MOHD. KAUSAR @ MONU AND 6 OTHERSversusSTATE OF U.P. AND 2 OTHERS

         HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
           CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 2956 of 2026

Mohd. Kausar @ Monu And 6 Others
                                                             .....Petitioner(s)
                                   Versus

State Of U.P. And 2 Others
                                                           .....Respondent(s)

Counsel for Petitioner(s)        : Atul Kumar Yadav, Imran, Mohd Sonu
Counsel for Respondent(s)        : Arti Srivastava, G.A.

Court No. - 47
                 HON'BLE RAJEEV MISRA, J.
                 HON'BLE LAKSHMI KANT SHUKLA, J.

1. Heard Mr. Vikas Singh, Advocate, holding brief of Mr. Mohd. Sonu, the
learned counsel for petitioners, the learned A.G.A. for State-respondents 1
and 2 and Miss Arti Srivastava, the learned counsel representing first
informant-respondent-3.

2. Perused the record.

3. Petitioners-Mohd. Kausar @ Monu and 6 Others have approached this
Court by means of present criminal misc. writ petition challenging the FIR
dated 28.02.2024 lodged by first informant-respondent-3 Afreen Bano and
registered as Case Crime No. 40 of 2024, under Sections 498-A, 323, 504,
506, 406 IPC and Sections 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station-
Utraon, District-Prayagraj.

4. Short counter affidavit filed by the learned counsel representing first
informant-respondent-3 in Court today, is taken on record.

5. Learned counsel for petitioners submits that the marriage of petitioner-1
Mohd. Kausar @ Monu was solemnized with first informant-respondent-3
Afreen Bano in accordance with Muslim Rites and Customs on 02.03.2023.
However, on account of some marital discord, relationship between
petitioner-1 (husband) and first informant-respondent-3 (wife) became
strained. On the above premise, it is thus urged by the learned counsel for
petitioner that the dispute between the parties is basically a matrimonial
dispute, which has been dragged into criminal litigation. It is then contended
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by the learned counsel for petitioner that during the pendency of present writ
petition, parties amicably settled their dispute outside the Court. On the basis
of settlement arrived at between the parties, a compromise was entered into
by the parties. The compromise so entered into by the parties has also been
admitted by first informant-respondent-3, as is clearly evident from the
recital occurring in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the short counter affidavit filed
by the learned counsel representing first informant-respondent-3. Paragraphs
5, 6 and 7 of the short counter affidavit are, accordingly, extracted herein
under;-

"5. That in fact the respondent no.3 has also filed a complaint under
Section 12 of Domestic Violence Act before the court of learned Village
Court Handia Prayagraj and same was registered as complaint no.75 of
2021 in which on 29.08.2025 the respondent no.3 has moved an
application before the court concerned and clearly mentioned the fact
that presently she did not want to pursue the proceeding of present case
against the petitioners which is already annexed as annexure no.3 of
the writ petition.

6. That presently the respondent no.3 did not want to pursue the
proceeding of present case against the petitioners because the
matrimonial discard between the parties were already settled before the
court concerned.

7. That in fact the respondent no.3 has also executed an affidavit in
which she has clearly admitted that presently she does not want to
pursue the proceeding of present case against the petitioners. For kind
perusal of this Hon'ble Court the copy of affidavit dated 02.02.2026 is
being filed herewith and marked as Annexure No.S.C.A.1 to this
affidavit."

6. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for petitioner that the dispute
between the parties is a purely private and matrimonial dispute. Offence
complained of against petitioners is not a crime against state or society. As
such, there does not exist any legal impediment for not accepting the
compromise entered into by the parties. Apart from above, once the
parties have entered into a compromise, the chances of conviction of
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                               3


accused-petitioners are not only remote but also bleak. The trial shall
only result in loss of public time and money. It is thus urged by the learned
counsel for petitioner that in view of above, the criminal prosecution of
petitioners pursuant to the impugned FIR is liable to be quashed by this
Court.

7. Per contra, the learned A.G.A. for State-respondents 1 and 2 does not
oppose the submissions urged by the learned counsel for petitioner.
Learned A.G.A. submits that since the dispute between the parties is a
purely private and matrimonial dispute and the parties have also entered
into a compromise, therefore, he cannot have any objection, in case, the
present writ petition is decided by this Court in the light of the
compromise entered into by the parties.

8. Miss Arti Srivastava, the learned counsel representing first
informant/respondent-3 submits that she has received instructions not to
oppose the present writ petition. Learned counsel representing first
informant-respondent-3 submits that once first informant-respondent-3
has herself entered into a compromise with accused/petitioners, therefore,
she cannot have any objection, in case the present writ petition is decided
in terms of the compromise entered into by the parties.

9. Be that as it may, the crux of the matter is that the parties have entered
into a compromise, which has been acted upon. This Court is not
unmindful of the following judgements of Apex Court:

i. B.S. Joshi and others Vs. State of Haryana and another (2003) 4
SCC 675
ii. Madan Mohan Abbot Vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 4 SCC 582
iii. Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation[2008)9 SCC
677]
iv. Manoj Sharma Vs. State and others ( 2008) 16 SCC 1
v. Shiji @ Pappu and Others VS. Radhika and Another, (2011) 10
SCC 705
vi. Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303
vii. K. Srinivas Rao Vs. D.A Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226
viii. Dimpey Gujral and others Vs. Union Territory through
Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh and others, (2013) 11 SCC 497
ix. Narindra Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab ( 2014) 6 SCC 466
x. Yogendra Yadav and Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand and another
(2014) 9 SCC 653
xi. Shlok Bhardwaj Vs. Runika Bhardwaj, (2015) 2 SCC 721
                                                     CRLP No. 2956 of 2026
                             4

xii. C.B.I. Vs. Maninder Singh (2016) 1 SCC 389
xiii. C.B.I. Vs. Sadhu Ram Singla and Others, (2017) 5 SCC 350
xiv. Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and
Others Vs. State of Gujarat and another, (2017) 9 SCC 641
xv. Anita Maria Dias and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others,
(2018) 3 SCC 290
xvi. Social Action Forum For Manav Adhikar and Another Vs. Union
of India and others, (2018) 10 SCC, 443 (Constitution Bench)
xvii. State of M.P. VS. Dhruv Gurjar and Another, (2019) 5 SCC 570
xviii. State of M.P. V/s Laxmi Narayan & Ors., (2019) 5 SCC 688
xix. Rampal Vs. State of Haryana, AIR online 2019 SC 1716
xx. Arun Singh and Others VS. State of U.P. and Another (2020) 3
SCC 736
xxi. (Ramgopal and Another Vs. The State of M.P.), 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 834
xxii. Daxaben Vs. State of Gujarat, 2022 SCC Online 936.
xxiii. State of Kerala VS. Hafsal Rahman N.R., Special Leave Petition
(Criminal) Diary Nos. 24362 of 2021.
xiv. Shatrughna Atmaram Patil and Another Vs. Vinod Dodhu
Chaudhary and Another, (2024) 4 SCC 458.
xv. Suraj Singh Gujar and Another Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and
Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2414.
xvi. K. Bharti Devi and Another Vs. State of Telangana and Another,
(2024) 10 SCC 384.
xvii. Ramji Lal Bairwa and Another Vs. State of Rajasthan and
Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3193.
xviii. H.N. Pandakumar Vs. State of Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 38.
wherein the Apex Court has categorically held that compromise can be
made between the parties even in respect of certain cognizable and non
compoundable offences. However, Apex Court in State of M.P. Vs.
Laxmi Narayan (Supra) held that no compromise can be made in
respect of offences against society as they are not private in nature.
Similarly in Ram Pal Vs. State of Haryana (Supra) it has been held that
no compromise can be made in cases relating to rape and sexual assault.
Recently, the Apex Court in Daxaben (supra) has held that no
compromise can be made in matter under Section 306 IPC. In state of
Kerala Vs. Hafsal Rahman (Supra), Court has held that no compromise
can be entertained in matters under the POCSO Acts. Reference may also
be made to the decision given by this Court in Shaifullah and others Vs.
State of U.P. And another [2013 (83) ACC 278] in which the law
expounded by the Apex court in some of the aforesaid cases has been
explained in detail.
Recently Apex court in Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai
Karmur (Supra) has laid down the following guidelines with regard to
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                                    5

quashing of criminal proceedings as well compromise in criminal
proceedings in paragraphs 16 to 16.10 of the report, which read as under:
"16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be
summarized in the following propositions
16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an
abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does
not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the
High Court;
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First
Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has
been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the
invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While
compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of
Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under
Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be
quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must
evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent
power;
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it
has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the
process of any court;
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be
quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute,
revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive
elaboration of principles can be formulated;
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea
that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature
and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity
or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed
though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences
are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society.
The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding
element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which
have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a
distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is
concerned;
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial,
mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may
in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view
of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote
and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and
prejudice; and
16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8 and 16.9
above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the
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                                   6

state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between
private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where
the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or
misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or
economic system will weigh in the balance."
Recently in Ramgopal and another (supra), Court has again reiterated the
guidelines regarding quashing of criminal proceedings in view of
compromise. Following has been observed in paragraph 18-19:-
"18. It is now a well crystalized axiom that plenary jurisdiction of this Court to
impart complete justice under Article 142 cannot ipso facto be limited or restricted
by ordinary statutory provisions. It is also noteworthy that even in the absence of an
express provision akin to Section 482 Cr.P.C. conferring powers on the Supreme
Court to abrogate and set aside criminal proceedings, the jurisdiction exercisable
under Article 142 of the Constitution embraces this Court with scopious powers to
quash criminal proceedings also, so as to secure complete justice. In doing so, due
regard must be given to the overarching objective of sentencing in the criminal
justice system, which is grounded on the sub-lime philosophy of maintenance of
peace of the collective and that the rationale of placing an individual behind bars is
aimed at his reformation.
19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where the
Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of
offences 'compoundable' within the statutory framework, the extra-ordinary power
enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court
under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds
of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude
ought to be exercise carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings,
bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society;
(ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between
accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after
the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations."

10. In State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan (Supra), the Apex Court held
that mere mention of Section 307 IPC cannot be sole basis for not
quashing the proceedings. Court has to examine whether the prosecution
has collected sufficient evidence for framing of charge under Section 307
IPC. The Court has further required to examine the weapons used and
nature of injury and whether injury has been inflicted on vital/delicate
parts of the body, the previous antecedents of accused and whether they
are absconding and how the compromise was got entered into by the
parties are relevant factors, which must be considered. The above
observations can be clearly delineated from the recital occurring in
paragraphs 11 to 18 of the aforementioned report.

11. Having heard the learned counsel for petitioner, the learned A.G.A.
for State-respondents 1 and 2, the learned counsel representing first
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                                    informant-respondent-3, upon perusal of record and in view of the facts
                                    and circumstances of the case as mentioned herein above and also the
                                    observations made by the Apex Court as noted above, this Court finds
                                    that there does not exists any legal impediment in accepting the
                                    compromise entered into by the parties inasmuch as, the dispute between
                                    the parties is private in nature and not a crime against state or society. In
                                    view of the compromise entered into by the parties, the chances of
                                    conviction of accused-petitioner is not only remote but also bleak. As
                                    such, continuation of proceedings would itself cause injustice to the
                                    parties. The trial would only entail loss of judicial time in a futile pursuit
                                    particularly when torrents of litigation drown the Courts with an
                                    unimaginable flood of dockets.

                                    12. In view of the discussion made above, the present writ petition
                                    succeeds and is liable to be allowed.

                                    13. It is, accordingly, allowed.

                                    14. The impugned FIR dated 28.02.2024 lodged by first informant-
                                    respondent-3 Afreen Bano and registered as Case Crime No. 40 of 2024,
                                    under Sections 498-A, 323, 504, 506, 406 IPC and Sections 3/4 Dowry
                                    Prohibition Act, Police Station-Utraon, District-Prayagraj is, hereby,
                                    quashed.

                                    February 24, 2026
                                    Vinay

                                                                (Lakshmi Kant Shukla,J.) (Rajeev Misra,J.)




Digitally signed by :-
VINAY KUMAR
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad