THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR.versusKAILASH CHANDRA KAPUR AND ORS.

A                THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ANR.
                                            v.
                   KAILASH CHANDRA KAPUR AND ORS.

                               NOVEMBER 29, 1996

B                [K. RAMASWAMY AND G.T. NANAVATI, JJ.]

         Lease-{}ovemment land-Bequest of lease-hold right by lessee in
  favour of a stranger-Pennissibility of-Lease for 999 years granted by
  Govemment-Lessee executed a will bequeathing demised land in favour of
C a stranger-Death of lessee-Thereafter legatee obtained probate of will and
  applied for mutation of his name in record as lessee-Rejection of muta-
  tion-Wlit-Direction by High Court to mutate the name of legatee as
  lessee-Order confim1ed by Division Bench-Appeal-Held, it is settled law
  that though lease hold interest may be bequeathed by a testamentary disposi-
  tion, the landlord is not bound by it nor a stranger be tTUsted as tenant against
D the u11willing landlord-But in the covenants of the lease deed there was no
  e).press prohibition against bequest in favour of a stranger-The High Court,
  therefore, has not committed any manifest error of law warranting inter-
  ference-The object of assignment of the Govemment land in favour of the
  lessee is to provide him right to residence-If any such transfer is made
E co11trary to the policy, obviously, it would be defeati11g the public purpose-But
  it. would be open to the Govemment to regulate by appropriate covenants in
  the lease deed or appropriate statutory orders as per law or to make a law in
  this behalf.-

         Dr. Anant Trimbak Sabnis v. Vasant Pratap Pa11dit, AIR (1980) Born.
F   69 and Bhavarlal Labhcha11d Shah v. Kanaiyalal Nathalal llltawala, [1986]
    1 sec 571, held inapplicable.

         · Gia11 Devi Ana11d v. Jeevan Kumar, [1985] 2 SCC 683, referred to.

          Constitutio11 of India, 1950: Articles 19(J)(e) and 39(b).
G
           Object of grant of Govemment la11d is to effectuate right to residence--
    Material resources of community-Distribution by State-Object is to effec-
    tuate the mandate of the Co11stitutio11.

H         Words and Phrases- .Assign ~ "Person 11 and 11 Transfer 1LMeaning of.
                                11      1



                                       398
                           STAlEv. K.C. KAPUR                            399

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 15703 of A
1996.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 19.1.96 of the Calcutta High
Court in A. No. 183 of 1995.

   . V.R. Reddy, Additional Solicitor General, H.K. Puri and Rajesh             B
Srivastava for the Appellants.

     D.P. Gupta, Sr. Adv., Jaideep Gupta, A.P. Agarwala and Ms. Radha
Rangaswamy for the Respondents.

        The following Order of the Court was delivered :                        c
        Leave granted.

        We have heard learned counsel on both sides.

     This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Division D
Bench of the Calcutta High Court, made on January 19, 1996 in Appeal
No. 182/95.

       The admitted facts are that a lease for 999 years was granted by the
Governor of West Bengal to one Tapan Kumar Mullick on July 28, 1983             E
assigning a plot of land No.CL-104 in Section II admeasuring 4.195 con-
ttahs in Bindhannagar (Salt Lake) in Calcutta. The lessee had executed a
Will in favour of the first respondent, a stranger to the family on July 22,
1992 of the lease-hold premises. The lessee died on May 22, 1993. There-
after, the first respondent had applied for and was granted without any
contest by the legal representatives of the lessee the probate to the Will by   F
order of the Court dated May 19, 1994. It would, therefore, be obvious that
the bequest was after receipt of consideration. Therefore, the legatee had
applied for mutation of his name in the record as lessee which was objected
to and met with rejection. As a consequence, the respondent had filed writ
petition ;.,der Article 226 of the Constitution. The learned single Judge       G
directed to mutate the name of the first respondent as a lessee under the
testamentary disposition made by the original lessee which was confirmed
by the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Appeal No. 183/95 by
judgment dated January 19, 1996 Thus, this appeal by special leave.

        Shri V.R. Reddy, learned Additional Solicitor General, has con- H
    400                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A tended that clauses 7, 8 and 12 of the indenture of the lease should be read
    together which manifest the intention that the lease was for the enjoyment
    of leasehold right of the demised site or a building constructed thereon
    either oy the lessee or his legal representatives and one among them alone
    should be made responsible to and answerable to the lessor-appellant, the
    Government of West Bengal. It prohibited sub-letting or transfer without
B   prior permission of the Governor; thereby, there is an implied prohibition
    to bequeath the leasehold right in the property in favour of the strangers.
    In that background, the word 'transfer' employed in clause 8 of the lease
    deed would be understood in a broader sense. If so understood, any
    bequest made to a stranger, without the permission of the Government,
C   does not bind the Governor. Therefore, the Government is not obliged to
    recognise a stranger as a lessee after the demise of the original lessee. In
    support thereof, he placed strong reliance on the judgment of a Division
    Bench of the Bombay High Court in Dr. Anant Trimbak Sabnis v. Vasant
    Pratap Pandit, AIR (1980) Born. 69. He also further placed reliance on a
D   report given by the Committee constituted in that behalf on May 3, 1984
    of the misuse of the leasehold right granted by seeking transfer in favour
    of the distant relations. On receipt thereof, the Governor by a notification
    specified that the near relations shall mean and include the father, mother,
    brother, sister, son, daughter, husband and wife. It prohibited registration
    under Registration Act by any other relative. It would amplify the intention
E   of the Government in that behalf in granting leasehold interest of their land
    for the benefit of use and enjoyment of the demised premises for the
    residential purpose by the members of the family or near relations. The
    strangers were not intePded to be inducted in and given enjoyment of the
    leasehold interest of the property demised by the Government. Unless the
    Government gives permission for such a transfer, it cannot be considered
F
    to be valid in law. The High Court thereby committed grave error of law
    in directing that a stranger be treated as a lessee of the Governor.

        Shri D .P. Gupta, learned senior counsel for the respondents, on the
  other hand, contends that we are concerned in this case with the covenants
G engrafted in the lease-deed. The relevant covenants are 7, 8 and 12. Each
  one deals, in its own parameters, with restricted covenants thereunder with
  different situations. Clause (U) is relevant in this behalf. It does not
  contemplate any restriction to will away the leasehold interest to a stranger.
  The word 'person' used in clause (12) would include the stranger also. The
H second clause in para 2 of clause (12) would include heirs also. Thus, these
                           STAIB v. K.C. KAPUR                            401
covenants contained in clause (12) do indicate that the lessee is empowered A
to bequeath his leasehold interest in favour of a stranger. The only restric-
tive covenant contained therein was that in the event of the bequest in
favour of more than one person, one among them alone should be recog-
nised as a person answerable to the Governor for compliance of the
covenants contained in the lease deed. The succession may be either
                                                                               B
testamentary or intestate succession. In this case, it is testamentary succes-
sion. in support thereof, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Con-
stitution Bench in Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar [1985] 2 SCC 683. He,
therefore, contends that there is no prohibition for testamentary succession
by the first respondent in respect of the leasehold interest given to Mullick.
Shri V.R. Reddy sought to distinguish the judgment in Gian Devi's case by C
relying upoh Bhavarlal Labhchand Shah v. Kanaiyalal Nathalal lntawa/a
[1986] 1 SCC 571, wherein this Court had held that it would not apply to
testamentary succession and the landlord should not be trusted with a
stranger as lessee.
                                                                                 D
      In view of the diverse contentions, the question that arises for con-
sideration is : what is the meaning of the word "person" in clause (12) of
the covenants? It is necessary to read the relevant clauses in the lease deed,
namely, clauses 7, 8 and 12 conjointly or independently. They read as
under:
                                                                                 E
        "(7) The Lessee shall not sub-divide or sub-let the demised land
        or the building to be constructed without the consent in writing of
        the Government first had and obtained and the Government shall
        have the right and be entitled to refuse its consent at its absolute
        discretion.                                                              F

        (8) The Lessee shall not assign or transfer the demised land or
        any part of the demised land and/or the structure erected thereon
        without the previous permission of the Government in writing. In
        case of transfer or assignment of the lease the Lessor shall have
        the right of pre-emption and upon the exercise of this right the G
        building constructed by the Lessee on the land shall be taken over
        by the lessor at a val' rntion of the building made by the Lessor on
        the basis of the costs of construction of the building less deprecia-
        tion at the usual rate or the market value thereof, whichever is less.
        The value of the land will be the amount of the salami or premium H
    402                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A           paid by the Lessee. In the event of difference between the parties
            as to the value of the building, the matters in dispute shall be
            referred to the arbitration of an arbitrator if the parties can agre~
            upon one or otherwise to two arbitrators, one to be appointed by
            each party with an Umpire. The award of the arbitrator or ar-
            bitrators or the Umpire, as the case may be, shall be final and
B           binding on both the parties.

            Provided however that in case the Lessee transfers or assigns the
            leasehold interest in the land and/or structure standing thereon in
            favour of LIC or Nationalised Bank or Government or Semi-
c           Government Organisation, or registered Housing Co-operative
            Society, or Statutory Body by creating mortgage for repayment of
            loan for house building purpose, Life Insurance Corporation of
            India or Nationalised Bank or Government or Semi-Government
            Organisation, or registered Housing Co-Operative Society, or
            statutory Body, as the case may be, it may claim priority over the
D
            Government of West Bengal in respect of right of pre-emption on
            the demised land and/or structure standing thereon subject to the
            condition that all the dues of the Government as provided herein
            shall be payable and recoverable to the Government of West
            Bengal either from the lessee or from the Life Insurance Corpora-
E           tion of India, or Nationalised Bank or Government or Semi-
            Government Organisation, or registered Housing Co-Operative
            Society, or Statutory Body, as the case may be. Provided however
            such charge if created shall be subject to the terms and condition
            of the lease.
F
            (12) If the Lessee dies efter having made a bequest of the lease
            ho~d premises and the building thereon, if any, in favour of more
            than one person or die intestate having more than one heir, then
            in such case the persons to whom the leasehold premises with the
            building thereon be so bequeathed or the heirs of the deceased
G           Lessee, as the case may be, shall hold the said partition of the
            same by metes and bounds or they shall nominate one person
            amongst their number in whom the same shall vest."

          It is true that the object of grant of leasehold right in the land
H belonging to the Government in a long lease for 999 years, as explained by
'
                                  STATE v. K.C. KAPUR                          403

    the Government in the report of the Committee and accepted by the A
    Governor, was that the demised land would be granted to the lessee and
    enjoyed by him, a legal heirs and close relations of the lessee. Thereby,
    they would remain in possession and enjoyment of the leasehold interest
    together with the building constructed thereon to make right to residence
    as engrafted in Article 19(1)(e) of the Constitution a reality and fundamen-
                                                                                   B
    tal right. When the Government distributes its material resources, as
    engrafted in Article 39(b) of the Constitution, the object of the policy is to
    effectuate the mandate of the Constitution in the Preamble of the Constitu-
    tion, viz., social Justice and dignity of person with equal status. The lease
    was in furtherance thereof. But the quesion is : Whether the lessee has a
    right to transfer in favour of a stranger in terms of the lease and whether C
    it would frustrate the object thereof?

           The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, considering Section
    15(1) of the Bombay Rent Act and the words "assignment" or "transfer" has
    held that the words 'assign' or 'transfer' are not defined under that Act. D
    The dictionary meaning of the word would be considered in the absence
    of any definition given in the Act. It would suggest that to transfer or
    formality to make over to another. The word "assign" denotes "generally to
    transfer property especially personal estate or set over a right to another".
    In their generic sense, the words 'assign' or 'transfer' include every kind of
    transfer of property from one to another including testamentary disposi- E
    tion. The restricted meaning of the word 'transfer' defined under Section
    5 of the Transfer of Property Act requires to be considered in the light of
    a particular enactment and its scheme. It has, therefore, been held that the
    word 'assign' does include disposition by a Will. Thereby, it would by
    construed that in an appropariate case where the property was assigned by F
    testamentary disposition, it may be a transfer for the purpose of a par-
    ticular Act or a Regulation, as the case may be.

          In Gian Devis's case (supra), this Court had to consider, in the
    absence of any restriction under the Delhi Rent Control Act, the intestate
    succession by the heirs of the tenant of the leasehold right of commercial        G
    prerises. This Court had considered the effect of the law in paragraphs
    23, 31 and 36 as und.or :

            11
                 For an appreciation of the question, it is necessary to understand
            the kind of protection that is sought to be afforded to a tenant H
    404                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A         under the Rent Acts and his status after the termination of the
          contractual tenancy under the Rent Acts. It is not in dispute that
          as long as the contractual tenancy remains subsisting, the contrac-
          tual tenancy creates heritable rights; and, on the death of a con-
          tractual tenant, the heirs and legal representatives step into the
          position of the contractual tenant; and, in the same way on the
B
          death of landlord the heirs and legal representatives of a landlord
          become entitiled to all the rights and privileges of the contractual
          tenancy. A valid termination of the contractual tenancy puts an
          end to the contractual relationship. On the determination of the
          contractual tenancy, the landlord becomes entitled under the law
c         of the land to recover possession of the premises from the tenant
          in due process of law and the tenant under the general law of the
          land is hardly in a position to resist eviction, once the contractual
          tenancy has been duly determined. Because of scarcity of accom-
          modation and gradual high rise in the rents due to various factors,
D         the landlords were in a position to exploit the situation for unjus-
          tified personal gains to the serious detriment of the helpless
          tenants. Under the circumstances, it became imperative for the
          legislature to intervene to protect the tenants against harassment
          and exploitaion by avaricious landlords and appropriate legislation
          came to be passed in all the States and Union Territories where
E         the situation required an interference by the legislature in this
          regard. It is no doubt true that the Rent Acts are essentially meant
          for the benefit of the tenants. It is, however, to be noticed that the
          Rent Acts at the same time also seek to safeguard legitimate
          interests of the landlords. The Rent Acts which are indeed in the
F         nature of social welfare legislation are intended to protect tenants
           against harassment and exploitaion by landlords, safeguarding at
          the same time the legitimate interests of the landlords. The Rent
          Acts seek to preserve social harmony and promote oocial justice
          by safeguarding the interests of the tenants mainly and at the same
          time protecting the legitimate interests of the landlords. Though
G         the purpose of the various Rent Acts appear to be the same,
          namely, to promote social justice by affording protection to tenants
          against undue harassment and exploitation by landlords, providing
          at the same time for adequate safeguards of the legitimate interests
          of the landlords, the Rent Acts undoubtedly lean more in favour
H          of the tenants for whose benefit the Rent Acts are essentially
                  STAIB v. K.C. KAPUR                           405

passed. It may also be noted that various amendments have been        A
introduced to the various Rent Acts from time to time as and when
situation so required for the purpose of mitigating the hardship of
tenants.


We now proceed to deal with the further argument advanced on B
behalf of the landlords that the amendment to the definition of
'tenant' with retrospective effect introduced by the Delhi Rent
Control Amendment Act (Act 18 of 1976) to give personal protec-
tion and personal right of continuing in possession to the heirs of
the deceased statutory tenant in respect of residential premises
only and not with regard to the heirs of the 'so-called statutory C
tenant' in respect of commercial premises, indicates that the heirs
of so-called statutory tenants, therefore, do not enjoy any protec-
tion under the Act. This argument proceeds on the basis that in
the absence of any specific right created in favour of the 'so-called
statutory tenant' in respect of his tenancy, the heirs of the statutory D
tenant who do not acquire any interest or estate in the tenanted
premises, become liable to be evicted as a matter of course. The
very premise on the basis of which the argument is advanced, is,
in our opinion, unsound. The termination of the contractual tenan-
cy in view of the definition of tenant in the Act does not bring
about any change in the status and legal position of the tenant, E
unless there are contrary provisions in the Act; and, the tenant
notwithstanding the termination of tenancy does enjoy an estate or
interest in the tenanted rremises. This interest or estate which the
tenant under the Act despite termination of the contractual tenan-
cy continues to enjoy creates a heritable interest in the absence of F
any provision to the contrary. We have earlier noticed the decision
of this Coiirt in Dari1adilal case. This view has been taken by this
Court in Damadilal case and in our opinion this decision repre-
sents the correct position in law. The observations of this Court in
the decision of the seven Judge Bench in the case of V. Hanpal G
Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal which we have earlier quoted appear
to conclude the question. The amendment of the definition of
tenant by the Act 18 of 1976 introducing particularly Section
2(1)(iii) does not in any way mitigate against this view. The said
sub-clause (iii) with all the three Explanations thereto is not in any
way inconsistent with or contrary to sub-clause (ii) of Section 2(1) H
    406                SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.

A         which unequivocally states that tenant includes any person con-
          tinuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy. In.the
          absence of the provision contained in Section 2(1)(iii), the
          heritable interest of the heirs of the statutory tenant w9uld devolve
          on all the heirs of the 'so-called statutory tenant' on his death and
          the heirs of such tenant would in law step into his position? This
B         sub-clause (iii) of Section 2(1) seeks to restrict this right insofar
          as the residential premises are concerned. The heritability of the
          statutory tenancy which otherwise flows from the Act is restricted
          in case of residential premises only to the heairs mentioned in
          Section 2(1) (iii) and the heirs therein are entitled to remain in
c         possession and to enjoy the pretection under the Act in the manner
          and to the extent indicated in Section 2(1) (iii). The Legislature,
          which under the Rent Act affords protection against eviction to
          tenants whose tenancies have been terminated and who continue
          to remain in possession and who are generally termed as statutory
          tenants, is perfectly competent to lay down the manner and extent
D
          of the protection and the rights and obligations of such tenants
          and their heirs. Section 2(1) (iii) of the Act does not create any
          additional or special right in favour of the heirs of the 'so- called
          statutory tenant' on his death, but seeks to restrict the right of the
          heirs of such tenant in respect of residential premises. As the status
E         and right of a contractual tenant even after determination of his
          tenancy when the tenant is at times described as the statutory
          become entitled by virtue of the provisions of the Act to inherit
          the status and position of the statutory tenant on his death, the
          Legislature which has created this right has thought it fit in the
F         case of residential premises to limit the rights of the heirs in the
          manner and to the extent provided in Section 2(1) (iii). It appears
          that the Legislature has not thought it fit to put any such restric-
          tions with regard to tenants in respect of commercial premises in
          this Act.

G              Accordingly, we hold that if the Rent Act in question defines
          a tenant in substance to mean 'a tenant who continues to remain
          in possession even after the termination of the contractual tenancy
          till a decree for eviction against him is passed', the tenant even
          after the determination of the tenancy continues to have an estate
H         or interest in the tenanted premises and the tenancy rights both in
                           STATE v. KC. KAPUR                            407
        respect of residential premises and commercial premises are A
        heritable. The heirs of the deceased tenant in the absence of any
        provision in the Rent Act to the contrary will step into the position
        of the deceased tenant and all the rights and obligations of the
        deceased tenant including the protection afforded to the deceased
        tenant under the Act will devolve on the heirs of the deceased
                                                                                B
        tenant. As the protection afforded by the Rent Act to a tenant
        after determination of the tenancy and to his heirs on the death
        of such tenant is a creation of the Act for the benefit of the tenants,
        it is open to the Legislature which provides for such protection to
        make appropriate provisions in the Act with regard to the nature
        and extent of the benefit and protection to be enjoyed and the          c
        manner in which the same is to be enjoyed. If the Legislature makes
        any provision in the Act limiting or restricting the benefit and the
        nature of the protection to be enjoyed in a specified manner by
        any particular class of heirs of the deceased tenant on any condi-
        tion laid down being fulfilled, the benefit of the protection has D
        necessarily to be enjoyed on the fulfilment of the condition in the
        manner and to the extent stipulated in the Act. The Legislature
        which by the Rent Act seeks to confer the benefit on the tenants
        and to afford protection against eviction, is perfectly competent to
        make appropriate provision regulating the nature of protection and
        the manner and extent of enjoyment of such tenancy rights after E
        the termination of contractual tenancy of the tenant including the
        rights and the nature of protection of the heirs on the death of the
        tenant. Such appropriate provision may be made by the Legislature
        both with regard to the residential tenancy and commercial tenan-
        cy. It is, however, entirely for the Legislature to decide whether F
        the Legislature will make such provision or not. In the absence of
        any provision regulating the right of inheritance, and the manner
        and extent thereof and in the absence of any condition being
        stipulated with regard to the devolution of tenancy rights on the
        heirs on the death of the tenant, the devolution of tenancy rights
        must necessarily be in accordance with the ordinary law of succes- G
        sion.''

      It was; therefore, held that in the absense of any definition the legal
heirs of the tenants who succeeded by intestate succession became the
tenants under the Rent Act for the purpose of continuance of tenancy            H
    408                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 9 S.C.R.
A rights had by the tenant even if it is after the determination of the
    contractual tenancy. The statutory tenancy steps in and gives protection to
    the legal heirs of the deceased tenant. It is true that in that case no
    distinction was made by this Court between testamentary succession or
    intestate succession. As far as testamentary succession is concerned, this
    Court had considered that question in Bhavarlal's case (supra). In that
B
    case, Section 5(11) of the Bombay Rent Act defines the tenant and clause
    (c) defines the "restricted tenancy rights" in favour of the family members
    of the tenant. In that context, the question arose in that case whether a
    tenant can bequeath a Will in favour of a stranger? Considering the ratio
    in Gian Devi's case (supra) and the object of the Act, this Court had held
C   that the tenant cannot by a Will bequeath leasehold right in favour of
    strangers and induct the stranger as tenant of the demised premises against
    the Will of the landlord and the landlord is not bound by such a bequest
    to recognise the legatee as a tenant. It is, thus, settled law that though lease
    hold interest may be bequeathed by a testamentary disposition, the
D   landlord is not bound by it nor a stranger be trusted as tenant against the
    unwilling landlord.

           In view of the above settled legal position, the question is : whether
    the bequest made by Mullick in 'favour of the respondent is valid in law
    and whether the Governor is bound to recognise him? It is seen that clauses
E   (7), (8) and (12) are independent and each deals with separate situation.
    Clause (7) prohibits sub-lease of the demised land or the building erected
    thereon without prior consent in writing of the Government. Similarly,
    clause (8) deals with transfer of the demised premises or the building
    erected thereon without prior permission in writing of the Government.
F   Thereunder, the restricted covenants have been incorporated by granting
    or refusing to grant permission with right of pre-emption. Similarly, clause
    (12) deals with the case of lessee dying after executing a Will. Thereunder,
    there is no such restrictive covenant contained for bequeath in favour of a
    stranger. The word 'person' has not been expressly specified whether it
G   relates to the heirs of the lessee. On the other hand, it postulates that if
    the bequest is in favour of more than one person, then such persons to
    whom the leasehold right has been bequeathed or the heirs of the deceased
    lessee, as the case may be, shall hold the said property jointly without
    having any right to have a partition of the same and one among them should
    alone be answerable to and the Government would recognise only one such
H   person. In the light of the language used therein, it is difficult to accept the
                           STAIB v. K.C. KAPUR                            409

contention of Shri V.R., Reddy, that the word 'person' should be construed       A
with reference to the heirs or bequest should be considered to be a
transfer. Transfer connotes, normally, between two living persons during
life; will takes effect after demise of the testator and transfer in that
perspective becomes incongruous. Though, as indicated earlier, the assign-
ment may be prohibited and Government intended to be so, a bequest in
favour of a stranger by way of testamentary disposition does not appear to
                                                                                 B
be intended, in view of the permissive language used in clause (12) of the
convenants, We find no express prohibition as at present under the terms
of the lease. Unless the Government amends the rules or imposes ap-
propriate restrictive covenants prohibiting the bequest in favour of the
strangers or by enacting appropriate law. There would be no statutory            C
power to impose such restriction prohibiting such bequest in favour of the
strangers. It is seen that the object of assignment of the Government land
in favour of the lessee is to provide him right to residence. If any such
transfer is made contrary to the policy, obviously, it would be defeating the
public purpose. But it would be open to the Government to regulate by            D
appropriate covenants in the lease deed or appropriate statutory orders as
per law or to make a law in this behalf. But so long as that is not done and
in the light of the permissive language used in clause (12) of the lease deed,
it cannot be said that the bequest in favour of strangers inducting a stranger
into the demised premises or the building erected thereon is not governed
by the provisions of the regulation or that prior permission should be           E
required in that behalf. However, the stranger legatee should be bound by
all the convenants or any new convenants or statutory base so as to bind
all the existing lessees.

      Under these circumstances, the action taken by the respondent can-         F
not be said to be vitiated by an error of law. The High Court, therefore,
has not committed any manifest error of law warranting interference. As
stated earlier, this order does not preclude the Government from taking
such step as is warranted under law to prohibit transfer in violation of the
covenants or defeating the public policy.                                        G


      The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.


T.N.A.                                                     Appeal dismissed.