SUJAL VISHWAS ATTAVAR & ANR.versusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 442
- Decided
- 4 May 2026
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- SANJAY KAROL
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be used to compel registration of an FIR where efficacious statutory remedies under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita exist and have not been exhausted.
Summary
The complainant company alleged that the appellants forged documents to obtain a property measurement and sought registration of a FIR. After filing complaints with the Deputy Superintendent of Land Records, the authority declined coercive action and referred the matter to the police, which returned the case to the land department. The company then approached the High Court under Article 226 for a direction to register the FIR, leading to an interim order directing the police to record a statement and register the FIR. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction cannot be invoked when effective statutory remedies under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) are available and have not been exhausted. Consequently, the interim order was set aside, the FIR quashed, and the appeal allowed. The Court emphasized that grievances about FIR registration must first be pursued through the statutory hierarchy of police superintendent and magistrate before seeking writ relief.
Issues considered
- Whether Article 226 of the Constitution can be invoked to direct registration of an FIR when alternative statutory remedies under the BNSS are available.
- Whether the High Court should entertain a writ petition for FIR registration without the petitioner exhausting the remedies provided under the BNSS.
Legislation cited
- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023s. Section 154(3), s. Section 156(3), s. Section 173(4), s. Section 175(3), s. Section 318, s. Section 319, s. Section 335, s. Section 336, s. Section 337, s. Section 338, s. Section 340, s. Section 61(2)
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. Section 154(3), s. Section 156(3), s. Section 175(3)
- Constitution of Indias. Article 226
- Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016s. Section 14
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether u/Art.226 of the Constitution of India a direction could be given to State Authorities to register an FIR without the applicant first having taken recourse to the alternative remedies provided in law. Headnotes† Constitution of India – Art.226 under, cannot be invoked seeking directions for registration of FIR when alternative statutory remedies are available – Complainant Company filed complaints before the Deputy Superintendent of Land Records Office alleging forgery, impersonation and fraud by accused persons including
Subjects
Judgment
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 273 : 2026 INSC 442
Sujal Vishwas Attavar & Anr.
v.
The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2325 of 2026)
04 May 2026
[Sanjay Karol* and Augustine George Masih, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether u/Art.226 of the Constitution of India a direction could be
given to State Authorities to register an FIR without the applicant first
having taken recourse to the alternative remedies provided in law.
Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Art.226 – Extraordinary jurisdiction under,
cannot be invoked seeking directions for registration of FIR
when alternative statutory remedies are available – Complainant
Company filed complaints before the Deputy Superintendent
of Land Records Office alleging forgery, impersonation and
fraud by accused persons including the appellant(s) in the
measurement application for measurement of the property and
sought registration of FIR – Land Records Authority declined
to take any coercive action – Allegations of fake measurement
were also brought to the notice of the Police however, the
matter was returned to the Land Records Department for further
inquiry – Writ petition filed by complainant Company – High
Court directed the police to record the statement of Director
of the Complainant Company and initiate necessary action as
per provisions of law – FIR registered against the appellant(s)
pursuant thereto – Interference with:
Held: The extraordinary jurisdiction u/Art.226 ought not to have been
invoked when alternative equally efficacious statutory remedies
were available – If a person has a grievance that his FIR has not
been registered by the police, or having been registered, proper
investigation is not being conducted, then the remedy does not
ordinarily lie in invoking the writ jurisdiction in the first instance, but
in seeking recourse to the statutory framework, unless of course
the urgency of the circumstances warrant otherwise – Complainant
Company did not exhaust the sequential statutory remedies
* Author
274 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
available under BNSS – Therefore, there is no foundation to invoke
the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court as efficacious and
efficient alternative remedies exist – Writ petition premature –
Impugned interim order set aside – FIR registered pursuant thereto
quashed – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 – Alternative
remedy. [Paras 7, 11, 12]
Constitution of India – Art.226 – Exercise of writ jurisdiction
by High Court in the presence of an alternative remedy –
Impermissibility:
Held: High Court is not bound to entertain a writ petition merely
because a case of alleged inaction or negligence is made out
against a statutory authority – Ordinarily, where a statute provides
a complete and efficacious remedy, the same must be exhausted
before invoking constitutional jurisdiction – Complainant Company
initially approached the Land Record Authority, by way of complaints
with copies thereof being sent to the police authority – However, it
did not avail any of the statutory remedies provided under BNSS
and instead directly invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court,
inter alia, seeking directions for registration of FIR – Such a
recourse, in the first instance, is contrary to the settled principles
of law – Particularly in the absence of imminent danger of violation
of life or liberty of an individual – Art.226 is not a panacea for all
grievances – Entertaining a writ petition, in the said circumstances,
would in effect, result in the High Court, acting as a forum of first
instance thereby bypassing the statutory scheme in its entirety –
This is impermissible, save and except in special circumstances
which are conspicuously absent in the present case. [Paras 9, 10]
Case Law Cited
Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. [2021] 3 SCR 406 :
(2021) 6 SCC 771; Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes
[1964] 6 SCR 654 : AIR 1964 SC 1419; Whirlpool Corporation v.
Registrar of Trade Marks [1998] Supp. 2 SCR 359 : (1998) 8 SCC
1; Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1337 : 2025
SCC OnLine 2510; Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. [2007] 12 SCR
1100 : (2008) 2 SCC 409; All India Institute of Medical Sciences
Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India [1996] Supp. 8 SCR
138 : (1996) 11 SCC 582; Aleque Padamsee v. Union of India
[2007] 8 SCR 390 : (2007) 6 SCC 171; M. Subramaniam v. S.
Janaki (2020) 16 SCC 728; Anurag Bhatnagar v. State (NCT of
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 275
Sujal Vishwas Attavar & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
Delhi) [2025] 7 SCR 1599 : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1514; Sudhir
Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage (2016) 6 SCC
277 – referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016;
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023; Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973.
List of Keywords
Alternative remedies; Alternative remedy; Alternative equally
efficacious statutory remedies available; Statutory remedies not
availed; Extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court; Jurisdiction of
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India; Writ
jurisdiction of High Court; Forged documents; Forgery; Fabrication
of details; Fabrication of signatures; Impersonation; Fraud;
Measurement application; Measurement of property; Allegations
of fake measurement.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2325 of 2026
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.12.2025 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in WP No. 5154 of 2025
With
Criminal Appeal No. 2326 of 2026
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Ms. Geeta Luthra, Sr. Advs, Nilesh Tribhuvann, Anand Dilip Landge,
Burzin Bharucha, Rohit Saraswat, Pururaj Agarwal, Rishabh Dahiya,
Ms. Prashansika Thakur, Ms. Janvi Desai, Nilesh Tribhuvann,
Burzin Bharucha, Rohit Saraswat, Shahrukh Ahmad, Pururaj
Aggarwal, Rishabh Dahiya, Ms. Prashansika Thakur, Ms. Janvi
Desai.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Samrat Krishnarao Shinde, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya
Aniruddha Pande, Shrirang B. Varma, Ms. Manjeet Kirpal.
276 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Sanjay Karol, J.
Leave Granted.
2. The appellant(s) have preferred the present appeal(s) against the
impugned interim order dated 17.12.2025 passed by the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.5154 of 2025, whereby
the High Court had directed the police to record the statement of
Director, Mrs. Asha Shivajirao Sanap, of E & G Global Estates Ltd.
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Complainant Company’) and initiate
necessary action as per provisions of law. Pursuant to the said
direction, FIR1 No.0194/2025 came to be registered against the
present appellant(s).
3. Although the question raised in this appeal is one of relative simplicity
i.e., whether under Article 226 of the Constitution of India a direction
could be given to State Authorities to register an FIR without the
applicant first having taken recourse to the alternative remedies
provided in law. This question however arises from a convoluted
set of facts involving various commercial transactions and as such it
would be important for the purposes of clarity to appreciate the same.
3.1 The property in question, bearing Gut No.82 situated at Mouje
Talwade, Trimbakeshwar, District Nashik, was purchased by the
complainant Company (Respondent No.2 herein) vide a Sale
Deed dated 11.10.2010 and was thereafter developed into a
leisure resort named as ‘E&G Green Valley’ comprising of 22
villas (Unit No.1 to 22) and a composite Unit No.23 consisting
of studio apartments and allied structures.
3.2 Upon its completion, the complainant Company executed an
Agreement to Lease dated 31.03.2012 in favour M/s. E & G
Resorts Pvt. Ltd., a Company in which respondent no.72 is
the Director. It is alleged that a registered Lease Deed dated
27.06.2014 was fraudulently executed between the complainant
1 Short for ‘First Information Report’.
2 Mrs. Sheetal Vishwas Attavar – Appellant No.1 in Crl A@SLP (Crl) No.1133/2026.
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 277
Sujal Vishwas Attavar & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
Company and M/s. E & G Resorts Pvt. Ltd., in respect of Unit
No.23, pursuant to which possession of the said unit was taken
over by the latter as a lessee.
3.3 Subsequently, since the complainant Company was classified
as a Non-Performing Asset, a Corporate Insolvency Resolution
Process3 was initiated and vide order dated 24.06.2020, a
statutory moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Code 20164 came into force.
3.4 It is the case of the complainant Company that during the
subsistence of the aforesaid moratorium, M/s. E&G Resorts Pvt.
Ltd., executed a sub-lease deed dated 14.10.2022 in favour of
respondent no.7 – Mrs. Sheetal Vishwas Attavar. Under the guise
of said sub-lease deed, respondent no.7 along with the present
appellants(s) is alleged to have asserted rights over the entire
project including Unit No.23 and began collecting maintenance
charge, creating third-party interests and carrying out unauthorized
constructions causing inconvenience to other lessees.
3.5 Consequently, multiple civil suits were instituted inter se the
parties, including suits challenging the validity of the sub-lease
deed dated 14.10.2022 and seeking an injunction from creating
encumbrances or third-party rights. It is not in dispute that such
civil proceedings are presently pending adjudication before
competent Courts.
3.6 The genesis of the criminal allegations, however, arise from
certain events stated to have occurred between December
2024 and April 2025. It is alleged that the accused persons,
including the present appellant(s), submitted an application for
measurement of the property on 02.04.2025 in the name of the
complainant Company using forged documents and fabricated
details and signatures. It is further alleged that during the survey
on 19.04.2025, a woman impersonated herself as the Director
of the complainant Company, namely Mrs. Asha Shivajirao
Sanap, and misled the Revenue officials into completing the
measurement process. According to the complainant Company,
3 Hereinafter ‘CIRP’.
4 Hereinafter ‘IBC’.
278 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the aforesaid acts were undertaken with an intent to regularize
the alleged unauthorized constructions and assert control over
the property, particularly after the complainant had, in September
2024, directed certain lessees, including the appellant(s), to
remove encroachments and illegal structures.
3.7 Upon discovering these facts in June 2025, the complainant
Company, through Mrs. Asha Shivajirao Sanap, filed complaints
dated 13.06.2025 and 09.07.2025 before the Deputy
Superintendent of Land Records Office, Trimbakeshwar,
alleging commission of forgery, impersonation and fraud in the
measurement application and sought registration of FIR.
3.8 The matter was considered by the Land Records Authority, and
a hearing was conducted; however, by letter dated 29.07.2025,
the Authority declined to take any coercive action and advised
the complainant to seek redressal from the competent authority.
The relevant part of the letter is extracted below:
“Subsequently, in connection with your above
mentioned complaint application regarding the above
reference, the date of 16.7.2025 was fixed by giving
notice to the survey applicant and you/the complainant
to present your respective statements. … It was
found that you have not filed the survey application
for the said Gut No. 82 nor paid the survey fee. You
stated in the complaint application and during the
hearing that the said survey application should be
disposed of without action. Looking at the points
mentioned in your complaint application, it is your
contention that a third party has filed the application
by providing forged documents in your name. You
have also mentioned in the complaint application you/
the company and the lessees of the said property are
in a court dispute and that sale of the said property
is mutual, etc. Despite being served with the hearing
notice, the holders who filed the survey application
were not present for the said hearing.
Therefore, considering your complaint application, the
statement filed by you at the time of the hearing, and
all the documents submitted, it would be appropriate
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 279
Sujal Vishwas Attavar & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
for you to seek redressal from the competent authority,
if necessary, regarding the said property dispute”
(emphasis supplied)
3.9 On the same date, the Deputy Superintendent of Land Records,
Trimbakeshwar, also wrote a letter to the Police Inspector,
Trimbakeshwar, bringing to notice the allegations of fake
measurement and stated:
“Sir,
In the above-referenced complaint applications dated
13.06.2025 and 09.07.2025 of M/s E. and G. Global
Estate Ltd., it has been stated that a fake measurement
application for Gut No. 82 at Village Talwade (Tr) by
forging signatures and other documents, including
Aadhaar cards, has been uploaded online to the
Office of the Deputy Superintendent of Land Records,
Trimbakeshwar. Looking at the contents of the
application, fake measurement applications and
documents are, mentioned therein. It is requested
that appropriate legal action be taken from your
level following the investigation of the facts as per
the complainant’s demand.”
3.10 In response, the Police Authorities, by letter dated 01.09.2025,
returned the matter to the Land Records Department, for
further inquiry stating that:
“… Upon reviewing the said complaint application, the
nature of the matter in the application is very serious
and since this matter is related to your office, it is
necessary that the redressal of this matter be done
by your department. If there is anything contrary to
the rules in this matter, a written complaint to that
effect should be given to this office by your office.
Therefore, the original complaint application and
photocopies of the referenced applications numbered
01 to 09 are being returned to your office for further,
inquiry.”
(emphasis supplied)
280 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
3.11 Aggrieved thereby, the complainant Company invoked the
writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, inter alia, seeking:
“ ... ... ...
b. pending hearing and final disposal of this
Petition, this Hon’ble Court be pleased to direct
the Respondent No.3 Senior Police Inspector,
Trimbakeshwar Police Station, Nashik to forthwith
register offence punishable under Section 318,
336, 319 and other allied provisions under Bhartiya
Nyaya Sanhita, forthwith against the Respondent
Nos.6 to 10 and such other persons who have aided
and abetted Respondent Nos.6 to 10 in committing
aforesaid offence;”
3.12 The High Court vide the impugned interim order dated
17.12.2025, without issuing notice, directed the Director of the
complainant Company to appear before the police for recording
of her statement and further directed that action be taken in
accordance with law. The order is extracted in toto as under:
“1) Learned APP on instructions from Mr. Mulane,
PC., Trimbakeshwar Police Station submitted that, let
the Director of Petitioner attend the Office of Senior
Inspector of Police, Trimbakeshwar Police Station,
District Nashik, tomorrow i.e. 18th December 2025,
by 11.00 a.m., to record her statement.
That, after recording the statement of the Director of
Petitioner, necessary action as per the provisions of
law will be initiated.
2) At the request of learned APP, stand over to 22nd
December 2025.”
3.13 Pursuant thereto, the police registered FIR No.0194/2025
dated 23.12.2025 against the appellant(s) under Sections
318(2), 318(4), 319, 335, 336(2), 336(3), 337, 338, 340(2),
and 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 20235.
5 Hereinafter ‘BNS 2023’.
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 281
Sujal Vishwas Attavar & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
4. In that view of the matter, the accused-appellant(s) are before us
contending that the registration of the FIR is a direct consequence of
the directions issued in writ proceedings, and is therefore, contrary
to law since alternative remedies available under the statutory
framework have not been exhausted. It is further contended that the
FIR has been lodged as a counterblast to the civil disputes pending
between the parties. We have heard the learned senior counsel for
the appellant(s) and learned counsel for the respondent(s) as also
perused the material placed on record.
5. At the outset, it would be apposite to reiterate the settled principle of
law governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction. While the jurisdiction
of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is
wide, it is well established that such jurisdiction is extraordinary,
discretionary and subject to certain self-imposed restrictions. In
Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P.6, a co-ordinate Bench of
this Court has summarized the principles governing the exercise of
writ jurisdiction by the High Court in the presence of an alternative
remedy and held as under:
“27. The principles of law which emerge are that:
27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to
issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement
of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well.
27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a
writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power
of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy
is available to the aggrieved person.
27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where:
(a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a
fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution;
(b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural
justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without
jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged.
27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High
Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution
6 (2021) 6 SCC 771
282 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition
should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate
remedy is provided by law.
27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself
prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right
or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory
remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under
Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of
statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and
discretion.
27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of
fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in
a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively
of the view that the nature of the controversy requires
the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not
readily be interfered with.”
(emphasis supplied)
[See also: Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes7 and
Whirlpool Corporation. v. Registrar of Trade Marks8]
5.1 Similarly, very recently this Court in Rikhab Chand Jain v.
Union of India9 held as under:
“10. We may profitably refer, in this context, to the
Constitution Bench decision in Thansingh Nathmal v.
Superintendent of Taxes [(1964) 15 STC 468 (SC);
1964 SCC OnLine SC 13; AIR 1964 SC 1419.] .
In Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes
[(1964) 15 STC 468 (SC); 1964 SCC OnLine SC 13;
AIR 1964 SC 1419.] , this court had the occasion to
lay down a principle of law which is salutary and not
to be found in any other previous decision rendered
by it. The principle, plainly, is that, if a remedy is
available to a party before the High Court in another
7 AIR 1964 SC 1419.
8 (1998) 8 SCC 1.
9 2025 SCC OnLine 2510.
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 283
Sujal Vishwas Attavar & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
jurisdiction, the writ jurisdiction should not normally
be exercised on a petition under article 226, for, that
would allow the machinery set up by the concerned
statute to be bye-passed. The relevant passage from
the decision reads as follows (page 474 in 15 STC):
“… The jurisdiction of the High Court
under article 226 of the Constitution is
couched in wide terms and the exercise
thereof is not subject to any restrictions
except the territorial restrictions which are
expressly provided in the article. But the
exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary;
it is not exercised merely because it is
lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the
jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be
exercised subject to certain self-imposed
limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is
not intended as an alternative remedy
for relief which may be obtained in a
suit or other mode prescribed by statute.
Ordinarily the court will not entertain a
petition for a writ under article 226, where
the petitioner has an alternative remedy,
which, without being unduly onerous,
provides an equally efficacious remedy.
Again the High Court does not generally
enter upon a determination of questions
which demand an elaborate examination
of evidence to establish the right to enforce
which the writ is claimed. The High Court
does not therefore act as a court of appeal
against the decision of a court or Tribunal,
to correct errors of fact, and does not by
assuming jurisdiction under article 226
trench upon an alternative remedy provided
by statute for obtaining relief. Where it
is open to the aggrieved petitioner to
move another Tribunal, or even itself in
another jurisdiction for obtaining redress
284 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
in the manner provided by a statute, the
High Court normally will not permit, by
entertaining a petition under article 226
of the Constitution, the machinery created
under the statute to be by-passed, and will
leave the party applying to it to seek resort
to the machinery so set up.”
(emphasis ours)
12. That apart, the majority view in a previous
Constitution Bench in A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector
of Customs v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani [1961
SCC OnLine SC 16; AIR 1961 SC 1506.] reads thus:
“14… ., we must express our dissent
from the reasoning by which the learned
judges of the High Court held that the writ
petitioner was absolved from the normal
obligation to exhaust his statutory remedies
before invoking the jurisdiction of the High
Court under article 226 of the Constitution.
If a petitioner has disabled himself from
availing himself of the statutory remedy
by his own fault in not doing so within the
prescribed time, he cannot certainly be
permitted to urge that as a ground for the
court dealing with his petition under article
226 to exercise its discretion in his favour.
Indeed, the second passage extracted from
the judgment of the learned C.J. in State
of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh [1957 SCC
OnLine SC 21; AIR 1958 SC 86.] with its
reference to the right to appeal being lost
‘through no fault of his own’ emphasizes
this aspect of the Rule.”
(emphasis ours)
In essence, this court was of the opinion that once a
petitioner has due to his own fault disabled himself
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 285
Sujal Vishwas Attavar & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
from availing a statutory remedy, the discretionary
remedy under article 226 may not be available.”
6. In the same vein, this Court has duly considered the question as
to whether the remedy under Article 226 can be availed of if there
exists inaction and/or nonaction by the police in registering the
FIR relating to a cognizable offence. We may refer to few such
pronouncements:
6.1 In Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P.10, a co-ordinate Bench of this
Court observed:
“11. In this connection we would like to state that if
a person has a grievance that the police station is
not registering his FIR under Section 154 CrPC, then
he can approach the Superintendent of Police under
Section 154(3) CrPC by an application in writing.
Even if that does not yield any satisfactory result in
the sense that either the FIR is still not registered, or
that even after registering it no proper investigation
is held, it is open to the aggrieved person to file an
application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the
learned Magistrate concerned. …
... ... ...
25. … we often find that when someone has a
grievance that his FIR has not been registered at the
police station and/or a proper investigation is not being
done by the police, he rushes to the High Court to file
a writ petition or a petition under Section 482 CrPC.
We are of the opinion that the High Court should not
encourage this practice and should ordinarily refuse
to interfere in such matters and relegate the petitioner
to his alternating remedy…
26. If a person has a grievance that his FIR has not
been registered by the police station his first remedy
is to approach the Superintendent of Police under
Section 154(3) CrPC or other police officer referred
10 (2008) 2 SCC 409.
286 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
to in Section 36 CrPC. If despite approaching the
Superintendent of Police or the officer referred to
in Section 36 his grievance still persists, then he
can approach a Magistrate under Section 156(3)
CrPC instead of rushing to the High Court by way
of a writ petition or a petition under Section 482
CrPC. Moreover, he has a further remedy of filing
a criminal complaint under Section 200 CrPC. Why
then should writ petitions or Section 482 petitions
be entertained when there are so many alternative
remedies?
27. As we have already observed above, the
Magistrate has very wide powers to direct registration
of an FIR and to ensure a proper investigation and
for this purpose he can monitor the investigation
to ensure that the investigation is done properly
(though he cannot investigate himself). The High
Court should discourage the practice of filing a writ
petition or petition under Section 482 CrPC simply
because a person has a grievance that his FIR has
not been registered by the police, or after being
registered, proper investigation has not been done
by the police. …
28. It is true that alternative remedy is not an absolute
bar to a writ petition, but it is equally well settled
that if there is an alternative remedy the High Court
should not ordinarily interfere.”
(emphasis supplied)
[See also: All India Institute of Medical Sciences Employees’
Union (Regd.) v. Union of India11; Aleque Padamsee v. Union of
India12; M. Subramaniam v. S. Janaki13; and Anurag Bhatnagar v.
State (NCT of Delhi)14]
11 (1996) 11 SCC 582.
12 (2007) 6 SCC 171.
13 (2020) 16 SCC 728.
14 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1514.
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 287
Sujal Vishwas Attavar & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
6.2 Following the law laid in Sakiri Vasu (supra), this Court in
Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage15,
observed as under:
“2. This Court has held in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P.
[Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., (2008) 2 SCC 409 :
(2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 440 : AIR 2008 SC 907], that if
a person has a grievance that his FIR has not been
registered by the police, or having been registered,
proper investigation is not being done, then the
remedy of the aggrieved person is not to go to the
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, but to approach the Magistrate concerned under
Section 156(3) CrPC. … We have said this in Sakiri
Vasu case [Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P., (2008) 2 SCC
409 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 440 : AIR 2008 SC 907]
because what we have found in this country is that
the High Courts have been flooded with writ petitions
praying for registration of the first information report
or praying for a proper investigation.
3. We are of the opinion that if the High Courts
entertain such writ petitions, then they will be flooded
with such writ petitions and will not be able to do any
other work except dealing with such writ petitions.
Hence, we have held that the complainant must avail
of his alternate remedy to approach the Magistrate
concerned under Section 156(3) CrPC and if he does
so, the Magistrate will ensure, if prima facie he is
satisfied, registration of the first information report
and also ensure a proper investigation in the matter,
and he can also monitor the investigation.”
(emphasis supplied)
7. Keeping in view the above exposition of law, we find that the
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
ought not to have been invoked when alternative equally efficacious
statutory remedies were available. If a person has a grievance that his
15 (2016) 6 SCC 277.
288 [2026] 5 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
FIR has not been registered by the police, or having been registered,
proper investigation is not being conducted, then the remedy does
not ordinarily lie in invoking the writ jurisdiction in the first instance,
but in seeking recourse to the statutory framework, unless of course
the urgency of the circumstances warrant otherwise.
8. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 202316 (erstwhile Code
of Criminal Procedure, 197317) provides a structured sequential
mechanism for initiating criminal prosecution. The statutory framework
contemplates that information relating to the commission of a
cognizable offence is first placed before the officer-in-charge of the
police station and an FIR is registered under Section 173(1) BNSS.
In the event of refusal to register the FIR, recourse lies before the
jurisdictional Superintendent of Police under Section 173(4) BNSS
and, thereafter, before the Magistrate, under Section 175(3) BNSS.
9. In the present case, it is evident from the record that the complainant
Company initially approached the Land Record Authority, by way of
complaints dated 13.06.2025 and 09.07.2025, with copies thereof
being sent to the police authority. However, it did not avail any of the
statutory remedies provided under BNSS and instead directly invoked
the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, inter alia, seeking directions for
registration of FIR. In our considered view, such a recourse, in the
first instance, is contrary to the settled principles of law. Particularly
in the absence of imminent danger of violation of life or liberty of an
individual. Article 226 is not a panacea for all grievances.
10. It is not the case of the complainant Company that it had approached
the concerned Superintendent of Police or Magistrate prior to filing
the writ petition, nor has any material been placed on record to show
that such remedies were unavailable or inefficacious. Entertaining a
writ petition, in the said circumstances, would in effect, result in the
High Court, acting as a forum of first instance thereby bypassing
the statutory scheme in its entirety. This is impermissible, save and
except in special circumstances as mentioned in Radha Krishan
Industries (supra), which are conspicuously absent in the present
case.
16 Hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’.
17 Hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’.
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 289
Sujal Vishwas Attavar & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.
11. The High Court is not bound to entertain a writ petition merely
because a case of alleged inaction or negligence is made out
against a statutory authority. Ordinarily, where a statute provides
a complete and efficacious remedy, the same must be exhausted
before invoking constitutional jurisdiction [See: Sakiri Vasu (supra)
and Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe (supra)]. In the present facts, the
complainant Company, has not exhausted the sequential statutory
remedies available under BNSS. There is, therefore, no foundation to
invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court for the reason
that efficacious and efficient alternative remedies exists. Hence, at
this stage, we find the instant writ petition to be premature, and,
therefore, not fit to be entertained.
12. Considering the above, we set aside the impugned interim order
and quash FIR No.0194/2025 registered pursuant thereto. Liberty
is reserved for the parties to espouse alternative remedies, as may
be available, in accordance with law, if so advised. Any recourse
to such a remedy shall be considered on its own merits by the
competent forum.
13. Nothing contained in the present judgment shall be construed as
an expression of opinion on the merits of the case or as to whether
or not the facts disclose the commission of any criminal offence.
14. In view of the above, appeal(s) stand allowed. Pending application(s),
if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal(s) allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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