TUHIN KUMAR BISWAS @ BUMBAversusTHE STATE OF WEST BENGAL

               [2025] 12 S.C.R. 258 : 2025 INSC 1373

                   Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba
                                 v.
                     The State of West Bengal
                    (Criminal Appeal No. 5146 of 2025)
                             02 December 2025
    [Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh and Manmohan,* JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       The Revision Petition filed by the Appellant-accused against the
       order dismissing the discharge application filed by the Appellant
       in FIR No.50/2020 dated 19.03.2020 lodged with police station
       Bidhannagar North, was dismissed by the High Court. Whether
       there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the Appellant-
       accused for the offences alleged in the FIR.

                                 Headnotes†
       Penal Code, 1860 – ss.341, 354C, 506 – The complainant, an
       alleged tenant of A, one of the co-owners of the property filed
       a complaint/FIR u/ss.341, 354C, 506 of IPC – It was alleged
       that when the complainant along with her friend and workmen
       tried to enter the property, the Appellant-accused intimidated
       them and restrained them from entering the property – The
       complainant further alleged that the Appellant-accused
       intimidated the complainant by clicking her pictures and
       making her videos on his mobile without her consent and
       by doing so, he intruded upon her privacy and outraged her
       modesty – Chargesheet was filed – Application for discharge
       filed by the accused was dismissed by the Trial Court –
       Revision Petition against the order of the Trial Court was
       dismissed by the High Court – Correctness:
       Held: At the stage of discharge, a strong suspicion suffices –
       However, a strong suspicion must be found on some material
       which can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial – FIR
       and chargesheet do not disclose an offence u/s.354C of IPC –
       Upon a perusal of the FIR and chargesheet on record, this Court
       is unable to conclude an offence u/s.354C of the IPC since there
       is no allegation in the FIR and chargesheet that the complainant


* Author
[2025] 12 S.C.R.                                                            259

      Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba v. The State of West Bengal


     was watched or captured by the appellant-accused while she
     was engaging in a ‘private act’ – Further, ingredients of criminal
     intimidation are not attracted – Except for the bald allegation that
     the Appellant-accused intimidated the complainant by clicking her
     photographs, the FIR and chargesheet are completely silent about
     the manner in which the complainant was threatened with any injury
     to her person or her property – Also, offence of wrongful restraint
     is not made out – In the present case, the right of the complainant
     to enter the property stems from the virtue of being a purported
     tenant of A – However, no material has been placed on record
     along with the chargesheet which indicates that the complainant
     was a tenant in the property at any point of time – In fact, the
     induction of the complainant as tenant in the property would have
     been in violation of the injunction passed by the Trial Court – This
     Court is of the opinion that all that the Appellant-accused did was
     to enforce what he bonafidely thought was his lawful right over the
     property in terms of the injunction order passed by the Trial Court –
     Consequently, this Court is of the view that criminal proceedings
     against the Appellant-accused for offences punishable u/ss.341,
     354C, 506 of IPC cannot be permitted to continue. [Paras 17, 19,
     20, 22, 25-27]

     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Chargesheets – Framing
     of charges – Tendency of filing chargesheets and framing
     charges in matters where no strong suspicion is made out
     clogs the Judicial system:
     Held: This Court would like to emphasise that where there is
     a pending civil dispute between the parties, the Police and the
     Criminal Courts must be circumspect in filing a chargesheet and
     framing charges respectively – In a society governed by rule of
     law, the decision to file a chargesheet should be based on the
     Investigating Officer’s determination of whether the evidence
     collected provides a reasonable prospect of conviction – The Police
     at the stage of filing of Chargesheet and the Criminal Court at the
     stage of framing of Charge must act as initial filters ensuring that
     only cases with a strong suspicion should proceed to the formal
     trial stage to maintain the efficiency and integrity of the judicial
     system – The tendency of filing chargesheets in matters where no
     strong suspicion is made out clogs the judicial system – It forces
     Judges, court staff, and prosecutors to spend time on trials that
     are likely to result in an acquittal – This diverts limited judicial
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       resources from handling stronger, more serious cases, contributing
       to massive case backlogs – Undoubtedly, there can be no analysis
       at the charge framing stage as to whether the case would end in
       conviction or acquittal, but the fundamental principle is that the
       State should not prosecute citizens without a reasonable prospect
       of conviction, as it compromises the right to a fair process. [Para 28]

                                 Case Law Cited
       Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of UP [2024] 7 SCR 1155 : (2024) 10
       SCC 651; M.E. Shivalingamurthy v. Central Bureau of Investigation
       Bengaluru [2020] 1 SCR 794 : (2020) 2 SCC 768 – relied on.
       Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia [1989]
       1 SCR 560 : (1989) 1 SCC 715; P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala
       [2010] 2 SCR 78 : (2010) 2 SCC 398; Union of India v. Prafulla
       Kumar Samal [1979] 2 SCR 229 : (1979) 3 SCC 4 – referred to.

                                   List of Acts
       Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

                                List of Keywords
       Chargesheet; Framing charges; Civil Dispute; Pending civil dispute;
       Integrity of Judicial system; Conviction; Acquittal; Wrongul restraint;
       Section 341 of IPC; Criminal Intimidation; Section 506 of IPC;
       Section 354 of IPC; Voyeurism; Private Act; Privacy; Modesty;
       Stage of discharge; Injunction; Violation of injunction.

                               Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       5146 of 2025
       From the Judgment and Order dated 30.01.2024 of the High Court
       at Calcutta in CRR No. 3443 of 2023

                            Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant:
       V. Somnath Ghoshal, Anupama Chakraborty, Sahid Uddin Ahmed,
       Towseef Ahmad Dar, Ms. Zinat Sultana.
       Advs. for the Respondent:
       Kunal Mimani, Prashant Alai.
[2025] 12 S.C.R.                                                         261

      Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba v. The State of West Bengal


                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                Judgment

     Manmohan, J.

1.   Leave granted.
2.   The present Appeal has been filed challenging the judgment dated
     30th January 2024 passed by the Calcutta High Court, whereby
     the revision petition filed by the Appellant-accused against the
     order dismissing the discharge application filed by the Appellant in
     FIR No.50/2020 dated 19th March 2020 lodged with police station
     Bidhannagar North, was dismissed.

     FACTS
3.   On 19th March 2020, the complainant-Ms. Mamta Agarwal, an alleged
     tenant of Mr. Amalendu Biswas, one of the co-owners of the property
     at CF-231, Sector I, Salt Lake, Kolkata 700064 (“the property”) filed a
     complaint/FIR under Sections 341, 354C, 506 of Indian Penal Code
     (‘IPC’). The complainant alleged that on 18th March 2020, when the
     complainant along with her friend and workmen tried to enter the
     property, the Appellant-accused intimidated them and restrained them
     from entering the property. The complainant further alleged that the
     Appellant-accused intimidated the complainant by clicking her pictures
     and making her videos on his mobile without her consent and by
     doing so, he intruded upon her privacy and outraged her modesty.
4.   Upon completion of investigation, a chargesheet dated 16th August
     2020 was presented against the Appellant-accused for offences
     punishable under Sections 341, 354C and 506 of IPC. It is stated in
     the chargesheet that the complainant expressed her unwillingness to
     make a judicial statement. The relevant portion of the chargesheet
     in question is reproduced hereinbelow:-
          “17. Brief facts of case: Bidhannagar North P.S. Case
          No:50/2020 Dated 19.03.2020 U/S 341/354C/506 IPC
          has been started on the basis of written Complaint of one
          Mamta Agarwal of I/B, Kustia Road, Kolkata – 700039. The
          fact in brief is that on 19.03.2020 at about 15.00 hrs. while
          she along with her friend were entering into the premise,
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            located at CF-231, Sector-1, Salt Lake, Kolkata-700 064,
            PS BDN(N), they were restrained by one Tuhin Kr. Biswas
            @ Bumba. Some argument took place between them.
            Said Tuhin Kr. Biswas snapped some photographs and
            recorded video, which caused outrage of female modesty
            of the complainant. Being endorsed by IC, Bidhannagar
            North PS, I took up its investigation.
            During investigation all follow-up actions were taken.
            Notice u/s 41A Cr.P.C. was complied with by the accused
            but he didn’t surrender before Ld. Court. The complainant
            expressed her unwillingness to make judicial statement.
            Discussed with IC, Bidhannagar North PS and considering
            all aspects, he opined to submit Charge Sheet in this case.
            Hence, I do submit Charge sheet vide BDN(N) PS
            CS No.128/2020 Dated 16.08.2020 u/s 341/354C/506
            IPC against accused Tuhin Kr. Biswas @ Bumba S/O
            Bimanlendu Biswas of CF-231, Sector-1, Salt Lake
            Kolkata-700 064, PS-BDN(N) to stand his trial in the open
            Court of law.
            The witnesses, noted in Col. No.14, will prove the charge
            during trial. They may kindly be summoned. Kept the
            complainant informed about the result of investigation.”
5.     Thereafter, the Appellant-accused, who is son of one of the co-owners
       of the property in question filed an application seeking discharge,
       which was dismissed by the Trial Court vide order dated 29th August
       2023. The revision petition against the order dated 29th August 2023
       was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide the impugned
       judgment.

       ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
6.     Learned counsel for the Appellant-accused stated that the two brothers
       (Mr. Bimalendu Biswas and Mr. Amalendu Biswas) are the joint
       owners of the property in question and one of the brothers, being Mr.
       Amalendu Biswas, had tried to dispossess the other brother without
       due process of law. He stated that said other brother, being father
       of the Appellant-accused, filed a civil suit being Title Suit No. 20 of
       2018 with respect to the property in question against Mr. Amalendu
[2025] 12 S.C.R.                                                           263

      Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba v. The State of West Bengal


     Biswas. He pointed out that vide order dated 29th November 2018, the
     learned Civil Judge directed the parties to maintain joint possession
     of the property as well as not to alienate the property and/or not to
     create any third-party interest in the property. He emphasized that
     the said injunction was prevalent on the date of the incident which
     led to filing of the FIR. The relevant portion of the injunction order
     dated 29th November 2018 is reproduced hereinbelow:-
          “….Both the parties should maintain a joint possession in
          the suit property. Both parties are hereby restrained from
          disturbing the joint possession of the other in the suit
          property and from alienating the suit property or creating 3rd
          party interest in the suit property till disposal of the suit…”
7.   He alleged that the FIR in question had been registered at the
     behest of Mr.Amalendu Biswas, who attempted to dispossess the
     Appellant-accused and his father from the property in violation of
     the injunction order passed by the Trial Court.
8.   He contended that on the date of the incident, the complainant had
     entered the property with anti-social elements in a bid to dispossess
     the Appellant-accused’s father. He pointed out that the complainant-
     Ms. Mamta Agarwal is a habitual offender and has been charged with
     offences under Sections 302 & 307 of IPC in one case, and offences
     under Sections 323, 341, 506(II) & 114 of IPC in another case. He
     emphasised that the complainant is not a tenant in the property. He
     further stated that in the chargesheet, the investigating agency has
     not adduced any document pertaining to tenancy of the complainant.
9.   He alleged that the other side, i.e., Mr. Amalendu Biswas was in the
     process of creating third-party rights in violation of the injunction and
     mere protest against creation of such third-party rights by the other
     litigant over the property did not attract Section 341 or 506 of IPC.
10. He stated that the allegations in the FIR did not disclose the
    commission of an offence under Section 354C of IPC. He stated
    that no photographs or seizure had been placed on record to
    substantiate the allegations of voyeurism. He submitted that despite
    the finding given by the learned Single Judge that the allegation in
    the FIR did not disclose any offence under Section 354C of IPC,
    the learned Single Judge did not quash the FIR or discharge the
    Appellant qua the said offence. He stated that the complaint was
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       silent with respect to the threatening language allegedly uttered by
       the Appellant-accused.
11. He stated that there are no statements under Section 161 of Code of
    Criminal Procedure (‘Cr.P.C’). of the alleged friend accompanying the
    complainant or her workmen. He further stated that the complainant
    had also expressed her unwillingness to get her statement recorded
    under Section 164 of Cr.P.C., thereby indicating the falsity of her
    allegations in the FIR.
12. He contended that the allegations in the FIR are false and even if
    they are accepted at face value, no case is made out against the
    Appellant-accused.

       ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT-STATE
13. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent-State
    stated that the complainant was only a prospective tenant. He pointed
    out that in his statement, the other co-owner of the property, being
    Mr. Amalendu Biswas had stated that the complainant had come
    to see the ground floor of the property. He emphasized that there
    was sufficient material on record which made out a prima facie case
    against the Appellant-accused for offences punishable under Sections
    341 and 506 of IPC. He relied upon the following observations and
    findings of the High Court in the impugned Judgment:-
            “14. With regard to truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility
            of the charge under Section 341/506 of the IPC made in
            the FIR, it cannot be said to be a matter falling within the
            domain of exercising jurisdiction under Section 227 of the
            Code of Criminal Procedure at the time of consideration
            of a prayer for discharge.
            15. On careful scrutiny of the order impugned, I find no
            reason to interfere with the order whereby Ld. Magistrate
            refused to discharge the accused and fixed a date for
            framing of charge and hearing of the petition.
            16. Thus, the revision application being no. CRR 3443 of
            2023 is hereby dismissed. Ld. Trial Court is directed to
            frame charge, keeping an eye on the observation made
            by this Court after giving an opportunity of hearing to both
            the parties.”
[2025] 12 S.C.R.                                                          265

      Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba v. The State of West Bengal


                               REASONING

     ABSENT A STRONG SUSPICION, AN ACCUSED CAN BE
     DISCHARGED
14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the
    view that before proceeding with the matter, it is essential to outline
    the legal principles to be kept in mind by the Court while deciding
    an application seeking discharge.
15. This Court has recently in Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of UP
    (2024) 10 SCC 651, cited with approval earlier decisions of this Court
    in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia,
    (1989) 1 SCC 715; P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC
    398; and Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC
    4 as under:-
          “21. In the decision in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v.
          Dilip Nathumal Chordia [Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v.
          Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC 715 : 1989 SCC
          (Cri) 285] , this Court held that the word “ground” in Section
          227CrPC, did not mean a ground for conviction, but a
          ground for putting the accused on trial.
          22. In P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala [P. Vijayan v. State of
          Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488] ,
          after extracting Section 227CrPC, this Court in paras 10
          and 11 held thus: (SCC pp. 401-402)
                “10. … If two views are possible and one of them
                gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from
                grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered
                to discharge the accused and at this stage he is
                not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or
                acquittal. Further, the words “not sufficient ground for
                proceeding against the accused” clearly show that the
                Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge
                at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise
                his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to
                determine whether a case for trial has been made
                out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is
                not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and
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            cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of
            evidence and probabilities which is really the function
            of the court, after the trial starts.
            11. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely
            to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not
            there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
            accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground
            would take within its fold the nature of the evidence
            recorded by the police or the documents produced
            before the court which ex facie disclose that there
            are suspicious circumstances against the accused
            so as to frame a charge against him.”
       23. In para 13 in P. Vijayan case [P. Vijayan v. State of
       Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC 398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488], this
       Court took note of the principles enunciated earlier by this
       Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [Union
       of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979
       SCC (Cri) 609] which reads thus: (Prafulla Kumar Samal
       case [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3
       SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] , SCC p. 9, para 10)
            “10. … (1) That the Judge while considering the
            question of framing the charges under Section 227
            of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and
            weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding
            out whether or not a prima facie case against the
            accused has been made out.
            (2) Where the materials placed before the Court
            disclose grave suspicion against the accused which
            has not been properly explained the Court will be
            fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding
            with the trial.
            (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would
            naturally depend upon the facts of each case
            and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal
            application. By and large however if two views are
            equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the
            evidence produced before him while giving rise to
[2025] 12 S.C.R.                                                         267

      Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba v. The State of West Bengal


                some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the
                accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge
                the accused.
                (4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section
                227 of the Code the Judge which under the present
                Code is a senior and experienced court cannot
                act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of
                the prosecution, but has to consider the broad
                probabilities of the case, the total effect of the
                evidence and the documents produced before the
                Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case
                and so on. This however does not mean that the
                Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros
                and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as
                if he was conducting a trial.”
16. In M.E. Shivalingamurthy vs. Central Bureau of Investigation
    Bengaluru, (2020) 2 SCC 768, this Court has held as under:-
          “17.This is an area covered by a large body of case law.
          We refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the
          earlier decisions viz. P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and
          discern the following principles:
          17.1. If two views are possible and one of them gives
          rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave
          suspicion, the trial Judge would be empowered to
          discharge the accused.
          17.2. The trial Judge is not a mere post office to frame
          the charge at the instance of the prosecution.
          17.3. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order
          to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for
          proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements
          recorded by the police or the documents produced before
          the Court.
          17.4. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to
          adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully
          accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or
          rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, “cannot show
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          that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no
          sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial”.
          17.5. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials
          giving rise to the grave suspicion.
          17.6. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the
          total effect of the evidence and the documents produced
          before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case
          and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to
          make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons.
          17.7. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative
          value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and
          the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to
          be accepted as true.
          17.8. There must exist some materials for entertaining the
          strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up
          a charge and refusing to discharge the accused.
          18. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into
          at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged
          under Section 227 CrPC (see State of J&K v. Sudershan
          Chakkar). The expression, “the record of the case”,
          used in Section 227 CrPC, is to be understood as the
          documents and the articles, if any, produced by the
          prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the
          accused to produce any document at the stage of framing
          of the charge. At the stage of framing of the charge, the
          submission of the accused is to be confined to the material
          produced by the police (see State of Orissa v. Debendra
          Nath Padhi).”
                                                 (emphasis supplied)

17. Consequently, at the stage of discharge, a strong suspicion suffices.
    However, a strong suspicion must be found on some material which
    can be translated into evidence at the stage of trial.
18. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles of law, this Court will have
    to assess as to whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding
    against the Appellant-accused for the offences alleged in the FIR.
[2025] 12 S.C.R.                                                      269

      Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba v. The State of West Bengal


     FIR AND CHARGESHEET DO NOT DISCLOSE AN OFFENCE
     UNDER SECTION 354C IPC
19. Section 354C of IPC defines voyeurism as an act of a man watching
    or capturing the image of a woman engaging in a ‘private act’ in
    circumstances where she would usually have the expectation of not
    being observed. ‘Private act’ has been defined in Explanation 1 as
    an act including “an act of watching carried out in a place which, in
    the circumstances, would reasonably be expected to provide privacy
    and where the victim’s genitals, posterior or breasts are exposed
    or covered only in underwear; or the victim is using a lavatory; or
    the victim is doing a sexual act that is not of a kind ordinarily done
    in public.”
20. Upon a perusal of the FIR and chargesheet on record, this Court is
    unable to conclude the same disclose an offence under Section 354C
    of the IPC since there is no allegation in the FIR and chargesheet that
    the complainant was watched or captured by the Appellant-accused
    while she was engaging in a ‘private act’. The learned Single Judge,
    in the impugned judgment, has concluded with respect to the offence
    under Section 354C as under:-
          “11. Allegation made in the written complaint, in my
          opinion, did not disclose any offence under Section
          354C…
          12. From the bare reading of the aforesaid provision, it
          is clearly intelligible that the allegation of clicking
          pictures and making video made in the written
          complaint cannot be said to be an offence within the
          meaning of Section 354C of IPC.”
                                                (emphasis supplied)

21. Consequently, the learned Single Judge in the impugned order itself
    concluded that the allegations in the FIR and the material on record
    did not disclose an offence under Section 354C of IPC.

     INGREDIENTS OF CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION ARE NOT
     ATTRACTED
22. Further, in order to constitute an offence of criminal intimidation
    punishable under Section 506 of IPC, it must be shown that the person
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       charged, threatened another with injury to his person, reputation
       or property or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that
       person is interested, with intent to cause alarm. Except for the bald
       allegation that the Appellant-accused intimidated the complainant by
       clicking her photographs, the FIR and chargesheet are completely
       silent about the manner in which the complainant was threatened with
       any injury to her person or her property. The words, if any, uttered by
       the complainant are not mentioned in the FIR. Additionally, as stated
       above, the complainant or her associates never made a statement to
       substantiate her allegations. Consequently, in the present case, even
       if the allegations in the FIR are taken at face value, the ingredients
       of offence of criminal intimidation are not attracted.

       OFFENCE OF WRONGFUL RESTRAINT IS NOT MADE OUT
23. Section 341 of IPC provides punishment for the offence of wrongful
    restraint, which has been defined in Section 339 of IPC as under:
            “339. Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to
            prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in
            which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully
            to restrain that person.
            Exception— The obstruction of a private way over land
            or water which a person in good faith believes himself to
            have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the
            meaning of this section.”
24. The ingredients essential to constitute an offence of wrongful restraint
    are that there should be an obstruction which prevents a person
    from proceeding in any direction in which the person has a right to
    proceed. The exception to the offence of wrongful restraint provides
    that no offence of wrongful restraint is committed if the person
    alleged of obstruction, in good faith, believes that he has a lawful
    right to obstruct. Therefore, the evidence required to establish the
    offence of wrongful restraint is that the person alleging obstruction
    has a right to proceed in such direction and the person obstructing
    has no lawful right to cause obstruction.
25. In the present case, the perusal of the FIR reveals that the alleged
    offences were committed when the complainant attempted to enter
    the property. The right of the complainant to enter the property
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      Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba v. The State of West Bengal


     stems from the virtue of being a purported tenant of Mr. Amalendu
     Biswas. However, no material has been placed on record along with
     the chargesheet which indicates that the complainant was a tenant
     in the property at any point of time. Surprisingly, the complainant
     has not even given a statement in pursuance to her complaint.
     On the contrary, the said Amalendu Biswas in his statement has
     stated that the complainant had come to see the property, meaning
     thereby that the complainant was not a tenant in the property but
     only a prospective tenant when the FIR was registered. Therefore,
     the material on record indicates that on the date of the alleged
     offence, the complainant had no right to enter the property. In fact,
     the induction of the complainant as tenant in the property would
     have been in violation of the injunction passed by the Trial Court.
26. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that all that the
    Appellant-accused did was to enforce what he bonafidely thought
    was his lawful right over the property in terms of the injunction order
    passed by the Trial Court. This Court is also of the opinion that the
    allegations in the FIR and the material on record at best constitute
    a cause of action for filing a suit for injunction and/or an application
    seeking modification of the interim order already in subsistence or
    an application for the relief of ingress and egress in the pending suit.
27. Consequently, this Court is of the view that criminal proceedings
    against the Appellant-accused for offences punishable under
    Sections 341, 354C, 506 of IPC cannot be permitted to continue.

     TENDENCY OF FILING CHARGESHEETS AND FRAMING
     CHARGES IN MATTERS WHERE NO STRONG SUSPICION IS
     MADE OUT CLOGS THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
28. Before parting with this case, this Court would like to emphasise
    that where there is a pending civil dispute between the parties,
    the Police and the Criminal Courts must be circumspect in filing a
    chargesheet and framing charges respectively. In a society governed
    by rule of law, the decision to file a chargesheet should be based
    on the Investigating Officer’s determination of whether the evidence
    collected provides a reasonable prospect of conviction. The Police
    at the stage of filing of Chargesheet and the Criminal Court at the
    stage of framing of Charge must act as initial filters ensuring that
    only cases with a strong suspicion should proceed to the formal trial
272                                                          [2025] 12 S.C.R.

                              Supreme Court Reports


       stage to maintain the efficiency and integrity of the judicial system.
       The tendency of filing chargesheets in matters where no strong
       suspicion is made out clogs the judicial system. It forces Judges, court
       staff, and prosecutors to spend time on trials that are likely to result
       in an acquittal. This diverts limited judicial resources from handling
       stronger, more serious cases, contributing to massive case backlogs.
       Undoubtedly, there can be no analysis at the charge framing stage
       as to whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal, but the
       fundamental principle is that the State should not prosecute citizens
       without a reasonable prospect of conviction, as it compromises the
       right to a fair process.
29. In the present case, the Police and the Trial Court should have been
    cognizant that as there was a pending civil dispute with regard to the
    property in question as well as a prior subsisting injunction order and
    the complainant had refused to make any judicial statement, strong
    suspicion founded on legally tenable material/evidence was absent.

                                   CONCLUSION
30. Keeping in view the aforesaid, the present Appeal is allowed and the
    impugned Judgment and Order is set aside as well as the Appellant-
    accused is discharged from G.R. Case No. 223 of 2020 (arising out
    of Bidhannagar North Police Station FIR No. 50 of 2020).

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed.




       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan