5 SCC 148
12   (2018) 4 SCC 579
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9.     From the above conspectus of judgments, inter alia, the following
       principles emerge regarding the permissibility of the registration of
       a second FIR:
       9.1. When the second FIR is counter-complaint or presents a rival
            version of a set of facts, in reference to which an earlier FIR
            already stands registered.
       9.2. When the ambit of the two FIRs is different even though they
            may arise from the same set of circumstances.
       9.3. When investigation and/or other avenues reveal the earlier FIR
            or set of facts to be part of a larger conspiracy.
       9.4. When investigation and/or persons related to the incident bring
            to the light hitherto unknown facts or circumstances.
       9.5. Where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different.
10. As recorded supra, the High Court found that the two FIRs were
    indeed in regard to the same offence and, therefore, not maintainable,
    however, in our view the scope of the two FIRs, as already referred
    to in para 3 supra, are distinct. The FIR prior in point of time refers
    to a particular incident and the action taken therein is limited. The
    second FIR pertains to the larger issue of widespread corruption in
    the concerned department and, therefore, is much larger in its scope
    than the previous FIR.
11. Quashing of the FIR would nip the investigation into such corruption,
    in the bud. The same would be against the interest of society.
12. In the attending facts and circumstances, the judgment referred to in
    para 1, impugned herein is set aside and FIR No.131 of 2022 stands
    restored on the file of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Jaipur. We direct
    the completion of the investigation at the earliest. Director General
    of Police, Rajasthan, to ensure compliance with the directions.
13. Appeal is allowed and the pending applications, if any, are disposed of.

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain