Holding

The death sentence was unjustified as the courts failed to consider mitigating circumstances and the "rarest of rare" doctrine requires a probability of non‑reformation, leading to commutation of death to life imprisonment.

Summary

The petitioner, Sundar, was convicted of kidnapping and murdering a seven‑year‑old child and sentenced to death by the trial court, a decision affirmed by the High Court and the Supreme Court. He filed a review petition alleging errors in the evidence, especially the admissibility of call‑detail records (CDRs) without a Section 65B certificate, and contended that mitigating circumstances were not considered. The Court held that none of the grounds raised amounted to errors apparent on the face of the record and that the prosecution's case remained unweakened even without the CDRs. It further observed that the trial and appellate courts failed to conduct a separate sentencing hearing or consider mitigating factors such as the petitioner's age, lack of prior antecedents, conduct in prison, and health. Applying the "rarest of rare" doctrine, the Court concluded that death was not warranted and commuted the sentence to life imprisonment for a minimum of twenty years without remission, while also initiating contempt proceedings against the police inspector for withholding material facts.

Issues considered

The applicability of review jurisdiction under Article 137 in death‑penalty cases and whether the petition can be disposed of by circulation.
Whether the call‑detail records admitted without a Section 65B certificate constitute a fatal error on the record.
The adequacy of the trial and appellate courts' consideration of mitigating circumstances and the requirement of a separate sentencing hearing under Section 235 CrPC.
Whether the "rarest of rare" doctrine justifies the death sentence in the present facts.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. Section 235, s. Section 354(3)
Constitution of Indias. Article 137
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. Section 63, s. Section 65, s. Section 65A, s. Section 65B
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. Section 201, s. Section 302, s. Section 364A
Supreme Court Rules, 2013s. Order XLVII Rule 1

Subjects

capital punishmentreview jurisdictionrarest of rare doctrinemitigating circumstanceselectronic evidenceSection 65Bsentencing hearingdeath sentence commutationkidnappingmurderchild victimcircumstantial evidencecontempt of court

Judgment

1016 [2023]
SUPREME COURT 5 S.C.R. 1016
REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A SUNDAR @ SUNDARRAJAN
v.
STATE BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE
(Review Petition (Crl.) Nos. 159-160 of 2013)
B In
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 300-301 of 2011)
MARCH 21, 2023
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI,
C HIMA KOHLI AND PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA,
JJ.]
Constitution of India : Arts. 137 – Review jurisdiction in
matters pertaining to capital punishment – Scope of – Petitioner
accused of kidnapping and murdering a 7-year old child –
Conviction u/ss. 364A, 302 and 201 IPC and imposition of death
D
sentence by the courts below – Upheld by this Court – Review
thereagainst – Dismissed through circulation – However, in view of
the judgment in Mohd. Arif’s case, order dismissing the review petition
through circulation recalled and the petition heard in open Court –
Held: None of the grounds raised amount to errors apparent on the
E face of the record – All the grounds fail to raise any reasonable
doubt in the prosecution case – Thus, no reason to interfere with
the concurrent findings of the trial court, the High Court and this
Court vis-a-vis the guilt of the petitioner for kidnapping and
murdering the victim – Even though the crime committed by the
petitioner is unquestionably grave and unpardonable, it is not
F
appropriate to affirm the death sentence awarded to him – ‘Rarest
of rare’ doctrine requires that the death sentence not be imposed
only by taking into account the grave nature of crime but only if
there is no possibility of reformation in a criminal – No mitigating
circumstances were placed before any of the appellate courts – It
G cannot be said that there is no possibility of reformation even though
the petitioner has committed a ghastly crime – Also it was submitted
that the hearing was not conducted separately in the trial court –
Thus, in view of the gruesome nature of the crime of murder of 7
year old child, the death sentence is commuted to life imprisonment
H
1016
SUNDAR @ SUNDARRAJAN v. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF 1017
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for not less than twenty years without reprieve or remission – A
Supreme Court Rules 2013 – Ord. XLVII r. 1.
Sentence/sentencing:
Capital punishment – Mitigating circumstances –
Consideration of, while deciding upon the sentence – Held: Duty
of the court is to enquire into mitigating circumstances as well as to B
foreclose the possibility of reformation and rehabilitation before
imposing the death penalty – State must equally place all material
and circumstances on the record bearing on the probability of reform
– Many such materials and aspects are within the knowledge of the
State which has had custody of the accused both before and after C
the conviction – Moreover, the court cannot be an indifferent by-
stander in the process – Process and powers of the court may be
utilised to ensure that such material is made available to it to form a
just sentencing decision bearing on the probability of reform.
Capital punishment – Aggravating circumstances – D
Consideration of, while deciding upon the sentence – Held: Sex of
the child cannot be in itself considered as an aggravating
circumstance – Murder of a young child is a grievous crime and the
young age of the victim as well as the trauma caused to the entire
family is in itself, an aggravating circumstance – It does not and
should not matter for a constitutional court whether the young child E
was a male child or a female child – Courts should not indulge in
furthering the notion that only a male child furthers family lineage
or is able to assist the parents in old age – Such remarks involuntarily
further patriarchal value judgments that courts should avoid.
Evidence Act, 1972 : s. 65 B – Electronic evidence in the F
form of Call detail records-CDRs – Production of a certificate u/
s.65 B, if mandatory for admitting any electronic evidence – Held:
s. 65B certificate is mandatory – On facts, the review petition to be
considered eschewing the electronic evidence in the form of CDRs
as they are without the appropriate certificate u/s. 65B. G
Contempt of Court : Non-disclosure of material facts –
Petitioner-convict tried to escape from prison – Inspector of Police
in the affidavit filed, materially withheld information regarding
conduct of the petitioner in the prison from the Court – Thus,
initiation of Suo Motu contempt proceedings against the convict.
H
1018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A Disposing of the review petitions, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The evidence in the form of CDRs-Call Detail
Record was merely to corroborate the evidence that had been
given through the depositions of PW1 and PW8. Both of their
testimonies stand corroborated not only through the CDRs but
B also through the recovery of the mobile phone on the basis of the
confessional statement of the petitioner. Even if Ex. P5, being
the CDR, is not relied upon by this Court, the case of the
prosecution is not weakened as it merely corroborates the
documentary evidence and witness testimonies that remain
unblemished regardless. In view thereof, it is clear that there is
C no reason to doubt the guilt of the petitioner. Therefore, even
though none of the grounds raised by the petitioner amount to
errors apparent on the face of the record, in view of thereof, it
can also be conclusively said that all the grounds on merits fail to
raise any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. There is
D no reason in the review jurisdiction to interfere with the
concurrent findings of the trial court, High Court and this Court
vis–à–vis the guilt of the petitioner for kidnapping and murdering
the victim. [Para 52-54][1048-E-F; 1049-F-H]
1.2 The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
E sentence of death cannot be imposed in such cases where the
conviction is based on circumstantial evidence as a ‘lingering
doubt’ regarding the guilt of the accused persists. The argument
of residual or lingering doubt does not come to the rescue of the
petitioner. [Para 57, 59][1050-C-D]

F 1.3 This Court has already applied the relevant standard to
confirm the guilt of the petitioner in the appeal in a case which is
based on circumstantial evidence and it will not be appropriate
for this Court to once again venture into an assessment of the
evidence in the review jurisdiction in view of its limited scope.
[Para 60][1051-F-G]
G
1.4 In the instant case, the judgment of the trial court dealing
with sentencing indicates that a meaningful, real and effective
hearing was not afforded to the petitioner. The trial court did not
conduct any separate hearing on sentencing and did not take into
account any mitigating circumstances pertaining to the petitioner
H
SUNDAR @ SUNDARRAJAN v. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF 1019
POLICE

before awarding the death penalty. The High Court took into A
account the gruesome and merciless nature of the act. It reiterated
the precedents stating that the death penalty is to be awarded
only in the rarest of rare cases. However, it did not specifically
look at any mitigating circumstances bearing on the petitioner.
This Court examined the aggravating circumstances of the crime
B
in detail. The above sequence indicates that no mitigating
circumstances of the petitioner were taken into account at any
stage of the trial or the appellate process even though the
petitioner was sentenced to capital punishment. [Para 70-
74][1056-B-C, F-G; 1057-A,D]
1.5 In terms of the aggravating circumstances that were C
taken note of by this Court in appeal, the attention has been drawn
to certain circumstance. It is noted that the sex of the child cannot
be in itself considered as an aggravating circumstance by a
constitutional court. The murder of a young child is
unquestionably a grievous crime and the young age of such a D
victim as well as the trauma that it causes for the entire family is
in itself, undoubtedly, an aggravating circumstance. In such a
circumstance, it does not and should not matter for a constitutional
court whether the young child was a male child or a female child.
The murder remains equally tragic. Courts should also not indulge
in furthering the notion that only a male child furthers family E
lineage or is able to assist the parents in old age. Such remarks
involuntarily further patriarchal value judgements that courts
should avoid regardless of the context. [Para 75][1057-E, H;
1058-A-C]
1.6 No inquiry was conducted for enabling a consideration F
of the factors mentioned in case of the petitioner. Neither the
trial court, nor the appellate courts have looked into any factors
to conclusively state that the petitioner cannot be reformed or
rehabilitated. The Courts have reiterated the gruesome nature
of crime to award the death penalty. In appeal, this Court merely G
noted that the counsel for the petitioner could not point towards
mitigating circumstances and upheld the death penalty. The state
must equally place all material and circumstances on the record
bearing on the probability of reform. Many such materials and
aspects are within the knowledge of the state which has had
custody of the accused both before and after the conviction. H
1020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A Moreover, the court cannot be an indifferent by-stander in the
process. The process and powers of the court may be utilised to
ensure that such material is made available to it to form a just
sentencing decision bearing on the probability of reform. [Para
79][1061-D-F]
B 1.7 The duty of the court to enquire into mitigating
circumstances as well as to foreclose the possibility of reformation
and rehabilitation before imposing the death penalty has been
highlighted in multiple judgments of this Court. Despite this, in
the present case, no such enquiry was conducted and the grievous
nature of the crime was the only factor that was considered while
C awarding the death penalty. [Para 81][1062-H; 1063-A]
1.8 The fact remains that no mitigating circumstances were
placed before any of the appellate courts. It cannot be said that
there is no possibility of reformation even though the petitioner
has committed a ghastly crime. The mitigating factors that the
D petitioner has no prior antecedents, was 23 years old when he
committed the crime and has been in prison since 2009 where
his conduct has been satisfactory, except for the attempt to escape
prison in 2013; that the petitioner is suffering from a case of
systemic hypertension and has attempted to acquire some basic
E education in the form of a diploma in food catering; that the
acquisition of a vocation in jail has an important bearing on his
ability to lead a gainful life, must be considered. Considering the
above factors, even though the crime committed by the petitioner
is unquestionably grave and unpardonable, it is not appropriate
to affirm the death sentence that was awarded to him. The ‘rarest
F of rare’ doctrine requires that the death sentence not be imposed
only by taking into account the grave nature of crime but only if
there is no possibility of reformation in a criminal. However, the
Court is also aware that a sentence of life imprisonment is subject
to remission. This would not be adequate in view of the gruesome
G crime committed by the petitioner. [Para 88-90][1064-E-H; 1065-
A]
1.9 There is no reason to doubt the guilt of the petitioner
in kidnapping and murdering the victim. The exercise of the
jurisdiction in review to interfere with the conviction is not
H warranted. However, the Court does take note of the arguments
SUNDAR @ SUNDARRAJAN v. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF 1021
POLICE

regarding the sentencing hearing not having been conducted A
separately in the trial court and mitigating circumstances having
not been considered in the appellate courts before awarding the
capital punishment to the petitioner. While weighing this
argument, the gruesome nature of the crime of murder of a young
child of merely 7 years of age has also weighed upon the Court
B
and the Court does not find that a sentence of life imprisonment,
which normally works out to a term of 14 years, would be
proportionate in the circumstances. Accordingly, the death
sentence imposed upon the petitioner is commuted to life
imprisonment for not less than twenty years without reprieve or
remission. [Para 93, 94][1066-B-E] C
1.10 Separately, a notice is required to be issued to the
Inspector of Police, Kammapuram Police Station, Cuddalore
District, State of Tamil Nadu to offer an explanation as to why
action should not be taken for the filing of the affidavit dated 26
September 2021. In this case, prima facie, material information D
regarding the conduct of the petitioner in the prison was concealed
from this Court. Accordingly, the Registry is directed to register
the matter as a suo motu proceeding for contempt of court. [Para
95][1066-F]
Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v Registrar, Supreme Court of E
India 2014 (9) SCC 737 : [2014] 11 SCR 1009 –
followed
Mofil Khan v State of Jharkhand 2021 SCC OnLineSC
1136; Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v Kailash Kushanrao
Gorantyal 2020 (7) SCC 1; Anvar P.V. v P.K. Basheer F
2014 (10) SCC 473 : [2014] 11 SCR 399; State (NCT
of Delhi) v Navjot Sandhu 2005 (11) SCC 600 : [2005]
2 Suppl. SCR 79; Tomaso Bruno v State of Uttar
Pradesh 2015 (7) SCC 178 : [2015] 1 SCR 721; Shafi
Mohammed v State of Himachal Pradesh 2018 (2) SCC
801; Sonu alias Amar v State of Haryana 2017 (8) SCC G
570 : [2017] 8 SCR 151; Mohd. Arif v State (NCT of
Delhi) 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1509; Shatrughna Baban
Meshram v State of Maharashtra 2021 (1) SCC 596;
Santa Singh v State of Punjab 1976 (4) SCC 190 :
[1977] 1 SCR 229; Bachan Singh v State of Punjab H
1022 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A 1980 (2) SCC 684; Muniappan v State of Tamil Nadu
1981 (3) SCC 11 : [1981] 3 SCR 270; Allauddin Mian
v State of Bihar 1989 (3) SCC 5 : [1989] 2 SCR 498;
Anguswamy v State of Tamil Nadu 1989 (3) SCC 33;
Malkiat Singh v State of Punjab 1991 (4) SCC 341 :
[1991] 2 SCR 256; Dattaraya v State of Maharashtra
B
2020 (14) SCC 290 : [2019] 11 SCR 295; Dagdu v
State of Maharashtra 1977 (3) SCC 68 : [1977] 3 SCR
636; Tarlok Singh v State of Punjab 1977 (3) SCC 218
: [1977] 3 SCR 711; Ramdeo Chauhan v State of Assam
2001 (5) SCC 714 : [2001] 3 SCR 669; In re: Framing
C Guidelines Regarding Potential Mitigating
Circumstances to be Considered while Imposing Death
Sentences Suo Motu W.P. (Crl.) No. 1/2022; Rajendra
Pralhadrao Wasnik v State of Maharashtra 2019 (12)
SCC 460 : [2018] 14 SCR 585; Santosh Kumar
Satishbhushan Bariyar v State of Maharashtra 2009
D
(6) SCC 498 : [2009] 9 SCR 90; Anil v State of
Maharashtra 2014 (4) SCC 69 : [2014] 3 SCR 34;
Swamy Shraddananda (2) @ Murali Manohar Mishra
v State of Karnataka 2008 (13) SCC 767 – referred
to.
E Exercise of Review Jurisdiction in Capital Cases in
DEATH PENALTY AND THE INDIAN SUPREME
COURT (2007–2021), Project 39A, National Law
University Delhi (2022) – referred to.
Case Law Reference
F
[2014] 11 SCR 1009 followed Para 1
(2020) 7 SCC 1 referred to Para 30
[2014] 11 SCR 399 referred to Para 30
[2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 79 referred to Para 31
G
[2015] 1 SCR 721 referred to Para 34
(2018) 2 SCC 801 referred to Para 35
[2017] 8 SCR 151 referred to Para 40

H (2021) 1 SCC 596 referred to Para 58
SUNDAR @ SUNDARRAJAN v. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF 1023
POLICE

[1977] 1 SCR 229 referred to Para 63 A
(1980) 2 SCC 684 referred to Para 64
[1981] 3 SCR 270 referred to Para 65
[1989] 2 SCR 498 referred to Para 66
(1989) 3 SCC 33 referred to Para 67 B
[1991] 2 SCR 256 referred to Para 67
[2019] 11 SCR 295 referred to Para 67
[1977] 3 SCR 636 referred to Para 68
[1977] 3 SCR 711 referred to Para 68 C
[2001] 3 SCR 669 referred to Para 68
[2018] 14 SCR 585 referred to Para 76
[2009] 9 SCR 90 referred to Para 77
[2014] 3 SCR 34 referred to Para 78 D

(2008) 13 SCC 767 referred to Para 91
INHERENT JURISDICTION : Review Petition (Crl.) Nos.159-
160 of 2013 In Criminal Appeal Nos.300-301 of 2011.
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.02.2013 in Crl. A. Nos.300 E
and 301 of 2011 of the Supreme Court of India.
Renjith B. Marar, Ms. Lakshmi N. Kaimal, Arun Poonavlli, M. J.
Santhosh, Advs. for the Petitioner.
V. Krishnamurthy, AAG, Dr. Joseph Aristotle S., Ms. Nupur
Sharma, Shobhit Dwivedi, Sanjeev Kumar Mahara, Ms. Richa F
Vishwakarma, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI
This Judgment consists of the following sections: G
A. Prologue–The impact of Mohd. Arif………………3*
B. Background ................................................................ 7*
C. Scope of Review Jurisdiction .................................. 9*
*Ed. Note : Pagination is as per the original judgment. H
1024 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A D. Error Apparent on the Face of the Record? ....... 10*
D.1 Submissions of Counsel .................................... 10*
D.2. Analysis ............................................................ 12*
E. Sentencing & Mitigation ........................................ 32*

B E.1. Lingering Doubt Theory .............................. 32*
E.2. Sentencing & Mitigation in the Trial Court and
the Appellate Courts .................................... 34*
F. Conclusion ................................................................ 50*

C 1. The applicant is a convict on death row. He has moved this
court for a fresh look at his petition seeking a review of his conviction
for the offence of murder and the award of the sentence of death. He
does soon the basis of the decision of the Constitution Bench in Mohd.
Arif alias Ashfaq v Registrar, Supreme Court of India1. In Mohd.
Arif, this Court has held that review petitions arising from conviction
D and the imposition of the sentence of death must be heard in open court
and cannot be disposed of by circulation. The Constitution Bench allowed
a period of a month from the date of judgment to petitioners whose
applications seeking review of the judgment of this Court confirming the
award of the sentence of death were rejected by circulation, where the
sentence was yet to be executed.
E
A. Prologue – The impact of Mohd. Arif
2. In Mohd. Arif, this Court took note of the irreversible nature of
the death penalty and of the possibility of two judicial minds reaching
differing conclusions on the question of a case being appropriate for the
award of the death penalty. The judgment of the majority allowed the
F right to oral hearing in review for cases involving death penalty:
29. […] death sentence cases are a distinct category of cases
altogether. Quite apart from Article 134 of the Constitution granting
an automatic right of appeal to the Supreme Court in all death
sentence cases, and apart from death sentence being granted only
G in the rarest of rare cases, two factors have impressed us. The
first is the irreversibility of a death penalty. And the second
is the fact that different judicially trained minds can arrive
at conclusions which, on the same facts, can be diametrically
*Ed. Note : Pagination is as per the original judgment.
1
2014 (9) SCC 737
H
SUNDAR @ SUNDARRAJAN v. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF 1025
POLICE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

opposed to each other. Adverting first to the second factor A
mentioned above, it is well known that the basic principle
behind returning the verdict of death sentence is that it
has to be awarded in the rarest of rare cases. There may be
aggravating as well as mitigating circumstances which are
to be examined by the Court. At the same time, it is not
B
possible to lay down the principles to determine as to which
case would fall in the category of rarest of rare cases,
justifying the death sentence. It is not even easy to mention
precisely the parameters or aggravating/mitigating circumstances
which should be kept in mind while arriving at such a question.
Though attempts are made by Judges in various cases to state C
such circumstances, they remain illustrative only.
30. […] A sentence is a compound of many factors, including the
nature of the offence as well as the circumstances extenuating or
aggravating the offence. A large number of aggravating
circumstances and mitigating circumstances have been pointed D
out in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, SCC at pp. 749-50,
paras 202 & 206, that a Judge should take into account when
awarding the death sentence. Again, as pointed out above,
apart from the fact that these lists are only illustrative, as
clarified in Bachan Singh itself, different judicially trained
minds can apply different aggravating and mitigating E
circumstances to ultimately arrive at a conclusion, on
considering all relevant factors that the death penalty may
or may not be awarded in any given case. Experience based
on judicial decisions touching upon this aspect amply
demonstrate such a divergent approach being taken. F
Though, it is not necessary to dwell upon this aspect
elaborately, at the same time, it needs to be emphasised
that when on the same set of facts, one judicial mind can
come to the conclusion that the circumstances do not
warrant the death penalty, whereas another may feel it to
be a fit case fully justifying the death penalty, we feel that G
when a convict who has suffered the sentence of death and
files a review petition, the necessity of oral hearing in such
a review petition becomes an integral part of “reasonable
procedure”.
(emphasis supplied) H
1026 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A 3. A recent study by Project 39A examined all the judgments
involving a sentence of death delivered by the Supreme Court between
2007 and 2021 as part of which it analysed the exercise of the review
jurisdiction in capital cases.2 It noted that, during the period covered by
the study, before the decision in Mohd. Arif, 14 review petitions were
dismissed by circulation and the capital punishment was confirmed in all
B
of them. Out of these, 13 were re-opened in view of the judgment which
resulted in only 4 re-confirmations of the death penalty. On the other
hand, 7 judgments resulted in commutation of death sentences, 1 in
acquittal and 1 case being abated due to the death of the prisoner. In
view of the above data, the impact of the oral hearing of review petitions,
C due to the judgment in Mohd. Arif leading to a change in the outcome
of a death penalty confirmation is evident.
4. The Court in Mohd. Arif, however, was not persuaded by the
argument of involving two additional judges beyond the judges who had
heard the original appeal during the hearing of the review petition. It also
D held that a review must be ordinarily heard by the same bench which
originally heard the criminal appeal. It had noted that:
39. Henceforth, in all cases in which death sentence has been
awarded by the High Court in appeals pending before the Supreme
Court, only a bench of three Hon’ble Judges will hear the same.
E This is for the reason that at least three judicially trained minds
need to apply their minds at the final stage of the journey of a
convict on death row, given the vagaries of the sentencing
procedure outlined above. At present, we are not persuaded
to have a minimum of 5 learned Judges hear all death
sentence cases. Further, […] a review is ordinarily to be
F heard only by the same bench which originally heard the
criminal appeal. This is obviously for the reason that in order
that a review succeeds, errors apparent on the record have
to be found. It is axiomatic that the same learned Judges
alleged to have committed the error be called upon now to
G rectify such error. We, therefore, turn down [the…] plea
that two additional Judges be added at the review stage in
death sentence cases.
(emphasis supplied)
2
Exercise of Review Jurisdiction in Capital Cases in DEATH P ENALTY AND THE INDIAN
H SUPREME COURT (2007-2021), Project 39A, National Law University Delhi (2022).
SUNDAR @ SUNDARRAJAN v. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF 1027
POLICE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

5. The data analysed by Project 39A indicates that it is not merely A
the oral hearing of review petitions that has changed the outcomes. There
may also be a correlation between the ultimate outcome changing and
different judges being involved as part of the review process instead of
the same judges who had originally decided the appeal. Post Mohd.
Arif, this happens when the judges who were members of the original
B
bench have demitted office by the time the open court review comes for
hearing. The data involves the 13 review cases re-opened and re-decided
post Mohd. Arif after an oral hearing as well as 10 fresh review cases
which were decided post Mohd. Arif. Out of 13 post Mohd. Arif cases
which were re-opened, we have already noted that only 4 led to re-
confirmation of the award of the death penalty, while in 7 cases the C
sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, 1 resulted in an acquittal
and 1 stood abated. Out of the 10 fresh review cases, in 7 the death
sentence was confirmed while in 3 the sentence was commuted.
6. In the cases where the sentence of death was commuted to
life imprisonment, i.e. 7 cases from the first lot of 13 re-opened review D
cases and 3 cases from the second lot of 10 fresh review cases, all of
the benches in review were of a different composition from the bench
that decided the appeal. The 1 case which resulted in acquittal also had
a different bench in review from the one in appeal. On the other hand, in
the 11 cases which re-confirmed the death sentence, 7 benches had a
composition of one or all the judges being the same as the bench that E
decided the appeal. The report notes that:
The stage of review is rendered almost superfluous for the
purpose envisaged by the majority, i.e., a further reconsideration
of a death sentence, when the same bench (as in criminal appeal)
is called upon to decide the review petition. This is in fact F
demonstrated by the data. As predicted by Justice Chelameswar, when
heard by the same bench as the appeal, review petitions resulted in the
death sentence being maintained. 4 out of 11 confirmation judgments
rendered at the stage of review had the same bench. While the
remaining 7 confirmation judgments in review were rendered by G
benches of different composition, it is relevant to note that in 1
of these judgments one judge was common to both the benches
that decided the review and the appeal, and in yet another, two
judges were common to both benches. On the other hand, all of
the 10 judgments that resulted in commutation at the review stage,
H
1028 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A were rendered by benches having a different composition from
the bench that decided the appeal. Therefore, the data suggests that
a review petition filed within 30 days of the judgment rendered in appeal,
decided by the same bench, will not demonstrate considerable differences
in approaches or outcome, unlike those decided by a different bench.
B (emphasis supplied)
7. While the above data is not conclusive and the correlation may
not necessarily equate to causation, we find it appropriate to mention as
the present case is also one of those being re-opened and re-heard as a
result of the decision in Mohd. Arif. We clarify by way of abundant
C caution that being both a smaller bench and having not been called upon
to consider the impact of different judges sitting in the review of an
appeal confirming the death sentence, we are not deciding on the merits
of the proposition.
B. Background
D 8. In view of the judgment in Mohd. Arif, the order dated 20
March 2013 in the present case dismissing the review petition through
circulation was recalled and this review petition was heard in open court.
9. The petitioner was accused of kidnapping and murdering a 7-
year-old child. The petitioner is alleged to have picked up the victim
E while he was returning from school in the school van on 27 July 2009.
Prosecution witnesses testified to the petitioner having picked up the
victim on his motorbike.
10. Due to the victim’s absence, his mother attempted to find his
whereabouts and was informed of the above sequence of events by one
F of the witnesses. Accordingly, she proceeded to register a complaint at
Police Station, Kammapuram on the same date. On the same night, she
also received a call on her mobile phone from the petitioner, demanding
a ransom of Rs. 5 lakhs for the release of the victim. Further, another
ransom call was made on the succeeding day from a telephone booth.
One of the witnesses is the individual who runs the booth and has testified
G
that the petitioner made a call enquiring regarding the payment of money.
11. On 30 July 2009 the police raided the house of the petitioner
and arrested him along with a co-accused who was later acquitted. The
petitioner made confessional statements on the basis of which three
mobile phone sets, two of which had SIM cards, were recovered. The
H
SUNDAR @ SUNDARRAJAN v. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF 1029
POLICE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

petitioner confessed to strangling the deceased, putting his dead body in A
a gunny bag and throwing it in the Meerankulam tank. The body of the
deceased was recovered from the tank on the basis of the confessional
statement.
12. On the basis of the investigation, the petitioner was charged
under Sections 364A, 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code.3 The trial B
was committed to the Court of the Sessions Judge on 30 July 2010. The
Sessions Judge convicted the petitioner for the offences with which he
was charged and sentenced him to (i) death with a fine of Rs.1000 for
the offence under section 364A IPC, (ii) death with a fine of Rs.1000
for the offence under section 302 IPC; and (ii) rigorous imprisonment
for seven years and a fine of Rs.1000 for the offence under section 201 C
IPC. The co-accused was acquitted of all the offences.
13. The petitioner’s appeal was dismissed by the High Court of
Judicature at Madras by a judgment dated 30 September 2010. The
High Court confirmed both the conviction and the award of the death
sentence. D

14. This Court dismissed the appeal of the petitioner and confirmed
the judgment of the Madras High Court on 5 February 2013. Both the
High Court and this Court entered into a detailed appreciation of facts
before confirming the conviction.
E
C. Scope of Review Jurisdiction
15. Article 137 of the Constitution states that the Supreme Court
has the power to review any judgment pronounced by it subject to
provisions of law made by the Parliament or any rules under Article 145.
The Supreme Court Rules 20134 have been framed under Article 145 of F
the Constitution. Order XLVII Rule 1of the 2013 Rules provides that the
Court may review its own judgment 16. or order but no application for
review will be entertained in a civil proceeding except on the ground
mentioned in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908,
and in a criminal proceeding except on the ground of an error apparent
on the face of the record. G
17. In Mofil Khan v State of Jharkhand5,a three judge Bench of
this Court while discussing the scope of the power of review held that:
3
“IPC”
4
“2013 Rules”
5
2021 SCC OnLineSC 1136 H
1030 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A 2. […] Review is not rehearing of the appeal all over again and to
maintain a review petition, it has to be shown that there has been
a miscarriage of justice (See: Suthendraraja v. State). An error
which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of
reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face
of the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review
B
(See: Kamlesh Verma v. Mayavati). An applicant cannot be
allowed to reargue the appeal in an application for review on the
grounds that were urged at the time of hearing of the appeal.
Even if the applicant succeeds in establishing that there may be
another view possible on the conviction or sentence of the accused
C that is not a sufficient ground for review. This Court shall exercise
its jurisdiction to review only when a glaring omission or patent
mistake has crept in the earlier decision due to judicial fallibility.
There has to be an error apparent on the face of the record leading
to miscarriage of justice.
D D. Error Apparent on the Face of the Record?
D.1 Submissions of Counsel
18. We have heard the counsel for the petitioner and for the State
of Tamil Nadu. The counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the
following errors are apparent on the face of the record and call for a
E review of the judgment dismissing the appeal:
a. There is no proof that the phone number through which the
ransom calls were allegedly made by the petitioner i.e. the
number ending with XXX5961, belongs to the petitioner;
b. That the call detail records show that the above-mentioned
F number is registered with one individual with residence in
Alathur, Palakkad whom the petitioner has no connection
with;
c. That the 15-digit IMEI number for the cell phone, allegedly
belonging to the petitioner containing the SIM with mobile
G number ending with XXX5961, mentioned in the seizure
memo differs from the IMEI number mentioned in the call
detail record;
d. There is no evidence that the number on which the ransom
call was allegedly made to PW1 (mother of the deceased),i.e.
H the number ending with XXX847, belongs to PW1;
SUNDAR @ SUNDARRAJAN v. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF 1031
POLICE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

e. PW1 has not stated that calls were made to her on 28 July A
2009 and the testimony of PW16, the operator of the phone
booth through which the call was made, cannot be relied
upon; and
f. The certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence
Act 18726 for the call detail records was not furnished. B
19. The counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu strongly resisted the
submissions which were urged by the Petitioner. The counsel submitted
that the above grounds do not amount to errors apparent on the face of
the record and do not meet the standard for re-appreciating evidence by
this Court in review jurisdiction in the face of concurrent findings of the C
Trial Court, the High Court and this Court. The counsel also took us
through the relevant exhibits and statements of prosecution witnesses to
counter the grounds raised by the petitioner on merits.
D.2. Analysis
20. We are in agreement with the counsel for the State of Tamil D
Nadu. The grounds which have been raised by the petitioner have already
been dealt with by the courts which have arrived at concurrent findings
recording the guilt of the petitioner. Further, the case of the prosecution
is not founded only on the alleged calls for ransom but on consistent
interlinked evidence as both the High Court and Supreme Court found in E
their judgments.
21. Regardless, we consider it appropriate to deal with the
contentions of the petitioner.
22. The petitioner has alleged that the number through which the
ransom call was allegedly made did not belong to him. However, on the F
basis of his statement of 30 July 2009, the cell phone with the SIM for
the mobile number ending with XXX5961 was seized from the petitioner
along with 2 other cell phones, the motorbike on which he had kidnapped
the victim as well as the victim’s school bag.
23. Similarly, the contention based on the difference in the IMEI G
number recorded in the seizure memo and the call detail records does
not affect the prosecution’s case for the following reason. The difference
in the IMEI number recorded in the seizure memo and the call detail

6
“IEA”
H
1032 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A record pertains to the last digit of the 15-digit IMEI number. Every device
has a unique IMEI number identifying the brand owner in the model.
The first 8 digits are the Type Allocation Code (TAC) digits of which the
initial 2 digits identify the reporting body and the next 6 identify the brand
owner and device model allocated by the reporting body. The next 6
digits are the unique serial number assigned to individual devices by the
B
manufacturer.7
24. These 14 digits in the petitioner’s case match in both the seizure
memo and the call detail record. The last digit in the IMEI number is the
‘Luhn check digit’ based on a function of the other digits using an
algorithm. Technically, the last digit, which is the only digit that is different
C in the seizure memo and the call detail record, can be calculated through
the algorithm on the basis of the first 14 digits which are the same in
both the documents. As the last digit of an IMEI number is a function of
the first 14 digits, as long as the first 14 digits are a match, it can only
lead to one unique device. Accordingly, it can be conclusively said that a
D difference in only the last digit of the IMEI number cannot imply that it
represents the IMEI number of a separate device. Therefore, the
difference in the last digit of the IMEI number can reasonably be assumed
to be a typographical error and does not raise a doubt in the prosecution’s
case.
E 25. The arguments regarding non-verification of PW1’s number,
non-confirmation with PW1 regarding a call received on the subsequent
day as claimed by PW16 have been raised at a belated stage.
26. PW8 has stated in her testimony that the petitioner called her
to enquire regarding the phone number of PW1 and she told him to cut
F the phone and call again so she can retrieve the number and provide the
same, as she did on the second call. PW1 has also testified that she
received the call for ransom at about 9:30PM. It was upon the petitioner,
at the stage of cross-examination of PW1 to raise questions regarding
the number ending with XXX847 belonging to her or regarding the call
alleged to have been made by the petitioner on 28 July 2009 mentioned
G by PW16.
27. Finally, the petitioner has argued that the CDRs cannot be
relied upon due to the lack of production of the Section 65B certificate.
7
GSMA TAC Allocation and IMEI Programming Rules for Device Brand Owners and
H Manufacturers, Training Guide (February 2018 v1.0).
SUNDAR @ SUNDARRAJAN v. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF 1033
POLICE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

The call detail records were verified in the testimony of the Legal Officer A
of Vodafone, PW11, who himself produced the documents from the
computer. He has in his cross-examination specifically corroborated the
details of the calls made between the petitioner and PW1 and PW8
(from whom the number of PW1 was received after enquiring about it
during the call by petitioner). The call detail records of the mobile number
B
ending with XXX5961 confirm that two calls were made to PW8 at
9:22PM and 9:25PM on 27 July 2009. Immediately after this he called
on the number ending with XXX847 at 9:39PM. However, admittedly
the certificate mentioned under Section 65B of the IEA was not produced.
28. Section 65B was inserted in the IEA along with various other
amendments by the Information Technology Act 20008 which took into C
account digital evidence. Section 65B provides for the admissibility of
electronic records.
29. Section 65B of the IEA is reproduced below:
“65-B. Admissibility of electronic records.—(1) D
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any information
contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper,
stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced
by a computer (hereinafter referred to as “the computer output”)
shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned
in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and E
computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings,
without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of
any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which
direct evidence would be admissible.
(2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a F
computer output shall be the following, namely—
(a) the computer output containing the information was produced
by the computer during the period over which the computer was
used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of
any activities regularly carried on over that period by the person G
having lawful control over the use of the computer;
(b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the
electronic record or of the kind from which the information so
8
“IT Act”
H
1034 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the
ordinary course of the said activities;
c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer
was operating properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in
which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during
B that part of the period, was not such as to affect the electronic
record or the accuracy of its contents; and
(d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces
or is derived from such information fed into the computer in the
ordinary course of the said activities.
C (3) Where over any period, the function of storing or processing
information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on
over that period as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) was
regularly performed by computers, whether—
(a) by a combination of computers operating over that period; or
D
(b) by different computers operating in succession over that period;
or
(c) by different combinations of computers operating in succession
over that period; or
E (d) in any other manner involving the successive operation over
that period, in whatever order, of one or more computers and one
or more combinations of computers, all the computers used for
that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes
of this section as constituting a single computer; and references
in this section to a computer shall be construed accordingly.
F
(4) In any proceedings where it is desired to give a statement in
evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the
following things, that is to say—
(a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and
G describing the manner in which it was produced;
(b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production
of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of
showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer;
(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions
H mentioned in sub-section (2) relate,
SUNDAR @ SUNDARRAJAN v. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF 1035
POLICE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible A
official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device
or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is
appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the
certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be
sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge
B
and belief of the person stating it.
(5) For the purposes of this section—
(a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer if it is
supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so
supplied directly or (with or without human intervention) by means C
of any appropriate equipment;
(b) whether in the course of activities carried on by any official,
information is supplied with a view to its being stored or processed
for the purposes of those activities by a computer operated
otherwise than in the course of those activities, that information, D
if duly supplied to that computer, shall be taken to be supplied to it
in the course of those activities;
(c) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a
computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without
human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment. E
Explanation—For the purposes of this section any reference to
information being derived from other information shall be a
reference to its being derived therefrom by calculation, comparison
or any other process.”
30. The petitioner has relied upon the judgment of this court in F
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal9 which
reiterated the dictum in the decision in Anvar P.V. v P.K. Basheer10
requiring mandatory compliance with Section 65B of the IEA.
31. One of the earliest decisions on the provision was of a two
judge bench of this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) v Navjot Sandhu11 G
where the Court held that Section 65B was only one of the provisions
through which secondary evidence by way of electronic record could be
9
2020 (7) SCC 1
10
2014 (10) SCC 473
11
2005 (11) SCC 600
H
1036 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A admitted and that there was no bar on admitting evidence through other
provisions. The Court noted that:
150. According to Section 63, “secondary evidence” means and
includes, among other things, ‘copies made from the original by
mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy
B of the copy, and copies compared with such copies’. Section 65
enables secondary evidence of the contents of a document to be
adduced if the original is of such a nature as not to be easily
movable. It is not in dispute that the information contained in the
call records is stored in huge servers which cannot be easily moved
and produced in the court. That is what the High Court has also
C observed at para 276. Hence, printouts taken from the computers/
servers by mechanical process and certified by a responsible official
of the service-providing company can be led in evidence through
a witness who can identify the signatures of the certifying officer
or otherwise speak of the facts based on his personal knowledge.
D Irrespective of the compliance with the requirements of
Section 65-B, which is a provision dealing with admissibility
of electronic records, there is no bar to adducing secondary
evidence under the other provisions of the Evidence Act,
namely, Sections 63 and 65. It may be that the certificate
containing the details in sub-section (4) of Section 65-B is
E not filed in the instant case, but that does not mean that
secondary evidence cannot be given even if the law permits
such evidence to be given in the circumstances mentioned
in the relevant provisions, namely, Sections 63 and 65.
(emphasis supplied)
F
32. The principle which was enunciated in Navjot Sandhu was
overruled by a three judge bench of this Court in Anvar P.V. where it
was held that:
22. The evidence relating to electronic record, as noted
G hereinbefore, being a special provision, the general law on
secondary evidence under Section 63 read with Section 65 of the
Evidence Act shall yield to the same. Generalia specialibus non
derogant, special law will always prevail over the general law. It
appears, the court omitted to take note of Sections 59 and 65-A
dealing with the admissibility of electronic record. Sections 63
H
SUNDAR @ SUNDARRAJAN v. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF 1037
POLICE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

and 65 have no application in the case of secondary evidence A
by way of electronic record; the same is wholly governed
by Sections 65-A and 65-B. To that extent, the statement
of law on admissibility of secondary evidence pertaining to
electronic record, as stated by this Court in Navjot Sandhu
case, does not lay down the correct legal position. It
B
requires to be overruled and we do so. An electronic record
by way of secondary evidence shall not be admitted in
evidence unless the requirements under Section 65-B are
satisfied. Thus, in the case of CD, VCD, chip, etc., the same
shall be accompanied by the certificate in terms of Section 65-B
obtained at the time of taking the document, without which, the C
secondary evidence pertaining to that electronic record, is
inadmissible.
(emphasis supplied)
33. Accordingly, in terms of the decision in Anvar P.V. for admitting
any electronic evidence by way of secondary evidence, such as CDRs, D
the requirements of Section 65B would necessarily need to be satisfied
and no other route under the IEA may be adopted for the admission of
such evidence.
34. However, a three judge bench in Tomaso Bruno v State of
Uttar Pradesh12 took a different approach and observed that secondary E
evidence of the contents of a document can also be led under Section 65
of the Evidence Act without referring to the decision in Anvar P.V. It
held that:
24. With the advancement of information technology, scientific
temper in the individual and at the institutional level is to pervade F
the methods of investigation. With the increasing impact of
technology in everyday life and as a result, the production of
electronic evidence in cases has become relevant to establish the
guilt of the Accused or the liability of the Defendant. Electronic
documents stricto sensu are admitted as material evidence. With G
the amendment to the Evidence Act in 2000, Sections 65-A and
65-B were introduced into Chapter V relating to documentary
evidence. Section 65-A provides that contents of electronic records
may be admitted as evidence if the criteria provided in Section
12
2015 (7) SCC 178 H
1038 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A 65-B is complied with. The computer generated electronic records
in evidence are admissible at a trial if proved in the manner
specified by Section 65-B of the Evidence Act. Sub-section (1) of
Section 65-B makes admissible as a document, paper printout of
electronic records stored in optical or magnetic media produced
by a computer, subject to the fulfilment of the conditions specified
B
in Sub-section (2) of Section 65-B. Secondary evidence of
contents of document can also be led Under Section 65 of
the Evidence Act. PW 13 stated that he saw the full video
recording of the fateful night in the CCTV camera, but he has not
recorded the same in the case diary as nothing substantial to be
C adduced as evidence was present in it.
(emphasis supplied)
35. A two judge bench in Shafi Mohammed v State of Himachal
Pradesh13 strayed even farther away from Anvar P.V. and held that the
Sections 65A and 65B cannot be held to be a complete code on the
D subject. It held that:
24. We may, however, also refer to the judgment of this Court
in Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, delivered by a three-Judge Bench.
In the said judgment in para 24 it was observed that electronic
evidence by way of primary evidence was covered by Section 62
E of the Evidence Act to which procedure of Section 65-B of the
Evidence Act was not admissible. However, for the secondary
evidence, procedure of Section 65-B of the Evidence Act was
required to be followed and a contrary view taken in Navjot
Sandhu that secondary evidence of electronic record could be
F covered under Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act, was not
correct. There are, however, observations in para 14 to the effect
that electronic record can be proved only as per Section 65-B of
the Evidence Act.
25. Though in view of the three-Judge Bench judgments in Tomaso
G Bruno and Ram Singh, it can be safely held that electronic
evidence is admissible and provisions under Sections 65-
A and 65-B of the Evidence Act are by way of a clarification
and are procedural provisions. If the electronic evidence
is authentic and relevant the same can certainly be admitted
13
H 2018 (2) SCC 801
SUNDAR @ SUNDARRAJAN v. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF 1039
POLICE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

subject to the court being satisfied about its authenticity A
and procedure for its admissibility may depend on fact
situation such as whether the person producing such
evidence is in a position to furnish certificate under Section
65-B(4).
26. Sections 65-A and 65-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 cannot B
be held to be a complete code on the subject. In Anvar P.V.,
this Court in para 24 clarified that primary evidence of electronic
record was not covered under Sections 65-A and 65-B of the
Evidence Act. Primary evidence is the document produced before
the court and the expression “document” is defined in Section 3
of the Evidence Act to mean any matter expressed or described C
upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by
more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may
be used, for the purpose of recording that matter.
(emphasis supplied)
D
36. The Court in Shafi Mohammed even diluted the requirement
of the Section 65B certificate. This led to contradictory positions in these
cases vis-à-vis the law laid down by Anvar P.V. which was settled by a
reference to a three judge bench of this Court in Arjun Panditrao
Khotkar. The Court reiterated Anvar P.V. and held Tomaso Bruno per
incuriam and overruled Shafi Mohammed. It held that: E

73. The reference is thus answered by stating that:
73.1. Anvar P.V., as clarified by us hereinabove, is the law
declared by this Court on Section 65-B of the Evidence
Act. The judgment in Tomaso Bruno, being per incuriam, F
does not lay down the law correctly. Also, the judgment
in Shafhi Mohammad and the judgment dated 3-4-2018
reported as Shafhi Mohd. v. State of H.P., do not lay down
the law correctly and are therefore overruled.
73.2. The clarification referred to above is that the required
certificate under Section 65-B(4) is unnecessary if the original G
document itself is produced. This can be done by the owner of a
laptop computer, computer tablet or even a mobile phone, by
stepping into the witness box and proving that the device concerned,
on which the original information is first stored, is owned and/or
operated by him. In cases where the “computer” happens to H
1040 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A be a part of a “computer system” or “computer network”
and it becomes impossible to physically bring such system
or network to the court, then the only means of providing
information contained in such electronic record can be in
accordance with Section 65-B(1), together with the requisite
certificate under Section 65-B(4). The last sentence in para
B
24 in Anvar P.V. which reads as “… if an electronic record as
such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the
Evidence Act …” is thus clarified; it is to be read without the
words “under Section 62 of the Evidence Act,…”. With this
clarification, the law stated in para 24 of Anvar P.V. does not need
C to be revisited.
(emphasis supplied)
37. Therefore, the law is now settled: a Section 65B certificate is
mandatory in terms of this Court’s judgment in Anvar P.V. as confirmed
in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar.
D
38. However, Anvar P.V. was decided on 18 September 2014. Till
then, the interpretation of law in Navjot Sandhu, which was decided on
4 August 2005 prevailed. In the instant case, the Trial Court pronounced
its judgment on 30 July 2010. Two months later, on 30 September 2010,
the High Court affirmed the decision of the Trial Court to award the
E death sentence. This Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the death
sentence on 5 February 2013. Even the review petition was dismissed in
chambers on 20 March 2013 before being re-opened in the instant
proceeding in view of the Constitution Bench’s judgment in Mohd. Arif
alias Ashfaq.
F 39. Accordingly, none of the courts had the benefit of the law laid
down vis-à-vis the mandatory requirement of the Section 65B certificate
in Anvar P.V.. The courts as well as the investigative agency proceeded
in accordance with the law that was then prevailing.
40. In Sonu alias Amar v State of Haryana 14 this court
considered the impact of the retrospective application of Anvar P.V.
G
upon trials that had already been held during the period when Navjot
Sandhu held the field and observed that:
37. The interpretation of Section 65-B(4) by this Court by a
judgment dated 4-8-2005 in Navjot Sandhu held the field till it
14
H 2017 (8) SCC 570
SUNDAR @ SUNDARRAJAN v. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF 1041
POLICE [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, CJI]

was overruled on 18-9-2014 in Anvar case. All the criminal courts A
in this country are bound to follow the law as interpreted by this
Court. Because of the interpretation of Section 65-B in Navjot
Sandhu, there was no necessity of a certificate for proving
electronic records. A large number of trials have been held during
the period between 4-8-2005 and 18-9-2014. Electronic records
B
without a certificate might have been adduced in evidence. There
is no doubt that the judgment of this Court in Anvar case has to
be retrospective in operation unless the judicial tool of “prospective
overruling” is applied. However, retrospective application of the
judgment is not in the interest of administration of justice as it
would necessitate the reopening of a large number of criminal C
cases. Criminal cases decided on the basis of electronic records
adduced in evidence without certification have to be revisited as
and when objections are taken by the accused at the appellate
stage. Attempts will be made to reopen cases which have become
final.
D
41. However, it did not decide upon this issue being a two judge
bench and kept the question of law open for it to be decided in an
appropriate case. In Arjun Panditrao Khotkar this court did not consider
the question raised in Sonu.
42. On the other hand, Sonu did deal with the question of whether, E
at the appellate stage, the reliance upon CDRs can be reconsidered if
the objection was not raised during the trial. As the counsel for the State
of Tamil Nadu has argued, the defense as well did not raise the plea of
the CDRs being inadmissible in the absence of a Section 65B certificate
at the trial or at the appellate stage. On this issue, this Court in Sonu
noted that: F

32. It is nobody’s case that CDRs which are a form of electronic
record are not inherently admissible in evidence. The objection is
that they were marked before the trial court without a certificate
as required by Section 65-B(4). It is clear from the judgments
referred to supra that an objection relating to the mode or method G
of proof has to be raised at the time of marking of the document
as an exhibit and not later. The crucial test, as affirmed by this
Court, is whether the defect could have been cured at the stage
of marking the document. Applying this test to the present case, if
an objection was taken to the CDRs being marked without a H
1042 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A certificate, the Court could have given the prosecution an
opportunity to rectify the deficiency. It is also clear from the above
judgments that objections regarding admissibility of documents
which are per se inadmissible can be taken even at the appellate
stage. Admissibility of a document which is inherently inadmissible
is an issue which can be taken up at the appellate stage because
B
it is a fundamental issue. The mode or method of proof is
procedural and objections, if not taken at the trial, cannot
be permitted at the appellate stage. If the objections to the
mode of proof are permitted to be taken at the appellate
stage by a party, the other side does not have an opportunity
C of rectifying the deficiencies. The learned Senior Counsel for
the State referred to statements under Section 161 CrPC, 1973
as an example of documents falling under the said category of
inherently inadmissible evidence. CDRs do not fall in the said
category of documents. We are satisfied that an objection that
CDRs are unreliable due to violation of the procedure
D
prescribed in Section 65-B(4) cannot be permitted to be
raised at this stage as the objection relates to the mode or
method of proof.
(emphasis supplied)
E 43. While the Court in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar did not directly
deal with the issue of allowing objections against CDRs, due to a violation
of the procedure under Section 65B, being raised at a belated stage, it
kept it open for trial courts, in exceptional cases, to allow the prosecution
to provide such certificate at a later stage.It held that:

F 54. Therefore, in terms of general procedure, the prosecution is
obligated to supply all documents upon which reliance may be
placed to an Accused before commencement of the trial. Thus,
the exercise of power by the courts in criminal trials in permitting
evidence to be filed at a later stage should not result in serious or
irreversible prejudice to the Accused. A balancing exercise in
G respect of the rights of parties has to be carried out by the court,
in examining any application by the prosecution Under Sections
91 or 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or Section 165 of the
Evidence Act. Depending on the facts of each case, and the
Court exercising discretion after seeing that the Accused
H is not prejudiced by want of a fair trial, the Court may in
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appropriate cases allow the prosecution to produce such A
certificate at a later point in time. If it is the Accused who
desires to produce the requisite certificate as part of his defence,
this again will depend upon the justice of the case-discretion to be
exercised by the Court in accordance with law.
(emphasis supplied) B
44. Therefore, we are inclined to agree with the ratio in Sonu by
not allowing the objection which is raised at a belated stage that the
CDRs are inadmissible in the absence of a Section 65B certificate,
especially in cases, where the trial has been completed before 18
September 2014, i.e. before the pronouncement of the decision in Anvar C
P.V.. However, we are also mindful of the fact that the instant matter
involves the death sentence having been awarded.
45. Most recently, in Mohd. Arif v State (NCT of Delhi)15, a
three judge Bench of this Court while deciding a review petition in a
case involving the review of a death penalty faced a similar fact situation D
where the decisions of the trial court and appellate courts were rendered
during the period when Navjot Sandhu was the prevailing law. In that
case as well, the Court took note of it being a matter involving a death
sentence and held that:
“24. Navjot Sandhu was decided on 4.8.2005 i.e., before the E
judgment was rendered by the Trial Court in the instant matter.
The subsequent judgments of the High Court and this Court were
passed on 13.9.2007 and 10.8.2011 respectively affirming the
award of death sentence. These two judgments were delivered
prior to the decision of this Court in Anvar P.V. which was given
on 18.9.2014. The judgments by the trial Court, High Court and F
this Court were thus well before the decision in Anvar P.V. and
were essentially in the backdrop of law laid down in Navjot
Sandhu. If we go by the principle accepted in paragraph 32
of the decision in Sonu alias Amar, the matter may stand on
a completely different footing. It is for this reason that G
reliance has been placed on certain decisions of this Court
to submit that the matter need not be reopened on issues
which were dealt with in accordance with the law then
prevailing. However, since the instant matter pertains to
15
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1509 H
1044 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A award of death sentence, this review petition must be
considered in light of the decisions made by this Court
in Anvar P.V. and Arjun Panditrao.
25. Consequently, we must eschew, for the present
purposes, the electronic evidence in the form of CDRs which
B was without any appropriate certificate under Section 65-
B(4) of the Evidence Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
46. Accordingly, we too deem it appropriate to consider this review
petition by eschewing the electronic evidence in the form of CDRs as
C they are without the appropriate certificate under Section 65B even if
the law, as it was during the time the trial in the present case was
conducted, allowed for such electronic evidence to be admitted.
47. Accordingly, we analyse the evidence considered by the High
Court and this Court in appeal without relying upon the CDRs. The High
D Court took note of the following evidence in its judgment before arriving
at the conclusion of the guilt of the petitioner and confirming his conviction:
18. According to P.W.1 the mother of the deceased child Suresh,
the child used to leave for School every day at about 8.00 A.M.
and come back at about 4.30 P.M., and on the date of occurrence,
E i.e., 27.7.2009, the child as usual went to the school. From the
evidence of P.W.6, the Correspondent of Sakthi Matriculation
School, Vridhachalam, and also the attendance register, Ex.P3, it
would be quite evident that the child attended the school that day
and was returning from the school in the van meant for that
F purpose. According to P.W. 2, she is also studying along with the
deceased Suresh, and on the day, both were returning from the
school in the van and got down at Karkudal, and at that time A-1
who was standing under a Neem tree along with the motorbike,
came to them and told the child Suresh that both his mother and
grandmother were not doing well and on that false reason, took
G the child from the place. The evidence of P.W.2 was much
commented by the learned Counsel for the appellant. But, those
contentions cannot be agreed. The learned trial Judge has
categorically pointed out before recording the evidence that the
maturity of the mind of the child, P.W.2, to give evidence was
actually tested and found satisfactory, and then he recorded the
H
SUNDAR @ SUNDARRAJAN v. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF 1045
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evidence. The child at the time of occurrence, was 10 years old, A
and at the time of giving evidence, it was aged 11.
[…]
19. It would quite clear that if the evidence of a child witness is
cogent and convincing, the Court can accept that evidence. In the
instant case, the evidence of P.W.2 is narrated above. According B
to P.W.1, immediately when the child did not return by 4.30 P.M.,
she entertained suspicion and went in search of her son, and she
immediately met P.W.2, the other child.P.W.2 informed P.W.1 that
the child Suresh was taken by a person in a motorbike telling the
above reasons. Now, at this juncture, in order to accept the C
evidence of P.W.2, the earliest version as found in Ex.P1, in the
considered opinion of the Court, would suffice. A perusal of Ex.P1,
the complaint, would clearly indicate that after the child did not
return, P.W.1 met P.W.2 Kamali, the other child, and she was
informed by P.W.2 that the child was taken by a person in a
motorbike with the above false reasons. Thus the earliest version D
found therein, would clearly indicate that P.W.2 has come with a
true version. That apart, the child was able to identify the motorbike,
marked as M.O.5, before the Court. Despite cross-examination
in full, the evidence of P.W.2 the child remained unshaken.
Following the ratio laid down in the above decision by the Apex E
Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the evidence of
P.W.2 has got to be accepted.
20. Added further, P.W.2 at the time of the identification parade,
was able to identify A-1 properly as could be seen from the
identification parade proceedings Ex.P4. Apart from that, the F
evidence of P.W.2 stood fully corroborated by the evidence of
P.W.3. P.W.3 was a native of the same village, and all these persons
were already known to him. P.W.3 was sufficiently matured and
aged 41. According to him, he was actually coming on the way,
and when the school van was stopped, P.W.2 and the deceased
Suresh got down, and the child was called by A-1, and on some G
reason, the child was taken in the bike which was noticed by him.
P.W.3 also took part in the identification parade and has also
identified A-1 properly. Now, the comment made by the learned
Counsel for the appellant that as regards the identification parade,
there were infirmities noticed cannot be countenanced in law. As
H
1046 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A far as the comment made that there was no requisition made by
the Investigating Officer for the test identification parade or the
signature of A-1 was not obtained is concerned, the same cannot
be accepted for the reason that insofar as the identification parade
conducted by P.W.10, it was pursuant to the orders of the Chief
Judicial Magistrate only on the requisition made by the Investigating
B
Officer; otherwise, it could not have taken place at all. The conduct
of the identification parade in order to identify A-1 in which P.Ws.2
and 3 have participated, was never denied by the appellant before
the trial Court. Under the circumstances, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the test identification parade was properly
C done, and the trial Judge was perfectly correct in accepting the
evidence adduced by the prosecution in that regard.
21. Apart from the above, it is pertinent to point out the legal
position in respect of the identification parade. It is settled
proposition of law that the identification parade is only a
D corroborative piece of evidence and the identification done in the
Court, is a substantive piece of evidence. The Court must look
into whether at the time when the witnesses saw the accused in
the company of the deceased, such a thing would have caused a
dent in their memory. In the instant case, the child was only 7
years old, and both the child and P.W.2 Kamali who was coming
E along with the child, got down together, and the appellant/A-1
came there and took the child on the flimsy reason. In such a
situation, naturally the same would have caused a dent in the
memory of P.W.2, and and it would not fail ordinarily, and equally
so the memory of P.W.3, a man aged about 41. No doubt, it would
F have caused a dent in their memory. Therefore, the trial Judge
was perfectly correct in accepting the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3.
48. From the above, it is clear that two witnesses, PW2 and PW3,
saw the petitioner taking away the victim on his motorbike after he got
down from the school bus while returning. PW2 and PW3 also identified
the petitioner upon his arrest at the time of the test identification parade
G
which was found to have been properly conducted. Furthermore, both
of the witnesses also provided unimpeachable evidence in their respective
cross-examinations before the trial court. The trial court also followed
the proper procedure in taking the testimony of PW2, a child witness, by
recording the maturity of the mind of the child, who even identified the
H motorbike before the Court.
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49. The aforementioned evidence shows that the victim was last A
seen with the petitioner. In the appeal before this Court, the petitioner’s
counsel seems to have acknowledged that there was enough evidence
to establish kidnapping, in view of the following observations:
21. We have considered the first contention advanced by the
learned counsel for the appellant, on the basis of the contention B
noticed in the foregoing paragraph. In the veiled submission
advanced in the hands of the learned counsel for the
appellant, we find an implied acknowledgement, namely, that
learned counsel acknowledges, that the prosecution had
placed sufficient material on the record of the case to
substantiate the factum of kidnapping of the deceased C
Suresh, at the hands of the accused-appellant. Be that as it
may, without drawing any such inference, we would still endeavour
to determine, whether the prosecution had been successful in
establishing the factum of kidnapping of the deceased Suresh, at
the hands of the accused-appellant. D
(emphasis supplied)
50. This Court in the course of the decision in appeal took note of
the evidence discussed above and held that there was sufficient evidence
to hold the petitioner guilty of murder as well:
“27. Since in the facts and circumstances of this case, it has been E
duly established, that Suresh had been kidnapped by the accused-
appellant; the accused-appellant has not been able to produce
any material on the record of this case to show the release of
Suresh from his custody. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 places the onus on him. In the absence of any such material F
produced by the accused-appellant, it has to be accepted, that the
custody of Suresh had remained with the accused-appellant, till
he was murdered. The motive/reason for the accused-appellant,
for taking the extreme step was, that ransom as demanded by
him, had not been paid. We are therefore, satisfied, that in the
facts and circumstances of the present case, there is sufficient G
evidence on the record of this case, on the basis whereof even
the factum of murder of Suresh at the hands of the accused
appellant stands established.
51. Furthermore, as this Court noted, material objects were
recovered on the basis of the petitioner’s statement: H
1048 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A 28. We may now refer to some further material on the record of
the case, to substantiate our aforesaid conclusion. In this behalf, it
would be relevant to mention, that when the accused-appellant
was detained on 30.7.2009, he had made a confessional statement
in the presence of Kasinathan (PW13) stating, that he had
strangulated Suresh to death, whereupon his body was put into a
B
gunny bag and thrown into the Meerankulam tank. It was
thereafter, on the pointing out of the accused-appellant, that the
body of Suresh was recovered from the Meerankulam tank. It
was found in a gunny bag, as stated by the accused-appellant. Dr.
Kathirvel (PW12) concluded after holding the post mortem
C examination of the dead body of Suresh, that Suresh had died on
account of suffocation, prior to his having been drowned. The
instant evidence clearly nails the accused-appellant as the
perpetrator of the murder of Suresh. Moreover, the statement of
Kasinathan (PW13) further reveals that the school bag, books
and slate of Suresh were recovered from the residence of the
D
accused-appellant. These articles were confirmed by Maheshwari
(PW1) as belonging to Suresh. In view of the factual and legal
position dealt with hereinabove, we have no doubt in our mind,
that the prosecution had produced sufficient material to establish
not only the kidnapping of Suresh, but also his murder at the hands
E of the accused-appellant.
52. The evidence in the form of CDRs was merely to corroborate
the evidence that had been given through the depositions of PW1 and
PW8. Both of their testimonies stand corroborated not only through the
CDRs but also through the recovery of the mobile phone on the basis of
F the confessional statement of the petitioner. The High Court discussed
this evidence in the following para:
[…] At this juncture, P.W.13 has categorically spoken to the fact
that at the time of arrest, A-1 came forward to give a confessional
statement voluntarily, and the same was recorded by the
G Investigator. The admissible part is marked as Ex.P9 pursuant to
which he produced three cell phones out of which it was one
which contained the number through which he made two phone
calls to P.W.8 at about 9.22 P.M. and 9.25 P.M. respectively on
27.7.2010, and also at about 9.39 P.M. to P.W.1 making a demand
for ransom. At this juncture, the contentions put forth by the learned
H
SUNDAR @ SUNDARRAJAN v. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF 1049
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Counsel as to whether one Shankar who made the calls at 9.22 A
and 9.25 P.M., was alive or a fictitious person, and the cellphone
recovered from A-1, did not belong to him even as per the
documentary evidence have got to be rejected since they do not
carry merit. The cellphone from which all the three calls were
made namely two calls to P.W.8 at about 9.22 and 9.25 P.M. in
B
the name of Shankar and one call at 9.39 P.M. by A-1 to P.W.1,
has been recovered, and the particulars of those calls have been
recorded in the cellphone, and it was actually kept by P.W.8 during
the relevant time and also A-1 during the relevant time. Thus the
prosecution has brought to the notice of the Court that in Ex.P5,
the calls were actually found for 71 seconds at 9.22 P.M. and 43 C
seconds at 9.25 P.M. are found in Ex.P5, and another call which
was made is also found therein which was from M.O.4 cellphone
which was recovered from the appellant/A-1. Out of these three
cell phones one cell phone was with the SIM card and the other
two cell phones without SIM card. Now the documentary evidence
D
produced by the prosecution would go to show that three calls
were made namely two calls to P.W.8 at 9.22 and 9.25 P.M.
respectively and after ascertaining the number of P.W.1, the third
call was made to P.W.1. All the documentary evidence were placed
before the trial Court. Thus it would be quite clear that the evidence
of P.W.8 that the appellant/A-1 wanted to know the number of E
P.W.1, and then he made a call to P.W.8 and came to know about
the number, and thereafter, he made a call at about 9.39 P.M. to
P.W.1 as could be found in the evidence of P.W.1.
Even if Ex. P5, being the CDR, is not relied upon by this Court in
the above paragraph, the case of the prosecution is not weakened F
as it merely corroborates the documentary evidence and witness
testimonies that remain unblemished regardless. From the above
discussion, it is clear that there is no reason to doubt the guilt of
the petitioner.
53. Therefore, even though none of the grounds raised by the G
petitioner amount to errors apparent on the face of the record, in view of
the above analysis, it can also be conclusively said that all the grounds
on merits fail to raise any reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case.
54. Accordingly, we see no reason in the review jurisdiction to
interfere with the concurrent findings of the Trial Court, High Court and
H
1050 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A this Court vis-à-vis the guilt of the petitioner for kidnapping and murdering
the victim.
55. The counsel for the petitioner has also pressed upon this Court
to reconsider the quantum of the sentence in terms of the capital
punishment which has been ordered by the Trial Court and confirmed in
B appeal in judgment of the High Court and this Court.
E. Sentencing & Mitigation
56. The counsel for the petitioner argued at length that the death
sentence was passed without a proper mitigation exercise regarding the
circumstances of the petitioner.
C E.1. Lingering Doubt Theory
57. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the sentence of
death cannot be imposed in such cases where the conviction is based on
circumstantial evidence as a ‘lingering doubt’ regarding the guilt of the
accused persists.
D 58. However, in Shatrughna Baban Meshram v State of
Maharashtra16, a three judge Bench of this Court has ruled out the
theory of ‘lingering doubt’/ ‘residual doubt’. The Court held:
77. When it comes to cases based on circumstantial evidence in
our jurisprudence, the standard that is adopted in terms of law laid
down by this Court as noticed in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda and
E
subsequent decisions is that the circumstances must not only be
individually proved or established, but they must form a consistent
chain, so conclusive as to rule out the possibility of any other
hypothesis except the guilt of the accused. On the strength of
these principles, the burden in such cases is already of a greater
F magnitude. Once that burden is discharged, it is implicit that any
other hypothesis or the innocence of the accused, already stands
ruled out when the matter is taken up at the stage of sentence
after returning the finding of guilt. So, theoretically the concept
or theory of “residual doubt” does not have any place in a
case based on circumstantial evidence. As a matter of fact,
G the theory of residual doubt was never accepted by the US
Supreme Court as discussed earlier.
78. However, as summed up in Kalu Khan, while dealing with
cases based on circumstantial evidence, for imposition of a death
16
2021 (1) SCC 596
H
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sentence, higher or stricter standard must be insisted upon. The A
approach to be adopted in matters concerning capital punishment,
therefore ought to be in conformity with the principles culled out
in para 50 hereinabove and the instant matter must therefore be
considered in the light of those principles.
(emphasis supplied) B
59. Accordingly, the argument of residual or lingering doubt does
not come to the rescue of the petitioner. Rather, in the course of the
appellate decision in the instant case, the standard laid out in Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda and subsequent cases was brought to the notice of
this Court and it was after analysing the facts in reference to these C
principles that the Court upheld the guilt of the petitioner. This court
noted that:
24. Based on the evidence noticed in the three preceding
paragraphs, there can be no doubt whatsoever, that the accused
appellant had been identified through cogent evidence as the person D
who had taken away Suresh when he disembarked from school
van on 27.7.2009. The. factum of kidnapping of Suresh by the
accused-appellant, therefore, stands duly established.
[…]
27. […] We are therefore, satisfied, that in the facts and E
circumstances of the present case, there is sufficient evidence on
the record of this case, on the basis whereof even the factum of
murder of Suresh at the hands of the accused-appellant stands
established.
60. This Court has already applied the relevant standard to confirm F
the guilt of the petitioner in the appeal in a case which is based on
circumstantial evidence and it will not be appropriate for this Court to
once again venture into an assessment of the evidence in the review
jurisdiction in view of its limited scope.
E.2. Sentencing & Mitigation in the Trial Court and the G
Appellate Courts
61. Counsel for the petitioner argued that even if the petitioner’s
guilt was affirmed, the trial court and appellate courts failed to
appropriately consider relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances
including the possibility of reformation of the petitioner while deciding H
1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A upon the sentence. Counsel urged that the petitioner should not have
been awarded the death sentence and it ought to be commuted in view
of the failure of the courts to conduct an appropriate mitigation exercise.
62. In a line of precedent of this Court, there has been a discussion
on whether a separate hearing on the issue of sentence is mandatory
B after recording the conviction of an accused for an offence punishable
by death. Section 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 17 states
thus:
235. Judgment of acquittal or conviction.—
(1) After hearing arguments and points of law (if any), the Judge
C shall give a judgment in the case.
(2) If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall, unless he proceeds
in accordance with the provisions of Section 360, hear the accused
on the question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him
according to law.
D
63. In Santa Singh v State of Punjab18, a two judge Bench of
this Court highlighted the requirement of having a separate sentencing
hearing in view of Section 235(2) of the CrPC and noted that the stage
of sentencing was as important a stage in the process of administering
criminal justice as the adjudication of guilt.
E
64. The judgment of the majority in the Constitution Bench decision
in Bachan Singh v State of Punjab19 reiterated the importance of a
sentencing hearing. The Court noted that:
151. Section 354(3) of the CrPC, 1973, marks a significant shift in
the legislative policy underlying the Code of 1898, as in force
F
immediately before April 1, 1974, according to which both the
alternative sentences of death or imprisonment for life provided
for murder and for certain other capital offences under the Penal
Code, were normal sentences. Now according to this changed
legislative policy which is patent on the face of Section 354(3),
G the normal punishment for murder and six other capital offences
under the Penal Code, is imprisonment for life (or imprisonment
for a term of years) and death penalty is an exception.
17
“CrPC”
18
1976 (4) SCC 190
19
H 1980 (2) SCC 684
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[…] A
152. In the context, we may also notice Section 235(2) of the
Code of 1973, because it makes not only explicit, what according
to the decision in Jagmohan’s case was implicit in the scheme of
the Code, but also bifurcates the trial by providing for two
hearings, one at the pre-conviction stage and another at B
the pre-sentence stage.
[…]
163. […] Now, Section 235(2) provides for a bifurcated trial
and specifically gives the accused person a right of pre-
sentence hearing, at which stage, he can bring on record C
material or evidence, which may not be strictly relevant to
or connected with the particular crime under inquiry, but
nevertheless, have, consistently with the policy underlined
in Section 354(3) a bearing on the choice of sentence. The present
legislative policy discernible from Section 235(2) read with Section
354(3) is that in fixing the degree of punishment or making the D
choice of sentence for various offences, including one under
Section 302, Penal Code, the Court should not confine its
consideration “principally” or merely to the circumstances
connected with particular crime, but also give due
consideration to the circumstances of the criminal.
E
(emphasis supplied)
65. This requirement of a separate hearing was reiterated in
Muniappan v State of Tamil Nadu 20 where the Court noted the
importance of complying with the provision for a separate hearing on
sentencing not merely as a formality but in spirit and substance by making
F
a genuine effort to enquire into information that may have a bearing on
the question of sentence.
66. In Allauddin Mian v State of Bihar21,a two judge Bench of
this Court held that a sentencing hearing is required to satisfy the rules
of natural justice; that it is mandatory and is not a mere formality. The
Court noted: G
10. …The requirement of hearing the accused is intended
to satisfy the rule of natural justice. It is a fundamental
requirement of fair play that the accused who was hitherto
20
1981 (3) SCC 11
21
1989 (3) SCC 5 H
1054 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A concentrating on the prosecution evidence on the question of guilt
should, on being found guilty, be asked if he has anything to say or
any evidence to tender on the question of sentence. This is all
the more necessary since the courts are generally required
to make the choice from a wide range of discretion in the
matter of sentencing. To assist the court in determining
B
the correct sentence to be imposed the legislature
introduced sub-section (2) to Section 235. The said
provision therefore satisfies a dual purpose; it satisfies the
rule of natural justice by according to the accused an
opportunity of being heard on the question of sentence and
C at the same time helps the court to choose the sentence to
be awarded. Since the provision is intended to give the
accused an opportunity to place before the court all the
relevant material having a bearing on the question of
sentence there can be no doubt that the provision is salutary
and must be strictly followed. It is clearly mandatory and
D
should not be treated as a mere formality.
[…]
In a case of life or death as stated earlier, the presiding officer
must show a high degree of concern for the statutory right of the
E accused and should not treat it as a mere formality to be crossed
before making the choice of sentence. If the choice is made, as in
this case, without giving the accused an effective and real
opportunity to place his antecedents, social and economic
background, mitigating and extenuating circumstances, etc., before
the court, the court’s decision on the sentence would be vulnerable.
F We need hardly mention that in many cases a sentencing
decision has far more serious consequences on the offender
and his family members than in the case of a purely
administrative decision; a fortiori, therefore, the principle
of fair play must apply with greater vigour in the case of the
former than the latter. An administrative decision having
G civil consequences, if taken without giving a hearing is
generally struck down as violative of the rule of natural
justice. Likewise a sentencing decision taken without
following the requirements of subsection (2) of Section 235
of the Code in letter and spirit would also meet a similar
H fate and may have to be replaced by an appropriate order.
SUNDAR @ SUNDARRAJAN v. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF 1055
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The sentencing court must approach the question seriously and A
must endeavour to see that all the relevant facts and circumstances
bearing on the question of sentence are brought on record. Only
after giving due weight to the mitigating as well as the aggravating
circumstances placed before it, it must pronounce the sentence.
We think as a general rule the trial courts should after
recording the conviction adjourn the matter to a future date B
and call upon both the prosecution as well as the defence
to place the relevant material bearing on the question of
sentence before it and thereafter pronounce the sentence
to be imposed on the offender.
(emphasis supplied) C
67. The importance of a separate sentencing hearing being afforded
to the accused after recording a conviction was reiterated in Anguswamy
v State of Tamil Nadu 22, Malkiat Singh v State of Punjab 23and
Dattaraya v State of Maharashtra24.
68. On the other hand, there have also been judgments of this D
Court where it was held that while the court may adjourn for a separate
hearing, same-day sentencing did not violate the provisions of Section
235(2) of the CrPC and did not in itself vitiate the sentence. This reasoning
was adopted in the judgments of this Court in Dagdu v State of
Maharashtra 25, Tarlok Singh v State of Punjab 26 and Ramdeo
Chauhan v State of Assam 27 E

69. In Suo Motu W.P. (Crl.) No. 1/2022 titled In re: Framing
Guidelines Regarding Potential Mitigating Circumstances to be
Considered while Imposing Death Sentences, this Court took note of
the difference in approach in the interpretation of Section 235(2) of CrPC
and referred the question for consideration of a larger bench. While it F
took note of the conflict on what amounted to ‘sufficient time’ at the trial
court stage to allow for a separate and effective sentencing hearing, it
noted that all the decisions also had the following common ground:
27. The common thread that runs through all these decisions is
the express acknowledgment that meaningful, real and G
22
1989 (3) SCC 33
23
1991 (4) SCC 341
24
2020 (14) SCC 290
25
1977 (3) SCC 68
26
1977 (3) SCC 218
27
2001 (5) SCC 714 H
1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A effective hearing must be afforded to the accused, with the
opportunity to adduce material relevant for the question of
sentencing.
70. In the present case, the judgment of the Trial Court dealing
with sentencing indicates that a meaningful, real and effective hearing
B was not afforded to the petitioner.
71. The Trial Court did not conduct any separate hearing on
sentencing and did not take into account any mitigating circumstances
pertaining to the petitioner before awarding the death penalty. In the
course of its judgment, the trial court merely noted the following, before
C awarding the death penalty:
In present day circumstances it has become common of kidnapping
of children and elders for ransom and kidnapped being murdered
if expected ransom is not received. In this situation unless the
kidnappers for ransom are punished with extreme penalty, in future
kidnapping of children and elders for ransom would get increased
D
and the danger of society getting totally spoiled, would have to
faced is of no doubt. Hence having regard to all these it is decided
that it would be in the interests of justice to award to the 1st
accused the extreme penalty. Not only that the court saw the
mother of the deceased boy profusely crying and weeping in court
E over the death of her son in court and the scene of onlookers in
court having wept also cannot be forgotten by anyone. Hence it is
decided that such offenders have to be punished with extreme
penalty; in the interests of justice.
72. The High Court took into account the gruesome and merciless
F nature of the act. It reiterated the precedents stating that the death penalty
is to be awarded only in the rarest of rare cases. However, it did not
specifically look at any mitigating circumstances bearing on the petitioner.
It merely held that:
28. In a given case like this, it is an inhuman and a merciless act
G of gruesome murder which would shock the conscience of the
society. Under the circumstance, showing mercy or leniency to
such accused would be misplacing the mercy. That apart, showing
leniency would be mockery on the criminal system. Therefore,
the death penalty imposed by the trial Judge, has got to be affirmed,
and accordingly, it is affirmed.
H
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73. This Court examined the aggravating circumstances of the A
crime in detail. However, as regards the mitigating circumstances, it
noted that:
31. As against the aforesaid aggravating circumstances, learned
counsel for the accused-appellant could not point to us even a
single mitigating circumstance. Thus viewed, even on the B
parameters laid down by this Court, in the decisions relied upon
by the learned counsel for the accused-appellant, we have no
choice, but to affirm the death penalty imposed upon the accused
appellant by the High Court. In fact, we have to record the
aforesaid conclusion in view of the judgment rendered by this C
Court in Vikram Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab, (2010) 3 SCC
56, wherein in the like circumstances (certainly, the circumstances
herein are much graver than the ones in the said case), this Court
had upheld the death penalty awarded by the High Court.
74. The above sequence indicates that no mitigating circumstances D
of the petitioner were taken into account at any stage of the trial or the
appellate process even though the petitioner was sentenced to capital
punishment.
75. In terms of the aggravating circumstances that were taken
note of by this Court in appeal, our attention has been drawn to the E
following circumstance:
30. […]
(vii) The choice of kidnapping the particular child for ransom,
was well planned and consciously motivated. The parents of the
deceased had four children – three daughters and one son. F
Kidnapping the only male child was to induce maximum fear in
the mind of his parents. Purposefully killing the sole male child,
has grave repercussions for the parents of the deceased. Agony
for parents for the loss of their only male child, who would have
carried further the family lineage, and is expected to see them G
through their old age, is unfathomable. Extreme misery caused to
the aggrieved party, certainly adds to the aggravating
circumstances.
We wish to note that the sex of the child cannot be in itself
considered as an aggravating circumstance by a constitutional court. H
1058 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A The murder of a young child is unquestionably a grievous crime and the
young age of such a victim as well as the trauma that it causes for the
entire family is in itself, undoubtedly, an aggravating circumstance. In
such a circumstance, it does not and should not matter for a constitutional
court whether the young child was a male child or a female child. The
B murder remains equally tragic. Courts should also not indulge in furthering
the notion that only a male child furthers family lineage or is able to
assist the parents in old age. Such remarks involuntarily further patriarchal
value judgements that courts should avoid regardless of the context.
76. In Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v State of Maharashtra28,
a three judge bench of this Court took note of the line of cases of this
C
Court which underline the importance of considering the probability of
reform and rehabilitation of the convicted accused before sentencing
him to death. The court observed:
43. At this stage, we must hark back to Bachan Singh and
differentiate between possibility, probability and impossibility of
D reform and rehabilitation. Bachan Singh requires us to consider
the probability of reform and rehabilitation and not its possibility
or its impossibility.
[…]
45. The law laid down by various decisions of this Court clearly
E
and unequivocally mandates that the probability (not possibility or
improbability or impossibility) that a convict can be reformed and
rehabilitated in society must be seriously and earnestly considered
by the courts before awarding the death sentence. This is one of
the mandates of the “special reasons” requirement of Section
F 354(3) CrPC and ought not to be taken lightly since it involves
snuffing out the life of a person. To effectuate this mandate, it
is the obligation on the prosecution to prove to the court,
through evidence, that the probability is that the convict
cannot be reformed or rehabilitated. This can be achieved by
G bringing on record, inter alia, material about his conduct in jail, his
conduct outside jail if he has been on bail for some time, medical
evidence about his mental make-up, contact with his family and
so on. Similarly, the convict can produce evidence on these issues
as well.
28
H 2019 (12) SCC 460
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46. If an inquiry of this nature is to be conducted, as is mandated A
by the decisions of this Court, it is quite obvious that the period
between the date of conviction and the date of awarding sentence
would be quite prolonged to enable the parties to gather and lead
evidence which could assist the trial court in taking an informed
decision on the sentence. But, there is no hurry in this regard, B
since in any case the convict will be in custody for a fairly long
time serving out at least a life sentence.
47. Consideration of the reformation, rehabilitation and
reintegration of the convict into society cannot be
overemphasised. Until Bachan Singh, the emphasis given C
by the courts was primarily on the nature of the crime, its
brutality and severity. Bachan Singh placed the sentencing
process into perspective and introduced the necessity of
considering the reformation or rehabilitation of the convict.
Despite the view expressed by the Constitution Bench, there have
been several instances, some of which have been pointed out D
in Bariyar and in Sangeet v. State of Haryana where there is a
tendency to give primacy to the crime and consider the criminal in
a somewhat secondary manner. As observed in Sangeet ”In the
sentencing process, both the crime and the criminal are equally
important.” Therefore, we should not forget that the criminal, E
however ruthless he might be, is nevertheless a human
being and is entitled to a life of dignity notwithstanding his
crime. Therefore, it is for the prosecution and the courts
to determine whether such a person, notwithstanding his
crime, can be reformed and rehabilitated. To obtain and F
analyse this information is certainly not an easy task but
must nevertheless be undertaken. The process of rehabilitation
is also not a simple one since it involves social reintegration of the
convict into society. Of course, notwithstanding any information
made available and its analysis by experts coupled with the
evidence on record, there could be instances where the social G
reintegration of the convict may not be possible. If that should
happen, the option of a long duration of imprisonment is permissible.
(emphasis supplied)

H
1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A 77. The law laid down in Bachan Singh requires meeting the
standard of ‘rarest of rare’ for award of the death penalty which requires
the Courts to conclude that the convict is not fit for any kind of reformatory
and rehabilitation scheme. As noted in Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan
Bariyar v State of Maharashtra29, this requires looking beyond the
B crime at the criminal as well:
66. The rarest of rare dictum, as discussed above, hints at this
difference between death punishment and the alternative
punishment of life imprisonment. The relevant question here would
be to determine whether life imprisonment as a punishment will
C be pointless and completely devoid of reason in the facts and
circumstances of the case? As discussed above, life
imprisonment can be said to be completely futile, only when
the sentencing aim of reformation can be said to be
unachievable. Therefore, for satisfying the second exception
to the rarest of rare doctrine, the court will have to provide
D clear evidence as to why the convict is not fit for any kind
of reformatory and rehabilitation scheme. This analysis can
only be done with rigour when the court focuses on the
circumstances relating to the criminal, along with other
circumstances. This is not an easy conclusion to be deciphered,
E but Bachan Singh sets the bar very high by introduction of the
rarest of rare doctrine.
(emphasis supplied)
78. A similar point was underlined by this Court in Anil v State of
Maharashtra30 where the Court noted that:
F
33. In Bachan Singh this Court has categorically stated, ‘the
probability that the accused would not commit criminal acts of
violence as would constitute a continuing threat to the society’, is
a relevant circumstance, that must be given great weight in the
G determination of sentence. This was further expressed in Santosh
Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar. Many a times, while
determining the sentence, the courts take it for granted,
looking into the facts of a particular case, that the accused
29
2009 (6) SCC 498
30
2014 (4) SCC 69
H
SUNDAR @ SUNDARRAJAN v. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF 1061
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would be a menace to the society and there is no possibility A
of reformation and rehabilitation, while it is the duty of the
court to ascertain those factors, and the State is obliged to
furnish materials for and against the possibility of
reformation and rehabilitation of the accused. The facts,
which the courts deal with, in a given case, cannot be the B
foundation for reaching such a conclusion, which, as already
stated, calls for additional materials. We, therefore, direct that
the criminal courts, while dealing with the offences like Section
302 IPC, after conviction, may, in appropriate cases, call for a
report to determine, whether the accused could be reformed or
rehabilitated, which depends upon the facts and circumstances of C
each case.
(emphasis supplied)
79. No such inquiry has been conducted for enabling a consideration
of the factors mentioned above in case of the petitioner. Neither the trial D
court, nor the appellate courts have looked into any factors to conclusively
state that the petitioner cannot be reformed or rehabilitated. In the present
case, the Courts have reiterated the gruesome nature of crime to award
the death penalty. In appeal, this Court merely noted that the counsel for
the petitioner could not point towards mitigating circumstances and upheld
E
the death penalty. The state must equally place all material and
circumstances on the record bearing on the probability of reform. Many
such materials and aspects are within the knowledge of the state which
has had custody of the accused both before and after the conviction.
Moreover, the court cannot be an indifferent by-stander in the process.
The process and powers of the court may be utilised to ensure that such F
material is made available to it to form a just sentencing decision bearing
on the probability of reform.
80. In Mofil Khan,a three judge bench of this Court was also
dealing with a review petition which was re-opened in view of the decision
in Mohd. Arif v Registrar, Supreme Court of India. While commuting G
the death sentence to life imprisonment, the Court reiterated the
importance of looking at the possibility of reformation and rehabilitation.
Notably, it pointed out that it was the Court’s duty to look into possible
mitigating circumstances even if the accused was silent. The Court held
that: H
1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A 9. It would be profitable to refer to a judgment of this Court
in Mohd. Mannan v. State of Bihar in which it was held that
before imposing the extreme penalty of death sentence, the Court
should satisfy itself that death sentence is imperative, as otherwise
the convict would be a threat to the society, and that there is no
B possibility of reform or rehabilitation of the convict, after giving
the convict an effective, meaningful, real opportunity of hearing
on the question of sentence, by producing material. The hearing
of sentence should be effective and even if the accused
remains silent, the Court would be obliged and duty-bound
to elicit relevant factors.
C
10. It is well-settled law that the possibility of reformation
and rehabilitation of the convict is an important factor which
has to be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance
before sentencing him to death. There is a bounden duty
cast on the Courts to elicit information of all the relevant
D factors and consider those regarding the possibility of
reformation, even if the accused remains silent. A scrutiny
of the judgments of the trial court, the High Court and this Court
would indicate that the sentence of death is imposed by taking
into account the brutality of the crime. There is no reference to
E the possibility of reformation of the Petitioners, nor has the State
procured any evidence to prove that there is no such possibility
with respect to the Petitioners. We have examined the socio-
economic background of the Petitioners, the absence of any
criminal antecedents, affidavits filed by their family and community
F members with whom they continue to share emotional ties and
the certificate issued by the Jail Superintendent on their conduct
during their long incarceration of 14 years. Considering all of the
above, it cannot be said that there is no possibility of reformation
of the Petitioners, foreclosing the alternative option of a lesser
sentence and making the imposition of death sentence imperative.
G
(emphasis supplied)
81. The duty of the court to enquire into mitigating circumstances
as well as to foreclose the possibility of reformation and rehabilitation
before imposing the death penalty has been highlighted in multiple
H judgments of this Court. Despite this, in the present case, no such enquiry
SUNDAR @ SUNDARRAJAN v. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF 1063
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was conducted and the grievous nature of the crime was the only factor A
that was considered while awarding the death penalty.
82. During the course of the hearing of the review petition, this
court had passed an order directing the counsel for the state to get
instructions from jail authorities on the following aspects: (i) the conduct
of the petitioner in jail; (ii) information on petitioner’s involvement in any B
other case; (iii) details of the petitioner acquiring education in jail; (iv)
details of petitioner’s medical records; and (v) any other relevant
information.
83. Through an affidavit dated 26 September 2021, the Sub-
Inspector of Police Kammapuram at Cuddalore District, Tamil Nadu C
has informed the court that the conduct of petitioner has been satisfactory
and he has not been involved in any other case. Furthermore, he is
suffering from systemic hypertension and availing medication from the
prison hospital. The petitioner has also acquired a diploma in food catering
during his time in the prison. D
84. Separately, this Court also received a document dated 8
November 2018 from the Superintendent of Prisons, Central Prison,
Cuddalore-4 in response to the letter from Assistant Registrar, Supreme
Court of India communicating the order seeking instructions from jail
authorities. Notably, this document states that the petitioner tried to escape E
from prison on 6 November 2013. It is concerning that the Respondent,
in the affidavit dated 26 September 2021, has failed to include this
information.
85. The non-disclosure of material facts amounts to misleading
this Court and to an attempt at interfering with the administration of F
justice. In the Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Civil) No 3 of 2021 titled In
Re: Perry Kansagra, this Court discussed the line of precedent of this
Court dealing with tendering of affidavits and undertakings containing
false statements or suppressing / concealing material facts amounting to
contempt of court: G
15. It is thus well settled that a person who makes a false statement
before the Court and makes an attempt to deceive the Court,
interferes with the administration of justice and is guilty of
contempt of Court. The extracted portion above clearly shows
that in such circumstances, the Court not only has the inherent H
1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A power but it would be failing in its duty if the alleged contemnor is
not dealt with in contempt jurisdiction for abusing the process of
the Court.
Accordingly, we deem it appropriate to initiate suo moto contempt
proceedings against the respondent for withholding material information
B from this Court.
86. As per the written submissions of the petitioner, he was about
24 years old when the judgment of the Trial Court was rendered on30
July 2010. He has been in prison since 2009,13 years. He had no prior
antecedents and thejail authorities have stated that he has not been
C involved in any other case. However, the jail authorities have brought to
the notice of this Court, the attempt of petitioner to escape from prison.
87. In the review petition, it has also been submitted that the
petitioner could not communicate mitigating circumstances bearing on
his sentencing decision to the lawyer and his relatives, who being poor
D and uneducated, could not properly contest the case for him. The fact
remains that no mitigating circumstances were placed before any of the
appellate courts.
88. On the basis of these details, it cannot be said that there is no
possibility of reformation even though the petitioner has committed a
E ghastly crime. We must consider several mitigating factors: the petitioner
has no prior antecedents, was 23 years old when he committed the crime
and has been in prison since 2009 where his conduct has been satisfactory,
except for the attempt to escape prison in 2013. The petitioner is suffering
from a case of systemic hypertension and has attempted to acquire some
F basic education in the form of a diploma in food catering. The acquisition
of a vocation in jail has an important bearing on his ability to lead a
gainful life.
89. Considering the above factors, we are of the view that even
though the crime committed by the petitioner is unquestionably grave
G and unpardonable, it is not appropriate to affirm the death sentence that
was awarded to him. As we have discussed, the ‘rarest of rare’ doctrine
requires that the death sentence not be imposed only by taking into
account the grave nature of crime but only if there is no possibility of
reformation in a criminal.
H
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90. However, we are also aware that a sentence of life A
imprisonment is subject to remission. In our opinion, this would not be
adequate in view of the gruesome crime committed by the petitioner.
91. This court has been faced with similar situations earlier where
it has noticed that the sentence of life imprisonment with remission may
be inadequate in certain cases. For instance, in Swamy Shraddananda B
(2) @ Murali Manohar Mishra v State of Karnataka31 the Court
noted that:
92. The matter may be looked at from a slightly different angle.
The issue of sentencing has two aspects. A sentence may be
excessive and unduly harsh or it may be highly disproportionately C
inadequate. When an appellant comes to this Court carrying a
death sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the
High Court, this Court may find, as in the present appeal, that the
case just falls short of the rarest of the rare category and may
feel somewhat reluctant in endorsing the death sentence. But at D
the same time, having regard to the nature of the crime,
the Court may strongly feel that a sentence of life
imprisonment subject to remission normally works out to
a term of 14 years would be grossly disproportionate and
inadequate. What then should the Court do? If the Court’s
E
option is limited only to two punishments, one a sentence
of imprisonment, for all intents and purposes, of not more
than 14 years and the other death, the Court may feel
tempted and find
itself nudged into endorsing the death penalty. Such a course
F
would indeed be disastrous. A far more just,
reasonable and proper course would be to expand the
options and to take over what, as a matter of fact, lawfully
belongs to the Court i.e. the vast hiatus between 14 years’
imprisonment and death. It needs to be emphasised that the G
Court would take recourse to the expanded option primarily
because in the facts of the case, the sentence of 14 year’s
imprisonment would amount to no punishment at all.
(emphasis supplied)
31
2008 (13) SCC 767 H
1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 5 S.C.R.

A 92. Accordingly, it is open to this Court to prescribe the length of
imprisonment, especially in cases where the capital punishment is replaced
by life imprisonment. Considering the facts of the instant case, we are
of the considered view that the petitioner must undergo life imprisonment
for not less than twenty years without remission of sentence.
B F. Conclusion
93. For the reasons discussed above, we see no reason to doubt
the guilt of the petitioner in kidnapping and murdering the victim. The
exercise of the jurisdiction in review to interfere with the conviction is
not warranted. However, we do take note of the arguments regarding
C the sentencing hearing not having been conducted separately in the Trial
Court and mitigating circumstances having not been considered in the
appellate courts before awarding the capital punishment to the petitioner.
While weighing this argument, the gruesome nature of the crime of
murder of a young child of merely 7 years of age has also weighed upon
D us and we do not find that a sentence of life imprisonment, which normally
works out to a term of 14 years, would be proportionate in the
circumstances.
94. Accordingly, we commute the death sentence imposed upon
the petitioner to life imprisonment for not less than twenty years without
E reprieve or remission.
95. Separately, a notice is required to be issued to the Inspector of
Police, Kammapuram Police Station, Cuddalore District, State of Tamil
Nadu to offer an explanation as to why action should not be taken for
the filing of the affidavit dated 26 September 2021. In this case, prima
F facie, material information regarding the conduct of the petitioner in the
prison was concealed from this Court. Accordingly, the Registry is
directed to register the matter as a suo motu proceeding for contempt
of court.
96. We dispose of the review petitions in the above terms.
G
Nidhi Jain Review petitions disposed of.
(Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)

H