SUKHDEV SINGHversusSUKHBIR KAUR

                [2025] 2 S.C.R. 1569 : 2025 INSC 197

                              Sukhdev Singh
                                    v.
                               Sukhbir Kaur
                      (Civil Appeal No. 2536 of 2019)
                              12 February 2025
           [Abhay S. Oka,* Ahsanuddin Amanullah, and
                  Augustine George Masih, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether a spouse of a marriage declared as void under s.11 of the
       Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is entitled to claim permanent alimony
       and maintenance under u/s.25 of the Act; whether in a petition
       filed seeking a declaration under s.11 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
       1955, a spouse is entitled to seek maintenance pendente lite
       under u/s.24 of the Act.

                                  Headnotes†
       Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – ss.5, 11, 23, 24, 25 – Whether
       spouse of marriage declared as void can claim permanent
       alimony u/s.25 and whether maintenance pendente lite can
       be granted u/s.24 in a s.11 HMA petition – Reference was
       made to three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in view of
       conflicting decisions and answered accordingly:
       Held: 1. s.5 r/w s.11 HMA, provides that certain categories of
       marriages are void – s.11 provides for grant of declaration of a
       marriage as null and void – s.25 confers power on matrimonial
       court to grant permanent alimony “at the time of passing any
       decree or at any time subsequent thereto” – “Decree” in s.25 is
       to be understood with reference to s.23 HMA, which deals with
       decrees granting relief u/ss.9 to 13 HMA – Such decrees bring
       about change in status of parties to marriage and are narrower than
       the general definition of “decree” u/s.2(2) CPC. [Paras 11-14, 17]
       2. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Reliance placed on Chand Dhawan v.
       Jawaharlal Dhawan to hold that when marital status is affected or
       disrupted, under HMA, court has power to grant permanent alimony
       or maintenance – Further, s.25(1) makes no distinction between
       decree of divorce and decree declaring marriage as nullity, thus
       decree of nullity u/s.11 cannot be excluded from purview of s.25(1)
* Author
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    HMA – Interpretation in Chand Dhawan and Rameshchandra
    Daga v. Rameshwari Daga holding that spouse whose marriage
    has been declared void u/s.11 HMA entitled to permanent alimony
    or maintenance from other spouse by invoking s.25 HMA affirmed –
    Abbayolla Reddy v. Padmamma held to be inapplicable as Andhra
    Pradesh High Court therein was dealing with maintenance u/s.18
    of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 – Further, law
    laid down by Himachal Pradesh High Court in Navdeep Kaur v.
    Dilraj Singh and full bench of Bombay High Court in Bhausaheb
    @ Sandhu v. Leelabai held to be incorrect. [Paras 17-20, 23-34]
    3. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – s.25 – Difference between remedy
    u/s.25 HMA and s.125 CRPC/s.144 BNSS – s.25 HMA and s.125
    CRPC operate in different fields – s.25 HMA is gender neutral
    whereas s.125 CrPC applies to wife and children – s.125 CrPC
    proceedings are summary in nature and a quick remedy to seek
    maintenance – s.25 confers rights on the spouses of the marriage
    declared as void u/s.11 HMA to claim maintenance from other
    spouse – Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav and
    Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat & Ors. distinguished
    as they related to applications u/s.125 CrPC. [Paras 21-22, 25]
    4. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – On maintenance pendente lite –
    s.24 empowers matrimonial court to grant interim maintenance
    in pending proceedings u/ss.9 to 13 HMA, provided: (i) There
    must be a proceeding under the 1955 Act pending (ii) Court must
    conclude that either the wife or husband has no independent
    income sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses
    of the proceeding – Even if court prima facie finds the marriage
    void or voidable, it may grant maintenance pendente lite if above
    conditions are met. [Paras 25-26]
    5. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Grant of relief u/ss.25 & 24
    discretionary – Whether relief of permanent alimony can be granted
    depends on facts of each case and conduct of parties – Equitable
    considerations apply when Court considers prayer for maintenance
    u/s.25 as the section provides that while considering prayer for
    granting relief, conduct of parties must be considered – While
    deciding prayer for interim relief u/s.24, Court will always consider
    conduct of the party seeking the relief. [Para 26]

    Hindu Law – Marriage – Referring to wife of a marriage
    declared as void as “illegitimate wife” and “faithful mistress” –
    Propriety of:
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                      Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur


     Held: Describing woman from a void marriage as “illegitimate
     wife” or “faithful mistress” violates her fundamental right of leading
     dignified life u/a.21 – Language used by full bench of Bombay High
     Court in Leelabai inappropriate, misogynistic and against ideals of
     Constitution – Pertinently High Court has not used similar adjectives
     in case of husbands of void marriages. [Para 24]

                              Case Law Cited
     Chand Dhawan v. Jawaharlal Dhawan, 1993 INSC 216 : [1993]
     3 SCR 954 : (1993) 3 SCC 406; Rameshchandra Rampratapji
     Daga v. Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga, 2004 INSC 711 :
     [2004] Supp. 6 SCR 888 : (2005) 2 SCC 33 – relied on.
     Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav & Another,
     1988 INSC 25 : [1988] 2 SCR 809 : [1988] 1 SCC 530; Savitaben
     Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat & Others, 2005 INSC 128 :
     [2005] 2 SCR 638 : (2005) 3 SCC 636 – distinguished.
     Abbayolla Reddy v. Padmamma, AIR 1999 AP 19 – distinguished.
     Navdeep Kaur v. Dilraj Singh [2003] 1 HLR 100 : 2002 SCC
     OnLine P&H 498; Bhausaheb @ Sandhu v. Leelabai [2004] AIR
     Bom. 283 (FB) – overruled.

                                 List of Acts
     Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973;
     Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Hindu Adoptions and
     Maintenance Act, 1956; Code of Civil Procedure; Constitution of India.

                              List of Keywords
     Hindu Marriage Act; Void marriage; Alimony; Permanent maintenance;
     s.25 HMA; Maintenance pendente lite; s.24 HMA; Discretionary
     relief; Decree meaning u/s.23 HMA; Marital status disruption; s.25
     HMA vs. s.125 CrPC/144 BNSS; s.25 HMA vs. s.18 HAMA.

                             Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2536 of 2019
     From the Judgment and Order dated 12.02.2018 of the High Court
     of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in FAO No. 35 of 2016
     With
     Civil Appeal No. 5726 of 2019
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                        Appearances for Parties
     Rajesh Aggarwal, Mrs. Mridul Aggarwal, Akash Karanwal, Shubham
     Chandel, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Ms. Mahalakshmi Pavani, Sr. Adv., Naresh Kumar, Neeleshwar
     Pavani, Ms. Shaurya Mishra, Advs. for the Respondent.

                 Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                               Judgment

     Abhay S. Oka, J.

     ISSUE REFERRED

1.   The reference to a Bench of the three Hon’ble Judges has been made
     by the order dated 22nd August 2024 of this Court, which reads thus:
          “Learned counsel appearing for the parties state at the
          Bar that these matters need to be considered by a Three
          Judge Bench combination as there are conflicting views
          on the applicability of Sections 24 and 25 of the Hindu
          Marriage Act, 1955, whether alimony can be granted where
          marriage has been declared void.
          Following are the judgments in favour of granting alimony :-

           Sl.        CITATION                    TITLED
           No.
           1.     (1993) 3 SCC 406     Chand Dhawan Vs.Jawaharlal
                                       Dhawan
           2.     (2005) 2 SCC 33      Rameshchandra Rampratapji
                                       Daga Vs. Rameshwari
                                       Rameshchandra Daga

          Following are the judgments against granting alimony :-

           Sl.         CITATION                   TITLED
           No.
           1.     (1988) 1 SCC 530      Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav
                                        Vs. Anantrao Shivram
                                        Adhav & Another
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                      Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur



            2.      AIR 1999 AP 19         Abbayolla Reddy Vs.
                                           Padmamma
            3.      (2003) 1 HLR 100       Navdeep Kaur Vs. Dilraj
                                           Singh
            4.      ( 2 0 0 4 ) A I R B o m . Bhausaheb @ Sandhu S/o
                    283(FB)                   Raguji Magar Vs. Leelabai
                                              W/o Bhausaheb Magar
            5.      (2005) 3 SCC 636       Savitaben Somabhai
                                           Bhatiya Vs. State of Gujarat
                                           & Others

           Accordingly, let the papers be placed before Hon’ble the
           Chief Justice of India for passing appropriate orders.”

     RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF LAW
2.   Before we refer to the submissions made across the Bar, it will be
     necessary to briefly refer to the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act,
     1955 (for short, ‘the 1955 Act’). Section 5 deals with the conditions
     for a Hindu marriage, which reads thus:
           “5. Conditions for a Hindu marriage.—A marriage may
           be solemnized between any two Hindus, if the following
           conditions are fulfilled, namely:—
           (i) neither party has a spouse living at the time of the
           marriage;
           (ii) at the time of the marriage, neither party—
                 (a) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in
                 consequence of unsoundness of mind; or
                 (b) though capable of giving a valid consent, has
                 been suffering from mental disorder of such a kind
                 or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and
                 the procreation of children; or
                 (c) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity;
           (iii) the bridegroom has completed the age of twenty-one
           years and the bride, the age of eighteen years at the time
           of the marriage;
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          (iv) the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited
          relationship unless the custom or usage governing
          each of them permits of a marriage between the two;
          (v) the parties are not sapindas of each other, unless
          the custom or usage governing each of them permits
          of a marriage between the two;”
                                                   (emphasis added)

3.   The 1955 Act deals with void marriages and voidable marriages.
     Section 11, which deals with void marriages, reads thus:
          “11. Void marriages.— Any marriage solemnised after
          the commencement of this Act shall be null and void
          and may, on a petition presented by either party thereto
          against the other party, be so declared by a decree of
          nullity if it contravenes any one of the conditions specified
          in clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of section 5.”
4.   The 1955 Act contemplates the filing of the following categories of
     petitions for grant of different reliefs:
     a.   A petition seeking relief of restitution of conjugal rights in
          accordance with Section 9;
     b.   A petition seeking relief of judicial separation in accordance
          with Section 10;
     c.   A petition seeking a declaration that a marriage is void in
          accordance with Section 11;
     d.   A petition for annulment of a marriage on the ground that it is
          voidable in accordance with Section 12;
     e.   A petition seeking a divorce in accordance with Section 13; and
     f.   A petition seeking divorce by mutual consent in accordance
          with Section 13B.
5.   We are called upon to interpret Sections 24 and 25 of the 1955 Act,
     which read thus:
          “24. Maintenance pendente lite and expenses of
          proceedings.—Where in any proceedings under this Act
          it appears to the court that either the wife or the husband,
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                     Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur


           as the case may be, has no independent income sufficient
           for her or his support and the necessary expenses of the
           proceeding, it may, on the application of the wife or the
           husband, order the respondent to pay to the petitioner
           the expenses of the proceeding, and monthly during the
           proceeding such sum as, having regard to the petitioner’s
           own income and the income of the respondent, it may
           seem to the court to be reasonable:
           Provided that the application for the payment of the
           expenses of the proceeding and such monthly sum during
           the proceeding shall, as far as possible, be disposed of
           within sixty days from the date of service of notice on the
           wife or the husband, as the case may be.”
           25. Permanent alimony and maintenance.—(1) Any
           court exercising jurisdiction under this Act may, at the
           time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent
           thereto, on application made to it for the purpose by
           either the wife or the husband, as the case may be,
           order that the respondent shall pay to the applicant
           for her or his maintenance and support such gross
           sum or such monthly or periodical sum for a term
           not exceeding the life of the applicant as, having
           regard to the respondent’s own income and other
           property, if any, the income and other property of
           the applicant, the conduct of the parties and other
           circumstances of the case, it may seem to the court
           to be just, and any such payment may be secured,
           if necessary, by a charge on the immovable property
           of the respondent.
           (2) If the court is satisfied that there is, a change in the
           circumstances of either party at any time after it has made
           an order under sub-section (1), it may at the instance of
           either party, vary, modify or rescind any such order in such
           manner as the court may deem just.
           (3) If the court is satisfied that the party in whose favour
           an order has been made under this section has remarried
           or, if such party is the wife, that she has not remained
           chaste, or, if such party is the husband, that he has had
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            sexual intercourse with any woman outside wedlock, it
            may at the instance of the other party vary, modify or
            rescind any such order in such manner as the court may
            deem just.”
                                                   (emphasis added)

6.   The following questions arise for our consideration:
     (i)    Whether a spouse of a marriage declared as void by a competent
            Court under Section 11 of the 1955 Act is entitled to claim
            permanent alimony and maintenance under Section 25 of the
            1955 Act?
     (ii)   Whether in a petition filed seeking a declaration under Section
            11 of the 1955 Act, a spouse is entitled to seek maintenance
            pendente lite under Section 24 of the 1955 Act?

     SUBMISSIONS
7.   The learned counsel appearing for the appellant-husband relied
     upon five decisions mentioned in the order dated 22nd August 2024.
     We have already reproduced the said order in this judgment. The
     learned counsel has taken us through the relevant paragraphs of the
     five decisions. He urged the Court to reconsider the two decisions
     mentioned in the order dated 22nd August 2024, which support the
     proposition that a spouse of a declared void marriage is entitled to
     seek maintenance under Section 25 of the 1955 Act.
8.   The learned counsel pointed out that there can be void marriages
     between father and daughter, brother and sister and grandfather
     and granddaughter. He questioned whether, in the case of such
     marriages, after the same are declared void, the Court can exercise
     the power under Section 25 of the 1955 Act to grant maintenance. He
     submitted that there would be cases where parties to void marriages
     are conscious of the fact that their marriage would be bigamous. There
     would be cases where the wife may be responsible for concealing
     her first marriage which is in subsistence, and induce the husband to
     marry. There may be cases where both parties may be unaware that
     they are solemnising a void marriage. He submitted that it is absurd
     to include a decree declaring a marriage as void in the expression
     “any decree” used in Section 25 of the 1955 Act. He submitted that
     to that extent, the view taken by this Court in the case of Chand
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                        Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur


      Dhawan v. Jawaharlal Dhawan1 and Rameshchandra Rampratapji
      Daga v. Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga2 is incorrect.
9.    He submitted that a marriage declared void under Section 11 is void
      ab initio, which does not exist. Therefore, a wife whose marriage is
      declared void cannot claim to be a spouse within the meaning of
      Section 25 of the 1955 Act. He relied upon a decision of the Full
      Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Bhausaheb @
      Sandhu s/o Raghuji Magar v. Leelabai w/o Bhausaheb Magar3.
      He relied upon the observations made therein that an illegitimate wife
      cannot be equated to a divorced wife. He would, therefore, submit
      that Section 25 of the 1955 Act cannot apply to a spouse whose
      marriage is declared void.
10. The learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-wife has
    made detailed submissions. She supported the decisions in the cases
    of Chand Dhawan1 and Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga2 and
    submitted that the view taken therein is correct. She relied upon
    Article 15(3) of the Constitution of India and submitted that Section
    25 is a special provision enacted for women. The learned senior
    counsel also tried to argue on facts of the case. However, we are
    not concerned with the facts of the case.

      OUR VIEW ON THE QUESTION (i)
11. If Section 5 is read in conjunction with Section 11, the following
    categories of marriages are void:
      a.     If one or both the parties to the marriage have a spouse living
             at the time of marriage;
      b.     The parties to the marriage are within the degrees of prohibited
             relationship unless the custom or usage governing each of them
             permits of a marriage between the two and
      c.     The parties are sapindas of each other, unless the custom or
             usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between
             the two.



1    (1993) 3 SCC 406
2    (2005) 2 SCC 33
3    AIR 2004 Bom 283
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12. A marriage is void when either of the parties to the marriage has a
    spouse living, and the marriage with the spouse is subsisting. If any
    of the spouses of the marriage had an earlier marriage dissolved by a
    decree of divorce before their marriage, clause (a) above will not apply.
    As far as clause (b) regarding prohibited relationships is concerned, the
    degrees of prohibited relationships have been specified in clause (g)
    of Section 3. Regarding the third category of sapinda relationship,
    clause (f) of Section 3 defines what is a sapinda relationship.
13. Section 11 provides for the grant of a declaration of a marriage as
    null and void. The marriages covered by the categories (a), (b) or (c)
    mentioned above become void at the inception. Therefore, such
    marriages are void ab initio. Such marriage does not exist at all in
    the eyes of the law.
14. Now, we come to Section 25 of the 1955 Act. We have already
    reproduced Section 25. It confers a power on the matrimonial court
    to grant permanent alimony “at the time of passing any decree or
    at any time subsequent thereto”. The issue is about the meaning
    of the decree contemplated by Section 25. A cause of action arises
    for the spouses to apply for permanent alimony and maintenance
    when any decree is passed by any court exercising its jurisdiction
    under the 1955 Act.
15. Section 23 has the title “decree in proceedings”. Section 23 of the
    1955 Act reads thus:
          “23. Decree in proceedings.— (1) In any proceeding
          under this Act, whether defended or not, if the court
          is satisfied that
          (a) any of the grounds for granting relief exists and the
          petitioner except in cases where the relief is sought by him
          on the ground specified in sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b)
          or sub-clause (c) of clause (ii) of section 5 is not in any
          way taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability
          for the purpose of such relief, and
          (b) where the ground of the petition is the ground specified
          in clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section 13, the petitioner
          has not in any manner been accessory to or connived at
          or condoned the act or acts complained of, or where the
          ground of the petition is cruelty the petitioner has not in
          any manner condoned the cruelty, and
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                      Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur


                (bb) when a divorce is sought on the ground of mutual
                consent, such consent has not been obtained by
                force, fraud or undue influence, and
           (c) the petition (not being a petition presented under section
           11) is not presented or prosecuted in collusion with the
           respondent, and
           (d) there has not been any unnecessary or improper
           delay in instituting the proceeding, and
           (e) there is no other legal ground why relief should not be
           granted, then, and in such a case, but not otherwise, the
           court shall decree such relief accordingly.
           (2) Before proceeding to grant any relief under this Act,
           it shall be the duty of the court in the first instance, in
           every case where it is possible so to do consistently
           with the nature and circumstances of the case, to make
           every endeavour to bring about reconciliation between
           the parties:
           Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall
           apply to any proceeding wherein relief is sought on any of
           the grounds specified in clause (ii), clause (iii), clause (iv),
           clause (v), clause (vi) or clause (vii) of sub-section (1) of
           section 13.
           (3) For the purpose of aiding the court in bringing about
           such reconciliation, the court may, if the parties so desire
           or if the court thinks it just and proper so to do, adjourn the
           proceedings for a reasonable period not exceeding fifteen
           days and refer the matter to any person named by the
           parties in this behalf or to any person nominated by the
           court if the parties fail to name any person, with directions
           to report to the court as to whether reconciliation can be
           and has been, effected and the court shall in disposing of
           the proceeding have due regard to the report.
           (4) In every case where a marriage is dissolved by a decree
           of divorce, the court passing the decree shall give a copy
           thereof free of cost to each of the parties.”
                                                      (emphasis added)
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     Clause (a) of Section 23(1) applies to a case where a decree of
     annulment is sought under Section 12. Only clause (d) of Section
     23(1) is applicable when a decree of nullity is sought. The decree of
     nullity cannot be passed if there has been unnecessary and improper
     delay in instituting the petition seeking a declaration of nullity.
16. The following are the decrees which may be passed under the 1955
    Act:
     a.   A decree under Section 9 of restitution of conjugal rights;
     b.   A decree under Section 10 of judicial separation;
     c.   A decree under Section 11 declaring a marriage as void;
     d.   A decree under Section 12 of annulment of a marriage on the
          ground that it is voidable; and
     e.   A decree of divorce under Sections 13 and 13B.
17. An order of dismissal of a suit will be a decree, provided the
    conditions in Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
    are satisfied. However, a decree in proceedings contemplated by
    Section 23 of the 1955 Act is a narrower concept. It can only be
    a decree granting one of the reliefs under Sections 9 to 13 of the
    1955 Act. The decree referred to in Section 25 of the 1955 Act is the
    decree as contemplated by Section 23, which has the title ‘decree in
    proceedings’. On plain reading thereof, the decree contemplated by
    Section 23 is a decree granting relief under the 1955 Act. Section 23
    deals with only the decrees granting reliefs under Sections 9 to 13
    of the 1955 Act. Considering the language employed in Section 23,
    the ‘decrees in proceedings’ will not include the decisions dismissing
    the petitions seeking reliefs under Sections 9 to 13. The decrees
    passed under Sections 11 to 13 bring about a change of status of
    the parties to the marriage. Even a decree of restitution of conjugal
    rights brings about a change of status of the parties in case there is
    no restitution of conjugal rights within one year of a decree. That is
    a ground for passing a decree of divorce under Section 13(1A)(ii).
    Even a decree of judicial separation under Section 10 brings about
    a change of status in the sense that a spouse who has got such a
    decree is no longer under an obligation to cohabit with his or her
    spouse. If the separation from the date of the decree continues for
    a period of one year, it becomes a ground for passing a decree of
    divorce by invoking Section 13(1A)(i).
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                      Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur


18. While enacting Section 25(1), the legislature has made no distinction
    between a decree of divorce and a decree declaring marriage as a
    nullity. Therefore, on a plain reading of Section 25(1), it will not be
    possible to exclude a decree of nullity under Section 11 from the
    purview of Section 25(1) of the 1955 Act.
19. In the case of Chand Dhawan1, the issue arose regarding the
    meaning of ‘decree’ referred to under Section 25 of the 1955 Act. In
    paragraph 25 of the said decision, this Court observed thus:
           “25. We have thus, in this light, no hesitation in coming
           to the view that when by court intervention under the
           Hindu Marriage Act, affectation or disruption to the
           marital status has come by, at that juncture, while
           passing the decree, it undoubtedly has the power
           to grant permanent alimony or maintenance, if that
           power is invoked at that time. It also retains the power
           subsequently to be invoked on application by a party
           entitled to relief. And such order, in all events, remains
           within the jurisdiction of that court, to be altered or modified
           as future situations may warrant. In contrast, without
           affectation or disruption of the marital status, a Hindu
           wife sustaining that status can live in separation from
           her husband, and whether she is living in that state
           or not, her claim to maintenance stands preserved in
           codification under Section 18(1) of the Hindu Adoptions
           and Maintenance Act. The court is not at liberty to
           grant relief of maintenance simpliciter obtainable under
           one Act in proceedings under the other. As is evident,
           both the statutes are codified as such and are clear on
           their subjects and by liberality of interpretation inter-
           changeability cannot be permitted so as to destroy
           the distinction on the subject of maintenance.”
                                                      (emphasis added)

     In the case of Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga2, the same view
     was taken relying upon the decision in the case of Chand Dhawan1.
     In paragraphs 18 to 20, this Court held thus:
           “18. In the present case, on the husband’s petition, a
           decree declaring the second marriage as null and void
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        has been granted. The learned counsel has argued
        that where the marriage is found to be null and void —
        meaning non-existent in the eye of the law or non est,
        the present respondent cannot lay a claim as wife for
        grant of permanent alimony or maintenance. We have
        critically examined the provisions of Section 25 in the
        light of conflicting decisions of the High Court cited
        before us. In our considered opinion, as has been
        held by this Court in Chand Dhawan case [(1993) 3
        SCC 406 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 915] , the expression used
        in the opening part of Section 25 enabling the “court
        exercising jurisdiction under the Act” “at the time of
        passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto”
        to grant alimony or maintenance cannot be restricted
        only to, as contended, decree of judicial separation
        under Section 10 or divorce under Section 13. When the
        legislature has used such wide expression as “at the
        time of passing of any decree”, it encompasses within
        the expression all kinds of decrees such as restitution
        of conjugal rights under Section 9, judicial separation
        under Section 10, declaring marriage as null and void
        under Section 11, annulment of marriage as voidable
        under Section 12 and divorce under Section 13.
        19. Learned counsel for the husband has argued that
        extending the benefit of Section 25 to even marriages
        which have been found null and void under Section 11
        would be against the very object and purpose of the Act
        to ban and discourage bigamous marriages.
        20. It is a well-known and recognised legal position that
        customary Hindu law like Mohammedan law permitted
        bigamous marriages which were prevalent in all Hindu
        families and more so in royal Hindu families. It is only
        after the Hindu law was codified by enactments including
        the present Act that bar against bigamous marriages
        was created by Section 5(i) of the Act. Keeping in
        consideration the present state of the statutory Hindu
        law, a bigamous marriage may be declared illegal
        being in contravention of the provisions of the Act
        but it cannot be said to be immoral so as to deny
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                      1583

                       Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur


            even the right of alimony or maintenance to a spouse
            financially weak and economically dependent. It is with
            the purpose of not rendering a financially dependent
            spouse destitute that Section 25 enables the court to
            award maintenance at the time of passing any type of
            decree resulting in breach in a marriage relationship.”
                                                  (emphasis added)

     When a decree is sought under Sections 9 to 13 and is declined
     by the court, the remedy under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption
     and Maintenance Act, 1956, remains available to the wife. Even
     the remedy under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
     1973 (for short, ‘the CrPC’) or Section 144 of the Bhartiya Nagrik
     Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘the BNSS’) continues to be
     available. The view taken in both cases on the interpretation of the
     words ‘any decree” used in Section 25 is consistent with what we
     have held above.
20. But in the case of Rameshchandra Rampratapji Daga , this Court
    observed that as a bigamous marriage cannot be said to be immoral,
    the right to claim maintenance under Section 25 is not taken away.
    The real question involved was whether a decree of nullity was a
    decree within the meaning of section 25. If a decree of nullity is
    covered by Section 25, the issue of whether a bigamous marriage
    is immoral is irrelevant. The entitlement under Section 25 does not
    depend on whether the bigamous marriage is moral or immoral.
21. Now, we come to the decision relied upon by the appellant-husband.
    In the first decision in the case of Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v.
    Anantrao Shivram Adhav & Anr.4, this Court was dealing with an
    application under Section 125 of the CrPC. This Court held that when
    a marriage is nullity by Section 25 of the 1955 Act, the spouse of
    such marriage is not entitled to get the benefit of Section 125 of the
    CrPC. Section 125 of the CrPC operates altogether in a different
    field. It is a quick and efficacious remedy made available to a wife or
    a child to seek maintenance. The proceedings under Section 125 of
    the CrPC are of a summary nature. While deciding the applications
    under Section 125 of the CrPC, a summary procedure is required


4   (1988) 1 SCC 530
1584                                                    [2025] 2 S.C.R.

                              Supreme Court Reports


     to be followed, and a detailed adjudication of the rights of the
     parties cannot be made. The same is the legal position as regards
     the corresponding remedy under Section 144 of the BNSS. Hence,
     the decision in the case of Yamunabai6 will have no application to
     Section 25.
22. The remedy under Section 25 of the 1955 Act is completely different
    from the remedy under Section 125 of the CrPC. It confers rights
    on the spouses of the marriage declared as void under Section 11
    of the 1955 Act to claim maintenance from the other spouse. The
    remedy is available to both husband and wife. The principles which
    apply to Section 125 of the CrPC cannot be applied to Section 25
    of the 1955 Act. The relief under Section 125 of the CrPC can be
    granted to wife or child and not to husband.
23. Now, we come to the decision in the case of Abbayolla Reddy v.
    Padmamma5. The Andhra Pradesh High Court’s view is based on the
    right of a spouse to claim maintenance under Section 18 of the Hindu
    Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. This is a specific provision
    for the grant of maintenance to the wife. The right under Section 25
    of the 1955 Act is different. The right is created in favour of both
    spouses once there is a decree passed under Sections 9 to 13 of
    the 1955 Act. The third decision is in the case of Navdeep Kaur v.
    Dilraj Singh6. In paragraph 10 of the said decision, the Himachal
    Pradesh High Court gave a very narrow meaning to the ‘decree
    in proceedings’ under the 1955 Act by holding that the expression
    “husband and wife” used in Section 23 must mean legally wedded
    husband and wife. This view is entirely contrary to the view taken
    in the case of Chand Dhawan1.
24. The Bombay High Court, in the case of Leelabai3, dealt with the
    reference made to the Full Bench of the three Hon’ble Judges.
    The issue referred to Full Bench was the same one we are dealing
    with. The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court relied upon the
    decision in the case of Yamunabai 6. In paragraph 18 of the
    judgment, the Full Bench has coined the term “illegitimate wife”.
    Calling the wife of a marriage declared as void as an illegitimate
    wife is very inappropriate. It affects the dignity of the concerned


5   AIR 1999 AP 19
6   (2003) 1 HLR 100 : 2002 SCC OnLine P&H 498
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                      1585

                       Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur


     woman. Unfortunately, the Bombay High Court went to the extent
     of using the words “illegitimate wife”. Shockingly, in paragraph 24,
     the High Court described such a wife as a “faithful mistress”. It is
     pertinent to note that the High Court has not used similar adjectives
     in the case of husbands of void marriages. Under Section 21 of the
     Constitution of India, every person has a fundamental right to lead
     a dignified life. Calling a woman an “illegitimate wife” or “faithful
     mistress” will amount to a violation of the fundamental rights of that
     woman under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Describing a
     woman by using these words is against the ethos and ideals of our
     Constitution. No one can use such adjectives while referring to a
     woman who is a party to a void marriage. Unfortunately, we find
     that such objectionable language is used in a judgment of the Full
     Bench of a High Court. The use of such words is misogynistic. The
     law laid by the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court is obviously
     not correct.
25. Then comes the decision in the case of Savitaben Somabhai
    Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat & Ors7. We must note here that in this
    decision, this Court was dealing with the proceedings under Section
    125 of the CrPC which is of a summary nature. This Court dealt with
    the eligibility of a spouse to claim maintenance under Section 125
    of the CrPC. Therefore, none of these decisions support the stand
    taken by the appellant-husband.
26. An apprehension is the expression by the learned counsel for
    the appellant that if it is held that Section 25 of the 1955 Act also
    applies to void marriages, it will lead to a ridiculous result. He gave
    an example of a wife whose first marriage is subsisting, inducing
    another man to marry her. He also gave an example of a daughter
    getting married to her father. We must note that Sub-Section 1 of
    Section 25 uses the word “may”. A grant of a decree under Section 25
    of the 1955 Act is discretionary. If the conduct of the spouse who
    applies for maintenance is such that the said spouse is not entitled
    to discretionary relief, the Court can always turn down the prayer
    for the grant of permanent alimony under Section 25 of the 1955
    Act. Equitable considerations do apply when the Court considers
    the prayer for maintenance under Section 25. The reason is that


7   (2005) 3 SCC 636
1586                                                        [2025] 2 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


     Section 25 lays down that while considering the prayer for granting
     relief under Section 25, the conduct of the parties must be considered.

     OUR VIEW ON THE QUESTION (ii)
27. Section 24 confers a power on a matrimonial Court to grant interim
    maintenance in pending proceedings seeking a decree contemplated
    under the 1955 Act. The power is to be exercised pending the
    proceedings for a grant of a decree under Sections 9 to 13 of the
    1955 Act. The conditions for applicability of Section 24 are:
     (i)    There must be a proceeding under the 1955 Act pending and
     (ii)   the court must come to a conclusion that either the wife or the
            husband, as the case may be, has no independent income
            sufficient for her or his support and the necessary expenses
            of the proceeding.
26. Even if, prima facie, the matrimonial court finds the marriage between
    the parties is void or voidable, the court is not precluded from granting
    maintenance pendente lite provided the conditions mentioned above
    are satisfied. The grant of relief under Section 24 is discretionary as
    the Section uses the word ‘may’. While deciding the prayer for interim
    relief under Section 24, the Court will always consider the conduct
    of the party seeking the relief. It provides for issuing a direction to
    pay a reasonable amount.
28. Accordingly, we answer the questions as follows:
     a.     A spouse whose marriage has been declared void under Section
            11 of the 1955 Act is entitled to seek permanent alimony or
            maintenance from the other spouse by invoking Section 25 of
            the 1955 Act. Whether such a relief of permanent alimony can
            be granted or not always depends on the facts of each case
            and the conduct of the parties. The grant of relief under Section
            25 is always discretionary; and
     b.     Even if a court comes to a prima facie conclusion that the
            marriage between the parties is void or voidable, pending the
            final disposal of the proceeding under the 1955 Act, the court
            is not precluded from granting maintenance pendente lite
            provided the conditions mentioned in Section 24 are satisfied.
            While deciding the prayer for interim relief under Section 24,
[2025] 2 S.C.R.                                                           1587

                         Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur


              the Court will always take into consideration the conduct of the
              party seeking the relief, as the grant of relief under Section 24
              is always discretionary.
     We direct the Registry to place these appeals before the appropriate
     Bench for the decision on merits.

     Result of the case: Reference answered and Appeals to be placed
                          before appropriate Bench for decision on
                          merits.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Aandrita Deb, Hony. Associate Editor
                                 (Verified by: Shadan Farasat, Sr. Adv.)