Holding

The Supreme Court held that a FIR disclosing a cognizable offence and a prima facie case cannot be quashed under Section 482 CrPC merely on the basis of inadmissible statements, and the respondent’s failure to report under the POCSO Act constitutes a punishable offence.

Summary

The State of Maharashtra filed a criminal appeal against the quashing of FIR No.185/2019 and the charge‑sheet against Dr. Maroti, a medical practitioner, who was alleged to have failed to report sexual assaults on minor tribal girls in a hostel as required under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act. The High Court had dismissed the FIR and charge‑sheet against the doctor, relying on statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of the CrPC to conclude that there was no evidence of his knowledge. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by examining inadmissible statements and by assessing the sufficiency of evidence, which is the domain of the trial court. It emphasized that prompt reporting under the POCSO Act is a statutory duty and that non‑reporting is a serious offence, warranting prosecution. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s order, reinstated the FIR and charge‑sheet, and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court could quash the FIR and charge‑sheet on the basis of statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of the CrPC.
Whether the failure of a medical practitioner to report a sexual offence under Section 19 of the POCSO Act constitutes a cognizable offence warranting prosecution.
Whether the exercise of power under Section 482 of the CrPC is permissible when the FIR discloses a prima facie case of an offence.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161, s. 164, s. 173(2), s. 482, s. 53A
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 145, s. 157, s. 59
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 376AB
Maharashtra Prevention and Eradication of Human Sacrifice and other Inhuman, Evil and Aghori Practices and Black Magic Act, 2013s. 3
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012s. 164A, s. 19(1), s. 21(1), s. 21(2), s. 27(1)
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989s. 3(1)(w), s. 3(2)(v)

Subjects

Section 482 CrPCPOCSO Actmandatory reportingnon‑reporting of sexual assaultquashing FIRevidence admissibilitySection 161 CrPCSection 164 CrPCchild sexual abusetribal girlsmiscarriage of justice

Judgment

[2022] 8 S.C.R. 821 821

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. A
v.
DR. MAROTI S/O KASHINATH PIMPALKAR
(Criminal Appeal No.1874 of 2022)
NOVEMBER 02, 2022 B
[AJAY RASTOGI AND C.T. RAVIKUMAR, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.482 – Quashing of F.I.R.
and charge sheet – Non Reporting of Sexual Assault – FIR registered
against unidentified person(s) on the accusation of commission of
C
sexual offences against minor tribal girls who were residing in the
girls’ hostel – Respondent is the medical practitioner who was
appointed for treatment of the girls in the said girl’s hostel – He
was arraigned as the sixth accused thereunder, essentially for the
failure to report the commission of the offence under the POCSO
Act, punishable u/s.21 (1) the POCSO Act – Respondent filed D
Criminal Application u/s. 482 seeking quashment of the FIR and
the chargesheet to the extent they are against him – High Court
quashed the FIR as also the charge sheet qua the respondent –
Hence, the instant appeal – Held: Prompt and proper reporting of
the commission of offence under the POCSO Act is of utmost
E
importance – Failure to report on coming to know about the
commission of any offence thereunder would defeat the very purpose
and object of the Act – If FIR and the materials collected disclose a
cognizable offence and the final report based on it reveal the
ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a
prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, F
then the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence
are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under
s.482 – High Court should not have embarked upon an enquiry,
especially by looking into the statements of the victims and their
teacher to form an opinion regarding the availability of evidence to
G
connect respondent with the crime – In troth, those statements did
mention about divulgation of sexual assault on them by victims to
the respondent – High Court was not justified in bringing abrupt
termination of the proceedings qua the respondent – There was prima
facie case against the respondent for the offence – Protection of
Children from Sexual Offence Act, 2012 – ss.19, 21 – Evidence Act H
821
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.

A – s.59 – Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 – ss. 3(1)(w) , 3(2)(v) – Crime against children.
Protection of Children from Sexual Offence Act, 2012: Object
and Purpose – Held: Recognising the constitutional obligation and
keeping in view the fundamental concept under Art.15 of the
B Constitution and also realizing that sexual offences against children
are not adequately addressed by the existing laws, POCSO Act was
enacted – The provisions thereunder would reveal that it also aims
to ensure that such offenders are not spared and should be properly
booked – Non-reporting of sexual assault against a minor child
despite knowledge is a serious crime and more often than not, it is
C an attempt to shield the offenders of the crime of sexual assault.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: ss.161, 164 – Admissibility
of – Statements recorded under s.161 are inadmissible in evidence
and its use is limited for the purposes as provided under ss.145 and
157 of the Evidence Act, 1872 – As a matter of fact, statement
D recorded under s.164 can also be used only for such purposes –
Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.145, 157.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is
E an exception and not the rule and it is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration
of which alone Courts exist. [Para 7][827-D-E]
2. Prompt and proper reporting of the commission of offence
under the POCSO Act is of utmost importance and its failure on
F coming to know about the commission of any offence thereunder
would defeat the very purpose and object of the Act. Prompt
reporting of the commission of an offence under POCSO Act
would enable immediate examination of the victim concerned and
at the same time, if it was committed by an unknown person, it
would also enable the investigating agency to commence
G investigation without wasting time and ultimately to secure the
arrest and medical examination of the culprit. There can be no
two views that in relation to sexual offences medical evidence
has much corroborative value. [Para 15][830-F-G; 831-B-C]

H
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. v. DR. MAROTI S/O 823
KASHINATH PIMPALKAR

3. If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable A
offence and the final report filed under Section 173(2), Cr.P.C. on
completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the
ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a
prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused,
the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are
B
not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. and undoubtedly they are matters to be done
by the Trial Court at the time of trial. [Para 18][831-H; 832-A]
4. The High Court arrived at the finding of absence of
evidence to implicate the respondent in the crime in question
upon going through the statements of the victims and also the C
statement of the teacher of the victims, which recourse is
absolutely impermissible. In troth, those statements did mention
about divulgation of sexual assault on them by victims to the
respondent. In the light of the circumstances available and in the
light of Section 59 of the Evidence Act, the High Court was not D
justified in bringing abrupt termination of the proceedings qua
the respondent. There is prima facie case against the respondent
for the offence referred above and hence, the appeal is liable to
succeed.The impugned judgment resulting in quashment of the
stated FIR and the charge-sheet throttling the prosecution at
the threshold, without allowing the materials in support of it to E
see the light of the day, cannot be said to be as an exercise done
to secure interests of justice whereas it can only be stated that
such exercise resulted in miscarriage of justice. [Paras 23-
25][835-E-F; G-H; 836-A-C]
R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 866; F
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. v. Union of India &
Ors. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929; M.L. Bhatt v. M.K.
Pandita 2002 (3) SC 899- followed.
A.S. Krishnan & Ors. v. State of Kerala (2004) 11 SCC
576 : [2004] 3 SCR 44 – held inapplicable. G
State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. 1992
Supp (1) SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259; State
of M.P v. Awadh Kishore Gupta & Ors. (2004) 1 SCC
691 : [ 2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 672; Shankar Kisanrao
Khade v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 5 SCC 546 : H
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.

A [ 2013] 6 SCR 949; Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab & Ors.
(2020) 3 SCC 317 – relied on.
Shalu Ojha v. Prashant Ojha (2015) 2 SCC 99; Dr.
Monica Kumar & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
(2008) 8 SCC 781 : [ 2008] 9 SCR 943; Shiji alias
B Pappu and Ors. v. Radhika and Another AIR 2012 SC
499- referred to.
Case Law Reference
(2015) 2 SCC 99 referred to Para 2

C A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 866 followed Para 8
[1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259 relied on Para 8
[2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 672 relied on Para 9
[2008] 9 SCR 943 referred to Para 9
D AIR 2012 SC 499 referred to Para 9
[2013] 6 SCR 949 relied on Para 12
(2002) 3 SC 899 followed Para 19
(2020) 3 SCC 317 relied on Para 19
E [2004] 3 SCR 44 held inapplicable Para 23
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No.1874 of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20-04-2021/27-04-2021 of
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay at Nagpur in CRLA (APL) No.
F
841/2019.
Sanjay Kharde, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha
Pande, Advs. for the Appellants.
Anil Mardikar, Sr. Adv., Sumeet Joshi, Sachin Shanmukham Pujari,
G Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.
1. Leave granted.
H
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. v. DR. MAROTI S/O 825
KASHINATH PIMPALKAR [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

2. This Court in Shalu Ojha v. Prashant Ojha1observed: “this is A
an unfortunate case where the provisions of the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 are rendered simply a pious hope of
the Parliament and a teasing illusion for the appellant”. Even while,
borrowing those words, we may say, we are not peeved, but certainly
pained, as a legitimate prosecution under another Act viz., the Protection
B
of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short “POCSO Act”),
has been throttled at the threshold by the exercise of power under Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’), without
permitting the materials in support to it to see the light of the day in
respect of misprision of sexual assault against minor tribal girls in a girls’
hostel. As per the impugned judgment, the High Court of Judicature at C
Bombay, Nagpur Bench in Criminal Application (APL) No.841 of 2019
dated 20.04.2021 quashed FIR No.185 of 2019 dated 12.04.2019 of Rajura
Police Station and the final report filed thereon under Section 173(2),
Cr.P.C. qua the Respondent. The raison d’etre for the said opening
remarks would be unraveled by the factual narration and the legal analysis
D
to be made hereinafter.
3. The stated chargesheet was laid on investigation in FIR No.185/
2019 registered at Rajura Police Station, Distt. Chandrapur, for the
offences under Section 376AB of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section
4 and 6 of POCSO Act, Section 3(1)(w) and 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and E
Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention and Eradication of Human
Sacrifice and other Inhuman, Evil and Aghori Practices and Black Magic
Act, 2013. We may hasten to add that it was filed under those Sections
against the first five accused and in fact, the Respondent herein was
arraigned as the 6th accused thereunder, essentially for the failure to F
report the commission of the offence under the POCSO Act (then, of
course by unknown persons), in compliance with the legal obligation
under Section 19 (1) of POCSO Act, punishable under Section 21 (1)
thereof.
4. The stated FIR came to be registered against unidentified G
person(s) on the accusation of commission of sexual offences against
minor tribal girls who were students of Infant Jesus English Public High
School, Rajura residing in its girls’ hostel. The complaint was lodged by
one Rajesh Tulsidas Dhotkar, Assistant Project Officer, Integrated Tribal
1
(2015) 2 SCC 99
H
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.

A Development Project, Chandrapur. According to the appellant, on
06.04.2019 the said officer received a telephonic information from
Chhaban Pandurang Pachare, the Superintendent of the said hostel which
is under the control of the Integrated Tribal Development Project,
Chandrapur that one girl studying in the 3rd standard and another studying
in the 5th standard, of the said school were not keeping well. Immediately,
B
he visited the hospital where they were admitted. Later, he received
letter No. 3392/2019 dated 10.02.2019 revealing that the students were
shifted from Rural Hospital Rajura to General Hospital, Chandrapur
owing to their deteriorating health condition. From the General Hospital,
Chandrapur a medical certificate was issued to the effect that there is
C suspicion of sexual abuse. Thereupon, the Project Officer, Integrated
Tribal Development Project, Chandrapur authorised him to lodge the
complaint and accordingly, it was laid. We may state at this juncture that
going by Criminal Application (APL) No.841/2019, filed along with the
present Appeal as Annexure-P3, the parents of the victims were not
happy with the investigation in the crime and they filed a Criminal Writ
D
Petition No.342/2019 and subsequently, Final Report / Charge-Sheet
No.43/2019 dated 08.06.2019 was filed.
5. Now, reverting to the case of the appellant, it is to the effect
that during the investigation, Superintendent of the aforementioned hostel
and four others, namely, Narendra Laxmanrao Virulkar, Sau Neeta alias
E Kalpana Mahadeo Thakare, Sau Lata Madhukar Kannake,
Venkateswami Bondaiyaa Jangam were arrested and arraigned as
accused in the crime. During the investigation, it was found that 17 minor
girls were abused by the accused and on their medical examination rupture
of hymen was found. The respondent herein is the Medical Practitioner
F appointed for treatment of girls admitted to the said Girls’ hostel and the
victim girls were taken to him. The investigation revealed that the
respondent had knowledge about the incidents occurred, from the victims
themselves as the victim girls revealed in their statements recorded under
Section 161 of Cr.P.C. about their divulgation of sexual assault on them
to the respondent. In fact, some of the victims had specifically revealed
G it in their statements recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. The respondent
who was under a legal obligation, in terms of the provisions under Section
19(1) of the POCSO Act upon getting the knowledge about committing
of an offence under the POCSO Act, to provide such information either
to the Special Juvenile Police Unit or the local police remained silent and
H did not provide such information to help the accused, is the gist of the
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. v. DR. MAROTI S/O 827
KASHINATH PIMPALKAR [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

allegation against him. As already stated, after investigation a charge A
sheet was also filed. The Respondent has been arraigned as accused
No. 6 in the aforesaid crime.
6. Apprehending arrest in connection with the said crime, the
respondent herein filed an anticipatory bail application before the Ld.
Sessions Judge on 10.06.2019 and the same was rejected on 25.06.2019. B
The said order was challenged before the High Court and the High
Court allowed the appeal and granted him protection from arrest.
Thereafter, the respondent herein filed Criminal Application (APL)
No.841/2019 under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. seeking quashment of the
FIR dated 12.04.2019 and the chargesheet dated 08.06.2019 to the extent
they are against him. The High Court passed the impugned judgment C
and quashed the FIR as also the chargesheet qua the respondent. Hence,
this appeal.
7. Before considering the merits of the challenge against the
impugned judgment whereby and whereunder the stated FIR and the
chargesheet were quashed, we think it appropriate to refer to certain D
aspects and also the position with respect to scope of exercise of power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
is an exception and not the rule and it is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which
alone Courts exist. This position has been stated and reiterated by this E
Court time and again.
8. This Court in the decision in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab2,held
that the High Court could not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the
evidence is reliable or not while exercising the power under Section 482
Cr.P.C. In State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. 3,at paragraph F
102 this Court held that quashing may be appropriate where the allegations
made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if taken at
their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused and where the
allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying G
an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code
except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
2
A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 866
3
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 H
828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.

A 9. In the decision in State of M.P v. Awadh Kishore Gupta &
Ors.4, this Court held that the High Court could not embark upon an
enquiry as to whether the evidence is reliable or not as that would be the
function of the Trial Court. In Dr. Monica Kumar & Anr. v. State of
Uttar Pradesh & Ors.5, this Court held that the inherent power under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate
B
prosecution. In Shiji alias Pappu and Ors. v. Radhika and Another6,
a two Judge Bench of this Court held thus:
“…plenitude of the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by itself,
makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same
with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the
C power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in
cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of
the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be
nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither
necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in
D which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be
justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power
must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases
where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse
of the process of law.”
E 10. Having made such a short survey on authorities on the exercise
of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as above, we will now refer to the
object and purposes of the POCSO Act. Article 15 of the Constitution,
inter alia confers powers upon the State to make special provisions for
children and Article 39 (f) provides not only that the State shall direct its
policy towards securing that the children are given opportunities to develop
F in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity but also to
ensure that their childhood and youth are protected against exploitation
and against moral and material abandonment. Recognising the
constitutional obligation and keeping in view the fundamental concept
under Article 15 of the Constitution and also realizing that sexual offences
G against children are not adequately addressed by the existing laws,
POCSO Act was enacted. The provisions thereunder would reveal that
it also aims to ensure that such offenders are not spared and should be
properly booked.
4
(2004) 1 SCC 691
5
(2008) 8 SCC 781
6
H AIR 2012 SC 499
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. v. DR. MAROTI S/O 829
KASHINATH PIMPALKAR [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

11. To achieve the avowed purpose, a legal obligation for reporting A
of offence under the POCSO Act is cast upon on a person to inform the
relevant authorities specified thereunder when he/she has knowledge
that an offence under the Act had been committed. Such obligation is
also bestowed on person who has apprehension that an offence under
this Act is likely to be committed. Besides casting such a legal obligation
B
under Section 19, the Legislature thought it expedient to make failure to
discharge the obligation thereunder as punishable, under Section 21
thereof. True that under Section 21 (1), failure to report the commission
of an offence under Sub-Section 1 of Section 19 or Section 20 or failure
to report such offence under Sub-Section 2 of Section 19 has been made
punishable with imprisonment of either description which may extend to C
six months or with fine or with both. Sub-Section 2 of Section 21 provides
that any person who being in-charge of any company or an institution
(by whatever name called) who fails to report the commission of an
offence under Sub-Section 1 of Section 19 in respect of a subordinate
under his control, shall be punishable with imprisonment with a term
D
which may extend to one year or with fine. Certainly, such provisions
are included in with a view to ensure strict compliance of the provisions
under the POCSO Act and thereby to ensure that the tender age of
children is not being abused and their childhood and youth is protected
against exploitation.
E
12. Looking at the penal provisions referred above, making failure
to discharge the obligation under Section 19 (1) punishable only with
imprisonment for a short duration viz., six months, one may think that it
is not an offence to be taken seriously. However, according to us that by
itself is not the test of seriousness or otherwise of an offence of failure
to discharge the legal obligation under Section 19, punishable under F
Section 21 of POCSO Act. We are fortified in our view, by the decisions
of a three Judge Bench of this Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary &
Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.7 and a two Judge-Bench in Shankar
Kisanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra8.
13. In the decision in Shankar Kisanrao Khade’s case (supra), G
a two Judge Bench of this Court in paragraph 77.5 and 77.6 issued
certain directions for due compliance and they read thus: -

7
2022 SCC OnLine SC 929
8
(2013) 5 SCC 546
H
830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.

A “77.5. If hospitals, whether government or privately-owned
or medical institutions where children are being treated come
to know that children admitted are subjected to sexual abuse,
the same will immediately be reported to the nearest Juvenile
Justice Board/SJPU and the Juvenile Justice Board, in
consultation with SJPU, should take appropriate steps in
B
accordance with the law safeguarding the interest of the child.
77.6. The non-reporting of the crime by anybody, after having
come to know that a minor child below the age of 18 years
was subjected to any sexual assault, is a serious crime and
by not reporting they are screening the offenders from legal
C punishment and hence be held liable under the ordinary
criminal law and prompt action be taken against them, in
accordance with law.”
14. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary’s case(supra), this Court
observed that the length of punishment is not only the indicator of the
D gravity of offence and it is to be judged by a totality of factors, especially
keeping in mind the background in which the offence came to be
recognized by the Legislature in the specific international context. In
this context, it is also relevant to note that the United Nations Convention
on Rights of Children, which was ratified by India on 11.12.1992, requires
E the State parties to undertake all appropriate national, bilateral and
multilateral measures to prevent the inducement or coercion of child to
engage in any unlawful sexual activity, the exploitative use of children in
prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices etc. Articles 3 (2) and 34
of the Convention have placed a specific duty on the State to protect the
child from all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse.
F
15. Prompt and proper reporting of the commission of offence
under the POCSO Act is of utmost importance and we have no hesitation
to state that its failure on coming to know about the commission of any
offence thereunder would defeat the very purpose and object of the
Act. We say so taking into account the various provisions thereunder.
G Medical examination of the victim as also the accused would give many
important clues in a case that falls under the POCSO Act. Section 27
(1) of the POCSO Act provides that medical examination of a child in
respect of whom any offence has been committed under the said Act,
shall, notwithstanding that a First Information Report or complaint has
H not been registered for the offence under the Act, be conducted in
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. v. DR. MAROTI S/O 831
KASHINATH PIMPALKAR [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

accordance with Section 164 A of the Cr.P.C., which provides the A
procedures for medical examination of the victim of rape. In this
contextual situation, it is also relevant to refer to Section 53 A of Cr.P.C.
that mandates for examination of a person accused of rape by a medical
practitioner. It is also a fact that clothes of the parties would also offer
very reliable evidence in cases of rape. We refer to the aforesaid
B
provisions only to stress upon the fact that a prompt reporting of the
commission of an offence under POCSO Act would enable immediate
examination of the victim concerned and at the same time, if it was
committed by an unknown person, it would also enable the investigating
agency to commence investigation without wasting time and ultimately
to secure the arrest and medical examination of the culprit. There can C
be no two views that in relation to sexual offences medical evidence has
much corroborative value.
16. Bearing in mind the position with respect to the exercise of
power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the provisions, penal and procedural,
under POCSO Act, we will proceed to consider the case on hand. D
17. The FIR registered in the case on hand would reveal that it
came to be registered on coming to know about the suspected commission
of sexual offence against minor tribal girl(s) against unidentified person(s).
Failure to report regarding the commission of the offence under the
POCSO Act despite knowledge about the same is the accusation against E
the respondent revealed from the charge-sheet. The FIR reveals the
ingredients of an offence under the POCSO Act and the real magnitude
of the same was revealed during the investigation, as stated above. On
completion of the investigation, based on the materials collected, the
Officer-in-Charge of the police station concerned formed an opinion
that a cognizable offence as mentioned therein, appears to had been F
committed and that the persons named therein, including the respondent
herein, appears to have committed the offences specified against them
and filed final report under Section 173(2) for prosecuting them. It is the
stated FIR dated 12.04.2019 and the stated chargesheet dated 08.06.2019
which were sought to be quashed and consequently quashed as per the G
impugned judgment.
18. If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence
and the final report filed under Section 173(2), Cr.P.C. on completion of
investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute
an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the H
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.

A persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or
admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview
of exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and undoubtedly they
are matters to be done by the Trial Court at the time of trial. This position
is evident from the decisions referred supra.
B 19. In the decision in M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita9, this court
held that while considering the question of quashing of FIR the High
Court would not be entitled to appreciate by way of sifting the materials
collected in course of investigation including the statements recorded
under Section 161, Cr.P.C. In the decision in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab
& Ors.10, a two Judge Bench of this Court dealt with question as to the
C matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment
proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It was held therein that statements
of witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. being wholly
inadmissible in evidence could not be taken into consideration by the
Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In
D that case, this Court took note of the fact that the High Court was aware
that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased-victim had informed
him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not able to
bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of
the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings in that case was on the
basis of its assessment of the statements recorded under Section 161
E Cr.P.C., it was held that statements thereunder, being wholly inadmissible
in evidence could not have been taken into consideration by the Court
while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It was also
held that the High Court committed an error in quashing the proceedings
by assessing the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
F 20. There can be no dispute with respect to the position that
statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. are inadmissible in
evidence and its use is limited for the purposes as provided under Sections
145 and 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. As a matter of fact,
statement recorded under Section 164, Cr.P.C. can also be used only for
G such purposes.
21. In the instant case, a scanning of the recitals in paragraph
No.10 of the impugned judgment would undoubtedly reveal the fact that
the High Court had formed an opinion on perusal of the statement of a
9
JT 2002 (3) SC 89
10
H (2020) 3 SCC 317
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. v. DR. MAROTI S/O 833
KASHINATH PIMPALKAR [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

teacher of the victims and also the statements of the victims that sexual A
assault was detected only from the General Hospital, Chandrapur and
then arrived at the conclusion that the Respondent was not made aware
of sexual assault committed on the victims and there is no evidence to
implicate him in the said crime. Paragraph No.10 of the impugned
judgment reads thus: -
B
“In the above backdrop, we have gone through the statements
of victims which have been referred by the prosecution. The
statements show that the applicant had examined the victims.
Their condition was deteriorating. Therefore, they were sent
to General Hospital, Chandrapur. There is no material on
record to show that the applicant was made aware about the C
sexual assault committed on the victims. On the contrary, from
the statement of the teacher of victims it appears that the sexual
assault was detected only in General Hospital, Chandrapur.
Therefore, we are of the view that there is no evidence to
implicate the applicant in the said crime. Therefore, the D
continuation of proceedings against the applicant would
amount to abuse of process of Court.”
(Emphasis added)
22. Thus, a bare perusal of the above extracted recitals from
paragraph No.10 of the impugned judgment would reveal that the High E
Court had gone through the statements of victims/witnesses cited by the
prosecution, to arrive at the conclusion as to the existence or otherwise
of evidence against the respondent. In view of the provisions referred
above and also plethora of decisions including the decisions in M.L.
Bhatt’s case (Supra) and in Rajeev Kourav’s case (supra), statements F
recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. are inadmissible in evidence and,
therefore, could not have been made the basis for arriving at such
conclusions. As noted above, the FIR carries suspicion of commission
of sexual assault and the charge-sheet reveals prima facie against the
respondent in relation to non-reporting of such an offence under the
POCSO Act. The very case of the Appellant is that some among the G
seventeen victims have given statements under Section 161, Cr.P.C.
and some others under Section164 Cr.P.C., specifically stating that the
respondent was informed of the sexual assault on them. When that be
the position, we have no doubt that the High Court should not have
embarked upon an enquiry, especially by looking into the statements of H
834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.

A the victims recorded as also their teacher to form an opinion regarding
the availability of evidence to connect the Respondent with the crime.
True that the FIR and the charge sheet still remain in fact in respect of
the other accused. But then, non-reporting of sexual assault against a
minor child despite knowledge is a serious crime and more often than
not, it is an attempt to shield the offenders of the crime of sexual assault.
B
Be that as it may in view of the decision in Shankar Kisan Rao Khade’s
case (supra) holding non-reporting of such a crime as serious and in
view of the position obtained from a conjoint reading of Sections 19(1)
and 21 of POCSO Act, such persons are also liable to be proceeded
with, in accordance with law. In this context, it is also relevant to refer to
C an observation made by this Court in the said case that this Court under
parens patriae jurisdiction has a duty to give directions for compliance
of the provisions under the POCSO Act.
23. The learned counsel for the respondent attempted to support
and get sustained the impugned judgment contending that it was rendered
D relying on the decision of this Court in A.S. Krishnan & Ors. v. State of
Kerala11and that going by the said decision, the respondent could not
have been accused of having failed to report the commission of the
offence of sexual assault under the POCSO Act despite possessing
knowledge about its commission. Upon going through the judgment, we
have no hesitation to hold that the said decision is totally inapplicable in
E the facts and circumstances of this case, for more than one reason.
Firstly, a bare perusal of the said judgment would reveal that the question
of knowledge was considered by this Court not at the stage of looking
into the correctness or otherwise of a finding on knowledge and the
consequential quashment of proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. As
F a matter of fact, it was so considered in an appeal against conviction of
the appellants therein under Sections 471, 420 read with Section 34,
IPC. This Court was considering the expression ‘knows or has reason
to believe’ occurring under Section 471, IPC and while explaining the
meanings of the words “knowledge” and “reason to believe” this Court
held: -
G
‘9. Under IPC, guilt in respect of almost all the offences is
fastened either on the ground of “intention” or “knowledge”
or “reason to believe”. We are now concerned with the
expressions “knowledge” and “reason to believe”.
11
H (2004) 11 SCC 576
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. v. DR. MAROTI S/O 835
KASHINATH PIMPALKAR [C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.]

“Knowledge” is an awareness on the part of the person A
concerned indicating his state of mind. “Reason to believe”
is another facet of the state of mind. “Reason to believe” is
not the same thing as “suspicion” or “doubt” and mere seeing
also cannot be equated to believing. “Reason to believe” is a
higher level of state of mind. Likewise “knowledge” will be
B
slightly on a higher plane than “reason to believe”. A person
can be supposed to know where there is a direct appeal to his
senses and a person is presumed to have a reason to believe
if he has sufficient cause to believe the same. Section 26 IPC
explains the meaning of the words “reason to believe” thus:
“26. ‘Reason to believe’. – A person is said to have ‘reason C
to believe’ a thing, if he has sufficient cause to believe that
thing but not otherwise.”
(Emphasis added)
In the contextual situation, it is also worthy to refer the following D
recital from para 8 of the said decision:
“Whether the accused knew or had reason to believe the
document in question to be forged has to be adjudicated on
the basis of materials and the finding recorded in that regard
is essentially factual”. E
In the case on hand, the High Court arrived at the finding of absence
of evidence to implicate the respondent in the crime in question upon
going through the statements of the victims and also the statement of the
teacher of the victims, which recourse is absolutely impermissible.
24. There is yet another reason to decline the aforesaid contention F
of the respondent. We would not have even perused Annexures- A1 to
A8, which are statements of some of the victims recorded under Section
161/164, Cr.P.C., recorded much prior to the impugned judgment dated
20.4.2021 viz., in the year 2019 itself. We do so solely to verify the verity
of the finding of the High Court to the effect that such statements do not
G
disclose anything suggesting knowledge of the respondent about the
commission of the crime. In troth, those statements did mention about
divulgation of sexual assault on them by victims to the respondent. We
may hasten to add, at the risk of repetition, that such statements recorded
under Section 161/164, Cr.P.C. are inadmissible in evidence, as held in
M.L. Bhatt’s case (supra) and in Rajeev Kourav’s case (supra). In H
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 8 S.C.R.

A the light of the circumstances available as above and in the light of Section
59 of the Evidence Act, the High Court was not justified in bringing
abrupt termination of the proceedings qua the respondent. The position
revealed from the discussion above constrains us to hold that there is
prima facie case against the respondent for the offence referred above
and hence, the appeal is liable to succeed.
B
25. In the light of the decisions and the provisions referred above,
the impugned judgment resulting in quashment of the stated FIR and the
charge-sheet throttling the prosecution at the threshold, without allowing
the materials in support of it to see the light of the day, cannot be said to
be as an exercise done to secure interests of justice whereas it can only
C be stated that such exercise resulted in miscarriage of justice.
26. In the result, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set
aside and the Appeal is, accordingly allowed. Pending applications, if
any, are disposed of.

D
Devika Gujral Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Shubhanshu Das, LCRA)

E

F

G

H