Holding

The convictions were unsustainable and set aside because the prosecution failed to prove the disclosure statements and the chain of circumstantial evidence was incomplete.

Summary

The appellants Thammaraya and Basappa were convicted for murder and concealment of dead body under Sections 302, 201 and 34 of the IPC based largely on circumstantial evidence and alleged disclosure statements that led to the recovery of certain articles. The prosecution's case hinged on the recovery of a gold chain, diary, ring and other items, purportedly identified through statements made by the accused while in police custody. The Supreme Court examined whether the disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Evidence Act were properly proved and whether the failure to conduct a Test Identification Parade rendered the recovered articles inadmissible. Applying the five principles for circumstantial evidence, the Court found the chain of evidence incomplete, the disclosure statements unsubstantiated, and a material omission in the investigation. Consequently, the convictions were held unsustainable, the judgments of the trial and High Courts were set aside, and the appellants were acquitted.

Issues considered

Whether the conviction under Sections 201, 302 read with Section 34 IPC, based solely on circumstantial evidence, is sustainable.
Whether the prosecution proved the disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
Whether the absence of a Test Identification Parade of the recovered articles defeats the prosecution's case.
Whether the chain of circumstantial evidence satisfies the five golden principles laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
Evidence Act, 1872s. 27
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302, s. 34

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the conviction of the appellants-accused under Sections 201 and 302 read with Section 34, Penal Code, 1860 is sustainable. Headnotes† Evidence – Case based on circumstantial evidence – Prosecution relied solely on recoveries of articles allegedly – Conviction u/s.201, s.302 r/w s.34, IPC – Sustainability: Held: Unsustainable – Impugned judgments quashed, set aside – Neither the disclosure statements of the accused persons were proved as per law nor the prosecution was able to establish the factum of recoveries of

Subjects

Circumstantial evidenceRecoveries of articlesLooted from the deceasedAsphyxiaStrangulationDisclosure statement not provedSheer negligenceDereliction of dutyTest Identification Parade (TIP) not conductedFacta probantiaFactum probandoChain of circumstantial evidencesRecovery memorandumsCase not proved beyond reasonable doubtAcquittal

Judgment

[2025] 1 S.C.R. 948 : 2025 INSC 108

Thammaraya and Another
v.
The State of Karnataka
(Criminal Appeal No. 649 of 2013)
22 January 2025
[Vikram Nath, Sanjay Karol and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the conviction of the appellants-accused under Sections
201 and 302 read with Section 34, Penal Code, 1860 is sustainable.

Headnotes†
Evidence – Case based on circumstantial evidence –
Prosecution relied solely on recoveries of articles allegedly
looted from the deceased – Conviction u/s.201, s.302 r/w s.34,
IPC – Sustainability:
Held: Unsustainable – Impugned judgments quashed, set aside –
Neither the disclosure statements of the accused persons were
proved as per law nor the prosecution was able to establish the
factum of recoveries of articles purported to have been made on
the behest of the accused persons by leading proper evidence –
Testimony of IO (PW-27) lacks material aspects required to
prove the disclosure statement followed by the recovery – There
is also material omission on his part in not conducting a Test
Identification Parade of the recovered articles, more particularly
when the prosecution case was based solely upon recoveries of
these articles – Prosecution’s case is weak, not proved beyond
reasonable doubt – Chain of circumstantial evidences not so
complete, so as to lead to the only hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused totally inconsistent with their innocence – Appellants
acquitted. [Paras 28, 26, 25, 27, 29]
Murder – Case based solely on circumstantial evidence –
Appreciation of evidence – Discussed. [Paras 14, 15]

Case Law Cited
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [1985] 1
SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116; Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and
* Author
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 949

Thammaraya and Another v. The State of Karnataka

Other v. State of Karnataka [2024] 5 SCR 174 : (2024) 8 SCC 149;
Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay [1955] 1 SCR 903 :
(1954) 2 SCC 516; Munna Kumar Upadhyay alias Munna
Upadhyaya v. State of Andhra Pradesh through Public Prosecutor,
Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh [2012] 6 SCR 611 : (2012) 6 SCC
174 – referred to.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Evidence
Act, 1872.

List of Keywords
Circumstantial evidence; Recoveries of articles; Looted from the
deceased; Asphyxia; Strangulation; Disclosure statement not
proved; Sheer negligence; Dereliction of duty; Test Identification
Parade (TIP) not conducted; Facta probantia; Factum probando;
Chain of circumstantial evidences; Recovery memorandums; Case
not proved beyond reasonable doubt; Acquittal.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
649 of 2013
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.08.2010 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Gulbarga in CRLA Nos. 964 and 1157 of 2006

Appearances for Parties
Rajesh Mahale, Sr. Adv., Parikshith Maliye, Anirudh Gupta,
Ms. Anuradha Bhat, Harisha S.R., Advs. for the Appellants.
D. L. Chidananda, Adv. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Mehta, J.

1. This appeal takes exception to the common judgment dated 3rd
August, 2010 rendered by the Division Bench of High Court of
950 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Karnataka(Circuit Bench, Gulbarga)1 in Criminal Appeal No. 964 of
2006 filed by Manoj @ Manohar2 and Criminal Appeal No. 1157 of 2006
filed by the appellants, Thammaraya3 and Basappa @ Basavaraj.4

2. The three accused persons, namely, Manoj(A-1), Thammaraya(A-2)
and Basappa @ Basavaraj(A-3) were tried by the learned Fast
Track Court-1, Bijapur5 in Sessions Case No. 22 of 2002 for the
offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860.6 They were convicted and sentenced in
the following terms: -

Manoj(A-1) i. Under Section 302 IPC r/w Section
(since deceased) 34 IPC: Life imprisonment with fine of
Rs. 1000/-.
ii. Under Section 201 IPC: 7 years R.I with
a fine of Rs. 1000/-.

Thammaraya(A-2) i. Under Section 302 IPC r/w Section
34 IPC: Life imprisonment with fine of
Rs. 1000/-.
ii. Under Section 201 IPC: 7 years R.I with
a fine of Rs. 1000/-.

Basappa(A-3) i. Under Section 302 IPC r/w Section
34 IPC: Life imprisonment with fine of
Rs. 1000/-.
ii. Under Section 201 IPC: 7 years R.I with
a fine of Rs. 1000/-.

3. The appeal(s) preferred by the accused persons against the judgment
of the trial Court came to be dismissed by the High Court, vide
common judgment dated 3rd August, 2010, which is a subject matter
of challenge in this appeal by special leave.

1 Hereinafter, referred to as the ‘High Court’.
2 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘Manoj(A-1)’ (since deceased).
3 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘Thammaraya(A-2)’.
4 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘Basappa(A-3)’.
5 Hereinafter being referred to as the ‘trial Court’
6 Hereinafter being referred to as the ‘IPC’
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 951

Thammaraya and Another v. The State of Karnataka

4. Since accused Manoj(A-1) passed away during the pendency of
this appeal, Criminal Appeal No. 648 of 2013 filed by him has been
dismissed as abated by this Court vide order dated 9th January, 2025.

Brief Facts: -
5. As per the prosecution case, Manoj(A-1) was the nephew of Shrishail,
a liquor merchant. He had developed an immoral and illicit relation with
the wife of Shrishail. As a sequel to this illicit relationship, Manoj(A-1)
hatched a plan to eliminate Shrishail. For this purpose of carrying
out the same, he contacted Thammaraya(A-2) and Basappa(A-3).
6. On 24th August, 2001, Manoj(A-1) took Shrishail in his Indica car
bearing No. MP-09/HB-7769 on the pretext of taking him to see
an expert doctor at Sholapur, Maharashtra. He also instructed
Thammaraya(A-2) and Basappa(A-3) to meet them on the way.
All the accused persons thereafter committed murder of Shrishail
by strangulating him with a nylon rope and abandoned the dead
body between Konnur cross to Domnal cross of Bijapur on National
Highway No. 13. Before abandoning the dead body, the clothes worn
by the deceased Shrishail were taken off and his denuded body was
thrown in the forest area near Tungabhadra dam at Hospet. The
clothes of deceased Shrishail were thrown away at some different
location. Accused Manoj(A-1) made a pretence of being a victim of
dacoity and lodged a complaint7 before the Solapur Police at Bijapur
Naka for the offences punishable under Sections 395, 363, 365,
323, 506(2) IPC read with Section 3(25) of the Arms Act, 1959 and
Section 135 of Bombay Police Act, 1951 which came to be registered
as Crime No. 165 of 2001 dated 25th August, 2001. It was inter alia
alleged in the said complaint that when he was near Teramail R.T.O
Check Post, some unknown persons, with their faces hidden under
a “Burka” and armed with weapons had come in two Maruti vans,
stopped their car and launched an attack on them. Eventually, the
assailants abducted Shrishail. He also alleged that the unknown
persons dragged him out of the car and pointed a revolver at him,
thereby, looting away money from both, accused Manoj(A-1) and
Shrishail. Two of the unknown assailants allegedly also looted the
car driven by accused Manoj(A-1), abandoning him at a distance
of one furlong.

7 Complaint No. 165 of 2001
952 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

7. Accused Manoj(A-1), thereafter, sent the information of Shrishail’s
death at the house of the deceased Shrishail and as a consequence,
the wife of the deceased Shrishail, further communicated it to
his friends, who were the members of the Wine Shop Merchants
Association in Bijapur. The friends of the deceased Shrishail
proceeded to Bijapur Naka Police Station, where accused Manoj(A-1)
was present. Thereafter, accused Manoj(A-1) was taken to the
Commissioner of Police at Solapur.
8. Looking at the suspicious conduct and the flimsy story concocted by
the accused Manoj(A-1), the police officers started interrogating him.
During the course of interrogation, accused Manoj(A-1) broke down
and confessed to have murdered Shrishail by strangulating him with
a nylon rope while he was in the car with the aid and assistance of
co-accused Thammaraya(A-2) and co-accused Basappa(A-3). He
confessed that the dead body of Shrishail was thrown away, after
removing his clothes. G. Kandakumar P. Govindaswamy(PW-1),
discovered the dead body of the deceased at Smayar factory
forest area and subsequently, gave the information8 of the same to
Bijapur Rural Police Station. After the dead body was discovered, an
F.I.R.9 was registered against the accused persons for the offences
punishable under Sections 302 and 201 IPC read with Section 34 IPC.
9. The Bijapur police took over the investigation and recovered one gold
chain bearing “S” symbol (MO-8), a chocolate coloured diary (MO-2),
a gold ring studded with white stones (MO-9), clothes worn by the
deceased(MO-4 & 5), one Jambia(MO-1) and one nylon rope(MO-6),
which was used for the commission of the offence. All these recoveries
were purportedly made in furtherance of the disclosure statements
given by the accused persons to the Investigating Officer under
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Charge sheet was
filed against the accused persons for the offences punishable under
Sections 302 and 201 IPC read with Section 34 IPC and the case
was committed to the learned Fast Track Court-I, Bijapur(trial Court).
Upon committal, charges were framed against the accused persons
who denied the same and claimed to be innocent. During trial, the
prosecution examined 31 witnesses, exhibited 47 documents and 9
material objects to prove its case.

8 Exh. P-1
9 FIR No. 105 of 2001
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 953

Thammaraya and Another v. The State of Karnataka

10. The accused persons were confronted with the circumstances
appearing against them in their statements recorded under Section
313 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 197310. They denied the
prosecution allegations and claimed to be innocent. However, upon
conclusion of the trial, the trial Court proceeded to convict and
sentenced all the three accused as noted above.11
11. Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence order, the accused persons
filed criminal appeals before the High Court, which came to be
dismissed vide a common judgment dated 3rd August, 2010, which
is assailed in the present appeal by special leave.

Discussion and Conclusion: -
12. We have heard and considered the submissions advanced by learned
counsel for the parties and have been taken through the impugned
judgments and the evidence available on record.
13. The entire case of the prosecution hinges on circumstantial evidence.
The law with regard to the appreciation of evidence in a case based
purely on circumstantial evidence has been crystallized by this Court
in a plethora of decisions. The locus classicus on this issue is the case
of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra12, wherein
this Court formulated the five golden principles(Panchsheel) for cases
based on circumstantial evidence, which are as follows:-
“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the
following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against
an accused can be said to be fully established:.
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is
to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may
be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal
distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should
be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao
Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973

10 Hereinafter being referred to as ‘CrPC’
11 Refer Para 2 of this judgment.
12 (1984) 4 SCC 116
954 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations
were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused
must be and not merely may be guilty before a court
can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’
and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures
from sure conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say,
they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis
except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature
and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except
the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to
leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent
with the innocence of the accused and must show that in
all human probability the act must have been done by the
accused.”
14. It is a well-established principle of criminal jurisprudence that conviction
on a charge of murder may be based purely on circumstantial
evidence, provided that such evidence is deemed credible and
trustworthy. In cases involving circumstantial evidence, it is crucial
to ensure that the facts leading to the conclusion of guilt are fully
established and that all the established facts point irrefutably towards
the accused person’s guilt. The chain of incriminating circumstances
must be conclusive and should exclude any hypothesis other than
the guilt of the accused.
15. It is also a fundamental principle that a court can convict an accused
only if their guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt and not
merely on the possibility of guilt. The gap between “may be guilty”
and “must be guilty” is significant, separating uncertain speculations
from definitive conclusions. Thus, it is the duty of the prosecution to
elevate its case from the realm of ‘may be true’ to ‘must be true’.13

13 Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 955

Thammaraya and Another v. The State of Karnataka

16. After adverting to the settled principles on cases based on
circumstantial evidence, we shall now discuss the evidence in
the present case. There is no dispute that the cause of death of
Shrishail was homicidal inasmuch as Ravi Basavaraj Akki, the
Medical Officer(PW-13) gave a categoric opinion in his testimony,
stating that the death of Shrishail was caused by asphyxia resulting
from strangulation.
17. The case as against accused Manoj(A-1) was based on three
incriminating circumstances i.e., ‘motive’, ‘last seen’ and ‘recoveries’.
18. So far as the surviving accused persons, Thammaraya(A-2)
and Basappa(A-3) are concerned, we find that the only piece of
circumstantial evidence available on record against them is that of
‘recoveries’. As per the prosecution, accused Thammaraya(A-2) made
a disclosure statement leading to the recovery of one gold chain,
one Jambia and a diary, which were all seized in the presence of
panch witnesses i.e. Ektarsab Hajisab @ Hayatsab Honnutagi(PW-8)
and Srimant, son of Khandu Hakke. Accused Basappa(A-3) also
made a similar disclosure statement, in furtherance whereof, a ring
studded with white stones was recovered. These recovered articles
were produced by the prosecution before the trial Court as material
object Nos. 1, 2, 8 and 9. The prosecution claims that these were the
ornaments worn by the deceased Shrishail at the time of the incident.
19. While analyzing the jurisprudence concerning the proving of disclosure
statements, this Court has held in Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar
and Other v. State of Karnataka14, as follows:
“64. The manner of proving the disclosure statement under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act has been the subject-matter
of consideration by this Court in various judgments, some
of which are being referred to below……..
66. Further, in Subramanya v. State of Karnataka (2023)
11 SCC 255 , it was held as under :
“76. Keeping in mind the aforesaid evidence,
we proceed to consider whether the prosecution
has been able to prove and establish the
discoveries in accordance with law. Section 27
of the Evidence Act reads thus:

14 (2024) 8 SCC 149
956 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

‘27. How much of information
received from accused may be
proved.—Provided that, when any
fact is deposed to as discovered in
consequence of information received
from a person accused of any offence,
in the custody of a police officer, so
much of such information, whether it
amounts to a confession or not, as
relates distinctly to the fact thereby
discovered, may be proved.’
77. The first and the basic infirmity in the evidence of all the
aforesaid prosecution witnesses is that none of them have
deposed the exact statement said to have been made by
the appellant herein which ultimately led to the discovery
of a fact relevant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
78. If, it is say of the investigating officer that the appellant-
accused while in custody on his own free will and volition
made a statement that he would lead to the place where
he had hidden the weapon of offence, the site of burial
of the dead body, clothes, etc. then the first thing that the
investigating officer should have done was to call for two
independent witnesses at the police station itself. Once
the two independent witnesses would arrive at the police
station thereafter in their presence the accused should
be asked to make an appropriate statement as he may
desire in regard to pointing out the place where he is said
to have hidden the weapon of offence, etc. When the
accused while in custody makes such statement before the
two independent witnesses (panch witnesses) the exact
statement or rather the exact words uttered by the accused
should be incorporated in the first part of the panchnama
that the investigating officer may draw in accordance with
law. This first part of the panchnama for the purpose of
Section 27 of the Evidence Act is always drawn at the police
station in the presence of the independent witnesses so
as to lend credence that a particular statement was made
by the accused expressing his willingness on his own free
will and volition to point out the place where the weapon
of offence or any other article used in the commission of
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 957

Thammaraya and Another v. The State of Karnataka

the offence had been hidden. Once the first part of the
panchnama is completed thereafter the police party along
with the accused and the two independent witnesses
(panch witnesses) would proceed to the particular place
as may be led by the accused. If from that particular place
anything like the weapon of offence or bloodstained clothes
or any other article is discovered then that part of the entire
process would form the second part of the panchnama.
This is how the law expects the investigating officer to
draw the discovery panchnama as contemplated under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act. If we read the entire oral
evidence of the investigating officer then it is clear that
the same is deficient in all the aforesaid relevant aspects
of the matter.”
(emphasis supplied)

20. On going through the evidence of Basanagouda, the Investigating
Officer(PW-27), who purportedly recorded the disclosure statements
of accused persons Thammaraya(A-2) and Basappa(A-3), which
led to the recovery of the articles allegedly looted from the person
of the deceased Shrishail at the time of the commission of the
offence, we find that his testimony is woefully lacking on the material
aspects required to prove the disclosure statement followed by the
recovery. The relevant extract from the evidence of the Investigating
Officer(PW-27) is reproduced hereinbelow for the sake of ready
reference: -
“…On 3.9.2001 I arrested accused Tammaraya Biradar and
Basavaraj @ Basappa Mallappa Hattaraki both resident
of Yelagi village, Indi taluka and interrogated them. They
accepted the commission of the murder of the Rudragouda.
I recorded their voluntary statement and also took their
finger prints for verification. On the basis of voluntary
statement of Tammaraya Patil, I conducted the recovery
panchanama with the help of panchas. Ek tarsab Hayatsab
Honnutagi and Shrimanth s/o Khandu Hakke. I recovered
one gold chain bearing ‘S’ symbol which was of a disco
model weighing of about 8 ½ grams, one chalklate colour
diary written in bold letters as “Sonni telephone Index”, Knife
of about 15” long including handle with one side sharpened.
Secondly, I conducted the recovery panchanama with the
958 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

same panchas on the basis of voluntary statement given
by Basavaraj @ Basappa Hattaraki. I recovered one white
stone ring gold weighing about 8 grams and a diary on
which it was written as “personal memorandam”…..”
21. A cautious appraisal of the above extract from the evidence of the
Investigating Officer(PW-27) would reveal that he did not depose
the exact words as narrated by the accused Thammaraya(A-2) and
accused Basappa(A-3) in their disclosure statements. In fact, he
even did not care to exhibit the disclosure statements of which he
was the scribe in his deposition. He also did not depose in clear
words that the accused persons had led him to the place mentioned
in the disclosure statements and got the articles recovered. No
connection between the accused and the particular articles recovered
is visible from the testimony of the Investigating Officer(PW-27).
The Investigating Officer(PW-27) also failed to exhibit the recovery
memorandums. There is no indication in the deposition of the
Investigating Officer(PW-27) that he sealed the recovery articles
or got the same subjected to test identification at the hands of the
relatives of the deceased Shrishail.
22. Furthermore, another very crucial missing link in the prosecution
case that it failed to conduct the Test Identification Parade(TIP) of the
recovered articles, thereby, bringing the identification of the material
objects in Court for the first time, is under a cloud of doubt. It is a
case of sheer negligence and dereliction of duty on the part of the
Investigating Agency and the Public Prosecutor for not conducting
Test Identification Parade(TIP). This Court shed light on the purpose
of Test Identification Parade(TIP) in Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v.
State of Bombay15, wherein it held as follows:
“20. … These parades are held by the police in the course
of their investigation for the purpose of enabling witnesses
to identify the properties which are the subject-matter of
the offence or to identify the persons who are concerned
in the offence. …the identifying witnesses are explained
the purpose of holding these parades and are asked to
identify the properties which are the subject-matter of the
offence or the persons who are concerned in the offence.”
(emphasis supplied)

15 (1954) 2 SCC 516
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 959

Thammaraya and Another v. The State of Karnataka

23. This Court has further noted the significance of Test Identification
Parade(TIP) in Munna Kumar Upadhyay alias Munna Upadhyaya v.
State of Andhra Pradesh through Public Prosecutor, Hyderabad,
Andhra Pradesh16, wherein it was held:
“66. There was some delay in holding the identification
parade. But the delay per se cannot be fatal to the validity
of holding an identification parade, in all cases, without
exception. The purpose of the identification parade is to
provide corroborative evidence and is more confirmatory
in its nature.” ………..
(emphasis supplied)

24. Therefore, this material omission on part of the Investigating
Officer(PW-27) in not conducting a Test Identification Parade(TIP) of
the recovered articles, more particularly when the case of prosecution
is based solely upon recoveries of these articles, has created holes
in the fabric of the prosecution story, which are impossible to mend.
25. Every piece of relevant fact needs to be sewn via the golden thread
of duly proved circumstances, in order to ultimately formulate the
fabric of guilt. Sadly, in the present case, the facta probantia fails
to sustain and support the alleged factum probando, rendering the
prosecution’s case miserably weak. Hence, the evidence led by
the prosecution against the accused person is woefully short of the
mandate to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.
26. Thus, we have no hesitation in arriving at a conclusion that neither
the disclosure statements of the accused persons were proved as
per law, nor the prosecution was able to establish the factum of
recoveries of allegedly looted articles purported to have been made
on the behest of the accused persons by leading proper evidence.
No other evidence was led by the prosecution to bring home the
guilt of the accused persons Thammaraya(A-2) and Basappa(A-3).
27. In wake of the above discussion, the chain of circumstantial evidences
in the present case cannot be held to be so complete, so as to lead
to the only hypothesis of the guilt of the accused which is totally
inconsistent with their innocence.

16 (2012) 6 SCC 174
960 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

28. Resultantly, the conviction of the accused Thammaraya(A-2) and
accused Basappa(A-3) recorded by the trial Court and affirmed by
the High Court is unsustainable in the eyes of law. The impugned
judgments do not stand to scrutiny and are hereby quashed and
set aside.
29. The appellant Thammaraya(A-2) and appellant Basappa(A-3) are
acquitted of the charges. They are on bail and need not surrender.
30. The appeal is allowed, accordingly.
31. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey