Supreme Court of India
SUKHDEV YADAV @ PEHALWANversusSTATE OF (NCT OF DELHI) & OTHERS
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 969
- Decided
- 29 July 2025
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- B V NAGARATHNA
Holding
Where a life sentence is expressly limited to a fixed term without remission, the convict must be released immediately upon completion of that term and is not required to seek remission.
Summary
The appellant Sukhdev Yadav was convicted of murder, kidnapping and related offences and sentenced to life imprisonment fixed at twenty years without remission, along with fines. After serving the full twenty‑year term on 9 March 2025, he sought release but the Delhi High Court had earlier denied his furlough application and the State argued that remission under the Sentence Review Board was still required. The Supreme Court examined the meaning of ‘life imprisonment’ under Sections 53 and 57 of the IPC, the effect of Section 433‑A of the CrPC, and the distinction between remission and release upon completion of a fixed term. It held that when a life sentence is expressly limited to a fixed term without remission, the convict is entitled to be released immediately upon completion of that term and is not required to seek remission. Consequently, the Court ordered the appellant’s release and directed all states to ensure no prisoner remains incarcerated beyond the period of sentence. The appeal was disposed.
Issues considered
- Whether a convict sentenced to “life imprisonment” fixed at a term of twenty years without remission is entitled to release upon completion of that term.
- Whether the convict must apply for remission of the life sentence after completing the fixed term.
- Interpretation of “life imprisonment” under Sections 53 and 57 of the IPC in relation to fixed‑term sentences.
- The applicability of Section 433‑A of the CrPC and the powers of the Sentence Review Board in such cases.
- Whether continued detention after the expiry of the fixed term violates Article 21 of the Constitution.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 428, s. 432, s. 433-A
- Constitution of Indias. Article 161, s. Article 21, s. Article 72
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 53, s. 57
- U.P. Prisoners Release on Probation Act, 1938s. 2
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether, an accused/convict who has completed his “life imprisonment for a fixed term” such as twenty years of actual sentence without remission, as in the instant case, is entitled to be released from prison on completion of such a sentence or in other of the fixed term of sentence as aforesaid, should the accused/convict seek remission of his sentence of “life imprisonment” by making an application to the competent authority for seeking “reduction of his sentence”. Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – ss.53,
Subjects
Life imprisonmentLife imprisonment for a fixed term without remissionNo remissionTwenty years of actual sentence without remissionLife imprisonment for twenty years without remissionPeriod of twenty years is completedEntitled to be released from prison on completion of such a sentenceCompletion of the fixed term of sentenceLife sentencePeriod of jail term completed
Judgment
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2012 : 2025 INSC 969
Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan
v.
State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others
(Criminal Appeal No. 3271 of 2025)
29 July 2025
[B.V. Nagarathna* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether, an accused/convict who has completed his “life
imprisonment for a fixed term” such as twenty years of actual
sentence without remission, as in the instant case, is entitled to
be released from prison on completion of such a sentence or in
other words, whether on completion of the fixed term of sentence
as aforesaid, should the accused/convict seek remission of his
sentence of “life imprisonment” by making an application to the
competent authority for seeking “reduction of his sentence”.
Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.53, 57 – “life imprisonment” –
Constitution of India – Art.21 – An accused/convict having
completed his “life imprisonment for a fixed term” such as
twenty years of actual sentence without remission, as in
the present case, if entitled to be released from prison on
completion of such a sentence:
Held: Yes – In all cases where an accused/convict has completed
his period of jail term, he is entitled to be released forthwith and
not continued in imprisonment if not wanted in any other case
as u/Art.21 no person shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except according to procedure established by law – In the
present case, the life imprisonment being twenty years of actual
imprisonment was without consideration of remission – Soon
after the period of twenty years is completed, the appellant has
to be simply released from jail provided the other sentences run
concurrently – Appellant is not under an obligation to make an
application seeking remission of his sentence on completion of
twenty years because he has completed his twenty years of actual
imprisonment and in fact, during the period of twenty years, the
* Author
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2013
Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others
appellant was not entitled to any remission – Thus, on completion
of the twenty years’ of actual imprisonment, it is wholly unnecessary
for the appellant to seek remission of his sentence on the premise
that his sentence is a life imprisonment i.e. till the end of his natural
life – The release of the appellant from jail does not depend upon
further consideration as to whether he has to be released or not
and as to whether remission has to be granted to him or not by the
Sentence Review Board – The Sentence Review Board cannot sit
in judgment over what was judicially determined as the sentence
by the High Court which was affirmed by this Court – Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.432, 433-A. [Paras 15.2, 15.4, 15.7]
Directions by Supreme Court – Accused/convicts having
completed their period of jail term, are entitled to be released
forthwith and not continued in imprisonment if not wanted in
any other case – A copy of this order to be circulated to all the
Home Secretaries of the States/Union Territories to ascertain
whether any accused/convict has remained in jail beyond the
period of sentence and if so, to issue directions for release
of such accused/convicts, if not wanted in any other case.
[Paras 15.7, 16]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.432, 433-A – Remission
of sentence vis-à-vis release on completion of a sentence of
an accused-convict in the case of a life sentence – Distinction
between, stated.
Words and Phrases – “life imprisonment” – Meaning –
Discussed – Penal Code, 1860 – s.53, 57.
Case Law Cited
Sarat Chandra Rabha v. Khagendranath Nath [1961] 2 SCR 133 :
AIR 1961 SC 334; State of Haryana v. Mahender Singh [2007]
11 SCR 932 : (2007) 13 SCC 606; Satish v. State of U.P. [2020]
9 SCR 21 : (2021) 14 SCC 580 – relied on.
Navas alias Mulanavas v. State of Kerala [2024] 3 SCR 913 : 2024
SCC OnLine SC 315 (“Navas alias Mulanavas”); Maru Ram v.
Union of India [1981] 1 SCR 1196 : (1981) 1 SCC 107 (“Maru
Ram”); Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra [1961] 3
SCR 440 : AIR 1961 SC 600 (“Gopal Vinayak Godse”); Ashok
Kumar alias Golu v. Union of India [1991] 2 SCR 858 : AIR 1991
SC 1792; Saibanna v. State of Karnataka [2005] 3 SCR 760 :
2014 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(2005) 4 SCC 165; Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka
[2008] 11 SCR 93 : (2008) 13 SCC 767 (“Swamy Shraddananda
(2)”); Mohinder Singh v. State of Punjab [2013] 3 SCR 90 : (2013)
3 SCC 294; Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra
[2013] 15 SCR 1 : (2013) 13 SCC 1; Mohd. Giasuddin v. State
of A.P. [1978] 1 SCR 153 : (1977) 3 SCC 287; Machhi Singh v.
State of Punjab [1983] 3 SCR 413 : (1983) 3 SCC 470 (“Machhi
Singh”); Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab [1983] 1 SCR 145 :
(1980) 2 SCC 684 (“Bachan Singh”); Subash Chander v. Krishan
Lal [2001] 2 SCR 864 : (2001) 4 SCC 458; Shri Bhagwan v. State
of Rajasthan [2001] 3 SCR 656 : (2001) 6 SCC 296; Prakash
Dhawal Khairnar (Patil) v. State of Maharashtra [2001] Supp. 5
SCR 612 : (2002) 2 SCC 35; Ram Anup Singh v. State of Bihar
(2002) 6 SCC 686; Mohd. Munna v. Union of India [2005] Supp.
3 SCR 233 : (2005) 7 SCC 417 (“Mohd. Munna”); Jayawant
Dattatraya Suryarao v. State of Maharashtra [2001] Supp. 5
SCR 54 : (2001) 10 SCC 109; and Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi
[2003] Supp. 2 SCR 884 : (2003) 8 SCC 461; Union of India v.
V. Sriharan [2015] 14 SCR 613 : (2016) 7 SCC 1 (“Sriharan”);
Sangeet v. State of Haryana [2012] 13 SCR 85 : (2013) 2 SCC
452; Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka [2024] 3 SCR 329 : (2023)
9 SCC 817 (“Shiva Kumar”); State (NCT of Delhi) v. Prem Raj
[2003] Supp. 2 SCR 235 : (2003) 7 SCC 121; State of Mysore v.
H. Srinivasmurthy [1976] 3 SCR 255 : 1976 1 SCC 817; State
of Haryana v. Mohinder Singh [2000] 1 SCR 698 : (2000) 3 SCC
394; Poonam Lata v. M.L. Wadhawan [1987] 2 SCR 1123 : (1987)
3 SCC 347; Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand [2013] 4 SCR
104 : (2013) 7 SCC 545; Bhola Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh
[2022] 7 SCR 1176 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 837 – referred to.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Constitution of India; Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords
Life imprisonment; Life imprisonment for a fixed term without
remission; No remission; Twenty years of actual sentence without
remission; Life imprisonment for twenty years without remission;
Period of twenty years is completed; Entitled to be released from
prison on completion of such a sentence; Completion of the fixed
term of sentence; Life sentence; Period of jail term completed; Life
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2015
Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others
imprisonment i.e. till the end of his natural life; Seek remission
of sentence of “life imprisonment”; Application to the competent
authority; Not necessary to seek remission of sentence; “reduction of
sentence”; Nitish Katara case; Vikas Yadav; Sentence Review Board;
Furlough; Parole; Remission of sentence; Release on completion of
a sentence in the case of a life sentence; National Legal Services
Authority; Accused/convict in jail beyond the period of sentence.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
3271 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.11.2024 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in WPCRL No. 1682 of 2023
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Gaurav Agrawal, Siddharth Mridul, Siddharth Aggarwal, Sr. Advs.,
Rajendra M Daga, C. George Thomas, Manan Daga, Milind Kumar,
Hemendra Jailiya, Madhurima Mridul, Mimatullah, Deepak Chhikara,
Sohil Batra, Mahfooz Ahsan Nazki, Shreya Rastogi, Vishwajeet
Bhati, Kothari Bhalla, Ms. Manasa Ramakrishna, Ms. Sakshi Jain,
Vishwajeet Singh, Karan Dhalla, Ms. Mamta Sharma, Vivek Rajan
D.b, Hemant Gupta.
Advs. for the Respondents:
R. Venkataramani, Attorney General for India, Tushar Mehta,
Solicitor General, Mrs. Aishwarya Bhati, Mrs. Archana Pathak
Dave, K M Nataraj, A.S.Gs, Ms. Aparajita Singh, Sr. Adv., Ms.
Vrinda Bhandari, Ms. Pragya Barsaijan, Prakhar Shukla, Shgubham
Rajhans, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Siddharth Dharmadhikari,
Shrirang B. Verma, Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna,
Adarsh Dubey, Ms. Chitransha Singh Sikarwar, Mukesh Kumar
Maroria, Ms. Priyanka Terdal, Ms. Harshita Choubey, Jagdish
Chandra, Annam Venkatesh, Rajan Kumar Chourasia, Padmesh
Mishra, Pratyush Shrivastava, Arkaj Kumar, Rajat Nair, Mayank
Pandey, Neelakshi Bhadauria, Kartikay Aggarwal, Ameyavikrama
Thanvi, Chitvan Singal, Abhishak Kr. Pandey, Dr. N. Visakamurthy,
Shailesh Madiyal, Shuvodeep Roy, Merusagar Samantray,
Sabarish Subramanian, Abhishek Kumar Pandey, Raman Yadav,
Chitvan Singhal, Kartikey Aggarwal, Mukesh Kumar Singh, Ms.
Ameyavikrama Thanvi, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Apoorva Singhal.
2016 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Nagarathna, J.
Leave granted.
2. The salient question that arises in this appeal is, whether, an accused/
convict who has completed his “life imprisonment for a fixed term”
such as twenty years of actual sentence without remission, as in the
instant case, is entitled to be released from prison on completion of
such a sentence. In other words, on completion of the fixed term of
sentence as aforesaid, should the accused/convict seek remission
of his sentence of “life imprisonment” by making an application to
the competent authority for seeking “reduction of his sentence”.
Background Facts:
3. By the impugned order dated 25.11.2024, the learned single Judge
of the Delhi High Court in W.P. (Crl.) No.1682 of 2023 rejected the
petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking
release of the appellant on furlough for a period of three weeks
considering the apprehension expressed by the complainant i.e.
mother of the deceased victim and respondent No.3 herein.
3.1 Being aggrieved by the said order dated 25.11.2024, the
appellant has preferred this appeal.
3.2 The relevant facts of the case are that on 17.02.2002, FIR
No.192/2002 was registered at P.S. Kavi Nagar, District
Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh under Section 364/34 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter, “IPC”) on the basis of a complaint
filed by Smt. Nilam Katara i.e. complainant and mother of the
deceased. On 28.05.2008, after completion of investigation and
trial, his co-convicts - Vikas Yadav and Vishal Yadav - were
convicted for commission of offences under Sections 302, 364,
201 read with Section 34 of the IPC in SC No.78/2002 by the
Additional Sessions Judge (01), New Delhi, (“Sessions Court”).
Thereafter, they were sentenced to undergo life imprisonment
as well as fine of Rs.1,00,000/- each under Section 302 of
the IPC and in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2017
Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others
imprisonment for one year. They were sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for ten years and fine of Rs.50,000/- each for their
conviction under Section 364/34 IPC and in default of payment
of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment of six months, and
rigorous imprisonment for five years and fine of Rs.10,000/- each
under Section 201/34 IPC and in default of payment of fine, to
undergo simple imprisonment for three months. All sentences
were to run concurrently.
3.3 On 06.07.2011, the appellant herein was found guilty of
commission of offences under Sections 302, 364, 201 read
with Section 34 of the IPC in SC No.76/2008 by the Sessions
Court. Subsequently, on 12.07.2011, the appellant was
sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and fine of Rs.10,000/-
for commission of the offence under Section 302 IPC and in
default of payment of fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for two years; rigorous imprisonment for seven years and fine
of Rs.5,000/- for commission of the offence under Section 364
IPC, and in default of payment of fine, rigorous imprisonment
for six months; rigorous imprisonment for three years and fine
of Rs.5,000/- for his conviction under Section 201 IPC and in
default of payment of fine, rigorous imprisonment for six months.
All sentences were to run concurrently.
3.4 Aggrieved by their conviction, the co-convicts and the appellant
herein preferred criminal appeals before the High Court of
Delhi. By judgment dated 02.04.2014, the Criminal Appeal
No.145/2012 preferred by the appellant herein was dismissed
by the High Court of Delhi and his conviction was upheld. During
the pendency of the aforesaid appeals, the State had also
preferred Criminal Appeal No.1322/2011 against the appellant
along with Criminal Appeal No.958/2008 against the co-convicts
seeking enhancement of sentence of life imprisonment to
imposition of death penalty. The complainant had also preferred
Criminal Revision Petition No.369/2008 against the order of
the Sessions Court, seeking enhancement of sentence for all
convicts including the appellant herein. By judgment dated
06.02.2015, the High Court disposed of all appeals and the
revision petition by modifying the sentence imposed upon the
appellant by judgment and order dated 12.07.2021 and directed
that he shall undergo the sentence as extracted hereunder:-
2018 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“881 xxx
(I)
For Sentences awarded Sentence awarded
commission to each of Vikas to Sukhdev Yadav
of offences Ya d a v & V i s h a l
under Yadav
Section Life imprisonment Life imprisonment
302/34 IPC which shall be 25 which shall be 20
years of actual years of actual
imprisonment without imprisonment without
consideration of consideration of
remission, and fine remission, and fine
of Rs.50 lakh each of Rs.10,000/-.”
Upon default in Upon default in
payment of fine, payment of fine,
they shall be liable he shall be liable
to undergo rigorous to undergo simple
imprisonment of 3 imprisonment for one
years. month
Section Rigorous imprison- 10 years rigorous
364/34 IPC ment for 10 years imprisonment with
with a fine of Rs. 2 fine of Rs. 5,000/-,
lakh each,
Upon default in Upon default in
payment of fine, payment of fine,
they shall be liable he shall be liable
to undergo rigorous to undergo simple
imprisonment for 6 imprisonment for 15
months days.
Section Rigorous imprison- 5 y e a r s r i g o r o u s
201/34 IPC ment for 5 years with imprisonment with
a fine of Rs. 2 lakh fine of Rs. 5,000/-,
each,
Upon default in Upon default in
payment of fine, payment of fine,
they shall be liable he shall be liable
to undergo rigorous to undergo simple
imprisonment for 6 imprisonment for 15
months days.
(underlining by us)
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2019
Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others
(II) It is directed that the sentences for conviction
of the offences under Section 302/34 and Section
364/34 IPC shall run concurrently. The sentence
under Section 201/34 IPC shall run consecutively to
the other sentences for the discussion and reasons
in paras 741 to 745 above.
(III) The amount of the fines shall be deposited with
the trial court within a period of six months from today.
xxx
(V) Amount of fines deposited by Sukhdev Yadav
and other fines deposited by Vikas Yadav and
Vishal Yadav shall be forwarded to the Delhi Legal
Services Authority to be utilized under the Victims
Compensation Scheme.
(VI) In case an application for parole or remission
is moved by the defendants before the appropriate
government, notice thereof shall be given to Nilam
Katara as well as Ajay Katara by the appropriate
government and they shall also be heard with regard
thereto before passing of orders thereon.”
3.5 Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the appellant herein
preferred Criminal Appeal Nos.1528-1530/2015 before this
Court which, along with appeals preferred by co-convicts, was
disposed of by a common judgment dated 03.10.2016, with a
singular modification in the sentence, i.e. the sentence under
Section 201/34 IPC shall run concurrently.
3.6 Since the year 2015, the appellant herein has been intermittently
granted parole for short periods. On 30.11.2022, the appellant
moved an application seeking grant of first spell of furlough for
a period of three weeks as per Rule 1223 of the Delhi Prison
Rules, 2018 (for short, “2018 Rules”) before the Director General
of Prisons, Prison Headquarters, Tihar (hereinafter, “Competent
Authority”). However, the same came to be rejected vide order
dated 28.04.2023 considering the nature of crime committed,
the sentence awarded and apprehension that the appellant may
abscond, disturb law and order and cause irreparable damage
to the victim’s family.
2020 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
3.7 Aggrieved by the order rejecting the application for grant of
furlough, the appellant filed Writ Petition Criminal No.1682/2023
before the High Court of Delhi seeking a writ of mandamus
directing the State to release the petitioner on furlough for a
period of three weeks. By impugned order dated 25.11.2024,
the writ petition preferred by the appellant was dismissed by
the High Court on the ground, inter alia, that there were serious
apprehensions with regard to threat to life and liberty of the
complainant and the star witness.
4. Hence, this appeal.
5. By Order dated 06.01.2025, this Court issued notice in the instant
matter. During subsequent hearings, this Court passed the following
order on 24.02.2025:
“We have perused the judgment of the High Court dated
6th February, 2025 in Criminal Appeal No.145 of 2012. As
regards the sentence awarded to the petitioner, in paragraph
881 of the operative part of the judgment, it is stated thus:
“Life imprisonment which shall be 20 years of
actual imprisonment without consideration of
remission, and fine of Rs.10,000/-.”
The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the
respondent State of Delhi states that even after completion
of 20 years of actual imprisonment, the State Government
will not release the petitioner, notwithstanding what is stated
in paragraph 881 of the judgment of the High Court which
has attained finality.
We direct the Secretary of the Home Department of the
State of NCT of Delhi to file an affidavit making a statement
on oath on the question whether after completing 20 years
of actual sentence, the petitioner will be released. An
affidavit to be filed by 28th February, 2025.
List on 3rd March, 2025.”
(underlining by us)
5.1 On 03.03.2025, this Court adjourned the matter for two weeks
on the assurance of the learned Additional Solicitor General
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2021
Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others
(ASG) appearing for the State that the case of the appellant
for remission shall be considered and decided within a period
of two weeks from the date of the order. However, as the same
was not done by the next date of hearing i.e. 17.03.2025; this
Court issued notice to the Principal Secretary of the Home
Department of Delhi Government calling upon him to indicate
why action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 should
not be initiated against him. The order of this Court recorded
as follows:
“A solemn statement on instructions of the State
Government was recorded in this order. Now we
are informed that Sentence Review Board is likely to
consider the case of the petitioner today. The State
Government has not shown elementary courtesy of
making an application for grant of extension of time.
We, therefore, issue notice to the Principal Secretary
of the Home Department of Delhi Government calling
upon him to show why action under the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 should not be initiated against him.
Notice of contempt is made returnable on 28th March,
2025. We direct the Secretary to remain present
through video conference.”
5.2 Pertinently, during the pendency of the instant appeal, the
appellant completed twenty years of actual incarceration on
09.03.2025.
5.3 On 28.03.2025, this Court listed the matter on 22.04.2025 for
considering the issue whether the appellant is entitled to be
released on completion of actual twenty years of incarceration.
However, on 22.04.2025, despite its clear and advance
notice to all parties that this Court will consider the aforesaid
substantive question of sentencing, the learned ASG raised
a preliminary objection after a half an hour of arguments that
since the appellant had not canvassed this ground in his
petition, this Court could not go into the question. In these
circumstances, the appellant was directed to file an amended
petition within three days from the date of the order, which
recorded as follows:
2022 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“The learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner completed his submissions. The learned
ASG appearing for the State of NCT of Delhi,
after making submissions for half an hour, raised
a preliminary objection that the petitioner has not
raised a plea in this Petition that he is entitled to
be released after undergoing actual sentence of 20
years. Thus, the submission in short was that this
Court cannot go into this question. As indicated in
the earlier two orders, which we have quoted above,
make it clear that we had put the learned counsel for
the parties to the notice that the issue whether the
petitioner is entitled to be released on completion of
20 years of incarceration will be considered today.
While the learned ASG was arguing, we thought that
the Advocates waiting for other cases should not be
made to wait as remaining part of the day’s time was
likely to be consumed in this case. Therefore, at 3:15
p.m., we discharged the rest of the cases on the cause
list and informed the members of the Bar that those
cases will not be taken up. Fifteen minutes thereafter,
this preliminary objection was raised by the learned
ASG. Therefore, raising such a preliminary objection
after arguing the case for half an hour especially in
the light of the two orders which we have quoted
above, is unfair to the other litigants whose cases
were listed before this Court today. Since this strong
objection has been raised, we permit the petitioner to
amend the Petition for raising the contention noted in
the earlier orders, though this amendment is strictly
not required in view of our earlier orders. We direct
the petitioner to file an amended petition within three
days from today with an advance copy to the learned
counsel representing the respondents.”
5.4 On 07.05.2025, the application seeking permission to amend
the special leave petition was allowed by this Court. Having
completed twenty years of actual incarceration on 09.03.2025,
the appellant also moved I.A. No.147782/2025 seeking release
on furlough for a suitable period during the pendency of instant
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2023
Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others
special leave petition. By Order dated 25.06.2025, this Court
allowed the application and granted the relief of furlough to the
appellant for a period of three months from the date of release,
subject to appropriate terms and conditions to be imposed by
the learned trial court. The said order reads as under:
“I.A. No.147782/2025 in SLP (Crl.) No.17915/2024
We have heard Shri Siddharth Mridul, learned senior
counsel for the petitioner, Mrs. Archana Pathak Dave,
learned A.S.G. for the respondent(s)/State and Ms.
Vrinda Bhandari, learned counsel for respondent No.2.
This interlocutory application has been filed by the
petitioner seeking the relief of his release on furlough
for a suitable period during the pendency of the related
special leave petition.
Be it stated that the related SLP(Crl) No. 17915/2024
has been preferred by the petitioner against the
order dated 25.11.2024 passed by the High Court of
Delhi in W.P. (Crl.) No.1682/2023 [Sukhdev Yadav
@ Pehalwan Vs. State (NCT of Delhi] whereby and
whereunder prayer of the petitioner for grant of
furlough was rejected.
Be it stated that petitioner was convicted by the Trial
Court under Sections 302, 364 and 201 read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and
sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life.
In Criminal Appeal No.145/2012, the High Court
passed judgment and order dated 06.02.2015
enhancing the sentence of the petitioner to life
imprisonment which shall be 20 years of actual
imprisonment without consideration of remission and
fine of Rs.10,000/-. This order of the High Court has
been affirmed by this Court.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits
that petitioner had completed 20 years of actual
imprisonment without consideration of remission on
09.03.2025. However, prior thereto the related Writ
2024 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Petition, i.e., W.P. (Crl.) No.1682/2023 was filed
before the High Court seeking furlough for a period
of three weeks.
As noted above, by the impugned order dated
25.11.2024, the said prayer was rejected.
In the course of hearing of the main SLP, this Court
permitted the petitioner to amend the Special Leave
Petition incorporating the ground that petitioner’s
sentence would come to an end on undergoing 20
years of actual incarceration without remission.
In the hearing today, learned A.S.G very fairly
submits that since it is a matter of furlough, Court
may consider passing appropriate order. But, at the
same time, the security of the informant should also
be taken into consideration by the Court as she has
already been offered security by the State because
of the circumstances surrounding the case.
Learned counsel for respondent No.2 vehemently
objects to the prayer of the petitioner. She submits that
conduct of the petitioner leaves much to be desired
and would not entitle him to any discretionary relief
from the Court. In this connection, she has referred
to an order dated 06.02.2025 passed by a learned
Judge of the High Court in W.P. (Crl.) No.1848/2020
whereby the learned Judge recused herself from
hearing the matter observing that attempts have been
made to influence the Court.
While such conduct is highly deplorable and
condemnable, there is nothing on record to show
whether any enquiry was conducted to find out who
had indulged in such reprehensible activity. In the
absence thereof, it would not be just and proper to
deny relief to the petitioner on that count.
After hearing learned counsel for the parties and
taking an overall view of the matter, more particularly
the factum that petitioner has completed 20 years
of uninterrupted incarceration without remission, as
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Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others
ordered by the High Court which was affirmed by the
Supreme Court, we are of the view that it is a fit case
where petitioner deserves to be released on furlough
at least for a limited duration. Of course, necessary
conditions would have to be imposed on the petitioner
so that liberty of furlough is not misused. That apart,
safety and security of respondent Nos.2 and 3 are
also required to be protected.
That being the position, we grant furlough to the
petitioner for a period of three months from the date
of release. Petitioner shall be produced before the
learned Trial Court within a maximum period of seven
days from today, whereafter the learned Trial Court
shall release the petitioner on furlough on appropriate
terms and conditions including concerning safety and
security of respondent Nos.2 and 3.
The Interlocutory Application is disposed of.
List the matters before the Regular Bench on
29.07.2025, as already ordered.”
6. Admittedly, during the pendency of the appeal before this Court, on
09.03.2025 the appellant has completed his jail sentence inasmuch
as he served the sentence which was awarded to him under Section
302/34 of the IPC vide paragraph 881 of the order of the High Court
of Delhi dated 06.02.2015. For convenience, the same is extracted
as under:
“Life Imprisonment which shall be twenty years of actual
imprisonment without consideration of remission and fine
of Rs.10,000/-.”
(underlining by us)
Submissions:
7. We have heard learned senior counsel Sri Siddharth Mridul for the
appellant and learned ASG Ms. Archana Pathak Dave appearing for
the respondent(s)-State and learned senior counsel Ms. Aparajita
Singh for the respondent No.2/complainant and perused the material
on record.
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7.1 It was submitted by learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant that the appellant has complied with
the sentence imposed on him and learned Additional Solicitor
General appearing for the respondent(s)-State has also
acknowledged the fact that he has completed twenty years
of actual imprisonment. In the circumstances, the appellant
is entitled to be released on completion of his sentence.
Consequently, it was contended that it would be unnecessary
to go into the question of the correctness or otherwise of the
impugned order dated 25.11.2024 and the appeal may be
allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid terms on the basis
of the aforesaid admitted facts.
7.2 Learned senior counsel Sri Mridul further contended that
although the application filed by the appellant for release on
furlough has not been accepted and in fact, the writ petition
filed by the appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution has
been dismissed by the High Court, the significant fact that on
09.03.2025, the appellant has completed his sentence inasmuch
as he has undergone incarceration for twenty years and has
also paid the fine would entitle him to be released. Since by
interim order dated 25.06.2025, this Court has released the
appellant on furlough, the appellant may be stated to have
been released from jail on completion of his sentence, if not
wanted in any other case.
7.3 Per contra, learned ASG appearing for the respondent-State
contended that the appellant has been sentenced to undergo
life imprisonment. That the period of incarceration being twenty
years is to be construed as the period without remission.
However, on completion of the period of twenty years, the
Sentence Review Board would have to consider whether the
appellant is entitled to be released from jail or not. This would
be on remission of his life sentence. That having regard to the
serious crime in which the appellant has been convicted of and
the fact that he has sustained the sentence of life imprisonment,
he cannot straightaway seek release from jail in the absence of
any application being made seeking remission of his sentence.
In other words, it was contended that it is necessary to consider
as to, whether, the appellant is entitled for release from jail at
all inasmuch as he has been sentenced to life imprisonment
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and hence, unless there is an order of remission of sentence
passed in favour of the appellant remitting his sentence of life
imprisonment, he cannot be released from jail. Therefore, on
completion of the period of three months furlough granted by
this Court, the appellant has to surrender and return to jail.
7.4 Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-
complainant also echoed the very same submission and in
that regard referred to the judgments of this Court in the case
of Navas alias Mulanavas vs. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 315 (“Navas alias Mulanavas”) and Maru Ram
vs. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 107 (“Maru Ram”), to
contend that the appellant cannot be simply released from jail
only because he has completed twenty years of incarceration
when in fact he has been sentenced to life imprisonment. It
was therefore vehemently submitted by the learned senior
counsel for the respective respondents that the appeal would
not call for any further consideration and the same may be
dismissed.
7.5 By way of reply arguments, learned senior counsel Sri Mridul
submitted that there is a distinction between release from jail
on completion of sentence of imprisonment and remission of
a sentence. He pointed out that remission of a sentence is
considered when the sentence is not yet complete whereas
release from jail is only upon completion of the period of
incarceration that the convict was sentenced to undergo. It
is not in dispute that on 09.03.2025, the appellant herein
completed his jail sentence of imprisonment being twenty years
and therefore was entitled to be released from jail; however,
the respondents have raised highly technical and irrelevant
submissions before this Court which has delayed the release.
Nevertheless, this Court has been pleased to grant a furlough
order dated 25.06.2025 only for a period of three months,
which implies that he would have to surrender on completion
of the said period.
7.6 Learned senior counsel argued that the course of action
suggested by the State to be taken in the case of the appellant,
that is, the appellant for seeking remission of his sentence must
be made by him (which could also be rejected) would be illegal
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and contrary to the sentence of imprisonment imposed on the
appellant and in violation of appellant’s right to liberty. That the
submissions of the learned senior counsel for the respondents
would tantamount to sitting in judgment over a judicial order
imposing the sentence on the appellant herein by the High
Court which has been sustained by this Court and, therefore,
no other authority can interfere with the sentence imposed on
the appellant. Learned senior counsel therefore contended that
the appellant would no longer require to plead for remission of
a sentence or for furlough in future as he has completed his
period of imprisonment being twenty years and is, therefore,
entitled to be released on such completion of a sentence, if
not wanted in any other case. Learned senior counsel for the
appellant submitted that the objections raised by the respondents
are wholly unsustainable and therefore, bearing in mind the
aforesaid facts, the appeal may be allowed.
8. In light of the aforesaid rival contentions, it is necessary to delineate
on the distinction between remission of sentence and release on
completion of a sentence of an accused-convict in the case of a life
sentence. But before that, it is necessary to understand the meaning
of the phrase “life imprisonment”.
Life Imprisonment:
8.1 Section 53 of the IPC speaks about various punishments which
could be ordered against the offenders and imprisonment for life
is one of such punishment. The said Section reads as under:
“53. Punishments.- The punishments to which
offenders are liable under the provisions of this
Code are –
First. – Death;
Secondly. – Imprisonment for life;
***[Clause “Thirdly” omitted by Act 17 of 1949, sec.
2 (w.e.f. 6.4.1949].
Fourthly. – Imprisonment, which is of two descriptions,
namely :-
(1) Rigorous, that is, with hard labour;
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Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others
(2) Simple;
Fifthly. – Forfeiture of property;
Sixthly. – Fine.”
Section 57 of the IPC is also relevant and is extracted
as under:
“57. Fractions of terms of punishment.– In
calculating fractions of terms of punishment,
imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as equivalent
to imprisonment for twenty years.”
8.2 The expression life imprisonment has been considered in
various decisions of this Court which could be adverted to at
this stage. In Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. State of Maharashtra,
AIR 1961 SC 600 (“Gopal Vinayak Godse”), it was observed
that a sentence of imprisonment for life must prima facie be
treated as imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period
of the convicted person’s natural life. In Ashok Kumar alias
Golu vs. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1792, it was observed
that the expression “imprisonment for life” must be read
in the context of Section 45, IPC. Then, it would ordinarily
mean imprisonment for the full or complete span of life. In
Saibanna vs. State of Karnataka, (2005) 4 SCC 165, it was
observed that life imprisonment means to serve imprisonment
for the remainder of his life unless sentence is commuted or
remitted. It cannot be equated with any fixed term. In Swamy
Shraddananda (2) vs. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC
767 (“Swamy Shraddananda (2)”), it was observed that it is
conclusively settled by a catena of decisions that the punishment
of imprisonment for life handed down by the Court means a
sentence of imprisonment for the convict for the rest of his
life. However, further discussion of this case is made later. In
Mohinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2013) 3 SCC 294, it
was observed that life imprisonment cannot be equivalent to
imprisonment for fourteen years or twenty years or even thirty
years, rather it always means the whole natural life. In Yakub
Abdul Razak Memon vs. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 13
SCC 1, it was observed that imprisonment for life is to be
treated as rigorous imprisonment for life. It was also observed
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that life imprisonment cannot be considered as equivalent to
imprisonment for fourteen years or twenty years or even thirty
years, rather it always means the whole natural life.
8.3 However, in a catena of cases, the punishment of imprisonment
for life has been restricted to certain number of years, for
instance twenty years or thirty years or thirty-five years. In such
a situation, would it mean, on completion of the fixed term of
imprisonment, say twenty years as in the instant case, that the
accused-convict would have to continue to remain in jail for the
remainder of his life or become entitled to be released from jail
on completion of the term of twenty years?
8.4 Krishna Iyer, J. in Mohd. Giasuddin vs. State of A.P., (1977)
3 SCC 287, quoted (at SCC p. 290, para 9) George Bernard
Shaw, the famous satirist who said, “If you are to punish a
man retributively, you must injure him. If you are to reform
him, you must improve him and, men are not improved by
injuries.” According to him, humanity today views sentencing
as a process of reshaping a person who has deteriorated into
criminality and the modern community has a primary stake in
the rehabilitation of the offender as a means of social defence.
Thus, the reformative approach to punishment should be the
object of criminal law, in order to promote rehabilitation without
offending communal conscience and to secure social justice.
9. In Swamy Shraddananda (2), a three-Judge Bench of this Court
considered the question as to how would the sentence of imprisonment
for life works out in actuality. This Court pondered over the definition
of the word “life” in Section 45 of the IPC which has been defined
to denote the life of the human being, unless the contrary appears
from the context. Further, whether this Court, which commutes the
punishment of death awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the
High Court as life imprisonment, would mean literally for life or in any
case, for a period far in excess of fourteen years. It was observed
that this Court in its judgment may make its intent explicit and state
clearly that the sentence handed over to the convict is imprisonment
till his last breath or, life permitting, imprisonment for a term not less
than twenty, twenty-five or even thirty years. But once the judgment
is pronounced, the execution of the sentence passes into the hands
of the executive and is governed by the different provisions of law.
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Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others
This Court questioned as to how the sentence of imprisonment for
life (till its full natural span) given to a convict as a substitute for
the death sentence be viewed differently and segregated from the
ordinary life imprisonment given as the sentence of first choice.
9.1 The appellant in the said case, on conviction, was imposed
the death sentence, which was confirmed by the High Court.
A two-Judge Bench of this Court concurred on the conviction
of the appellant but was unable to agree on the punishment
to be meted out to him. Sinha, J. felt that in the facts and
circumstances of the case the punishment of life imprisonment,
rather than death would serve the ends of justice. However,
he opined, the appellant would not be released from prison till
the end of his life. Katju, J. on the other hand, was of the view
that the appellant therein deserves nothing but death penalty.
Hence, the matter was referred to a three-Judge Bench.
9.2 Aftab Alam, J. speaking for the three-Judge Bench, after
discussing the manner in which the crime was committed
referred to the judgments in Machhi Singh vs. State of Punjab,
(1983) 3 SCC 470 (“Machhi Singh”) and Bachan Singh vs.
State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 (“Bachan Singh”). It was
observed that in Bachan Singh, the principle of “the rarest of
rare” cases was laid down and in Machhi Singh, this Court for
practical application, crystallised the principle into five definite
categories of cases of murder and in doing so also considerably
enlarged the scope for imposing death penalty. It was also
observed that in reality in the later decisions neither “the rarest
of rare cases” principle nor the Machhi Singh categories were
followed uniformly and consistently. Holding that this Court was
reluctant to confirm the death sentence of the appellant therein,
the question about the punishment being commensurate to
the appellant’s crime was considered. Not accepting the fact
that life imprisonment could be equated to a term of fourteen
years, it was observed that “the answer lies in breaking this
standardisation that, in practice, renders the sentence of life
imprisonment equal to imprisonment for a period of no more
than fourteen years: in making it clear that the sentence of life
imprisonment when awarded as a substitute for death penalty
would be carried out strictly as directed by the Court.” This
Court, therefore, thought it fit to lay down a good and sound
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legal basis for imposing the punishment of imprisonment for
life, when awarded as substitute for death penalty, beyond any
remission so that it may be followed in appropriate cases as
a uniform policy not only by this Court but also by the High
Courts, being the superior courts in their respective States.
9.3 Referring to Sinha, J. order, that a life sentence was meant to
be “life sentence”, reference was also made to the judgments of
this Court in Subash Chander vs. Krishan Lal, (2001) 4 SCC
458; Shri Bhagwan vs. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 6 SCC 296;
Prakash Dhawal Khairnar (Patil) vs. State of Maharashtra,
(2002) 2 SCC 35; Ram Anup Singh vs. State of Bihar, (2002)
6 SCC 686; Mohd. Munna vs. Union of India, (2005) 7 SCC
417 (“Mohd. Munna”); Jayawant Dattatraya Suryarao vs.
State of Maharashtra, (2001) 10 SCC 109; and Nazir Khan
vs. State of Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 461.
9.4 In the aforesaid seven decisions, this Court modified the death
sentence to imprisonment for life or in some case imprisonment
for a term of twenty years with a further direction that the convict
must not be released from prison for the rest of his life or before
actually serving the term of twenty years, as the case may
be, primarily on two premises: one, an imprisonment for life,
in terms of Section 53 read with Section 45 of the IPC meant
imprisonment for the rest of life of the prisoner and two, a convict
undergoing life imprisonment has no right to claim remission.
In support of the second premise, reliance was placed on the
line of decisions beginning from Gopal Vinayak Godse and
upto Mohd. Munna.
9.5 In Swamy Shraddananda (2), this Court took note of the
contention that to say that a convict undergoing a sentence of
imprisonment has no right to claim remission was not the same
as the Court, while imposing the punishment of imprisonment,
suspending the operation of the statutory provisions of remission
and restraining the appropriate Government from discharging
its statutory function. It was contended in the said case that just
as the Court could not direct the appropriate Government for
granting remission to a convicted prisoner, it was not open to
the Court to direct the appropriate Government not to consider
the case of a convict for grant of remission in sentence. It was
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Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others
contended therein that giving punishment for an offence is a
judicial function but the execution of the punishment passes into
the hands of the executive and under the scheme of statute,
the Court had no control over the execution. This contention
was however, not accepted and held to be untenable. Referring
to Sections 45, 53, 54, 55 and 57 of the IPC, it was observed
that Section 57 provides that in calculating fractions of terms
of punishment, imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as
equivalent to imprisonment for twenty years. That Section
57 of the IPC does not in any way limit the punishment for
imprisonment for life to a term of twenty years. It only provides
that imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as imprisonment for
twenty years while calculating fraction of terms of punishment.
It was observed that the object and purpose of Section 57
would be clear by referring to Sections 65, 116, 119, 129 and
511 of the IPC.
9.6 Discussing on remission, it was pointed out that under the
Prison Acts and the Rules for good conduct and for doing certain
duties, etc. inside the jail, the prisoners are given some days’
remission on a monthly, quarterly, or annual basis. The days
of remission so earned by a prisoner are added to the period
of his actual imprisonment (including the period undergone as
an undertrial) to make up the term of sentence awarded by
the Court.
9.7 Taking note of the way in which remission is actually allowed in
cases of life imprisonment, it was found necessary to make a
special category for the very few cases where the death penalty
might be substituted by the punishment of imprisonment for
life or imprisonment for a term in excess of fourteen years and
to put that category beyond the application of remission. This
Court further observed that if the Court’s option is limited only
to two punishments, one a sentence of life imprisonment, for all
intents and purposes, of not more than fourteen years and the
other death, the Court may feel tempted and find itself nudged
into endorsing the death penalty which would be disastrous in
certain cases. The Court observed thus:
“A far more just, reasonable and proper course would
be to expand the options and to take over what, as
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a matter of fact, lawfully belongs to the Court i.e.
the vast hiatus between 14 years’ imprisonment and
death. It needs to be emphasized that the Court
would take recourse to the expanded option primarily
because in the facts of the case, the sentence of 14
years’ imprisonment would amount to no punishment
at all.”
9.8 Consequently, the three-Judge Bench agreed with the view
taken by Sinha, J. and substituted the death sentence given
to the appellant therein by imprisonment for life and directed
that he shall not be released from prison till the rest of his life.
10. Thereafter, the Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India
vs. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1 (“Sriharan”) considered, inter alia,
the following two questions:
“(i) As to whether the imprisonment for life means till
the end of convict’s life with or without any scope for
remission?
(ii) Whether a special category of sentence instead of
death for a term exceeding 14 years can be made by
putting that category beyond grant of remission?”
10.1 The Constitution Bench speaking through Kalifulla, J.- for the
majority- observed that the first question relates to Sections 53
and 45 of the IPC vis-à-vis the meaning of “life imprisonment”
as to whether it means imprisonment for the rest of one’s life or
a convict has a right to claim remission. The second question
is based on the ruling of Swamy Shraddananda (2).
10.2 Having noted the judgments of this Court in Gopal Vinayak
Godse and Maru Ram as well as other cases discussed therein
which have followed those decisions, it was observed that, “The
first part of the first question can be conveniently answered to
the effect that imprisonment for life in terms of Section 53 read
with Section 45 of the Penal Code only means imprisonment
for rest of the life of the prisoner subject, however, to the right
to claim remission, etc. as provided under Articles 72 and 161
of the Constitution to be exercisable by the President and the
Governor of the State and also as provided under Section 432
of the Criminal Procedure Code.”
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Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others
10.3 On the concept of remission in paragraph 62, it was observed
as under:
“62……Similarly, in the case of a life imprisonment,
meaning thereby the entirety of one’s life, unless
there is a commutation of such sentence for any
specific period, there would be no scope to count
the earned remission. In either case, it will again
depend upon an answer to the second part of the
first question based on the principles laid down in
Swamy Shraddananda (2).”
(underlining by us)
10.4 With regard to the second part of the first question which
pertains to the special category of the sentence to be
considered in substitute of death penalty by imposing a life
sentence i.e., the entirety of the life or a term of imprisonment
which can be less than full life term but more than fourteen
years and put that category beyond application of remission
which has been propounded in paragraphs 91 and 92 of
Swamy Shraddananda (2), it was observed that the said
dictum “has come to stay as on this date”.
10.5 Analysing the decision in Swamy Shraddananda (2) and
endorsing the same, it was observed that the death penalty in
that case was set aside although much anguish was expressed
on the nature of the crime and the life sentence for the rest
of the life of the convict therein was ordered by this Court.
The justification for the same was stated in paragraph 68 of
Sriharan in the following words:
“68. … But in an organised society where the Rule
of Law prevails, for every conduct of a human being,
right or wrong, there is a well-set methodology
followed based on time tested, well-thought out
principles of law either to reward or punish anyone,
which were crystallised from time immemorial by
taking into account very many factors, such as
the person concerned, his or her past conduct,
the background in which one was brought up, the
educational and knowledge base, the surroundings in
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which one was brought up, the societal background,
the wherewithal, the circumstances that prevailed
at the time when any act was committed or carried
out whether there was any pre-plan prevalent,
whether it was an individual action or personal
action or happened at the instance of anybody else
or such action happened to occur unknowingly, so
on so forth. It is for this reason, we find that the
criminal law jurisprudence was developed by setting
forth very many ingredients while describing the
various crimes, and by providing different kinds of
punishment and even relating to such punishment
different degrees, in order to ensure that the
crimes alleged are befitting the nature and extent
of commission of such crimes and the punishments
to be imposed meets with the requirement or the
gravity of the crime committed.”
10.6 After referring in detail to the judgment of this Court in Swamy
Shraddananda (2), it was observed that when by way of a
judicial decision, after a detailed analysis, having regard to
the proportionality of the crime committed, it is decided that
the offender deserves to be punished with the sentence of
life imprisonment i.e. till end of his life or for a specific period
of twenty years, thirty years or forty years, such a conclusion
should survive without any interruption. In such an event, it
can be stated that such punishment imposed will have no
remission or other such liberal approach should not come into
effect to nullify such imposition. Accepting the submission of
learned Solicitor General that there is no restriction to fix any
period beyond fourteen years and up to the end of one’s life
span, it was stated that the Court can sentence the accused
to undergo imprisonment for a specified period even beyond
fourteen years without any scope for remission. The Court
can direct that such offender is not to be released early and
be kept in confinement for a longer period by imposition of
an appropriate sentence.
10.7 Moving further it was observed that nowhere under the IPC is
there any prohibition that the imprisonment cannot be imposed
for any specific period within the lifespan. Thus, when life
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Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others
imprisonment is imposed, the Court can specify the period up
to which the said sentence of life should remain, befitting the
nature of the crime committed, when the Court’s conscience
does not persuade the death penalty. Therefore, the dictum
in Swamy Shraddananda (2) was approved by this Court by
observing that within the prescribed limit of life imprisonment,
imprisonment for a specified period would be a proportionate
punishment having regard to the nature of the crime as well
as the interest of the victim.
10.8 Therefore, the law-makers have thought it fit to prescribe
the minimum and maximum sentence to be imposed having
regard to the nature of crime and have left it to the Courts to
determine the kind of punishments that have to be imposed
within the prescribed limit under the relevant provision. In
other words, while the maximum extent of punishment of
either death or life imprisonment is provided for under the
relevant provisions, it will be for the Courts to decide if, in
its opinion, the imposition of death may not be warranted,
what should be the number of years of imprisonment that
would be judiciously and judicially more appropriate. This is
by taking into account, apart from the crime itself, the interest
of the society at large and other relevant factors which cannot
be put in any straight jacket formula. The said process of
determination must be held to be available with the courts by
virtue of extent of the punishments provided for such specified
nature of crimes and such power is also to be derived from
those penal provisions themselves.
10.9 Further, it was noted that even with regard to the nature of
punishment imposed by the Sessions Court insofar as capital
punishment is concerned, the reference made to the Division
Bench of the High Court is in order to give a second look to
the findings arrived by the Sessions Court, both with regard to
conviction as well as with regard to the death penalty imposed.
In a death reference case, the High Court can commute the
death penalty to life imprisonment or for any specific period of
more than fourteen years i.e. twenty, thirty or so on, depending
upon the gravity of the crime committed and the exercise of
judicial conscience vis-à-vis the offences proved to have been
committed. In conclusion, it was observed as under:
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“105. We, therefore, reiterate that the power
derived from the Penal Code for any modified
punishment within the punishment provided for
in the Penal Code for such specified offences
can only be exercised by the High Court and in
the event of further appeal only by the Supreme
Court and not by any other court in this country. To
put it differently, the power to impose a modified
punishment providing for any specific term of
incarceration or till the end of the convict’s life as
an alternate to death penalty, can be exercised
only by the High Court and the Supreme Court
and not by any other inferior court.”
10.10 Consequently, the ratio laid down in Swamy Shraddananda
(2) with regard to special category of sentence was affirmed.
It was expressed that the opinion of this Court in Sangeet
vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 that the deprival of
remission power of the appropriate Government by awarding
sentences of twenty or twenty-five years without any remission
was not permissible, was not in consonance with law and
hence, the said judgment was overruled.
11. Recently, this Court in Shiva Kumar vs. State of Karnataka, (2023)
9 SCC 817 (“Shiva Kumar”) reiterating the aforesaid observations
made in Sriharan, observed that there is a power which can be
derived from the IPC to impose a fixed term sentence or modified
punishment which can only be exercised by the High Court or in
the event of any further appeal, by the Supreme Court and not by
any other Court. It was further observed that the Constitution Bench
in Sriharan held that power to impose a modified punishment of
providing any specific term of incarceration or till the end of convict’s
life as an alternative to death penalty, can be exercised only by the
High Court and the Supreme Court and not by any other inferior
Court. More pertinently, it was observed that the observations of
the Constitution Bench in Sriharan cannot be construed in a narrow
perspective. Oka, J. speaking for the Bench observed that “the
majority view in Sriharan cannot be construed to mean that such a
power cannot be exercised by the Constitutional Courts unless the
question is of commuting the death sentence”. For this, paragraph
104 of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sriharan was
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Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others
relied upon. Clarifying the position at paragraph 14 of the judgment
in Shiva Kumar, Oka, J. held as under:
“14. Hence, we have no manner of doubt that even in a
case where capital punishment is not imposed or is not
proposed, the constitutional courts can always exercise
the power of imposing a modified or fixed-term sentence
by directing that a life sentence, as contemplated by
“secondly” in Section 53IPC, shall be of a fixed period of
more than fourteen years, for example, of twenty years,
thirty years and so on. The fixed punishment cannot be
for a period less than 14 years in view of the mandate
of Section 433-A CrPC.”
(Underlining by us)
11.1 In the said case, the sentence imposed by the Fast Track Court
(Sessions Court) on the appellant therein to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for rest of his life for an offence punishable under
Section 302 IPC was modified to the extent that the appellant
was directed to undergo thirty years of actual sentence and
to be released thereafter. The appeal was partly allowed to
the above extent.
12. Navas alias Mulanavas was a criminal appeal which arose out of a
death reference from the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge,
Fast Track Court, Thrissur in Sessions Case No.491 of 2006. The High
Court had modified the death penalty to imprisonment for life with the
further direction that the accused shall not be released from prison
for a period of thirty years including the period already undergone
with set off under Section 428 of Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (for short, “CrPC”) alone. The accused approached this Court
assailing the aforesaid judgments both on conviction as well as on
sentence. While considering the alternative submission regarding the
sentence of imprisonment for thirty years without remission being
excessive and disproportionate, this Court speaking through one of
us (Viswanathan, J.) considered the judgments discussed above and
after a chronological survey of a large number of cases, observed
in paragraph 59 as under:
“59. A journey through the cases set out hereinabove
shows that the fundamental underpinning is the principle
2040 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
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of proportionality. The aggravating and mitigating
circumstances which the Court considers while deciding
commutation of penalty from death to life imprisonment,
have a large bearing in deciding the number of years
of compulsory imprisonment without remission, too. As
a judicially trained mind pores and ponders over the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and in cases
where they decide to commute the death penalty they
would by then have a reasonable idea as to what would
be the appropriate period of sentence to be imposed
under the Swamy Shraddananda (supra) principle too.
Matters are not cut and dried and nicely weighed here to
formulate a uniform principle. That is where the experience
of the judicially trained mind comes in as pointed out in
V. Sriharan (supra). Illustratively in the process of arriving
at the number of years as the most appropriate for the
case at hand, which the convict will have to undergo
before which the remission powers could be invoked,
some of the relevant factors that the courts bear in mind
are : - (a) the number of deceased who are victims of
that crime and their age and gender; (b) the nature of
injuries including sexual assault if any; (c) the motive for
which the offence was committed; (d) whether the offence
was committed when the convict was on bail in another
case; (e) the premeditated nature of the offence; (f) the
relationship between the offender and the victim; (g) the
abuse of trust if any; (h) the criminal antecedents; and
whether the convict, if released, would be a menace to
the society. Some of the positive factors have been, (1)
age of the convict; (2) the probability of reformation of
convict; (3) the convict not being a professional killer;
(4) the socioeconomic condition of the accused; (5) the
composition of the family of the accused and (6) conduct
expressing remorse. These were some of the relevant
factors that were kept in mind in the cases noticed above
while weighing the pros and cons of the matter. The Court
would be additionally justified in considering the conduct
of the convict in jail; and the period already undergone
to arrive at the number of years which the Court feels
the convict should, serve as part of the sentence of life
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2041
Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others
imprisonment and before which he cannot apply for
remission. These are not meant to be exhaustive but
illustrative and each case would depend on the facts
and circumstances therein.”
12.1 Applying the aforesaid factors to the case, this Court allowed
the appeal in part by modifying the sentence imposed under
Section 302 IPC by the High Court for a period of thirty years’
of life imprisonment without remission to a period of twenty-
five years without remission, including the period already
undergone.
13. We have discussed the implications of the punishment imposed on
the appellant herein by analysing the same and holding that the life
imprisonment has been fixed at twenty years of actual imprisonment
without consideration of remission. This means that within the twenty
years of sentence the appellant could not have sought any remission of
his sentence. Therefore, it was mandatory on the part of the appellant
to have completed twenty years of actual imprisonment without
remission and pay fine of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand). This
sentence imposed by the High Court was affirmed by this Court except
for the singular modification already noted. Then, what would be the
position after completion of twenty years of actual imprisonment?
Does it mean that after the completion of twenty years of actual
imprisonment the appellant has to seek remission of his sentence
inasmuch as he has been awarded a life imprisonment or, on the
other hand, on completion of twenty years of actual imprisonment
without remission the appellant can be released from prison.
14. The expression “remission” has been considered in a number of
judgments which we can discuss. This is as opposed to the expression
“parole and furlough” etc. With reference to the decisions of this
Court and on a discussion of the expression “remission”, it becomes
clear that the said expression is used in two nuances: firstly, when
the remission of sentence would mean a reduction in the sentence
imposed on a convict without wiping out of the conviction which does
not amount to an acquittal. On the other hand, remissions are also
granted during the course of undergoing a sentence on the basis of
the certain legal considerations. The same can be discussed in detail.
14.1 The principles covering grant of remission as distinguished from
concepts such as “commutation”, “pardon”, and “reprieve” can
2042 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
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be brought out with reference to a judgment of this Court in
State (NCT of Delhi) vs. Prem Raj, (2003) 7 SCC 121 (“Prem
Raj”). Articles 72 and 161 deal with clemency powers of the
President of India and the Governor of a State respectively, and
also include the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites or
remissions of punishment or to suspend, remit or commute the
sentences in certain cases. The power under Article 72, inter
alia, extends to all cases where the punishment or sentence is
for an offence against any law relating to a matter to which the
executive power of the Union extends and in all cases where
the sentence is a sentence of death. Article 161 states that the
Governor of a State shall have the power to grant pardons,
reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or to suspend,
remit or commute the sentence of any person convicted of
any offence against any law relating to a matter to which the
executive power of the State extends. It was observed in the
said judgment that the powers under Articles 72 and 161 of
the Constitution of India are absolute and cannot be fettered
by any statutory provision, such as, Sections 432, 433 or
433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter,
“CrPC”) or by any prison rules.
14.1.1. It was further observed in Prem Raj that a pardon is
an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted
with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment
the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It affects
both the punishment prescribed for the offence
and the guilt of the offender. But pardon has to be
distinguished from “amnesty” which is defined as
a “general pardon of political prisoners; an act of
oblivion”. An amnesty would result in the release
of the convict but does not affect disqualification
incurred, if any. “Reprieve” means a stay of execution
of a sentence, a postponement of a capital sentence.
“Respite” means awarding a lesser sentence instead
of the penalty prescribed in view of the fact that
the accused has had no previous conviction. It
is tantamount to a release on probation for good
conduct under Section 360 of the CrPC. On the other
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2043
Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others
hand, remission is reduction of a sentence without
changing its character. In the case of a remission,
neither the guilt of the offender is affected nor is the
sentence of the court, except in the sense that the
person concerned does not suffer incarceration for
the entire period of the sentence, but is relieved from
serving out a part of it. Commutation is change of
a sentence to a lighter sentence of a different kind.
Section 432 of the CrPC empowers the appropriate
Government to suspend or remit sentences.
14.2 Further, a remission of sentence does not mean acquittal and
an aggrieved party still has every right to vindicate himself
or herself. In this context, reliance could be placed on Sarat
Chandra Rabha vs. Khagendranath Nath, AIR 1961 SC 334,
wherein a Constitution Bench of this Court, while distinguishing
between a pardon and a remission, observed that an order of
remission does not wipe out the offence and it also does not
wipe out the conviction. All that it does is to have an effect on
the execution of the sentence; though ordinarily a convicted
person would have to serve out the full sentence imposed
by a court, he need not do so with respect to that part of the
sentence which has been ordered to be remitted. An order of
remission, thus, does not in any way interfere with the order of
the court; it affects only the execution of the sentence passed
by the court and frees the convicted person from his liability
to undergo the full term of imprisonment inflicted by the court
even though the order of conviction and sentence passed by
the court still stands as it is. The power to grant remission is
an executive power and cannot have the effect which the order
of an appellate or revisional court would have of reducing the
sentence passed by the trial court and substituting in its place
the reduced sentence adjudged by the appellate or revisional
court. According to Weater’s Constitutional Law, to cut short
a sentence by an act of clemency is an exercise of executive
power which abridges the enforcement of the judgment but
does not alter it qua the judgment.
14.3 Reliance could be placed on State of Haryana vs. Mahender
Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 606, to observe that a right to be
considered for remission, keeping in view the constitutional
2044 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
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safeguards of a convict under Articles 20 and 21 of the
Constitution of India, must be held to be a legal one. Such a
legal right emanates from not only the Prisons Act, 1894 but
also from the Rules framed thereunder. Although no convict can
be said to have any constitutional right for obtaining remission
in his sentence (except under Articles 72 and 161), the policy
decision itself must be held to have conferred a right to be
considered therefor. Whether by reason of a statutory rule or
otherwise, if a policy decision has been laid down, the persons
who come within the purview thereof are entitled to be treated
equally - vide State of Mysore vs. H. Srinivasmurthy, (1976)
1 SCC 817.
14.4 Satish vs. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 580 can be pressed
into service to hold that the length of the sentence or the
gravity of the original crime cannot be the sole basis for
refusing premature release. Any assessment regarding a
predilection to commit crime upon release must be based on
antecedents as well as conduct of the prisoner while in jail,
and not merely on his age or apprehensions of the victims
and witnesses. It was observed that although a convict cannot
claim remission as a matter of right, once a law has been
made by the appropriate legislature, it is not open for the
executive authorities to surreptitiously subvert its mandate.
It was further observed that where the authorities are found
to have failed to discharge their statutory obligations despite
judicial directions, it would then not be inappropriate for a
Constitutional Court while exercising its powers of judicial
review to assume such task onto itself and direct compliance
through a writ of mandamus. Considering that the petitioners
therein had served nearly two decades of incarceration and
had thus suffered the consequences of their actions, a balance
between individual and societal welfare was struck by granting
the petitioners therein conditional premature release, subject
to their continuing good conduct. In the said case, a direction
was issued to the State Government to release the prisoners
therein on probation in terms of Section 2 of the U.P. Prisoners
Release on Probation Act, 1938 within a period of two weeks.
Liberty was reserved to the respondent State with the overriding
condition that the said direction could be reversed or recalled
in favour of any party or as per the petitioner therein.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2045
Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others
14.5 The following judgments of this Court are apposite to the
concept of remission:
14.5.1. In Maru Ram, a Constitution Bench considered
the validity of Section 433-A of the CrPC. Krishna
Iyer, J. speaking for the Bench, observed: (SCC p.
129, para 25)
“25. … Ordinarily, where a sentence is for
a definite term, the calculus of remissions
may benefit the prisoner to instant release
at the point where the subtraction results
in zero.”
14.5.2. However, when it comes to life imprisonment, where
the sentence is indeterminate and of an uncertain
duration, the result of subtraction from an uncertain
quantity is still an uncertain quantity and release of
the prisoner cannot follow except on some fiction of
quantification of a sentence of uncertain duration.
14.5.3. Referring to Gopal Vinayak Godse, it was observed
that the said judgment is an authority for the
proposition that a sentence of imprisonment for life is
one of “imprisonment for the whole of the remaining
period of the convicted person’s natural life”, unless
the said sentence is commuted or remitted by an
appropriate authority under the relevant provisions
of law. In the aforesaid case, a distinction was drawn
between remission in sentence and life sentence.
Remission, limited in time, helps computation but
does not ipso jure operate as release of the prisoner.
But, when the sentence awarded by the Judge is
for a fixed term, the effect of remissions may be
to scale down the term to be endured and reduce
it to nil, while leaving the factum and quantum of
sentence intact. However, when the sentence is a
life sentence, remissions, quantified in time, cannot
reach a point of zero. Since Section 433-A deals
only with life sentences, remissions cannot entitle
a prisoner to release. It was further observed that
remission, in the case of life imprisonment, ripens
2046 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
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into a reduction of sentence of the entire balance
only when a final release order is made. If this is
not done, the prisoner will continue to be in custody.
The reason is that life sentence is nothing less than
lifelong imprisonment and remission vests no right
to release when the sentence is of life imprisonment
nor is any vested right to remission cancelled by
compulsory fourteen years jail life as a life sentence
is a sentence for whole life.
14.5.4. Interpreting Section 433-A, it was observed that
it was a savings clause in which there are three
components. Firstly, CrPC generally governs matters
covered by it. Secondly, if a special or local law
exists covering the same area, the latter law will
be saved and will prevail, such as short sentencing
measures and remission schemes promulgated
by various States. The third component is that if
there is a specific provision to the contrary, then
it would override the special or local law. It was
held that Section 433-A of the CrPC picks out of a
mass of imprisonment cases, a specific class of life
imprisonment cases and subjects it explicitly to a
particularised treatment. Therefore, Section 433-A
of the CrPC applies in preference to any special or
local law. This is because, Section 5 of the CrPC
expressly declares that specific provision, if any, to
the contrary will prevail over any special or local law.
Therefore, Section 433-A of the CrPC would prevail
and escape exclusion of Section 5 thereof. The
Constitution Bench concluded that Section 433-A of
the CrPC is supreme over the remission rules and
short-sentencing statutes made by various States.
Section 433-A of the CrPC does not permit parole or
other related release within a span of fourteen years.
14.5.5. It was further observed that criminology must
include victimology as a major component of its
concerns. When a murder or other grievous offence
is committed, the victims or other aggrieved persons
must receive reparation and social responsibility of
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2047
Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others
the criminal to restore the loss or heal the injury is
part of the punitive exercise although the length of
the prison term is no reparation to the crippled or
bereaved.
14.5.6. Fazal Ali, J. in his concurring judgment in Maru
Ram observed that crime is rightly described as an
act of warfare against the community touching new
depths of lawlessness. According to him, the object
of imposing a deterrent sentence is threefold. While
holding that a deterrent form of punishment may not
be the most suitable or ideal form of punishment,
yet, the fact remains that a deterrent punishment
prevents occurrence of offence. He further observed
that Section 433-A of the CrPC is actually a piece of
social legislation which by one stroke seeks to prevent
dangerous criminals from repeating offences and on
the other hand, protects the society from harm and
distress caused to innocent persons. Therefore, he
opined that where Section 433-A applies, no question
of reduction of sentence arises at all unless the
President of India or the Governor of a State choose
to exercise their wide powers under Article 72 or
Article 161 of the Constitution respectively, which
also have to be exercised according to sound legal
principles as any reduction or modification in the
deterrent punishment would, far from reforming the
criminal, be counterproductive.
14.6 State of Haryana vs. Mohinder Singh, (2000) 3 SCC 394 is a
case which arose under Section 432 of the CrPC on remission
of sentence in which the difference between the terms “bail”,
“furlough” and “parole” having different connotations were
discussed. It was observed that furloughs are variously known
as temporary leaves, home visits or temporary community
release and are usually granted when a convict is suddenly
faced with a severe family crisis such as death or grave
illness in the immediate family and often the convict/inmate is
accompanied by an officer as part of the terms of temporary
release of special leave. Parole is the release of a prisoner
temporarily for a special purpose or completely before the expiry
2048 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of the sentence, on promise of good behaviour. Conditional
release from imprisonment is to entitle a convict to serve
remainder of his term outside the confines of an institution on
his satisfactorily complying all terms and conditions provided
in the parole order.
14.7 In Poonam Lata vs. M.L. Wadhawan, (1987) 3 SCC 347, it was
observed that parole is a provisional release from confinement
but it is deemed to be part of imprisonment. Release on parole
is a wing of reformative process and is expected to provide
opportunity to the prisoner to transform himself into a useful
citizen. Parole is thus, a grant of partial liberty or lessening
of restrictions on a convict prisoner but release on parole
does not change the status of the prisoner. When a prisoner
is undergoing sentence and confined in jail or is on parole
or furlough, his position is not similar to a convict who is on
bail. This is because a convict on bail is not entitled to the
benefit of the remission system. In other words, a prisoner
is not eligible for remission of sentence during the period he
is on bail or when his sentence is temporarily suspended.
Therefore, such a prisoner who is on bail is not entitled to get
remission earned during the period he is on bail.
15. The sentence imposed on the appellant herein, inter alia, is
recapitulated as under:
“Life imprisonment which shall be 20 years of actual
imprisonment without consideration of remission, and fine
of Rs.10,000/-.”
The word “which” used after the words “life imprisonment”, is an
interrogative pronoun, related pronoun and determiner, referring to
something previously mentioned when introducing a clause giving
further information. Therefore, the sentence of life imprisonment
is determined as twenty years which is of actual imprisonment.
Further, during the period of twenty years, the appellant cannot seek
remission during his sentence of twenty years of imprisonment i.e.,
after completion of fourteen years as per Section 433A of the CrPC
but must continue his sentence for a period of twenty years without
any remission whatsoever. Therefore, the appellant has no right
to make any application for remission of the above sentence for a
period of twenty years.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2049
Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others
15.1 In Criminal Appeal Nos.1531-1533 of 2015 filed by Vikas Yadav
as well as in Criminal Appeal Nos.1528-1530 of 2015 which also
included the appeal filed by the appellant herein, the imposition
of a fixed term sentence on the appellants by the High Court
was also questioned but this Court observed that such a term
of sentence on the appellants by the High Court could not be
found fault with. Placing reliance on Gopal Singh vs. State
of Uttarakhand, (2013) 7 SCC 545, at paragraph 84 of its
judgment in the aforesaid criminal appeal, this Court observed
that “Judged on the aforesaid parameters, we reiterate that
the imposition of fixed terms sentence is justified.”
15.2 In the instant case, as already noted, the life imprisonment
being twenty years of actual imprisonment was without
consideration of remission. Soon after the period of twenty
years is completed, in our view, the appellant has to be
simply released from jail provided the other sentences run
concurrently. The appellant is not under an obligation to
make an application seeking remission of his sentence on
completion of twenty years. This is simply for the reason
that the appellant has completed his twenty years of actual
imprisonment and in fact, during the period of twenty years,
the appellant was not entitled to any remission. Thus, in the
instant case, on completion of the twenty years’ of actual
imprisonment, it is wholly unnecessary for the appellant
to seek remission of his sentence on the premise that his
sentence is a life imprisonment i.e. till the end of his natural
life. On the other hand, learned senior counsel appearing for
the respondent-State and respondent-complainant contended
that once the period of twenty years is over, which was
without any consideration of remission, the appellant had
to seek remission of his sentence (life imprisonment) by
making an application to the Sentence Review Board which
would consider in accordance with the applicable policy and
decide whether the remission of sentence imposed on the
appellant has to be granted or not. Such a contention cannot
be accepted for the following reasons:
(i) firstly, because, in the instant case, the sentence of life
imprisonment has been fixed to be twenty years of actual
imprisonment which the appellant herein has completed;
2050 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
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(ii) secondly, during the period of twenty years the appellant
was not entitled to seek any remission; and
(iii) thirdly, on completion of twenty years of actual
imprisonment, the appellant is entitled to be released.
15.3 This is because in this case, instead of granting death
penalty, alternative penalty of life imprisonment has been
awarded which shall be for a period of twenty years of actual
imprisonment. That even in the absence of death penalty
being imposed, life imprisonment of a fixed term of twenty
years was imposed which is possible only for a High Court
or this Court to do so. The period of twenty years is without
remission inasmuch as the appellant is denied the right of
remission of his sentence on completion of fourteen years as
per Section 432 read with Section 433-A of the CrPC. Such
a right has been denied by the High Court but that does not
mean that on completion of twenty years of imprisonment
the appellant has to still seek reduction of his sentence on
the premise that he was awarded life imprisonment which is
till the end of his natural life. If that was so, the High Court
would have specified it in those terms. On the other hand,
the High Court has imposed life imprisonment which shall be
twenty years of actual imprisonment without consideration of
remission. The High Court was of the view that for a period of
twenty years, the appellant has to undergo actual imprisonment
which would not take within its meaning any period granted
for parole or furlough.
15.4 In the instant case, the actual imprisonment of twenty years
was admittedly completed by the appellant on 09.03.2025 which
was without any remission. If that is so, it would imply that the
appellant has completed his period of sentence. In fact, the
award of the aforesaid sentence was also confirmed by this
Court. On completion of twenty years of actual imprisonment
on 09.03.2025, the appellant was entitled to be released. The
release of the appellant from jail does not depend upon further
consideration as to whether he has to be released or not and
as to whether remission has to be granted to him or not by the
Sentence Review Board. In fact, the Sentence Review Board
cannot sit in judgment over what has been judicially determined
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2051
Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of (NCT of Delhi) & Others
as the sentence by the High Court which has been affirmed
by this Court. There cannot be any further incarceration of the
appellant herein from 09.03.2025 onwards. On the other hand,
in the instant case, the appellant’s prayer for furlough was
refused by the High Court and, thereafter, this Court granted
furlough only on 25.06.2025 as he had completed his actual
sentence by then, pending consideration of the amended prayer
made by the appellant herein on completion of his sentence
on 09.03.2025. Therefore, the continuous incarceration of the
appellant from 09.03.2025 onwards was illegal. In fact, on
10.03.2025, the appellant ought to have been released from
prison as he had completed the sentence imposed on him by
the High Court as affirmed by this Court.
15.5 In Bhola Kumar vs. State of Chhattisgarh, 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 837, this Court lamented the unfortunate fate of
prisoners languishing behind bars even long after completing
their period of sentence noted as follows:
“23. …When such a convict is detained beyond
the actual release date it would be imprisonment
or detention sans sanction of law and would thus,
violate not only Article 19(d) but also Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. …”
15.6 Although, presently the appellant is not in custody but on
furlough for three months pursuant to the interim order dated
25.06.2025 passed by this Court, he need not surrender after
expiry of the period of furlough as he has completed his jail
sentence of twenty years on 09.03.2025, if not wanted in any
other case.
15.7 Consequently, we hold that in all cases where an accused/
convict has completed his period of jail term, he shall be entitled
to be released forthwith and not continued in imprisonment if
not wanted in any other case. We say so in light of Article 21
of the Constitution of India which states that no person shall
be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law.
16. A copy of this order shall be circulated by the Registry of this Court to
all the Home Secretaries of the States/Union Territories to ascertain
2052 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
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whether any accused/convict has remained in jail beyond the period
of sentence and if so, to issue directions for release of such accused/
convicts, if not wanted in any other case.
Similarly, a copy of this order shall also be sent by the Registry of this
Court to the Member Secretary, National Legal Services Authority for
onward transmission to all Member Secretaries of the States/Union
Territories Legal Services Authorities for communication to all the
Member Secretaries of the District Legal Services Authorities in the
States for the purpose of implementation of this judgment.
This appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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