Holding

The Supreme Court held that the school certificate could not be treated as conclusive proof of age and that Respondent No.2 was a major at the time of the incident, rendering the declaration of juvenility improper.

Summary

The appellant Suresh alleged that his paternal uncle and the uncle's son, Respondent No.2, forcibly entered his house and the son shot his brother Rajesh, resulting in death. Respondent No.2 claimed juvenility, asserting he was 16 years old at the time, based on a school transfer certificate from the first school he attended. The trial court and the High Court accepted this certificate as conclusive proof of age under Rule 12(3)(a)(ii) of the Juvenile Justice Rules and declared him a juvenile. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the hierarchy of documents prescribed by the Rules and found the school certificate unreliable because it was based solely on an oral statement by the father and the school was not a government institution, rendering its record neither a public document nor a public servant's entry. Conflicting public records – a family register under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, a 2012 voters' list, and a medical board report estimating the accused’s age at about 22 – were given greater weight. Consequently, the Court held that Respondent No.2 was a major at the time of the offence and set aside the lower courts' orders, directing the trial to proceed against him as an adult.

Issues considered

Whether a school transfer certificate from the first attended school can be treated as conclusive proof of age under Rule 12(3)(a)(ii) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007.
Whether such a school certificate qualifies as a public document or an entry made by a public servant under Sections 35 and 74 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
Whether conflicting public records and a medical opinion outweigh the school certificate in determining the accused's juvenility.
Whether the trial court erred in declaring Respondent No.2 a juvenile and applying the protection of the Juvenile Justice Act.

Legislation cited

Evidence Act, 1872s. 35, s. 74
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 452
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007s. Rule 12
U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the Courts below erred in declaring the Respondent No.2 as a ‘juvenile’ under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, on the date of the incident. Headnotes† Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 – r.12 – Procedure to be followed in determination of Age – FIR was filed against Respondent No.2 and his father u/ss.452 and 302, IPC – Respondent No.2 pleaded juvenility – Trial Court declared

Subjects

JuvenileJuvenilityRule 12 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007Determination of AgeJuvenility not establishedFirst attended schoolSchool transfer certificateBirth-date entryDate of birth certificateEquivalent certificatesOther school certificatesConflicting public records and public documentsConclusive proof of date of birthFamily RegisterEntry in the Voters’ List for the Legislative AssemblyGram PanchayatNot a ‘juvenile’ on the date of the incidentDeclaration as ‘juvenile’ improperPublic servantPublic recordPublic documentsFirst attended school not a Government SchoolHeadmaster/Principal of first attended school not a public servantRelevancy of an entry in a public recordCertificate of the Municipal CorporationMurderHouse-trespassExhortationCountry-made pistolDeceased shotMatriculation certificateStatutory document

Judgment

[2025] 8 S.C.R. 305 : 2025 INSC 918

Suresh
v.
The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
R1: State of Uttar Pradesh
R2: Devi Singh
(Criminal Appeal No. 347 of 2018)
01 August 2025
[Pankaj Mithal and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the Courts below erred in declaring the Respondent No.2
as a ‘juvenile’ under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2000, on the date of the incident.

Headnotes†
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 –
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules,
2007 – r.12 – Procedure to be followed in determination of
Age – FIR was filed against Respondent No.2 and his father
u/ss.452 and 302, IPC – Respondent No.2 pleaded juvenility –
Trial Court declared the Respondent No.2 to be a ‘juvenile’
on the date of the incident – Challenged by appellant – Order
upheld by High Court – Interference with:
Held: r.12(3)(a) lays down the sequential list of certificates to
be examined and the order thereof – In the present case, as no
‘matriculation or equivalent certificates’ were available u/r.12(3)
(a)(i), thus u/r.12(3)(a)(ii), ‘date of birth certificate from the school
(other than a play school) first attended’ was attracted and the
certificate issued by the first attended school was taken as
conclusive proof of date of birth – However, the deposition of the
School’s Headmaster to the effect that the birth-date was noted
on an oral representation by Respondent No.2’s father, makes the
said certificate unreliable – Other school certificates were issued
following this and therefore, are not correct, in the face of conflicting
public records and public documents as also the Medical Report
which state to the contrary – Thus, the certificate issued by the first
attended school could not have been taken as conclusive proof
of date of birth of Respondent No.2, discarding Form (A) u/r.2 of
* Author
306 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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the Rules under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act 1947; the entry in the
Voters’ List for the Legislative Assembly of the year 2012, and; the
Medical Report – Respondent No.2 was not a ‘juvenile’ on the date
of the incident – Declaration of Respondent No.2 as a ‘juvenile’ was
improper – Impugned order of the High Court as well as the order
of the Trial Court holding the Respondent No.2 to be a ‘juvenile’,
set aside – Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.35, 74. [Paras 23-26]

Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.35, 74 – Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000 – Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 – Certificate issued by the
first attended school was taken as conclusive proof of date
of birth of the Respondent No.2-accused and he was held a
‘juvenile’ on the date of the incident:
Held: The first attended school is not a Government School and
thus, the records maintained by the said School would not be
‘public documents’ – Moreover, the Headmaster/Principal of such
School cannot be said to be a ‘public servant’ for the purposes of
the Evidence Act – Thus, neither the Headmaster/Principal of the
first attended school nor its records would qualify as ‘public servant’
or ‘public record’ or ‘public document’ respectively. [Paras 21, 22]

Case Law Cited
Om Prakash v. State of Rajasthan [2012] 5 SCR 237 : (2012) 5
SCC 201 – relied on.
Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 1 : (1988)
Supp. SCC 604 – referred to.

List of Acts
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000; Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection. of Children) Rules, 2007; Penal Code,
1860; Evidence Act, 1872; UP Panchayat Raj Act, 1947.

List of Keywords
Juvenile; Juvenility; Rule 12 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of Children) Rules, 2007; Determination of Age; Juvenility not
established; First attended school; School transfer certificate;
Birth-date entry; Birth-date noted as per an oral representation; Date
of birth certificate; Equivalent certificates; Other school certificates;
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 307

Suresh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.

Conflicting public records and public documents; Conclusive proof
of date of birth; Family Register; Entry in the Voters’ List for the
Legislative Assembly; Gram Panchayat; Not a ‘juvenile’ on the
date of the incident; Declaration as ‘juvenile’ improper; Public
servant; Public record; Public documents; First attended school
not a Government School; Headmaster/Principal of first attended
school not a public servant; Relevancy of an entry in a public record;
Certificate of the Municipal Corporation; Murder; House-trespass;
Exhortation; Country-made pistol; Deceased shot; Matriculation
certificate; Statutory document.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
347 of 2018
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.03.2016 of the High Court
Of Judicature at Allahabad in CRLR No. 2144 of 2015

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Ms. Neema, Rajesh.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Vishwa Pal Singh, Mukesh Kumar, Prateek Rai, Vikrant Rana,
Prafulla, Anurag Pandey, Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair, Ms. Nivedita
Nair, Shashikant Pralhad Chaudhari.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

The present appeal emanates from the Final Judgment and Order
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘High Court’) in Criminal Revision No.2144/2015
dated 29.03.2016 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Order’)
[2016:AHC:50543], whereby the High Court dismissed the criminal
revision petition filed by the Appellant and upheld the Order passed
by the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.1,
Kairana, Muzaffarnagar (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’)
on 19.05.2015, declaring Respondent No.2 as a ‘juvenile’ under
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the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Juvenile Justice Act’) [as it then was].

BRIEF FACTS:
2. The Appellant alleges that, on 31.08.2011, while the Appellant, his
father, mother and his brother/Rajesh Singh (hereinafter referred to
as ‘Rajesh’) had gone to their fields, his chacha (paternal uncle)/Lillu
Singh and his son Devi Singh/Respondent No.2 forcibly entered his
house at around 10 am. When restrained by his wife who was alone
at the house, the Appellant alleges that the two persons – father
and son i.e., Lillu Singh and Respondent No.2 – manhandled her.
When the said incident was narrated to the Appellant and his brother
by the Appellant’s parents who had reached the house during the
incident, Rajesh went to the accused/father-son duo, to enquire
about the same. In this interaction, it is alleged that his chacha and
Respondent No.2 forcibly took Rajesh inside their house, where the
chacha caught/held him, and Respondent No.2 took out a country-
made pistol and fired it on Rajesh with the intention to kill him. It
is stated that pursuant to this, Rajesh suffered injuries and died en
route to Kairana hospital.
3. Thereafter, the Appellant lodged a First Information Report being
Crime Case No.385/2011 at Kairana Police Station, Muzaffarnagar
against Lillu Singh and Respondent No.2 under Sections 4521 and
3022 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘IPC’).
4. This complaint proceeded to be converted into Sessions Trial
No.123/2012 before the Court of the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Kairana, Muzaffarnagar. With a plea that his date of birth
was 18.04.1995, and as on the date of the incident, he was aged 16
years, 4 months and 13 days, Respondent No.2 filed a miscellaneous
application numbered as Miscellaneous Case No.04/11/2015 before
the Trial Court seeking to establish his juvenility, which was connected

1 ‘452. House-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint.—Whoever commits
house-trespass, having made preparation for causing hurt to any person or for assaulting any person, or
for wrongfully restraining any person, or for putting any person in fear of hurt, or of assault, or of wrongful
restraint, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven
years, and shall also be liable to fine.’
2 ‘302. Punishment for murder.—Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or imprisonment
for life, and shall also be liable to fine.’
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 309

Suresh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.

with Sessions Trial No.123/2012. The Trial Court, on appreciating the
evidence and material placed on record, vide Order dated 19.05.2015,
confirmed that as on the date of the incident, the Respondent No.2
was 16 years, 4 months and 13 days old and thereby established
his juvenility.
5. Aggrieved by the Order of the Trial Court, the Appellant preferred
a criminal revision petition before the High Court, which was
dismissed vide the Impugned Order. Consequently, the juvenility of
the Respondent No. 2 stood confirmed by the High Court.

THE APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS:
6. The Appellant’s submissions majorly revolved around pointing out
how the Courts below erred in establishing and confirming the
Respondent No.2’s juvenility based on a transfer certificate issued by
the first school attended by Respondent No.2, i.e., Kaushik Modern
Public School, Khurgaon, to which he was directly admitted in Class
V. Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Courts’
reliance on this certificate issued by the school was incorrect, when
a statutory document like the Family Register maintained under the
U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 by the Gram Panchayat declared the
age of the Respondent No.2 as 20, mentioning his year of birth as
1991. Further, the Voters’ List also, of the year 2012, mentioned
Respondent No.2’s age as 22 years as on 01.01.2012. In this light,
learned counsel urged that though there were school certificates which
declared the date of birth of the Respondent No.2 as 18.04.1995,
relying on the date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate
issued by the first school attended, these ought not to have been
relied on, when there is evidence contradicting this claim, especially
in light of the fact that the first school attended by the Respondent
No.2 directly admitted him into Class V, recording his date of birth
as 18.04.1995 – on the oral mention of his father, without enquiring/
looking into any proof for his date of birth being such.
7. In this light, learned counsel sought to buttress his argument on the
basis of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Evidence Act’), which would make admissible a
document if it states a relevant fact or fact in issue and if it is made
by a public servant in discharge of his official duty or by any other
person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. It was
submitted that Section 35 of the Evidence Act would be attracted
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both in civil and criminal proceedings. To support this argument,
learned counsel for the Appellant placed reliance on a decision of
this Court in Birad Mal Singhvi v Anand Purohit, 1988 Supp SCC
604, which held:
‘15. … To render a document admissible under Section
35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is
relied on must be one in a public or other official book,
register or record, secondly; It must be an entry stating a
fact in issue or relevant fact, and thirdly, it must be made
by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any
other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school
register is relevant and admissible under section 35 of
the Act, but the entry regarding the age of a person in a
school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove
the age of the person in the absence of the material on
which the age was recorded. …’
8. Importantly, learned counsel submitted that the age of the accused-
Respondent No.2 was over 18 years even as per the medical
evidence/report given by the Chief Medical Officer, on 01.12.2012,
which stated that his age was 22 years, which meant that at the time
of the incident, the accused was over 20 years of age, and thus,
could not raise any claim of juvenility. To support this submission,
learned counsel placed reliance on the decision in Om Prakash v
State of Rajasthan, (2012) 5 SCC 201, wherein this Court held that
in cases of serious offences like murder, rape, etcetera, an accused
cannot be allowed to abuse the statutory protection afforded to him
by attempting to prove himself as a minor when the documentary
evidence to prove his minority gives rise to a reasonable doubt
about his assertion of minority. This Court also held that under such
circumstances, medical evidence based on scientific investigation
will have to be given due weight and precedence over the evidence
based on school administration records, which give rise to hypothesis
and speculation about the age of the accused. It was prayed that
the appeal be allowed.

SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT NO.1-STATE:
9. Respondent No.1/State of Uttar Pradesh succinctly submitted that
since Respondent No.2 neither produced a birth certificate nor a
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 311

Suresh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.

matriculation certificate, in such case, date of birth as mentioned in the
transfer certificate cannot be made the basis for giving benefit of the
Juvenile Justice Act to the accused-Respondent No.2, especially when
the Appellant produced a Voters’ List, Family Register and Medical
Report which shows that at the time of the incident, Respondent
No.2 was a major. Thus, the State also prayed that the Orders of
the courts below be interfered with and set aside, and the instant
appeal be allowed.

SUBMISSIONS OF RESPONDENT NO.2:
10. The learned counsel for the Respondent No.2 canvassed three-fold
arguments. Firstly, learned counsel contended that the Trial Court
established the Respondent No.2’s juvenility based on the date(s)
of birth consistently recorded in the transfer certificates of multiple
schools attended by him. This date of birth, i.e., 18.04.1995, as
recorded in the school transfer certificates of 4 schools where
Respondent No.2 studied from Classes Vth to IXth suggests that, as
on the date of the incident, he was 16 years, 4 months, and 13 days
old and, thus, entitled to the benefit conferred under the Juvenile
Justice Act read with Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘Rules’). Learned counsel contended that the officials of the schools
which gave these school certificates were also examined, and the
validity of these certificates was testified by these witnesses. In light
of such evidence and testimonies placed, learned counsel contended
that the Trial Court rightly established juvenility of Respondent No.2.
11. Secondly, learned counsel submitted that Rule 12 of the Rules
provide that the Court determining the juvenility of an accused can
seek evidence by obtaining a matriculation certificate, in absence
whereof, a date of birth certificate from the school first attended,
in absence whereof a birth certificate given by a corporation or
a municipal authority, and only in absence of these documents,
a medical opinion declaring the age of the juvenile would be
considered. Learned counsel submitted that in the present case,
since matriculation certificate in respect of Respondent No.2 was
not available, the school transfer certificate issued by the Kaushik
Modern Public School, Khurgaon, Shamli, Uttar Pradesh, which is
a certificate of the first school attended, is exclusive proof that the
date of birth of Respondent No.2 is 18.04.1995, and there is no need
312 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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to consider any other evidence such as certificate of the Municipal
Corporation or Family Register or certificate of the Medical Board.
12. Thirdly, learned counsel submitted that Respondent No.2 has been
released by the Juvenile Justice Board after completing the maximum
punishment of three years prescribed by law. It was, accordingly,
urged that the appeal be dismissed.

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
13. Having bestowed anxious thoughts to the issue, we find that the
approach adopted by the Trial Court as well as the High Court was
not proper. Though the issue of juvenility, indubitably and primarily
has to be determined as per the relevant provisions of the Juvenile
Justice Act and the Rules framed thereunder, as applicable at the
relevant time, yet under appropriate circumstances and with justifiable
reasons, the Court examing the issue has the discretion to take other
relevant materials and factors into account, for ultimately the cause
of justice has to prevail.
14. In the present case, the serious allegation against Respondent No.2
is that on the exhortation of his father, he along with his father forcibly
took the deceased Rajesh inside their house, whereafter Respondent
No.2 took out a country-made pistol and shot the deceased Rajesh,
resulting in his death.
15. With regard to the modalities of the enquiry governing determination
of juvenility, Rule 12(3) of the Rules provides:
‘12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.―
…
(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict
with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted
by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the
Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining –
(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if
available; and in the absence whereof;
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than
a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal
authority or a panchayat;
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 313

Suresh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.

(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause
(a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly
constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of
the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age
cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case
may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded
by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the
child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side
within the margin of one year.
and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking
into consideration such evidence as may be available, or
the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding
in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified
in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence
whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age
as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law.’
16. In the present case, four certificates have been produced from
schools said to have been attended by Respondent No.2 viz. Public
Inter College, Kairana, Muzaffarnagar; S. N. Junior High School,
Kairana; Sarvoday Public Junior High School, Mohalla Shitla, Kairana,
Muzaffarnagar, and; Kaushik Modern Public School, Khurgaon, but
all are based on the certificates issued by the first attended school,
Kaushik Modern Public School, Khurgaon.
17. The first school certificate issued by Kaushik Modern Public School,
Khurgaon, where Respondent No.2 was admitted in Class V, records
his date of birth as 18.04.1995. Pausing here, it is also relevant to
indicate that the Headmaster of the said School while deposing
has stated that this birth-date entry was made only on an oral
representation by Respondent No.2’s father.
18. On the other side, the Appellant produced the relevant page from a
Family Register maintained under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947
which records the year of birth of the Respondent No.2 as 1991.
The Appellant further relied on the Report of the Medical Board
which was constituted pursuant to a reference made by the Trial
Court when the plea of juvenility was raised before it by Respondent
No.2. Such examination was conducted and Report submitted on
01.12.2012 i.e., nearly after a year of the date of the incident. The
Medical Board through its Report opined that Respondent No.2
was aged about 22 years, which would make him between 20-21
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years of age, as on the date of the incident, whereas, as per the
school certificates, his age was estimated to be 16 years, 4 months
and 13 days. Another factor which cannot be ignored is the Voters’
List of the Kairana Legislative Assembly Constituency of the year
2012. The List shows Respondent No.2 to be approximately 21
years old as on 01.01.2012. This entry is not conclusive proof, but
the fact remains that such entry is made only on representation of
either person concerned or his/her parent/guardian. No objection to
Respondent No.2’s name figuring in the Voters’ List by either him or
his parent was raised contemporaneously. In our considered view,
such conduct would have a bearing, especially when there are rival
and competing documents denying his juvenility.
19. The relevancy of an entry in a ‘public record’ is guided by Section
35 of the Evidence Act:
‘35. Relevancy of entry in public record or an electronic
record, made in performance of duty.–– An entry in
any public or other official book, register or record or an
electronic record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact,
and made by a public servant in the discharge of his
official duty, or by any other person in performance of a
duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which
such book, register or record or an electronic record, is
kept, is itself a relevant fact.’
20. Section 74 of the Evidence Act deals with ‘public documents’:
‘74. Public documents.––The following documents are
public documents: ––
(1) Documents forming the acts, or records of the acts ––
(i) of the sovereign authority,
(ii) of official bodies and tribunals, and
(iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, of
any part of India or of the Commonwealth, or of a foreign
country;
(2) public records kept in any State of private documents.’
21. There is no dispute on the factum that Kaushik Modern Public
School, Khurgaon – the first attended school – is not a Government
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 315

Suresh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.

School and thus, the records maintained by the said School would
not be ‘public documents’. Moreover, the Headmaster/Principal of
such School cannot be said to be a ‘public servant’ for the purposes
of the Evidence Act. The Headmaster when examined has himself
taken the stand that Kaushik Modern Public School, Khurgaon was
only a State Government-recognized school.
22. Therefore, neither the Headmaster/Principal of the first attended
school nor its records would qualify as ‘public servant’ or ‘public
record’ or ‘public document’ respectively.
23. Even otherwise, in the case at hand, except for the Headmaster’s sole
testimony, there is no material to establish that the date 18.04.1995
as Respondent No.2’s date of birth, as recorded in the certificate
issued by Kaushik Modern Public School, Khurgaon, was correct.
As a matter of fact, the Principal in his cross-examination stated that
when the Respondent No.2 was leaving the school on that day after
making cutting he had written the correct date of birth. Moreover, the
Principal has also stated that the birth-date entry was made on the
basis of an oral representation alone by Respondent No.2’s father
and when he was asked for the horoscope or any other document
in support of the date of birth of the Respondent No.2, nothing was
submitted. This, in our view, discredits the certificate issued by the
Kaushik Modern Public School, Khurgaon. As noted hereinbefore,
the other school certificates were issued following this and therefore,
meet the same fate inasmuch as they cannot be treated as correct,
in the face of conflicting public records and public documents as also
the Medical Report which state to the contrary. The observations by
a Bench of 2 learned Judges in Om Prakash v State of Rajasthan
(supra) are clearly attracted, and the relevant excerpts therefrom
read as under:
‘22. It is no doubt true that if there is a clear and
unambiguous case in favour of the juvenile accused that
he was a minor below the age of 18 years on the date
of the incident and the documentary evidence at least
prima facie proves the same, he would be entitled for
this special protection under the Juvenile Justice Act. But
when an accused commits a grave and heinous offence
and thereafter attempts to take statutory shelter under
the guise of being a minor, a casual or cavalier approach
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while recording as to whether an accused is a juvenile or
not cannot be permitted as the courts are enjoined upon
to perform their duties with the object of protecting the
confidence of common man in the institution entrusted
with the administration of justice.
23. Hence, while the courts must be sensitive in dealing
with the juvenile who is involved in cases of serious nature
like sexual molestation, rape, gang rape, murder and
host of other offences, the accused cannot be allowed
to abuse the statutory protection by attempting to prove
himself as a minor when the documentary evidence to
prove his minority gives rise to a reasonable doubt about
his assertion of minority. Under such circumstance, the
medical evidence based on scientific investigation will have
to be given due weight and precedence over the evidence
based on school administration records which give rise to
hypothesis and speculation about the age of the accused.
The matter however would stand on a different footing if
the academic certificates and school records are alleged
to have been withheld deliberately with ulterior motive and
authenticity of the medical evidence is under challenge
by the prosecution.
xxx
33. Similarly, if the conduct of an accused or the method
and manner of commission of the offence indicates an evil
and a well-planned design of the accused committing the
offence which indicates more towards the matured skill
of an accused than that of an innocent child, then in the
absence of reliable documentary evidence in support of
the age of the accused, medical evidence indicating that
the accused was a major cannot be allowed to be ignored
taking shelter of the principle of benevolent legislation like
the Juvenile Justice Act, subverting the course of justice
as statutory protection of the Juvenile Justice Act is meant
for minors who are innocent law-breakers and not the
accused of matured mind who use the plea of minority
as a ploy or shield to protect himself from the sentence
of the offence committed by him.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 317

Suresh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.

34. The benefit of benevolent legislation under the Juvenile
Justice Act obviously will offer protection to a genuine
child accused/juvenile who does not put the court into any
dilemma as to whether he is a juvenile or not by adducing
evidence in support of his plea of minority but in absence
of the same, reliance placed merely on shaky evidence
like the school admission register which is not proved
or oral evidence based on conjectures leading to further
ambiguity, cannot be relied upon in preference to the
medical evidence for assessing the age of the accused.
35. While considering the relevance and value of the
medical evidence, the doctor’s estimation of age although
is not a sturdy substance for proof as it is only an opinion,
such opinion based on scientific medical tests like
ossification and radiological examination will have to be
treated as a strong evidence having corroborative value
while determining the age of the alleged juvenile accused.
xxx
38. The Juvenile Justice Act which is certainly meant to
treat a child accused with care and sensitivity offering
him a chance to reform and settle into the mainstream
of society, the same cannot be allowed to be used as a
ploy to dupe the course of justice while conducting the
trial and treatment of heinous offences. This would clearly
be treated as an effort to weaken the justice dispensation
system and hence cannot be encouraged.’
(emphasis supplied)

24. Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules lays down the sequential list of certificates to
be examined and the order thereof. As no ‘matriculation or equivalent
certificates’ were available under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) of the Rules, thus
under Rule 12(3)(a)(ii) of the Rules, ‘date of birth certificate from the
school (other than a play school) first attended’ was attracted and
certificate issued by Kaushik Modern Public School, Khurgaon was
taken as conclusive proof of date of birth. However, the deposition
of the School’s Headmaster, especially to the effect that the birth-
date was noted as per an oral representation by Respondent No.2’s
father, makes the said certificate unreliable. Moving on, Rule 12(3)
318 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

(a)(iii) and Rule 12(3)(b) of the Rules, respectively, provide for
‘birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a
panchayat’ and ‘only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause
(a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted
Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child.’
25. From an overall circumspection of all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case, including the Rules, the picture which
emerges is that on the one hand, there is the certificate backed
by the testimony of the Headmaster of the first school (which as
indicated supra notes that the recordal was made on the oral say-
so of Respondent No.2’s father) relating to the date of birth and the
three consequentially-made/issued certificates, whereas on the other
hand, there exists a statutory document, being a public record and
a public document, in Form (A) under Rule 2 of the Rules framed
under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 disclosing the year of birth
of Respondent No.2 as 1991 as also the entry in the Voters’ List for
the Legislative Assembly of the year 2012 and the Medical Report
apropos the age of Respondent No.2 given by the Chief Medical
Officer, Muzaffarnagar, who opined that Respondent No.2 was aged
about 22 years on 01.12.2012. As such, the certificate issued by
Kaushik Modern Public School, Khurgaon could not have been taken
as conclusive proof of date of birth of Respondent No.2, discarding
Form (A) under Rule 2 of the Rules under the U. P. Panchayat Raj
Act, 1947; the entry in the Voters’ List for the Legislative Assembly
of the year 2012, and; the Medical Report. On the basis of the latter
three documents, it is clear that Respondent No.2 cannot be said to
have been a ‘juvenile’ on the date of the unfortunate incident.
26. Accordingly, for the reasons aforesaid, the declaration of Respondent
No.2 as a ‘juvenile’ being plainly improper, the Impugned Order as
well as the Order dated 19.05.2015 of the Trial Court holding the
Respondent No.2 to be a ‘juvenile’ are hereby set aside. Respondent
No.2 is held to have been a major as on the date of commission
of the alleged offence and liable to be tried as a major for Crime
No. 385/2011, Police Station - Kairana.
27. The trial be expedited. The Trial Court is directed to conclude the
trial on priority basis ensuring that the same is taken to its logical
conclusion, latest by the end of July, 2026.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 319

Suresh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.

28. In view of Respondent No.2’s Written Submissions to the effect that
the accused/Respondent No.2 was released by the Juvenile Justice
Board, it is directed that he shall appear before the Trial Court within
three weeks from date and shall be at liberty to pray for bail, to be
considered on its own merits by the Trial Court. Failure to appear
within three weeks will enable the State to resort to coercive measures
to ensure his production. For completeness, the Order directing his
release upon completing three years under the Juvenile Justice Act
would also require to be and is set aside.
29. The trial shall proceed on its own merits in accordance with law
without being prejudiced on merits by the instant Judgment. If the
trial results in conviction, benefit of set-off in relation to 3 years shall
be afforded to Respondent No.2.
30. The Appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey