Holding

The Supreme Court held that the Chief Minister’s approval of the initiation of disciplinary proceedings sufficed as approval of the draft charge‑sheet, that the procedural safeguards of Article 311 and the relevant service rules were satisfied, and therefore the High Court’s order quashing the dismissal was erroneous.

Summary

The respondent, a civil servant of Jharkhand, was dismissed after disciplinary proceedings for alleged misconduct, including financial irregularities and forgery. The draft charge‑sheet and a proposal to suspend him were placed before the Chief Minister, who approved the proposal on 21 March 2014, after which the charge‑sheet was issued and an inquiry conducted. The respondent challenged his dismissal before the High Court, arguing that the charge‑sheet lacked the Chief Minister’s separate approval, and the High Court quashed the dismissal. The Supreme Court examined whether approval of the initiation of disciplinary proceedings sufficed as approval of the charge‑sheet, and whether Article 311(1) of the Constitution required the appointing authority’s direct approval of the charge‑sheet. Relying on the Civil Services Rules, the 2016 Jharkhand Rules, and a line of precedents, the Court held that the Chief Minister’s approval of the proposal covered the draft charge‑sheet and that no procedural infirmity existed. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside and the respondent’s writ petition dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the dismissal order should be interdicted on the ground that the charge‑sheet was not approved by the Chief Minister of Jharkhand.
Whether approval of the initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the Chief Minister amounts to approval of the draft charge‑sheet under the applicable service rules.
Whether Article 311(1) of the Constitution mandates that the charge‑sheet be issued or approved by the appointing authority.
Whether the High Court erred in quashing the dismissal order and directing reinstatement.

Legislation cited

Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965s. Rule 14(3), s. Rule 14(4)
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930s. Rule 55
Constitution of Indias. Art.141, s. Art.311
Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2016s. Rule 16, s. Rule 17(3), s. Rule 2(k), s. Rule 32(3)
Right to Information Act, 2005

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the order by which the respondent-civil servant was dismissed from service, following disciplinary proceedings, should have been interdicted by the High Court on the ground that the charge-sheet had not been approved by the Chief Minister of Jharkhand. Art.311 – Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State – Authority to issue chargesheet or initiate disciplinary proceedings against the government servant – Respondent-civil service officer, indulged in diverse

Subjects

DismissalMisconductDisciplinary proceedingsStare decisis et non queta movereStare decisisDraw upCause to be drawn upApproval to initiate the disciplinary proceedingsFailure of justiceCharge-sheetChief Minister of JharkhandCivil service officerWrit jurisdictionPrecedents

Judgment

[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1254 : 2025 INSC 412

The State of Jharkhand & Ors.
v.
Rukma Kesh Mishra
(Civil Appeal No. 4480 of 2025)
28 March 2025
[Dipankar Datta* and Manmohan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the order by which the respondent-civil servant was
dismissed from service, following disciplinary proceedings, should
have been interdicted by the High Court on the ground that the
charge-sheet had not been approved by the Chief Minister of
Jharkhand.

Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Art.311 – Dismissal, removal or
reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities
under the Union or a State – Authority to issue chargesheet
or initiate disciplinary proceedings against the government
servant – Respondent-civil service officer, indulged in diverse
activities constituting misconduct – Deputy Commissioner
seeking approval of initiation of disciplinary proceedings
along with draft charge-sheet, placed the proposals before
the Chief Minister – Proposals approved by the Chief Minister
and suspension of the respondent – Issuance of charge-sheet
and conduct of the departmental inquiry, and thereafter, the
respondent dismissed from service – Respondent then filed
writ petition challenging the order of dismissal on the ground
of absence of approval by the Chief Minister at or about the
time of issuance of the charge-sheet, allowed by the High
Court-Division Bench upheld the same – Sustainability:
Held: Unless the relevant rules applicable to an officer/employee
of an authority so require, disciplinary proceedings by issuance
of a charge-sheet cannot be faulted solely on the ground that
Appointing Authority/Disciplinary Authority has not issued the same
or approved it – On facts, no infirmity in initiation of disciplinary

* Author
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1255

The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Rukma Kesh Mishra

proceedings – Chief Minister himself having approved initiation
of disciplinary proceedings against the respondent, question of
absence of approval of the charge-sheet by the Chief Minister
separately was a non-issue – Any officer holding a rank subordinate
to the respondent’s appointing authority but superior in rank than
the respondent could have issued the charge-sheet – Disciplinary
proceedings was initiated against the respondent having the
approval of the Chief Minister – Draft charge-sheet was part of
the proposal – Once the draft charge-sheet was on record before
the Chief Minister, approval of the proposal to initiate disciplinary
proceedings should have been read as including the Chief Minister’s
assent not only to the draft charge-sheet, as drawn up, but also to the
other proposals to suspend the respondent as well as appointment
of an inquiry officer and presenting officer – Also, no procedure
of placing the matter before the Chief Minister is shown to have
been breached – According approval to initiate the disciplinary
proceedings against the respondent did amount to approval of the
draft charge-sheet – Single Judge committed grave miscarriage
of justice in interfering with the order of dismissal and the Division
Bench, by failing to right the wrong, equally contributed to same
justice – Orders by the courts below fundamentally incorrect and
patently illegal and are set aside – Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 – r.55 – Jharkhand Government
Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 2016 – rr. 16, 17.
[Paras 26, 27, 29, 30, 34, 39, 40, 43]

Service law – Disciplinary proceedings – ‘Draw up’ and
‘cause to draw up’ the charge sheet signifying initiation of
disciplinary proceedings against an officer/employee found
to be delinquent – Meaning:
Held: Disciplinary Authority is mandated by the law to ‘draw up’
or ‘cause to be drawn up’ the substance of the imputations of
misconduct or misbehavior as a definite and distinct article of
charge together with the statement of such imputations – Phrases
‘draw up’ and ‘cause to be drawn up’ do have different meanings
in the context of disciplinary proceedings, though both relate to
drawing up of a charge-sheet – By ‘draw up’, what is express is
that the Disciplinary Authority itself is responsible for preparing the
substance of imputation and the statement of allegations, whereas
‘cause to be drawn up’ would enable the Disciplinary Authority
1256 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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to instruct or direct someone else to prepare the substance and
statement – Effect is that the Disciplinary Authority itself may not
prepare the document but rather delegate the task to someone
else – If the delegation is proved to have been made in favour of
an authority holding an office superior to that of the officer/employee
proposed to be proceeded against, nothing much is required to be
done and the courts ought to exercise restraint. [Para 36]

Constitution of India – Art.141 – Precedents – Reliance by
the courts:
Held: Whenever a precedent is cited laying down a principle of
law having application to the facts of the case in hand and having
binding effect, it is customary and expected of courts to be bound
by the law declared by this Court u/Art.141 – However, the courts
are free not to place blind reliance on whatever precedent is cited
by the parties since facts of two cases are not seldom alike – It
is the duty of the court, if it considers the precedent not to be
applicable, to refer to factual dissimilarities that are found and
thereafter to distinguish the precedent cited before it by assigning
brief but cogent reasons. [Para 35]

Constitution of India – Art.311 – Dismissal, removal or reduction
in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union
or a State – Safeguards for civil servants from dismissal:
Held: Member of the civil service of the State, can legitimately
claim that the safeguards enshrined in Art.311 be scrupulously
followed prior to ordering his dismissal including drawing up
a charge-sheet in the manner required by the relevant law –
Sole safeguard provided by Art.311 to any member of a civil
service/holder of a civil post is that he shall not be dismissed
or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he
was appointed – Clause 1 of Art.311 does not require that the
disciplinary proceedings should also be initiated by the appointing
authority. [Paras 19, 33]

Doctrines/principles – Stare decisis et non queta movere –
Meaning:
Held: Means that to stand by what has been decided and do not
disturb what has been settled – While courts are not restrained
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1257

The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Rukma Kesh Mishra

by any principle of law from expressing a different view on a point
of law or to distinguish precedents, stare decisis need not be
disregarded to unsettle settled positions. [Para 26]

Case Law Cited
Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana [2006] Supp. 9 SCR
257 : (2006) 12 SCC 28; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shardul
Singh [1970] 3 SCR 302 : (1970) 1 SCC 108; P. V. Srinivasa
Sastry v. Comptroller and Auditor General [1992] Supp. 3 SCR
503 : (1993) 1 SCC 419 – relied on.
Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath [2013] 14 SCR 185 : (2014) 1
SCC 351; State of Tamil Nadu v. Promod Kumar, IAS (2018) 17
SCC 677 – distinguished.
Transport Commissioner v. A. Radhakrishna Moorthy (1995) 1 SCC
332; Inspector General of Police v. Thavasippan [1996] 1 SCR
977 : (1996) 2 SCC 145; Government of Tamil Nadu v. S. Vel Raj
[1996] Supp. 10 SCR 452 : (1997) 2 SCC 708; Commissioner of
Police v. Jayasurian (1997) 6 SCC 75; Regional Manager, Food
Corporation of India v. Pawan Kumar Dubey [1976] 3 SCR 540 :
(1976) 3 SCC 334 – referred to.

List of Acts
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930;
Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules 2016; Right to Information Act, 2005; Central
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965;
Constitution of India.

List of Keywords
Dismissal; Misconduct; Disciplinary proceedings; Stare decisis et
non queta movere; Stare decisis; ‘Draw up’; ‘Cause to be drawn
up’; Approval to initiate the disciplinary proceedings; Failure of
justice; Charge-sheet; Chief Minister of Jharkhand; Civil service
officer; Misconduct; Writ jurisdiction; Precedents.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4480 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 24.11.2023 of the High Court
of Jharkhand at Ranchi in LPA No. 572 of 2023
1258 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Anirudh Sharma, Ms. Tulika Mukherjee, Venkat Narayan.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Dr. Manish Singhvi, Sr. Adv., Shiv Ram Pandey, Mrs. Sandhya
Pandey, Dr. Kishor Shankar Dere, Mrs. Amita Agarwal, Madan
Lal Daga, Man Singh Chouhan, Amarjeet Sahani, Dr. Sunil Kumar
Agarwal.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Dipankar Datta, J.

1. Leave granted.

The Appeal
2. Appellants - the State of Jharkhand and three of its officers – assail
the judgment and order dated 24th November, 20231 of a Division
Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi2 in this civil appeal.
By the impugned order, the Division Bench dismissed an intra-court
appeal3 carried by the appellants from the judgment and order dated
20th April, 2023 of a Single Judge, allowing a writ petition4 instituted
by the respondent - Rukma Kesh Mishra.

The Question
3. We are tasked to decide a solitary legal question: whether the order
by which the respondent was dismissed from service, following
disciplinary proceedings, should have been interdicted by the High
Court on the specious ground that the charge-sheet had not been
approved by the Chief Minister of Jharkhand5?

1 impugned order
2 High Court
3 LPA No. 572 of 2023
4 WP (S) No. 4781 of 2017
5 Chief Minister
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1259

The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Rukma Kesh Mishra

Brief Resume of Facts
4. Facts giving rise to this appeal are not too complicated. While the
respondent had been functioning as a civil service officer, it came to
light that he had indulged in diverse activities of dishonesty, financial
irregularities, forgery of documents, etc. constituting misconduct. It
was proposed to proceed against him departmentally. Along with
the proposal dated 13th January, 2014, which was initiated by the
appellant no. 3 – the Deputy Commissioner, Koderma – seeking
approval of initiation of disciplinary proceedings, the draft charge-
sheet containing 9 (nine) charges proposed to be levelled against
the respondent (contained in form ‘K’) was placed before the Chief
Minister together with proposals that the respondent be suspended
from service with immediate effect and that in the inquiry to be initiated
against the respondent, the officers named therein be appointed
as the inquiry officer and the presenting officer. The Chief Minister
approved all the proposals on 21st March, 2014. On 31st March,
2014, the appellant no.2 – Deputy Secretary to the Government of
Jharkhand (Personnel, Administrative and Rajbhasha Department)6 –
suspended the respondent from service. Appellant no.2 thereafter
issued charge-sheet dated 4th April, 2014 under Rule 55 of the Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 19307 for the
purpose of an inquiry to be conducted into the respondent’s conduct
vis-à-vis the 9 (nine) articles of charges drawn up against him.
Respondent having denied and disputed the material allegations in
the charge-sheet, an inquiry came to be conducted with the appellant
no.4 – described in the array of appellants as the Departmental
Enquiry-cum-Conducting Officer – as the inquiry officer. Respondent
duly participated in such inquiry whereafter a report of inquiry
was submitted by the appellant no.4 on 31st July, 2015. Appellant
no.4 held the respondent guilty of all but 3 (three) of the charges.
A second show cause notice was issued to the respondent on 11th
April, 2016, followed by a reminder. Respondent replied to the second
show cause notice on 24th September, 2016. Apropos a proposal
containing detailed reasons why the report of the appellant no.4 called
for acceptance and the respondent dismissed from service on proof
of majority of the charges of misconduct levelled against him, the

6 relevant department
7 1930 Rules
1260 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

same was placed before the Cabinet of the State Government8 in
its meeting held on 13th June, 2017. The Cabinet having approved
such proposal, the respondent was dismissed from service vide an
order of the Governor contained in memo dated 16th June, 2017
issued by the Joint Secretary of the relevant department. The order
of dismissal recorded that the Government had taken the decision
to dismiss the respondent based on proof of the charges against
him in terms of Rule 14(xi) of the Jharkhand Government Servants
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 20169 and that under
Rule 18(7) thereof, due consent of the Jharkhand Public Service
Commission for imposing such punishment had been obtained.
5. After obtaining information through the machinery provided by the
Right to Information Act, 2005 that approval of the Chief Minister
being the competent authority has not been “accorded at the time of
issuing/signing of the memo of charge”, the respondent challenged
the order of dismissal from service before the High Court by
invoking its writ jurisdiction primarily on the ground of absence of
approval by the Chief Minister at or about the time of issuance of
the charge-sheet. He also challenged the disciplinary proceedings
on the grounds that there was no application of mind and the
appellants had failed to take into consideration the entire facts
and circumstances of the case; also, that the punishment imposed
was excessive and disproportionate to the allegations levelled and
gravity of the misconduct found proved. Accordingly, the respondent
prayed that by issuing a writ of certiorari, the order of dismissal dated
16th June, 2017 be quashed and a mandamus be issued directing
the appellants to reinstate him in service.

The Judgments of the High Court
6. Perusal of the writ petition (Annexure P22 of the paper book) does
not reveal reference to any provision of law premised whereon the
respondent contended that the charge-sheet could not have been
issued without the approval of the Chief Minister, being the competent
authority in case of the respondent.
7. Be that as it may, it is only on this ground that the writ petition
of the respondent succeeded. The Single Judge, who heard the

8 Cabinet
9 2016 Rules
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1261

The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Rukma Kesh Mishra

writ petition, unequivocally recorded that initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against the respondent was duly approved by the
competent authority but “nowhere from the counter affidavit it appears
that Chargesheet was ever approved by the competent authority”.
Placing reliance on the decisions of this Court in Union of India
v. B.V. Gopinath10 and State of Tamil Nadu v. Promod Kumar,
IAS11, the Single Judge held that it is the “requirement of law that
charge has to be approved by the competent authority and the same
was not done here, which is dehorse (sic, dehors) the Rule”. Based
on such findings, while quashing the order of dismissal the Single
Judge directed reinstatement of the respondent in service with all
consequential benefits. The writ petition, thus, stood allowed.
8. The Division Bench, while dismissing the intra-court appeal of the
appellants, proceeded to record the following findings:
“12. *** However, on scrutiny of the materials on record, we
find that before a decision was taken to start a departmental
proceeding against the respondent and Resolution dated 4th April
2014 was issued thereof, charge memo was already prepared
on 13th January 2014. Not only that, the competent authority had
accorded his approval to the charge memo on 21st March 2014.
That is, before a decision was taken to start the departmental
proceeding against the respondent and approval thereon of the
competent authority was taken. Apparently, the charge memo
was incompetent and therefore the subsequent proceedings
taken in the departmental inquiry against the respondent were
also rendered illegal.
13. In view of this procedural error which is not a curable
irregularity, the writ Court rightly interfered with the termination
order dated 16th June 2017”.
After extracting paragraph 41 of the decision in B. V. Gopinath
(supra) and paragraph 21 of the decision in Promod Kumar (supra),
the Division Bench held the writ court’s interference with the order
dated 6th June, 2017 to be perfectly valid and, accordingly, dismissed
the intra-court appeal.

10 2014 (1) SCC 351
11 2018 (17) SCC 677
1262 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Analysis and Reasons
9. We have heard Mr. Rajiv Shankar Dvivedi, learned counsel for the
appellants and Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned senior counsel for the
respondent, at some length.
10. Respondent, without exhausting the alternative remedy of appeal/
revision challenging the order of dismissal from service, had invoked
the writ jurisdiction before the High Court. For reasons assigned
hereafter, we find that the writ petition could have been entertained
by the High Court having regard to the jurisdictional issue raised by
the respondent.
11. A coordinate bench of this Court in Union of India v. Kunisetty
Satyanarayana12 has held that ordinarily no writ lies against a show
cause notice or charge-sheet. The reason is that a mere show-cause
notice or charge-sheet does not give rise to any cause of action,
because it does not amount to an adverse order affecting the rights
of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having
no jurisdiction to do so (emphasis supplied). Writ jurisdiction is
discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226
should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice
or charge-sheet. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases
the High Court can quash a show cause notice or charge-sheet if
it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason
it is wholly illegal (emphasis supplied). However, ordinarily the High
Court should not interfere in such a matter.
12. Having read the decision in Kunisetty Satyanarayana (supra), we
are of the view that it was open to the High Court to examine the
question of jurisdiction to issue the charge-sheet to the respondent
since he had invoked the writ jurisdiction after suffering the order
of dismissal from service and not at an initial stage of the inquiry.
The writ petition, therefore, could not have been thrown out at the
threshold.
13. Now, while addressing the question arising for decision, it would
be worthwhile to notice paragraphs ‘41’ and ‘21’ of the decisions in
B. V. Gopinath (supra) and Promod Kumar (supra), respectively.

12 (2006) 12 SCC 28
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1263

The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Rukma Kesh Mishra

14. In B.V. Gopinath (supra), this Court intervened and quashed the
charge-sheet on the ground of want of the Finance Minister’s approval.
Paragraph ‘41’ reads as follows:
“41. Disciplinary proceedings against the respondent herein were
initiated in terms of Rule 14 of the aforesaid Rules. Rule 14(3)
clearly lays down that where it is proposed to hold an inquiry
against a government servant under Rule 14 or Rule 15, the
disciplinary authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up the
charge-sheet. Rule 14(4) again mandates that the disciplinary
authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the government
servant, a copy of the articles of charge, the statement of the
imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour and the supporting
documents including a list of witnesses by which each article
of charge is proposed to be proved. We are unable to interpret
this provision as suggested by the Additional Solicitor General,
that once the disciplinary authority approves the initiation of the
disciplinary proceedings, the charge-sheet can be drawn up by an
authority other than the disciplinary authority. This would destroy
the underlying protection guaranteed under Article 311(1) of the
Constitution of India. Such procedure would also do violence to
the protective provisions contained under Article 311(2) which
ensures that no public servant is dismissed, removed or suspended
without following a fair procedure in which he/she has been given
a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations contained in
the charge-sheet. Such a charge-sheet can only be issued upon
approval by the appointing authority i.e. Finance Minister”.
(italics in original)

15. B.V. Gopinath (supra) was followed in Promod Kumar (supra).
Paragraph ‘21’ of the latter decision being relevant, is quoted below:
“21. It is clear that the approval of the disciplinary authority was
taken for initiation of the disciplinary proceedings. It is also clear
from the affidavit that no approval was sought from the disciplinary
authority at the time when the charge memo was issued to
the delinquent officer. The submission made on behalf of the
appellant is that approval of the disciplinary authority for initiation
of disciplinary proceedings was sufficient and there was no need
for another approval for issuance of charge memo. The basis
for such submission is that initiation of disciplinary proceedings
1264 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

and issuance of charge memo are at the same stage. We are
unable to agree with the submission in view of the judgment of
this Court in B.V. Gopinath. In that case the charge memo issued
to Mr Gopinath under Rule 14(3) of the Central Civil Service
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 was quashed
by the Central Administrative Tribunal on the ground that the
Finance Minister did not approve it. The judgment of the Tribunal
was affirmed by the High Court. The Union of India, the appellant
therein submitted before this Court that the approval for initiation of
the departmental proceedings includes the approval of the charge
memo. Such submission was not accepted by this Court on an
interpretation of Rule 14(3) which provides that the disciplinary
authority shall “draw up or cause to be drawn up” the charge
memo. It was held that if any authority other than the disciplinary
authority is permitted to draw the charge memo, the same would
result in destroying the underlying protection guaranteed under
Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India”.
16. Having read excerpts from the decisions in B. V. Gopinath (supra)
and Promod Kumar (supra), heavily relied on by the High Court
for allowing the writ petition of the respondent, we propose to first
examine whether the law laid down therein had any application to
the facts pleaded in the writ petition and how far the same is relevant
for deciding this appeal. Next, we propose to consider whether, on
facts, initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the respondent
suffered from any infirmity warranting interference. Finally, we
propose to consider the contours of Article 311 of the Constitution
and the legal requirements of who should ‘draw up’ or ‘cause to draw
up’ the charge-sheet signifying initiation of disciplinary proceedings
against an officer/employee prima facie found to be delinquent.

Applicability of B. V. Gopinath (supra) And Promod Kumar (supra)
17. It is not in dispute that at the time the appellants resolved to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against the respondent, the 1930 Rules were
in force. The Single Judge noticed this fact, although the Division
Bench has not adverted to it. Under the 1930 Rules, disciplinary
proceedings could be initiated in terms of Rule 5513 thereof. The

13 55. Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants Inquiries Act, 1850, no order of dismissal,
removal, compulsory retirement Vide Notification no.13213-A, dated the 17th October, 1957 (or reduction)
shall be passed on a member of a Service (other than an order based on facts which have led to his
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1265

The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Rukma Kesh Mishra

effect that Rule 55 would have on the merits of the plea raised by the
respondent, in the ultimate analysis, is what appears to be clinching.
18. Bare perusal of Rule 55 reveals that it does not expressly specify
the authority, who is competent to issue the charge-sheet. On the
contrary, the decisions of this Court in B.V. Gopinath (supra) and
Promod Kumar (supra) dealt with different rules which expressly
specified who could issue the charge-sheet. We have noted with
some measure of disappointment that long-standing precedents
of this Court, which did lend sustenance to the impugned charge-
sheet, were neither placed before the Division Bench nor the Single
Judge for consideration. This is one reason why we are persuaded
to interfere.
19. Respondent was a member of the civil service of the State. Thus,
he could legitimately claim that the safeguards enshrined in Article
311 of the Constitution be scrupulously followed prior to ordering
his dismissal including drawing up a charge-sheet in the manner
required by the relevant law.
20. It would, therefore, be profitable to note what is the law declared by
this Court on the point as to who can issue the charge-sheet.
21. As far back as in 1970, this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v.
Shardul Singh14 held that Article 311(1) does not in terms require
that the authority empowered by that provision to dismiss or remove
an officer should initiate or conduct the inquiry. This decision could
count as the parent decision on the topic, declaring the law in
paragraphs ‘6’ and ‘10’. The said paragraphs are quoted below for
ease of understanding as to how Article 311(1) was construed:

conviction in a criminal court or by a Court-Martial) unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds
on which it is proposed to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending
himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to the form of a definite
charge or charges which shall be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the
allegations on which each charge is based and on any other circumstances which it is proposed to take
into consideration in passing orders on the case. He shall be required, within a reasonable time, to put in
a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires
or if the authority concerned so direct an oral inquiry shall be held. At that inquiry oral evidence shall be
heard as to such of the allegations as are not admitted, and the person charged shall be entitled to cross-
examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called, as he may wish,
provided that the officer, conducting the inquiry may, for special and sufficient reasons to be recorded in
writing, refuse to call a witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and a
statement of the findings and the grounds thereof.
***
14 (1970) 1 SCC 108
1266 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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“6. Article 311(1) provides that no person who is a member
of Civil Service of the Union or of an All-India Service or Civil
Service of a State or holds civil post under the Union or State
shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to
that by which he was appointed. This Article does not in terms
require that the authority empowered under that provision to
dismiss or remove an official, should itself initiate or conduct
the enquiry preceding the dismissal or removal of the officer
or even that that enquiry should be done at its instance. The
only right guaranteed to a civil servant under that provision
is that he shall not be dismissed or removed by an authority
subordinate to that by which he was appointed. But it is said
on behalf of the respondent that that guarantee includes within
itself the guarantee that the relevant disciplinary inquiry should
be initiated and conducted by the authorities mentioned in the
Article. The High Court has accepted this contention. We have
now to see whether the view taken by the High Court is correct.
***
10. But for the incorporation of Article 311 in the Constitution
even in respect of matters provided therein, rules could have
been framed under Article 309. The provisions in Article 311
confer additional rights on the civil servants. Hence we are
unable to agree with the High Court that the guarantee given
under Article 311(1) includes within itself a further guarantee that
the disciplinary proceedings resulting in dismissal or removal
of a civil servant should also be initiated and conducted by the
authorities mentioned in that Article”.
(emphasis supplied)

22. Then came the decision in P. V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller and
Auditor General15, where this Court reiterated that a departmental
proceeding need not be initiated only by the appointing authority
and that initiation by a subordinate authority, in the absence of rules,
is not vitiated. We consider it appropriate to extract paragraph ‘4’
hereunder:

15 1993 (1) SCC 419
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1267

The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Rukma Kesh Mishra

“4. Article 311(1) says that no person who is a member of a civil
service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of
a State or holds civil post under the Union or a State “shall be
dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which
he was appointed”. Whether this guarantee includes within itself
the guarantee that even the disciplinary proceeding should be
initiated only by the appointing authority? It is well known that
departmental proceeding consists of several stages: the initiation
of the proceeding, the inquiry in respect of the charges levelled
against that delinquent officer and the final order which is passed
after the conclusion of the inquiry. Article 311(1) guarantees that
no person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or a
State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate
to that by which he was appointed. But Article 311(1) does not
say that even the departmental proceeding must be initiated only
by the appointing authority. However, it is open to Union of India
or a State Government to make any rule prescribing that even
the proceeding against any delinquent officer shall be initiated by
an officer not subordinate to the appointing authority. Any such
rule shall not be inconsistent with Article 311 of the Constitution
because it will amount to providing an additional safeguard or
protection to the holder of a civil post. But in absence of any
such rule, this right or guarantee does not flow from Article 311
of the Constitution. It need not be pointed out that initiation
of a departmental proceeding per se does not visit the officer
concerned with any evil consequences, and the framers of the
Constitution did not consider it necessary to guarantee even
that to holders of civil posts under the Union of India or under
the State Government. At the same time this will not give right
to authorities having the same rank as that of the officer against
whom proceeding is to be initiated to take a decision whether
any such proceeding should be initiated. In absence of a rule,
any superior authority who can be held to be the controlling
authority, can initiate such proceeding”.
(emphasis supplied)

23. Yet again, in Transport Commissioner v. A. Radhakrishna
Moorthy16, this Court clearly declared the law as follows:

16 (1995) 1 SCC 332
1268 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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“8. Insofar as initiation of enquiry by an officer subordinate to the
appointing authority is concerned, it is well settled now that it is
unobjectionable. The initiation can be by an officer subordinate
to the appointing authority. Only the dismissal/removal shall
not be by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority.
Accordingly it is held that this was not a permissible ground for
quashing the charges by the Tribunal”.
(emphasis supplied)

24. All these decisions were considered by this Court in Inspector
General of Police v. Thavasippan17, and it was ruled as follows:
“9. … Generally speaking, it is not necessary that the charges
should be framed by the authority competent to award the
proposed penalty or that the enquiry should be conducted
by such authority. We do not find anything in the rules which
would induce us to read in Rule 3(b)(i) such a requirement.
In our opinion, the view taken by the Tribunal that in a case
falling under Rule 3(b) the charge memo should be issued by
the disciplinary authority empowered to impose the penalties
referred to therein and if the charge memo is issued by any
lower authority then only that penalty can be imposed which
that lower authority is competent to award, is clearly erroneous.
We, therefore, allow this appeal”. …
(emphasis supplied)

25. Later decisions of this Court in Government of Tamil Nadu v. S.
Vel Raj18 and Commissioner of Police v. Jayasurian19 also declare
the law in the same vein, albeit in respect of different discipline and
appeal rules, that a charge-sheet need not be issued by the appointing
authority; any other authority, who is the controlling authority, can
initiate departmental proceedings by issuing a chargesheet.
26. At this stage, we are reminded of the Latin phrase stare decisis et
non queta movere meaning, stand by what has been decided and
do not disturb what has been settled. While it is true that courts are

17 (1996) 2 SCC 145
18 (1997) 2 SCC 708
19 (1997) 6 SCC 75
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1269

The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Rukma Kesh Mishra

not restrained by any principle of law from expressing a different view
on a point of law or to distinguish precedents (a topic we wish to
advert to briefly a little later), stare decisis need not be disregarded to
unsettle settled positions. We would read these precedents (referred
to in paragraphs 21 to 25, supra) as settling the law that unless the
relevant discipline and appeal rules applicable to an officer/employee
of an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution so
require, disciplinary proceedings by issuance of a charge-sheet cannot
be faulted solely on the ground that either the Appointing Authority or
the Disciplinary Authority has not issued the same or approved it. These
precedents have stood the test of time and having full application to
the case at hand, could not have been lightly overlooked. A holistic
consideration of all these precedents by the High Court was certainly the
need of the hour. Thavasippan (supra) had considered the precedents
in Shardul Singh (supra), P. V. Srinivasa Sastry (supra) and A.
Radhakrishna Moorthy (supra) and P. V. Srinivasa Sastry (supra)
was placed before the coordinate Bench in B.V. Gopinath (supra).
We are anchored in a belief that had the High Court looked into these
precedents, the conclusion would have certainly been otherwise.
27. Be that as it may, the governing rules in B.V. Gopinath (supra) and
Promod Kumar (supra) being different, notwithstanding the similarity
in language of Rule 14(3) of the Central Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 196520 and Rule 17(3) of the 2016 Rules,
reliance placed by the Division Bench on the ratio of the said two
decisions seems to be wholly inapt. An erroneous conclusion was
arrived at contrary to the settled position of law and we have no
hesitation to conclude that the impugned order is manifestly flawed
and hence, unsustainable.

On facts, was there any infirmity in initiation of disciplinary
proceedings?

28. The second reason for which we propose to hold the impugned order
to be indefensible turns on the facts.
29. It is found that during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings
against the respondent, the 2016 Rules came into force with effect

20 1965 Rules
1270 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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from 3rd February, 2016. Sub-rule (3)21 of rule 32 on ‘Repeal and
Savings’ saved actions taken under the 1930 Rules. In the light thereof,
although the disciplinary authority of the respondent had initiated
disciplinary proceedings against him under the 1930 Rules, there
was no obligation to take such proceedings to a logical conclusion in
terms of the 2016 Rules. If the 2016 Rules contemplated additional
safeguards over and above what were provided by the 1930 Rules, it
is debatable whether the charged officer could, as of right, claim such
safeguards to be extended though nothing prevents the disciplinary
authority in its discretion to extend the same. Even otherwise, the
Division Bench referred to Rule 17(3)22 laying down the ‘Procedure
for imposing major penalties’ for the purpose of invalidating the
order of the respondent’s dismissal from service but, in the process,
completely overlooked Rule 1623 (which dealt with ‘Authority to
institute proceedings’ and inter alia empowered ‘any other authority’
to institute disciplinary proceedings), Rule 2(k)24 defining Disciplinary
Authority as well as Rule 32(3) (supra) of the 2016 Rules. In the first
place, the complaint of the respondent that the charge-sheet had not
been issued by the competent authority could not have been decided
looking at the 2016 Rules. Secondly, even if such Rules had any
application, still the procedure for imposing major penalties in Rule
17 could not have prevailed over the provision in rule 16 laying down
the particulars of authorities competent to institute proceedings. As
per the scheme of the 2016 Rules and in terms of Rule 16(1) thereof,
notwithstanding that the Disciplinary Authority could be subordinate

21 32(3) Anything done or any action taken in exercise of the powers under the Civil Service (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 and The Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal)
Rules, 1935 shall be deemed to have been done or taken in exercise of the powers conferred by or under
those Rule (sic, Rules), as if those Rules were in force on the day on which such thing or action was done
or taken.
22 17(3). Where it is proposed to hold an inquiry against a Government servant under this rule, the
Disciplinary Authority shall draw up or cause to be drawn up:
i) The substance of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour as a definite and distinct article
of charge.
ii) A statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour in support of each article of
charge, which shall contain:-
***
23 16. The Government or Appointing Authority or any authority to which the Appointing Authority is
subordinate or any other authority empowered by general or special order of the Government may – (a)
institute disciplinary proceedings against any Government servant; (b) direct a Disciplinary Authority to
institute disciplinary proceedings against any Government servant on whom that Disciplinary Authority is
competent to impose any of the penalties specified in rule 14 under these Rules.
24 2(ka) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the rules of a particular cadre, ‘Disciplinary Authority’
means Appointing Authority or any other Authority authorised by it who shall be competent under these
Rules to impose on a Government Servant any of the penalties specified in rule 14 of these Rules.
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1271

The State of Jharkhand & Ors. v. Rukma Kesh Mishra

to an Appointing Authority in a given case, any authority empowered
by general or special order of the Government could have instituted
disciplinary proceedings against the respondent. In any event,
assuming that Rule 17(3) was applicable, the Chief Minister himself
having approved initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the
respondent, question of absence of approval of the charge-sheet
by the Chief Minister separately was a non-issue.
30. Reverting to Rule 55 of the 1930 Rules, it is observed that the same did
not specify any particular authority to be under an obligation to issue
the charge-sheet against a civil servant. In such view of the matter
and having regard to the law settled by this Court, it is axiomatic that
any officer holding a rank subordinate to the respondent’s appointing
authority but superior in rank than the respondent could have issued
the charge-sheet. Admittedly, the facts do reveal initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against the respondent having the approval of the Chief
Minister dated 21st March, 2014. The draft charge-sheet was part of
the proposal dated 13th January, 2014. Once the draft charge-sheet
was on record before the Chief Minister, approval of the proposal to
initiate disciplinary proceedings should have been read as including
the Chief Minister’s assent not only to the draft charge-sheet, as drawn
up, but also to the other proposals to suspend the respondent as well
as appointment of an inquiry officer and presenting officer. In such
circumstances, reference by the Division Bench to Rule 17(3) of the
2016 Rules appears to be wholly misplaced since the charge-sheet
was not issued under such sub-Rule.
31. In a parliamentary democracy like India where the Constitution
permits each of the Governments – Central as well as the States –
to have their own Rules of Business framed, it was incumbent for
the respondent to prove to the satisfaction of the High Court with
reference to the rules prevalent in the State of Jharkhand that the
procedure prescribed thereunder for the file to be placed before
the Chief Minister was observed in the breach. Also, by referring to
any other relevant law, it ought to have been shown that the draft
charge-sheet should not have been prepared prior to the date of
approval of the proposal to initiate disciplinary proceedings and also
that, such preparation should not have been left to be undertaken
by the departmental officers; instead, the charge-sheet should
have been drafted after the proposal were approved and that the
competent authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings should have
himself proceeded to draft and issue the same. No law in this behalf
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has been shown to have been breached. Therefore, no issue could
have legitimately been urged in relation to the departmental officers
entrusted with the work of preparing papers for seeking approval to
initiate disciplinary proceedings against an officer prima facie found
to be delinquent and in drafting the charge-sheet to be issued to him
as part of the requisite groundwork for the Chief Minister to signify
his approval to such proposal.
32. We, thus, find an erroneous approach having been adopted by the
High Court while dealing with the writ petition as well as the intra-
court appeal rendering its decision liable to interdiction in appeal.

What is the requirement of Article 311 of the Constitution and
who should ‘draw up’ or ‘cause to draw up’ the charge-sheet?

33. The final reason for interdicting the impugned order stems from
non-consideration of Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India in its
correct perspective by the Division Bench. If one looks at Article
311(1), the sole safeguard that it provides to any member, inter alia,
of a civil service of a State or the holder of a civil post under the
State is that he shall not be dismissed or removed by an authority
subordinate to that by which he was appointed (emphasis supplied).
Clause (1) does not on its own terms require that the disciplinary
proceedings should also be initiated by the appointing authority. This
is what Shardul Singh (supra) and P.V. Srinivasa Sastry (supra)
have articulated, with which we wholeheartedly agree.
34. The Division Bench noticed that Rule 17(3) of the 2016 Rules were pari
materia Rule 14(3) of the 1965 Rules and, therefore, what was held in
paragraph ‘41’ of the decision in B.V. Gopinath (supra) would clearly
be applicable to resolve the controversy at hand. In B.V. Gopinath
(supra), certain office memoranda were under consideration apart
from Rule 14(3) of the 1965 Rules. Submissions advanced on behalf
of the charged officers, recorded in paragraphs ‘20’ and ‘21’, would
reveal that the Court was addressed with regard to the fact situation
where approval to initiate disciplinary proceedings had been obtained
but subsequent thereto, the charge-sheet that was drawn up had not
been approved by the Finance Minister. This is where the Division
Bench again committed a clear error in failing to appreciate the facts,
which bear vital importance. As noted above, in the present case,
the draft charge-sheet was there on record when the Chief Minister
accorded his approval and there appears to be no valid reason as to
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1273

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why approval of the proposal to initiate disciplinary proceedings against
the respondent would not be regarded as grant of approval to the draft
charge-sheet too. We are unhesitatingly of the view that according
approval to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent,
in this case, did amount to approval of the draft charge-sheet.
35. It has been observed by this Court in several decisions that each
decision is an authority for what it decides and not what could logically
be deduced therefrom. Mechanical reliance on precedents, as if they
are statutes, has been deprecated. Whenever a precedent is cited
laying down a principle of law having application to the facts of the
case in hand and having binding effect, it is customary and expected
of courts to be bound by the law declared by this Court under Article
141 of the Constitution. However, the courts are free not to place blind
reliance on whatever precedent is cited by the parties since facts of
two cases are not seldom alike. It is the duty of the court, if it considers
the precedent not to be applicable, to refer to factual dissimilarities
that are found and thereafter to distinguish the precedent cited before
it by assigning brief but cogent reasons. It is always well to remember
in this context the dictum of this Court in Regional Manager, Food
Corporation of India v. Pawan Kumar Dubey25:
“7. ... It is the rule deducible from the application of law to the
facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio
decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which
may appear to be similar. One additional or different fact can
make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases
even when the same principles are applied in each case to
similar facts”.
36. Since invocation of the provisions in Discipline and Appeal Rules
similar to Rule 14(3) of the 1965 Rules or Rule 17(3) of the 2016
Rules and citing failure to adhere to the same to invalidate orders
terminating services of officers/employees is not too infrequent, we
consider it proper to briefly touch upon the requirement thereof. The
Disciplinary Authority is mandated by the law to ‘draw up’ or ‘cause
to be drawn up’ the substance of the imputations of misconduct
or misbehavior as a definite and distinct article of charge together
with the statement of such imputations. The phrases ‘draw up’ and
‘cause to be drawn up’ do have different meanings in the context

25 (1976) 3 SCC 334
1274 [2025] 3 S.C.R.

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of disciplinary proceedings, though both relate to drawing up of a
charge-sheet. By ‘draw up’, what is express is that the Disciplinary
Authority itself is responsible for preparing the substance of imputation
and the statement of allegations in support thereof, whereas ‘cause
to be drawn up’ would enable the Disciplinary Authority to instruct or
direct someone else to prepare the substance and statement. The
effect of it is that the Disciplinary Authority itself may not prepare
the document but rather delegate the task to someone else. If the
delegation is proved to have been made in favour of an authority
holding an office superior to that of the officer/employee proposed
to be proceeded against, nothing much is required to be done and
the courts ought to exercise restraint.
37. Lest confusion continues to prevail, thereby obfuscating the course of
justice, we also consider it expedient to clarify as regards the efficacy
of the decisions in B.V. Gopinath (supra) and Promod Kumar (supra)
as binding precedents. Both these decisions by coordinate Benches
of two Hon’ble Judges of this Court. All other decisions on the topic
are also by Benches of coordinate strength. Before the Bench in
B.V. Gopinath (supra), out of the 6 (six) decisions referred to by us
in paragraphs 21 to 25 (supra), only the decision in Thavasippan
(supra) was placed by counsel wherein one would find reference
to the earlier decision in P. V. Srinivasa Sastry (supra). Though
Thavasippan (supra) had considered all the earlier decisions, it
was not even distinguished in B.V. Gopinath (supra). Importantly,
the Bench after noting the law laid down in P. V. Srinivasa Sastry
(supra), extracted two sentences from paragraph ‘4’, quoted above,
to support the conclusion which the Bench intended to record. Having
read what P. V. Srinivasa Sastry (supra) in paragraph ‘4’ laid down
and our agreement therewith, we see good reason to opine that there
could be a healthy debate on the correctness of the ratio decidendi
of the decision in B. V. Gopinath (supra), or for that matter, Promod
Kumar (supra), in the light of the precedents which were binding
on the Benches deciding the same. However, for the purpose of
deciding this appeal, we need not venture that far to declare the
decisions in B. V. Gopinath (supra) and Promod Kumar (supra) as
not laying down good law or that its efficacy as binding precedents
stands eroded for not considering the law declared in Shardul Singh
(supra) on Article 311(1) of the Constitution, as well as the other
decisions that we have referred to above, speaking in a different
voice. Nonetheless, we are of the undoubted view that whatever be
[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1275

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the ratio decidendi of B. V. Gopinath (supra) and Promod Kumar
(supra), for its application in future cases, the same have to be read
and understood as confined to interpretation of the rules governing
the disciplinary proceedings in each of the two cases, the facts and
law presented before the coordinate Benches, and the exposition of
law by this Court for over half a century till this date.
38. Turning focus once again to the factual narrative, it is worthy of being
noted that it was the Cabinet which approved the proposal to dismiss
the respondent. Respondent’s service having been terminated based
on such approval, the Single Judge as well as the Division Bench
should have been loath to hold the dismissal illegal on acceptance of
the specious plea raised by the respondent by its misplaced reliance
on B.V. Gopinath (supra) and Promod Kumar (supra).
39. Viewed from whichever angle, we are unable to support the finding
returned by the Single Judge, since affirmed by the Division Bench,
that the charge-sheet did not have the approval of the competent
authority though both the Benches indubitably agreed that the
proposal to initiate disciplinary proceedings did have such approval.
We repeat, the entire proposal of initiating disciplinary proceedings
inclusive of the draft charge-sheet, to suspend the respondent
pending such proceedings and the names of the officers who would
conduct the inquiry and present the case of the department in such
inquiry having been approved by the Chief Minister, the Single
Judge seems to have occasioned a grave miscarriage of justice in
interfering with the order of dismissal on the wholly untenable ground
of lack of approval of the charge-sheet by the Chief Minister; and
the Division Bench, by failing to right the wrong, equally contributed
to the failure of justice.
40. For the foregoing reasons, there can be and is little hesitation for us
to hold that the impugned order of the Division Bench upholding the
judgment and order of the Single Judge of allowing the writ petition
as well as the latter is fundamentally incorrect and patently illegal.
The judgments of the High Court under challenge, thus, cannot be
sustained in law, with the result that the writ petition of the respondent
must be and has to be dismissed.
41. Realizing the difficulty in having the impugned order sustained, as
a last-ditch effort, Dr. Singhvi contended that the respondent has
been out of service for nearly 8 (eight) years, which is sufficient
punishment for him, and that the direction of the High Court ordering
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his reinstatement need not be disturbed upon recording that the
respondent would not claim any arrears of salary.
42. We are not impressed, to say the least. Prima facie, at this stage, we
see no reason to hold the order of dismissal to have been vitiated on
any count. Directing the respondent’s reinstatement despite finding
no error in the proceedings drawn up against him would render such
valid dismissal order ineffective and inoperative.

Relief
43. The impugned order of the Division Bench as well as the judgment and
order of the Single Judge are set aside, resulting in the respondent’s
writ petition on the file of the High Court being dismissed.
44. However, considering the fact that the charge-sheet was interdicted
by the High Court, at both tiers, on the ground of jurisdictional error
and the respondent might not have pursued the appellate/revisional
remedy provided under the 1930 Rules/2016 Rules labouring under
a misconception that he was forced to face proceedings and answer
a charge-sheet which did not have the approval of the competent
authority, we grant him liberty to appeal against the impugned order
of dismissal or to seek a revision thereof by filing an appeal/memorial,
whichever is permissible under the relevant Rules, within a period of
one month from the date of pronouncement of this judgment. If an
appeal/revision is presented by the respondent before the competent
appellate/revisional authority within such period, the same shall be
decided on merits and in accordance with law, as early as possible,
waiving the bar of limitation. All points except the point of validity of
the charge-sheet, decided by us, are kept open.

Conclusion
45. The appeal, accordingly, stands allowed. Parties shall, however,
bear their own costs.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain